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Abstract
Buyer power is a controversial issue in EU competition law. It is an undeniable fact
that the exercise of buyer power may bring benefits to consumers through lower
prices. However, some buyer practices are likely to restrict or distort competition
and thereby harm consumers, especially in the grocery retail sector where large
supermarket chains have significant buyer power. Despite these potential harmful
effects, it turns out that the current EU competition rules as well as the different
initiatives taken by some Member States are unsuitable to address the issue of
buyer power. Because buyers' market power differs from sellers' market power,
common and specific criteria should be defined to deal with buyer practices so
as to protect effective competition in the European Union.
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The	   issue	  of	  buyer	  power	   is	  not	  well-­‐known	   to	   the	  general	  public	  and	   raising	   that	   issue	  may	   leave	  
some	  perplexed.	  Buyer	  power	  must	  in	  fact	  be	  distinguished	  from	  the	  concept	  of	  purchasing	  power	  -­‐	  
which	  refers	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  consumers	  or	  firms	  have	  available	  money	  or	  credit	  for	  spending	  
and	   consumption	   of	   goods	   and	   services	   -­‐,	   and	   from	   that	   of	   market	   power	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   seller	  
power.	  	  The	  latter	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  firm’s	  ability	  to	  profitably	  raise	  the	  price	  of	  a	  product.	  The	  concept	  
of	  purchasing	  power	  is	  familiar	  to	  consumers	  as	  it	  determines	  their	  ability	  to	  purchase	  products	  and	  
services.	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  market	  power,	  consumers	  know	  well	  the	  potential	  negative	  
effect	  of	  such	  power	  as	  they	  often	  pay	  directly	  the	  consequences	  of	  it.	  In	  addition,	  due	  to	  some	  big	  
cases	  reported	  by	  the	  media	  involving	  large	  companies	  which	  abused	  their	  market	  power	  or	  colluded	  
with	  competitors,	  public	  opinion	  is	  increasingly	  aware	  of	  how	  harmful	  the	  exercise	  of	  market	  power	  
may	  be.	  
Market	  power	  is,	  however,	  not	  necessarily	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  sellers.	  The	  concept	  of	  market	  power	  has	  
in	   fact	   two	   branches:	   	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   seller	   power	   and,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   buyer	   power.	  
Sometimes	   viewed	   as	   the	   mirror	   image	   of	   seller	   power,	   buyer	   power	   is	   a	   firm’s	   ability	   to	   exert	  
pressure	  on	  its	  suppliers	  so	  as	  to	  lower	  prices	  or	  extract	  other	  concessions.	  A	  good	  illustration	  of	  the	  
exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	   can	  be	   found	   in	   the	  grocery	   retail	   sector	  where	   large	   supermarket	   chains	  
generally	  hold	  the	  whip	  in	  the	  negotiations	  with	  their	  suppliers	  and	  are	  able	  to	  dictate	  the	  rules	  when	  
buying	  products	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market.	  Whoever	  has	  to	  deal	  with	  such	  customers	  can	  indeed	  
tell	  how	  strong	  their	  buyer	  power	  is.	  	  
At	  first	  sight,	  buyer	  power	   is	  regarded	  positively	  as	   it	   is	   likely	  to	  counter	  sellers’	  market	  power	  and	  
thereby	  lead	  to	  lower	  prices	  for	  consumers.	  However,	  concerns	  are	  being	  raised	  about	  the	  potential	  
negative	   effects	   of	   buyer	   power,	   especially	   in	   the	   grocery	   sector.	   It	   is	   indeed	   argued	   that	   some	  
supermarkets’	   practices	   lead	   to	   the	   exclusion	   of	   smaller	   competitors	   and	   of	   producers	   who	   are	  
unable	   to	   cope	   with	   excessive	   pressure	   put	   on	   them	   by	   their	   large	   customers.	   In	   addition,	   some	  
consider	   that	   buyer	   power	   is	   not	   always	   used	   for	   the	   benefit	   of	   consumers	   and	   call	   therefore	   for	  
action	  to	  restrain	  such	  power.	  Given	  the	  controversies	  surrounding	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  and	  
its	  effects,	  it	  is	  worth	  entering	  the	  debate	  on	  that	  issue	  so	  as	  to	  determine	  whether	  action	  is	  or	  not	  
needed	  to	  constrain	  that	  power.	  
In	  this	  thesis,	  we	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  buyer	  power	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  EU	  competition	  law.	  The	  
objective	   is	   hence	   to	   ascertain	   the	   impact	  of	   buyer	  power	  on	   competition	   in	   the	  European	  Union.	  
Although	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  may	  bring	  about	  lower	  consumer	  prices,	  which	  is	  positive	  from	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a	  competition	  law	  point	  of	  view,	  it	  remains	  to	  examine	  the	  potential	  long-­‐term	  effects	  of	  some	  buyer	  
practices	   and	   their	   impact	   on	   other	   values	   protected	   by	   the	   competition	   rules.	   The	   potential	  
restrictive	  effect	  of	  buyer	  power	  on	  competition	  is	  a	  central	  question	  as	  it	  will	  indicate	  the	  policy	  to	  
be	   used	   to	   address	   large	   buyers’	   market	   power.	   Action	   under	   the	   scope	   of	   competition	   policy	   is	  
indeed	  only	  justified	  if	  buyer	  power	  is	  likely	  to	  jeopardize	  the	  objectives	  pursued	  under	  that	  policy.	  
Seller	   power	   and	   buyer	   power	   are	   the	   two	   facets	   of	   the	   concept	   of	  market	   power.	   However,	   this	  
does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  those	  two	  types	  of	  power	  emerge	   in	  similar	  circumstances.	  Factors	  
giving	   rise	   to	   buyer	   power	   and	   inciting	   buyers	   to	   exert	   it	  may	   indeed	  differ	   from	   those	   defined	   in	  
seller	   power	   cases.	   The	   specificities	   of	   buyer	   power	   should	   hence	   lead	   competition	   authorities	   to	  
follow	  a	  specific	  approach	  when	  assessing	  the	  existence	  of	  buyer	  power	  and	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  firm	  to	  
distort	  competition	  through	  its	  conduct	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market.	  The	  analysis	  of	  EU	  documents	  
and	  case	  law	  related	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  buyer	  power	  will	  show	  if	  those	  specificities	  are	  indeed	  taken	  into	  
consideration	  or	  if	  new	  criteria	  should	  be	  defined	  to	  assess	  the	  lawfulness	  of	  buyer	  practices.	  	  
Among	  the	  various	  concepts	  that	  intervene	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  competition	  law	  cases,	  such	  as	  the	  
concepts	   of	   undertaking,	   relevant	   market,	   market	   power,	   anticompetitive	   agreement	   or	   abusive	  
conduct,	   we	   will	   focus	   on	   those	   that	   are	   likely	   to	   require	   the	   use	   of	   specific	   criteria	   to	   properly	  
measure	  and	  assess	  the	  impact	  of	  buyer	  power	  on	  competition,	  that	  is,	  criteria	  differing	  from	  those	  
used	   in	   seller	   power	   cases.	   As	   such,	   the	   focus	  will	   be	   put	   on	   defining	   the	   relevant	   buyer	  market,	  
measuring	  buyer	  market	  power	  and	  assessing	  buyer	  conduct.	  	  
We	  will	   start	  with	  a	  general	  approach,	   looking	  at	   the	  theory	  of	  buyer	  power	   in	  economic	  and	   legal	  
terms	  and	  at	  all	  sectors	  where	  buyers	  are	  able	  to	  exert	  market	  power	  on	  their	  suppliers.	  The	  scope	  of	  
our	   analysis	   will	   then	   gradually	   be	   narrowing	   and	   focusing	   on	   one	   particular	   sector,	   namely	   the	  
grocery	   retail	   sector	   due	   to	   some	   specificities	   of	   that	   sector	   which	   increase	   significantly	   buyer’s	  
ability	  and	  incentive	  to	  (ab)use	  their	  market	  power	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market.	  	  
To	   illustrate	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   and	   its	   likely	   effects	   on	   the	   markets,	   we	   will	   therefore	  
mostly	  refer	  to	  the	  grocery	  retail	  sector.	  Practices	  used	  by	  large	  supermarket	  chains	  in	  the	  upstream	  
buyer	  market	  are	  indeed	  a	  good	  example	  of	  how	  buyer	  power	  can	  be	  exercised.	  Furthermore,	  most	  
of	   the	   concerns	   regarding	   buyer	   power	   have	   in	   fact	   been	   raised	   in	   that	   sector.	   One	   may	   hence	  
wonder	   whether	   competition	   authorities	   should	   adopt	   a	   cross-­‐sectors	   approach	   to	   address	   buyer	  
power	  or	  instead	  focus	  on	  a	  specific	  sector,	  such	  as	  the	  grocery	  retail	  sector,	  where	  different	  factors	  
make	  buyers	  more	  likely	  to	  affect	  competition	  through	  their	  conduct.	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The	  present	   thesis	   is	  divided	   in	   three	  Parts.	  The	   first	  Part	   looks	   into	   the	  concept	  of	  market	  and,	   in	  
particular,	   into	  the	  specificities	  of	  buyer	  power	  by	  pointing	  out	  the	  factors	  giving	  buyers	  the	  ability	  
and	   incentive	   to	   exert	  market	   power	   in	   the	   upstream	   buyer	  market.	   Among	   the	   different	   sectors	  
characterised	   by	   a	   strong	   buying	   side,	   particular	   attention	   will	   be	   drawn	   on	   the	   grocery	   retail	  
industry.	   The	   general	   description	   and	   illustration	   of	   buyer	   power	   provided	   in	   Part	   I	   set	   in	   fact	   the	  
scene	  of	  the	  debate	  about	  the	  positive	  and/or	  negative	  effects	  of	  buyer	  power	  on	  competition.	  
In	  Part	  II,	  we	  will	  examine	  how	  buyer	  power	   is	  addressed	  in	  EU	  law	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  whether	  the	  
specificities	   of	   such	   power	   are	   taken	   into	   consideration	   by	   EU	   authorities	   when	   drafting	   and	  
enforcing	   the	   competition	   rules.	   Different	   initiatives	   taken	   by	   national	   authorities	   will	   also	   be	  
analysed	  so	  as	  to	  highlight	  other	  ways	  to	  address	  buyer	  power	  concerns.	  Such	  analysis	   is	  meant	  to	  
determine	   to	   what	   extent	   the	   competition	   rules	   can	   be	   used	   to	   tackle	   the	   exploitation	   of	   buyer	  
power	  and	  what	  policy	  is	  favoured	  to	  restrain	  that	  power.	  	  
In	  Part	   III,	   we	  will	   try	   to	   provide	   answers	   to	   all	   the	   questions	   raised	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   potential	  
negative	  impact	  of	  buyer	  power	  on	  competition	  and	  the	  type	  of	  action	  to	  be	  taken	  to	  prevent	  it.	  If	  it	  
turns	   out	   that	   buyer	   power	   is	   likely	   to	   undermine	   the	   competition	   law	  objectives,	   anticompetitive	  
buyer	  practices	   should	  be	  pursued	  under	   the	   competition	   rules.	  Given	   the	  analysis	  made	   in	  Part	   II	  
concerning	   the	   application	  of	   the	   current	   competition	   rules	   in	   buyer	  power	   cases,	   a	   new	   initiative	  
might	  prove	  to	  be	  needed	  to	  protect	  competition	  in	  the	  European	  Union.	  We	  will	  suggest	  a	  possible	  
action	   at	   EU	   level	   to	   prevent	   anticompetitive	   use	   of	   buyer	   power.	   This	   will	   imply	   defining	   the	  
instrument	  to	  be	  adopted	  and	  the	  criteria	  to	  be	  used	  to	  assess	  buyers’	  conduct.	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  
scope	  of	  such	  an	  instrument,	  it	  will	  have	  to	  be	  decided	  whether	  all	  buyers,	  whatever	  the	  sector	  they	  
act	  in,	  must	  be	  tarred	  with	  the	  same	  brush	  or	  whether,	  given	  the	  particularities	  of	  the	  grocery	  retail	  
sector,	  action	  must	  be	  limited	  to	  that	  sector.	  	  
All	  these	  questions	  regarding	  the	  effects	  of	  buyer	  power	  on	  competition	  and	  the	  way	  to	  effectively	  
address	   buyer	   practices	   are	   worth	   being	   asked	   and	   thoroughly	   examined.	   The	   protection	   of	  
competition	   in	   fact	   depends	   directly	   on	   the	   adequacy	   of	   the	   answers	   provided	   in	   response	   to	   the	  
concerns	  raised.	  The	  objective	  is,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  to	  remedy	  possible	  deficiency	  in	  the	  enforcement	  
of	   the	   competition	   rules	   and,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   to	   avoid	   excessive	   intervention	   in	   business-­‐to-­‐
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  PART	  I	  –	  THE	  NOTION	  OF	  BUYER	  POWER	  
	  
Market	   power	   is	   a	  well-­‐known	   concept	   in	   competition	   law	   as	   it	   determines	   the	   application	   of	   the	  
competition	  rules	  to	  a	  given	  company.	  However,	  that	  concept	  has	  in	  fact	  two	  facets:	  seller	  power	  on	  
the	  sell-­‐side	  and	  buyer	  power	  on	  the	  buy-­‐side.	   In	  EU	   legislation	  and	  other	   instruments,	   it	   is	  mostly	  
referred	  to	  the	  first	  facet,	  namely	  sellers’	  market	  power	  with	  regard	  to	  their	  customers.	  The	  exercise	  
of	   buyer	   power	   over	   suppliers	   has	   yet	   drawn	   less	   attention,	   at	   least	   in	   the	   early	   years	   of	   EU	  
competition	  law,	  so	  that	  no	  clear	  definition	  has	  been	  given	  to	  that	  aspect	  of	  market	  power.	  	  
The	   first	   Chapter	   is	   meant	   to	   define	   the	   concept	   of	   buyer	   power	   and	   to	   draw	   some	   distinction	  
between	  that	  concept	  and	  market	  power	  commonly	  referred	  to	  in	  seller	  power	  cases.	  Buyer	  power	  
may	  be	  defined	  in	  different	  terms	  depending,	  in	  particular,	  on	  how	  it	  is	  used,	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  
different	  markets	  involved	  and	  on	  the	  degree	  of	  market	  power	  held	  by	  the	  opposite	  sellers.	  We	  will	  
highlight	   the	   main	   factors	   giving	   buyers	   the	   ability	   to	   exercise	   buyer	   power	   in	   the	   upstream	  
procurement	  market.	  Such	  ability	  to	  exert	  pressure	  on	  suppliers	  must	  yet	  be	  distinguished	  from	  the	  
incentive	  to	  effectively	  exert	  it.	  On	  that	  matter,	  differences	  between	  buyer	  and	  seller	  power	  will	  also	  
been	  pointed	  out	  so	  as	  to	  show	  that	  the	  incentive	  for	  buyers	  to	  use	  their	  buyer	  power	  may	  be	  much	  
stronger	   than	   the	   incentive	   for	   sellers	   to	   exploit	   their	   market	   power	   in	   the	   downstream	   selling	  
market.	  	  
On	  basis	  of	  those	  distinctions	  and	  on	  the	  different	  definitions	  given	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  buyer	  power,	  
Chapter	   1	   also	   addresses	   the	   potential	   effects	   of	   some	   buyer	   practices.	   A	   quick	   insight	   into	   the	  
objectives	  of	  EU	  competition	  law	  –	  which	  will	  be	  more	  deeply	  developed	  in	  Part	  III	  –	  will	   lead	  us	  to	  
already	  raise	  some	  concerns	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  buyer	  power	  on	  the	  competition	  process.	  Although	  
it	   may	   be	   affirmed	   that	   the	   exercise	   of	   market	   power	   in	   upstream	   buyer	   markets	   is	   not	   per	   se	  
harmful,	   some	   buyer	   practices	   might	   bring	   about	   undesirable	   consequences	   on	   the	   markets.	   The	  
positive	   and/or	   negative	   effects	   of	   buyer	   power	   will	   in	   fact	   mainly	   depend	   on	   the	  
symmetry/asymmetry	  of	  the	  markets	  as	  well	  as	  on	  the	  degree	  of	  market	  power	  on	  each	  side	  of	  the	  
market	  and	  on	  the	  incentive	  to	  exploit	  it.	  	  
The	   European	   Commission	   and	   most	   national	   competition	   authorities	   (NCA)	   have	   recognized	   the	  
existence	   of	   buyer	   power,	   especially	   in	   the	   grocery	   retail	   sector	   where	   large	   supermarket	   chains	  
enjoy	  significant	  market	  power	  over	  their	  suppliers.	  However,	  buyer	  power	   is	  also	  present	   in	  other	  
sectors.	  Chapter	  2	  describes	  some	  of	  those	  sectors	  so	  as	  to	  illustrate	  how	  buyer	  power	  emerges	  and	  
is	  exercised.	  This	  will	  help	  provide	  clear	  understanding	  on	   the	  different	  elements	   that	  are	   likely	   to	  
give	  rise	  and	  reinforce	  buyers’	  market	  power	  in	  each	  sector.	  Specific	  attention	  will	  be	  drawn	  on	  the	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grocery	   sector	   where	   the	   potential	   anticompetitive	   effects	   of	   buyer	   power	   are	   increasingly	   being	  
pointed	  out,	  raising	  the	  question	  of	  the	  need	  to	  take	  action	  against	  that	  power.	  
This	  first	  Part	  raises	  purposely	  more	  questions	  than	  it	  answers.	  The	  objective	  is	  to	  enter	  the	  debate	  
about	   the	   impact	   of	   buyer	   power	   on	   competition	   by	   exposing	   the	   different	   positions	   that	  may	   be	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CHAPTER	  1	  –	  DEFINITION	  AND	  IMPLICATION	  OF	  BUYER	  POWER	  
Market	   power	   is	   a	   well-­‐known	   concept	   which	   has	   been	   examined	   both	   in	   economics	   and	   in	  
competition	  law.	  Section	  I	  of	  this	  Chapter	  defines	  first	  the	  notion	  of	  market	  power	  on	  the	  sell-­‐side	  as	  
well	  as	  some	  concepts	  related	  to	  some	  extent	  to	  that	  notion,	  namely	  the	  concepts	  of	  dominance	  and	  
economic	   dependency.	   These	   different	   definitions	  will	   then	   help	   us	   to	   define	   and	   understand	   the	  
concept	  of	  buyer	  power.	  
Buyer	   power	   can	   in	   fact	   manifest	   itself	   in	   different	   variants	   depending	   on	   the	   structure	   of	   the	  
markets	  involved.	  Accordingly,	  three	  notions	  can	  be	  distinguished:	  monopsony	  power,	  countervailing	  
buyer	  power	  and	  buyer	  power.	  On	  basis	  of	  such	  a	  distinction,	  we	  will	  point	  out	  different	  effects	  that	  
may	  result	  from	  the	  exercise	  of	  market	  power	  in	  upstream	  buyer	  market.	  	  
However,	  we	  will	  see	  that	  the	  degree	  of	  buyer	  power	  understood	  in	  its	  broad	  sense	  depends	  less	  on	  
the	  horizontal	  structure	  of	  the	  market	  than	  on	  the	  vertical	  relationship	  between	  sellers	  and	  buyers	  
and	  on	  the	  importance	  each	  of	  them	  attach	  to	  that	  relationship.	  Key	  factors	  giving	  buyers	  the	  ability	  
but	  also	  the	  incentive	  to	  exert	  market	  power	  over	  their	  suppliers	  will	  as	  such	  be	  developed.	  	  
Section	  2	  provides	  an	  insight	  into	  the	  objectives	  of	  EU	  competition	  law	  so	  as	  to	  raise	  some	  questions	  
with	  regard	  to	  the	  possible	  anticompetitive	  impact	  of	  buyer	  power.	  The	  issue	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  buyer	  
practices	   on	   competition	   is	   in	   fact	   controversial.	   The	   description	   of	   the	   competition	   goals	   aims	   at	  
highlighting	   in	   which	   way	   buyer	   practices	   might	   adversely	   affect	   competition.	   Such	   impact	   on	  
competition	   is	  an	  essential	   issue	  as	   this	  will	  determine	  under	  which	  policy	  action	   is	   to	  be	   taken	   to	  
address	  buyer	  conduct.	  
This	   first	   Chapter	   sets	   in	   fact	   the	   scene	   by	   providing	   a	   general	   framework	   and	   some	   keys	   to	  
understand	   and	   assess	   the	   concept	   of	   buyer	   power	   and	   its	   possible	   implication	   in	   EU	   law.	   The	  
objective	  is	  to	  raise	  different	  questions	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  buyer	  power	  on	  the	  markets	  and	  
on	  the	  way	  such	  power	  should	  be	  addressed.	  All	  those	  questions	  will	  then	  be	  further	  developed	  and	  
answered	  in	  the	  next	  parts.	  
	  
SECTION	  I	  –	  DEFINITION	  OF	  BUYER	  POWER	  
The	   reading	   of	   the	   various	   regulations	   and	   other	   instruments	   adopted	   by	   the	   Commission	   in	  
application	  of	  EU	  competition	  law	  shows	  that	  the	  focus	  is	  mainly	  put	  on	  the	  danger	  of	  sellers’	  market	  
power	   to	   effective	   competition.	   One	   might	   then	   assume	   that	   buyers	   lack	   or	   are	   unable	   to	   exert	  
market	   power	   when	   purchasing	   products.	   However,	   where	   that	   assumption	   is	   true	   as	   regards	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atomistic	  final	  consumers	  in	  the	  retail	  market,	  the	  situation	  may	  be	  much	  different	  at	  stages	  further	  
up	   the	   supply	   chain.	   In	   some	   industries	   indeed,	   manufacturers	   of	   intermediate	   products	   face	   a	  
limited	  number	  of	   large	  buyers	  which	  detain	  a	  strong	  bargaining	  power	  and	  are	  sometimes	  able	  to	  
dictate	   terms,	   conditions	   and	  prices	   to	   their	   suppliers.	  Market	  power	   is	   therefore	  not	   an	  attribute	  
exclusively	  related	  to	  sellers.	  Market	  participants	  may	  also	  exercise	  such	  power	  when	  acting	  on	  the	  
buying	  side,	  towards	  their	  suppliers.	  
Buyer	   power	   generally	   arises	   when	   the	   level	   of	   concentration	   among	   buyers	   is	   relatively	   high.	  
However,	  other	   factors	  have	   in	   fact	  much	  more	   influence	  on	   the	  degree	  of	  buyers’	  market	  power.	  
Those	   sources	  of	  power	  may	  vary	   from	  one	  sector	   to	  another,	  depending	  on	   the	  characteristics	  of	  
each	   market.	   It	   is	   nevertheless	   possible	   to	   describe	   roughly	   key	   elements	   which	   are	   commonly	  
viewed	  as	  reinforcing	  buyers’	  position	  in	  the	  negotiations.	  
This	  Section	  aims	  to	  describe	  the	  notion	  of	  buyer	  power	  and	   its	   implication	   in	  EU	  competition	   law.	  
First	  of	  all,	  the	  concepts	  of	  market	  power,	  dominance	  and	  economic	  dependence	  will	  be	  developed.	  
The	   objective	   is	   to	   provide	   a	   general	   understanding	   of	   those	   concepts,	   mainly	   from	   a	   buy-­‐side	  
perspective	  as	  EU	  competition	  law	  instruments	  and	  case	  law	  mainly	  refer	  to	  sellers’	  ability	  to	  distort	  
competition	  when	  addressing	  the	  issue	  of	  market	  power.	  Secondly,	  we	  will	  turn	  to	  the	  actual	  concept	  
of	   buyer	   power	   which	   may	   be	   defined	   slightly	   differently	   and	   whose	   exercise	   may	   bring	   about	  
various	  effects	  depending	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  markets	  involved.	  Buyer	  power	  results	  in	  fact	  from	  
different	  factors	  which	  strengthen	  the	  buyer’s	  position	  in	  the	  upstream	  market	  and	  incite	  it	  to	  take	  
advantage	  of	  that	  power.	  
A. MARKET	  POWER,	  DOMINANCE	  AND	  ECONOMIC	  DEPENDENCE	  
The	  notion	  of	  market	  power	   is	   central	   in	  EU	  competition	   law.	  The	   rules	  on	   that	  matter	  are	   indeed	  
unlikely	   to	   be	   applied	   to	   firms	   lacking	   market	   power	   as	   those	   are	   deemed	   unable	   to	   affect	  
competition	  on	  the	  markets	  through	  their	  conduct.	  In	  particular,	  with	  regard	  to	  single-­‐firm	  conduct,	  
Article	   102	   TFEU	   is	   aimed	   at	   regulating	   only	   the	   behaviour	   of	   firms	   holding	   a	   very	   strong	  market	  
position	  or,	   in	  other	  words,	  a	  dominant	  position.	  Economic	  dependence	   is	  a	  distinct	  concept	  which	  
can	  take	  different	  forms.	  That	  concept	  may	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  market	  
power	  and	  dominance	  on	  the	  buying-­‐	  and	  selling-­‐side	  of	  the	  market.	  It	  is	  in	  particular	  in	  buyer	  power	  
cases	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  economic	  dependence	  seems	  to	  play	  a	  determinant	  role.	  
1. Market	  power	  and	  dominance	  
Both	   sellers	   and	   buyers	   can	   have	   market	   power.	   However,	   EU	   authorities	   usually	   refer	   to	   that	  
concept	  to	  describe	  supplier	  market	  power.	  In	  that	  case,	  market	  power	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  the	  ability	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profitably	  to	  increase	  prices	  above	  the	  competitive	  level	  for	  a	  significant	  period	  of	  time.1	  As	  pointed	  
out	   in	   the	   Commission’s	   Guidance	   on	   Article	   102	   TFEU,	   the	   expression	   “increase	   prices”	   is	   a	  
shorthand	  for	  the	  various	  ways	  in	  which	  competition	  can	  be	  restricted	  by	  a	  firm	  such	  as	  by	  limiting	  
output,	   innovation,	   the	   variety	   or	   quality	   of	   goods	   or	   services.2	   In	   the	   abstract	   world	   of	   perfect	  
competition,	  no	  firm	  has	  market	  power	  while	   in	  a	  pure	  monopoly	  one	  firm	  has	  absolute	  control	  of	  
the	  market.3	  Between	  these	  two	  extremes,	  firms	  have	  some	  degree	  of	  market	  power	  which	  may,	  in	  
some	  circumstances,	  call	  the	  attention	  of	  competition	  authorities.	  
Competition	   law	   is	   concerned	  with	  problems	   that	  arise	  when	  one	  or	  more	   firm(s)	  detain(s),	  or	  will	  
detain	  after	  a	  merger,	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  market	  power.4	  This	  is	  in	  particular	  the	  case	  under	  Article	  
102	  TFEU	  as	  the	  prohibition	  on	  abusive	  conduct	  applies	  only	  to	  firms	  in	  a	  dominant	  position,	  that	  is	  
to	   firms	   with	   substantial	   market	   power.	   The	   assessment	   of	   the	   firm’s	   degree	   of	  market	   power	   is	  
hence	  a	  first	  step	  in	  the	  application	  of	  that	  provision.	  However,	  the	  measurement	  of	  market	  power	  
can	  only	  be	  made	  once	  the	  relevant	  market	  has	  been	  defined.	  Market	  definition	  provides	   indeed	  a	  
framework	  within	  which	  competition	  enforcers	  assess	  whether	  the	  firm(s)	   involved	  possess	  market	  
power.	  The	  objective	  of	  defining	  the	  relevant	  market	  in	  both	  its	  product	  and	  geographic	  dimension	  is	  
to	  identify	  the	  competitive	  constraints	  exerted	  on	  the	  market	  and	  to	  assess	  whether	  they	  are	  capable	  
of	   preventing	   the	   firm	   (or	   the	   group	   of	   firms)	   in	   question	   from	   behaving	   independently	   in	   that	  
relevant	   market.5	   In	   other	   words,	   within	   that	   framework,	   the	   Commission	   examines	   whether	   the	  
firm’s	  degree	  of	  market	  power	  is	  sufficient	  to	  reach	  the	  level	  of	  dominance.	  	  
Under	  EU	  law,	  a	  dominant	  position	  has	  been	  defined	  as:	  
“A	  position	  of	  economic	  strength	  enjoyed	  by	  an	  undertaking	  which	  enables	  it	  to	  prevent	  
effective	   competition	   being	   maintained	   on	   that	   market	   by	   affording	   it	   the	   power	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  M.Motta,	  Competition	  Policy	  –	  Theory	  and	  Practices	  (2004),	  at	  40-­‐41.	  “Since	  the	  lowest	  possible	  price	  a	  firm	  
can	  profitably	  charge	  is	  the	  price	  which	  equals	  the	  marginal	  cost	  of	  production,	  market	  power	  is	  usually	  defined	  
as	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  price	  charged	  by	  a	  firm	  and	  its	  marginal	  cost	  of	  production.”	  
2	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission:	  Guidance	  on	  its	  enforcement	  priorities	  in	  applying	  Article	  82	  of	  the	  EC	  
Treaty	  to	  abusive	  exclusionary	  conduct	  by	  dominant	  undertakings,	  OJ	  C	  45,	  24/02/2009,	  p.7,	  at	  11.	  
3	  R.Wish	  &	  D.Bailey,	  Competition	  Law	  (2012),	  at	  25.	  
4	  R.Wish	  &	  D.Bailey,	  ibid.,	  at	  26.	  For	  examples,	  under	  Article	  101	  TFEU,	  various	  “de	  minimis”	  exceptions	  apply	  
where	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  restrictive	  agreement	  lack	  market	  power;	  the	  general	  block	  exemption	  Regulation	  is	  
not	  applicable	  when	  the	  parties	  to	  an	  agreement	  have	  a	  market	  share	  exceeding	  a	  certain	  threshold;	  
concentration	  is	  only	  prohibited	  when	  the	  merging	  parties	  have	  sufficient	  market	  power	  so	  as	  to	  significantly	  
impede	  effective	  competition	  in	  the	  EU.	  
5	  Commission	  notice	  on	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  relevant	  market	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  Community	  competition	  law,	  
OJ	  C	  372,	  09/12/1997,	  p.5,	  at	  2.	  A	  relevant	  product	  market	  comprises	  all	  those	  products	  and/or	  services	  which	  
are	  regarded	  as	  interchangeable	  or	  substitutable	  by	  the	  consumer,	  by	  reason	  of	  the	  products’	  characteristics,	  
their	  prices	  and	  their	  intended	  use.	  (at	  7)	  A	  relevant	  geographic	  market	  comprises	  the	  area	  in	  which	  the	  
undertakings	  concerned	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  supply	  and	  demand	  of	  products	  or	  services,	  in	  which	  the	  conditions	  
of	  competition	  are	  sufficiently	  homogeneous	  and	  which	  can	  be	  distinguished	  from	  neighbouring	  areas	  because	  
the	  conditions	  of	  competition	  are	  appreciably	  different	  in	  those	  area.	  (at	  8)	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behave	   to	   an	   appreciable	   extent	   independently	   of	   its	   competitors,	   its	   customers	   and	  
ultimately	  of	  consumers.”6	  
In	  order	   to	  measure	  the	  degree	  of	  market	  power	  of	  a	   firm,	   the	  Commission	  has	   thus	   to	  assess	   the	  
degree	  of	  competitive	  constraint	  in	  the	  relevant	  market.7	  To	  this	  end,	  three	  issues	  are	  relevant.	  
Firstly,	   the	  Commission	  examines	   the	  market	  position	  of	   the	  dominant	   firm	  and	   its	   competitors.	  A	  
key	   role	   is	   attributed	   to	   the	  market	   share	  held	  by	   the	   firm	  under	   investigation	  and	  by	   its	   rivals.	   In	  
general,	  market	  shares	  exceeding	  50%	  raise	  a	  presumption	  of	  dominance8	  while	  shares	  below	  40%	  
cannot	   support	   a	   finding	   of	   dominance.	   Between	   40%	   and	   50%,	   additional	   factors	   must	   be	  
considered	  because	   such	  a	  market	   share	   is	  not	   conclusive	  evidence	  of	   the	  presence	  or	   absence	  of	  
dominance.9	   However,	   even	   though	  market	   shares	   provide	   a	   useful	   first	   indication	   of	   the	  market	  
structure	  and	  of	  the	  relative	  importance	  of	  the	  various	  undertakings	  active	  on	  the	  relevant	  market,	  
the	  Commission	  interpret	  these	  data	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  relevant	  market	  conditions.10	  For	  example,	  in	  
industries	  where	  production	   is	   limited	  by	  a	  crucial	   input,	   the	  current	  market	  share	  of	  a	   firm	  would	  
over-­‐estimate	  the	  competitive	  constraint	  exerted	  by	  that	  firm	  on	  the	  market	  if	  it	  is	  established	  that	  
its	  reserves	  will	  be	  exhausted	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  The	  degree	  of	  excess	  capacity	  held	  by	  competitors	  is	  
also	  a	  factor	  that	  may	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration.	  If	  their	  supply	  elasticity	  is	  low,	  that	  is,	  their	  ability	  
to	   serve	   new	   customers	   in	   case	   of	   an	   increase	   in	   prices	   is	   limited,	   those	   rivals	  will	   not	   be	   able	   to	  
constrain	  the	  dominant	  firm’s	  behaviour.11	  
The	   second	   type	   of	   competitive	   constraints	   examined	   by	   the	   Commission	   includes	   constraints	  
imposed	   by	   the	   credible	   threat	   of	   future	   expansion	   by	   actual	   competitors	   or	   entry	   by	   potential	  
competitors.	   A	   firm	  may	   indeed	   be	   deterred	   from	   increasing	   prices	   if	   expansion	   or	   entry	   is	   likely,	  
timely	  and	  sufficient.	  
“For	   the	   Commission	   to	   consider	   expansion	   or	   entry	   likely	   it	   must	   be	   sufficiently	  
profitable	  for	  the	  competitor	  or	  entrant,	  taking	  into	  account	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  barriers	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Case	  27/76,	  United	  Brands	  Company	  and	  United	  Brands	  Continental	  v	  Commission	  [1978]	  ECR	  207,	  at	  65.	  See	  
also:	  Case	  85/76,	  Hoffman-­‐La	  Roche	  v	  Commission	  [1979]	  ECR	  461,	  at	  87.	  
7	  A	  theoretical	  measure	  of	  market	  power	  is	  given	  by	  the	  Lerner	  index,	  defined	  as	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  
price	  and	  the	  marginal	  cost	  as	  a	  fraction	  of	  the	  product’s	  price.	  The	  Lerner	  index	  of	  a	  monopolistic	  firm	  
corresponds	  to	  the	  inverse	  of	  the	  elasticity	  of	  demand	  faced	  by	  it.	  See:	  M.Motta,op.cit.,	  at	  116.	  
8	  See	  for	  example:	  Case	  85/76,	  Hoffman-­‐La	  Roche,	  op.cit.,	  at	  59;	  Case	  322/81,	  Nederlandsche	  Banden	  Industrie	  
Michelin	  (Michelin	  I)	  	  v	  Commission	  [1983]	  ECR	  3461;	  C-­‐62/86,	  Akzo	  Chemie	  BV	  v	  Commission	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐
3359,	  at	  60;	  T-­‐30/89,	  Hilti	  AG	  v	  Commission	  [1991]	  ECR	  II-­‐1439,	  at	  92,	  on	  appeal	  C-­‐53/92	  P,	  Hilti	  AG	  Commission	  
[1994]	  ECR	  I-­‐667.	  
9	  R.O’Donoghue	  &	  A.J.Padilla,	  The	  Law	  and	  Economics	  of	  Article	  82	  EC	  (2006),	  at	  114.	  
10	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission:	  Guidance	  on	  its	  enforcement	  priorities	  in	  applying	  Article	  82	  of	  the	  EC	  
Treaty	  to	  abusive	  exclusionary	  conduct	  by	  dominant	  undertakings,	  OJ	  C	  45,	  24/02/2009,	  p.7,	  at	  13.	  
11	  M.Motta,	  op.cit.,	  at	  119-­‐120.	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to	   expansion	   or	   entry,	   the	   likely	   reactions	   of	   the	   allegedly	   dominant	   undertaking	   and	  
other	   competitors,	   and	   the	   risk	   and	   costs	   of	   failure.	   For	   expansion	   or	   entry	   to	   be	  
considered	   timely,	   it	   must	   be	   sufficiently	   swift	   to	   deter	   or	   defeat	   the	   exercise	   of	  
substantial	  market	  power.	  For	  expansion	  or	  entry	  to	  be	  considered	  sufficient,	   it	  cannot	  
be	  simply	  small-­‐scale	  entry,	  for	  example	  into	  some	  market	  niche,	  but	  must	  be	  of	  such	  a	  
magnitude	   as	   to	   be	   able	   to	   deter	   any	   attempt	   to	   increase	   prices	   by	   the	   putatively	  
dominant	  undertaking	  in	  the	  relevant	  market.”	  12	  
Barriers	  to	  entry	  and	  expansion	  are	  factors	  that	  prevent	  or	  hinder	  companies	  from	  easily	  entering	  a	  
market	  or	  expanding	  in	  that	  market.13	  These	  factors	  are	  of	  particular	   importance	  in	  the	  assessment	  
of	   potential	   competition.	   They	  may	   be	   legal	   or	   administrative	   barriers,	   such	   as	   state	  monopolies,	  
authorization	   or	   licensing	   requirements,	   intellectual	   property	   rights,	   or	   economic	   barriers,	   such	   as	  
sunk	  costs	  of	  entry.	  They	  may	  also	  take	  the	  form	  of	  advantages	  specifically	  enjoyed	  by	  the	  dominant	  
undertaking,	  such	  as	  economies	  of	  scale/scope,	  privileged	  access	  to	  key	   inputs,	  vertical	   integration,	  
brand	   recognition	  or	  established	  distribution	  and	   sales	  network.14	   In	  addition,	   care	   is	  devoted	   to	  a	  
number	  of	   impediments	   faced	  by	  customers	   in	   switching	   to	  a	  new	  supplier,	   such	  as	   lock-­‐in	  effects	  
and	  network	  externalities.15	  
Finally,	  aside	  from	  existing	  and	  potential	  competitors,	  competitive	  constraints	  can	  also	  be	  exerted	  by	  
the	  firm’s	  customers.16	  A	  buyer	  can	  indeed	  has	  a	  strong	  bargaining	  strength	  and	  use	  it	  to	  stimulate	  
competition	   among	   suppliers.	   The	   strong	   negotiating	   position	   of	   customers,	   called	   countervailing	  
buyer	  power17,	  can	  consequently	  have	  a	  significant	   influence	  on	  the	  assessment	  of	  dominance	  as	   it	  
may	  be	  sufficient	  to	  constrain	  a	  supplier’s	  competitive	  behaviour.	  Such	  countervailing	  buying	  power	  
may	   result	   from	  the	  buyer’s	   size	  or	   from	  the	   large	   share	   it	   accounts	   for	   in	   the	   supplier’s	   turnover.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Guidance	  on	  its	  enforcement	  priorities	  in	  applying	  Article	  82	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  p.7,	  at	  16.	  
13	  This	  is	  the	  basic	  definition	  of	  barriers	  to	  entry.	  However,	  there	  is	  some	  disagreement	  among	  economists	  
about	  what	  should	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  barrier	  to	  entry.	  See:	  R.O’Donoghue	  &	  A.J.Padilla,	  op.cit.,	  at	  117-­‐119.	  
14	  R.O’Donoghue	  &	  A.J.Padilla,	  op.cit.,	  at	  116.	  
15	  M.Motta,	  op.cit.,	  at	  121.	  Customers	  are	  locked	  in	  where	  they	  find	  it	  costly	  to	  switch	  from	  one	  supplier	  to	  
another.	  Switching	  costs	  also	  arise	  if	  a	  customer	  has	  to	  purchase	  follow-­‐on	  products	  such	  as	  service	  or	  repair	  
but	  find	  it	  costly	  to	  switch	  to	  another	  supplier.	  To	  avoid	  those	  costs,	  he	  has	  to	  buy	  from	  the	  supplier	  of	  the	  
original	  product.	  Network	  effects	  arise	  when	  the	  value	  of	  a	  good	  increases	  with	  the	  number	  of	  users	  adopting	  
the	  same	  good.	  For	  example,	  a	  telephone	  user	  benefits	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  other	  users	  are	  connected	  to	  the	  
same	  network.	  As	  explained	  by	  Sharp	  and	  Varian,	  network	  effects	  can	  also	  be	  indirect.	  Those	  effects	  occur	  
when	  the	  increased	  use	  of	  one	  product	  leads	  to	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  value	  of	  a	  complementary	  product.	  For	  
example,	  the	  more	  people	  purchase	  the	  same	  operating	  system,	  the	  more	  programs	  will	  be	  created	  for	  that	  
system.	  See:	  C.Shapiro	  &	  H.R.Varian,	  Information	  rules:	  a	  strategic	  guide	  to	  the	  network	  economy	  (1999),	  at	  
173.	  See	  also:	  G.J.Werden,	  Network	  effects	  and	  conditions	  of	  entry:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  Microsoft	  case,	  69	  
Antitrust	  Law	  Journal	  81	  (2001);	  J.Farrel	  &	  P.Klemperer,	  Coordination	  and	  lock-­‐in:	  competition	  with	  switching	  
costs	  and	  network	  effects,	  3	  Handbook	  of	  Industrial	  Organization	  1970	  (2007).	  
16	  Guidance	  on	  its	  enforcement	  priorities	  in	  applying	  Article	  82	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  p.7,	  at	  18.	  
17	  The	  concept	  of	  countervailing	  buyer	  power	  will	  be	  further	  developed	  in	  Point	  B,	  1,	  c),	  ii	  of	  this	  Section.	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However,	  as	  it	  will	  be	  further	  developed	  below,	  the	  degree	  of	  buyers’	  market	  power	  mainly	  depends	  
on	   their	  ability	   to	   (threaten	   to)	   switch	  quickly	   to	  competing	  suppliers,	   to	  promote	  new	  entry	  or	   to	  
vertically	  integrate.	  
Where	   the	   competitive	   constraints,	   exerted	   by	   (potential)	   competitors	   or	   by	   customers,	   are	   not	  
sufficient	   to	  prevent	  a	   firm	  from	  raising	  prices	  or	  affecting	  competition	   in	  one	  way	  or	  another,	   the	  
firm	  in	  question	  will	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  competition	  rules.	  With	  regard	  to	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  this	  means	  
that	  companies	  in	  a	  dominant	  position	  will	  have	  a	  special	  responsibility	  not	  to	  allow	  their	  conduct	  to	  
impair	  genuine	  undistorted	  competition.18	  That	  provision	  covers	  indeed	  all	  abusive	  conduct	  that	  has	  
been	  defined	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  as:	  
“An	   objective	   concept	   relating	   to	   the	   behaviour	   of	   an	   undertaking	   in	   a	   dominant	  
position	  which	  is	  such	  as	  to	  influence	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  market	  where,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  
very	  presence	  of	   the	  undertaking	   in	   question,	   the	  degree	  of	   competition	   is	  weakened	  
and	  which,	   through	   recourse	   to	  methods	  different	   from	  those	  which	  condition	  normal	  
competition	   in	   products	   or	   services	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   transactions	   of	   commercial	  
operators,	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  hindering	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  degree	  of	  competition	  still	  
existing	  in	  the	  market	  or	  the	  growth	  of	  that	  competition”.19	  
As	   mentioned	   above,	   Article	   102	   TFEU	   and	   more	   generally	   all	   competition	   provisions	   have	  
mainly	   been	   enforced	   against	   practices	   used	   by	   sellers	   to	   prevent	  misuse	   of	  market	   power.	  
However,	  it	  was	  already	  noted	  in	  this	  section	  that	  buyers	  are,	  in	  some	  circumstances,	  also	  able	  
to	   exert	   market	   power	   over	   their	   suppliers.	   Where	   such	   buyer	   power	   may	   constitute	   a	  
countervailing	   strength	   and	   prevent	   sellers	   from	   raising	   prices,	   it	  may	   also	   turn	   itself	   into	   a	  
competitive	  concern	  when	  buyers	  get	  the	  ability	  to	  fix	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  transaction.	  In	  the	  
next	   section,	   the	   various	   circumstances	   in	   which	   buyer	   power	   may	   arise	   will	   be	   described.	  
Depending	  on	  the	  market	  structure	  in	  the	  upstream	  and	  downstream	  market,	  such	  power	  may	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  See	  :	  Case	  322/81,	  Michelin	  I,	  op.cit.,	  at	  57;	  T-­‐203/01,	  Manufacture	  française	  des	  pneumatiques	  Michelin	  v	  
Commission	  (Michelin	  II)	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐4071,	  at	  97;	  T-­‐83/91,	  Tetra	  Pak	  International	  SA	  v	  Commission	  [1994]	  
ECR	  II-­‐755,	  at	  114;	  T-­‐228/97,	  Irish	  Sugar	  Plc	  v	  Commission	  [1999]	  ECR	  II-­‐2969,	  at	  112.	  
19	  Case	  85/76,	  Hoffman-­‐La	  Roche,	  op.cit.,	  at	  91.	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2. Economic	  dependence	  
A	  situation	  of	  economic	  dependence	  arises	  when	  a	  supplier	  (buyer)	  is	  economically	  dependent	  
on	  a	  buyer	  (supplier).	  This	  occurs	  in	  particular	  when	  the	  former	  has	  not	  alternative	  to	  sell	  (buy)	  
its	  products	  and	  that	  the	  proportion	  of	  its	  turnover	  with	  the	  latter	  is	  significant	  (the	  so-­‐called	  
risk	   or	   threat	   rate).20	   The	   absence	   of	   alternative	   solution	   and	   a	   high	   risk	   (or	   threat)	   rate	  
constitute	   the	  main	   criteria	   for	   the	   finding	   of	   a	   situation	   of	   economic	   dependence.	   Indeed,	  
when	  a	  firm	  cannot	  switch	  to	  other	  trading	  partners	  or	  when	  the	  switching	  costs	  are	  very	  high,	  
it	  will	  most	  probably	  be	  dependent	  on	  existing	  customer(s)	  or	  supplier(s).	  This	   is	  all	  the	  more	  
true	   if	   the	   latter	  represents	  a	  very	   large	  share	   in	  the	  firm’s	  turnover	  as	   it	  will	  be	  much	  more	  
difficult	  for	  the	  firm	  in	  question	  to	  find	  a	  comparable	  trading	  partner.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  
alternatives,	   the	   loss	   of	   such	   a	   large	   part	   in	   its	   business	   is	   likely	   to	   threaten	   the	   dependent	  
undertaking’s	  viability.	  
When	  combined,	  the	  absence	  of	  alternatives	  and	  the	  high	  threat	  rate	  are	  two	  elements	  which	  
make	  a	  market	  participant	   strongly	  dependent	  on	  a	  particular	   trading	  partner.	   In	   fact,	   if	   the	  
loss	  of	  a	  customer	  or	  supplier	  does	  not	  affect	  significantly	  the	  undertaking’s	  business	  activity,	  
the	   lack	  of	  alternative	  solutions	   is	  unlikely	   to	   lead	  to	  a	  situation	  of	  economic	  dependence	  as	  
the	  other	  existing	  business	  partners	  will	  allow	  the	   firm	   in	  question	  to	  cover	   its	  costs.	  On	  the	  
other	  hand,	   the	  presence	  of	  other	  buyers	  or	   sellers	  may,	   in	   some	  cases,	  not	  be	   sufficient	   to	  
enable	  an	  undertaking	   to	   replace	  a	   customer	  or	   supplier	   that	   represents	   a	   large	   share	  of	   its	  
business.	  Indeed,	  the	  higher	  the	  risk	  rate,	  the	  more	  difficult	  it	  is	  to	  find	  a	  comparable	  business	  
partner.21	   The	   existence	   of	   a	   situation	   of	   economic	   dependence	   needs	   therefore	   to	   be	  
assessed	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.	  
In	   a	   case	  of	   economic	  dependence,	   the	  buyer	  or	   supplier	   is	   in	   a	  position	  of	   superiority	  with	  
regard	  to	  the	  dependent	  undertaking.	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  firm	  in	  question	  
will	  be	  considered	  as	  dominant	  in	  the	  whole	  relevant	  market	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  
Indeed,	   in	   seller	   power	   cases,	   factors	   related	   to	   economic	   dependence	   of	   customers	   only	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  P.Këllezi,	  Abuse	  below	  the	  Threshold	  of	  Dominance?	  Market	  Power,	  Market	  Dominance,	  and	  Abuse	  of	  
Economic	  Dependence,	  in	  Abuse	  of	  Dominant	  Position:	  New	  Interpretation,	  New	  Enforcement	  Mechanisms?,	  
M.-­‐O.	  Mackenrodt,	  B.Conde	  Gallego	  &	  S.Enchelmaier	  (eds)	  (2008),	  at	  69-­‐70.	  Këllezi	  defines	  the	  risk	  or	  threat	  
rate	  as	  the	  proportion	  of	  the	  business	  with	  a	  particular	  undertaking.	  “In	  the	  case	  of	  buyer	  power,	  the	  risk	  rate	  
constitutes	  the	  share	  of	  the	  supplier’s	  turnover	  in	  the	  product	  categories	  accounted	  for	  by	  the	  new	  entity,	  
above	  which	  there	  will	  be	  a	  threat	  to	  its	  existence”.	  	  A	  threat	  rate	  has	  been	  used	  by	  the	  Commission	  in	  different	  
merger	  cases	  to	  assess	  supermarkets’	  buyer	  power.	  See	  on	  that	  matter:	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  II,	  Point	  B,	  2.	  
21	  P.Këllezi,	  op.cit.,	  at	  70.	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complement	   the	   classical	   analysis	   of	   dominance.22	   Unless	   the	   other	   elements	   taken	   into	  
consideration	  in	  that	  analysis	  also	  attest	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  dominant	  position,	  such	  as	  a	  high	  
market	  share	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  competitive	  constraints	  exerted	  by	  competitors	  or	  customers,	  the	  
Commission	  is	  unlikely	  to	  apply	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  The	  ABG/Oil	  case	  constitutes	  an	  exception	  to	  
that	  rule.	  The	  Commission	  held	  in	  that	  case	  that	  BP	  was	  in	  a	  dominant	  position	  relative	  to	  one	  
of	  its	  customers,	  namely	  ABG,	  due	  to	  the	  shortage	  of	  oil	  products,	  and	  concluded	  that	  Article	  
102	   TFEU	  was	   applicable,	   despite	   BP’s	   low	  market	   share	   (26%).23	   The	   situation	   of	   economic	  
dependence	   of	   BP’s	   customers	   played	   therefore	   an	   important	   role	   in	   the	   assessment	   of	  
dominance	   in	   that	   case.	   However,	   the	   assessment	   of	   the	   Commission	   was	   justified	   by	  
exceptional	   circumstances	   related	   to	   the	   oil	   crisis	   in	   the	   early	   seventies	   and	   the	   resulting	  
shortage	   of	   oil	   which	   put	   customers	   in	   a	   situation	   of	   strong	   economic	   dependence	   on	   oil	  
companies.24	   In	   other	   circumstances,	   EU	   competition	   authorities	   generally	   consider	   that	  
buyers’	  economic	  dependence	  on	  suppliers	  cannot	  by	  itself	   lead	  to	  the	  finding	  of	  a	  dominant	  
position	  on	  the	  relevant	  market.25	  
Such	   an	   approach	   applies	   in	   seller	   power	   cases	   where	   customers	   may	   be	   considered	  
dependent	   on	   suppliers.	   In	   case	   of	   buyer	   power,	   however,	   the	   concept	   of	   economic	  
dependence	   is	   likely	   to	   play	   a	   greater	   role	   in	   the	   competition	   assessment.	   Suppliers’	  
dependence	  on	  a	  particular	  buyer	  may	  indeed	  give	  the	  latter	  significant	  market	  power	  in	  the	  
procurement	  market.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  British	  Airways	  case,	  the	  Commission,	  upheld	  by	  the	  
Tribunal	   and	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice,	   found	   that	   the	   dependence	   of	   travel	   agents	   on	   British	  
Airways	  was	   a	   factor	  of	   particular	   importance	   in	   the	   analysis	   of	   dominance.26	   In	   fact,	   British	  
Airways’	  alleged	  abusive	  conduct	  occurred	  in	  the	  buyer	  market	  of	  air	  travel	  agency	  services.27	  
When	  assessing	  the	  firm’s	  market	  power	  in	  that	  market,	  it	  was	  noted	  that	  travel	  agents	  were	  
substantially	   dependent	   on	   the	   income	   they	   received	   from	   British	   Airways	   which	   was	  
consequently	   considered	   as	   an	   obligatory	   business	   partner.	   The	   factors	   related	   to	   economic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  See	  for	  examples:	  T-­‐128/98,	  Aéroports	  de	  Paris	  v	  Commission	  [2000]	  ECR	  II-­‐3929	  ;	  T-­‐229/94,	  Deutsche	  Bahn	  
AG	  v	  Commission	  [1997]	  ECR	  II-­‐1689	  ;	  Trans-­‐Atlantic	  Conference	  Agreement	  (TACA),	  Case	  No	  IV/35.134,	  
Commission	  Decision	  of	  16	  September	  1998	  and	  Michelin,	  Case	  No	  COMP/E-­‐2/36.041/PO,	  Commission	  
Decision	  of	  20	  June	  2001.	  
23	  ABG/Oil	  companies	  operating	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	  Case	  No	  IV/28.841,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  19	  April	  1977.	  
The	  Court	  of	  Justice	  annulled	  the	  decision,	  considering	  BP	  had	  not	  abused	  its	  dominant	  position	  but	  without	  
challenging	  the	  approach	  followed	  by	  the	  Commission	  regarding	  the	  issue	  of	  dominance.	  See:	  Case	  77/77,	  
Benzine	  en	  Petroleum	  Handelsmaatschappij	  BV	  and	  others	  v	  Commission	  [1978]	  ECR	  1513.	  
24	  P.Këllezi,	  op.cit.,	  at	  77.	  
25	  See	  for	  example:	  Case	  26/76,	  Metro	  SB-­‐Großmärkte	  GmbH	  &	  Co.	  KG	  v	  Commission	  [1977]	  ECR	  1875.	  
26	  Virgin/British	  Airways,	  Case	  IV/D-­‐2/34.780,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  14	  July	  1999.	  See	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  
Tribunal	  and	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice:	  T-­‐219/99,	  British	  Airways	  v	  Commission	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐5917C-­‐95/04P	  and	  
British	  Airways	  plc	  v	  Commission	  [2007]	  ECR	  I-­‐2331	  
27	  The	  British	  Airways	  case	  will	  be	  further	  developed	  in	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  I,	  Point	  B,	  2,	  a),	  iii.	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dependence	  played	  a	  decisive	  role	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  dominance	  in	  that	  case.	  Indeed,	  they	  
were	  not	  only	  used	  to	  confirm	  a	  finding	  of	  dominance	  on	  basis	  of	  the	  traditional	  analysis	  but	  
constituted	   an	   element	   without	   which	   the	   Commission	   would	   not	   have	   concluded	   to	   the	  
existence	  of	  a	  dominant	  position	  due,	  in	  particular,	  to	  the	  relatively	  low	  market	  share	  of	  British	  
Airways	  (39.7%).	  
The	  central	  role	  played	  by	  supplier’s	  economic	  dependence	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  buyer	  power	  
appears	  specifically	  in	  some	  merger	  cases	  involving	  supermarket	  chains.	  In	  different	  decisions,	  
the	   Commission	   based	   indeed	   its	   assessment	   of	   dominance	   on	   the	   bilateral	   relationships	  
between	  the	  merging	  retail	  distributors	  and	  their	  suppliers.28	  Despite	  the	  low	  market	  share	  of	  
the	  merged	  entities	  in	  those	  cases,	  it	  was	  concluded	  that	  the	  mergers	  in	  question	  would	  create	  
a	  dominant	  position	  or	  at	  least	  affect	  competition	  in	  the	  procurement	  market.	  The	  main	  factor	  
taken	  into	  consideration	  to	  reach	  that	  conclusion	  was	  the	  situation	  of	  economic	  dependence	  
of	  producers	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  merging	  parties.29	  
The	   importance	  paid	   to	   the	  bilateral	   relations	  between	  buyers	  and	  suppliers	   in	  buyer	  power	  
cases	   stems	   from	   the	   very	   definition	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   buyer	   power.	   The	   literature	   on	   that	  
concept	  puts	   indeed	   the	  emphasis	  on	  all	   the	  different	  elements	   characterizing	  a	   situation	  of	  
economic	  dependence	  when	  assessing	  the	  ability	  of	  firms	  to	  exercise	  buyer	  power.	  
B. NOTION	  OF	  BUYER	  POWER	  AND	  POTENTIAL	  IMPLICATION	  ON	  THE	  MARKETS	  
The	   power	   held	   by	   large	   buyers	   over	   their	   suppliers	   is	   called	   buyer	   power.	  Generally,	   such	   power	  
arises	  when	   the	   demand	   side	   of	   a	  market	   is	   sufficiently	   concentrated	   so	   that	   buyers	   can	   exercise	  
market	  power	  over	  sellers.30	  
1. Definition	  of	  buyer	  power	  
Numerous	   definitions	   have	   been	   suggested	   to	   describe	   the	   concept	   of	   buyer	   power.	   We	   can	  
distinguish	  different	  forms	  of	  buyer	  power	  whose	  characteristics	  are	  determined	  by	  the	  structure	  of	  
the	   upstream/downstream	  markets	   and	   by	   the	   (im)balance	   of	   power	   between	   buyers	   and	   sellers.	  
The	   first	   case	   constitutes	   an	   example	  where	   buyer	   power	   is	   inexistent	   so	   that	   customers	   lack	   any	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  See:	  Kesko/Tuko,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.784,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  20	  November	  1996;	  Rewe/Meinl,	  Case	  No	  
IV/M.1221,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  3	  February	  1999;	  Carrefour/Promodes,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.1684,	  
Commission	  Decision	  of	  25	  January	  2000.	  Those	  decisions	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  details	  in	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  1,	  
Section	  II,	  Point	  B,	  2,	  b),	  c)	  and	  d).	  
29	  In	  the	  Rewe/Meinl	  and	  Carrefour/Promodes	  decisions,	  the	  risk	  or	  threat	  rate	  was	  about	  22%.	  The	  
Commission	  considered	  that	  “when	  a	  retailer	  exceeds	  such	  a	  share	  in	  the	  manufacturer’s	  turnover,	  the	  latter	  
finds	  itself	  de	  facto	  in	  a	  situation	  of	  economic	  dependence.”	  See:	  Rewe/Meinl,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1221,	  at	  97-­‐101	  
and	  Carrefour/Promodes,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.1684,	  at	  52.	  
30	  Z.CHEN,	  Defining	  buyer	  power,	  53	  The	  Antitrust	  Bulletin	  241,	  at	  242	  (2008)	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bargaining	   power	   in	   negotiations	   with	   concentrated	   suppliers.	   However,	   in	   business-­‐to-­‐business	  
relationships,	   it	   is	  not	  uncommon	  for	  buyers	  to	  exercise	  some	  “countervailing	  power”	  against	   their	  
suppliers	   and	   thereby	   to	  mitigate	   seller	  market	   power.	   This	   happens	   in	   particular	   when	   both	   the	  
upstream	   seller	   market	   and	   the	   downstream	   buyer	   market	   are	   characterised	   by	   a	   high	   level	   of	  
concentration.	  The	  third	  situation	  involves	  the	  presence	  of	  atomistic	  suppliers	  facing	  a	  concentrated	  
buying	   side.	   In	   that	   last	   case,	   we	   can	   make	   a	   further	   distinction	   between	   the	   exercise	   of	   pure	  
“monopsony	  power”	  by	  one	  or	  several	  buyers	  (collusive	  monopsony)	  and	  the	  use	  of	  “buyer	  power”	  
in	  the	  sense	  of	  superior	  or	  significant	  buyer	  market	  power.31	  
Figure	  1	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  DOWNSTREAM	  MARKET	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  UPSTREAM	  MARKET	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Buyers	  in	  the	  downstream/retail	  market	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Buyers	  in	  the	  upstream	  market	  
	  
Atomistic	  consumers	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Retailers	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Manufacturers	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Sellers	  in	  the	  downstream/retail	  market	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Sellers	  in	  the	  upstream	  market	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (downstream	  sellers)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (upstream	  sellers)	  
	  
The	   figure	   here	   above	   shows	   the	   different	   markets	   which	   may	   be	   involved	   in	   competition	   law	   cases.	  
Retailers,	  such	  as	  supermarkets	  for	  example,	  act	  as	  sellers	  in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market	  where	  they	  sell	  
products	   to	   final	   consumers.	   They	   also	   act	   as	   buyers	   in	   the	   upstream	  buyer	  market	  when	   they	   purchase	  
goods	  from	  food	  processing	  companies	  or	   from	  food	  producers.	  Those	  companies	  selling	  to	  supermarkets	  
also	  play	  the	  role	  of	  buyers	   in	  other	  upstream	  markets	  further	  up	  the	  supply	  chain	  where	  they	  buy	  inputs	  
such	   as	   food	   packaging	   or	   agricultural	   commodities.	   Depending,	   in	   particular,	   on	   the	   structure	   of	   those	  
markets	   and	   on	   the	   number	   of	   alternatives	   available	   to	   each	  market	   participant,	  market	   power	  may	   be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Some	  commentators	  distinguish	  only	  two	  forms	  of	  buyer	  power:	  monopsony	  power	  and	  countervailing	  
power.	  Under	  that	  distinction,	  monopsony	  power	  includes	  the	  pure	  monopsony	  model	  but	  also	  all	  situations	  
where	  powerful	  buyers	  face	  a	  large	  number	  of	  competitive	  suppliers	  and	  are	  able	  to	  negotiate	  prices	  below	  the	  
competitive	  level,	  even	  without	  reducing	  their	  input	  purchases.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  countervailing	  power	  refer	  
to	  situations	  where	  powerful	  buyers	  face	  relatively	  few	  input	  suppliers	  which	  have	  significant	  market	  power.	  
See	  for	  examples:	  Z.CHEN,	  Defining	  buyer	  power,	  53	  The	  Antitrust	  Bulletin	  241	  (2008)	  and	  J.B.Kirkwood,	  
Powerful	  buyers	  and	  merger	  enforcement,	  Seattle	  University	  School	  of	  Law	  Research	  Paper	  No.	  13-­‐04	  (2012),	  
available	  at:	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1809985	  We	  prefer	  to	  make	  a	  distinction	  
between	  three	  different	  forms	  of	  buyer	  power.	  The	  first	  one	  involves	  a	  market	  interface	  where	  buyers	  reduce	  
their	  purchases	  in	  order	  to	  lower	  input	  prices.	  The	  second	  and	  the	  third	  ones	  occur	  in	  a	  bargaining	  interface	  but	  
are	  distinct	  due	  to	  differences	  with	  regard	  to	  sellers’	  market	  power	  in	  the	  upstream	  market.	  In	  case	  of	  superior	  
bargaining	  power,	  buyers	  face	  weak	  sellers	  and	  are	  hence	  able	  to	  extract	  prices	  below	  the	  competitive	  level	  
without	  input	  reduction	  or	  to	  obtain	  other	  concessions.	  In	  contrast,	  in	  case	  of	  countervailing	  buyer	  power,	  
powerful	  buyers	  deal	  with	  powerful	  sellers	  and	  may	  therefore	  use	  their	  position	  to	  discipline	  the	  pricing	  policy	  
of	  the	  latter.	  See:	  M.E.Stucke,	  Looking	  at	  the	  monopsony	  in	  the	  mirror,	  (2012)	  available	  at:	  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2094553	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concentrated	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  either	  suppliers	  or	  buyers	  or	  spread	  more	  or	  less	  equally	  between	  those	  two	  
parties.	  
a) Concentrated	  sellers	  facing	  atomistic	  buyers	  
In	  various	  sectors	  and	  possibly	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  the	  supply	  chain,	  buyers	  lack	  market	  power	  when	  
purchasing	   their	  products	  and	  are,	  as	  a	   result,	   at	   the	  mercy	  of	  powerful	   sellers.	  This	   is	  particularly	  
true	   as	   regards	   individual	   consumers	   who	   face	   a	   relatively	   concentrated	   seller	   market	   for	   most	  
products/services	  they	  purchase	  and	  act	  therefore	  as	  passive	  price-­‐takers.	  Take	  for	  example	  the	  food	  
retail	  sector	  where	  in	  some	  Member	  States	  only	  three	  or	  four	  supermarket	  chains	  account	  for	  more	  
than	   70%	   of	   the	   market	   or	   the	   energy	   retail	   market	   which	   remains	   highly	   concentrated,	   if	   not	  
monopolistic,	  despite	  the	  liberalization	  process	  in	  the	  European	  Union.	  The	  EU	  competition	  rules	  are	  
well	   designed	   to	   address	   those	   situations	   and	   ensure	   consumer	   protection	   against	   improper	  
exploitation	  of	  market	  power.	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  on	  abuse	  of	  dominance	  is	  indeed	  complemented	  by	  
various	   instruments	  which	   focus	   on	   the	   definition	   of	   the	   relevant	  market	   in	   cases	   involving	   seller	  
market	  power,	  on	  the	  assessment	  of	  dominance	  as	  well	  as	  on	  the	  types	  of	  abuses	  powerful	  sellers	  
may	  commit.32	  However,	  where	  customers	  are	  subject	  in	  many	  industries	  to	  firms’	  market	  power	  in	  
business-­‐to-­‐consumer	  (B2C)	  relationships,	  we	  cannot	  but	  notice	  that	  the	  situation	  may	  be	  (radically)	  
different	  in	  business-­‐to-­‐business	  (B2B)	  relationships	  where	  producers	  may	  compete	  with	  each	  other	  
for	  the	  business	  of	  a	  few	  large	  potential	  customers.33	  In	  such	  cases,	  buyers	  are	  in	  fact	  likely	  to	  detain	  
a	  high	  degree	  of	  market	  power	  impacting	  on	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  the	  buyer-­‐supplier	  relationship	  
and	  possibly	  turning	  those	  large	  firms	  into	  price-­‐setters.	  
b) Concentrated	  sellers	  facing	  concentrated	  buyers	  
When	  firms	  interact	  through	  bilateral	  negotiations	  for	  the	  supply	  of	  goods,	  powerful	  buyers	  may	  be	  
in	  a	  position	  to	  extract	  a	  better	  deal	  from	  their	  suppliers.	  In	  case	  the	  selling	  side	  and	  the	  buying	  side	  
of	  the	  market	  are	  relatively	  concentrated	  for	  example,	  one	  can	  assume	  that	  both	  sellers	  and	  buyers	  
have	  a	  particular	  market	  power	  so	  that	  they	  are,	  to	  some	  extent,	  mutually	  interdependent.	  In	  such	  a	  
situation,	   buyers	   are	   in	   fact	   able	   to	   exercise	   countervailing	   power	   over	   their	   suppliers	   in	   order,	  
among	  other	  things,	  to	  bring	  prices	  closer	  to	  the	  competitive	  level.	  34	  Take	  for	  example	  the	  case	  of	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  See:	  Commission	  notice	  on	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  relevant	  market	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  Community	  competition	  
law,	  O.J.	  C372	  of	  09/12/1997;	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission	  –	  Guidance	  on	  the	  Commission’s	  
enforcement	  priorities	  in	  applying	  Article	  102	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty	  to	  abusive	  exclusionary	  conduct	  bye	  dominant	  
undertakings	  (Text	  with	  EEA	  relevance),	  O.J.	  C	  45/7	  of	  24/02/2009.	  
33	  B.J.Ruffle,	  Buyer	  countervailing	  power:	  A	  survey	  of	  experimental	  evidence	  (2005),	  available	  at:	  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=894664	  	  
34	  Z.CHEN,	  Buyer	  Power:	  Economic	  Theory	  and	  Antitrust	  Policy,	  22	  Research	  in	  Law	  and	  Economics	  17,	  at	  22	  
(2007).	  Conversely,	  when	  the	  existence	  of	  buyer	  power	  is	  examined,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  merger	  between	  
buyers	  for	  example,	  sellers	  may	  be	  deemed	  to	  have	  countervailing	  power	  and	  hence	  be	  able	  to	  constrain	  the	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bilateral	   monopoly	   which	   arises	   when	   an	   upstream	   monopolist	   faces	   only	   one	   customer,	   the	  
monopsonist	   firm.	   As	   each	   of	   them	   seeks	   to	  maximize	   profit,	   the	   former	   tempts	   to	   set	   the	   price-­‐
quantity	   combination	  where	  marginal	   revenue	   (MR)	   equates	  marginal	   cost	   (MC),	   that	   is	   (Q1,	   P1),	  
while	   the	   latter	   is	  willing	   to	   buy	   inputs	   up	   to	   the	   point	  where	  marginal	   factor	   cost	   (MFC)	   equates	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Market	  power	  on	  the	  buying	  side	  is	  thus	  used	  as	  a	  way	  to	  counter	  market	  power	  on	  the	  selling	  side	  
of	   the	   input	   market.	   Unlike	   the	   other	   forms	   of	   buyer	   power,	   countervailing	   power	   is	   exercised	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
exercise	  of	  monopsony	  or	  buyer	  power	  by	  the	  new	  entity.	  	  The	  concept	  of	  “countervailing	  buyer	  power”	  has	  
been	  first	  introduced	  by	  Galbraith	  to	  describe	  the	  ability	  of	  concentrated	  buyers	  to	  obtain	  lower	  prices	  from	  
suppliers	  and	  thereby	  counteract	  the	  adverse	  effects	  resulting	  from	  the	  exercise	  of	  market	  power	  at	  the	  
supplier	  level.	  See:	  J.K.Galbraith,	  American	  capitalism:	  the	  concept	  of	  countervailing	  power	  (1952).	  According	  to	  
Galbraith,	  concentration	  on	  the	  buying	  side	  and	  the	  exercise	  of	  countervailing	  power	  lead	  to	  lower	  prices	  on	  
the	  retail	  market	  as	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  price	  concessions	  obtains	  from	  suppliers	  are	  passed	  on	  to	  consumers.	  
The	  presence	  of	  large	  buyers	  would	  therefore	  be	  sufficient	  to	  restore	  competitive	  outcomes	  on	  the	  markets.	  
His	  theory	  has	  however	  raised	  some	  criticisms.	  (See	  for	  examples:	  G.Stigler,	  The	  economist	  plays	  with	  blocs,	  44	  
American	  Economic	  Review	  Papers	  and	  Proceeding	  7(1954)	  and	  A.Hunter,	  Notes	  on	  countervailing	  power,	  68	  
Economic	  Journal	  89	  (1958)).	  Although	  it	  is	  commonly	  recognized	  that	  the	  exercise	  of	  countervailing	  power	  
may	  bring	  about	  benefits	  to	  the	  markets	  and	  in	  particular	  to	  consumers	  as	  maintained	  by	  Galbraith,	  these	  are	  
not	  guaranteed	  in	  all	  circumstances	  but	  mainly	  depend	  on	  the	  level	  of	  competition	  in	  the	  downstream	  market.	  	  
See	  for	  example:	  P.W.Dobson	  and	  M.Waterson,	  Countervailing	  power	  and	  consumer	  price,	  107	  Economic	  
Journal	  418	  (1997)	  and	  Z.CHEN,	  Dominant	  retailers	  and	  the	  countervailing-­‐power	  hypothesis,	  34	  RAND	  Journal	  
of	  Economics	  612	  (2003)	  
35	  R.D.Blair	  &	  J.L.Harrison,	  Monopsony	  in	  Law	  and	  Economics	  (2010),	  at	  126-­‐127.	  If	  the	  monopsonist	  faced	  a	  
competitive	  upstream	  seller	  market,	  the	  supply	  curve	  would	  correspond	  to	  MC.	  In	  case	  of	  monopsony,	  profit-­‐
maximizing	  conduct	  leads	  the	  single	  buyer	  to	  set	  the	  quantity	  purchased	  where	  its	  demand	  curve	  and	  the	  
marginal	  factor	  costs	  curve	  intersect.	  See	  below,	  Point	  C	  on	  pure	  monopsony	  power.	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against	  a	  similarly	  strong	  market	  participant	  so	  that	  a	  certain	  balance	  of	  power	  is	  established	  in	  the	  
bargaining	   relationship	   between	   the	   buyer	   and	   the	   seller.	   One	   may	   assume	   that	   neither	   the	  
monopolist	  nor	  the	  monopsonist,	  given	  their	  significant	  market	  power,	  will	  behave	  competitively	  so	  
that	  neither	  of	  them	  will	  completely	  dominate	  the	  bargaining	  process	  and	  be	  able	  to	  impose	  one	  of	  
the	   two	   boundary	   equilibrium	   price-­‐quantity	   combinations.	   Instead,	   the	   equilibrium	   price	   will	   lie	  
between	   P1	   and	   P2	   and	   the	   parties	  will	   share	   the	   profit.36	   Negotiation	   outcomes	  will	   in	   fact	   vary	  
depending	  on	   the	  relative	  bargaining	  strength	  of	  each	  player	  at	  a	  given	   time	  and	  on	   the	  strategies	  
each	  of	  them	  will	  use	  in	  order	  to	  extract	  a	  larger	  share	  of	  that	  profit.37	  Used	  as	  countervailing	  power,	  
buyer	  power	  is	  likely	  to	  benefit	  consumers	  and	  improve	  economic	  efficiency	  because	  it	  may	  offset	  or	  
at	  least	  mitigate	  the	  harmful	  effects	  of	  sellers’	  market	  power	  by	  increasing	  output	  and	  thus	  lowering	  
prices	   to	   consumers.38	   Such	   a	   balance	   of	   powers	  may	   for	   example	   takes	   place	   in	   the	   relationship	  
between	  a	  large	  supermarket	  chain	  and	  a	  producer	  of	  a	  “must-­‐carry”	  brand,	  that	  is,	  a	  leading	  brand,	  
such	  as	  Coca-­‐Cola,	  that	  the	  retailer	  must	  have	  on	  its	  shelves	  at	  the	  risk	  of	  losing	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  
its	  customers.	  
Buyer	  power	   is	  mostly	  analysed	   in	   terms	  of	   countervailing	  power	   in	   the	  Commission	  decisions	  and	  
case	   law	   of	   the	   European	   Courts.	   It	   has	   already	   been	   noted	   in	   Point	   A	   of	   this	   Section	   that	   the	  
existence	   of	   countervailing	   buyer	   power	   constitutes	   a	   competitive	   constraint	   taken	   into	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  R.D.Blair	  &	  J.L.Harrison,	  op.cit.,	  at	  128-­‐131.	  
37	  See:	  R.SCHEELINGS	  &	  R.S.WRIGHT,	  “Sui	  Generis”?:	  an	  Antitrust	  Analysis	  of	  Buyer	  Power	  in	  the	  United	  States	  
and	  European	  Union,	  39	  Akron	  Law	  Review	  207,	  at	  219-­‐222	  (2006).	  The	  share	  of	  profits	  between	  the	  two	  
negotiators	  will	  mainly	  depend	  on	  the	  outside	  options	  available	  to	  each	  of	  them.	  Each	  party’s	  bargaining	  
strength	  increases	  with	  its	  outside	  options.	  Any	  change	  in	  behavior	  or	  market	  structure	  that	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  
wider	  range	  of	  alternative	  sources	  of	  supply	  available	  to	  the	  buyer	  or	  that	  would	  reduce	  the	  number	  of	  sales	  
channels	  available	  to	  the	  seller	  will	  allow	  the	  former	  to	  gain	  a	  larger	  share	  of	  the	  jointly	  realized	  profits,	  thereby	  
increasing	  its	  buyer	  power.	  See:	  R.Inderst	  &	  N.Mazzarotto,	  Buyer	  power	  in	  distribution,	  Chapter	  prepared	  for	  
the	  ABA	  Antitrust	  Section	  Handbook	  Issues	  in	  Competition	  Law	  and	  Policy	  (2006).	  The	  better	  the	  alternative	  
pay-­‐off	  in	  the	  event	  of	  no	  agreement,	  the	  more	  credible	  the	  threat	  of	  resorting	  to	  that	  alternative	  and	  the	  
stronger	  the	  firm’s	  bargaining	  power.	  In	  order	  to	  predict	  the	  likely	  outcome	  of	  the	  process	  of	  negotiation,	  
economists	  use	  bargaining	  theory	  which	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  parties’	  best	  alternative	  outcomes	  (or	  their	  
fallback	  positions)	  in	  the	  event	  of	  no	  agreement	  but	  also	  their	  attitudes	  to	  risk	  and	  their	  degree	  of	  impatience.	  
Risk	  aversion	  adversely	  affect	  the	  player’s	  bargaining	  power	  as	  he	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  accept	  a	  lower	  share	  of	  
surplus	  in	  order	  to	  minimize	  the	  risk	  of	  breakdown.	  A	  high	  degree	  of	  impatience	  also	  weakens	  the	  bargaining	  
position.	  The	  more	  eager	  a	  firm	  is	  to	  strike	  a	  deal,	  the	  more	  incited	  it	  is	  to	  compromise	  and	  to	  reach	  an	  
agreement	  without	  delay	  even	  if	  it	  means	  obtaining	  a	  lower	  share	  of	  the	  surplus.	  On	  the	  basic	  principle	  of	  
bargaining	  theory	  see:	  F.Carmichael,	  A	  Guide	  to	  Game	  Theory	  (2005),	  at	  238-­‐264	  and	  A.Muthoo,	  A	  non-­‐
technical	  introduction	  to	  bargaining	  theory,	  1	  World	  Economics	  145	  (2000)	  
38	  P.W.DOBSON,	  M.WATERSON	  &	  A.CHU,	  The	  Welfare	  Consequences	  of	  the	  Exercise	  of	  Buyer	  Power,	  Research	  
paper	  prepared	  for	  the	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading,	  1998,	  at	  17-­‐21,	  available	  at:	  
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft239.pdf;	  See	  also:	  J.Engle-­‐Warnick	  &	  B.J.Ruffle,	  
Buyer	  concentration	  as	  a	  source	  of	  countervailing	  power:	  Evidence	  from	  experimental	  posted-­‐offer	  markets,	  
September	  2005,	  available	  at:	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=310339	  and	  Z.CHEN,	  Buyer	  
Power:	  Economic	  Theory	  and	  Antitrust	  Policy,	  22	  Research	  in	  Law	  and	  Economics	  17	  (2007)	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consideration	   in	   the	   assessment	   of	   a	   supplier’s	   dominance.39	   As	   it	  will	   be	   developed	   in	   chapter	   2,	  
Section	  1	  below,	  the	  countervailing	  role	  that	  buyers	  may	  play	  in	  some	  markets	  is	  also	  considered	  by	  
the	  Commission	  when	  enforcing	  the	  Merger	  Regulation.	  Countervailing	  power	  exerted	  by	  buyers	  may	  
indeed	  prevent	  a	  merger	  between	  suppliers	   from	  constituting	  a	  significant	   impediment	  of	  effective	  
competition.40	  On	   that	  matter,	   the	  Enso/Stora	   case	  constitutes	  a	   landmark	  decision.41	   In	   that	   case,	  
the	  Commission	   cleared	   a	  merger	   between	   suppliers	   of	   liquid	  packaging	  board	   even	   though	   those	  
merging	  parties	  had	  a	  combined	  market	  share	  of	  more	  than	  60%,	  a	  position	  far	  ahead	  of	  the	  other	  
players	  in	  the	  relevant	  market.	  In	  fact	  the	  operation	  was	  cleared	  solely	  on	  basis	  of	  the	  domination	  of	  
a	  company,	  namely	  Tetra	  Pak,	   in	  the	  buying	  market.	  Tetra	  Pak’s	  countervailing	  power	  was	  deemed	  
sufficient	   to	   counteract	   the	   increase	   in	  market	   power	   of	   the	  merged	   entity	   in	   the	  upstream	   seller	  
market.	  
However,	   where	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   exercise	   of	   countervailing	   power	   by	   some	   buyers	   are	   a	   priori	  
positive,	  we	  will	  see	  that,	  depending	  on	  the	  symmetry/asymmetry	  of	  the	  upstream	  and	  downstream	  
markets,	  the	  impact	  of	  such	  bargaining	  power	  may	  also	  raise	  some	  competitive	  concerns.	  
c) Atomistic	  sellers	  facing	  concentrated	  buyers	  
In	  case	  concentrated	  buyers	  face	  atomistic	  sellers,	   the	  balance	  of	  power	   is	   likely	  to	  tilt	   in	  favour	  of	  
the	   former	  who	  will	   hence	   be	   able	   to	   exercise	   buyer	  market	   power	   over	   the	   latter.	  Where	   buyer	  
power	   is	   often	   called	   monopsony	   power,	   a	   distinction	   can	   nevertheless	   be	   drawn	   between	   pure	  
monopsony	  power,	  which	  involves	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  quantity	  purchased,	  and	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  
power	  which	  leads	  to	  lower	  prices	  without	  affecting	  the	  volume	  of	  purchases.	  
i. Pure	  monopsony	  power	  
In	  the	  standard	  textbook	  model	  of	  monopsony	  power,	  as	  described	  by	  Professors	  Blair	  and	  Harrison,	  
buyers	  and	  sellers	  interact	  via	  a	  market	  interface.42	  Facing	  competitive	  sellers	  and	  assuming	  that	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  See	  :	  Guidance	  on	  the	  Commission’s	  enforcement	  priorities	  in	  applying	  Article	  102	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  at	  
18.	  Countervailing	  power	  held	  by	  buyers	  may	  deter	  or	  defeat	  an	  attempt	  by	  a	  large	  seller	  to	  profitably	  increase	  
prices.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  seller	  in	  question	  is	  not	  able	  to	  act	  to	  an	  appreciable	  extent	  independently	  of	  its	  
customers	  and	  does	  not	  therefore	  fall	  within	  the	  definition	  of	  dominance.	  
40	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  assessment	  of	  horizontal	  mergers	  under	  the	  Council	  Regulation	  on	  the	  control	  of	  
concentrations	  between	  undertakings,	  O.J.	  C	  31	  of	  05/02/2004,	  at	  64.	  Power	  of	  some	  buyers	  may	  neutralize	  
the	  ability	  of	  the	  merging	  firm	  to	  raise	  prices	  in	  future.	  Depending	  on	  the	  situation,	  the	  existence	  of	  buyer	  
power	  can	  constitute	  a	  decisive	  factor	  leading	  the	  Commission	  to	  give	  clearance	  for	  a	  merger	  among	  sellers.	  	  	  
41	  Enso/Stora,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1225,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  25	  November	  1998.	  
42	  R.D.Blair	  &	  J.L.Harrison,	  op.cit..	  The	  text	  book	  view	  is	  mostly	  relevant	  for	  competitive	  commodity	  markets	  
where	  a	  large	  number	  of	  producers	  sell	  their	  products	  on	  the	  spot	  market.	  However,	  nowadays,	  even	  for	  the	  
purchase	  of	  those	  commodities,	  buyers	  tend	  to	  resort	  to	  contracts	  and	  interact	  with	  sellers	  through	  bilateral	  
negotiations	  in	  order,	  in	  particular,	  to	  insure	  product	  quality	  and	  uniformity	  as	  well	  as	  to	  introduce	  a	  form	  of	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supply	  side	  is	  represented	  by	  an	  upward-­‐sloping	  supply	  curve,	  a	  monopsonist	  is	  able	  to	  obtain	  lower	  
prices	  by	  reducing	   its	  demands.43	  This	  occurs	  when	  a	  single	  buyer	   is	  acting	   in	  the	   input	  market	  but	  
also	  when	  a	  buyer	  has	  a	  sufficiently	  large	  share	  of	  the	  market	  so	  that	  its	  purchasing	  policy	  is	  likely	  to	  
influence	   prices	   in	   the	   whole	   market	   or	   when	   some	   buyers	   recognize	   their	   common	   interest	   in	  
restricting	  collective	  purchases	  (oligopsony).44	  A	  reduced	  demand	  for	  inputs	  may	  also	  be	  the	  result	  of	  
an	   explicit	   agreement	   between	   competing	   buyers	   who	   collude	   to	   depress	   prices	   (collusive	  
monopsony).	  
In	   a	   competitive	   industry,	   the	   competitive	   equilibrium	   is	  where	   the	   demand	   curve	   and	   the	   supply	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As	  the	  purchase	  of	  an	  additional	  unit	  of	  input	  leads	  to	  a	  higher	  price	  for	  all	  the	  other	  units	  purchased,	  
the	  marginal	  cost	  of	  that	  additional	  unit	  includes	  not	  only	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  unit	  in	  question	  but	  also	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
traceability	  and	  preservation	  of	  identity.	  See:	  B.Vorley,	  Food,	  Inc.	  Corporate	  concentration	  from	  farm	  to	  
consumer,	  UK	  Food	  Group,	  London	  (2003),	  at	  8-­‐9.	  
43	  A	  supply	  curve	  is	  upward-­‐sloping	  when	  the	  market	  price	  for	  a	  good	  increases	  as	  a	  higher	  quantity	  of	  that	  
good	  is	  supplied,	  due	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  marginal	  costs	  for	  the	  input	  suppliers.	  According	  to	  J.M.Jacobson	  and	  
G.J.Dorman,	  the	  supply	  curve	  is	  rarely	  upward	  sloping	  as,	  even	  in	  case	  of	  resource	  scarcity,	  if	  economies	  of	  
scale	  are	  present,	  the	  supply	  curve	  will	  tend	  to	  flatten	  out.	  They	  consider	  that	  only	  two	  types	  of	  markets	  are	  
likely	  to	  be	  characterized	  by	  an	  upward	  supply	  curve,	  namely	  labor	  markets	  and	  agricultural	  markets.	  With	  
regard	  to	  the	  latter,	  producers	  use	  first	  their	  most	  productive	  land.	  If	  demand	  increases,	  they	  will	  have	  to	  use	  
less	  productive	  land	  so	  that	  the	  additional	  output	  units	  will	  cost	  more	  and	  hence	  be	  more	  expensive.	  See:	  
J.M.Jacobson	  &	  G.J.Dorman,	  Monopsony	  revisited	  :	  a	  comment	  on	  Blair	  &	  Harrison,	  37	  The	  Antitrust	  Bulletin	  
151,	  at	  156-­‐157	  (1992)	  
44	  P.W.DOBSON,	  M.WATERSON	  &	  A.CHU,	  op.cit.,	  at	  13.	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cost	  increase	  on	  the	  other	  units.	  The	  curve	  representing	  the	  cost	  of	  each	  additional	  unit	  of	  input	  to	  a	  
monopsonist,	  called	  the	  “marginal	  factor	  cost”	  (MFC),	  is	  consequently	  higher	  than	  the	  marginal	  cost	  
of	  production.	  In	  order	  to	  maximize	  profits,	  the	  monopsonist	  will	  hence	  buy	  up	  to	  the	  point	  where	  its	  
demand	   equals	   its	  marginal	   factor	   cost.45	   As	   shown	   in	   figure	   4,	   by	  moving	   down	   along	   the	   supply	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Such	  reduction	  of	  purchases	  benefits	  all	  competing	  buyers	  in	  the	  input	  market	  but	  entails	  economic	  
inefficiency	   and	   possible	   harm	   to	   consumers.	   The	   effects	   of	   pure	   monopsony	   power	   are	   indeed	  
symmetrical	   to	   those	   of	  monopoly.	   In	   both	   situations,	   there	   is	   a	  wealth	   transfer	   –	   from	   the	   input	  
seller	  to	  the	  input	  buyer	  in	  case	  of	  monopsony46	  and	  from	  end	  consumers	  to	  output	  sellers	  in	  case	  of	  
monopoly	  -­‐,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  deadweight	  social	  welfare	  loss	  represented	  by	  the	  triangle	  (ABC).	  In	  effect,	  
because	  of	   the	  private	  profit	  maximization	  objective	  of	   the	  buyer,	   too	   few	   inputs	  are	  purchased	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  R.D.Blair	  &	  J.L.Harrison,	  op.cit.,	  at	  43.	  The	  demand	  curve	  represents	  the	  marginal	  revenue	  product	  curve,	  
that	  is,	  the	  additional	  revenue	  generated	  by	  employing	  one	  more	  unit	  of	  the	  input.	  
46	  Producer	  surplus	  declines	  by	  the	  area	  P(c)BMP(c)	  while	  buyer	  surplus	  increases	  by	  the	  difference	  between	  
the	  rectangle	  P(c)DBP(m)	  and	  triangle	  ABD.	  See:	  L.Alexander,	  Monopsony	  and	  the	  Consumer	  Harm	  Standard,	  95	  
The	  Georgetown	  Law	  Journal	  1611,	  at	  1616-­‐1617	  (2007)	  
Final	  version	  -­‐	  Mai	  2014	   	  
22	  
	  
comparison	   with	   the	   social	   optimal	   level	   so	   that	   the	   quantity	   exchanged	   leads	   to	   allocative	  
inefficiency.47	  
As	  regards	  the	  effects	  in	  the	  output	  market,	  the	  impact	  on	  consumer	  prices	  mainly	  depends	  on	  the	  
position	   of	   the	   monopsonist	   in	   that	   market.	   If	   it	   also	   has	   market	   power	   as	   a	   seller,	   the	   reduced	  
quantity	  of	   inputs	  purchased	   in	   the	  upstream	  market	  will	   lead	   to	   the	  production	  of	   fewer	  outputs	  
and	  thus	  to	  higher	  prices	  for	  consumers,	  given	  a	  downward	  sloping	  demand	  curve	  in	  the	  downstream	  
market.	   The	   presence	   of	   seller	   power	   will	   consequently	   entail	   an	   additional	   welfare	   loss.	   On	   the	  
other	   hand,	   if	   the	   monopsonist	   faces	   a	   competitive	   output	   market	   where	   competitors	   have	   the	  
capacity	  to	  increase	  production,	  consumer	  prices	  may	  be	  unaffected	  as	  other	  firms	  may	  make	  up	  for	  
the	  shortfall	  in	  output.48	  For	  example,	  a	  processor	  may	  be	  the	  only	  buyer	  in	  a	  local	  input	  market,	  such	  
as	  the	  livestock	  market,	  due	  to	  the	  high	  costs	  of	  transporting	  such	  a	  product.	  Once	  the	  meat	  is	  cut	  up	  
and	   packaged	   however,	   the	   relevant	   geographic	  market	  may	   be	   national	   or	   even	   international	   in	  
scope.	   A	   similar	   example	   may	   be	   found	   in	   the	   labour	   market.	   Where	   a	   company	   constitutes	   the	  
largest	  employer	  in	  a	  particular	  local	  area,	  it	  may	  use	  its	  market	  power	  by	  restricting	  the	  amount	  of	  
labor	  it	  demands	  in	  order	  to	  drive	  down	  salaries.	  Even	  though	  such	  conduct	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  decrease	  in	  
output	  production,	  the	  price	  to	  end	  consumers	  may	  remain	  unchanged	  as	  the	  final	  product	  market	  is	  
likely	   to	  be	  much	  broader	  and	  competitive.49	  However,	  as	  Professor	  Noll	  notes,	  even	   though	  other	  
firms	  are	  able	  to	  increase	  their	  production,	  consumers	  are	  nevertheless	  not	  insulated	  from	  potential	  
negative	  effects	   resulting	   from	  the	  exercise	  of	  monopsony	  power.	   In	   fact,	   the	  expansion	  of	  output	  
production	  by	  the	  monopsonist’s	  competitors	  may	  be	  carried	  out	  by	  using	  less	  productive	  inputs	  and	  
thus	  requires	  more	  resources	  than	  would	  have	  been	  used	  in	  absence	  of	  monopsony.	  As	  a	  result,	  this	  
is	  likely	  to	  make	  consumers	  worse	  off	  in	  the	  downstream	  market.50	  
Monopsony	  or	  collusive	  monopsony	  may	  also	  appear	  in	  case	  of	  supply	  inelasticity,	  that	  is	  when	  the	  
supply	   curve	   is	   drawn	   as	   a	   vertical	   line	   so	   that	   any	   change	   in	   price	   will	   not	   affect	   the	   quantity	  
supplied.	  Examples	  of	  inelastic	  supply	  curve	  may	  be	  found	  in	  the	  agricultural	  sector	  where	  perishable	  
commodities	  cannot	  be	  restricted	  to	  respond	  to	  changes	  in	  price.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  a	  monopsonist	  can	  
artificially	   reduce	   its	   demand	   for	   the	   product	   in	   question	   in	   order	   to	   depress	   prices.	   As	   shown	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  R.D.Blair	  &	  J.L.Harrison,	  op.cit.,	  at	  44-­‐45.	  Allocative	  efficiency	  occurs	  when	  resources	  available	  are	  allocated	  
in	  a	  way	  that	  meets	  the	  wants	  and	  needs	  of	  society	  so	  that	  no	  one	  can	  be	  made	  better	  off	  without	  others	  
becoming	  worse	  off.	  Allocative	  efficiency	  is	  achieved	  at	  the	  point	  where	  supply	  and	  demand	  are	  equal,	  that	  is	  
in	  this	  case,	  where	  “the	  value	  of	  the	  labor	  services	  as	  measured	  by	  the	  value	  of	  the	  marginal	  product	  (or	  the	  
demand	  price)	  is	  just	  equal	  to	  the	  cost	  to	  society	  of	  providing	  that	  quantity	  as	  measured	  by	  the	  supply	  price.”	  
48	  P.W.DOBSON,	  M.WATERSON	  &	  A.CHU,	  op.cit.,	  at	  12-­‐13.	  
49	  For	  an	  example	  of	  buyer	  power	  exercised	  in	  the	  labor	  market,	  see	  :	  R.D.Blair	  &	  J.L.Harrison,	  The	  
measurement	  of	  monopsony	  power,	  37	  The	  Antitrust	  Bulletin	  133	  (1992).	  See	  also:	  A.Manning,	  Monopsony	  in	  
motion	  –	  Imperfect	  competition	  in	  labor	  markets	  (2003).	  
50	  R.G.Noll,	  «	  Buyer	  power	  »	  and	  economic	  policy,	  72	  Antitrust	  Law	  Journal	  589,	  at	  599-­‐600	  (2005)	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figure	   5,	   this	   will	   not	   result	   in	   a	   movement	   down	   along	   the	   supply	   curve	   but	   in	   a	   downward	  
movement	  of	  the	  whole	  demand	  curve.51	  
Figure	  5	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Consequently,	   suppliers	  will	   receive	   less,	   P2.Q1	   instead	   of	   P1.Q1,	   for	   the	   same	   quantity	  while	   the	  
difference	  will	  be	  absorbed	  by	  the	  monopsonist.	  Again,	  no	  reduction	  in	  quantity	  occurs	  in	  the	  short-­‐
run.	  However,	  depressed	  prices	   reduce	  producer	  profits	  and	  may	  hence	   lead	   them	  to	   reduce	   their	  
production	  in	  the	  future	  and	  so	  consumer	  welfare.52	  
	  
The	   issue	   of	   monopsony	   power	   is	   pointed	   out	   in	   the	   Guidelines	   on	   the	   assessment	   of	   horizontal	  
mergers.	  The	  Commission	  considers	  indeed	  that	  mergers	  creating	  or	  strengthening	  buyer	  power	  may	  
constitute	  a	  competitive	  concern,	  in	  particular,	  if	  the	  new	  entity	  would	  be	  able	  to	  obtain	  lower	  prices	  
by	  reducing	  its	  purchases	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market.53	  However,	  it	  turns	  out	  that,	  in	  practice,	  the	  
exercise	   of	   pure	   monopsony	   power	   is	   not	   envisaged	   by	   the	   EU	   institutions	   when	   enforcing	   the	  
Merger	  Regulation	  and	  the	  other	  competition	  rules.	  The	  focus	  is	  rather	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  buyer	  power	  
exercised	  without	  necessarily	  reducing	  the	  level	  of	  purchase	  of	  inputs.	  Those	  effects	  may	  for	  example	  
consist	   in	   input	   foreclosure	   when	   a	   buyer	   uses	   its	   market	   power	   in	   the	   procurement	   market	   to	  
restrict	   rivals’	   access	   to	  an	   input	   supplier.54	  Buyer	  power	  may	   indeed	  be	  exerted	   through	  different	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  R.D.Blair	  &	  J.L.Harrison,	  op.cit.,	  at	  79-­‐82.	  
52	  Ibid.,	  at	  82.	  
53	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  assessment	  of	  horizontal	  mergers,	  op.cit.,	  at	  61.	  
54	  See,	  for	  examples:	  Rewe/Meinl,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1211,	  op.cit.,	  at	  71-­‐74	  and	  Kesko/Tuko,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.784,	  
op.cit.,	  at	  157-­‐158.	  In	  those	  cases,	  the	  Commission	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  mergers	  would	  significantly	  increase	  
the	  parties’	  market	  power	  in	  the	  procurement	  market.	  Consequently,	  competitors	  would	  have	  difficulty	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practices	   and	   affect	   not	   only	   prices	   in	   the	   upstream	   and	   downstream	   markets	   but	   also	   product	  
quality,	  diversity	  or	  consumer	  choice.	  
	  
ii. Buyer	  power	  
Pure	  monopsony	  power	  constitutes	  a	  narrow	  definition	  of	  buyer	  power	  as	   large	  buyers	  may	  obtain	  
lower	  prices	  without	  withholding	  demand	  or	  may	  extract	   other	   concessions.	   This	   is	   possible	  when	  
firms	   interact	   through	   bilateral	   negotiations	   for	   the	   supply	   of	   goods.	   In	   such	   a	   case,	   a	   buyer	   is	  
deemed	  to	  have	  market	  power	  where	  he	  is	  able	  to	  significantly	  influence	  the	  transaction	  conditions	  
to	  its	  advantage.	  Even	  though	  there	  is	  no	  general	  consensus	  on	  the	  definition	  of	  buyer	  power	  in	  such	  
a	   situation,	   the	   term	   is	   related	   to	   the	  ability	  of	   a	  buyer	   to	  negotiate	  prices	  below	   the	   competitive	  
level	  and/or	  other	  advantageous	  conditions,	  non-­‐cost	  related,	  in	  comparison	  to	  those	  offered	  to	  his	  
competitors.55	  In	  a	  report	  on	  buying	  power,	  the	  OCDE	  similarly	  defines	  buyers	  power	  as	  
“the	   situation	   which	   exists	   when	   a	   firm	   or	   a	   group	   of	   firms,	   either	   because	   it	   has	   a	  
dominant	  position	  as	  a	  purchaser	  of	  a	  product	  or	  a	  service	  or	  because	  it	  has	  strategic	  or	  
leverage	  advantages	  as	  a	  result	  of	  its	  size	  or	  other	  characteristics,	  is	  able	  to	  obtain	  from	  
a	  supplier	  more	  favourable	  terms	  than	  those	  available	  to	  other	  buyers.”56	  
Under	   the	  Canadian	  draft	  enforcement	  guidelines	  on	  abuse	  of	  dominance	  of	  2012,	  buyer	  power	   is	  
deemed	  to	  exist	  when	  
“a	  single	  firm	  or	  group	  of	  firms	  has	  the	  ability	  of	  profitably	  depress	  prices	  paid	  to	  sellers	  
to	  a	  level	  that	  is	  below	  the	  competitive	  price	  for	  a	  significant	  period	  of	  time.”57	  
With	  regard	  to	   the	  definition	  of	  market	  power	  on	  the	  selling	  side,	   the	  Canadian	  guidelines	  make	   it	  
clear	   that	   the	   term	  “price”	   refers	   to	  all	   aspects	  of	   firms’	   actions	   that	  affect	   the	   interest	  of	  buyers,	  
such	  as	  a	  reduction	  in	  product	  quality,	  choice,	  service,	  innovation	  or	  other	  dimensions	  of	  competition	  
that	  buyers	  value.	  By	  analogy,	  one	  can	  assume	  that	  the	  clarification	  concerning	  the	  different	  aspects	  
covered	  by	  the	  term	  “price”	  is	  also	  applicable	  to	  buyer	  power	  cases.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
securing	  suppliers	  at	  prices	  comparable	  to	  those	  of	  the	  merging	  entities	  and	  effectively	  competing	  with	  them	  in	  
the	  downstream	  seller	  markets.	  Those	  two	  decisions	  will	  be	  further	  developed	  in	  chapter	  x.	  	  
55	  P.DOBSON	  &	  R.INDERST,	  Differential	  Buyer	  Power	  and	  the	  Waterbed	  Effect	  :	  Do	  Strong	  Buyers	  Benefit	  or	  
Harm	  Consumers	  ?,	  28	  European	  Competition	  Law	  Review	  393,	  at	  394	  (2007).	  	  
56	  OECD,	  Buying	  power:	  the	  exercise	  of	  market	  power	  by	  dominant	  buyers,	  Report,	  Paris,	  1981,	  at	  10.	  
57	  Draft	  enforcement	  guidelines	  on	  the	  abuse	  of	  dominance	  provisions	  (Section	  78	  and	  79	  of	  the	  Competition	  
Act),	  Competition	  Bureau	  Canada,	  March	  2012,	  at	  2,	  available	  at:	  
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-­‐bc.nsf/vwapj/Abuse-­‐Dominance-­‐2012-­‐03-­‐22-­‐
e.pdf/$file/Abuse-­‐Dominance-­‐2012-­‐03-­‐22-­‐e.pdf	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In	  order	   to	  obtain	   such	  concessions,	   the	  buyer	  uses	  all-­‐or-­‐nothing	  contracts	  according	   to	  which	  he	  
agrees	  to	  buy	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  units	  but	  only	  at	  a	  specified	  price	  which	  can	  be	  significantly	  lower	  
than	  the	  price	   for	   the	   last	  unit	  of	   that	  aggregate	  quantity	  given	  by	  the	  normal	  supply	  curve.58	   	  The	  
concessions	   obtained	   result	   hence	   not	   from	   the	   act	   of	   reducing	   purchases	   but	   from	   the	   threat	   of	  
moving	   to	   another	   supplier.	   Such	   take-­‐it-­‐or-­‐leave-­‐it	   contracts	   can	   occur	   only	   when	   buyers	   have	  
sufficient	   market	   power	   in	   the	   input	   market	   or	   constitute	   inevitable	   business	   partners	   to	   access	  
consumers	  so	  that	  suppliers	  cannot	  but	  accept	  the	  offer.	  This	  would	  be	  for	  example	  the	  case	  when	  
suppliers	  lack	  sufficient	  alternatives	  to	  sell	  their	  products.	  
As	   explained	   by	   Professors	   Blair	   &	   Harrison,	   when	   buyer	   power	   is	   exercised	   to	   obtain	   the	   lowest	  
possible	  prices	  without	   reducing	   the	  quantity	  purchased,	   the	  question	   facing	   suppliers	   is	  what	   the	  
maximum	   quantity	   they	   would	   sell	   at	   a	   particular	   price	   given	   that	   the	   alternative	   is	   not	   to	   sell	  
anything,	   or,	   put	   in	   another	   way,	   what	   the	   minimum	   price	   they	   would	   accept	   to	   provide	   each	  
quantity.	   Through	   a	   credible	   threat	   of	   buying	   nothing,	   buyers	   can	   in	   fact	   push	   suppliers	   off	   their	  
supply	   curve	  and	  onto	   their	   all-­‐or-­‐none	   supply	   curve	   represented	   in	   figure	  6,	  which	   lies	  below	   the	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58	  Monopsony	  and	  Buyer	  Power,	  OECD	  –	  Policy	  Roundtables,	  2008,	  DAF/COMP(2008)38,	  at	  32,	  available	  at:	  
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/63/44445750.pdf	  	  
59	  R.D.Blair	  &	  J.L.Harrison,	  op.cit.,	  at	  83.	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In	  a	  competitive	  market,	  the	  equilibrium	  quantity	  and	  price	  would	  have	  been	  Q1	  and	  P1.	  However,	  
through	  the	  exercise	  of	  market	  power,	  a	  buyer	  or	  a	  group	  of	  buyers	  is	  able	  to	  get	  the	  same	  quantity	  
but	  at	  a	   lower	  price	  (P2),	   thereby	  absorbing	  a	   large	  part	  of	  producer	  surplus.	   	  This	  type	  of	  conduct	  
does	  not	  lead	  to	  output	  reduction	  in	  the	  downstream	  market	  and	  entails	  actually	  only	  distributional	  
consequences	  which,	  at	  first	  sight,	  do	  not	  constitute	  competition	  law	  concerns.	  In	  the	  long-­‐run,	  yet,	  
such	  behaviour	  might	  cause	  competition	  harm	  if	  suppliers	  were	  forced	  to	  reduce	  investments	  or	  to	  
leave	   the	   market	   due	   to	   excessively	   low	   prices.	   This	   might	   in	   turn	   lead	   to	   a	   decreased	   product	  
quality/variety	  in	  the	  downstream	  retail	  market	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  consumers.	  
In	  addition,	   it	   is	   important	  to	  note	  that,	  through	  the	  use	  of	  those	  all-­‐or-­‐nothing	  offers,	  buyers	  have	  
the	   ability	   not	   only	   to	   obtain	   low	   prices	   or	   extra	   discounts	   but	   also,	   for	   examples,	   to	   transfer	  
unjustified	  risks	  or	  costs	  to	  their	  suppliers,	  to	  place	  additional	  contractual	  obligations	  on	  them	  such	  
as	   most	   favoured	   customer	   clauses,	   exclusivity	   requirements	   or	   other	   restrictions	   with	   regard	   to	  
competitors,	  etc.	  The	  different	  ways	  buyer	  power	  may	  manifest	  itself	  will	  be	  further	  illustrated	  below	  
in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  retail	  sector.	  We	  can	  already	  mention	  that	  it	  is	  probably	  through	  some	  of	  those	  
other	  practices,	  not	  directly	  related	  to	  a	  reduction	  in	  purchasing	  prices,	  that	  buyer	  power	  is	  likely	  to	  
raise	  competitive	  concerns.	  
As	   mentioned	   above,	   in	   the	   few	   cases	   where	   buyer	   power	   was	   assessed	   by	   the	   Commission,	  
concerns	  were	  not	  about	   the	  ability	  of	  buyers	   to	  decreases	  prices	   through	  the	  purchase	  of	   smaller	  
quantities	  but	   rather	  on	   their	   ability	   to	   achieve	   the	   same	   result	   by,	   for	   example,	   threatening	   their	  
suppliers	   to	   stop	  doing	  business	  with	   them.	  By	   so	  doing,	   buyers,	  who	  detain	  market	   power	   in	   the	  
upstream	  buyer	  market,	  are	  able	  to	  obtain	  lower	  prices	  or	  other	  concessions	  without	  reducing	  their	  
purchases.	   This	   is	   particularly	   common	   in	   the	   grocery	   retail	   sector	   where	   supermarket	   chains	  
exercise	   significant	   buyer	   power	   over	   their	   suppliers.	   In	   different	   decisions,	   the	   Commission	  
underlined	   indeed	  that	   large	  retailers	  can	  extract	  better	  terms	  and	  conditions	  from	  food	  producers	  
due	  to	  different	  factors	  which	  increase	  their	  outside	  options	  and	  turn	  them	  into	  unavoidable	  trading	  
partners	  for	  their	  suppliers.60	  Even	  though	  such	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  does	  not	  lead	  directly	  to	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  See	  for	  example:	  Kesko/Tuko,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.784,;	  Rewe/Meinl,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1221,	  and	  Carrefour/Promodes,	  
Case	  No	  COMP/M.1684,	  op.cit.	  In	  those	  decisions,	  the	  Commission	  considered	  in	  particular	  that	  the	  increasing	  
use	  of	  private	  labels,	  that	  is	  brands	  produced	  by	  retailers,	  reinforces	  the	  latter’s	  buyer	  power.	  It	  was	  also	  
highlighted	  that,	  due	  to	  the	  large	  number	  of	  alternatives	  available	  to	  supermarket	  chains,	  the	  latter	  can	  easily	  
(threat	  to)	  switch	  to	  other	  suppliers.	  However,	  the	  high	  degree	  of	  concentration	  in	  the	  retail	  sector	  significantly	  
reduces	  producers’	  outside	  options	  and	  turns	  large	  retailers	  into	  gatekeepers.	  All	  those	  factors	  contribute	  to	  
strengthening	  supermarket	  chains’	  buyer	  power	  and	  enable	  them	  to	  force	  suppliers	  to	  lower	  prices	  and	  make	  
other	  concessions.	  On	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  in	  the	  retail	  sector,	  see,	  in	  particular,	  below	  Chapter	  2,	  
Section	  II.	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reduction	   in	   quantity	   and	   to	   higher	   prices	   in	   the	   downstream	   seller	  markets,	   it	  may	   nevertheless	  
entail	  some	  harmful	  effects	  on	  the	  different	  markets	  involved.	  
2. Potential	  effects	  of	  buyer	  power	  in	  the	  up-­‐	  and	  downstream	  markets	  
The	   exercise	   of	   market	   power	   by	   buyers,	   be	   it	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   countervailing	   power	   or	  
monopsony/buyer	  power,	  may	   lead	   to	   various	  potential	   effects	   on	   the	  different	  markets	   involved.	  
Those	  effects	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  different	  depending,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  on	  the	  position	  of	  the	  buyer	  in	  
the	  downstream	  retail	  market	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  on	  the	  symmetry/asymmetry	  of	  the	  upstream	  
markets.	  
a) Different	  relevant	  markets	  involved	  
Firms	   acting	   in	   the	   supply	   chain	   play	   different	   roles	   and	  may	   have	   a	   different	   position	   from	   one	  
market	   to	   another.	   They	   act	   as	   buyers	   in	   the	   upstream	   input	   market	   but	   also	   as	   sellers	   in	   the	  
downstream	  output/retail	  markets.	  The	  analysis	  of	  that	  downstream	  market	  is	  particularly	  relevant,	  
not	  because	  of	  the	  buyers’	  market	  power	  –	  as	  we	  assumed	  that	  consumers	  lack	  market	  power	  –,	  but	  
because	  the	  exercise	  of	  market	  power	  by	  buyers	  in	  the	  upstream	  market	  is	  likely	  to	  affect	  the	  latter’s	  
position	   in	   the	   downstream	   market	   when	   acting	   as	   sellers	   and	   vice	   versa.	   After	   examining	   the	  
existence	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  buyer	  power	  in	  the	  upstream	  market,	  one	  should	  therefore	  turn	  to	  the	  
situation	  in	  the	  downstream	  market.	  
Figure	  7	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We	  will	   see	  that	  when	  the	  same	  firms	  compete	  with	  each	  other	  as	  buyers	   in	   the	  upstream	  market	  
and	   as	   sellers	   in	   the	   downstream	  market,	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   and	   the	   resulting	   benefits	  
extracted	   from	   upstream	   suppliers	   constitute	   competitive	   advantages	   in	   the	   downstream	   market	  
likely	   to	   reinforce	   the	   firm’s	  position	  as	   sellers	   in	   that	  market.	  Conversely,	   a	   strong	  position	   in	   the	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downstream	   market	   increases	   a	   firm’s	   ability	   to	   exercise	   buyer	   power	   in	   the	   upstream	   market.	  
Where	   the	   creation	   or	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   results	   in	   enhancing	   seller	   power	   in	   the	   output	  
market,	   it	   is	   considered	   that	   lower	   prices	   are	   less	   likely	   to	   be	   brought	   to	   consumers	   and	   that	   the	  
latter	  may	  even	  end	  up	  worse	  off.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  emergence	  of	  both	  forms	  of	  market	  power	  
reduces	  the	  incitement	  of	  buyers	  to	  pass	  on	  lower	  prices	  to	  consumers.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  without	  
fierce	  competition	  in	  the	  output	  market,	  the	  acquisition	  of	  seller	  power	  due	  to	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  
power	   will	   give	   the	   firm	   the	   ability	   to	   increase	   consumer	   prices.61	   In	   merger	   cases	   for	   example,	  
competition	  authorities	  are	  thus	  less	  likely	  to	  authorize	  an	  operation	  which	  leads	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  
both	   countervailing	   power	   and	   market	   power	   in	   the	   downstream	   market.62	   In	   the	   few	   merger	  
decisions	  where	  buyer	  power	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  competitive	  concern,	  the	  Commission	   indeed	  
concluded	   that	   such	  power,	  when	  combined	  with	  market	  power	   in	   the	  downstream	  seller	  market,	  
was	  very	  likely	  to	  adversely	  affect	  competition	  through	  a	  strengthening	  of	  the	  merging	  firms’	  market	  
power	  both	  in	  the	  upstream	  and	  downstream	  markets.63	  	  This	  correlation	  between	  buyer	  and	  seller	  
market	   power	   and	   the	   resulting	   mutual	   reinforcement	   of	   those	   powers	   will	   be	   illustrated	   in	   the	  
section	  on	  the	  retail	  sector.	  
However,	  buyers	  competing	  in	  the	  upstream	  market	  for	  the	  purchase	  of	  goods	  do	  not	  necessarily	  act	  
in	   the	   same	   relevant	   market	   when	   selling	   their	   products.	   A	   same	   input	   may	   indeed	   be	   used	   to	  
produce	  different	  types	  of	  outputs	  not	  competing	  with	  each	  other	  in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market.	  
In	  addition,	   the	  relevant	  geographic	  upstream	  and	  downstream	  markets	  are	  not	  necessarily	  similar	  
so	  that	  a	  firm	  may	  face	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  competitors	  in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market	  than	  in	  the	  
upstream	  buyer	  market.	  As	  it	  has	  been	  developed,	  in	  particular,	  in	  some	  merger	  cases,	  the	  relevant	  
upstream	   input	  market	   is	   defined	   on	   basis	   of	   specific	   criteria	   focusing	   on	   suppliers’	   ability	   to	   find	  
alternative	   buyers	   or	   to	   produce	   alternative	   goods.64	   The	   definition	   of	   the	   downstream	   market,	  
however,	   primarily	   relies	   on	   consumers’	   ability	   to	   switch	   to	   readily	   substitutable	   products	   or	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  P.W.DOBSON,	  M.WATERSON	  &	  A.CHU,	  op.cit.,	  at	  19-­‐20.	  This	  is	  also	  true	  when	  buyer	  power	  is	  used	  as	  
countervailing	  power.	  See:	  P.W.Dobson	  and	  M.Waterson,	  Countervailing	  power	  and	  consumer	  price,	  107	  
Economic	  Journal	  418	  (1997);	  T.Ungern-­‐Sternberg,	  Countervailing	  power	  revisited,	  14	  International	  Journal	  of	  
Industrial	  Organization	  507	  (1996)	  and	  Z.Chen,	  Dominant	  retailers	  and	  countervailing	  power	  hypothesis,	  34	  
RAND	  Journal	  of	  economics	  612	  (2003)	  
62	  See:	  J.B.Kirkwood,	  Powerful	  buyers	  and	  merger	  enforcement,	  op.cit.,	  at	  42-­‐47.	  
63	  See:	  Kesko/Tuko,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.784;	  Rewe/Meinl,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1221	  and	  Carrefour/Promodes,	  Case	  No	  
COMP/M.1684,	  op.cit.	  The	  Commission	  pointed	  out	  that	  if	  a	  powerful	  buyer	  himself	  occupied	  a	  strong	  position	  
in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market,	  the	  incitement	  to	  pass	  on	  savings	  to	  consumers	  would	  be	  greatly	  reduced.	  In	  
addition,	  it	  considered	  that	  a	  spiral	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  put	  into	  motion	  where	  the	  reinforcement	  of	  buyer	  power	  in	  
the	  upstream	  market	  will	  strengthen	  the	  firm’s	  market	  power	  in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market	  and	  vice	  versa.	  
64	  On	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  relevant	  upstream	  buyer	  market,	  See	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  II,	  Point	  B,	  2,	  a)	  and	  
Part	  III,	  Chapter	  2,	  Section	  II,	  Point	  B,	  3,	  a).	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suppliers	  located	  in	  another	  geographic	  area.	  This	  last	  definition	  of	  the	  relevant	  market	  is	  thoroughly	  
spelt	  out	  in	  the	  Commission	  notice	  relating	  to	  that	  subject	  matter.65	  
Such	  difference	  between	  the	  upstream	  and	  downstream	  products	  and/or	  geographic	  markets	  is	  not	  
uncommon.	  As	  we	  pointed	  out	  above,	  a	  monopsonist,	  such	  as	  a	  meat	  packer,	  which,	  by	  definition,	  
detains	   significant	  buyer	  power	  over	  his	   suppliers	  may	   in	   fact	   lack	  market	  power	  as	  a	   seller	   in	   the	  
downstream	  market.	  The	  final	  product,	  processed	  meat	  after	  packaging	  in	  that	  case,	  is	  indeed	  easily	  
transportable	   in	   comparison	   with	   livestock	   so	   that	   the	   downstream	   market	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   much	  
broader	  than	  the	  local	  upstream	  market	  for	  the	  purchase	  of	  animals.	  Many	  agricultural	  products	  are	  
affected	   by	   high	   costs	   of	   transporting	   and	  must	   consequently	   be	   supplied	   in	   a	   limited	   geographic	  
area	  as	  well	  as	  in	  a	  limited	  time	  frame	  due	  to	  their	  perishable	  nature.66	  Take	  for	  example	  producers	  
of	   milk	   who	   are	   compelled	   to	   find	   buyers	   established	   near	   their	   farms	   in	   order	   to	   sell	   off	   their	  
production	   without	   bearing	   excessive	   additional	   costs.	   Accordingly,	   a	   dairy	   processor	   may	   be	   the	  
only	  buyer	  of	  milk	  in	  a	  local	  geographic	  area	  and	  held	  a	  monopsonistic	  position	  but	  nevertheless	  face	  
competitors	   in	   the	   downstream	   market	   as	   dairy	   products	   can	   be	   sold	   in	   a	   nation-­‐wide	   or	  
international-­‐wide	  market.	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   a	   buyer	   may	   lack	   market	   power	   in	   the	   upstream	   market	   but	   have	   a	   strong	  
position	  as	  a	  seller	  in	  the	  downstream	  market.	  Take	  for	  example	  the	  automotive	  industry	  which	  has	  a	  
high	   demand	   for	   steel	   products	   but	   face	   concentrated	   upstream	   sellers.	   Even	   though	   car	  
manufacturers	  are	  generally	  deemed	  to	  detain	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  market	  power	  over	  their	  suppliers,	  
they	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  exercise	  sufficient	  countervailing	  power	  when	  acting	  in	  an	  input	  market,	  such	  
as	  the	  steel	  procurement	  market,	  where	  competing	  buyers	  are	  not	  only	  other	  car	  manufacturers	  but	  
a	  multitude	  of	  firms	  which	  need	  the	  same	  input	  to	  produce	  different	  types	  of	  goods.	  Steel	  is	  indeed	  
also	   in	  high	  demand	   in	   the	  construction,	  household	  appliances	  and	  packaging	   sectors	   for	  example.	  
Consequently,	   as	   a	   buyer	   of	   that	   particular	   input,	   a	   car	   manufacturer	   will	   be	   subject	   to	   steel	  
producers’	   seller	   power.	  However,	  when	  putting	   on	   its	   “seller	   hat”,	   the	  manufacturer	   in	   question,	  
given	  the	  high	  market	  concentration	  in	  the	  automotive	  industry,	  is	  likely	  to	  exercise	  market	  power	  in	  
the	  downstream	  car	  market.	  
It	  is	  therefore	  particularly	  important	  to	  define	  separately	  the	  upstream	  and	  the	  downstream	  markets	  
as	  they	  are	  not	  necessarily	  aligned	  with	  each	  other.	  The	  size	  of	  those	  markets	  is	   indeed	  likely	  to	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Commission	  notice	  on	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  relevant	  market,	  op.cit.	  
66	  Farmers	  are	  indeed	  in	  most	  cases	  very	  impatient	  to	  strike	  a	  deal	  with	  buyers	  due	  to	  the	  perishable	  nature	  of	  
their	  products.	  They	  are	  also	  more	  risk	  averse	  than	  buyers	  when	  the	  latter	  account	  for	  a	  large	  fraction	  of	  their	  
total	  profit	  so	  that	  they	  are	  more	  willing	  to	  concede	  a	  larger	  share	  of	  profit	  to	  their	  customers	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  
that	  the	  negotiations	  break	  down.	  In	  addition,	  farmers’	  outside	  options	  are	  often	  less	  attractive	  and	  
consequently	  less	  credible,	  further	  reducing	  their	  bargaining	  power.	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different	  from	  both	  a	  geographical	  and	  product	  point	  of	  view	  and	  so	  the	  position	  of	  the	  firm	  in	  each	  
of	   them.	   The	   narrower	   the	   relevant	   market,	   the	   likelier	   an	   undertaking	   will	   be	   deemed	   to	   have	  
market	  power.	  An	  accurate	  definition	  of	   the	   relevant	  upstream	  and	  downstream	  markets	   is	  hence	  
essential	   to	   assess	   the	   degree	   of	   market	   power	   of	   the	   firm	   in	   question	   as	   well	   as	   to	   identify	   its	  
competitors	   and	   other	   competitive	   constraints	   that	   are	   capable	   of	   preventing	   it	   from	   using	   such	  
power	  in	  an	  improper	  way.	  
b) Exercise	  and	  potential	  effects	  of	  buyer	  power	  
The	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  and	  the	  effects	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  entail	  in	  the	  up-­‐	  and	  downstream	  markets	  
vary	  according	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  market	  power	  in	  those	  markets	  but	  also	  to	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  
of	   smaller	   firms	   acting	   along	   powerful	   buyers	   and	   sellers.67	   In	   the	   four	   following	   situations,	   we	  
examine	  briefly	   the	  potential	   impact	  of	   the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  depending	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  
the	  downstream	  and	  upstream	  markets.	   In	   the	   first	   case,	   one	  or	   a	   few	  big	  buyers	   share	   the	   input	  
market	   and	   do	   not	   face	   any	   powerful	   seller.	   The	   second	   situation	   involves	   symmetric	   buyers	   and	  
sellers	   where	   all	   players	   enjoy	   some	  market	   power.	   In	   the	   two	   last	   situations,	   asymmetry	   among	  
firms	  is	  envisaged	  in	  order	  to	  examine	  the	  effects	  of	  buyer	  power	  on	  smaller	  upstream	  sellers	  and	  on	  
smaller	  rival	  buyers.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  On	  different	  potential	  harmful	  effects	  of	  buyer	  power,	  see:	  See:	  J.B.Kirkwood,	  Powerful	  buyers	  and	  merger	  
enforcement,	  op.cit.	  Professor	  Kirkwood	  highlights	  ten	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  enhancement	  of	  buyer	  power	  
following	  a	  merger	  may	  lead	  to	  negative	  effects	  in	  the	  downstream	  market	  where	  the	  merged	  entity	  sells	  its	  
products	  and	  in	  the	  upstream	  market	  where	  it	  buys	  inputs.	  According	  to	  him,	  the	  acquisition	  of	  buyer	  power	  
through	  a	  merger	  may	  harm	  competition	  in	  the	  downstream	  market	  in	  five	  ways	  and	  in	  five	  others	  in	  the	  
upstream	  market.	  “In	  particular:	  (1)	  the	  merged	  firm	  may	  coerce	  or	  induce	  its	  suppliers	  to	  raise	  the	  costs	  if	  its	  
remaining	  rivals,	  enabling	  the	  merged	  firm	  to	  increase	  prices	  in	  downstream	  markets;	  (2)	  the	  merged	  firm	  may	  
extract	  price	  cuts	  or	  other	  concessions	  from	  its	  suppliers	  and	  they	  may	  react	  by	  increasing	  prices	  to	  other	  
buyers,	  allowing	  the	  merged	  firm	  to	  raise	  its	  own	  prices;	  (3)	  the	  merged	  firm	  may	  obtain	  discriminatory	  
concessions	  that	  are	  so	  large	  and	  long-­‐lasting	  that	  they	  enable	  the	  merged	  firm	  to	  drive	  out	  or	  greatly	  diminish	  
the	  market	  share	  of	  smaller	  buyers,	  increasing	  downstream	  concentration	  and	  making	  tacit	  or	  explicit	  collusion	  
more	  likely;	  (4)	  even	  if	  downstream	  prices	  fall	  as	  the	  merged	  firm	  takes	  share	  from	  its	  smaller	  rivals,	  their	  
destruction	  may	  deprive	  consumers	  of	  choices	  they	  preferred	  and	  depress	  overall	  consumer	  welfare;	  and	  (5)	  
the	  concessions	  obtained	  by	  the	  merged	  firm	  may	  allow	  it	  to	  become	  less	  efficient,	  less	  dynamic,	  and	  less	  
responsive	  to	  changing	  consumer	  preferences.”	  (See	  at	  47-­‐59)	  “A	  merger	  of	  buyers	  that	  enhances	  
countervailing	  power	  could	  also	  reduce	  competition	  upstream:	  (1)	  the	  merged	  firms’	  exercise	  of	  countervailing	  
power	  could	  diminish	  the	  returns	  that	  suppliers	  earn	  from	  research	  and	  development,	  curbing	  their	  incentive	  
to	  innovate;	  (2)	  alternately,	  by	  depressing	  suppliers’	  profits,	  the	  exertion	  of	  countervailing	  power	  may	  cause	  
suppliers	  to	  restrict	  the	  variety	  of	  products	  they	  offer;	  (3)	  if	  the	  merged	  firm	  concentrates	  all	  its	  purchases	  in	  a	  
single	  supplier,	  it	  could	  give	  that	  supplier	  monopsony	  power	  over	  atomistic	  suppliers	  further	  upstream;	  (4)	  a	  
merger	  that	  appears	  to	  create	  countervailing	  power	  may	  actually	  result	  in	  monopsony	  power	  if	  the	  structure	  of	  
the	  supplying	  tier	  changes	  and	  suppliers	  lose	  their	  market	  power;	  and	  (5)	  the	  merged	  firm’s	  exercise	  of	  
countervailing	  power	  may	  cause	  suppliers	  to	  collude	  in	  response,	  worsening	  consumer	  welfare.”	  (See	  at	  59-­‐66)	  
Most	  of	  those	  potential	  harmful	  effects	  on	  competition	  will	  be	  further	  developed	  in	  the	  next	  sections.	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i. Concentrated	  symmetric	  buyers	  facing	  atomistic	  suppliers	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In	  case	  of	  monopsony	  or	  symmetric	  oligopsony	  -­‐	  that	   is,	  a	  situation	  where	  a	  small	  number	  of	  firms	  
have	   (roughly)	  equal	   size	   -­‐,	   all	  buyers	  have	  presumably	  market	  power	  over	   their	   suppliers	  and	  can	  
exercise	  such	  power	  without	  constraints	  coming	  from	  the	  selling	  side	  if	  the	  latter	  is	  unconcentrated.	  
Facing	  few	  powerful	  customers,	  sellers	  are	  indeed	  in	  most	  cases	  devoid	  of	  any	  bargaining	  power	  and	  
hence	   unable	   to	  mitigate	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power.	   Such	  market	   structure	   can	   for	   example	   be	  
observed	  in	  the	  milk	  sector	  where	  milk	  produced	  by	  a	  large	  number	  of	  farmers	  is	  generally	  sold	  to	  a	  
limited	  number	  of	  dairy	  processors	   in	   the	  different	  Member	  States.	  The	  processing	  stage	   is	   indeed	  
much	  more	  concentrated	  than	  the	  production	  stage	  in	  the	  milk	  supply	  chain.68	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  The	  milk	  production	  sector	  may	  differ	  from	  one	  Member	  State	  to	  another	  in	  terms	  of	  market	  structures.	  In	  
different	  Member	  States,	  a	  progressive	  restructuring	  process	  has	  undergone	  the	  milk	  sector	  due,	  in	  particular,	  
to	  many	  farmers	  stopping	  their	  production	  activities.	  However,	  it	  remains	  that	  the	  dairy	  processing	  industry	  is	  
overall	  characterized	  by	  higher	  ratios	  of	  concentration	  at	  national	  level	  and	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  larger	  operators	  
than	  in	  the	  production	  sector.	  	  The	  milk	  supply	  chain	  is	  hence	  characterized	  by	  a	  numeric	  imbalance	  between	  
milk	  producers	  and	  their	  buyers.	  For	  example,	  in	  France,	  70%	  of	  farmers	  deal	  only	  with	  one	  buyer	  which	  
purchases	  milk	  from	  at	  least	  500	  producers.	  	  See:	  European	  Commission,	  Competition	  DG,	  Synopsis	  of	  Member	  
states’	  National	  Competition	  Authorities	  Contributions	  on	  the	  Milk	  Supply	  Chain,	  E2/AB/JCE/D(2009),	  Brussels,	  
23/11/2009.	  Dairy	  processors	  may	  be	  independent	  processing	  companies	  or	  farm-­‐owned	  cooperatives.	  Milk	  
producers	  can	  indeed	  reinforce	  their	  market	  position	  and	  bargaining	  power	  in	  the	  milk	  supply	  chain	  by	  entering	  
into	  cooperation	  arrangements,	  such	  as	  by	  grouping	  in	  cooperatives.	  However,	  the	  European	  Milk	  Board	  has	  
pointed	  out	  that,	  due	  in	  particular	  to	  the	  cooperatives’	  size	  and	  to	  the	  dependence	  of	  farmers	  on	  those	  
organizations,	  the	  interest	  of	  milk	  producer	  members	  are	  in	  fact	  not	  represented	  effectively	  so	  that	  they	  can	  
hardly	  obtain	  the	  expected	  benefits	  of	  such	  cooperation.	  The	  No.1	  dairy	  cooperative	  in	  Europe	  processes	  more	  
than	  10	  billion	  kg	  of	  milk	  from	  14	  800	  farmers	  a	  year	  and	  operates	  in	  25	  countries.	  According	  to	  the	  European	  
Milk	  Board,	  “the	  No.1	  cooperative	  is	  no	  exception	  in	  Europe.	  The	  dairies	  are	  becoming	  bigger	  and	  bigger,	  their	  
catchment	  areas	  for	  raw	  milk	  are	  constantly	  expanding.	  The	  individual	  member	  of	  the	  cooperative	  scarcely	  sees	  
a	  trace	  of	  the	  old	  values	  of	  involvement	  in	  decision-­‐making,	  solidarity	  and	  participation.	  S/he	  has	  practically	  no	  
opportunity	  any	  more	  to	  influence	  how	  ‘his/her	  cooperative’	  is	  run”.	  See:	  European	  Milk	  Board,	  Co-­‐operatives	  
–	  Between	  myth	  and	  reality	  –	  What	  dairy	  co-­‐operatives	  can	  do	  to	  strengthen	  the	  milk	  producers’	  position	  in	  the	  
market	  and	  what	  they	  cannot	  do,	  May	  2012,	  available	  at:	  
http://www.europeanmilkboard.org/fileadmin/Dokumente/Positions_EMB/12-­‐02_Positions/Cooperatives.pdf	  	  
Final	  version	  -­‐	  Mai	  2014	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As	  explained	  above,	  when	  buyer	  power	  is	  exercised	  in	  the	  form	  of	  pure	  monopsony	  power,	  involving	  
reduced	  purchases	   in	  order	   to	  decrease	   the	   selling	  price,	   this	   leads	   to	  a	  deadweight	   social	  welfare	  
loss	  which	  is	  likely	  to	  harm	  final	  consumers	  through	  higher	  prices.	  However,	  when	  buyers	  are	  able	  to	  
extract	   lower	   prices	   or	   other	   advantageous	   purchasing	   terms	   without	   affecting	   their	   volume	   of	  
purchases,	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   is	   often	   viewed	   as	   harmless	   or	   even	   beneficial	   since	   its	  
impact	   is	   purely	   distributional.	   Especially	   if	   the	   downstream	   market	   is	   characterized	   by	   fierce	  
competition,	   buyers	   will	   indeed	   probably	   pass	   on	   the	   lower	   prices	   obtained	   from	   suppliers	   to	  
consumers.	  From	  a	  consumer	  welfare	  standard	  focusing	  in	  particular	  on	  retail	  prices,	  the	  exercise	  of	  
buyer	  power	  without	  a	  reduction	  in	  quantity	  does	  not	  raise	  competitive	  concerns	  and	  is	  often	  viewed	  
as	  procompetitive.	  
Some	  nevertheless	  maintain	  that	  buyer	  power	  is	  not	  always	  harmless	  to	  consumers	  and	  may	  in	  some	  
cases	  negatively	   impact	   consumer	  welfare.	   For	   example,	  when	   the	  exercise	  of	  market	  power	  does	  
not	  result	  in	  obtaining	  lower	  prices	  from	  suppliers	  but	  in	  transferring	  to	  them	  unjustified	  costs/risks	  
or	   in	   imposing	   on	   them	   exclusivity	   obligations	  with	   no	   efficiency	   justification,	   consumers	   are	   very	  
unlikely	   to	   reap	   any	   benefit	   from	   the	   presence	   of	   powerful	   buyers	   in	   the	   upstream	   market.	   In	  
addition,	   turning	   from	  static	  welfare	   considerations	   to	  a	  dynamic	  perspective	  of	  buyer	  power,	   it	   is	  
possible	  to	  envisage	  that	  excessive	  transfer	  of	  wealth	  from	  suppliers	  to	  buyers	  reduces	  the	  long-­‐run	  
incentives	   of	   upstream	   sellers	   to	   innovate,	   to	   invest	   in	   quality	   product	   or	   to	   participate	   in	   the	  
production	  markets	  as	  their	  long-­‐term	  viability	  may	  be	  threatened.69	  	  The	  arguments	  supporting	  the	  
idea	   that	   competition	   authorities	   should	   take	   into	   greater	   consideration	   the	   potential	   long-­‐term	  
negative	   effects	   resulting	   from	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   and	   the	   impact	   such	   power	   has	   on	  
suppliers	  will	  be	   further	  developed	   in	   the	  next	   chapters.	   The	  various	  opinions	  about	   the	  effects	  of	  
buyer	  power	  are	  in	  fact	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  objectives	  of	  competition	  law.	  
ii. Concentrated	  symmetric	  buyers	  facing	  concentrated	  symmetric	  suppliers	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69	  P.C.Cartsensen,	  Buyer	  power	  and	  the	  horizontal	  merger	  guidelines:	  minor	  progress	  on	  an	  important	  issue,	  14	  
University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Journal	  of	  Business	  Law	  775,	  at	  799-­‐800	  (2012)	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When	   a	   limited	   number	   of	   symmetric	   buyers	   are	   able	   to	   exercise	   bargaining	   power	   over	   the	   few	  
powerful	  and	  also	  symmetric	  upstream	  sellers	  and	  then	  act	  in	  a	  competitive	  downstream	  market	  to	  
sell	  their	  products,	  buyer	  power	  is	  viewed	  as	  pure	  countervailing	  power	  and	  is	  very	  likely	  to	  benefit	  
consumers.	  Such	  power	  is	   in	  fact	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  buyer	  power	  which	  is	  so-­‐called	  countervailing	  
or	  bargaining	  power	  as	  it	  is	  used	  against	  similarly	  powerful	  sellers.	  It	  is	  generally	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  
positive	  strength	  since	  it	  may	  discipline	  the	  action	  of	  large	  firms	  in	  the	  upstream	  market.	  
A	   good	   example	   of	   such	   market	   structures	   can	   be	   found	   in	   the	   Enso/Stora	   case	   where	   the	  
Commission	  authorized	  a	  merger	  between	   two	   suppliers	  of	   liquid	  packaging	  board	   (LPB)	   given	   the	  
strong	   countervailing	   power	   of	   one	   of	   the	   customers,	   Tetra	   Pak.70	   The	   Commission	   indeed	  
considered	  that,	  after	  the	  transaction,	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  supply	  side	  would	  mirror	  the	  structure	  of	  
the	  demand	  side	  of	  the	  market	  for	  LPB	  with	  one	  large	  supplier	  (StoraEnso)	  and	  two	  smaller	  suppliers	  
facing	  one	  large	  buyer	  (Tetra	  Pak)	  and	  two	  smaller	  buyers.71	  Even	  though,	  in	  that	  case,	  firms	  were	  not	  
symmetric,	  as	  Tetra	  Pak	  and	  StoraEnso	  were	  larger	  than	  their	  competitors	  in	  their	  respective	  market,	  
the	   Commission	   nevertheless	   highlighted	   the	   existence	   of	   symmetry	   between	   the	   upstream	   and	  
downstream	  markets.	  It	  was	  considered	  that	  the	  two	  other	  smaller	  firms	  acting	  in	  each	  market	  were	  
very	  unlikely	  to	  be	  exploited	  or	  discriminated	  by	  the	  incumbents	  as	  it	  was	  not	  in	  the	  latter’s	  interest	  
to	  do	  so.72	  The	  exercise	  of	  countervailing	  power	  would	  hence	  benefit	  the	  whole	  market	  and	  prevent	  
competition	  distortion	  as	  though	  each	  firm	  had	  in	  fact	  the	  same	  degree	  of	  market	  power.	  
However,	  such	  procompetitive	  power,	  if	  it	  reaches	  a	  particularly	  high	  degree,	  is	  likely	  to	  fall	  into	  the	  
“darker	   side”	  of	  buyer	  power,	   that	   is,	  market	  power	  exercised	  against	   sellers	  devoid	  of	  bargaining	  
power	  who	  are	  hence	  subject	  to	  the	  rules	  of	  their	  powerful	  customers.	  Increasing	  buyer	  power	  may	  
indeed	   end	   up	   by	   taking	   away	   market	   power	   from	   sellers.	   In	   that	   case,	   the	   questions	   and	  
controversies	  about	  the	  long-­‐run	  impact	  of	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  would	  re-­‐emerge.	  The	  main	  
difficulty	   is	   to	   determine	   at	   what	   point	   the	   presence	   of	   buyer	   power	   does	   lead	   to	   imbalances	   of	  
power	  between	  buyers	  and	  sellers	  and,	  more	   importantly	  from	  a	  competition	   law	  point	  of	  view,	  at	  
what	  point	  does	  the	  exercise	  of	  such	  power	  may	  lead	  to	  anticompetitive	  effects.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  Enso-­‐Stora,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1225,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  25	  November	  1998.	  
71	  Ibid.,	  at	  74-­‐92.	  
72	  See:	  Korsnäs/AssiDomän	  Cartonboard,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.4057,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  12	  May	  2006.	  This	  case	  
concerned	  the	  same	  market	  as	  in	  the	  Enso/Stora	  case.	  The	  Commission	  authorized	  further	  consolidation	  in	  the	  
LPB	  market	  through	  a	  merger	  between	  the	  second	  and	  third	  suppliers.	  The	  strong	  position	  of	  Tetra	  Pak	  was	  
again	  highlighted	  and	  the	  Commission	  concluded	  that	  such	  buyer	  was	  able	  to	  exercise	  sufficient	  countervailing	  
power.	  It	  was	  pointed	  out	  that	  any	  discriminatory	  policy	  against	  Tetra	  Pak’s	  competitors	  would	  be	  counter-­‐
productive	  for	  the	  merging	  parties.	  Such	  conduct	  would	  indeed	  be	  likely	  to	  foreclose	  smaller	  buyers	  and	  
thereby	  reinforce	  even	  more	  Tetra	  Pak’s	  market	  power	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market.	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  among	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In	  an	  asymmetric	  upstream	  seller	  market,	  large	  but	  also	  smaller	  players	  compete	  with	  each	  other	  for	  
the	  supply	  of	  goods	  or	  services.	  Even	  though	  the	  size	  of	  a	  firm	  is	  not	  the	  only	  factor	  likely	  to	  give	  rise	  
to	  market	  power,	  large	  sellers	  are	  often	  in	  a	  better	  bargaining	  position	  when	  dealing	  with	  powerful	  
buyers.73	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  powerful	  buyers	  detain	  a	  different	  degree	  of	  buyer	  power	  depending	  on	  the	  
upstream	  business	  partner	  they	  are	  dealing	  with.	  In	  reference	  to	  the	  definitions	  given	  above,	  we	  can	  
say	  that	  concentrated	  buyers	  facing	  asymmetric	  sellers	  are	  able	  to	  exercise	  buyer	  power	  over	  smaller	  
suppliers	  and	  countervailing	  power	  over	   larger	  ones.	  The	  presence	  of	  powerful	   sellers	   in	   the	   input	  
market	  over	  which	  a	  large	  buyer	  can	  only	  exercise	  countervailing	  power	  does	  not	  preclude	  the	  buyer	  
in	  question	  from	  exercising	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  buyer	  power	  over	  the	  other	  market	  participants	  who	  are	  
not	  shielded	  from	  the	  extraction	  of	  unjustified	  and	  possibly	  anticompetitive	  terms	  of	  supply.74	   	   In	  a	  
bargaining	  interface	  where	  firms	  interact	  through	  bilateral	  negotiations,	  that	  situation	  is	  hence	  likely	  
to	  lead	  to	  discrimination	  among	  sellers.	  In	  fact,	  smaller	  actors	  in	  the	  upstream	  seller	  market,	  devoid	  
of	  bargaining	  power,	  will	  be	  forced	  to	  accept	  lower	  prices	  or	  less	  advantageous	  contractual	  terms	  in	  
comparison	   with	   their	   larger	   rivals.	   Accordingly,	   their	   competitive	   position	   will	   be	   weakened,	  
sometimes	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  they	  will	  be	  driven	  out	  of	  the	  market.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  Small	  firms	  may	  detain	  market	  power	  when	  they	  produce	  differentiated	  products	  for	  which	  consumer	  
demand	  is	  high.	  As	  retailers	  reflect	  consumer	  demand	  in	  their	  purchases	  in	  the	  upstream	  market,	  they	  will	  be	  
willing	  to	  pay	  more	  for	  the	  special	  features	  of	  the	  differentiated	  product	  in	  question.	  The	  relative	  size	  of	  the	  
supplier	  to	  the	  buyer	  is	  therefore	  not	  always	  determinant	  to	  assess	  market	  power	  of	  each	  of	  them.	  This	  is	  also	  
due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  market	  power	  mainly	  depends	  on	  outside	  option	  for	  each	  party.	  See:	  U.Heimeshoff	  &	  
G.J.Klein,	  Bargaining	  Power	  and	  Local	  Heroes,	  Düsseldorf	  Institute	  for	  Competition	  Economics,	  Discussion	  
Paper,	  No.87	  (2013),	  available	  at:	  http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70822	  	  
74	  The	  presence	  of	  some	  powerful	  sellers	  in	  the	  upstream	  market	  may	  indeed	  not	  be	  sufficient	  to	  prevent	  large	  
buyers	  from	  adversely	  affecting	  competition	  by	  exploiting	  their	  market	  power	  over	  smaller	  producers.	  The	  
same	  reasoning	  is	  held	  by	  the	  Commission	  in	  merger	  cases	  where	  buyer	  power	  may	  constitute	  a	  sufficient	  
competitive	  constraint	  likely	  to	  counteract	  the	  increase	  in	  market	  power	  of	  the	  new	  entity	  in	  the	  upstream	  
seller	  market	  unless	  that	  countervailing	  power	  is	  unlikely	  to	  shield	  smaller	  buyers	  from	  exploitative	  or	  
exclusionary	  conduct	  following	  the	  merger.	  By	  analogy,	  it	  may	  be	  concluded	  that	  the	  ability	  of	  some	  
manufacturers	  to	  exercise	  market	  power	  over	  large	  buyers	  does	  not	  exclude	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  latter	  exert	  
significant	  market	  power	  over	  smaller	  sellers	  and	  thereby	  potentially	  restrict	  or	  distort	  competition.	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The	   issue	   of	   the	   role	   of	   competition	   law	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   over	   smaller	  
sellers	  arises	  again	   in	  a	   situation	  of	  asymmetric	  upstream	  seller	  market.	   The	  competition	   rules	  are	  
not	  designed	  to	  protect	  weaker	  or	  inefficient	  firms	  but	  they	  may	  nevertheless	  intervene	  when	  buyer	  
power	   is	   used	   with	   the	   object	   or	   effect	   of	   lessening	   competition,	   by	   foreclosing	   competitors	   for	  
example,	  or	  when	  the	  exercise	  of	  such	  power	   in	   fact	  prevents	   the	  achievement	  of	   the	  competition	  
objectives.	  For	  example,	   large	  buyers	  could	  exploit	   their	  market	  power	  over	  smaller	  producers	  and	  
use	  coercive	  measures	  to	  prevent	  them	  from	  dealing	  with	  competing	  buyers	  in	  order	  to	  foreclose	  the	  
input	  market	  to	  the	  latter.75	  In	  addition,	  where	  some	  buyers’	  conduct	  is	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  a	  reduction	  
in	   product	   quality	   or	   diversity	   due	   to	   excessive	   pressure	   exerted	   on	   most	   suppliers,	   it	   may	   be	  
considered	   that	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   hinders	   the	   goals	   of	   competition.	   That	   issue	   will	   be	  
further	  developed	  in	  Part	  III.76	  
	  
iv. Asymmetry	  among	  buyers	  
Figure	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The	  presence	  of	  smaller	  actors	  on	  the	  buying	  side	  may	  also	  lead	  to	  discrimination	  but	  from	  suppliers	  
in	  that	  case.	  Where	  large	  buyers	  are	  able	  to	  exercise	  countervailing	  or	  buyer	  power	  over	  sellers	  and	  
to	  extract	  favourable	  terms	  of	  supply,	  such	  is	  not	  the	  case	  for	  all	  market	  participants.	  Smaller	  buyers	  
are	  thus	  often	  subject	  to	  higher	  purchasing	  prices	  due	  to	  their	   limited	  volume	  of	  purchases	  -­‐	  which	  	  
prevents	  them	  from	  benefiting	  of	  rebates	  resulting	  from	  economies	  of	  scale	  for	  example	  -­‐,	  but	  also	  
due	  to	  their	   lack	  of	  market	  power	  when	  acting	  as	  buyers.	  That	  weakened	  position	   in	  the	  upstream	  
buyer	  market	  is	  consequently	  likely	  to	  affect	  the	  ability	  of	  smaller	  firms	  to	  compete	  effectively	  in	  the	  
downstream	  seller	  market	   if	  the	  favoured	  buyers	  also	  act	  as	  rival	  sellers	   in	  that	  market.	  The	  higher	  
costs	  borne	  by	  those	  smaller	  firms	  will	  indeed	  make	  more	  difficult	  for	  them	  to	  offer	  better	  conditions	  
to	  their	  own	  customers	  while	  remaining	  profitable.	  In	  addition,	  upstream	  sellers	  may	  be	  tempted	  to	  
recover	  the	   loss	  profit	  engendered	  by	  the	  exercise	  of	   large	  buyers’	  market	  power	  and	  the	  resulting	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that,	  given	  the	  increasing	  bargaining	  strength	  of	  buyers	  in	  some	  sectors,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  
grocery	  retail	  sector,	  such	  conduct	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  successfully	  used	  even	  with	  regard	  to	  larger	  suppliers.	  	  
76	  See:	  Part	  III,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  II.	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lower	  prices	  offered	  to	  them	  by	  raising	  prices	  on	  their	  other	  customers	  who	  lack	  bargaining	  power.	  
That	  phenomenon,	  called	   the	  “waterbed	  effect”,	   is	  defended	  by	  some	  while	  questioned	  by	  others.	  
The	  different	  arguments	  on	  that	  issue	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  the	  section	  on	  the	  retail	  sector.	  
We	  cannot	  but	  notice	  that	  the	  Commission	  is	  not	  insensitive	  to	  the	  situation	  of	  smaller	  buyers.	  As	  we	  
mentioned	  above,	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  dominance,	  buyers’	  market	  power	  constitutes	  a	  competitive	  
constraint	  which	   is	   likely	   to	   counteract	   a	   seller’s	  market	   power	   and	   thereby	   to	   exclude	   the	   latter	  
from	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  However,	  as	  provided	  in	  the	  Guidance	  paper	  on	  Article	  102	  
TFEU,	   the	   Commission	   considers	   that	   such	   constraint	   is	   not	   sufficient	   if	   only	   a	   limited	   segment	   of	  
customers	   is	   able	   to	   exercise	   countervailing	   buyer	   power.77	   The	   same	   approach	   prevails	   in	   the	  
enforcement	  of	  the	  Merger	  Regulation.	   Indeed,	   in	  some	  cases,	  the	  exercise	  of	  countervailing	  buyer	  
power	   may	   lead	   the	   Commission	   to	   clear	   a	   concentration	   despite	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   merging	  
suppliers’	  market	   power	   following	   the	   transaction.	  However,	   the	   presence	   of	   smaller	   buyers	  must	  
also	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration.	  As	  such,	  large	  buyers’	  market	  power	  cannot	  be	  found	  to	  sufficiently	  
off-­‐set	   potential	   adverse	   effects	   of	   a	   merger	   if	   only	   those	   buyers	   are	   shielded	   from	   deteriorated	  
conditions	   after	   the	   operation.78	   For	   example,	   in	   a	   case	   involving	   a	   merger	   between	   two	   large	  
processors	  of	  dairy	  products,	   the	  Commission	  considered	   that	   the	  exercise	  of	   countervailing	  buyer	  
power	  by	   some	   large	   supermarket	   chains	  would	  not	  be	   sufficient	   to	   constrain	   the	  merged	  entity’s	  
conduct.	  It	  was	  indeed	  pointed	  out	  that	  other	  retailers	  would	  still	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  merging	  parties’	  
market	  power	  and	  that	  larger	  buyers	  would	  use	  their	  strong	  bargaining	  position	  to	  protect	  their	  own	  
interests	  only.79	  This	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  attention	  should	  also	  be	  paid	  to	  smaller	  customers	  in	  order	  
to	  safeguard	  their	  right	  to	  also	  operate	  in	  a	  competitive	  market.	  
We	   can	   conclude	   that	   buyers	   are	   protected	   by	   the	   competition	   rules	   against	   sellers’	   misuse	   of	  
market	   power	   even	   though	   some	   of	   them	   are	   able	   to	   defend	   themselves	   because	   of	   their	   strong	  
buyer	   power.	   However,	   smaller	   buyers	   can	   also	   be	   prevented	   from	   competing	   in	   an	   undistorted	  
market	   due	   to	   an	   improper	   use	   of	   buyer	   power	   by	   some	   of	   their	   competitors.	   It	   is	   indeed	   not	  
excluded	  that	  powerful	  buyers	  use	  their	  position,	  deliberately	  or	  not,	  to	  exclude	  smaller	  competitors	  
and	   restrict	   competition	   in	   the	   upstream	   and	   downstream	   markets,	   calling	   for	   action	   from	  
competition	  authorities.	  It	  cannot	  be	  denied	  that	  the	  stronger	  position	  acquired	  by	  some	  firms	  in	  the	  
upstream	  market	   through	   efficiencies	   and	   the	   resulting	   better	   conditions	   obtained	   by	   them	   from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  Guidance	  on	  the	  Commission’s	  enforcement	  priorities	  in	  applying	  Article	  82	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  at	  18.	  
78	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  assessment	  of	  horizontal	  mergers,	  op.cit.,	  at	  65.	  
79	  Friesland	  Foods/Campina,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5046,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  17	  December	  2008,	  at	  276.	  The	  
Commission	  considered	  that	  this	  is	  all	  the	  more	  true	  because	  the	  retail	  market	  for	  milk	  is	  relatively	  competitive.	  
Large	  retail	  chains	  would	  indeed	  gain	  from	  an	  increase	  in	  their	  rivals’	  costs	  since	  that	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  lessening	  
of	  competition	  to	  their	  advantage.	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suppliers	  are	  clearly	  procompetitive	  as	  it	  is	  probably	  the	  expression	  of	  the	  firm’s	  higher	  performance.	  
Nevertheless,	  that	  position	  should	  not	  be	  used	  so	  as	  to	  weaken	  competition	  either	  in	  the	  upstream	  
buyer	  or	  downstream	  seller	  market.	  
C. ABILITY	  AND	  INCENTIVES	  TO	  EXERCISE	  BUYER	  POWER	  
Different	  factors	  may	  contribute	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  buyer	  power.	  Most	  of	  them	  are	  related	  to	  the	  
number	  of	  alternatives	  available	  to	  buyers	  and	  to	  the	  limited	  capacity	  of	  suppliers	  to	  switch	  to	  other	  
customers.	  Where	  the	  market	  conditions	  are	  such	  as	  tilting	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  favour	  of	  buyers,	  
the	  latter	  may	  in	  addition	  be	  greatly	  incited	  to	  exploit	  their	  market	  power	  over	  suppliers.	  Given	  these	  
elements,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  draw	  some	  distinctions	  between	  buyer	  and	  seller	  power.	  
1. Ability	  to	  exercise	  buyer	  power	  
Numerous	   factors	  are	   likely	   to	   influence	   the	  degree	  of	  buyer	  power.	  High	  barriers	   to	  expansion	  or	  
entry	  into	  the	  buy-­‐side	  of	  the	  market	  for	  example	  insulate	  to	  some	  extent	  buyers	  from	  competitive	  
constraints	   that	   new	   entrants	   might	   represent	   by	   offering	   better	   conditions	   to	   suppliers.80	   Other	  
competitive	   advantages	   such	   as	   the	   reputation	   of	   a	   buyer	   may	   also	   give	   rise	   to	   a	   strengthened	  
bargaining	  power	  over	  suppliers.	  However,	  a	  key	  factor	  to	  determine	  the	  existence	  of	  buyer	  power	  is	  
the	  possibility	  for	  buyers	  to	  easily	  find	  alternatives	  to	  get	  their	  products	  while	  suppliers	  do	  not	  have	  
the	  capacity	  to	  switch	  to	  other	  buyers	  without	  undue	  delay,	  risk	  or	  cost.	  In	  this	  section,	  the	  main	  and	  
common	   factors	   giving	   buyers	   the	   ability	   to	   exercise	   market	   power	   over	   their	   suppliers	   are	  
presented.	  However,	  those	  cannot	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  exhaustive	  list.	  Depending	  on	  the	  characteristics	  
of	   each	   market,	   various	   elements	   may	   also	   influence	   buyers’	   market	   power.	   Additional	   elements	  
reinforcing	   buyer	   power	   in	   specific	   sectors,	   such	   as	   the	   use	   of	   competitive	   bidding	   or	   the	  
development	  of	  private	  labels,	  will	  be	  examined	  further	  below.81	  
a) Concentration	  and	  market	  structure	  
The	   more	   concentrated	   the	   buyers,	   the	   fewer	   outside	   options	   available	   for	   suppliers.	   In	   sectors	  
characterised	  by	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  consolidation	  on	  the	  buy-­‐side,	  large	  buyers	  are	  therefore	  likely	  to	  
enjoy	  greater	  bargaining	  power	   relative	   to	   their	  business	  partners,	  especially	  when	   they	  are	   facing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  Z.CHEN,	  Buyer	  Power:	  Economic	  Theory	  and	  Antitrust	  Policy,	  op.cit.,	  at	  31.	  
81	  The	  use	  of	  private	  label	  will	  be	  developed	  in	  the	  section	  devoted	  to	  the	  retail	  sector.	  Different	  factors	  
increasing	  buyer	  power	  will	  also	  be	  examined	  in	  section	  x	  of	  this	  chapter.	  In	  different	  sectors,	  the	  Commission	  
has	  indeed	  identified	  the	  presence	  of	  significant	  buyer	  power	  and	  pointed	  out	  various	  elements	  likely	  to	  give	  
customers	  a	  strong	  bargaining	  power	  with	  regard	  to	  their	  suppliers.	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atomistic	  sellers.82	  Such	  as	   in	  cases	   involving	  the	  exercise	  of	  seller	  power,	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  
buyer’s	  market	   share	   in	   the	   input	  market	   as	  well	   as	   the	   relative	  market	   share	  of	   competitors	  may	  
therefore	  be	  a	  first	  step	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  buyer	  power.	  However,	  a	  very	  large	  share	  of	  the	  market	  
in	  the	  hand	  of	  a	  particular	  buyer	  should	  be	  neither	  a	  necessary,	  nor	  a	  sufficient	  condition	  to	  conclude	  
to	  the	  existence	  of	  buyer	  power.83	  
b) Alternatives	  available	  to	  buyers	  
A	  buyer	  will	  have	  substantial	  buyer	  power	  if	  it	  can	  find	  alternative	  sources	  of	  supply	  without	  incurring	  
excessive	   risks	  or	  costs.	  Low	   level	  of	  concentration	   in	   the	  upstream	  market	   is	   for	  example	   likely	   to	  
enable	  buyers	  to	  switch	  easily	  to	  other	  sellers	  should	  their	  suppliers	  refuse	  to	  concede	  lower	  prices	  
or	  other	  benefits.	  The	  more	  attractive	  the	  buyer’s	  outside	  options,	   the	  more	  credible	  the	  threat	  of	  
resorting	  to	  those	  alternatives.	  As	  long	  as	  a	  buyer	  can	  credibly	  threat	  to	  switch	  to	  another	  supplier,	  it	  
will	  be	  able	  to	  affect	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  negotiation	  to	  its	  advantage.84	  The	  size	  of	  a	  buyer	  may	  also	  
be	  a	   factor	  giving	   rise	   to	  buyer	  power.	  Even	   though	  a	   large	  buyer	  does	  not	  necessarily	  have	  buyer	  
power	  over	  its	  suppliers,	  its	  size	  makes	  nevertheless	  more	  credible	  any	  threat	  to	  switch	  elsewhere	  by	  
raising	   the	   value	   of	   its	   outside	   options.85	   Indeed,	   it	  may	   be	   cheaper	   for	   large	   buyers	   to	   switch	   to	  
alternative	  sources	  of	  supply	  if	  there	  is	  a	  fixed	  cost	  required	  to	  do	  so.	  On	  a	  per	  unit	  basis,	  the	  costs	  of	  
identifying	   and	   negotiating	   contracts	   with	   another	   seller	   will	   in	   fact	   be	   lower	   for	   big	   traders.86	   In	  
addition,	   the	   larger	   the	   buyer,	   the	   higher	   the	   number	   of	   outside	   options	   available	   to	   it.	   Besides	  
switching	  to	  existing	  suppliers,	  large	  buyers	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  sponsor	  new	  entry	  in	  the	  upstream	  
market	  by,	  for	  example,	  underwriting	  some	  or	  all	  of	  the	  new	  entrant’s	  costs	  and/or	  by	  committing	  to	  
placing	   larger	   orders	  with	   that	   new	   supplier.87	   Finally,	   large	   buyers	  may	   pose	   a	   credible	   threat	   of	  
backward	  integration	  by	  producing	  the	  input	  themselves	  and	  becoming	  their	  own	  suppliers.88	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  See:	  U.Schumacher,	  Buyer	  structure	  and	  seller	  performance	  in	  US	  manufacturing	  industries,	  73	  the	  Review	  of	  
Economics	  and	  Statistics	  277	  (1991).	  Schumacher	  established	  a	  negative	  relationship	  between	  buyer	  
concentration	  and	  suppliers’	  profit	  margin,	  showing	  the	  stronger	  bargaining	  power	  of	  concentrated	  buyers.	  
83	  Z.CHEN,	  Buyer	  Power:	  Economic	  Theory	  and	  Antitrust	  Policy,	  op.cit.,	  at	  31.	  
84	  A.Muthoo,	  A	  non-­‐technical	  introduction	  to	  bargaining	  theory,	  1	  World	  Economics	  145	  (2000)	  
85	  R.Inderst	  &	  N.Mazzarotto,	  Buyer	  power	  –	  Sources,	  consequences,	  and	  policy	  responses	  (2006),	  available	  at:	  
http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/conferences/supermarket/ind.pdf	  ,at	  9.	  
86	  Monopsony	  and	  Buyer	  Power,	  OECD	  –	  Policy	  Roundtables,	  2008,	  DAF/COMP(2008)38,	  at	  40,	  available	  at:	  
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/63/44445750.pdf	  
87	  C.Doyle	  &	  R.Inderst,	  Some	  economics	  on	  the	  treatment	  of	  buyer	  power	  in	  antitrust,	  28	  European	  Competition	  
Law	  Review	  210,	  at	  213	  (2007).	  See	  also:	  R.Inderst	  	  &	  G.Shaffer,	  Retail	  mergers,	  buyer	  power,	  and	  product	  
variety,	  117	  Economic	  Journal	  45	  (2007)	  
88	  M.L.Katz,	  The	  welfare	  effects	  of	  third-­‐degree	  price	  discrimination	  n	  intermediate	  goods	  markets,	  77	  American	  
Economic	  Review	  124	  (1987).	  Katz’s	  model	  shows	  buyers’	  ability	  to	  extract	  price	  concession	  through	  their	  
increased	  threat	  of	  vertical	  integration.	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c) Dependency	  of	  suppliers	  
Buyers’	  market	  power	   is	  all	   the	  more	  significant	  when	  suppliers	   lack	  alternative	  outside	  options	  so	  
that	   they	   are	   at	   the	  mercy	   of	   their	   customers	   in	   the	   negotiations.	   The	   capacity	   to	   exercise	   buyer	  
power	   is	   in	   fact	   closely	   related	   to	   the	   elasticity	   of	   supply	   (Es)	   and	   demand	   (Ed).89	   Those	   concepts	  
measure	  respectively	  the	  responsiveness	  of	  the	  quantity	  supplied	  (Es)	  or	  demanded	  (Ed)	  of	  a	  good	  or	  
service	   to	  a	   change	   in	   its	  price.90	  More	   specifically,	   the	  price	  elasticity	   is	   the	  percentage	  change	   in	  
quantity	  supplied	  or	  demanded	  due	  to	  a	  percentage	  change	  in	  price.	  Supply	  or	  demand	  is	  elastic	  if	  a	  
specific	  price	  change	  results	  in	  a	  larger	  change	  in	  quantity	  demanded	  or	  supplied.	  Conversely,	  supply	  
or	   demand	   is	   inelastic	   if	   price	   changes	   cause	   relatively	   smaller	   change	   in	   quantity	   demanded	   or	  
supplied.91	  	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  buyer	  power,	  the	  more	  inelastic	  the	  demand	  by	  other	  firms	  in	  
the	  upstream	  buyer	  market,	  the	  easier	   it	  will	  be	  for	  a	   large	  buyer	  to	  exercise	  market	  power	   in	  that	  
market.	  Especially	   in	  case	  of	  pure	  monopsony,	  the	  strategy	  of	  a	  buyer	  to	  cut	  prices	  by	  curtailing	   its	  
purchases	   would	   indeed	   fail	   if	   its	   rivals	   respond	   to	   such	   a	   decrease	   in	   prices	   by	   enhancing	   their	  
purchases.	   In	   that	   case,	   elastic	   demand	   makes	   it	   hence	   difficult	   to	   keep	   prices	   low	   through	   the	  
exercise	   of	   monopsony	   power.92	   On	   the	   supply	   side,	   the	   lower	   the	   elasticity	   of	   supply	   in	   the	  
upstream	  seller	  market,	  the	  stronger	  the	  bargaining	  position	  of	  buyers.	  Where	  suppliers	  are	  unable	  
to	   redirect	   their	   efforts	   to	   other	  markets	   or	   other	   products	   should	   prices	   fall,	   they	   can	   hardly	   be	  
expected	   to	   bargain	   effectively	   with	   their	   large	   customers.93	   The	   supply	   elasticity	   in	   fact	   mainly	  
depends	  on	  suppliers’	  capacity	  to	  find	  equivalent	  customers	  to	  sell	  their	  products.	  Different	  elements	  
however	  may	  get	  in	  the	  way	  of	  suppliers	  willing	  to	  switch	  to	  new	  buyers,	  contributing	  hence	  to	  the	  
emergence	  of	  buyer	  power.	  
Firstly,	   the	   finding	   of	   alternative	   customers	  may	   involve	   high	   switching	   costs,	   especially	   in	   sectors	  
requiring	   important	   sunk	   investment.	   For	   example,	   in	   the	   labor	  market,	   skilled	   and	   highly	   trained	  
employees,	   such	   as	   professional	   athletes,	   have	   invested	   substantial	   time	   and	   resources	   to	  master	  
their	  profession.	  However,	  outside	   their	  area	  of	  expertise,	   such	   investment	  would	   lose	  much	  of	   its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  R.D.Blair	  and	  J.L.Harrison	  have	  defined	  a	  Buyer	  Power	  Index	  (BPI)	  in	  order	  to	  measure	  the	  degree	  of	  buyer	  
power.	  The	  calculation	  of	  BPI	  is	  based	  on	  three	  elements,	  namely	  the	  buyer’s	  market	  share,	  the	  overall	  
elasticity	  of	  supply	  and	  the	  elasticity	  of	  demand	  of	  the	  fringe	  buyers.	  See:	  R.D.Blair	  and	  J.L.Harrison,	  oop.cit.,	  at	  
55-­‐58.	  
90	  R.D.Blair	  and	  J.L.Harrison,	  op.cit.,	  at	  58-­‐59.	  The	  formula	  of	  price	  elasticity	  is:	  percentage	  change	  in	  quantity	  
supplied	  or	  demanded/percentage	  change	  in	  price.	  High	  elasticity	  indicates	  that	  the	  supply	  is	  sensitive	  to	  a	  
price	  change	  while	  low	  elasticity	  indicates	  that	  quantity	  supplied	  does	  not	  respond	  much	  to	  a	  price	  change.	  
91	  For	  example,	  if	  a	  2	  percent	  decline	  in	  the	  price	  apples	  results	  in	  a	  4	  percent	  increase	  in	  quantity	  demanded,	  
the	  elasticity	  of	  demand	  is	  high	  as	  it	  equals	  2	  (>	  1).	  In	  such	  a	  case	  the	  demand	  is	  elastic.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  a	  
2	  percent	  decline	  in	  the	  price	  of	  apples	  leads	  to	  only	  a	  1	  percent	  decrease	  in	  quantity	  supplied,	  the	  elasticity	  of	  
supply	  is	  low	  as	  it	  equal	  0.5	  (<	  1).	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  supply	  is	  inelastic.	  	  
92	  R.D.Blair	  and	  J.L.Harrison,	  op.cit.,	  at	  59.	  
93	  Ibid.,	  at	  58.	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value	   thereby	   deterring	  workers	   from	   switching	   to	   a	   new	   employer.94	   Another	   illustration	  may	   be	  
found	  in	  the	  livestock	  industry	  where	  the	  process	  of	  raising	  and	  feeding	  animals	   implies	  substantial	  
and	  specialized	  investments	  by	  producers.	  Switching	  to	  an	  alternative	  line	  of	  production	  in	  order	  to	  
enlarge	  their	  customer	  basis	  would	  therefore	  entail	  important	  losses	  for	  farmer	  and	  require	  them	  to	  
make	  new	  investment.	  Seeking	  buyers	  who	  use	  the	  input	  in	  other	  geographical	  areas	  may	  also	  turn	  
out	   to	  be	  a	  difficult	   task	  due	   to	   the	  high	   transport	   costs	  of	   some	  goods	  which	   strongly	   reduce	   the	  
scope	   of	   the	   relevant	   market	   but	   also	   due	   to	   the	   perishable	   nature	   of	   assets.95	   The	   degree	   of	  
uncertainty	  as	  well	  as	  the	  costs	  involved	  by	  a	  switch	  to	  a	  new	  customer	  may,	  as	  a	  result,	  constitute	  a	  
substantial	  deterrent	  to	  looking	  for	  alternatives.96	  
Secondly,	   even	   if	   alternative	   buyers	   are	   present	   on	   the	   market,	   they	   may	   not	   constitute	   a	   good	  
substitute	  to	  have	  access	  to	  a	  large	  number	  of	  consumers.	  This	  would	  be	  the	  case	  if	  a	  buyer	  acts	  in	  
fact	  as	  a	  “gatekeeper”	  due	  to	  its	  significant	  market	  share	  in	  the	  retail	  downstream	  market.	  Without	  
dealing	  with	   that	  particular	  buyer,	   suppliers	  would	  not	  be	  able	   to	  market	  efficiently	   their	  products	  
since	   they	   would	   be	   deprived	   of	   the	   largest	   channel	   to	   serve	   end-­‐users.97	   Market	   power	   in	   the	  
downstream	  market	   is	   therefore	   likely	   to	   create	   or	   reinforce	   the	   firm’s	   bargaining	   strength	   in	   the	  
upstream	  market.	   In	   fact,	  buyer	  power	  and	  seller	  power	  often	  go	  hand	   in	  hand	  and	  reinforce	  each	  
other	   as	   it	   will	   be	   illustrated	   in	   the	   section	   devoted	   to	   the	   retail	   sector.	  Where	   large	   buyers	  may	  
intuitively	   be	   considered	   as	   difficult	   to	   replace,	   a	   smaller	   company	   can	   nevertheless	   also	   acquire	  
significant	  buyer	  power	   if	  they	  act	  as	  a	  monopolist	   in	  a	   local	  market.	   In	  such	  a	  case,	  suppliers	  have	  
indeed	  no	  alternative	  channel	  to	  serve	  consumers.	  As	  a	  result,	  their	  position	  in	  that	  market	   is	  even	  
weaker	  than	  the	  one	  they	  hold	  when	  negotiating	  with	  a	  larger	  retailer	  in	  highly	  competitive	  markets,	  
as,	   in	   that	   latter	   case,	   they	   may,	   at	   least	   in	   theory,	   replace	   sales	   made	   through	   that	   customer.	  
According	   to	   Inderst	  and	  Mazzarotto,	  even	   though	   it	   is	  probable	   that	  a	   large	   retailer	  may	  be	  more	  
difficult	  to	  replace,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  realize	  that	  “it	  is	  not	  size	  in	  itself	  that	  determines	  buyer	  power	  but	  
rather	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  retailer	  acts	  as	  a	  gatekeeper	  to	  final	  consumers.”98	  
Finally,	   the	   ability	   of	   a	   supplier	   to	   switch	   to	   alternative	   buyers	   is	   influenced	   by	   the	   proportion	   a	  
certain	  customer	  represents	  in	  its	  overall	  sales,	  the	  so-­‐called	  risk	  or	  threat	  rate.	  The	  larger	  a	  buyer’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  W.S.Grimes,	  Buyer	  power	  and	  retail	  gatekeeper	  power:	  Protecting	  competition	  and	  the	  atomistic	  seller,	  72	  
Antitrust	  Law	  Journal	  563,	  at	  567-­‐568	  (2005)	  
95	  The	  perishable	  nature	  of	  most	  agricultural	  products	  makes	  farmers	  eager	  to	  strike	  quickly	  a	  deal	  with	  buyers	  
and	  thereby	  reduces	  their	  bargaining	  power.	  
96	  P.C.CARSTENSEN,	  Buyer	  Power,	  Competition	  Policy,	  and	  Antitrust	  :	  The	  Competitive	  effects	  of	  discrimination	  
among	  suppliers,	  53	  The	  Antitrust	  Bulletin	  271,	  at	  279	  (2008)	  
97	  C.Doyle	  &	  R.Inderst,	  op.cit.,	  at	  213.	  
98	  R.Inderst	  &	  N.Mazzarotto,	  Buyer	  power	  –	  Sources,	  consequences,	  and	  policy	  responses,	  op.cit.,	  at	  10.	  The	  role	  
of	  gatekeepers	  is	  formalized	  in	  N.Mazzarotto,	  Retail	  mergers	  and	  buyer	  power,	  CCR	  Working	  Paper	  04-­‐3	  (2003),	  
available	  at:	  https://lred.uea.ac.uk/documents/107435/107587/ccp4-­‐3.pdf	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share	  in	  the	  supplier’s	  total	  turnover,	  the	  more	  dependent	  the	  latter	  will	  be	  on	  the	  former.	  Indeed,	  
where	  the	  proportion	  of	  turnover	  is	  high,	  substituting	  the	  customer	  in	  question	  would	  entail	  serious	  
risks	  and	  possible	  heavy	  financial	  consequences	  for	  the	  supplier.99	  The	  percentage	  of	  business	  that	  a	  
buyer	   or	   supplier	  would	   lose	   in	   case	   of	   breaking-­‐off	  may	   therefore	   be	   of	   particular	   importance	   in	  
determining	  the	  bargaining	  position	  of	  each	  party.	  
It	  must	  be	  made	  clear	  that	  the	  share	  a	  buyer	  accounts	  for	  in	  a	  supplier’s	  turnover	  may	  be	  different	  
from	  the	  market	  share	  held	  by	  that	  buyer	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market.	  The	  market	  share	  is	  the	  part	  
represented	   by	   a	   buyer	   in	   the	   relevant	   procurement	   market	   which	   in	   fact	   corresponds	   to	   a	  
percentage	   of	   the	   sales	   in	   one	   particular	   product	   category,	   considering	   all	   brands	   or	   sources	   of	  
supply.	  	  That	  market	  share	  is	  not	  necessarily	  equivalent	  to	  the	  part	  the	  buyer	  in	  question	  represents	  
in	  the	  total	  sales	  of	  the	  suppliers	  active	  in	  that	  relevant	  market.	  Suppliers	  may	  indeed	  carry	  out	  their	  
activities	   in	   different	   markets	   so	   that	   products	   sold	   on	   a	   particular	   market	   do	   not	   necessarily	  
represent	  all	  their	  sales.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  grocery	  sector,	  suppliers	  sell	  the	  large	  majority,	  around	  
80%,	  of	  their	  products	  through	  the	  grocery	  retail	  sector	  where	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  large	  retailers,	  say	  
three,	   are	  active.	   In	   a	   symmetric	  market,	   each	  of	   those	   retailers	  will	   have	  approximately	   a	  market	  
share	  of	  30%	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market.	  The	  suppliers	  in	  question	  also	  have	  smaller	  customers	  in	  
other	   markets	   such	   as	   specialized	   outlets	   or	   drugstores	   which	   buy	   the	   remaining	   20%	   of	   their	  
production.	  Although	  the	  share	  accounted	  for	  by	  the	  incumbent	  retailers	  in	  suppliers’	  turnover	  varies	  
depending	   on	   each	   supplier,	   it	   may	   be	   considered	   that	   each	   of	   those	   customers	   will	   represent	  
around	   25%	   in	   the	   suppliers’	   turnover.	   It	   is	   therefore	   important	   to	  make	   a	   distinction	   between	   a	  
buyer’s	   market	   share	   and	   the	   share	   accounted	   for	   by	   that	   buyer	   in	   a	   supplier’s	   turnover	   as	   the	  
calculation	  method	  as	  well	  as	  the	  resulting	  share	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  different.	  
2. Seller	  power	  and	  buyer	  power:	  distinctive	  features	  
A	   striking	   distinction	   between	   seller	   and	   buyer	   power	   concerns	   the	   elements	   taken	   into	  
consideration	  when	  assessing	  the	  existence	  and	  degree	  of	  market	  power	  on	  each	  side	  of	  the	  market.	  
In	   seller	   power	   cases,	   it	   is	   mostly	   referred	   to	   the	   horizontal	   structure	   and	   concentration	   of	   the	  
relevant	   market.	   The	   first	   elements	   to	   be	   considered	   are	   indeed	   the	   market	   share	   of	   the	   firm	  
involved,	   the	  position	  of	   its	  competitors	  and	   the	  other	  potential	  horizontal	  competitive	  constraints	  
that	  could	  be	  exerted	  on	  that	  firm,	  such	  as	  the	  entry	  of	  new	  rivals.	  In	  some	  cases,	  the	  firm’s	  vertical	  
relation	  with	   its	   customers	   is	   also	   considered	   so	   as	   to	   examine	  whether	   the	   latter	   could	   exercise	  
countervailing	   power	   and	   thereby	   constrain	   the	   firm’s	   competitive	   behavior.	   However,	   such	   an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  C.Doyle	  &	  R.Inderst,	  op.cit.,	  at	  213.	  The	  large	  share	  a	  customer	  accounts	  for	  in	  a	  supplier’s	  turnover	  makes	  
the	  latter	  risk	  averse	  given	  the	  loss	  it	  would	  suffer	  if	  the	  negotiations	  break	  down.	  Besides	  impatience	  and	  the	  
lack	  of	  equivalent	  alternatives,	  risk	  aversion	  further	  weakens	  suppliers’	  bargaining	  power	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assessment	  is	  not	  systematically	  carried	  out	  and	  generally	  plays	  a	  relatively	  minor	  role	  in	  the	  overall	  
analysis	  of	  a	  seller’s	  market	  power.100	   In	  addition,	  vertical	  relationships	  are	   in	  fact	  not	  examined	  to	  
measure	  the	  seller’s	  market	  power	  as	  such	  but	  to	  assess	  whether	  that	  power	  could	  be	  mitigated	  by	  
customers’	  countervailing	  power.	  It	  may	  be	  concluded	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  significant	  market	  power	  in	  
the	  hands	  of	  a	  selling	  firm	  without	  looking	  at	  the	  part	  such	  a	  firm	  represents	  in	  the	  business	  activity	  
of	  its	  customers.	  Horizontal	  market	  conditions,	  and,	  in	  some	  cases,	  the	  firm’s	  high	  market	  shares	  may	  
be	   sufficient	   to	  determine	   the	  degree	  of	  market	  power	  of	   the	   firm	   in	  question.101	   The	  question	  of	  
buyer	  power	  is	  only	  possibly	  considered	  where,	  on	  basis	  of	  those	  conditions,	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  firm	  
holds	   significant	   market	   power	   or	   a	   dominant	   position.	   Vertical	   issues	   could	   then	   influence	   the	  
market	   power	   assessment	   if,	   for	   example,	   it	   appears	   that	   the	   firm	   is	   economically	   dependent	   on	  
some	  powerful	  customers.	  It	  results	  that	  vertical	  relations	  play	  a	  role	  only	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  buyer	  
power	  even	  in	  seller	  power	  cases.	  	  
In	   buyer	   power	   cases,	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   bilateral	   relationships	   between	   a	   buyer	   and	   its	   suppliers	  
constitute	   the	   core	   of	   the	  market	   power	   assessment.	   The	   focus	   is	   indeed	   not	   put	   on	   the	   buyer’s	  
market	  share	  in	  the	  upstream	  purchasing	  market	  but	  on	  the	  share	  it	  accounts	  for	  and	  the	  importance	  
it	  represents	  in	  the	  business	  portfolio	  of	   its	  suppliers	  and	  vice	  versa.	   Indeed,	  the	  more	  valuable	  is	  a	  
specific	  customer	   in	  the	  eyes	  of	   its	  suppliers,	  the	  greater	   its	  buyer	  power	  with	  regard	  to	  the	   latter.	  
Such	  power	   is	   further	  reinforced	   if	  each	  of	   those	  suppliers	  does	  not	  account	   for	  a	   large	  part	   in	  the	  
buyer’s	  business	  activity,	  is	  not	  indispensable	  for	  that	  buyer	  or	  can	  easily	  be	  replaced.	  	  
The	  “value”	  of	  a	  customer	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  a	  particular	  supplier	  is	  high	  if	  that	  customer	  accounts	  for	  a	  
substantial	   part	   of	   the	   supplier’s	   sales	   and	   that	   no	   equivalent	   alternative	   is	   available.	   In	   such	  
circumstances,	  the	  supplier	  is	  economically	  dependent	  on	  its	  customer	  who,	  a	  result,	  is	  able	  to	  exert	  
significant	  buyer	  power.	   	   	  A	   limited	  market	  share	   in	  the	  upstream	  purchasing	  market	  can	  therefore	  
not	  lead	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  a	  firm	  lacks	  buyer	  power	  in	  that	  market.	  If	  suppliers	  depend	  on	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100	  See	  for	  example,	  case	  T-­‐228/97,	  Irish	  Sugar	  v	  Commission	  [1999]	  ECR	  II-­‐2969,	  at	  97-­‐104	  in	  which	  the	  General	  
Court	  examined	  whether	  the	  alleged	  lack	  of	  independence	  of	  the	  seller	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  its	  customers	  could	  deprive	  the	  
former	  of	  the	  freedom	  of	  conduct	  characteristic	  of	  a	  dominant	  position.	  See	  also	  for	  examples:	  T-­‐57/01,	  Solvay	  
SA	  v	  Commission	  [2009]	  ECR	  II-­‐4621	  and	  T-­‐66/01,	  Imperial	  Chemical	  Industries	  Ltd	  v	  Commission	  [2010]	  ECR	  II-­‐
2631.	  Countervailing	  buyer	  power	  can	  also	  be	  considered	  in	  merger	  cases	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  whether	  the	  
merging	  parties	  could	  impede	  effective	  competition	  post-­‐merger	  by	  exerting	  market.	  The	  assessment	  of	  
customers’	  countervailing	  power	  is	  only	  included	  in	  some	  merger	  decisions	  and,	  in	  most	  cases,	  the	  Commission	  
did	  not	  enlarge	  on	  that	  issue.	  However,	  the	  existence	  and	  extent	  of	  buyer	  countervailing	  power	  was	  of	  
particular	  importance	  in	  the	  Enso/Stora	  case	  and	  led	  the	  Commission	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  merged	  entity	  
would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  exert	  market	  power	  due	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  strong	  buyers.	  See:	  Enso/Stora,	  Case	  
IV/M.1225,	  op.cit.	  On	  that	  case,	  see	  below	  Chapter	  2,	  Section	  I,	  Point	  E,	  4,	  b).	  
101	  In	  Tetra	  Pak,	  the	  General	  Court	  maintained	  that	  the	  firm’s	  very	  high	  market	  shares	  (90%)	  guaranteed	  it	  the	  
freedom	  of	  conduct	  characteristic	  of	  a	  dominant	  position	  and	  were	  in	  themselves	  evidence	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  
a	  dominant	  position.	  See:	  T-­‐83/91,	  Tetra	  Pak	  v	  Commission	  [1994]	  ECR	  II-­‐755,	  at	  109.	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buyer	  for,	  say,	  20%	  of	  their	  sales,	  they	  can	  indeed	  already	  be	  considered	  economically	  dependent	  on	  
it.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  unless	  suppliers	  produce	  an	  essential	  input	  that	  cannot	  be	  replaced	  by	  another	  
product,	  the	  buyer	   is	  unlikely	  to	  feel	  economically	  threatened	  by	  the	   loss	  of	  one	  of	  those	  suppliers	  
and	  will	  then	  be	  incited	  to	  use	  its	  buyer	  power.	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  where	  buyers	  do	  not	  produce	  
new	  items	  by	  assembling	  components	  but	  merely	  resale	  as	  such	  various	  products,	  independent	  from	  
one	  another,	   in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market,	  such	  as	   in	  the	  grocery	  retail	  sector.	  The	   loss	  of	  one	  
particular	  supplier	  is	  less	  likely	  to	  affect	  a	  large	  retail	  chain	  than	  the	  other	  way	  round	  because,	  on	  the	  
one	  hand,	  the	  latter	  can	  generally	  find	  alternative	  sources	  of	  supply	  or	  can	  more	  easily	  integrate	  into	  
the	   upstream	  market	   and,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   share	   that	   supplier	   represents	   in	   the	   retailer’s	  
business	  activity	  may	  be	  insignificant	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  number	  of	  products	  bought	  and	  sold	  by	  that	  
retailer.	  	  	  
Economic	  dependency	  of	   suppliers	   gives	   therefore	  buyers	   the	  ability	   to	  exercise	   significant	  market	  
power	   in	   the	   upstream	  buyer	  market	   and	   the	   incentives	   to	   effectively	   exert	   pressure	   on	   suppliers	  
may	  also	  be	  stronger	  than	  in	  seller	  power	  cases.	  
3. Incentives	  to	  exercise	  buyer	  power	  
Where	  the	  possession	  of	  market	  power	  is	  not	  reprehensible	  in	  itself,	  its	  exercise	  may	  nonetheless,	  in	  
some	  circumstances,	  lead	  to	  adverse	  effects	  on	  the	  market	  and	  hence	  be	  subject	  to	  some	  conditions.	  
Under	   the	   EU	   competition	   rules,	   a	   firm	   is	   deemed	   to	   be	   able	   to	   affect	   competition	   through	   its	  
conduct	   only	   when	   its	   degree	   of	   market	   power	   is	   high	   enough	   to	   give	   it	   the	   ability	   to	   behave	  
independently	  on	  the	  markets.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  the	  firm	  in	  question	  will	  be	  qualified	  as	  dominant	  and	  
be	  subject	   to	  Article	  102	  TFEU.102	  The	  prohibition	  on	  abuse	  of	  dominance	   imposes	   in	   fact	  a	  special	  
responsibility	  on	   large	  market	  participants	  not	   to	  allow	  their	  conduct	   to	   impair	  competition	  on	  the	  
market.103	   We	   will	   not	   enter	   here	   into	   the	   discussion	   of	   the	   degree	   of	   buyer	   power	   needed	   to	  
possibly	  affect	  competition	  or	  the	  type	  of	  buyer	  practices	   likely	  to	  distort	  competition	  as	  that	   issue	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  See:	  Case	  27/76,	  United	  Brands	  Company,	  op.cit.,	  at	  65	  and	  Case	  85/76,	  Hoffman-­‐La	  Roche,	  op.cit.,	  at	  38-­‐39.	  
The	  concept	  of	  dominance	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  as	  follows:	  “[the	  dominant	  position]	  relates	  to	  a	  
position	  of	  economic	  strength	  enjoyed	  by	  an	  undertaking,	  which	  enables	  it	  to	  prevent	  effective	  competition	  
being	  maintained	  on	  the	  relevant	  market	  by	  affording	  it	  the	  power	  to	  behave	  to	  an	  appreciable	  extent	  
independently	  of	  its	  competitors,	  its	  customers	  and	  ultimately	  of	  the	  consumers.	  Such	  a	  position	  does	  not	  
preclude	  some	  competition,	  which	  it	  does	  where	  there	  is	  a	  monopoly	  or	  quasi-­‐monopoly,	  but	  enables	  the	  
undertaking,	  which	  profits	  by	  it,	  if	  not	  to	  determine,	  at	  least	  to	  have	  an	  appreciable	  influence	  on	  the	  conditions	  
under	  which	  that	  competition	  will	  develop,	  and	  in	  any	  case	  to	  act	  largely	  in	  disregard	  of	  it	  so	  long	  as	  such	  
conduct	  does	  not	  operate	  to	  its	  detriment.”	  
103	  See:	  Case	  322/81,	  Michelin	  I,	  op.cit.,	  at	  56.	  See	  also:	  Case	  85/76,	  Hoffman-­‐La	  Roche,	  op.cit.,	  at	  91	  where	  the	  
Court	  of	  Justice	  delineated	  the	  concept	  of	  abuse	  of	  a	  dominant	  position,	  as	  a	  behaviour	  “which,	  through	  
recourse	  to	  methods	  different	  from	  those	  which	  condition	  normal	  competition	  in	  products	  or	  services	  on	  the	  
basis	  of	  the	  transactions	  of	  commercial	  operators,	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  hindering	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  degree	  of	  
competition	  still	  existing	  in	  the	  market	  or	  the	  growth	  of	  that	  competition.”	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will	   be	   closely	   examined	   further	   below.	   However,	   we	   may	   nevertheless	   already	   note	   that,	   as	  
maintained	   by	   Professor	   Peter	   C.	   Carstensen,	   buyers	   may	   have,	   in	   some	   circumstances,	   great	  
incentives	   to	   exploit	   their	   market	   power	   over	   suppliers.	   In	   addition,	   self-­‐correction	   of	   market	  
distortions	   is	   less	   likely	   to	   occur	   than	   on	   the	   selling	   side.104	   Unless	   the	   demand	   for	   input	   exceeds	  
supply,	   all	   buyers	   share	   a	   common	   interest	   in	   paying	   low	   prices.	   Indeed,	   where	   sellers	   may	  
immediately	   increase	   their	   sales	   and	   profits	   through	   a	   price	   cut,	   buyers	   will	   not	   necessarily	   reap	  
benefits	  by	  offering	  higher	  input	  prices	  to	  suppliers.	  In	  fact,	  buyers’	  costs	  of	  production	  will	  rise	  while	  
an	  inherent	  lag	  will	  delay	  a	  potential	  increase	  in	  sales	  in	  the	  output	  market.105	  Buyers	  may	  therefore	  
have	  greater	  incentives	  not	  to	  compete	  against	  each	  other	  by	  keeping	  prices	  low	  or	  by	  allocating	  the	  
buying	  markets	  so	  that	  each	  buyer	  has	   its	  own	  set	  of	  suppliers	  over	  which	  they	  can	  exercise	  buyer	  
power.106	  
Buyers	   are,	   as	   a	   result,	   insulated	   from	   competitive	   pressures	   exercised	   by	   rivals	   in	   the	   buyer	  
upstream	  market	   to	   a	   greater	   extent	   than	   sellers	   are.	   In	   addition,	   it	   is	  more	  difficult	   for	   sellers	   to	  
constrain	  a	  buyer’s	  ability	  to	  impose	  different	  prices	  by	  engaging	  in	  arbitrage.	  On	  the	  selling	  side,	  a	  
favored	   buyer	   may	   easily	   resell	   a	   product	   to	   a	   disfavored	   buyer	   and	   makes	   thus	   ineffective	   the	  
seller’s	  discriminatory	  pricing	  policy.	  On	   the	  buying	   side,	  however,	   a	   supplier	   can	  hardly	   substitute	  
sales	  to	  a	  more	  favored	  supplier	  for	  delivery	  to	  a	  buyer	  who	  exercises	  its	  buyer	  power	  through	  price	  
discrimination.	   The	   latter	  may	   indeed	   require	   that	   each	   supplier	   produces	   and	   provides	   the	   input	  
itself.107	  
However,	  where	  greater	   incentives	   to	  exercise	  market	  power	  may	  emerge	  on	  the	  buying	  side	  with	  
regard	   to	   homogeneous	   products,	   buyers	   may	   nonetheless	   have	   an	   interest	   in	   raising	   prices	   and	  
taking	  care	  of	  the	  situation	  of	  firms	  producing	  differentiated	  inputs	  in	  order,	  among	  other	  things,	  to	  
get	   higher	   quality	   product	   or	   to	   guarantee	   sustainable	   relationships	   with	   their	   suppliers.	   In	   that	  
perspective,	   the	  Japanese	  automobile	   industry	  provides	  good	  examples	  of	  mutual	  beneficial	  buyer-­‐
supplier	  relationships.	  Car	  manufacturers	  such	  as	  Toyota	  or	  Honda	  have	  indeed	  developed	  long-­‐term	  
relations	   with	   their	   suppliers	   and	   implemented	   programmes	   which	   help	   the	   latter	   to	   improve	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104	  P.C.Carstensen,	  Buyer	  Power	  and	  merger	  Analysis	  –	  The	  Need	  for	  Different	  Metrics,	  Statement	  prepared	  for	  
the	  Workshop	  on	  Merger	  Enforcement,	  Washington	  DC,	  February	  17,	  2004,	  at	  4-­‐6.	  
105	  P.C.Cartsensen,	  Buyer	  power	  and	  the	  horizontal	  merger	  guidelines,	  op.cit.,	  at	  790.	  In	  fact,	  by	  bidding	  up	  
input	  prices,	  the	  buyer	  in	  question	  will	  attract	  more	  suppliers	  and	  achieve	  hence	  a	  larger	  volume	  of	  production.	  
This	  in	  turn	  will	  lead	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  volume	  of	  outputs	  sold	  in	  the	  downstream	  market.	  However,	  it	  is	  
possible	  that	  the	  additional	  sales	  made	  in	  that	  market	  will	  not	  be	  sufficient	  to	  offset	  the	  higher	  costs	  resulting	  
from	  the	  higher	  prices	  offered	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market.	  See	  also:	  P.C.Carstensen,	  Buyer	  cartels	  versus	  
buying	  groups:	  Legal	  distinctions,	  competitive	  realities,	  and	  antitrust	  policy,	  1	  William	  &	  Mary	  Business	  Law	  
Review	  1,	  at	  34-­‐35	  (2010)	  
106	  P.C.Carstensen,	  Buyer	  Power	  and	  merger	  Analysis	  –	  The	  Need	  for	  Different	  Metrics,	  op.cit.,	  at	  6.	  
107	  P.C.Cartsensen,	  Buyer	  power	  and	  the	  horizontal	  merger	  guidelines,	  op.cit.,	  at	  784.	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production	   system	   so	   as	   to	   achieve	   lower	   costs	   and	   higher	   quality	   input.	   	   Instead	   of	   relying	   on	  
immediate	  benefits	  of	  low	  prices	  imposed	  unilaterally	  on	  suppliers,	  those	  car	  manufacturers	  bet	  thus	  
on	  the	  benefits	  of	  investing	  in	  better	  relationships	  with	  input	  producers	  with	  the	  view	  to	  ensure	  the	  
quality	  of	   the	   final	  products.	   The	   results	  of	   such	  a	  policy	   turn	  out	   to	  be	  very	   conclusive	  as	   the	   car	  
producers	   in	   question,	   in	   comparison	   with	   their	   U.S.	   rivals	   for	   example,	   have	   the	   fastest	   product	  
development	  processes	  and	  manage	  to	  reduce	  their	  costs	  and	  to	  achieve	  a	  higher	  quality	  level	  year	  
after	   year.108	   That	   example	   shows	   that	   buyers	   are	   not	   necessarily	   incited	   to	   exercise	   their	  market	  
power	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   suppliers	   but	  may	   instead	   believe	   that	   the	   latter’s	  welfare	   is	   crucial	   to	  
their	  own	  success.	  In	  addition,	  the	  ability	  to	  exercise	  market	  power	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market	  is	  
closely	   linked	  to	  the	  number	  of	  alternatives	  available	  in	  that	  market.	  Excessive	  pressure	  exerted	  on	  
suppliers,	  likely	  to	  drive	  them	  out	  of	  the	  market,	  might	  therefore	  jeopardize	  buyers’	  market	  power	  in	  
the	   longer-­‐term.	   In	   fact,	   the	   incentives	   to	  exploit	  buyer	  power	  depend	   in	  particular	  on	   the	   type	  of	  
industry	   involved,	   on	   the	   degree	   of	   product	   differentiation	   and	   on	   the	   firm’s	   business	   strategy	   to	  
maximize	  profits.	  
In	   addition,	   buyers	  may	   be	   aware	   that	   their	  market	   power	   in	   the	   upstream	   buyer	  market	  mainly	  
depends	   on	   the	   number	   of	   alternatives	   available	   in	   that	   market.	   Conduct	   which	   leads	   to	   the	  
exclusion	  of	  suppliers	   is	  hence	  very	   likely	   to	  weaken	  buyers’	  bargaining	  power.	  With	   fewer	  outside	  
options	   available	   to	   them,	   the	   threat	   of	   customers	   to	   switch	   to	   other	   sources	   of	   supply	   is	   indeed	  
much	   less	   credible.	  Where	   that	   link	   between	   the	   availability	   of	   outside	   options	   and	   the	   degree	  of	  
market	  power	  is	  taken	  into	  consideration,	  the	  incentives	  to	  exercise	  buyer	  power	  may	  therefore	  be	  
reduced	  and	  lead	  buyers	  to	  care	  about	  their	  suppliers’	  viability.	  
Yet,	   especially	   in	   times	  of	   crisis	   such	  as	   those	   the	  European	  Union	  and	   the	   rest	  of	   the	  world	  have	  
been	  going	  through	  since	  2009,	  one	  cannot	  but	  notice	  that	  many	  firms	  do	  not	  turn	  their	  nose	  up	  at	  
the	   opportunity	   to	   ensure	   better	   profitability	   through	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power.	   This	   is	  
undoubtedly	  even	  more	  likely	  in	  sectors	  characterized	  by	  little	  product	  differentiation	  or	  in	  the	  retail	  
sector	  for	  example	  where	  supermarket	  chains	  are	  not	   involved	  in	  manufacturing	  their	  own	  outputs	  
but	  sell	  as	  such	  products	  they	  buy	  in	  the	  upstream	  market	  so	  that	  they	  are	  not	  directly	  responsible	  
for	  product	  defects	  or	  lack	  of	  quality.	  In	  addition,	  as	  each	  supermarket	  chain	  sells	  generally	  the	  same	  
brands	  in	  a	  large	  range	  of	  product	  categories,	  any	  product	  improvement	  or	  degradation	  will	  similarly	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  See	  :	  J.K.Liker	  &	  T.Y.Choi,	  Building	  deep	  supplier	  relationship,	  Harvard	  Business	  Review,	  available	  at:	  
http://hbr.org/2004/12/building-­‐deep-­‐supplier-­‐relationships/ar/1	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affects	   all	   retailers.	   The	   latter	   are	   consequently	   less	   incited	   to	   care	   for	   the	   situation	   of	   branded	  
products	  manufacturers	  and	  focus	  instead	  mostly	  on	  price	  competition.109	  
Furthermore,	   buyers	   which	   are	   able	   to	   exercise	   market	   power	   over	   their	   suppliers	   are	   incited	   to	  
effectively	   use	   that	   power	   as	   they	  may	   expect	   their	   large	   competitors	   to	   act	   similarly.	   A	   firm	  will	  
indeed	   not	   deprive	   itself	   of	   better	   conditions	   obtained	   through	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   if	   it	  
knows	  that	  some	  rivals	  are	  also	  able	  to	  extract	  good	  terms	  from	  suppliers.	  Low	  purchasing	  prices	  and	  
other	   advantages	   obtained	   in	   the	   upstream	   buyer	   market	   are	   of	   crucial	   importance	   to	   compete	  
effectively	   in	   the	   downstream	   seller	  market.	   	   If	   firms	   focus	   on	   their	   short-­‐term	   interests,	   they	   are	  
therefore	  very	   likely	   to	  exercise	   their	  buyer	  power	   in	  order	   to	   secure	  a	   competitive	  position	  when	  
acting	  as	  sellers.	  
When	  buyers	   are	   so	   able	   and	   incited	   to	   exercise	   pressures	   on	   their	   suppliers,	   such	  power	  may	  be	  
translated	   into	   lower	  prices	  paid	   to	   sellers,	   but	   also	  excessive	   transfer	  of	   risks/costs	  or	  other	  non-­‐
pricing	  obligations	  such	  as	  a	  restriction	  to	  deal	  with	  competing	  buyers.	  Whether	  those	  practices	  may	  
put	  effective	  competition	  at	  risk	  is	  probably	  the	  main	  issue	  facing	  the	  European	  Commission	  and	  the	  
national	  Competition	  Authorities	  today.	  
D. CONCLUSIVE	  REMARKS	  
Market	  power	   is	   a	  notion	   that	  has	  been	  examined	  and	  defined	  mainly	   in	   seller	  power	   cases.	  Clear	  
guidelines	  have	  been	  published	  by	  the	  Commission	  in	  order	  to	  define	  the	  relevant	  seller	  market	  and	  
to	  assess	  the	  existing	  competitive	  constraints	  in	  that	  market.	  Market	  power	  on	  the	  buy-­‐side	  has	  yet	  
drawn	  less	  attention	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  EU	  competition	  policy.	  Buyer	  power	  is	  nevertheless	  an	  
issue	  that	  may	  arise	  in	  various	  markets	  and	  that	  is	  worth	  being	  properly	  defined.	  
The	   assessment	   of	   market	   power	   constitutes	   an	   important	   step	   in	   the	   enforcement	   of	   EU	  
competition	   law	  as	   the	   rules	  of	   the	  Treaty	  on	   that	  matter,	  and	   in	  particular	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  only	  
apply	   to	  market	  participants	  which	  possess	   significant	  market	  power.	  Accordingly,	   in	   the	  upstream	  
buyer	  market,	   a	   firm	  would	  be	   subject	   to	   that	   provision	   if	   it	   detains	   a	   sufficient	   degree	  of	  market	  
power	   so	   as	   to	   be	   able	   to	   prevent	   effective	   competition	   from	   being	   maintained	   in	   the	   relevant	  
market.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  the	  buyer	  would	  in	  fact	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  depress	  prices	  paid	  to	  suppliers	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109	  Circumstances	  are	  likely	  to	  change	  in	  case	  of	  own-­‐brand	  products	  as	  retailers	  are	  responsible	  for	  those	  
products	  and	  can	  win	  customers	  by	  differentiating	  their	  offerings	  introducing	  products	  that	  consumers	  
demand.	  However,	  as	  most	  private	  label	  lines	  are	  produced	  by	  SME,	  retailers’	  buyer	  power	  over	  those	  smaller	  
companies	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  great	  enough	  to	  extract	  low	  prices	  while	  exercising	  additional	  pressure	  to	  ensure	  that	  
quality	  and	  other	  requirements	  are	  maintained.	  In	  most	  cases,	  given	  the	  large	  number	  of	  potential	  suppliers	  at	  
disposal,	  retailers	  can	  easily	  find	  alternative	  sources	  of	  supply	  if	  one	  of	  their	  suppliers	  is	  forced	  to	  leave	  the	  
market	  due	  to	  unbearable	  costs	  and	  charges.	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a	  level	  that	  is	  below	  the	  competitive	  price	  or	  to	  obtain	  more	  favourable	  terms	  than	  those	  available	  to	  
other	  buyers.	  
It	  was	  noted	  in	  this	  chapter	  that,	  where	  the	  same	  firm	  acts	  simultaneously	  as	  a	  buyer	  in	  the	  upstream	  
input	   market	   and	   as	   a	   seller	   in	   the	   downstream	   output/retail	   market,	   its	   market	   power	   in	   the	  
respective	   markets	   may	   be	   relatively	   different.	   The	   relevant	   downstream	   market	   may	   indeed	   be	  
given	   a	   larger	   definition	   than	   the	   relevant	   upstream	  market	   and	   vice	   versa.	   This	   means	   that	   the	  
competitive	  constraints	  exerted	  on	  the	  firm	  in	  question	  is	  also	  likely	  to	  differ	  from	  one	  market	  to	  the	  
other.	   Consequently,	   in	   order	   to	   accurately	   assess	   the	   degree	   of	   buyer	   power,	   competition	  
authorities	   have	   to	   define	   the	   relevant	   upstream	   market	   and	   then	   to	   evaluate	   the	   competitive	  
pressures	  that	  a	  firm	  allegedly	  involved	  in	  anticompetitive	  behavior	  faces	  when	  acting	  as	  a	  buyer	  in	  
that	  market.	  
On	  the	  buy-­‐side,	  the	  degree	  of	  market	  power	  depends	  not	  only	  on	  the	  level	  of	  concentration	  among	  
buyers	  but	  also	  and	  mainly	  on	  the	  number	  of	  alternatives	  available	  to	  buyers	  and	  sellers.	  A	  buyer	  is	  
likely	  to	  exert	  market	  power	  over	  its	  suppliers	  where	  it	  can	  credibly	  threaten	  to	  switch	  to	  alternative	  
sources	   of	   supply,	   to	   sponsor	   new	   entry	   or	   to	   integrate	   backwards.	   Outside	   options	   available	   to	  
suppliers	  also	  constitute	  an	  essential	  element	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  a	  firm’s	  buyer	  power.	  Bargaining	  
power	  of	  existing	  customers	  is	  indeed	  all	  the	  more	  significant	  when	  suppliers	  cannot	  find	  easily	  other	  
and	  equivalent	  buyers	  to	  sell	  their	  products.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  such	  a	  lack	  of	  alternatives,	  producers	  may	  
be	  heavily	  dependent	  on	  their	  customers,	  especially	  when	  the	  latter	  represent	  a	  very	  high	  proportion	  
of	  their	  turnover.	  This	  gives	  de	  facto	  buyers	  the	  ability	  to	  exploit	  their	  market	  power	  in	  the	  relevant	  
upstream	  buyer	  market.	  
With	  regard	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  buyer	  power,	  these	  depend	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  and	  
downstream	  seller	  markets	  as	  well	  as	  on	  the	  way	  such	  power	  is	  exerted.	  Where	  the	  selling	  and	  the	  
buying	   sides	   of	   the	   market	   are	   both	   relatively	   concentrated,	   buyers	   may	   in	   fact	   exercise	  
countervailing	   power	   over	   large	   suppliers.	   In	   such	   a	   case,	   buyer	   power	   is	   generally	   considered	  
procompetitive	  as	  it	  prevents	  selling	  firms	  in	  the	  upstream	  seller	  market	  from	  exploiting	  their	  market	  
power	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  consumers.	  Where	  concentrated	  buyers	  face	  atomistic	  sellers,	  the	  former	  
are	   more	   likely	   to	   exert	   market	   power	   unilaterally.	   It	   is	   generally	   accepted	   that	   the	   exercise	   of	  
monopsony	   power	   -­‐	   that	   is	   buyers	   reducing	   their	   purchases	   in	   order	   to	  make	   prices	   decrease	   -­‐	   is	  
harmful	  to	  competition.	  Such	  reduction	  in	  quantity	  is	  indeed	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  a	  reduced	  production	  of	  
output	   and	   consequently	   to	   an	   increase	   in	   consumer	   prices	   in	   the	   downstream	   seller	   market.	  
However,	   where	   buyers	   are	   able	   to	   obtain	   lower	   prices	   or	   other	   concessions	  without	   limiting	   the	  
quantity	   purchased	   but	   by	   using	   take-­‐it-­‐or-­‐leave-­‐it	   contracts,	   the	   effects	   on	   competition	   are	  more	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controversial.	  Even	  though	  consumers	  generally	  benefit	  from	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power,	  especially	  
in	  terms	  of	  lower	  prices,	  some	  argue	  that,	  from	  a	  dynamic	  perspective,	  buyer	  practices	  might	  affect	  
competition	  on	  the	  markets	  in	  the	  longer	  term.	  This	  would	  for	  example	  be	  the	  case	  if	  buyer	  power	  is	  
used	  by	  some	  firms	  to	  reinforce	  their	  market	  position	  in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  markets	  or	   leads	  in	  
fact	  to	  a	  reduction	  in	  product	  quality	  or	  diversity.	  
In	   different	   upstream	   markets,	   buyers	   have	   strong	   incentives	   to	   exercise	   market	   power	   over	  
suppliers.	  Issues	  related	  to	  buyer	  power	  and	  its	  consequences	  are	  therefore	  likely	  to	  arise	  frequently	  
in	  various	  sectors.	  In	  order	  to	  make	  sure	  such	  power	  is	  not	  used	  anti-­‐competitively,	  those	  issues	  are	  
worth	  being	  addressed	  by	  competition	  authorities.	  The	  competitiveness	  of	  buyer	  practices	  is	  in	  fact	  
to	  be	  assessed	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   goals	  of	   EU	   competition	   law.	   That	  question	   is	   essential	   so	   as	   to	  
determine	  whether	  more	  intense	  enforcement	  of	  the	  competition	  rules	   is	  needed	  against	  powerful	  
buyers.	  
	  
SECTION	  II	  –	  IMPLICATION	  OF	  BUYER	  POWER	  IN	  EU	  COMPETITION	  LAW	  
The	  exploitation	  of	  buyer	  power	  has	  rarely	  given	  rise	  to	  antitrust	  action	  in	  the	  European	  Union.	  While	  
the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  has	  been	  recognized	  in	  different	  sectors110,	  nothing	  is	  really	  happening	  
in	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  competition	  rules	  against	  powerful	  buyers	  as	  it	  will	  be	  developed	  below	  in	  
Part	   II.	  One	  might,	   though,	  wonder	  whether	   the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  does	  not	  conflit	  with	   the	  
competition	  goals	  or	  affect	  the	  long-­‐term	  interests	  of	  consumers.	  
The	  first	  issue	  to	  be	  examined	  is	  related	  to	  the	  objectives	  of	  EU	  competition	  law.	  A	  short	  description	  
of	   those	  objectives	   is	   provided	   in	   Point	  A	  of	   this	   Section.	   In	   Point	   B,	  we	  will	   sum	  up	   the	  potential	  
effects	  of	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  and	  see	  whether,	  and	  to	  what	  extent,	  powerful	  buyers	  might	  
impede	  the	  achievement	  of	  the	  competition	  goals.	  Point	  C	  provides	  some	  reflection	  on	  how	  to	  deal	  
with	  buyer	  power	  in	  EU	  law.	  
A. THE	  OBJECTIVES	  OF	  EU	  COMPETITION	  LAW	  
The	  issue	  of	  the	  goals	  pursued	  in	  EU	  competition	  law	  is	  of	  crucial	  importance	  to	  assess	  the	  lawfulness	  
of	   a	   firm’s	   conduct.	   A	   practice	   is	   indeed	  unlikely	   to	   be	   found	   in	   violation	  of	   the	   competition	   rules	  
unless	   it	   results	   in	   (potentially)	   impeding	   the	   achievement	   of	   the	   competition	   goals.	   Different	  
objectives	   may	   in	   fact	   guide	   enforcement	   actions	   taken	   by	   competition	   authorities,	   ranging,	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110	  In	  various	  merger	  cases,	  the	  Commission	  highlighted	  in	  different	  sectors	  the	  presence	  of	  powerful	  buyers	  
who	  were	  able	  to	  exercise	  significant	  market	  power	  over	  their	  suppliers.	  See	  blow,	  Chapter	  2,	  Section	  I.	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particular,	  from	  increasing	  economic	  efficiency	  to	  integrating	  national	  markets	  as	  well	  as	  protecting	  
economic	  freedom	  or	  enhancing	  consumer	  welfare.	  These	  various	  objectives	  are	  further	  elaborated	  
in	  Part	  III.	  It	  is	  however	  convenient	  to	  provide	  already	  an	  insight	  into	  the	  goals	  of	  EU	  competition	  law	  
in	  this	  chapter	  so	  as	  to	  initiate	  some	  thought	  on	  the	  potential	  anticompetitive	  nature	  of	  certain	  buyer	  
practices.	  On	  basis	  of	  documents	   issued	  and	  declarations	  made	  by	  the	  Commission,	  along	  with	  the	  
case	   law	   of	   the	   European	   Courts,	   it	   may	   be	   affirmed	   that	   the	   competition	   rules	   aim	   primarily	   at	  
enhancing	   consumer	   welfare.	   However,	   it	   appears	   that,	   when	   enforcing	   those	   rules,	   competition	  
authorities	   focus	   rather	  on	   the	  protection	  of	   the	   competitive	  process	   and	   structure	   as	   a	  means	  of	  
indirectly	  ensuring	  consumer	  interests.	  
1. Main	  objective	  of	  EU	  competition	  law:	  protection	  of	  consumers	  
Consumer	  welfare	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  competition	  policy	  and	  constitutes	  the	  standard	  the	  Commission	  
applies	  when	  assessing	  mergers	   and	   infringements	  of	   the	   Treaty	   competition	   rules,	   namely	  Article	  
101	  and	  102	  TFEU.	  This	  was,	  in	  particular,	  highlighted	  by	  the	  former	  Commissioner	  Neelie	  Kroes	  who	  
maintained	  that:	  
“Consumer	  welfare	   is	   now	  well	   established	   as	   the	   standard	   the	   Commission	   applies	  
when	   assessing	   mergers	   and	   infringements	   of	   the	   Treaty	   rules	   on	   cartels	   and	  
monopolies.	   Our	   aim	   is	   simple:	   to	   protect	   competition	   in	   the	  market	   as	   a	  means	   of	  
enhancing	  consumer	  welfare	  and	  ensuring	  an	  efficient	  allocation	  of	  resources.	  “111	  
The	  aim	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  enforcement	  activity	  is	  hence	  to	  prevent	  firms	  from	  adversely	  affecting	  
consumer	  welfare	  through	  their	  conduct	  and	  to	  ensure	  their	  act	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  consumers.112	  
Practices	   that	   provide	   benefits	   to	   consumers	   are	   consequently	   unlikely	   to	   be	   condemned	   by	   the	  
Commission.	   Restrictive	   conduct	   that	  may	   otherwise	   violate	   the	   competition	   rules	  may	   indeed	   be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	  N.Kroes,	  Delivering	  better	  markets	  and	  better	  choices,	  Speech/05/512,	  European	  Consumer	  and	  
Competition	  Day,	  London,	  15	  September	  2005,	  available	  at:	  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-­‐release_SPEECH-­‐05-­‐
512_en.htm	  	  
112	  See:	  Commission	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  81(3)	  of	  the	  Treaty	  (Text	  with	  EEA	  relevance),	  O.J.	  C	  
101	  of	  27/04/2004,	  at	  13,	  noting	  that	  the	  objective	  of	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  “is	  to	  protect	  competition	  on	  the	  
market	  as	  a	  means	  of	  enhancing	  consumer	  welfare	  and	  of	  ensuring	  an	  efficient	  allocation	  of	  resources.	  
Competition	  and	  market	  integration	  serve	  these	  ends	  since	  the	  creation	  and	  preservation	  of	  an	  open	  single	  
market	  promotes	  an	  efficient	  allocation	  of	  resources	  throughout	  the	  Community	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  consumers”.	  
See	  also:	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission	  –	  Guidance	  on	  the	  Commission’s	  enforcement	  priorities	  in	  
applying	  Article	  102	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty	  to	  abusive	  exclusionary	  conduct	  bye	  dominant	  undertakings	  (Text	  with	  
EEA	  relevance),	  O.J.	  C	  45/7	  of	  24/02/2009,	  at	  19,	  which	  says	  that	  “The	  aim	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  enforcement	  
activity	  in	  relation	  to	  exclusionary	  conduct	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  dominant	  undertakings	  do	  not	  impair	  effective	  
competition	  by	  foreclosing	  their	  competitors	  in	  an	  anticompetitive	  way,	  thus	  having	  an	  adverse	  impact	  on	  
consumer	  welfare,	  whether	  in	  the	  form	  of	  higher	  price	  levels	  than	  would	  have	  otherwise	  prevailed	  or	  in	  some	  
other	  form	  such	  as	  limiting	  quality	  or	  reducing	  consumer	  choice”.	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exempted	   if	   it	   contributes	   to	   the	   well-­‐being	   of	   consumers.113	   In	   the	   overall	   assessment	   of	   the	  
foreseeable	   impact	   of	   a	   practice	  on	   the	  market,	   the	   restrictive	  but	   also	   the	  positive	   effects	   of	   the	  
practice	   in	  question	  are	  taken	   into	  account	  and	  balanced	  against	  each	  other	   in	  order	   to	  determine	  
the	  net	  effect	  on	  consumers.	  	  In	  fact,	  restrictive	  practices	  can	  be	  deemed	  on	  balance	  pro-­‐competitive	  
only	   if	   the	   resulting	   benefits	   are	   passed	   on	   to	   consumers	   and	   at	   least	   compensate	   them	   for	   any	  
negative	   impact	   caused	   by	   the	   restriction.	   Even	   though	   some	   restrictions	   appear	   beneficial	   to	  
consumers	   in	   the	   short-­‐term,	   they	   may	   nevertheless	   be	   considered	   to	   jeopardize	   the	   long-­‐term	  
interests	  of	   the	   latter	  due	   to	   their	   significant	  distortive	  effects	  on	   competition.	   In	   such	  a	   case,	   the	  
practice	  will	   not	   be	  upheld	   if	   the	  potential	   negative	   impact	  on	   consumers	   caused	   in	   the	   future	  by	  
such	   restriction	   is	   likely	   to	   outweigh	   the	   short-­‐run	   benefits	   consisting	   for	   example	   of	   lower	   retail	  
prices.	  Among	  those	  restrictive	  practices	  which	  bring	  about	  benefits	  to	  consumers	  only	  in	  the	  short-­‐
term,	  we	  can	  mention	  buyer	  cartels,	  predatory	  pricing	  or	  fidelity	  rebates,	  to	  name	  but	  a	  few.114	  
Even	  though	  consumer	  welfare	  constitutes	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  EU	  competition	  law,	  the	  direct	  effect	  
a	   practice	  may	   have	   on	   consumers	   is	   not	   necessarily	   the	  metric	   used	   to	   assess	   business	   conduct.	  
Consumer	   harm	   is	   in	   fact	   neither	   a	   sufficient	   nor	   a	   necessary	   condition	   to	   find	   a	   violation	   of	   the	  
competition	  rules.	  Accordingly,	  conduct	  that	  has	  an	  adverse	  impact	  on	  consumers	  may	  not	  be	  found	  
anticompetitive	   where	   no	   harm	   to	   competition	   is	   established.	   Practices	   such	   as	   misleading	  
information	   or	   confusing	   marketing	   are	   indeed	   more	   likely	   to	   be	   dealt	   with	   under	   consumer	  
protection	   policy.115	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   a	   firm’s	   behavior	   may	   violate	   the	   Treaty	   provisions	   on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113	  See	  Article	  101(3)	  which	  makes	  the	  prohibition	  in	  Article	  81(1)	  inapplicable	  to	  agreements	  or	  categories	  of	  
agreements	  that	  contribute	  to	  the	  improvement	  of	  the	  production	  or	  distribution	  of	  goods,	  or	  promote	  
technical	  or	  economic	  progress,	  that	  pass	  a	  fair	  share	  of	  the	  benefits	  to	  the	  consumers,	  and	  do	  not	  impose	  
restrictions	  that	  are	  not	  indispensable	  for	  achieving	  these	  benefits	  or	  afford	  the	  parties	  the	  possibility	  of	  
eliminating	  competition	  in	  respect	  of	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  the	  products	  in	  question.	  See	  also:	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  
application	  of	  Article	  81(3)	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  op.cit.	  and	  Guidance	  on	  the	  Commission’s	  enforcement	  priorities	  in	  
applying	  Article	  102	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  at	  28-­‐31.	  
114	  Buyer	  agreements	  fixing	  lower	  prices,	  quantities	  or	  allocating	  sources	  of	  supply	  are	  prohibited	  even	  though	  
they	  may	  lead	  to	  lower	  consumer	  prices	  as	  such	  arrangements	  eliminate	  the	  participants’	  autonomy	  in	  
strategic	  decision-­‐making.	  On	  that	  matter,	  see:	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  I,	  Point	  B,	  1,	  a).	  With	  regard	  to	  
predatory	  pricing,	  provided	  that	  the	  price	  fixed	  by	  a	  dominant	  firm	  is	  low	  enough	  to	  be	  considered	  predatory,	  it	  
will	  be	  concluded	  that	  the	  firm	  abused	  its	  dominant	  position,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  firm	  in	  question	  has	  a	  
realistic	  chance	  of	  recouping	  its	  losses.	  Concerning	  fidelity	  rebates,	  those	  practices	  are	  seen	  as	  impeding	  
competitors’	  access	  to	  the	  market	  leading	  to	  a	  potential	  reduction	  in	  consumer	  choice	  in	  the	  long-­‐term.	  Lower	  
prices	  enjoyed	  by	  some	  loyal	  consumers	  are	  therefore	  not	  sufficient	  to	  compensate	  the	  harm	  caused	  by	  the	  
restriction	  on	  competition.	  
115	  P.Akman,	  Exploitative	  abuse	  in	  Article	  82	  EC:	  Back	  to	  basics?,	  CCP	  Working	  Paper	  01/09	  (2009),	  at	  32,	  
available	  at:	  http://www.uea.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.105848!ccp09-­‐1.pdf	  	  Even	  though	  exploitative	  abuses	  are	  
included	  in	  the	  ambit	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  unfair	  practices	  are	  hardly	  condemned	  under	  that	  provision	  unless	  
additional	  harm,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  restriction	  on	  parallel	  trade	  or	  discrimination	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  nationality	  for	  
example,	  is	  established.	  See:	  I.Haracoglou,	  Competition	  law,	  consumer	  policy	  and	  the	  retail	  sector:	  the	  systems’	  
relation	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  a	  strengthened	  consumer	  protection	  on	  competition	  law,	  3	  The	  Competition	  Law	  
Review	  175	  (2007).	  Concerning	  excessive	  prices,	  the	  case	  law	  shows	  that	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  European	  
Courts	  have	  mostly	  addressed	  such	  practices	  in	  markets	  where	  entry	  could	  not	  be	  expected,	  such	  as	  in	  case	  of	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competition	  despite	  the	  absence	  of	  direct	  consumer	  harm.	  In	  different	  cases,	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  has	  
indeed	  pointed	  out	  that,	  for	  a	  finding	  that	  a	  practice	  is	  anticompetitive,	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	  that	  final	  
consumers	  be	  deprived	  of	  the	  advantages	  of	  effective	  competition	   in	  terms	  of	  supply	  or	  price.116	   In	  
fact,	  EU	  competition	  enforcers	  refuse	  to	  base	  their	  assessment	  on	  the	  direct	  harm	  a	  firm’s	  conduct	  
causes	  to	  consumers	  because	  they	  consider	  that	  the	  latters’	  interests	  in	  the	  medium	  to	  long	  term	  is	  
best	  protected	  through	  protection	  of	  the	  competitive	  process	  and	  structure.	  
2. Protection	  of	  the	  competitive	  process	  as	  a	  means	  of	  enhancing	  consumer	  welfare	  
The	  primary	  concern	   in	  competition	  cases	   is	   to	  protect	   the	  structure	  of	  competition	  while	  proof	  of	  
direct	  harm	  to	  consumers	  is	  generally	  not	  considered	  necessary.	  The	  Commission	  asserted	  that:	  
“[The	  Treaty]	  does	  not	  require	  it	  to	  be	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  conduct	   in	  question	  had	  
any	  actual	  or	  direct	  effect	  on	  consumers.	  Competition	  law	  concentrated	  upon	  protecting	  
the	  market	  structure	  from	  artificial	  distortions	  because	  by	  doing	  so	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  
consumer	  in	  the	  medium	  to	  long	  term	  are	  best	  protected”.117	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
legal	  monopoly.	  See	  for	  examples:	  General	  Motors	  Continental,	  Case	  IV/28.851,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  19	  
December	  1974,	  annulled	  on	  appeal	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (Case	  26/75,	  General	  Motors	  Continental	  NV	  v	  
Commission	  [1975]	  ECR	  1367);	  Case	  30/87,	  Corinne	  Bodson	  v	  SA	  Pompes	  funèbres	  des	  regions	  libérées	  [1988]	  
ECR	  2479;	  Joined	  cases	  110/88,	  241/88	  &	  242/88,	  François	  Lucazeau	  and	  others	  v	  Société	  des	  Auteurs,	  
Compositeurs	  et	  Editeurs	  de	  Musique	  (SACEM)	  and	  others	  [1989]	  ECR	  2811;	  Deutsche	  Post	  AG	  –	  Interception	  of	  
cross-­‐border	  mail,	  COMP/C-­‐1/36.915,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  25	  July	  2001.	  The	  only	  exception	  is	  the	  United	  
Brands	  case	  where	  the	  Court	  did	  not	  find	  excessive	  prices.	  (Case	  26/76,	  United	  Brands	  Company	  and	  United	  
Brands	  Continentaal	  BV	  v	  Commission	  [1978]	  ECR	  207)	  On	  the	  EU	  experience	  on	  excessive	  pricing,	  see:	  OECD,	  
Working	  party	  No.2	  on	  competition	  and	  regulation,	  Excessive	  prices,	  document	  submitted	  by	  the	  European	  
Union,	  DAF/COMP/WP2/WD(2011)54,	  17	  October	  2011,	  available	  at:	  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/multilateral/2011_oct_excessive_prices.pdf	  With	  regard	  to	  
unfair	  practices	  consisting	  of	  discriminatory	  prices,	  infringements	  of	  the	  competition	  rules	  were	  only	  found	  
where	  such	  practices	  were	  used	  to	  limit	  parallel	  trade	  (See	  for	  example:	  Case	  226/84,	  British	  Leyland	  Public	  
Limited	  Company	  v	  Commission	  [1986]	  ECR	  3263)	  or,	  for	  example,	  where	  they	  were	  accompanied	  and	  rendered	  
effective	  through	  other	  practices	  restricting	  parallel	  trade.	  (See	  for	  example:	  United	  Brands	  Company	  and	  
United	  Brands	  Continentaal	  BV	  v	  Commission	  [1978]	  ECR	  207)	  Unfair	  trading	  conditions	  were	  also	  found	  in	  
violation	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  where	  they	  involved	  an	  element	  of	  discrimination	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  nationality	  or	  
residence	  (See	  for	  example:	  1998	  Football	  World	  Cup,	  Case	  IV/36.888,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  20	  July	  1999)	  On	  
price	  discrimination,	  see:	  D.Geradin	  &	  N.Petit,	  Price	  discrimination	  under	  EC	  competition	  law:	  The	  need	  for	  a	  
case-­‐by-­‐case	  approach,	  GCLC	  Working	  Paper	  07/05	  (2005),	  available	  at:	  
http://www.coleurope.eu/sites/default/files/research-­‐paper/gclc_wp_07-­‐05.pdf	  	  Those	  cases	  show	  that	  the	  
objective	  of	  market	  integration,	  central	  in	  the	  European	  Union,	  is	  also	  taken	  into	  consideration	  in	  the	  
enforcement	  of	  the	  competition	  rules.	  On	  the	  objectives	  of	  EU	  competition	  law,	  see:	  Part	  III,	  Chapter	  I,	  Section	  
I.	  
116	  See	  for	  examples:	  Case	  6/72,	  Europemballage	  Corporation	  and	  Continental	  Can	  Company	  Inc.	  v.	  Commission	  
[1973]	  ECR	  215,	  at	  26;	  Case	  85/76,	  Hoffman-­‐La	  Roche	  v	  Commission	  [1979]	  ECR	  461,	  at	  125;	  Joined	  cases	  C-­‐
501/06P,	  C-­‐513/06P,	  C-­‐515/06P	  and	  C-­‐519/06P,	  Glaxosmithkline	  Services	  Unlimited	  and	  Others	  v.	  Commission	  
[2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐9291,	  at	  63;	  C-­‐8/08,	  T-­‐Mobile	  Netherlands	  BV	  and	  others	  v	  Raad	  van	  bestuur	  van	  de	  Nederlandse	  
Mededingingsautoriteit	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐4529,	  at	  38-­‐39.	  
117	  T-­‐219/99,	  British	  Airways	  v	  Commission	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐5917,	  at	  264.	  See	  also:	  Opinion	  Advocate	  General	  
Kokott,	  delivered	  on	  23	  February	  2006,	  C-­‐95/04P,	  British	  Airways	  plc	  v	  Commission	  [2007]	  ECR	  I-­‐2331,	  at	  68.	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The	  proof	  of	  harm	  to	  the	  competition	  process	  is	  therefore	  sufficient	  to	  establish	  a	  violation	  of	  
the	   competition	   rules.	   The	   Commission	   and	   the	   European	   Courts	   in	   fact	   consider	   that	   any	  
restriction	  on	  competition	  is	  likely	  to	  endanger	  consumer	  welfare	  in	  a	  longer-­‐term	  perspective.	  
The	   concept	   of	   consumer	  welfare	   includes	   a	   large	   variety	   of	   elements	   ranging	   from	   low	   prices	   to	  
product	  quality,	  diversity,	  safety	  as	  well	  as	  choice	  and	  innovation.	  It	  is	  assumed	  that	  the	  protection	  of	  
those	   different	   factors	   cannot	   be	   properly	   guaranteed	   by	   a	   mere	   assessment	   of	   the	   direct	   and	  
immediate	   effect	   of	   a	   firm’s	   conduct	  on	   consumers.	   The	  potential	   impact	  of	   business	  practices	  on	  
consumer	   interests	   such	   as	   quality,	   innovation	   or	   choice,	   is	   difficult	   or	   even	   impossible	   to	   assess	  
immediately.	  It	  is	  indeed	  only	  in	  the	  longer-­‐term	  that	  the	  positive/negative	  effects	  of	  some	  practices	  
will	   appear	   on	   the	  market.	   This	   is	  why	   the	   standard	   governing	   the	   assessment	   of	   anticompetitive	  
behavior	  is	  not	  the	  direct	  impact	  on	  consumers	  as	  such	  but	  rather	  the	  likely	  effect	  on	  the	  competitive	  
process	  brought	   about	  by	   such	  behavior.	   The	  protection	  of	   a	   competitive	  business	   environment	   is	  
essential	   for	   enhancing	   consumer	  welfare.	   Rivalry	   between	   competitors	   and	   openness	   of	  markets	  
incite	   indeed	   companies	   to	   compete	   and	   innovate	   so	   as	   to	   provide	   better	   goods/services	   for	  
consumers.	  Accordingly,	  the	  EU	  authorities	  focus	  on	  the	  effects	  on	  the	  competitive	  process	  to	  decide	  
whether	  firms’	  conduct	  violates	  or	  not	  Article	  101	  or	  102	  TFEU.	  
Given	  the	  objective	  to	  protect	  the	  competitive	  process	  as	  a	  means	  of	  enhancing	  consumer	  welfare,	  
one	  may	  wonder	  whether	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  is	  likely,	  in	  some	  circumstances,	  to	  impede	  the	  
achievement	  of	  that	  objective.	  
B. CONTROVERSY	  ABOUT	  THE	  EFFECT	  OF	  BUYER	  POWER	  ON	  COMPETITION	  
Unlike	  the	  exercise	  of	  seller	  power	  which	  generally	  leads	  to	  direct	  negative	  outcomes	  for	  consumers	  
through,	   for	   example,	   higher	   prices,	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   entails	   less	   straightforward	  
consequences.	  As	  we	  have	  already	  noted,	  the	  presence	  of	  large	  buyers	  may	  entail	  both	  positive	  and	  
negative	  effects	  on	  the	  markets.	  
1. Positive	  effects	  of	  buyer	  power	  
The	   presence	   of	   large	   buyers	   has	   raised	   few	   competitive	   concerns	   so	   far	   as	   the	   action	   of	   those	  
players	  in	  the	  input	  upstream	  market	  has	  been	  deemed	  beneficial	  for	  end-­‐users.	  Powerful	  buyers	  are	  
indeed	  able	  to	  achieve	  efficiencies	  in	  their	  purchasing	  activities	  such	  as	  economies	  of	  scale	  or	  scope	  
and	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  bargain	  effectively	  over	  price	  and	  quality.	  In	  addition,	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  
power	   is	   likely	   to	   deter	   or	   to	   counteract	   anticompetitive	   conduct	   in	   the	   upstream	   seller	   market	  
(countervailing	  buyer	  power)	  by	  preventing	  any	   increase	   in	  price	  above	  the	  competitive	   level	  or	  by	  
tempting	   suppliers	   into	   deviating	   from	   a	   collusive	   scheme.	   A	   large	   buyer	   can	   indeed	   make	   seller	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cartels	   less	   stable	   as	   the	   offer	   of	   important	   orders	   to	   some	   of	   the	   participants	   creates	   great	  
incentives	  to	  deviate	  from	  the	  collusive	  strategy.118	  As	  a	  result,	  assuming	  that	  lower	  prices	  negotiated	  
upstream	  are	  passed	  on	  to	  consumers	  in	  the	  output	  market,	  competition	  authorities	  and	  courts	  have	  
not	  attached	  a	  great	  importance	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  buyer	  power.	  That	  limited	  interest	  is	  attested	  by	  the	  
nearly	  non-­‐existent	  case	  law	  of	  the	  European	  Courts	  on	  abuse	  of	  buyer	  power	  as	  well	  as	  the	  different	  
instruments	   adopted	   by	   the	   EU	   institutions	   which	   focus	   almost	   entirely	   on	   output	   market	  
considerations.119	  
2. Negative	  effects	  of	  buyer	  power	  
When	   lower	   prices	   obtained	   by	   large	   customers	   do	   not	   constitute	   efficiency-­‐related	   discounts	   but	  
are	   only	   the	   result	   of	   the	   exploitation	   of	   buyer	   power	   through	   coercive	   means	   or	   market-­‐prices	  
manipulation,	  uncertainty	  arises	  about	   the	  effects	  of	   such	  exploitation	  on	  the	  competitive	  process.	  
Where	   in	  the	  short-­‐run	  large	  buyers’	  action	   in	  the	   input	  market	  may	  improve	  consumer	  welfare,	   in	  
the	  long-­‐term,	  it	  is	  likely,	  at	  best,	  to	  leave	  end-­‐users	  unaffected.	  Different	  adverse	  effects	  may	  indeed	  
arise	  from	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power.	  
First,	   if	  buyer	  power	   is	  combined	  with	  seller	  power	   in	   the	  downstream	  market	  or	  used	  to	  enhance	  
such	  power,	  consumers	  will	  not	  necessarily	  benefit	   from	  the	  presence	  of	   large	  buyers	  as	   the	   latter	  
will	  not	  be	  incited	  to	  pass	  on	  cost-­‐savings	  to	  their	  own	  customers.	  
Second,	  consumers	  are	  not	  always	  allowed	  to	  share	  the	  benefits	  resulting	  from	  the	  pressure	  exerted	  
by	  buyers	  in	  the	  upstream	  market.	  Indeed,	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  does	  not	  only	  translate	  into	  
lower	   prices	   paid	   to	   suppliers	   but	  may	   also	   consist	   in,	   for	   example,	   transferring	   excessive	   risks	   or	  
costs	  to	  the	   latter	  or	  coercing	  them	  to	  boycott	  rival	  buyers.	  These	  other	  concessions	  that	  powerful	  
buyers	  may	  extract	  are	  yet	  less	  likely	  to	  directly	  benefit	  consumers.	  
Thirdly,	   large	  buyers’	  market	  power	  may	  also	  harm	  market	  participants	   in	  the	  up-­‐	  and	  downstream	  
markets.	   On	   the	   firing	   line	   are	   small	   suppliers	   who	   are	   forced	   to	   absorb	   the	   revenue	   loss	   and	  
sometimes	  to	  live	  with	  a	  very	  low,	  if	  any,	  return	  on	  capital.	  The	  wealth	  transfer	  from	  sellers	  to	  buyers	  
resulting	  from	  the	  exercise	  of	  market	  power	  may	  consequently	  lower	  the	  incentives	  of	  the	  former	  to	  
invest	  in	  product	  quality	  and	  innovation	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  consumers.	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  R.INDERST	  &	  G.SHAFFER,	  Buyer	  power	  in	  merger	  control,	  ABA	  Antitrust	  Section	  Handbook:	  Issues	  in	  
competition	  law	  and	  policy,	  W.D.Collins,	  ed.,	  2007,	  Chapter	  XX,	  at	  18.	  
119	  See	  for	  example	  :	  Commission	  Notice	  on	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  relevant	  market,	  op.cit.;	  Council	  Regulation	  
(EC)	  No	  139/2004	  of	  20	  January	  2004	  on	  the	  control	  of	  concentrations	  between	  undertakings,	  O.J.	  L	  24,	  
29.01.2004;	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  assessment	  of	  non-­‐horizontal	  mergers	  under	  the	  Council	  Regulation	  on	  the	  
control	  of	  concentrations	  between	  undertakings	  O.J.	  C	  265	  of	  18/10/2008	  ;	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  assessment	  of	  
horizontal	  mergers	  under	  the	  Council	  Regulation	  on	  the	  control	  of	  concentrations	  between	  undertakings	  O.J.	  C	  
31	  of	  05/02/2004;	  Commission	  notice	  -­‐	  Guidelines	  on	  Vertical	  Restraints,	  O.J.	  C	  130	  of	  19/05/2010	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Fourthly,	  excessive	  pressures	  exerted	  on	  sellers	  may	  generate	  additional	  costs	  that	  society	  will	  have	  
to	   bear	   such	   as	   taxpayer-­‐funded	   subsidies	   granted	   to	   farmers	   in	   order,	   among	   other	   things,	   to	  
provide	  them	  with	  a	  reasonable	  standard	  of	  living.120	  
Finally,	  competing	  buyers	  are	  also	  affected	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  powerful	  buyers.	  Market	  power	  in	  the	  
input	  market	  constitutes	  indeed	  a	  competitive	  advantage	  which	  is	  likely	  to	  reinforce	  the	  position	  of	  
the	   latter	   in	   the	  output	  market.	  Obtaining	   lower	  prices	  or	  better	   contractual	   conditions	   cannot	  be	  
seen	   as	   anticompetitive,	   even	   though	   this	   puts	   rivals	   at	   a	   competitive	   disadvantage	   in	   the	  
downstream	   market.	   However,	   some	   practices	   used	   to	   exclude	   competitors	   such	   as	   exclusive	  
dealings	  or	  price	  squeezes	  may	  in	  fact	  adversely	  affect	  competition	  and	  contribute	  to	  the	  emergence	  
of	  seller	  power	  in	  the	  output	  market.	  
Given	   those	  potential	  benefits	  and	  harmful	  effects,	  one	  may	  wonder	  whether	   the	  exercise	  of	   such	  
power	  might	  hinder	  the	  achievement	  of	  the	  objectives	  of	  EU	  competition	  law.	  
3. Buyer	  power	  and	  the	  objectives	  of	  EU	  competition	  law	  
If	   competition	   authorities	   equated	   competition	   injury	   with	   direct	   consumer	   harm,	   the	   exercise	   of	  
buyer	  power	  would	  hardly	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  EU	  competition	  law.	  Under	  such	  an	  approach,	  any	  
action	  taken	  against	  a	  buyer’s	  conduct	  would	  indeed	  require	  the	  proof	  that	  the	  buyer	  in	  question	  has	  
market	   power	   in	   the	   downstream	  market	   or	   used	   its	   buyer	   power	   to	   enhance	   its	   position	   in	   that	  
market.	  121	  
However,	  as	  briefly	  developed	  above,	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  European	  Courts	  do	  not	  focus	  on	  the	  
direct	   impact	   on	   consumers,	   appearing	   generally	   through	   higher	   or	   lower	   prices	   in	   the	   output	  
market,	  but	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  business	  practices	  on	  the	  competitive	  process.	  Price	  alone	  is	  indeed	  not	  
a	   sufficient	  metric	   to	   protect	   the	   long-­‐run	   interests	   of	   consumers.122	   As	  maintained	  by	   the	   former	  
Competition	   Commissioner	   Neelie	   Kroes,	   the	   pro-­‐consumer	   approach	   includes	   not	   only	   lowering	  
prices	  but	  also	  protecting	  choice	  and	  quality.	  
“For	   the	  Commission's	  part,	   competition	  policy	   is	  about	  more	   than	   lowering	  prices	   for	  
consumers.	  Our	  effect	  on	  choice	  and	  quality	  is	  just	  as	  important.	  We	  must	  also	  consider	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120	  W.S.Grimes,	  op.cit.,	  at	  574.	  
121	  See	  for	  example:	  J.T.Rosch,	  Monopsony	  and	  the	  meaning	  of	  “consumer	  welfare”:	  A	  closer	  look	  at	  
Weyerhaeuser,	  2007	  Columbia	  Business	  Law	  Review	  353	  (2007)	  
122	  J.C.Berson,	  Looking	  beyond	  efficiency	  :	  Applying	  the	  consumer-­‐choice	  standard	  to	  agriculture,	  83	  Temple	  Law	  
Review	  491,	  at	  494	  (2011)	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the	   benefits	   of	   more	   dynamic	   efficiencies	   associated	   with	   innovation	   and	   increased	  
productivity.”123	  
Under	   such	   a	   dynamic	   perspective	   of	   consumer	  welfare,	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	  might	   raise	  
concerns	  under	  competition	  law.	  Indeed,	  the	  transfer	  of	  gains	  from	  upstream	  sellers	  to	  buyers	  may	  
have	   an	   adverse	   effect	   on	   the	   incentives	   of	   the	   former	   to	   invest	   in	   innovation	   or	   to	   continue	  
performing	   their	   productive	   activity.	   This	   in	   turn	   would	   negatively	   impact	   consumers	   in	   the	  
downstream	  market	  who	  might	  face	  in	  the	  longer-­‐term	  reduced	  choices	  and	  lower	  quality	  product.	  
In	  order	  to	  prevent	  or	  at	  least	  limit	  the	  emergence	  of	  such	  harmful	  impact,	  one	  may	  wonder	  whether	  
competition	  law	  should	  not	  protect	  competition	  in	  the	  downstream	  but	  also	  in	  the	  upstream	  markets	  
and	  as	  such	  protect	  all	  market	  participants	  who	  are	  made	  victims	  of	  anticompetitive	  conduct.	  
Among	  others,	  Gregory	  Werden	  defends	  that	  approach	  and	  considers	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  end-­‐user	  harm	  
does	  not	  preclude	  competition	  authorities	   from	  concluding	   to	  a	  violation	  of	   the	  competition	   rules.	  
The	  main	  issue	  must	  instead	  be	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  competition	  process	  as	  a	  whole	  as	  it	  constitutes	  
the	   best	   mean	   to	   enhance	   consumer	   welfare	   in	   the	   end.	   Whoever	   are	   the	   victims	   of	   an	  
anticompetitive	  practice,	  such	  conduct	  is	  therefore	  to	  be	  condemned	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  any	  market	  
distortion.124	  Accordingly,	  in	  sell-­‐side	  cases,	  competition	  authorities	  would	  focus	  on	  consumers	  while	  
in	  buy-­‐side	  cases	  suppliers’	  interests	  would	  mainly	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration.	  Consequently,	  where	  
the	   competition	   rules	   may	   be	   enforced	   to	   prevent	   unfair	   transfer	   of	   surplus	   from	   consumers	   to	  
producers,	  any	  undue	  transfer	  of	  wealth	  from	  sellers	  to	  buyers	  should	  give	  rise	  to	  similar	  concerns.125	  
The	  protection	  of	  the	  competitive	  process	  would	  thus	  imply	  that	  all	  market	  participants	  are	  entitled	  
to	   the	  benefits	  of	  competition	  when	  they	  buy	  or	  when	  they	  sell	  a	  product.126	   Instead	  of	  subjecting	  
competition	   injury	   to	   the	  proof	   of	   consumer	  harm,	   competition	   authorities	   should	   infer	   consumer	  
harm	  from	  injury	  to	  competition.	  
That	  approach	  would	  in	  fact	  be	  in	  line	  with	  some	  recent	  statements	  made	  by	  the	  EU	  institutions.	  For	  
example,	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  maintained	   in	  different	  cases	  that	   the	  Treaty	  provisions	  are	  designed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123	  Speech	  given	  by	  Competition	  Commissioner,	  Neelie	  Kroes,	  on	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Welfare,	  
21/10/2009,	  available	  at:	  
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/09/486&format=HTML&aged=0&language
=EN.	  See	  also:	  R.H.Lande,	  Proving	  the	  obvious:	  The	  Antitrust	  laws	  were	  passed	  to	  protect	  consumers	  (not	  just	  to	  
increase	  efficiency),	  50	  Hastings	  Law	  Journal	  959	  (1999)	  
124	  G.J.Werden,	  Monopsony	  and	  the	  Sherman	  Act:	  Consumer	  Welfare	  in	  a	  New	  Light,	  74	  Antitrust	  Law	  Journal	  
707,	  at	  735	  (2007)	  
125	  See:	  W.S.Grimes,	  op.cit.,	  at	  569	  and	  J.B.Kirkwook	  &	  R.H.Lande,	  The	  fundamental	  goal	  of	  antitrust:	  Protecting	  
consumers,	  not	  increasing	  efficiency,	  84	  Notre	  Dame	  law	  Review	  191	  (2008)	  
126	  A.A.Foer,	  mr.Magoo	  visits	  Wal-­‐Mart:	  Finding	  the	  right	  lens	  for	  antitrust,	  39	  Connecticut	  Law	  Review	  1307,	  at	  
1332	  (2007)	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“to	   protect	   not	   only	   the	   immediate	   interests	   of	   individual	   competitors	   and	   consumers	   but	   also	   to	  
protect	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  market	  and	  thus	  competition	  as	  such.”127	  
As	   for	   the	   European	   Parliament,	   in	   a	   resolution	   of	   2010,	   it	   called	   for	   “an	   expansion	   of	   European	  
Competition	  Law	  beyond	   its	  current	  narrow	  focus	  on	  consumer	  welfare	  and	  concerns	   for	   low	  food	  
prices”.128	   This	   is	   in	   fact	   in	   line	  with	   the	  objective	  pursued	  by	   the	  Commission	  when	  enforcing	   the	  
competition	   rules.	  The	  aim	   to	   safeguard	  a	  competitive	  environment	   in	   the	  EU	   in	  order	   to	  enhance	  
consumer	  welfare	  requires	  protecting	  competition	  in	  all	  directions.	  Such	  an	  approach	  is	  indeed	  most	  
likely	  to	  bring	  consumers	  all	  the	  benefits	  that	  fierce	  competition	  on	  the	  markets	  is	  supposed	  to	  offer,	  
that	  is	  low	  prices,	  choice,	  quality,	  variety	  and	  innovation.	  
C. THE	  OPEN	  QUESTION	  ON	  HOW	  TO	  DEAL	  WITH	  THE	  EXERCISE	  OF	  BUYER	  POWER	  
The	  exploitation	  of	  buyer	  power	  has	  rarely	  given	  rise	  to	  antitrust	  action	  in	  the	  European	  Union.	  One	  
could	  hence	  assume	  that	  buyer	  power	  is	  not	  an	  issue	  in	  EU	  law.	  However,	  it	  is	  clearly	  recognised	  that	  
some	  buyers	  detain	  significant	  market	  power	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  markets	  and	  that	  the	  exercise	  of	  
such	   power	   may	   harm	   other	   market	   participants.	   The	   question	   is	   hence	   whether	   action	   against	  
excessive	  buyer	  power	  should	  take	  place	  within	  the	  ambit	  of	  competition	  law.	  
1. Buyer	  power:	  an	  issue	  but	  not	  addressed	  in	  EU	  law	  
The	  EU	  competition	  rules	  are	  generally	  enforced	  against	  seller	  practices.	  Very	  few	  competition	  cases	  
deal	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  buyer	  power	  and	  its	  consequences	  on	  the	  markets.129	  	  The	  lack	  of	  decisions	  and	  
interests	  about	  that	  issue	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  EU	  competition	  law	  is	  mostly	  explained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  
customers	   were	   assimilated	   to	   atomistic	   consumers	   devoid	   of	   market	   power.	   The	   attention	   of	  
competition	  authorities	  was	  hence	  rather	  focused	  on	  the	  potential	  misuse	  of	  market	  power	  form	  the	  
selling	  side	  only.	  
The	   question	   is	   why	   today,	   while	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   has	   been	   recognized	   in	   different	  
sectors,	  buyer	  practices	  seem	  to	  remain	  a	  side-­‐issue	  in	  competition	  law	  cases.	  The	  answer	  probably	  
lies	  in	  the	  controversies	  about	  the	  effects	  of	  buyer	  power	  on	  competition.	  As	  buyer	  power	  does	  not	  
seem	  at	  first	  sight	  contrary	  to	  the	  primary	  objective	  of	  the	  Commission,	  which	  is	  to	  maximize	  welfare	  
of	  consumers,	  no	  consensus	  has	  emerged	  on	  the	  necessity	  and	  on	  the	  way	  to	  intervene	  against	  some	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127	  See	  for	  example:	  C-­‐8/08,	  T-­‐Mobile	  Netherlands	  BV	  and	  others	  v	  Raad	  van	  bestuur	  van	  de	  Nederlandse	  
Mededingingsautoriteit	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐4529,	  at	  38.	  
128	  European	  Parliament	  resolution	  of	  7	  September	  2010	  on	  fair	  revenues	  for	  farmers	  :	  A	  better	  functioning	  
food	  supply	  chain	  in	  Europe,	  2009/2237(INI),	  at	  30.	  
129	  See	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  I,	  Point	  B	  where	  the	  few	  cases	  involving	  the	  enforcement	  of	  Article	  101	  and	  
102	  TFEU	  against	  powerful	  buyers	  are	  examined.	  In	  fact,	  the	  issue	  of	  buyer	  power	  has	  mostly	  been	  addressed	  
in	  merger	  cases.	  See	  below,	  Chapter	  2,	  Section	  1	  and	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  II.	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buyers’	   practices.	   Indeed,	   except	   in	   case	   of	  monopsony	   power	   combined	  with	   seller	   power	   in	   the	  
downstream	  market,	  straightforward	  harmful	  effects	  on	  consumers	  have	  hardly	  been	  noted.	  On	  the	  
contrary,	   buyer	   power	   is	   generally	   considered	   to	   bring	   about	   positive	   effects	   in	   the	   short-­‐term,	   in	  
particular	   through	   lower	  prices.	  Consequently,	   competition	  authorities	  are	   rather	   reluctant	   to	   take	  
the	  risk	  of	  deterring	  conduct	  that	  creates	  such	  benefits	  for	  consumers.	  
However,	  as	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  might,	  in	  some	  circumstances,	  affect	  the	  
long-­‐term	  interest	  of	  consumers.	  Even	  though	  there	  is	  still	  room	  for	  disagreement	  about	  the	  need	  to	  
intervene	   against	   powerful	   buyers,	   a	   rising	   number	   of	   national	   authorities	   are	   taking	  measures	   to	  
restore	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  fairness	  in	  business	  relationships.130	  At	  EU	  level,	  authorities	  seem	  also	  to	  
consider	  that,	   in	  some	  circumstances,	   imbalances	  of	  power	  between	  the	  different	  players	  may	  lead	  
to	  consequences	  going	  further	  than	  a	  mere	  inequitable	  distribution	  of	  profits.	  Various	  investigations	  
have	  been	  carried	  out	  to	  assess,	  among	  other	  things,	  the	  impact	  of	  buyer	  power	  on	  the	  markets	  as	  
well	  as	  to	  determine	  whether	  and	  which	  action	  at	  EU	  level	  is	  needed.131	  
2. Buyer	  power:	  an	  issue	  to	  be	  addressed	  within	  or	  outside	  EU	  competition	  law	  ?	  
It	  is	  undeniable	  that	  buyer	  power	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  small	  number	  of	  firms	  causes	  harm	  to	  some	  other	  
market	   participants.	   However,	   it	   remains	   to	   identify	   whether	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	  
power	   run	   counter	   to	   the	   objectives	   of	   EU	   competition	   law.	   If	   so,	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   ability	   of	  
competition	   authorities	   to	   address	   anticompetitive	   buyer	   practices	   under	   the	   current	   competition	  
rules	  is	  to	  be	  raised.	  
a) Unfair	  versus	  anticompetitive	  practices	  
The	  Commission	  draws	  a	  distinction	  between,	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	  anticompetitive	  business	  practices	  
which	   distort	   competition	   and,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   unfair	   practices	   resulting	   from	   contractual	  
imbalances	  but	  which	  do	  not	  fall	  under	  the	  scope	  of	  EU	  competition	  rules	  because	  they	  do	  not	  entail	  
any	  anticompetitive	  effect	  on	  the	  markets.132	  
On	   the	   buy-­‐side,	   unequal	   bargaining	   power	   is	   present	   whenever	   the	   buyer	   can	   “drive	   a	   hard	  
bargain”;	   that	   is,	   can	   impose	   upon	   its	   contracting	   party	   terms	   and	   conditions	   that	   are	   deemed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130	  Various	  types	  of	  measures	  have	  In	  fact	  been	  implemented	  by	  national	  authorities	  ranging	  from	  new	  
contractual	  laws	  to	  a	  code	  of	  conduct.	  Action	  taken	  at	  national	  level	  in	  different	  countries	  is	  examined	  in	  Part	  II,	  
Chapter	  2.	  	  
131	  See	  Part	  III,	  Chapter	  2,	  Section	  I,	  Point	  A.	  
132	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission	  to	  the	  European	  Parliament,	  the	  Council,	  the	  European	  Economic	  and	  
Social	  Committee	  and	  the	  Committee	  of	  the	  Regions,	  A	  better	  functioning	  food	  supply	  chain	  in	  Europe,	  
SEC(2009)	  591	  final,	  Brussels,	  28/10/2009,	  at	  5.	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unfavourable	  by	  that	  other	  party.133	  Different	  factors	  enable	  a	  buyer	  to	  do	  so	  without	  risking	  that	  its	  
supplier	  declines	  the	  proposed	  contract.	  For	  examples,	  the	  economic	  dependency	  of	  a	  supplier	  on	  its	  
customer,	   the	   significant	   sunk	   costs	   already	   incurred	   by	   the	   seller	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   buyer’s	  
requirements	  or	  the	  high	  concentration	  in	  the	  buyer	  market	  are	  so	  many	  elements	  that	  strengthen	  a	  
buyer's	  bargaining	  position.134	  The	  resulting	  unbalanced	  relationships	  between	  buyers	  and	  suppliers	  
often	  lead	  to	  unfair	  contractual	  terms	  that	  may	  be	  undesirable	  from	  a	  social	  or	  political	  point	  view.	  
However,	   provided	   that	   those	   terms	   do	   not	   restrict	   competition,	   the	   issue	   of	   unequal	   bargaining	  
power	   and	   its	   consequences	   should	   be	   addressed	   outside	   the	   scope	   of	   competition	   policy.	   The	  
competition	   rules	   are	   indeed	   not	   designed	   to	   protect	   weaker	   players	   in	   the	   supply	   chain	   but	   to	  
ensure	  effective	  and	  undistorted	  competition	  on	  the	  markets	  to	  the	  ultimate	  benefits	  of	  consumers.	  
By	   contrast,	   buyer	   power	   is	   more	   likely	   to	   constitute	   a	   problem	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   EU	  
competition	  law.	  Such	  power	  is	  deemed	  to	  exist	  “if	  a	  market	  is	  concentrated	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  a	  
particular	   buyer	   has	   not	   only	   power	   over	   a	   particular	   supplier	   but	   over	   suppliers	   in	   general”.135	   In	  
fact,	   the	  Commission	   considers	   that	  buyer	  power	  may	  have	  either	  beneficial	  or	   adverse	  effects	  on	  
consumers.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  when	  powerful	  buyers	  exercise	  countervailing	  power	  and	  pass	  on	  the	  
better	  prices	  and	  terms	  obtained	  from	  suppliers	  to	  consumers	  downstream,	  buyer	  power	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  
positive	  strength	   for	  consumers.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   if	  a	  buyer	  has	  significant	  market	  power	   in	   the	  
upstream	  buyer	  market	  combined	  with	  significant	  market	  power	   in	   the	  downstream	  seller	  market,	  
savings	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  passed	  on	  to	  consumers.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  competition	  concerns	  may	  arise.	  
Excessive	   buyer	   power	   may	   also	   raise	   competition	   concerns	   if	   a	   buyer	   used	   its	   position	   in	   the	  
upstream	  market	   to	   foreclose	   (potential)	   rivals	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   consumers.136	   In	   addition,	   the	  
Commission	   points	   out	   that,	   in	   specific	   circumstances,	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   may	   induce	  
suppliers	   to	   invest	   less	   in	   product	   quality	   and	   innovation	   due	   to	   the	   low	   profitability	   of	   such	  
investment.	  This	   is	  hence	   likely	   to	  adversely	  affect	   consumers	  as	   the	  concept	  of	   consumer	  welfare	  
encompasses	  not	  only	  low	  prices	  but	  also	  diversity,	  quality	  and	  innovation.137	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133	  Commission	  Staff	  working	  document,	  Competition	  in	  the	  food	  supply	  chain,	  SEC(2009)	  1449,	  Accompanying	  
document	  to	  the	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission	  to	  the	  European	  Parliament,	  the	  Council,	  the	  European	  
Economic	  and	  Economic	  Committee,	  and	  the	  Committee	  of	  the	  Regions,	  A	  better	  functioning	  food	  supply	  chain	  
in	  Europe,	  COM(2009)591,	  at	  17.	  
134	  Ibidem.	  
135	  European	  Competition	  network,	  ECN	  activities	  in	  the	  food	  sector	  –	  Report	  on	  competition	  law	  enforcement	  
and	  market	  monitoring	  activities	  by	  European	  competition	  authorities	  in	  the	  food	  sector,	  May	  2012,	  at	  41,	  
available	  at:	  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/food_report_en.pdf	  	  
136	  European	  Competition	  network,	  ECN	  activities	  in	  the	  food	  sector	  –	  Report	  on	  competition	  law	  enforcement	  
and	  market	  monitoring	  activities	  by	  European	  competition	  authorities	  in	  the	  food	  sector,	  May	  2012,	  at	  41,	  
available	  at:	  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/food_report_en.pdf	  	  
137	  Commission	  Staff	  working	  document,	  Competition	  in	  the	  food	  supply	  chain,	  op.cit.,	  at	  18.	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b) Buyer	  power	  and	  competition	  law	  
Competition	  authorities	  mostly	  refer	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  unequal	  bargaining	  power	  when	  dealing	  with	  
the	  issue	  of	  unfair	  trading	  practices	  whereas	  the	  potential	  negative	  impact	  of	  some	  buyer	  practices	  
on	  competition	  seems	  to	  be	  disregarded	  or	  at	  least	  underestimated.	  However,	  in	  some	  sectors,	  such	  
as	   in	   the	   food	   retail	   industry,	   a	   small	   number	   of	   large	   buyers	   are	   able	   to	   exert	   significant	  market	  
power,	  not	  only	  over	  one	  particular	  contracting	  party,	  but	  over	  suppliers	   in	  general,	   including	  over	  
some	  big	  food	  processing	  companies.	  Particular	  attention	  should	  therefore	  be	  paid	  by	  EU	  institutions	  
on	  such	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  and	  its	  effects	  on	  competition	  in	  the	  Union.	  
Throughout	   this	   thesis,	   different	   arguments	   will	   be	   set	   forth	   in	   order	   to	   determine	   whether	   the	  
exercise	  of	  market	  power	  over	  producers	   impedes	  the	  achievement	  of	  the	  competition	  goals	  or,	  at	  
least,	  is	  likely	  to	  bring	  about	  in	  the	  longer-­‐term	  such	  harmful	  effects.	  Where	  a	  buyer’	  practices	  have	  a	  
negative	  impact	  on	  suppliers	  in	  general	  but	  also	  on	  other	  market	  participants,	  it	  can	  be	  assumed	  that	  
the	  buyer	   in	   question	  does	   not	   only	   benefit	   from	  unequal	   bargaining	   power	  with	   its	   suppliers	   but	  
enjoy	  in	  fact	  significant	  buyer	  power	  whose	  exercise	  may	  adversely	  affect	  competition.	  
3. Buyer	  power:	  a	  need	  for	  specific	  criteria?	  
As	   soon	   as	   a	   company	   has	   sufficient	   market	   power	   to	   restrict	   or	   distort	   competition	   through	   its	  
conduct,	  either	  by	  affecting	  prices	  or	  by	  reducing	  product	  quality,	  innovation	  or	  consumer	  choice,	  it	  
should	  be	  subject	  to	  supervision	  of	  competition	  authorities	  and	  to	  the	  competition	  rules.	  Presuming	  
that	   some	   practices	   used	   by	   powerful	   buyers	   are	   likely	   to	   cause	   competition	   harm,	   those	   firms’	  
conduct	   should	  hence	  be	  scrutinized	  by	  competition	  enforcers.	  However,	   the	  EU	  competition	   rules	  
turn	  out	  to	  be	  hardly	  enforceable	  against	  buyer	  practices	  as	  it	  will	  be	  examined	  below.138	  It	  appears	  
indeed	  that	  the	  criteria	  to	  be	  used	  when	  enforcing	  Articles	  101	  and	  102	  TFEU	  are	  ill-­‐adapted	  to	  tackle	  
effectively	  the	  issue	  of	  buyer	  power,	  especially	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  market	  share	  thresholds	  applicable	  
to	  assess	  dominance.	  
On	  that	  matter,	  one	  may	  consider	  that,	  if	  the	  buy-­‐side	  of	  the	  market	  is	  protected	  equally	  to	  the	  sell-­‐
side,	   there	   is	  no	   reason	   to	   treat	  buyer	  power	  differently	   from	  seller	  power.139	  The	  same	  standards	  
and	  criteria	  developed	   in	   the	  Commission	  guidelines	  and	  by	   the	  European	  Courts	   should	  hence	  be	  
applied	   to	   buyers’	   conduct.	   This	   is	   in	   fact	   the	   approach	   the	   Commission	   and	   most	   national	  
competition	   authorities	   have	   followed	   so	   far.	   However,	   if	   a	   firm	   or	   a	   group	   of	   firms	   restricts	   or	  
distorts	   competition	   through	   its	   conduct	   but	   nevertheless	   shrink	   from	   the	   application	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138	  See,	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  I.	  
139	  See	  :	  M.Schwartz,	  Should	  Antitrust	  Assess	  Buyer	  Market	  Power	  Differently	  than	  Seller	  Market	  Power?,	  
Comments	  presented	  at	  DOF-­‐FTC	  Workshop	  on	  Merger	  Enforcement,	  Washington	  DC,	  February	  17,	  2004.	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competition	  rules	  because	  it	  does	  not	  meet	  the	  criteria	  of	  market	  power	  defined	  by	  the	  Commission,	  
one	   may	   legitimately	   wonder	   whether	   the	   specificities	   attached	   to	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	  
should	   not	   call	   for	   a	   different	   treatment.	   Those	   specificities	   concern,	   in	   particular,	   the	   degree	   of	  
buyer	  power	  likely	  to	  give	  a	  particular	  buyer	  the	  ability	  to	  behave	  independently	  on	  the	  markets.	  The	  
concept	  of	  dominance	  as	  applied	   to	  seller	  power	  cases	  and	  the	   factors	   taken	   into	  consideration	   to	  
assess	   such	   dominance,	   especially	  with	   regard	   to	   the	  market	   share	   threshold,	  may	   indeed	   not	   be	  
accurate	   to	   determine	   from	   what	   point	   a	   buyer	   has	   sufficient	   market	   power	   to	   influence	  
competition.	  
The	  need	  to	  define	  criteria	  specific	  to	  the	  exercise	  of	  market	  power	  on	  the	  buying	  side	  is	  particularly	  
defended	  by	  Peter	  Carstensen	  who	  maintains	  that,	  if	  the	  concept	  of	  buyer	  power	  is	  often	  considered	  
as	  the	  mirror	  image	  of	  seller	  power,	  the	  mirror	  must	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  one	  in	  a	  carnival	  fun	  house	  which	  
distorts	  the	  viewer’s	  image	  because	  buyer	  power	  presents	  different	  characteristics	  with	  regard	  to	  its	  
sources,	  uses	  and	  impact.140	  He	  affirms	  in	  particular	  that	  the	  exploitation	  of	  buyer	  power	  may	  occur	  
from	  a	  substantially	   lower	  market	   share	   than	   is	  usual	   in	   seller	  power	  cases.141	  The	  existing	  metrics	  
used	   to	   assess	   the	   dominant	   position	   of	   sellers	   may	   therefore	   not	   be	   suitable	   to	   effectively	   take	  
action	  against	  buyers	  whose	  conduct	  might	  adversely	  affect	  competition	  such	  as	  in	  the	  grocery	  retail	  
sector	  where,	  despite	  a	  relatively	  low	  market	  share	  in	  the	  input	  market	  in	  comparison	  with	  the	  usual	  
threshold	   applied	   in	   dominance	   cases,	   some	   retailers	   are	   nevertheless	   able	   to	   impede	   effective	  
competition.	  The	  use	  of	  such	  different	  metrics	  on	  the	  buying	  side	  will	  probably	  lead	  to	  the	  finding	  of	  
buyer	  power	  where	  it	  was	  maybe	  not	  expected.	  Take	  for	  example	  a	  situation	  where	  both	  buyers	  and	  
upstream	   sellers	   are	   concentrated	   and	   symmetric.	   If	   the	   firms	   in	   question	   have	   relatively	   similar	  
market	  shares	   in	  their	  respective	  market,	  say	  around	  30%,	  one	  could	  presume	  that	  this	   is	  a	  case	  of	  
countervailing	   power	  where	   both	   buyers	   and	   sellers	   are	   able	   to	   exercise	  market	   power	   over	   their	  
business	   partners.	  However,	   the	   assessment	  of	   buyer	   power	  under	   specific	   criteria	  might	   lead	   the	  
competition	  authorities	  to	  conclude	  that,	  in	  view	  of	  the	  particular	  circumstances	  of	  the	  case,	  buyers	  
detain	  significant	  market	  power	  over	  their	  suppliers	  so	  that	  the	  latter	  are	  in	  fact	  faced	  with	  a	  lack	  of	  
bargaining	   strength.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   case	  would	   fall	   into	   the	   category	   of	   buyer	   power	   and,	   if	   it	   is	  
concluded	   that	   such	   market	   power	   is	   sufficient	   to	   enable	   the	   buyer	   in	   question	   to	   behave	  
independently,	   the	   prohibition	   on	   abusive	   conduct	   should	   apply.	   The	   main	   issue	   is	   therefore	   to	  
determine	  which	   factors,	   peculiar	   to	  market	   power	   on	   the	   buying	   side,	   is	   likely	   to	   give	   a	   firm	   the	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  P.C.Carstensen,	  Buyer	  power,	  competition	  policy	  and	  antitrust,	  op.cit.,	  at	  273.	  
141	  See	  for	  examples	  :	  P.C.Carstensen,	  Buyer	  Power	  and	  merger	  Analysis	  –	  The	  Need	  for	  Different	  Metrics,	  
Statement	  prepared	  for	  the	  Workshop	  on	  Merger	  Enforcement,	  Washington	  DC,	  February	  17,	  2004.	  
	  And	  P.C.Carstensen,	  Buyer	  cartels	  versus	  buying	  groups:	  Legal	  distinctions,	  competitive	  realities,	  and	  antitrust	  
policy,	  1	  William	  &	  Mary	  Business	  Law	  Review	  1	  (2010).	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ability	   to	   act	   without	   regard	   to	   the	   other	   market	   participants	   and	   thereby	   to	   affect	   competition	  
through	  its	  conduct.	  
Extension	   of	   the	   scope	   of	   application	   of	   Article	   102	   TFEU	   would	   in	   fact	   enable	   competition	  
authorities	   to	   act	   against	   all	   firms	   capable	   of	   influencing	   to	   an	   appreciable	   extent	   the	   conditions	  
under	  which	  competition	  will	  develop.	  Such	  an	  approach	  would	  hence	  subject	  all	  firms	  meeting	  the	  
definition	   of	   dominance	   given	   initially	   bye	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   to	   the	   rules	   of	   competition	   and	  
thereby	  prevent	   any	  distortion	  on	   the	  markets.142	  A	   redefinition	  of	   the	   criteria	   used	   in	   dominance	  
cases	  could	  hence	  be	  necessary	  on	  basis	  of	  the	  specificities	  of	  market	  power	  on	  the	  buy-­‐side	  and	  on	  
its	  impact	  on	  the	  markets,	  specifically	  regarding	  the	  market	  share	  threshold	  levels	  whereby	  business	  
practices	  must	  be	  examined.	  This	  would	  prevent	  that	  conduct	  affecting	  competition	  goes	  unchecked	  
because	   the	   buyers	   in	   question	   do	   not	   reach	   the	   threshold	   of	   40%	  market	   share	   in	   the	   upstream	  
buyer	  market.	  
Few	  Member	  States	  have	  addressed	  buyer	  power	  concerns	  through	  the	  enactment	  of	  specific	  criteria	  
under	  the	  competition	  rules.	  In	  fact,	  most	  of	  them	  are	  trying	  to	  deal	  with	  that	  issue	  outside	  the	  scope	  
of	   competition	   law	  by	   implementing	  new	   rules	   in	   contract	   law	  or	   soft	   law	   rules	   for	  examples.	   The	  
diversity	  of	  actions	  undertaken	  at	  the	  national	  level	  again	  shows	  the	  lack	  of	  consensus	  about,	  on	  the	  
hand,	   the	  effects	  of	  buyer	  power	  on	   the	  markets	  and	  on	  competition	  and,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   the	  
way	  to	  address	  that	  issue.	  Action	  at	  the	  EU	  level	  could	  therefore	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  a	  common	  answer	  
in	   the	  different	  Member	  states	  and	  thereby	  prevent	  that	   legislation	  discrepancies	   lead	  to	  potential	  
competition	  distortion	  in	  the	  Union	  
D. CONCLUSIVE	  REMARKS	  
The	  objective	  of	  EU	  competition	  law	  is	  to	  promote	  consumer	  welfare	  through	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  
competition	  process.	  Competition	  authorities	  are	  generally	  not	  concerned	  about	  powerful	  buyers	  as	  
the	  latter	  are	  likely	  to	  obtain	  lower	  prices	  as	  well	  as	  better	  contractual	  terms	  from	  their	  suppliers	  and	  
to	  pass	  on	  those	  savings	  to	  consumers.	  However,	  in	  light	  of	  all	  the	  aspects	  included	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142	  See:	  Case	  85/76,	  Hoffman	  LaRoche,	  op.cit.,	  at	  39.	  	  On	  that	  benchmark	  case,	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  defined	  the	  
dominant	  position	  as	  “a	  position	  of	  economic	  strength	  enjoyed	  by	  an	  undertaking	  which	  enables	  it	  to	  prevent	  
effective	  competition	  being	  maintained	  on	  the	  relevant	  market	  by	  affording	  it	  the	  power	  to	  behave	  to	  an	  
appreciable	  extent	  independently	  of	  its	  competitors,	  its	  customers	  and	  ultimately	  of	  the	  consumers.	  Such	  a	  
position	  does	  not	  preclude	  some	  competition,	  which	  it	  does	  where	  there	  is	  a	  monopoly	  or	  a	  quasi-­‐monopoly,	  
but	  enables	  the	  undertaking	  which	  profits	  by	  it,	  if	  not	  to	  determine,	  at	  least	  to	  have	  an	  appreciable	  influence	  
on	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  that	  competition	  will	  develop,	  and	  in	  any	  case	  to	  act	  largely	  in	  disregard	  of	  it	  so	  
long	  as	  such	  conduct	  does	  not	  operate	  to	  its	  detriment.”	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consumer	   welfare,	   such	   as	   choice,	   quality	   or	   innovation,	   some	   argue	   that	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	  
power	  may,	  in	  some	  circumstances,	  impede	  the	  achievement	  of	  EU	  competition	  goals.	  
Some	  buyer	   practices	   are	   indeed	   likely	   to	   bring	   about	   (long-­‐term)	   negative	   effects	   on	   the	   smooth	  
functioning	  of	  the	  supply	  chain	  and	  should,	  as	  a	  result,	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  EU	  competition	  law.	  In	  
such	  a	  case,	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  competition	  rules	  against	  anticompetitive	  buyer	  practices	  must	  
not	  be	  neglected.	  As	  regards	  unfair	  trading	  practices	  which	  do	  not	  distort	  or	  restrict	  competition	  on	  
the	  markets,	  European	  and	  national	  authorities	  can	  resort	  to	  other	  policies	  to	  protect	  firms	  harmed	  
by	  such	  conduct.	  
If	   it	   is	  concluded	  that,	   indeed,	  buyer	  practices	  may	  harm	  competition,	   it	  may	  then	  appear	   that	   the	  
criteria	  used	  to	  enforce	  the	  competition	  rules	  are	  not	  appropriately	  designed	  to	  tackle	  the	   issue	  of	  
buyer	  power.	   It	   is	   indeed	  argued	  that	  buyers	  with	  a	   relatively	   low	  market	  share	  are	  able	   to	  distort	  
competition	  through	  their	  conduct.	  Specific	  factors	  could	  therefore	  be	  needed	  to	  define	  dominance	  
in	   the	  upstream	  buyer	  market	   in	  order	   to	  give	  competition	  authorities	   the	  power	   to	  act	  against	  all	  
practices	   likely	   to	   harm	   the	   competitive	   process.	   If	   new	   criteria	   are	   to	   be	   defined	   in	   buyer	   power	  
cases,	  they	  should	  be	  at	  EU	  level	  so	  as	  to	  ensure	  undistorted	  competition	  in	  the	  Union.	  
The	  game	  of	  competition	   includes	  fierce	  trading	  and	  negotiation	  rules	  which	  are	  essential	   in	  a	   free	  
market	  environment	  and	  entail	  benefits	  for	  consumers.	  Not	  all	  actors	  are	  therefore	  able	  to	  continue	  
playing	  and	  that	  must	  be	  considered	  as	  part	  of	  the	  game.	  The	  objective	  of	  scrutinizing	  carefully	  buyer	  
power	  practices	   is	  hence	  not	   to	  protect	  weaker	  and	   inefficient	  actors	   from	  competition	  but	   rather	  
make	   sure	   that	   each	   market	   participant	   has	   the	   opportunity	   to	   operate	   in	   a	   competitive	  
environment.	  The	  distinction	  between	  effects	  resulting	  from	  superior	  efficiency	  and	  effects	  resulting	  
from	   abusive	   conduct	   is	   sometimes	   slim.	   Guidelines	   drawn	   up	   at	   EU	   level	   would	   therefore	   help	  
competition	   authorities	   as	   well	   as	   all	   market	   participants	   in	   the	   Union	   to	   assess	   and	   ensure	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CHAPTER	  2-­‐	  INDUSTRIES	  AND	  SECTORS	  CHARACTERIZED	  BY	  STRONG	  BUYER	  POWER	  
As	   pointed	   out	   in	   the	   First	   Chapter,	   buyers	   are,	   in	   some	   circumstances,	   able	   to	   exercise	   market	  
power	  over	  their	  suppliers	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market.	  Among	  the	  factors	  that	  give	  a	  firm	  buyer	  
power,	   we	   highlighted,	   in	   particular,	   the	   lack	   of	   alternatives	   available	   for	   suppliers	   and	   the	   large	  
share	  represented	  by	  that	  firm	  in	  suppliers’	  total	  sales.	  	  	  
This	   Chapter	   provides	   some	   examples	   of	   sectors	  with	   a	   strong	   buying	   side	   so	   as	   to	   illustrate	   how	  
buyer	   power	   arises	   and	   how	   it	   may	   be	   exerted.	   The	   analysis	   of	   these	   sectors	   will	   in	   fact	   show	  
whether	  the	  theoretical	  elements	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  sources	  of	  buyer	  power	  developed	  in	  Chapter	  1	  
can	  be	  observed	   in	  practice.	  That	  analysis	  will	  also	  put	   forward	  additional	   factors	  or	  circumstances	  
that	  are	  likely	  to	  create	  or	  enhance	  buyer	  power.	  
Different	  markets	   in	   the	  hand	  of	  public	  authorities	  present	  elements	   in	   favor	  of	  buyers	  due	   to	   the	  
limited	   number	   of	   customers	   but	   also	   to	   the	   particular	   procurement	   procedure	   used	   by	   those	  
customers.	  In	  the	  private	  sector,	  we	  will	  refer,	  among	  others,	  to	  the	  car	  industry	  where	  buyers	  resort	  
to	   different	   strategies	   to	   reinforce	   their	   position	   in	   the	   upstream	   buyer	   market	   and	   put	   further	  
pressure	  on	  suppliers.	  
In	   the	  grocery	  supply	  chain,	   some	  processing	  companies	  are	  considered	   to	  be	  strong	  buyers	   facing	  
weak	  producers.	  However,	  buyer	  power	  held	  by	  those	  companies	  appears	  lower	  or	  even	  insignificant	  
compared	   to	   buyer	   power	   of	   large	   supermarket	   chains.	   Given	   grocery	   retailers’	   high	   degree	   of	  
market	   power	   and	   the	   increasing	   attention	   that	   is	   being	   drawn	   on	   some	   practices	   used	   by	   those	  
buyers,	  a	  particular	  emphasis	  will	  be	  put	  on	  the	  retail	  grocery	  sector	  in	  Section	  II	  of	  this	  Chapter.	  The	  
characteristics	   of	   that	   sector	   will	   be	   examined	   as	   well	   as	   the	   different	   factors	   that	   give	   rise	   to	   a	  
strong	  buying	   side	  and	   incite	   retail	   chains	   to	  effectively	  exploit	   their	  buyer	  power	   in	   the	  upstream	  
procurement	   market.	   Various	   practices	   can	   be	   viewed	   as	   the	   expression	   of	   grocery	   retailers’	  
significant	   buyer	   power.	   We	   will	   provide	   examples	   of	   such	   practices	   and	   underline	   the	   possible	  
effects	  they	  may	  have	  on	  the	  markets.	  While	  some	  consider	  that	  those	  practices	  are	  harmless,	  others	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SECTION	  I	  –	  BUYER	  POWER	  IN	  VARIOUS	  INDUSTRIES	  
Buyer	  power	  is	  exercised	  in	  various	  industries	  and	  by	  different	  types	  of	  firms.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  we	  will	  
refer	   to	   sectors	   characterized	  by	  a	   strong	  buying	   side	  and	  point	  out	   factors	   that	   enable	   and	   incite	  
buyers	  to	  exercise	  market	  power	  over	  suppliers	  in	  different	  buyer	  markets.	  
The	   selection	   of	   those	   sectors	   is	   based	   on	  merger	   decisions	   where	   the	   Commission	   assessed	   the	  
degree	   of	   countervailing	   buyer	   power	   exercised	   by	   the	   merging	   parties’	   customers.	   The	   issue	   of	  
buyer	  power	  had	  indeed	  mainly	  been	  examined	  in	  merger	  cases.	  The	  Commission,	  in	  its	  assessment	  
of	   the	   compatibility	   of	   a	   concentration	   with	   the	   Common	   Market,	   takes	   into	   consideration	   the	  
competitive	   pressures	   exercised	   on	   the	   new	   entity,	   not	   only	   by	   competitors	   but	   also	   by	   their	  
customers.	   	   	  Where	   the	   latter	  possess	   sufficient	   countervailing	  buyer	  power,	   it	  may	  be	   considered	  
that	  the	  merged	  entity,	  even	  if	  it	  holds	  a	  high	  market	  share	  in	  the	  relevant	  market,	  will	  not	  be	  able,	  
post-­‐merger,	   to	   significantly	   impede	   effective	   competition.143	   The	   degree	   of	   such	   competitive	  
constraint	  coming	  from	  customers	  depends	  on	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  markets	  on	  the	  selling	  and	  
on	  the	  buying	  side.	  In	  some	  cases,	  buyers’	  bargaining	  strength	  may	  constitute	  a	  decisive	  factor	  in	  the	  
appraisal	   of	   a	   merger	   between	   upstream	   firms	   since	   it	   is	   likely,	   by	   itself,	   to	   mitigate	   or	   even	  
neutralize	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  new	  entity	  to	  raise	  prices.	  
As	  we	  have	  already	  noted	  in	  the	  first	  chapter,	  when	  exercised	  as	  countervailing	  power,	  market	  power	  
in	   the	   upstream	   buyer	   market	   is	   unlikely	   to	   raise	   competition	   concerns.	   Quite	   the	   opposite,	   it	   is	  
considered	   to	  be	  procompetitive	  as	  powerful	  buyers	  are	  able	   to	  prevent	  concentrated	  sellers	   from	  
exploiting	  their	  market	  power.	  Therefore,	  in	  this	  chapter,	  the	  potential	  adverse	  impact	  buyer	  power	  
may	  entail	  on	  the	  markets	  is	  not	  addressed.	  When	  examining	  the	  existence	  of	  countervailing	  power	  
exerted	  by	  customers	   in	  merger	  cases,	  the	  Commission	   indeed	  focuses	  on	  the	  positive	  effects	  such	  
power	  may	  have	  on	  the	  markets	  by	  subduing	  the	  merged	  entity’s	  market	  power.	  
The	  examination	  of	   the	  demand-­‐side	  structure	   is	   therefore	  fully	  part	  of	   the	  Commission	  analysis	   in	  
the	   enforcement	   of	   the	   Merger	   Regulation.144	   The	   assessment	   so	   carried	   out	   in	   merger	   cases	  
provides	   valuable	   information	   about	   factors	   likely	   to	   give	   rise	   to	   buyer	   power.	   In	   addition,	   when	  
reading	   the	   numerous	   decisions	   in	  which	   customers	  were	   recognized	   to	   enjoy	   a	   certain	   degree	   of	  
buyer	   power,	   we	   cannot	   but	   notice	   that	   some	   sectors	   seem	   to	   be	   particularly	   characterized	   by	   a	  
strong	   buying	   side.	   As	   such,	   public	   bodies,	   automotive	   manufacturers,	   retailers	   and	   well-­‐known	  
companies	   manufacturing	   consumer	   goods	   are	   recurring	   players,	   mostly	   mentioned	   as	   exerting	  
competitive	  pressures	  on	  their	  suppliers.	  Highlighted	  in	  fewer	  decisions	  but	  nevertheless	  important,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143	  See:	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  assessment	  of	  horizontal	  mergers,	  op.cit.,	  at	  64-­‐67.	  
144	  Council	  Regulation	  (EC)	  No	  139/2004	  on	  the	  control	  of	  concentrations,	  op.cit.	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we	   can	   also	   mention	   buyer	   power	   of	   electronics	   manufacturers,	   oil	   and	   gas	   companies,	   paper	  
producers	   and	   publishers,	   as	   well	   as	   some	   isolated	   powerful	   private	   companies.	   Other	   customer-­‐
bases	  may	  be	   likely	   to	   exercise	   such	   countervailing	  buying	  power	   as	  well	   but,	   since	   they	  have	  not	  
been	  subject	  to	  the	  Commission	  assessment	  in	  merger	  decisions	  or	  have	  only	  been	  mentioned	  in	  one	  
or	  two	  isolated	  cases,	  we	  will	  not	  dwell	  on	  those	  categories	  of	  buyers.145	  
The	  characteristics	  of	  the	  sectors	  examined	  below	  and	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  each	  product	  
market	   on	   the	   buying	   and	   on	   the	   selling	   side	   will	   help	   to	   determine	   the	   sources	   of	   buyer	   power	  
common	  or	  specific	  to	  those	  different	  industries.	  
A. PUBLIC	  SECTOR:	  GOVERNMENT	  AND	  PUBLIC	  BODIES	  
As	   mentioned	   in	   the	   introduction,	   the	   merged	   entity’s	   market	   power	   is	   assessed	   by	   taking	   into	  
account	  the	  bargaining	  strength	  on	  the	  buying	  side.	  We	  cannot	  but	  notice	  that,	  when	  that	  demand-­‐
side	  is	  mainly	  composed	  of	  government	  Ministries	  or	  other	  public	  bodies,	  the	  Commission	  generally	  
considers	  that	  those	  customers	  are	  able	  to	  exercise	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  buyer	  power.	  The	  extent	  of	  
such	  countervailing	  power	  varies	  depending	  on	  different	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  number	  of	  buyers,	  their	  
knowledge	   of	   the	   cost	   structure	   in	   the	   upstream	   markets	   or	   their	   ability	   to	   easily	   switch	   to	  
alternative	  suppliers.	  A	  common	  feature	  characterizing	  the	  different	  public	  entities	  mentioned	  below	  
is	   the	  bidding	  nature	  of	   their	  procurement	  process,	  which	   is	  generally	   imposed	  on	  them	  by	   law.	   In	  
the	   first	  part	  of	   this	   section,	   the	   specificity	  of	   those	   tendering	  procedures	   is	   addressed	   in	  order	   to	  
understand	   their	   impact	   on	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   between	  buyers	   and	   suppliers.	   The	   second	  part	  
takes	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  different	  markets	  in	  which	  the	  Commission	  has	  already	  recognized,	  in	  one	  
or	  several	  decisions,	  the	  presence	  of	  powerful	  buying	  public	  entities.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145	  Different	  categories	  of	  customers	  were	  recognized,	  at	  least	  in	  one	  merger	  decision,	  to	  exercise	  buyer	  power	  
towards	  their	  suppliers.	  See	  for	  examples:	  Vesuvius/Wülfrath,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.472,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  5	  
September	  1994.	  Steelmakers	  belonging	  to	  the	  major	  European	  steel	  groups	  were	  deemed	  to	  enjoy	  a	  large	  
amount	  of	  buyer	  power	  in	  the	  market	  of	  refractory	  products;	  GEC	  Alsthom/Cegelec,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1164,	  
Commission	  Decision	  of	  15	  May	  1998	  and	  BP	  Amoco/Castrol,	  Case	  NO	  IV/M.1891,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  18	  
May	  2000.	  The	  markets	  involved	  in	  those	  decisions	  were	  respectively	  the	  market	  of	  marine	  propulsion	  systems	  
and	  the	  market	  of	  marine	  lubricants.	  The	  Commission	  held	  that	  recent	  consolidation	  in	  the	  shipping	  market	  
and	  the	  emergence	  of	  buying	  consortia	  concentrating	  demand	  have	  increased	  ship-­‐owners	  leverage	  to	  gain	  
concessions	  from	  their	  suppliers	  and	  flexibility	  in	  honouring	  their	  supply	  contracts;	  Emerson	  Electric/Ericsson	  
Energy	  Systems,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1854,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  15	  March	  2000	  and	  Intracom/Siemens/STI,	  Case	  
No	  IV/M.2851,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  10	  February	  2003.	  	  Buyer	  power	  of	  telecom	  operators	  was	  recognized	  
in	  the	  procurement	  market	  of	  telecom	  equipment	  such	  as	  transmission	  systems	  or	  access	  network	  equipment;	  
Apollo/Akzo	  Nobel	  IAR,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.4071,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  29	  May	  2006.	  Ink	  manufacturers	  were	  
considered	  as	  exerting	  considerable	  buyer	  power	  on	  the	  resin	  manufacturers.	  This	  decision	  was	  confirmed	  by	  
the	  General	  Court.	  See:	  T-­‐282/06,	  Sun	  Chemical	  Group	  BV,	  Siegwerk	  Druckfarben	  AG	  and	  Flint	  Group	  Germany	  
GmbH	  v	  Commission	  [2007]	  ECR	  II-­‐2149;	  Berkshire	  Hathaway/Converium/Gaum/JV,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.3035,	  
Commission	  Decision	  28	  February	  2003.	  In	  this	  decision,	  insurers	  were	  considered	  as	  able	  to	  exercise	  sufficient	  
pressures	  on	  management	  services	  providers.	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1. Special	  features	  of	  bidding	  markets	  
In	  different	  decisions,	  the	  Commission	  has	  maintained	  that,	  in	  bidding	  markets,	  high	  market	  share	  is	  
not	   indicative	   of	   a	   supplier’s	   long-­‐term	   market	   power	   since	   that	   position	   can	   substantially	   vary	  
depending	   on	   the	   outcome	  of	   a	   single	   tender.146	   As	   a	   consequence,	   even	   though	   a	  merged	   entity	  
holds	  a	  very	  high	  market	  share	  at	  a	  given	  time,	  that	  single	  element	  will	  not	  be	  sufficient	  to	  constitute	  
a	   possible	   impediment	   to	   effective	   competition	   due	   to	   the	   likely	   volatility	   of	   that	   position.	   This	   is	  
particularly	  true	  in	  markets	  where	  contracts	  are	  very	  important	  in	  value	  and	  duration	  like	  in	  defence	  
markets	   for	  example.147	   In	  such	  cases,	   suppliers	  have	  strong	   incentives	   to	  bid	  aggressively	   for	  each	  
contract	   considering	  what	   is	   at	   stake.	   Furthermore,	   the	  purchase	  of	   products	   through	   competitive	  
biddings	  enhances	  customers’	  buyer	  power	  since	  they	  can	  compare	  all	  competitors’	  respective	  offers	  
and	   negotiate	   intensively	   with	   all	   those	   bidders	   before	   choosing	   their	   supplier.148	   Therefore,	   the	  
bidding	  nature	  of	  the	  markets	  leads	  to	  fierce	  competition	  on	  the	  selling	  side	  and	  gives	  customers	  the	  
means	  to	  exercise	  pressures	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  quality	  bids	  at	  lower	  prices.	  In	  that	  context,	  the	  very	  
high	  combined	  market	  shares	  of	  the	  merging	  parties,	  provided	  that	  some	  competition	  remains	  in	  the	  
upstream	   markets,	   does	   not	   necessarily	   reflect	   a	   leading	   position	   which	   is	   likely	   to	   affect	   the	  
competition	  process.	  
2. Buyer’s	  markets	  in	  public	  sectors	  
Public-­‐sector	  markets	  are	  generally	  buyer’s	  markets	  characterized	  by	  a	  stronger	  buying	  side.	  When	  
State	  bodies	  constitute	  the	  only	  or	  the	  largest	  purchasers	  of	  a	  particular	  product,	  they	  are	  indeed,	  in	  
most	   cases,	   able	   to	   exercise	   buyer	   power	   over	   their	   suppliers.	   The	   purchase	   of	   products	   through	  
public	   tenders	   and	   the	   fact	   that	   those	   buyers	   account	   for	   a	   very	   large	   part	   of	   the	   total	   demand	  
contribute	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   non-­‐negligible	   bargaining	   strength.149	   The	   degree	   of	   that	   buyer	  
power	  depends	   in	  particular	  on	   the	  product	   involved	  and	  on	   the	  market	   structure	  of	  both	   the	  up-­‐	  
and	  downstream	  markets.	  The	  Commission	  has	  noted,	  through	  the	  enforcement	  of	  its	  merger	  policy,	  
the	  existence	  of	  public	  entities’	  buyer	  power	  especially	  in	  the	  following	  different	  markets.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146	  See	  for	  examples	  :	  Philips/Marconi	  Medical	  Systems,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.2537,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  17	  
October	  2001,	  at	  30	  and	  SHV/ERIKS,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5563,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  31	  July	  2009,	  at	  33.	  This	  
particular	  case	  concerned	  tender	  launched	  by	  public	  hospitals.	  The	  fact	  that	  market	  share	  cannot	  be	  
considered	  as	  an	  absolutely	  faithful	  indicator	  of	  market	  power	  has	  also	  been	  highlighted	  in	  other	  decisions	  
where	  buyers	  were	  private	  entities,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  car	  industry.	  See	  below,	  Point	  B.	  
147	  Thomson-­‐CSF/Racal	  Electronics,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1413,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  15	  March	  1999,	  at	  31.	  
148	  EADS	  DS/Atlas/JV,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5936,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  28	  October	  2010,	  at	  92.	  
149	  Take	  for	  example,	  the	  purchase	  of	  deicing	  salt	  by	  public	  road	  authorities.	  Such	  product	  is	  normally	  
purchased	  in	  very	  large	  quantities	  on	  an	  annual	  basis	  and	  mostly	  by	  public	  authorities.	  See:	  K+S/Solvay/JV,	  Case	  
No	  COMP/2176,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  10	  January	  2002.	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a) Defence	  and	  related	  security	  markets	  
The	   characteristics	   of	   the	   military	   markets	   are	   such	   as	   giving	   buyers	   of	   defence	   products	   strong	  
market	  power	  over	  suppliers.	  In	  some	  cases,	  the	  Commission	  authorized	  a	  merger	  between	  suppliers	  
of	  defence	  equipment	  although	  the	  parties	  held	  a	  combined	  market	  share	  of	  up	  to	  80%.150	  The	  main	  
argument	   leading	   the	   Commission	   to	   clear	   the	   operation	   was	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   considerable	  
countervailing	   buying	   power.	   Different	   elements	   indeed	   enable	   customers	   to	   exert	   pressure	   in	  
upstream	  buyer	  markets	  and	  thereby	  to	  counteract	  even	  a	  significant	   increase	   in	  market	  power	  on	  
the	  selling	  side.	  
Firstly,	  suppliers	  of	  military	  devices	  are	  faced	  by	  a	  single	  customer	  in	  each	  Member	  State,	  namely	  the	  
Ministry	  of	  defence.	  Such	  monopsony	  power	   severely	   restricts	   their	   scope	  of	  action	   since	   they	  are	  
highly	  dependent	  on	   the	  decisions	  of	   those	  Ministries.151	   	   Secondly,	  military	   supplies	   are	  procured	  
through	  bidding	  markets,	  involving	  a	  qualification	  process	  based	  on	  the	  specifications	  defined	  by	  the	  
Ministry	   of	   the	   State	   concerned.152	   As	   mentioned	   above,	   the	   launch	   of	   public	   tenders	   enables	  
customers	   to	   exercise	   additional	   pressures	  on	   the	  bidding	   suppliers	   and	  ensure	   fierce	   competition	  
between	  them.	  	  Thirdly,	  buyer	  power	  may	  effectively	  be	  exercised	  since	  alternative	  sources	  of	  supply	  
are	  available.	  Each	  Ministry	  of	  defence	  is	  indeed	  able	  to	  switch	  to	  other	  national	  producers	  or	  to	  call	  
for	  new	  tenders	  at	  the	  European	  or	  even	  at	  the	  international	  level.153	  	  Finally,	  a	  specificity	  of	  defence	  
markets	   is	   the	   key	   role	   played	   by	   the	   Ministry	   of	   defence	   in	   the	   granting	   of	   export	   licenses	   for	  
military	   products.154	   Based	   on	   that	   competence,	   the	   Government	   has	   thus	   additional	   means	   to	  
negotiate	  lower	  prices	  and	  to	  prevent	  the	  merged	  entity	  from	  acting	  independently.	  
Those	   various	   elements	   enable	   the	  Ministries	   of	   defence	   to	   exercise	   significant	   buyer	   power.	   It	   is	  
therefore	   unlikely,	   as	   exemplified	   in	   the	   Commission	   decisions	   on	   that	   matter,	   that	   a	   merger	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150	  Saab/Celsius,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1979,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  4	  February	  2000,	  at	  36.	  
151	  Thomson/Pilkington,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.0086,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  23	  October	  1991,	  at	  29	  and	  Saab/EMW,	  
Case	  No	  COMP/M.4288,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  31	  August	  2006,	  at	  57.	  See	  also:	  Safran/SNPE	  Matériaux	  
énergétiques/Regulus,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.6104,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  30	  March	  2011.	  
152	  EADS,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1745,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  11	  May	  2000,	  at	  169.	  
153	  SNPE/Saab/Patria/JV	  (Eurenco),	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.3205,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  2	  October	  2003,	  at	  38.	  See	  
also:	  HDW/Ferrostaal/Hellenic	  Shipyard,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.2772,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  25	  April	  2002,	  at	  15.	  
154	  Saab/Celsius,	  op.cit.,	  at	  36.	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b) Aerospace	  markets	  
For	   different	   devices,	   such	   as	   institutional	   civil	   satellites,	   the	   European	   Space	   Agency	   acts	   as	   a	  
monopsonist	  buyer	  in	  the	  European	  Union.155	  In	  other	  product	  markets,	  suppliers	  remain	  subject	  to	  a	  
limited	  number	  of	  sophisticated	  customers.156	  	  As	  in	  the	  defence	  industry,	  the	  aerospace	  markets	  are	  
therefore	  presumed	  to	  be	  buyer’s	  markets	  where	  considerable	  countervailing	  buyer	  power	  is	  likely	  to	  
be	  exercised.	  
In	  various	  decisions,	  the	  Commission	  pointed	  out	  the	  ability	  of	  aerospace	  customers,	  especially	  the	  
European	   Space	   Agency,	   to	   closely	   scrutinize	   and	   monitor	   the	   suppliers’	   costs	   structure.	   Such	  
knowledge	  on	  the	  pricing	  and	  supply	  conditions	  in	  the	  upstream	  markets	  enables	  those	  customers	  to	  
detect	   uncompetitive	   prices	   possibly	   imposed	   by	   suppliers	   and	   to	   put	   significant	   pressure	   on	   the	  
latter	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  any	  unjustified	  price	  increase	  or	  other	  unacceptable	  contractual	  conditions.157	  
However,	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  is	  intrinsically	  linked	  to	  the	  availability	  of	  alternative	  sources	  of	  
supply.	  Even	  a	  monopsonist	  would	  be	  deprived	  of	  its	  bargaining	  strength	  if	  it	  cannot	  credibly	  threat	  
to	  switch	  to	  another	  supplier.	  That	  is	  why	  the	  Commission	  considers	  that,	  if	  following	  the	  merger,	  the	  
European	  Space	  Agency	  would	  be	  confronted	  to	  a	  single	  source	  of	  supply,	   it	  would	  no	   longer	  have	  
sufficient	   countervailing	   power	   to	   prevent	   the	   merger	   from	   giving	   rise	   to	   serious	   competition	  
concerns	  in	  the	  product	  market	  in	  question.158	  Without	  outside	  options,	  the	  Commission	  is	  therefore	  
unlikely	  to	  recognize	  the	  existence	  of	  market	  power	  on	  the	  buying	  side.	  
c) Medical	  devices	  and	  pharmaceutical	  markets	  
Public	  hospitals	  and	  university	  clinics	  are	  also	  sophisticated	  buyers	  with	  considerable	  buyer	  power.	  
Among	  the	  factors	  giving	  rise	  to	  that	  power,	  some	  of	  them	  have	  already	  been	  mentioned,	  such	  as	  the	  
bidding	   nature	   of	   the	  markets,	   the	   existence	   of	   credible	   alternative	   suppliers	   and	   the	   absence	   of	  
switching	  costs.159	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155	  Alcatel/Finmeccanica/Alcatel	  Alenia	  Space	  &	  Telespazio,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.3680,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  28	  
April	  2005,	  at	  74.	  	  
156	  EADS,	  op.cit.,	  at	  117.	  
157MMS/DASA/Astrium,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1636,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  21	  March	  2000,	  at	  64.	  The	  buyers’	  
experience	  and	  control	  over	  the	  procurement	  markets	  is	  likely	  to	  prevent	  not	  only	  non-­‐coordinated	  effects	  
from	  occurring	  but	  also	  any	  attempt	  of	  collusion	  between	  the	  merged	  entity	  and	  its	  competitors	  as	  well	  as	  
vertical	  foreclosure.	  See:	  	  Alcatel/Finmeccanica/Alcatel,	  op.cit.,	  at	  115.	  	  
158	  Alcatel/Finmeccanica/Alcatel,	  op.cit.,	  at	  87.	  Contrary	  to	  the	  market	  of	  institutional	  satellites,	  the	  market	  of	  
radar	  altimeters	  was	  more	  concentrated	  on	  the	  selling	  side.	  The	  investigation	  showed	  that,	  post-­‐merger,	  only	  
one	  supplier	  would	  remain	  on	  the	  market.	  The	  Commission	  therefore	  did	  not	  accept	  the	  operation	  without	  
undertakings	  since	  it	  would	  have	  removed	  all	  competitive	  constraints,	  coming	  from	  rivals	  and	  customers.	  
159	  GE/Amersham,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.3304,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  21	  January	  2004,	  at	  38.	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In	   addition,	   other	   elements	   specific	   to	   that	   sector	   constitute	   important	   drivers	   of	   competition	   as	  
well.	   Firstly,	   the	   ability	   of	   a	   supplier	   to	   offer	   highly	   innovative	   solutions	   constitutes	   an	   essential	  
criterion	   for	   the	   hospitals’	   choice.	   Customers	   are	   therefore	   induced	   to	   switch	   to	   other	   producers	  
should	   these	   offer	   machines	   with	   a	   better	   technological	   performance.160	   The	   possibility	   for	  
competitors	   to	   leapfrog	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   technological	   innovation	  makes	   the	  market	  position	  of	   the	  
current	   suppliers	  unstable.	  Competing	   suppliers’	   ability	   to	  manufacture	  new	  or	   improved	  products	  
constitutes	  indeed	  a	  strong	  incentive	  for	  hospitals	  to	  switch	  to	  the	  most	  innovative	  firms.	  The	  second	  
element	  related	  to	  the	  medical	  sector	  is	  the	  disciplinary	  effect	  that	  tight	  reimbursement	  regimes	  and	  
hospital	  budgets	  have	  on	  product	  prices.161	  The	  Commission	  has	  indeed	  noticed	  that,	  in	  many	  cases,	  
facing	   increasing	   budget-­‐restraints,	   hospitals	   require	   their	   suppliers	   to	   offer	   improved	   medical	  
equipment	  for	  the	  same	  price.	  The	  ability	  to	  obtain	   lower	  prices	  or	  similar	  prices	   for	  higher	  quality	  
products	   is	  an	   indication	  of	   the	  effective	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power.	  Finally,	   the	  existence	  of	  hospital	  
purchasing	   groups	   enhances	   buyer	   power	   and	   enables	   the	   members	   of	   those	   groups,	   through	  
centralized	  buying	  procedures,	  to	  negotiate	  lower	  prices.162	  
However,	   in	   some	   circumstances,	   hospitals	   and	   university	   clinics	   are	   not	   in	   a	   position	   to	   exercise	  
market	  power	  over	  their	  suppliers.	   Indeed,	   if	  technical	  specifications	  requested	  by	  those	  customers	  
may	  enhance	   innovation	  and	  competition	   in	  upstream	  markets,	   they	  may	  also	  considerably	   reduce	  
the	  number	  of	  available	  suppliers.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  hospitals	  primarily	  value	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  
products.	  When	   they	  make	   a	   choice,	   winning	   bids	   are	   generally	   allocated	   not	   to	   the	   lowest-­‐price	  
bidder,	  but	  to	  the	  supplier	  that	  best	  meets	  the	  hospitals’	  technical	  specifications.	  The	  problem	  arises	  
when	   those	   requirements	   become	  more	   and	  more	   complex	   and	   demanding	   for	  manufacturers	   so	  
that	  only	  a	  few	  of	  them	  are	  able	  to	  meet	  all	  the	  specifications.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  limited	  choice	  faced	  by	  
buyers	  significantly	  impairs	  their	  ability	  to	  exercise	  countervailing	  power	  since	  the	  purchase	  cannot,	  
in	   most	   cases,	   be	   delayed	   for	   a	   substantial	   period	   of	   time.163	   The	   Commission	   therefore	   pays	  
attention	   to	   the	   number	   of	   alternatives	   left	   after	   a	   merger	   in	   the	   upstream	  market	   and	   will	   not	  
accept	  the	  transaction	  if	  it	  substantially	  reduces	  that	  number.164	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160	  Philips/Marconi	  Medical	  Systems,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.2537,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  17	  October	  2001,	  at	  43.	  
161	  Ibid..,	  at	  41.	  
162	  Apax/Mölnlycke,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.3816,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  15	  June	  2005,	  at	  47.	  See	  also:	  Tyco/CR	  
Bard,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.2505,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  4	  October	  2001.	  
163	  GE/Instrumentarium,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.3083,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  2	  September	  2003,	  at	  208.	  	  
164	  Glaxo	  Wellcome/Smithkline	  Beecham,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1846,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  8	  May	  2000,	  at	  122-­‐123.	  
Although	  the	  Commission	  recognized	  that	  hospitals	  enjoy	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  buyer	  power,	  it	  considered	  that	  
the	  transaction	  would	  reduce	  the	  number	  of	  competitors	  from	  three	  to	  two,	  bringing	  together	  the	  two	  leading	  
producers	  of	  anti-­‐emetics,	  and	  would	  therefore	  remove	  the	  possibility	  to	  negotiate	  discounts	  post-­‐merger.	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Although	   it	  was	  maintained	   above	   that	  market	   shares	  do	  not	   constitute	   a	   strong	   indication	  of	   the	  
merged	   entity’s	   market	   power	   in	   bidding	   markets,	   in	   some	   cases,	   that	   assumption	   is	   no	   longer	  
accurate.	   Indeed,	  when	  the	  number	  of	  tenders	  for	  a	  particular	  medical	  device	   is	  fairly	  high	  and	  the	  
value	  of	   each	   contract	   is	   relatively	   low,	   the	   fact	   that	   purchases	   go	   through	   a	   tendering	  procedure	  
does	  not	  fundamentally	  affect	  the	  value	  of	  market	  shares.165	  
d) Electricity	  markets	  
Despite	  the	  gradual	  liberalization	  of	  the	  electricity	  markets	  in	  the	  European	  Union,	  in	  most	  Member	  
States	  the	  demand	  for	  electricity	  products	  consists	  mainly	  of	  the	  national	  operators	  such	  as	  ENEL	  in	  
Italy	   and	   EDF	   in	   France.166	   Because	   those	   customers	   account	   for	   a	   very	   large	   part	   of	   domestic	  
demand,	   suppliers	  are	  heavily	   reliant	  on	  national	  electricity	  utilities.	  The	   loss	  of	   such	  an	   important	  
trading	  partner	  would	  indeed	  entail	  serious	  financial	  consequences.167	  The	  particular	  features	  of	  the	  
bidding	   procedures	   used	   by	   those	   national	   operators	   also	   tilt	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   in	   favour	   of	  
buyers	   as,	   in	   most	   cases,	   such	   as	   for	   the	   procurement	   of	   power	   cables,	   tenders	   take	   place	  
infrequently	  and	  the	  value	  of	  each	  individual	  contract	  usually	  is	  significant.168	  
Due	  to	  their	  substantial	  purchasing	  power,	  national	  electricity	  operators	  have	  not	  only	  the	  possibility	  
to	  switch	  to	  other	  existing	  suppliers	  but	  also	  to	  actively	  develop	  new	  supply	  sources	  through	  strategic	  
allocation	  of	  orders.169	  The	  sponsor	  of	  new	  entry,	  or	   the	   threat	   to	  do	  so,	   reinforces	   the	  bargaining	  
position	  of	   those	  powerful	  buyers.	  They	  are	   therefore	  able	   to	  use	   that	  power	   to	  obtain	   favourable	  
conditions,	  such	  as	  the	  renegotiation	  of	  framework	  contracts	  when	  they	  feel	  that	  market	  prices	  have	  
decreased	  during	  the	  contract	  term.170	  
Where	   former	   state	  monopoly	   entities	   in	   the	  electricity	   sector	   are,	   in	  many	   countries,	   still	   able	   to	  
exercise	   substantial	  market	  power	   in	   the	   retail	  markets,	   those	  public	  bodies	  are	   very	   likely	   to	  also	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165	  GE/Instrumentarium,	  op.cit.,	  at	  122.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  procurement	  of	  perioperative	  patient	  monitors	  through	  
a	  tendering	  procedure	  was	  not	  deemed	  to	  affect	  the	  value	  of	  market	  shares	  as	  a	  strong	  indication	  of	  the	  
merged	  entity’s	  market	  power.	  	  
166	  Pirelli/BICC,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.1882,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  19	  July	  2000,	  at	  70.	  	  
167	  Pirelli/Siemens,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1271,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  30	  September	  1998,	  at	  116.	  
168	  Pirelli/BICC,	  op.cit.,	  at	  79.	  	  
169	  Ibid.,	  at	  76.	  	  
170	  Ibid.,	  at	  75.	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e) Railway	  markets	  
Customers	   for	   rail	   technology	  products	  are	  not	  only	   the	  national	   railway	  company	  but	  also	  a	   large	  
number	   of	   local	   transport	   companies.	   The	   importance	   of	   bargaining	   power	   of	   those	   buyers	   is	  
different	  and	  leads	  therefore	  the	  Commission	  to	  distinguish	  the	  markets	  for	  mainline	  railways	  from	  
those	   for	   local	   railways.171	   In	   the	   procurement	   markets	   for	   mainline	   transportation	   products,	   the	  
national	  operator,	  as	  a	  monopsonist,	  is	  in	  position	  to	  exercise	  buyer	  power	  over	  its	  suppliers	  and	  to	  
obtain	   competitive	   offers.172	   	   The	   situation	   is	   nevertheless	   very	   different	   for	   local	   transport	  
companies	  when	  they	  buy	  rail	  technology	  products	  for	  local	  railways.	  Much	  smaller	  in	  turnover	  and	  
in	   terms	   of	   the	   size	   of	   their	   orders,	   those	   companies	   are	   to	   a	   great	   extent	   dependent	   on	   their	  
suppliers	  and	  in	  most	  cases	  unable	  to	  exercise	  sufficient	  countervailing	  power.173	  
Although	  their	  degree	  of	  market	  power	  varies	  from	  one	  market	  to	  another,	  public	  entities	  are	  likely	  
to	   hold,	   in	   many	   sectors,	   significant	   buyer	   power,	   contributing	   thereby	   to	   maintaining	   fierce	  
competition	   in	   the	   upstream	   seller	   market.	   As	   far	   as	   the	   ability	   to	   exercise	   countervailing	   buyer	  
power	  is	  concerned,	  private	  companies	  are	  yet	  not	  left	  behind,	  especially	  in	  the	  automotive	  industry,	  
in	  the	  retail	  sector	  and	  in	  the	  food	  processing	  sector.	  
B. CAR	  MANUFACTURING	  INDUSTRY	  
Buyer	   power	   of	   car	   manufacturers	   has	   been	   highlighted	   by	   the	   Commission	   in	   many	   merger	  
decisions.	   Those	   buyers	   are	   able	   to	   exercise	   significant	   bargaining	   power	   towards	   most	   of	   the	  
suppliers	  of	   automotive	   components.	   To	  name	  but	   a	   few,	   car	   companies	  have	  been	   recognized	  as	  
using	   their	   buyer	   power	   when	   purchasing	   coatings174,	   anti-­‐freeze	   products175,	   wiper	   blades176,	  
switches177,	   braking	   systems178,	   bearings179,	   batteries180,	   airbags	   and	   steering	  wheels181	   	   as	   well	   as	  
rear	  mirror	  systems182.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171	  AAB/Daimler-­‐Benz,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.580,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  18	  October	  1995,	  at	  109.	  	  
172	  Ibid.,	  at	  99-­‐100.	  
173	  Bombardier/ADtranz,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.2139,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  3	  April	  2001,	  at	  81.	  The	  difference	  in	  
buyer	  power	  existing	  between	  customers	  of	  the	  merged	  entity	  may	  therefore	  lead	  the	  Commission	  to	  conclude	  
differently	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  concentration	  on	  the	  relevant	  markets.	  Even	  though	  some	  
customers	  are	  able	  to	  counteract	  the	  increase	  in	  market	  power	  in	  the	  upstream	  markets	  through	  the	  exercise	  
of	  buyer	  power,	  that	  does	  not	  exclude	  anticompetitive	  outcome	  from	  arising	  in	  other	  markets	  where	  the	  
demand	  side	  is	  more	  fragmented	  and	  can	  therefore	  not	  act	  as	  a	  sufficient	  competitive	  constraint.	  
174	  Dupont/Hoechst/Herberts,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1363,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  5	  February	  1999.	  	  
175	  Elf/Texaco/Antifreze	  JV,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1135,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  18	  August	  1998.	  
176	  Valeo/ITT	  Industries,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1245,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  30	  July	  1998.	  
177	  Valeo/Labinal,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.2036,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  4	  August	  2008.	  
178	  Knorr/Bremse/Allied	  Signal,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.337,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  15	  October	  1993.	  	  
179	  INA/FAG,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.2608,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  18	  October	  2001.	  
180	  Johnson	  Controls/Robert	  Bosch/Delphi	  SLI,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.3789,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  29	  June	  2005.	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In	   its	   assessment	   of	   an	   operation	   of	   concentration,	   the	   Commission	   considers,	   for	   a	   number	   of	  
reasons	   developed	   below,	   that	   the	   high	   market	   share	   of	   the	   merged	   entity	   in	   the	   automotive	  
industry	   is	   not	   a	   sufficient	   basis	   to	   raise	   anticompetitive	   concerns.183	   That	   market	   power	   on	   the	  
selling	   side	   is	   indeed	   to	   be	   evaluated	  by	   taking	   into	   account	   the	   characteristics	   of	   the	   automotive	  
parts	   markets	   which	   are	   characterized	   as	   buyer’s	   markets	   due	   to	   the	   strong	   buyer	   power	   of	  
automobile	   and	   truck	  manufacturers.	   The	   automotive	   industry	   has	   indeed	   experienced	   significant	  
consolidation	   in	   the	   recent	   years	   so	   that	   the	   decreasing	   number	   and	   increasing	   size	   of	   car	  
manufacturers	  enable	  the	  latter	  to	  exert	  strong	  pressure	  on	  suppliers.184	  
In	   the	   first	  part	  of	   this	   section,	   the	  different	   factors	   leading	   to	   the	   creation	  of	  buyer	  power	   in	   the	  
automotive	   industry	   are	   developed.	   While	   the	   use	   of	   bidding	   procedures	   has	   already	   been	  
mentioned	  as	  increasing	  the	  customers’	  bargaining	  strength,	  other	  elements,	  specific	  to	  the	  sector	  in	  
question,	   reinforce	   even	   more	   that	   power.	   The	   second	   part	   refers	   to	   a	   few	   cases	   where	   the	  
Commission	   refused	   to	   recognize	   the	   existence	   of	   sufficient	   countervailing	   buyer	   power	   in	   some	  
particular	  product	  markets.	  
1. Buyer’s	  nature	  of	  markets	  for	  automotive	  components	  
The	  structure	  of	  the	  markets	   in	  the	  automotive	   industry,	  sophisticated	  purchasing	  procedures	  used	  
by	  car	  manufacturers,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  availability	  of	  alternative	  sources	  of	  supply	  constitute	  sufficient	  
elements	   to	   give	   buyers	   the	  means	   to	   put	   their	   suppliers	   under	   pressures.	   Favourable	   contractual	  
conditions	  or	  low	  prices	  prove	  that	  such	  buyer	  power	  is	  effectively	  exercised.	  
a) Structure	  and	  organization	  of	  the	  markets	  
Automotive	   components	   are	   usually	   sold	   to	   car	   manufacturers,	   called	   Original	   Equipment	  
Manufacturers,	  for	   installation	  into	  new	  cars	  (“OEM”	  channel)	  or	  as	  replacement	  products	  to	  those	  
same	  manufacturers	   and	   their	   authorized	   dealers,	   known	   as	   Original	   Equipment	   suppliers	   (“OES).	  
Replacement	  sales	  also	  take	  place	  to	  the	  so-­‐called	  independent	  after-­‐market	  (“IAM”)	  which	  consists	  
of	  retailers,	  fast-­‐fitters	  and	  supermarkets.185	  It	  is	  commonly	  recognized	  in	  the	  automotive	  industry	  to	  
distinguish	  OEM/OES	   sales	   from	   IAM	   sales	   due	   to	   the	   difference	   in	   the	   customer	   base	   and	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181	  TRW	  Automotive/Dalphi	  Metal	  Espac,	  Case	  COMP/M.3972,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  12	  October	  2005.	  	  
182	  Magna/Donnelly,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.2901,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  16	  September	  2002.	  
183	  Magna/New	  Venture	  Gear,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.3486,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  24	  September	  2004,	  at	  40.	  	  
184	  U-­‐Shin/Valeo	  Cam,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.6714,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  6	  February	  2013,	  at	  46.	  Such	  
consolidation	  is	  the	  result	  of	  different	  mergers	  and	  acquisitions	  such	  as	  for	  example	  Fiat’s	  acquisition	  of	  
Chrysler	  and	  Volkswagen’s	  acquisition	  of	  a	  number	  of	  lower	  volume	  manufacturers	  such	  as	  Porsche.	  The	  
Commission	  also	  noted	  that	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  links	  between	  remaining	  manufacturers,	  for	  example,	  
Renault	  has	  a	  shareholding	  in	  Nissan	  whilst	  Nissan	  has	  a	  shareholding	  in	  Renault.	  
185	  Johnson	  Controls/Robert	  Bosch/Delphi	  SLI,	  op.cit.,	  at	  8.	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purchasing	  mechanisms.	   	   Indeed,	  with	   regard	   to	  OEM/OES,	   the	   demand	   side	   is	   very	   concentrated	  
and	  consists	  of	  the	  major	  car	  manufacturers	  which	  generally	  purchase	  large	  quantities	  of	  a	  particular	  
product.186	  According	  to	  the	  Commission,	  it	  is	  anticipated	  that	  this	  client	  base	  will	  become	  even	  more	  
concentrated	  in	  the	  future	  due	  to	  the	  consolidation	  which	  is	  taking	  place	  at	  the	  level	  of	  car	  and	  truck	  
manufacturers	  and	  the	   increasing	  trend	  toward	  global	  sourcing.187	  Such	  shrinking	   in	   the	  number	  of	  
OEMs,	  	  as	  well	  as	  the	  adoption	  of	  common	  global	  vehicle	  platforms	  over	  multiple	  vehicle	  lines,	  confer	  
a	   certain	   buyer	   power	   to	   those	   customers	   which	   may	   also	   be	   used	   for	   the	   procurement	   of	  
replacement	   parts.	   They	   can	   in	   fact	   require	   similar	   terms	   and	   conditions	   for	   the	   supply	   of	  
components,	  be	  it	  for	  OES	  use	  or	  OEM	  use.188	  
With	  regard	  to	  the	   independent	  after-­‐sale	  market,	   the	  bargaining	  strength	  of	  customers	   is	   likely	  to	  
be	  different.	  Since	  there	  are	  more	  fragmented	  and	  purchase	  lower	  volumes	  of	  a	  particular	  product,	  
independent	   resellers	   will	   probably	   face	   higher	   prices.	   However,	   for	   some	   specific	   products,	   the	  
demand	  side	   in	   the	  after-­‐sale	  market	  may	  be	  as	  concentrated	  as	   that	   in	   the	  OEM	  sales	  sector.	  For	  
example,	   in	   the	   wiper	   blades	  market,	   the	  main	   customers	   are	   large	   retail	   chains,	   service	   stations	  
networks	   and	   specialized	   retail	   chains	   which	   all	   account	   for	   a	   substantial	   part	   of	   suppliers’	  
turnover.189	  Since	  those	  buyers	  may	  enjoy	  buyer	  power	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  car	  manufacturers,	  they	  will	  
also	   be	   able	   to	   prevent	   an	   excessive	   increase	   in	   market	   power	   in	   upstream	   markets	   following	   a	  
merger.	   In	  addition,	  even	   though	   the	   client	  base	   is	   less	   concentrated,	   strong	   competition	  may	   still	  
come	  from	  parts	  sold	  through	  the	  OES	  network.	   	  Spare	  parts	  suppliers’	  ability	  to	  raise	  prices	   in	  the	  
independent	  after-­‐market	  may	  indeed	  be	  limited	  by	  the	  price	  at	  which	  those	  products	  are	  sold	  to	  the	  
car	   manufacturers’	   own	   dealers.	   As	   mentioned	   above,	   those	   lower	   prices,	   in	   turn,	   reflect	   the	  
purchasing	  power	  of	  OEMs.190	  If	  the	  distinction	  made	  between	  OEM/OES	  and	  IAM	  is	  relevant	  in	  some	  
circumstances	   because	   of	   the	   difference	   in	   buying	   power	   of	   the	   respective	   customers,	   it	   is	  
nevertheless	  necessary	  to	  assess	  whether,	  in	  fact,	  the	  purchasing	  conditions	  obtained	  by	  those	  actors	  
are	  different	  or	  not.	  Anticompetitive	  effects	  may	  indeed	  be	  prevented	  on	  all	  the	  markets	  in	  question	  
if	  the	  after-­‐market	   is	  sufficiently	  concentrated	  or	   if	   independent	  resellers	  operating	  on	  that	  market	  
indirectly	  benefit	  from	  OEMs’	  buyer	  power.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186	  INA/FAG,	  op.cit.,	  at	  13.	  
187	  Dupont/Hoechst/Herberts,	  op.cit.,	  at	  31.	  
188	  Knorr/Bremse/Allied	  Signal,	  op.cit.,	  at	  25.	  
189	  Valeo/ITT	  Industries,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1245,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  30	  July	  1998,	  at	  39.	  	  
190	  Knorr/Bremse/Allied	  Signal,	  op.cit.,	  at	  52.	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b) Bidding	  and	  multi-­‐sourcing	  strategies	  
Like	  in	  the	  public	  sector,	  buyers	  in	  the	  automotive	  industry	  use	  bidding	  procedures	  for	  the	  selection	  
of	  suppliers.	  On	  basis	  of	  the	  technical	  specifications	  mentioned	  in	  the	  tender,	  suppliers	  submit	  offers	  
to	   car	   manufacturers.191	   	   In	   addition	   to	   those	   product	   requirements,	   the	   Commission	   noted	   in	  
different	  decisions	  that	  OEMs	  also	  determine	  a	  target	  price	  that	  has	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration	  
by	   the	   bidders.192	   Based	   on	   those	   elements	   and	   on	   the	   different	   quotations	   submitted,	   car	  
manufacturers	  use	  to	  bargain	  for	  lower	  prices	  and	  leverage	  potential	  suppliers	  against	  each	  other	  in	  
negotiations	   before	   choosing	   amongst	   them.193	   The	   possibility	   to	   switch	   to	   alternative	   sources	   of	  
supply,	  as	  it	  will	  be	  developed	  below,	  enables	  OEMs	  to	  exercise	  pressures	  on	  the	  bidders	  if	  they	  do	  
not	  match	   the	   pricing	   objective.	   In	   view	   of	   the	   high	   value	   of	   the	   contracts	   awarded	   and	   of	   their	  
duration,	   generally	   running	   for	   the	  whole	   vehicle	   life,	   competition	   for	   every	   supply	   opportunity	   is	  
fierce.	  Winning	  a	  tender	  is	  even	  more	  essential	  that	  R&D	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  that	  sector.	  Huge	  
investment	   has	   indeed	   to	   be	  made	   on	   products	   improvement	   and	   innovation	   in	   order	   to	   remain	  
competitive	  on	  the	  markets.194	  
Furthermore,	   in	   order	   to	   maintain	   competitive	   constraints	   on	   their	   selected	   suppliers,	   car	  
manufacturers	  adopt	  a	  multi-­‐sourcing	  strategy.	  As	  such,	  they	  award	  contracts	  to	  different	  suppliers	  
so	  that	  they	  are	  not	  dependent	  upon	  any	  single	  equipment	  manufacturer	  but	  can	  switch	  easily	  and	  
quickly	  to	  alternative	  sources	  of	  supply.	  Such	  a	  strategy	  in	  fact	  allows	  them	  to	  retaliate	  against	  price	  
increases	  in	  a	  specific	  product	  well	  before	  the	  end	  of	  the	  life-­‐time	  of	  a	  specific	  vehicle.195	  As	  a	  result,	  
technical	  and	  price	  competition	  is	  likely	  to	  remain	  fierce	  between	  the	  different	  suppliers.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191Dupont/Hoechst/Herberts,	  op.cit.,	  at	  31.	  See	  also:	  GKN/Gegrag	  Corporation/Getrag	  All	  Wheel	  Drive,	  Case	  No	  
COMP/M.6320,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  28	  September	  2011,	  at	  41.	  The	  market	  investigation	  carried	  out	  in	  that	  
case	  revealed	  that	  car	  manufacturers	  have	  extensive	  experience	  of	  employing	  competitive	  multi-­‐stage	  tenders	  
to	  ensure	  they	  obtain	  the	  most	  competitive	  terms	  from	  their	  suppliers.	  
192	  Dupont/Hoechst/Herberts,	  op.cit.,	  at	  31	  and	  Magna/New	  Venture	  Gear,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.3486,	  
Commission	  Decision	  of	  24	  September	  2004,	  at	  38.	  
193See	  for	  examples:	  Dupont/Hoechst/Herberts,	  op.cit.,	  at	  31;	  Freudenberg	  &	  Co/Trelleborg/JV,	  Case	  No	  
COMP/M.6339,	  Commission	  decision	  of	  14	  May	  2012,	  at	  38;	  Robert	  Bosch/SPX’	  Service	  Solutions	  Business,	  Case	  
No	  COMP/M.6538,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  26	  June	  2012,	  at	  64;	  U-­‐Shin/Valeo	  Cam,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.6714,	  
Commission	  Decision	  of	  6	  February	  2013,	  at	  37;	  Hig	  Capital/Petrochem	  Carless	  Holdings,	  Case	  No	  
COMP/M.6782,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  26	  March	  2013,	  at	  72.	  
194Dupont/Hoechst/Herberts,	  op.cit.,	  at	  31.	  
195	  See:Freudenberg	  &	  Co/Trelleborg/JV,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.6339,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  14	  May	  2012,	  at	  38.	  
See	  also:	  Dupont/Hoechst/Herberts,	  op.cit.,	  at	  32;	  	  Johnson	  Controls/Robert	  Bosch/Delphi	  SLI,	  Case	  No	  
COMP/M.3789,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  29	  June	  2005,	  at	  16;	  Renco	  group/Body	  Systems,	  Case	  No	  
COMP/M.5785,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  2	  December	  2010	  and	  Sumitomo	  Electric	  Industries/Anvis	  Group,	  Case	  
No	  COMP/M.6876,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  24	  May	  2013,	  at	  21.	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c) Alternative	  sources	  of	  supply	  
The	  existence	  of	  buyer	  power	  is	  closely	  linked	  to	  the	  number	  of	  alternative	  sources	  of	  supply.	  In	  the	  
car	  industry,	  different	  types	  of	  alternatives	  are	  available	  to	  OEMs.	  While	  car	  manufacturers	  can	  easily	  
switch	   to	   existing	   suppliers	   on	   the	   relevant	   market,	   they	   can	   also	   threat	   to	   turn	   to	   other	   global	  
players	   or	   induce	   new	   entry.196	   Such	   potential	   to	   switch	   is	   in	   particular	   facilitated	   when	   excess	  
production	  capacity	  exists	   in	   the	   industry	  and	  when	   suppliers	   face	   low	  barriers	   to	  entry.	  However,	  
the	   Commission	   has	   already	   recognized	   that,	   even	   though	   entry	   of	   new	   actors	   into	   the	   markets	  
concerned	   is	   not	   probable	   because	   of	   the	   high	   costs	   of	   investment,	   customers	   are	   not	   prevented	  
from	  exercising	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  sufficient	  countervailing	  power.	   In	  most	  cases,	  the	  sophisticated	  
purchasing	  procedures	  mentioned	  above	  as	  well	  as	  limited	  brand	  loyalty	  in	  that	  sector	  enable	  in	  fact	  
car	   manufacturers	   to	   still	   hold	   the	   whip	   in	   the	   negotiations.197As	   a	   result,	   despite	   the	   lack	   of	  
competitive	  constraints	  coming	  from	  potential	  competitors	  and	  the	  limited	  number	  of	  existing	  rivals,	  
the	   Commission	  may	   consider	   that	   sufficient	   pressures	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   exercised	   from	   the	   buying	  
side,	  counteracting	  the	  increase	  of	  market	  power	  of	  a	  merged	  entity	  in	  the	  upstream	  markets.	  
Existing	   or	   new	   suppliers	   do	   not	   constitute	   the	   only	   outside	   options.	   Indeed,	   car	   manufacturers	  
themselves	  are	  sometimes	  able	  to	  produce	  car	  components	  in	  their	  own	  facilities.	  Such	  in-­‐house	  or	  
captive	  manufacture	   is	   an	  additional	   supply	   alternative	   that	   further	   increases	  OEMs’	  buyer	  power.	  
The	   threat	   to	  meet	   internally	   component	   requirements	  or	   to	  enter	   into	   supply	   arrangements	  with	  
other	   car	   manufacturers	   which	   are	   able	   to	   increase	   their	   in-­‐house	   production,	   is	   a	   powerful	  
bargaining	  tool	  to	  gain	  cost	  or	  other	  concessions	  from	  suppliers.198	  
d) Contracts	  in	  favour	  of	  buyers	  
The	  high	  concentration	  on	  the	  buying	  side	  in	  the	  car	  industry,	  the	  bidding	  nature	  of	  the	  procurement	  
procedures	  and	  the	  large	  number	  of	  alternative	  sources	  of	  supply	  constitute	  the	  main	  factors	  leading	  
to	  the	  creation	  of	  buyer	  power.	  Some	  contractual	  conditions	  imposed	  by	  car	  manufacturers	  on	  their	  
suppliers	  as	  well	  as	  significant	  price	  decreases	  over	  the	  past	  year	  show	  that	  such	  power	  is	  effectively	  
exercised.	   For	   example,	   it	   is	   usually	   provided	   that	   car	   manufacturers	   retain	   intellectual	   property	  
rights	  on	  any	  products	  developed	   for	   them.199	   The	  existence	  of	   car	  manufacturers’	  buyer	  power	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196	  Magna/New	  Venture	  Gear,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.3486,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  24	  September	  2004,	  at	  50.	  
197	  See	  for	  examples:	  Valeo/ITT	  Industries,	  op.cit.;	  	  	  Dupont/Hoechst/Herberts,	  op.cit.	  and	  INA/FAG,	  Case	  No	  
IV/M.2608,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  18	  October	  2001.	  
198	  Switching	  to	  in-­‐house	  production	  or	  entering	  into	  cross-­‐supply	  agreements	  was	  considered	  as	  a	  credible	  
threat	  in	  products	  markets	  such	  as	  braking	  systems,	  transfer	  cases	  and	  power	  transmission	  units	  as	  well	  as	  
driven	  axles.	  See:	  Knorr/Bremse/Allied	  Signal,	  op.cit.,	  1993,	  at	  40;	  Magna/New	  Venture	  Gear,	  op.cit.,	  at	  47	  and	  
Arvin	  Meritor/Volvo	  (Assets),	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3351,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  1	  October	  2004,	  at	  12.	  
199	  Valeo/ITT	  Industries,	  op.cit.,,	  at	  29.	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also	  expressed	  by	  the	  inclusion	  into	  supply	  agreements	  of	  a	  unilateral	  right	  to	  terminate	  as	  well	  as	  to	  
reduce	  prices	  annually	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  OEMs.200	  In	  fact,	  due	  to	  an	  excellent	  knowledge	  of	  the	  cost	  
structure	   of	   components,	   OEMs	   are	   able	   to	   bring	   prices	   down.	   The	   Commission	   has	   nevertheless	  
noted	  in	  a	  decision	  that,	  notwithstanding	  the	  significant	  price	  increase	  of	  battery	  raw	  materials,	  car	  
manufacturers	  have	  managed	  to	  secure	  price	  reductions.201	  This	  confirms	  the	  high	  degree	  of	  buyer	  
power	  exerted	  by	  OEMs.	  
It	  follows	  from	  all	  those	  factors	  that,	  even	  though	  a	  merger	  in	  the	  upstream	  markets	  would	  lead	  to	  
increasing	  significantly	  the	  combined	  market	  shares	  of	  the	  merging	  parties,	  the	  effective	  exercise	  of	  
buyer	   power	   by	   car	   manufacturers	   will	   mitigate,	   in	   most	   cases,	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   merger	   on	  
competition.	   Where	   generally	   analysed	   in	   addition	   to	   other	   competitive	   pressures	   coming	   from	  
rivals,	   buyers’	   market	   power	   may	   also	   be	   considered	   as	   a	   self-­‐sufficient	   constraint	   and	   lead	   the	  
Commission	  to	  authorize	  a	  merger	  on	  basis	  of	  that	  single	  element.202	  
2. Exceptions	  
The	  existence	  of	  OEMs’	  buyer	  power	  has	  been	  recognized	   in	  many	  product	  markets.	  However,	   the	  
mere	  fact	  that	  the	  merged	  entity’s	  customers	  are	  automotive	  companies	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  buyer	  
power	   is	   present.	   In	   a	   limited	   number	   of	   cases,	   the	   Commission	   considered	   that,	   due	   to	   a	   lack	   of	  
outside	  options,	  car	  manufacturers	  were	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  exert	  sufficient	  countervailing	  power.203	  
It	  was	  indeed	  maintained	  that	  a	  highly	  concentrated	  customer-­‐group	  is	  able	  to	  exercise	  buyer	  power	  
only	   if	  credible	  alternatives	  exist	  which	  buyers	  can	  easily	  switch	  to.204	   In	  one	  of	   those	  cases,	   it	  was	  
held	  that	  the	  long	  time	  scale	  necessary	  to	  introduce	  new	  suppliers,	  the	  limited	  number	  of	  alternative	  
suppliers	  and	  the	  limited	  available	  capacity	  made	  it	  unlikely	  that	  car	  companies	  would	  exercise	  any	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200	  SGL	  Carbon/Brembo/BCBS/JV,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5484,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  27	  May	  2009,	  at	  42.	  See	  
also:	  U-­‐Shin/Valeo	  Cam,	  op.cit.,	  at	  41.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  market	  investigation	  provided	  indications	  that	  supply	  
agreements	  between	  car	  component	  manufacturers	  and	  OEMs	  are	  at	  least	  subject	  to	  annual	  price	  
negotiations,	  allowing	  OEMs	  to	  gauge	  competing	  suppliers’	  quotation	  prices.	  Also	  there	  can	  be	  ‘annual	  price	  
reductions’,	  comprising	  annual,	  pre-­‐defined	  percentage	  price	  reductions	  imposed	  by	  OEMs.	  The	  Commission	  
concluded	  that,	  in	  any	  case,	  the	  inclusion	  of	  such	  pricing	  provisions	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  OEMs	  confirms	  the	  
existence	  of	  a	  degree	  of	  countervailing	  buyer	  power	  for	  OEMs.	  (at	  44)	  
201	  Johnson	  Controls/Robert	  Bosch/Delphi	  SLI,	  op.cit.,	  at	  16.	  See	  also:	  JCI/Bosch/VB	  Autobatterien	  JV,	  Case	  No	  
COMP/M.2939,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  18	  October	  2002.	  
202	  See	  for	  example:	  Johnson	  Controls/Robert	  Bosch/Delphi	  SLI,	  op.cit.	  In	  this	  decision,	  the	  Commission	  only	  
took	  into	  consideration	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  strong	  buying	  side	  to	  clear	  the	  merger.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  merging	  parties	  
holding	  a	  combined	  market	  share	  of	  50-­‐60%,	  various	  elements	  related	  to	  buyers	  were	  considered	  as	  sufficient	  
to	  prevent	  the	  new	  entity	  from	  acting	  independently,	  such	  as	  the	  high	  volume	  of	  purchases,	  the	  multi-­‐sourcing	  
strategy,	  the	  use	  of	  bidding	  procedures	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  viable	  alternatives.	  
203See	  for	  examples:	  Continental/Phoenix,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.3436,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  26	  October	  2004	  
and	  Usinor/Arbed/Aceralia,	  Case	  No	  COMP/ECSC.1351,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  21	  November	  2001.	  
204	  Ibid.,	  at	  168.	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form	  of	   buyer	   power	   in	   the	   short	   term.205	   The	  market	   in	   question,	   namely	   the	   supply	   of	   a	   certain	  
steel	  product,	  was	  characterized	  by	  a	  level	  of	  concentration	  higher	  than	  the	  level	  in	  the	  automotive	  
industry	   and	   the	   very	   strict	   and	   technical	   specifications	   required	   by	   OEMs	   were	   regarded	   as	  
restricting	  even	  more	  the	  choice	  of	  suppliers.206	   In	  another	  case,	  the	   investigation	  showed	  that,	   for	  
the	   procurement	   of	   air	   springs,	   many	   car	   producers	   had	   only	   one	   supplier.	   Those	   buyers	   were	  
therefore	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  dependent	  on	  air	  springs	  manufacturers	  and	  would	  not	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  
prevent	   the	   merged	   entity,	   with	   a	   combined	   market	   share	   around	   85-­‐95%,	   from	   acting	  
independently	  of	  its	  customers.207	  
In	  most	  cases,	  suppliers	  are	  highly	  dependent	  on	  car	  companies	  since	  the	  latter	  account	  for	  a	   large	  
proportion	  of	  their	  turnover	  and	  that	  the	  loss	  of	  one	  of	  those	  customers	  would	  have	  strong	  incidence	  
on	  their	  market	  share.	  However,	  the	  examples	  mentioned	  above	  show	  that	  each	  situation	  must	  be	  
assessed	  by	   taking	   into	  account	  all	   the	  circumstances	  of	   the	  case	   in	  order	   to	  determine	  accurately	  
the	  degree	  of	  buyer	  power	  and	  hence	  the	  potential	  effects	  of	  the	  merger	  on	  competition.	  
C. RETAIL	  MARKETS	  
The	   second	   sector	   where	   the	   Commission	   concluded	   to	   the	   existence	   of	   private	   companies’	  
countervailing	   buyer	   power	   in	   merger	   cases	   is	   the	   retail	   sector.	   Retailers,	   and	   especially	   large	  
supermarket	  chains,	  enjoy	  indeed	  significant	  buyer	  power	  they	  can	  use	  toward	  suppliers	  of	  food	  and	  
non-­‐food	  products.	   The	  high	   level	  of	   concentration	   in	   the	   retail	  markets	   and	   the	  growing	   share	  of	  
private	  labels	  on	  the	  shelves	  are	  the	  main	  sources	  of	  buyer	  power	  in	  that	  sector.208	  The	  presence	  of	  
such	   countervailing	   buying	   power	   makes	   therefore	   the	   Commission	   more	   inclined	   to	   authorize	   a	  
merger	  between	  suppliers	  of	  consumer	  goods	  except	  when	  the	  merging	  parties	  produce	  must-­‐carry	  
brands.	  In	  that	  latter	  case,	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  is	  likely	  to	  shift	  to	  the	  suppliers’	  advantage.	  
1. Sources	  of	  buyer	  power	  in	  the	  retail	  sector	  
The	  level	  of	  concentration	  among	  retailers	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  their	  market	  
power	  on	  the	  selling	  and	  on	  the	  buying	  side.	  The	  presence	  and	  the	  success	  of	  private	   labels	   in	   the	  
retail	  sector	  has	  also	  a	  strong	  influence	  on	  the	  degree	  of	  buyer	  power.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205	  Ibid.,	  at	  162.	  
206	  Ibid.,	  at	  163	  and	  164.	  
207	  Continental/Phoenix,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.3436,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  26	  October	  2004,	  at	  23.	  
208	  In	  addition,	  retailers	  have	  generally	  various	  alternatives	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market.	  They	  can	  switch	  to	  
other	  suppliers	  but	  they	  can	  also	  get	  into	  vertical	  integration	  or	  sponsor	  new	  entry	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  a	  price	  
increase.	  See:	  FrieslandCampina/Zijerveld	  &	  Veldhuyzen	  and	  Den	  Hollander,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.6772,	  
Commission	  Decision	  of	  12	  April	  2013,	  at	  170.	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a) Concentration	  and	  internationalization	  
Large	   supermarket	   chains	   have	   over	   time	   significantly	   increased	   their	   purchasing	   power	   through	  
internationalization	  and	  concentration.	  In	  most	  Member	  States,	  only	  a	  few	  retailers	  control	  over	  up	  
to	   90%	   of	   the	  market.	   The	   high	  market	   shares	   held	   by	   big	   supermarkets	   in	   the	   selling	   and	   in	   the	  
buying	  markets	  make	  suppliers	  dependent	  on	  those	  actors	  in	  two	  ways.	  
On	  the	  one	  hand,	  since	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  retail	  chains	  control	  a	  very	  large	  part	  of	  the	  retail	  market,	  
they	   perform	   an	   important	   “gatekeeper”	   function	   for	   suppliers.	   Indeed,	   the	   access	   to	   consumers	  
mainly	  depends	  on	  the	  access	  to	  those	  retailers’	  shelf-­‐space.209	  	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  case	  concerning	  a	  
merger	   between	   suppliers	   of	   oral	   care	   products,	   the	   Commission	   considered	   that	   the	   loss	   of	   such	  
customers	  would	  entail	  serious	  consequences	  for	  a	  supplier	  since	  branded	  products	  excluded	  from	  a	  
major	   retailer	   would	   risk	   disappearing	   from	   the	   consumers’	   awareness.210	   The	   threat	   of	   delisting	  
and/or	  reduction	  in	  the	  self-­‐space	  constitute	  therefore	  a	  very	  strong	  bargaining	  tool	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  
retailers,	   especially	   when	   a	   product	   is	   characterized	   by	   low	   brand	   loyalty	   and	   subject	   to	   the	  
increasing	  share	  of	  private	  labels	  as	  it	  is	  further	  developed	  below.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  since	  large	  retail	  chains	  account	  generally	  for	  a	  large	  fraction	  of	  a	  supplier’s	  total	  
turnover,	  the	  loss	  of	  one	  of	  those	  customers	  is	  likely	  to	  put	  at	  risk	  the	  financial	  viability	  of	  the	  latter	  
whilst	  the	  costs	  would	  be	  relatively	  minor	  for	  the	  retailer.	  Indeed,	  the	  sales	  with	  a	  particular	  branded	  
product	  represent	  only	  a	  small	   fraction	  of	  a	  supermarket’s	  turnover	  and,	   in	  most	  cases,	  consumers	  
will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  switch	  to	  another	  brand	  rather	  than	  to	  turn	  to	  another	  retail	  chain	  to	  find	  the	  
delisted	   product.211	   The	   threat	   of	   losing	   those	   vital	   trading	   partners	   will	   hence	   force	   suppliers	   to	  
agree	  on	  prices	  and	  conditions	  they	  would	  never	  have	  agreed	  on	  but	  for	  the	  exploitation	  of	  market	  
power	  by	  large	  retailers.	  
b) Success	  of	  private	  labels	  
Private	  labels,	  also	  called	  own-­‐brands,	  are	  products	  sold	  under	  a	  retailer’s	  brand.	  Depending	  on	  the	  
product	   involved	   and	   on	   the	  Member	   State	   in	   question,	   the	   share	   of	   private	   labels	   in	   a	   product’s	  
total	   sales	  may	  be	  significant.	  The	  success	  of	   that	  particular	   segment	  of	   consumer	  goods	   increases	  
retailers’	   bargaining	   power	  with	   regard	   to	   brands	   producers	   but	   also	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   different	  
suppliers	  of	  those	  own-­‐brand	  products.	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  Phillip	  Morris/Nabisco,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.2072,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  16	  October	  2000,	  at	  25.	  
210	  Procter	  &	  Gamble/Gillette,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3732,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  15	  July	  2005,	  at	  125.	  
211	  Procter	  &	  Gamble/Gillette,	  op.cit.,	  at	  125	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i. Competitive	  pressures	  on	  brands	  producers	  
Where	  retailers	  can	  threaten	  their	  suppliers	  to	  find	  alternative	  sources	  of	  supply	  or	  to	  sponsor	  new	  
entry,	  such	  threat	  of	  delisting	  becomes	  even	  more	  credible	  when	  they	  can	  integrate	  private	  labels	  on	  
their	   shelves.212	   The	   market	   investigations	   held	   in	   different	   merger	   cases	   attest	   that	   own-­‐brand	  
products	   predominate	   in	   more	   and	   more	   product	   markets.213	   The	   particular	   role	   of	   competitive	  
constraint	   played	   by	   the	   private	   label	   segment	   has	   been	   particularly	   developed	   in	   a	   decision	   on	  
concentration	   between	   producers	   of	   consumer	   tissue	   products.214	   The	   Commission	   noted	   in	   that	  
case	   that	   increasing	   shelf-­‐space	   is	   devoted	   by	   retailers	   to	   their	   own	   private	   label	   products	   at	   the	  
expense	  of	  manufacturer	  branded	  products.215	  The	  success	  of	  own-­‐brands	  in	  product	  markets	  such	  as	  
toilet	  paper	  or	  household	  towels	  results	   from	   low	  brand	   loyalty	  among	  consumers.	  Due	  to	  the	   low	  
level	  of	  differentiation	  between	  private	   labels	  and	  branded	  products	   in	   that	   sector,	  with	   regard	   to	  
both	  quality	  and	  packaging,	  brands	  bring	   little	  added-­‐value	  to	  consumers	  who	  therefore	  base	  their	  
choice	  on	  the	  lower	  prices	  of	  retailers’	  brands.216	  In	  other	  decisions,	  the	  Commission	  also	  recognized	  
that	   brand	   loyalty	   is	   relatively	   weak	   for	   products	   such	   as	   air	   fresheners217	   or	   nut	   snacks.218	   The	  
continuing	  trend	  towards	  the	  weakening	  of	  brands	  and	  the	  increasing	  share	  of	  private	   labels	   in	  the	  
markets	   of	   toilet	   paper	   and	   household	   products	   constitute	   a	   serious	   competitive	   constraint	   for	  
brands	   producers.	   Since	   consumers	   are	   likely	   to	   turn	   easily	   to	   private	   labels,	   retail	   chains	   are	   in	   a	  
position	  to	  discipline	  manufacturers	  of	  branded	  products	  in	  case	  of	  disagreement	  on	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  
supply	  contracts.219	  They	  can	  indeed	  delist	  or	  threat	  to	  delist,	  reallocate	  shelf-­‐space	  to	  other	  brands,	  
put	   the	  manufacturer’s	  brands	  on	  a	   less	   favourable	  position	  on	   the	   shelf	  or	   reduce	   the	  number	  of	  
stores	   stocking	   the	  brands	   in	  question	   in	  order	   to	  make	   their	   trading	   conditions	   accepted	  by	   their	  
suppliers.220	   The	   resulting	   strong	   competitive	   pressure	   put	   on	   branded	   product	   manufacturers	   by	  
their	   large	  customers	  may	  be	  sufficient	   to	  prevent	  suppliers	  merging	   in	   the	  upstream	  market	   from	  
exerting	  market	  power	  at	  the	  wholesale	  level.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212	  See	  for	  example:	  Nestlé/Gerber,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.4688,	  Commission	  decision	  of	  27	  July	  2007.	  The	  Commission	  
held	  in	  that	  case	  that	  retailers	  have	  buyer	  power	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  baby	  food	  manufacturers	  even	  though	  the	  parties’	  
brands	  were	  considered	  as	  must-­‐have	  brands.	  The	  data	  submitted	  by	  the	  parties	  indeed	  showed	  that	  the	  baby	  
food	  products	  in	  question	  were	  subject	  to	  delisting	  and	  that	  large	  supermarkets	  could	  sponsor	  new	  entry	  either	  
via	  introduction	  of	  private	  labels	  or	  by	  attracting	  new	  suppliers.	  
213	  For	  example,	  private	  label	  share	  of	  total	  retail	  sales	  amounts	  to	  41%	  in	  Belgium,	  45%	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  
and	  51%	  in	  Spain.	  See	  on	  that	  matter,	  the	  figure	  in	  Part	  III,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  II,	  Point	  A,	  2.	  
214	  See	  :	  SCA/P&G,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.4533,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  5	  September	  2007.	  
215	  Ibid.,	  at	  80.	  Private	  labels	  clearly	  predominated	  in	  toilet	  paper	  and	  household	  paper	  with	  an	  overall	  share	  of	  
approximately	  80%.	  
216	  Ibid.,	  at	  114.	  
217	  Procter	  &	  Gamble/Sara	  Lee	  Air	  Care,	  Care	  No	  COMP/M.5828,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  17	  June	  2010.	  
218	  Granaria/Ültje/Intersnack/May	  Holding,	  Case	  No	  COMP/JV.32,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  28	  February	  2000,	  at	  
42.	  Retailer	  own	  labels	  account	  for	  approximately	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  total	  sales	  in	  that	  market.	  
219	  	  SCA/P&G,	  op.cit.,	  at	  81.	  
220	  	  Ibid.,	  at	  118.	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However,	   the	   constraint	   exercised	   by	   private	   labels	   on	   brands	   suppliers	   differs	   depending	   on	   the	  
relevant	  product	  market	  involved.	  	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  level	  of	  brand	  loyalty	  and	  the	  difference	  
in	  quality	  between	  rival	  products	   influence	   the	  overall	   share	  of	  own-­‐brands	   in	  a	  particular	  product	  
market.	   According	   to	   the	   Commission,	   the	   low	   share	   of	   private	   labels	   in	   a	   market	   provides	   an	  
indication	  that	  the	  relative	  buyer	  power	  of	  retailers	  is	  quite	  low	  since	  that	  means	  that	  the	  power	  of	  
brands	   is	   still	   strong	   in	   that	  market.	  On	   basis	   of	   those	   elements,	   it	  was	   considered	   that	   the	   small	  
share	  of	  private	   labels	   for	   frozen	  pizzas	  and	   the	  well-­‐known	  brands	  owned	  by	   the	  merging	  parties	  
prevented	  retailers	  from	  exercising	  sufficient	  bargaining	  power.221	  In	  contrast,	  in	  the	  same	  decision,	  
the	   Commission	   held	   that,	   in	   the	   markets	   of	   frozen	   potato	   products,	   no	   barriers	   impede	   the	  
expansion	  of	  private	  labels	  so	  that,	  in	  those	  markets,	  supermarkets	  are	  able	  to	  constrain	  the	  power	  
of	  brand	  owners.222	  	  In	  the	  case	  related	  to	  the	  markets	  of	  consumer	  tissue	  products,	  the	  Commission	  
noted	  a	  distinction	  between	   the	   toilet	   paper/household	   towels	  markets,	   characterized	  by	   a	   strong	  
presence	  of	  private	  labels,	  and	  handkerchief/facials	  markets	  where	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  total	  sales	  is	  
still	  made	   through	   branded	   products.223	   In	   that	   latter	   case,	   due	   to	   the	   important	   role	   that	   brands	  
continue	  to	  play,	   the	  competitive	  constraint	  exerted	  by	  retailers’	  own	  brands	  on	  the	  shelves	   is	   less	  
effective	   and	   so	   is	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power.	   The	   bargaining	   strength	   of	   each	   player	   in	   the	  
negotiations	  varies	  therefore	  depending	  on	  the	  product	  in	  question.	  As	  such,	  while	  the	  Commission	  
recognized	  that	  retailers	  enjoy	  buyer	  power	  when	  purchasing	  oral	  care	  products,	  it	  considered	  that,	  
in	   the	   particular	   market	   of	   battery	   and	   rechargeable	   toothbrushes,	   such	   buying	   power	   was	   not	  
sufficient	   to	   remove	   potential	   competition	   problems	   brought	   about	   by	   a	  merger	   in	   the	   upstream	  
market.224	  	  It	  was	  maintained	  that	  private	  labels	  or	  other	  rival	  products	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  constitute	  
credible	   competitive	   pressures,	   not	   only	   because	   the	   merging	   parties	   held	   a	   large	   number	   of	  
important	  patents	   for	   those	  products,	  but	  also	  because	  a	  good	   reputation	  was	  needed	   to	  enter	  or	  
expand	  successfully	  in	  that	  market.225	  
If	  the	  share	  of	  private	  labels	  may	  vary	  depending	  on	  the	  type	  of	  product	  in	  question,	  it	  may	  also	  be	  
different	  from	  one	  Member	  State	  to	  another	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  same	  product	  market.	  While	  private	  
label	  products	  represent	  a	  significant	  share	  of	  the	  chocolate	  tablet	  market	  in	  France	  for	  example,	  the	  
situation	   is	   different	   in	   Poland	   and	   Romania	   where	   own-­‐brands	   do	   not	   impose	   a	   significant	  
competitive	   constrain	   on	   branded	   products	   given	   their	   significantly	   lower	   price,	   quality,	   different	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221	  Orkla/Chips,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3658,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  3	  March	  2005,	  at	  25.	  
222	  Ibid.,	  at	  30.	  
223	  SCA/P&G,	  op.cit.,	  at	  154.	  
224	  Procter	  &	  Gamble/Gillette,	  op.cit.,	  at	  24.	  
225	  Ibid.,	  at	  26.	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product	   denomination	   and	   shelf	   positioning.226	   The	   Commission	   also	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   retail	  
market	   in	   those	   countries	   is	   not	   as	   concentrated	   as	   in	   other	  Member	   States,	   because	   traditional	  
small	  retail	  outlets	  still	  account	  for	  more	  than	  50%	  of	  all	  retail	  sales.227	  
It	  is	  also	  worth	  mentioning	  that,	  if	  the	  large	  presence	  of	  private	  labels	  in	  some	  product	  markets	  or	  in	  
some	  Member	  States	  enables	  retailers	  to	  exert	  strong	  pressures	  on	  their	  suppliers,	  it	  also	  gives	  them	  
additional	  competitive	  advantages.	  Indeed,	  since	  supermarkets	  know	  the	  prices	  of	  goods	  offered	  by	  
brands	  owners,	  they	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  fix	  the	  prices	  for	  their	  private	  labels	  in	  reaction	  to	  those	  of	  
branded	  products.	  Due	  to	   this	  asymmetry	  of	   information,	   retailers	  have	   the	  capacity	   to	  counteract	  
efficiently	   against	   the	   leading	   brands	   with	   its	   own-­‐brand	   products.228	   The	   possibility	   to	   switch	   to	  
private	  labels	  and	  to	  delist	  branded	  products,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  knowledge	  on	  prices	  of	  goods	  offered	  by	  
brand	  producers	  give	  retailers	  strong	  bargaining	  tools	  and	  thereby	  substantial	  buyer	  power.	  
ii. Competitive	  pressures	  on	  private	  labels	  producers	  
Buyer	   power	   may	   also	   be	   exercised	   towards	   suppliers	   of	   retailers’	   brands.	   The	   procurement	  
procedures	  used	  for	  private	  labels	  are	  very	  similar	  to	  those	  used	  in	  the	  public	  sector	  and	  in	  the	  car	  
industry.	  As	  such,	  retailers	  typically	  ask	  for	  bids	  from	  a	  number	  of	  producers	  based	  on	  specifications	  
with	   regard	   to	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   products	   and	   other	   contractual	   terms.229	   The	   supermarkets’	  
bargaining	   strength	   resulting	   from	   those	   bidding	   procedures	   is	   further	   reinforced	   by	   their	   multi-­‐
source	   procurement	   strategy.	   Indeed,	   using	   EU-­‐wide	   tenders,	   retailers	   are	   able	   to	   compare	   price	  
offers	  from	  suppliers	  in	  several	  countries	  and	  to	  select	  multiple	  sources	  of	  supply	  so	  that	  they	  are	  not	  
dependent	  upon	  a	  single	  supplier.230	  Spreading	  their	  private	  label	  purchases	  over	  different	  producers	  
also	  enable	  retailers	  to	  benchmark	  those	  suppliers	  against	  each	  other.231	  In	  addition,	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  
supermarkets’	  buyer	  power	  over	  suppliers	  is	  even	  more	  substantial	  when	  the	  industry	  in	  question	  is	  
volume	   driven	   and	   has	   to	   cope	   with	   an	   oversupply	   problem,	   such	   as	   in	   the	   raw	   milk	   sector.	   As	  
cooperatives	  are	  obliged	  to	  purchase	  all	  the	  milk	  produced	  by	  their	  farmer	  members	  and	  that	  such	  
product	   cannot	   be	   stored,	   strong	   pressure	   is	   put	   on	   those	   market	   participants	   who	   have	   to	   find	  
quickly	   sufficient	   sale	   channels	   to	   sell	   off	   their	   products.	   Consequently,	   suppliers’	   high	   degree	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226	  Kraft	  Foods/Cadbury,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5644,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  6	  January	  2010,	  at	  96	  and	  117.	  
227	  Ibid.,	  at	  118.	  
228	  Procter	  &	  Gamble/Gillette,	  op.cit.,	  at	  124.	  
229	  SCA	  Hygiene	  Products/Cartoinvest,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.2522,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  21	  March	  2002,	  at	  25.	  
230	  Granaria/Ültje/Intersnack/May	  Holding,	  op.cit.,	  at	  48.	  
231	  SCA	  Hygiene	  Prodcuts/Cartoinvest,	  op.cit.,	  at	  31.	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impatience	   further	   increases	   retailers’	   buyer	   power	   and	   enables	   them	   to	   negotiate	   even	   lower	  
prices.232	  
Concerning	  the	  other	  contractual	  terms,	  purchase	  contracts	  for	  private	  label	  products	  are	  generally	  
in	   the	   form	   of	   annual	   framework	   arrangements,	   allowing	   the	   retailer	   to	   call	   off	   quantities	   as	  
required,	  without	  giving	  the	  supplier	  any	  commitment	  on	  the	  volume	  of	  purchases.233	  The	  short-­‐term	  
nature	  of	  those	  arrangements,	  and	  the	  availability	  of	  other	  sources	  of	  supply,	  give	  supermarkets	  the	  
possibility	   to	   switch	  easily	   at	  minimal	   cost	   to	   another	   trading	  partner	   should	   their	   suppliers	  be	  no	  
longer	  capable	  of	  meeting	  the	  lowest	  price	  presented.234	  As	  a	  result,	  as	  in	  other	  bidding	  markets,	  the	  
market	  share	  of	  a	  merged	  entity	  involved	  in	  the	  manufacturing	  of	  private	  labels	  does	  not	  necessarily	  
reflect	  a	   long	  term	  market	  position	  since	  winning	  or	   losing	  one	  of	   the	  contracts	  on	  the	  market	  can	  
result	  in	  a	  significant	  increase	  or	  decrease	  in	  market	  share.235	  
2. Factors	  excluding	  the	  exercise	  of	  a	  sufficient	  countervailing	  buyer	  power	  
On	  basis	  of	  what	  has	  been	  developed	  above,	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  by	  
large	  retail	  chains	  is	  mostly	  linked	  to	  two	  factors:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  large	  number	  of	  
alternative	  suppliers	  that	  are	  capable	  of	  offering	  an	  equivalent	  range	  of	  products	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  
hand,	  the	  retailer’s	  effective	  power	  to	  delist	  brands	  if	  the	  terms	  on	  which	  those	  products	  are	  offered	  
no	   longer	   meet	   its	   requirements.236	   Conversely,	   the	   presence	   of	   strong	   brands,	   the	   low	   share	   of	  
private	   labels	   on	   a	   particular	  market	   and	   the	   limited	   number	   of	   alternative	   sources	   of	   supply	   are	  
likely	  to	  greatly	  mitigate	  retailers’	  bargaining	  power	  as	  those	  factors	  increase	  the	  dependence	  of	  the	  
latter	  on	  their	  suppliers.	  
a) Must-­‐carry	  brands	  
Some	  well-­‐known	  brands	  are	  so	  popular	  that	  retailers	  need	  to	  stock	  them	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  attracting	  
consumers	   in	   their	  outlets.	  With	   regard	   to	  must-­‐stock	  brands,	   retailers	  only	   reflect	   the	  demand	  of	  
consumers	   who	  manifest	   a	   high	   fidelity	   for	   those	   brands.	   The	   best	   example	   of	   such	   a	  must-­‐carry	  
brand	  is	  Coca-­‐Cola	  for	  which	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  demand	  among	  consumers.	  If	  that	  brand	  were	  delisted,	  
a	  certain	  volume	  of	  consumers	  would	  switch	  to	  another	  retail	  outlet	  in	  order	  to	  find	  their	  preferred	  
beverage.237	  A	  similar	  conclusion	  was	  reached	  in	  a	  case	  concerning	  a	  merger	  between	  producers	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232	  See:	  Friesland	  Coberco/Nutricia,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.2399,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  8	  August	  2001,	  at	  25-­‐26.	  
233	  Granaria/Ültje/Intersnack/May	  Holding,	  op.cit.,	  at	  48.	  
234	  Sovion/S	  Fleisch,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3968,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  21	  December	  2005,	  at	  76.	  
235	  SCA/P&G,	  op.cit.,	  at	  75.	  
236	  Guinness/Grand	  Metropolitan,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.938,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  15	  October	  1997,	  at	  68.	  
237	  The	  Coca-­‐Cola	  Company/Carlsberg	  A/S,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.833,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  11	  September	  1997,	  at	  
79.	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well-­‐known	   whisky	   brands.238	   The	   Commission	   considered	   that	   the	   merging	   parties’	   brands	   were	  
viewed	  as	  must-­‐have	  brands	  and	  that,	  if	  retailers	  no	  longer	  stock	  those	  products,	  	  they	  risked	  losing	  a	  
large	  part	  of	  their	  customers,	  not	  only	  for	  the	  whisky	  but	  for	  all	  the	  rest	  of	  their	  purchase	  from	  the	  
store	  as	  well.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  delisting	  is	  generally	  not	  a	  realistic	  option	  for	  retailers	  who	  are	  therefore	  
deprived	   of	   a	   strong	   bargaining	   tool.239	   The	   percentage	   of	   such	   switch	   in	   each	   case	   is	   indeed	  
unpredictable	  and	  thus	  constitutes	  a	  risk	  for	  the	  retailer.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  a	  merger	  
between	  suppliers	  of	  bottled	  mineral	  waters,	  the	  Commission	  held	  that,	  even	  though	  those	  products	  
represent	  only	   an	  estimated	  1%	  of	   the	   sales	  of	   a	   retailer,	   it	   is	   not	   excluded	   that	   a	  delisting	  of	   the	  
brands	  in	  question	  can	  result	   in	  a	   loss	  of	  one	  out	  of	  10	  end-­‐consumers.	  Removing	  one	  single	  major	  
brand	  from	  the	  shelves	  can	  therefore	  have	  a	  much	  higher	  impact	  on	  the	  retailer’s	  sales	  than	  the	  1%	  
figure	   would	   suggest.	   The	   delisting	   of	   one	   single	   brand	   may	   indeed	   lead	   to	   the	   loss	   of	   all	   the	  
purchases	   made	   by	   consumers	   of	   that	   brand	   in	   the	   retail	   outlet	   concerned.	   240	   However,	   in	   later	  
decisions,	  the	  Commission	  pointed	  out	  that,	  in	  case	  of	  delisting,	  consumers	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  switch	  
to	  another	  brand	  than	  look	  for	  the	  desired	  product	  in	  another	  supermarket.241	  
It	  may	  be	  assumed	  that	  the	  stronger	  the	  brand,	  the	  less	  realistic	  the	  threat	  of	  delisting.	  Recent	  events	  
yet	  show	  that	  large	  retail	  chains	  sometimes	  shake	  that	  preconceived	  principle	  and	  end	  up	  removing	  
popular	  brands	  from	  their	  shelves	  following	  a	  dispute	  with	  a	  brand	  manufacturer.242	  
b) Lack	  of	  alternatives	  
The	  main	  source	  of	  buyer	  power	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  substitute	  away	  from	  any	  supplier.	  In	  merger	  cases,	  
the	  Commission	  put	   the	  emphasis	  on	   the	   fact	   that	   such	  possibility	  must	   remain	  effective	   following	  
the	   operation	   of	   concentration.243	   A	   merger	   may	   indeed	   significantly	   reduce	   buyers’	   bargaining	  
power	  if	  it	  thereby	  removes	  an	  important	  alternative	  source	  of	  supply.	  Where	  the	  brands	  produced	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238	  Guinness/Grand	  Metropolitan,	  op.cit.,	  at	  75.	  See	  also	  in	  the	  tobacco	  products	  market:	  BAT/Skandinavisk	  
Tobakskompagni,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5086,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  27	  June	  2008.	  
239	  Must-­‐carry	  brands	  are	  also	  likely	  to	  mitigate	  buyer	  power	  of	  other	  types	  of	  retailers	  such	  as	  large	  sport	  
goods	  retailers.	  In	  a	  merger	  decision	  in	  the	  market	  of	  alpine	  skis,	  the	  Commission	  considered	  that	  the	  strength	  
of	  the	  brands	  provided	  by	  the	  parties	  mitigated	  to	  a	  significant	  extent	  buyer	  power	  of	  even	  large	  customers	  like	  
Decathlon,	  Intersport	  and	  Sport	  2000.	  See:	  Amer/Salomon,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3765,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  12	  
October	  2005,	  at	  66.	  
240	  Nestlé/Perrier,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.190,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  22	  July	  1992,	  at	  87.	  
241	  See:	  Rewe/Meinl,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1221,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  3	  February	  1999.	  This	  decision	  will	  be	  
analysed	  in	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  II,	  Point	  B,	  2,	  c).	  
242	  See	  Part	  III,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  II,	  Point	  B,	  3.	  
243	  Kraft	  Foods/Cadbury,	  op.cit.,	  at	  142.	  See	  also:	  SCA/Georgia-­‐Pacific	  Europe,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.6455,	  
Commission	  Decision	  of	  5	  July	  2012,	  at	  213.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  Commission	  considered	  that	  a	  three	  to	  two	  
merger	  in	  the	  market	  for	  the	  supply	  for	  branded	  household	  towels	  would	  trigger	  limited	  competition	  and	  fewer	  
alternatives	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  final	  customers.	  The	  leverage	  given	  by	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  third	  alternative	  
supplier	  would	  indeed	  disappear	  following	  the	  merger	  so	  that	  retailers	  would	  loss	  part	  of	  their	  negotiation	  
power.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  post-­‐merger	  countervailing	  buyer	  power	  will	  not	  be	  sufficiently	  strong	  to	  offset	  the	  
potential	  adverse	  effects	  resulting	  from	  the	  transaction.	  (at	  211-­‐214)	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by	   the	  merging	   parties	   are	   the	   closest	   competitors	   in	   the	   downstream	  market,	   supermarkets	   risk	  
losing	  most	   of	   their	   negotiation	   tools	   post-­‐merger.	   They	  will	   no	   longer	   be	   able	   to	   play	   one	   brand	  
against	  the	  other	  in	  listing	  and	  pricing	  negotiations.	  The	  same	  applies	  for	  the	  procurement	  of	  private	  
labels	  since	  the	  operation	  will	  reduce	  the	  number	  of	  alternative	  sources	  of	  supply	  for	  those	  products	  
as	  well.244	  If,	  following	  the	  merger,	  no	  supplier	  of	  the	  products	  in	  question	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  serve	  
the	  requirement	  of	  large	  retail	  chains	  other	  than	  the	  merging	  parties,	  buyer	  power	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  
exercised,	  even	  by	  large	  supermarkets,	  and	  the	  operation	  is	  therefore	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  authorized.245	  
c) Presence	  of	  smaller	  and	  powerless	  retailers	  
Even	   though	   some	   buyers	   are	   considered	   as	   enjoying	   a	   certain	   degree	   of	   buyer	   power,	   the	  
Commission	  also	  pays	  attention	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  smaller	  retailers	  who	  are	  not	  shielded	  from	  the	  
imposition	  of	  adverse	  terms	  of	  supply.246	   Indeed,	   if	   large	  supermarkets	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  exercise	  
pressures	  on	  their	  suppliers	  and	  obtain	  good	  supply	  conditions,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  why	  other	  retailers	  
should	  benefit	  from	  the	  same	  discounts	  or	  other	  advantages.	  Furthermore,	  especially	  when	  the	  retail	  
market	  is	  relatively	  competitive,	  such	  as	  the	  retail	  market	  for	  fresh	  milk,	  large	  retail	  chains	  would	  be	  
induced	  to	  take	  steps	  that	  protect	  only	  their	  own	  interests	  and	  would	  gain	  from	  an	  increase	  in	  their	  
rivals’	   costs	   since	   that	  would	   lead	   to	   a	   lessening	   of	   competition	   to	   their	   advantage.247	   In	   fact,	   the	  
Commission	   also	   takes	   into	   consideration	   a	   particular	   consequence	   that	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   few	  
powerful	  buyers	  could	  have	  on	  smaller	  competitors	  post-­‐merger,	  namely	  the	  waterbed	  effect.248	  	  
The	  existence	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  retailers’	  buyer	  power	  are	  therefore	  examined	  on	  basis	  of	  all	  those	  
elements.	  Supermarkets’	  strongest	  weapon	  is	  probably	  the	  threat	  to	  delist	  which	   is	  becoming	  even	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244	  Friesland	  Foods/Campina,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5046,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  17	  December	  2008,	  at	  243.	  
245	  Ibid.,	  at	  280.	  
246	  See:	  Procter	  &	  Gamble/Wella,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3149,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  30	  July	  2003,	  at	  57	  and	  Friesland	  
Foods/Campina,	  op.cit.,	  at	  274	  .	  
247	  Friesland	  Foods/Campina,	  op.cit.,	  at	  276.	  See	  also:	  Arla	  Foods/Milk	  Link,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.6611,	  
Commission	  Decision	  of	  27	  September	  2012.	  In	  that	  decision,	  the	  Commission	  also	  pointed	  out	  that	  
“countervailing	  buyer	  power	  cannot	  be	  found	  to	  sufficiently	  offset	  potential	  adverse	  effect	  of	  a	  merger	  if	  it	  only	  
ensures	  that	  a	  particular	  customer	  segment,	  with	  particular	  
bargaining	  strength,	  is	  shielded	  from	  significantly	  higher	  prices	  or	  deteriorated	  conditions	  after	  the	  merger.	  
(…)In	  the	  Commission's	  view,	  a	  significant	  supply	  alternative	  will	  be	  removed	  and	  choice	  will	  be	  limited	  as	  the	  
parties	  would	  have	  more	  than	  two	  thirds	  of	  the	  current	  sales	  in	  the	  long-­‐life	  milk	  market	  and	  no	  other	  supplier	  
would	  have	  a	  facility	  of	  a	  similar	  scale	  in	  the	  UK”.	  (at	  116-­‐117)	  
117.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  price	  discriminate	  between	  different	  customers	  as	  long-­‐life	  
milk	  products	  are	  delivered	  according	  to	  customers'	  specifications	  and	  thus	  are	  
customized	  products.	  Hence,	  even	  if	  the	  largest	  customers	  would	  be	  able	  to	  exercise	  
some	  countervailing	  buyer	  power	  this	  would	  not	  protect	  smaller	  customers	  and	  the	  
parties	  would	  still	  be	  able	  to	  raise	  prices	  above	  the	  pre-­‐merger	  level.	  
248	  The	  waterbed	  effect	  is	  a	  particular	  phenomenon	  which	  could	  arise	  when	  suppliers	  face	  some	  large	  
customers	  and	  involves	  suppliers	  charging	  higher	  prices	  to	  smaller	  buyers	  in	  order	  to	  recoup	  the	  squeezed	  
margins	  resulting	  from	  their	  transactions	  with	  powerful	  supermarkets.	  On	  that	  matter,	  see	  Section	  II,	  Point	  A,	  
4,	  of	  this	  Chapter.	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more	  credible	  with	  the	  growing	  success	  of	  private	  label	  products.	  However,	  that	  trump	  may	  be	  made	  
valueless	  when	  suppliers	  producing	  must-­‐carry	  brands	  merge	  and	  no	  equivalent	  alternative	  to	  those	  
products	  is	  left	  on	  the	  relevant	  market.	  
D. CONSUMER	  GOODS	  AND	  FOOD/BEVERAGE	  PROCESSING	  SECTOR	  
As	   developed	   in	   Section	   3,	   some	   consumer	   goods	   manufacturers	   –	   be	   it	   food	   and	   beverage	  
processing	  companies	  or	  other	  non-­‐food	  	  manufacturers	  -­‐	  produce	  must-­‐carry	  brands	  which	  enable	  
them	  to	  exercise	  significant	  market	  power	  in	  the	  downstream	  markets	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  to	  mitigate	  or	  
even	  override	  large	  retailers’	  buyer	  power.	  That	  strong	  bargaining	  power	  is	  though	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  
selling	   side	   but	   may	   also	   be	   exercised	   by	   those	   companies	   in	   the	   procurement	   markets.	   It	   is	  
particularly	   in	   the	   packaging	   and	   containers	  markets	   that	   the	   Commission	   had	   the	   opportunity	   to	  
examine	  buyer	  power	  in	  that	  sector.	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Different	  elements	  characterizing	  the	  existence	  of	  buyer	  power	  mentioned	   in	  the	  previous	  sections	  
remain	   valid	   in	   this	   sector.	   The	   commission	   for	   example	   noted	   that	   prices	   for	   containers	   are	   set	  
through	   competitive	   tendering	   on	   basis	   of	   the	   customer’s	   specifications.249	   Competition	   among	  
suppliers	   is	   thus	   generally	   intense,	   especially	   when	  multinational	   companies	   carry	   out	   centralized	  
purchasing	   operations	   of	   a	   particular	   product	   at	   European	   or	   global	   level.250	   After	   comparing	   the	  
different	   offers,	   customers	   use	   to	   select	   several	   sources	   of	   supply.	   	   Such	   multi-­‐sourcing	   strategy	  
enables	  them	  to	  play	  one	  supplier	  against	  the	  other	  and	  to	  guaranty	  supply	  security.251	  
When	   a	   contract	   has	   been	   drawn	   up252,	   contractual	   terms	   are	   generally	   set	   in	   favour	   of	   buyers.	  
Supply	   contracts	   are	   indeed	   often	   of	   a	   short	   duration,	  which	   enable	   the	   latter	   to	   switch	   to	   other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249	  CVC/Danone/Gerresheimer,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1539,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  5	  July	  1999,	  at	  33.	  
250	  Alcon/Flexpack,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3049,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  24	  February	  2003,	  at	  24.	  
251	  See	  for	  examples:	  Viag/Continental	  Can,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.0081,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  6	  June	  1991,	  at	  21;	  
Henkel/Sovereign,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3612,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  22	  December	  2004,	  at	  58	  and	  Ardagh/Impress,	  
Case	  No	  COMP/M.6025,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  29	  November	  2010.	  In	  those	  decisions,	  the	  Commission	  noted	  
that	  food	  and	  beverage	  processing	  companies	  commonly	  use	  a	  policy	  of	  multi-­‐sourcing	  for	  the	  procurement	  of	  
various	  packaging	  materials	  such	  as	  glass	  containers	  or	  adhesives	  for	  flexible	  packaging.	  
252	  In	  some	  cases,	  customers	  do	  not	  commit	  themselves	  to	  purchase	  particular	  volumes	  and	  do	  not	  even	  have	  
any	  contract.	  That	  gives	  them	  the	  freedom	  to	  switch	  to	  other	  suppliers	  very	  easily.	  See:	  Mauser	  Holding	  
International/Reyde/JV,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5394,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  21	  January	  2009,	  at	  39.	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suppliers	  without	  difficulty	  and	  at	  short	  notice,	  and	  usually	  provide	   that	  contractual	  quantities	  and	  
prices	  are	  renegotiated	  periodically.253	  
With	  regard	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  number	  of	  alternatives	  available	  to	  customers,	  the	  Commission	  noted	  
that	  well-­‐known	  food	  and	  drink	  companies,	  such	  as	  Nestlé,	  Unilever,	  Coca-­‐Cola,	  Mars	  or	  Kraft,	  may	  
easily	  switch	  to	  other	  sources	  of	  supply,	  expand	  or	  buy	  rival	  suppliers	  as	  well	  as	  sponsor	  new	  entry	  or	  
cross	  entry.	  254	  That	  large	  array	  of	  outside	  options	  gives	  customers	  the	  possibility	  to	  retaliate	  against	  
any	   anticompetitive	   behaviour	   by	   withdrawing	   their	   purchases	   from	   their	   current	   suppliers	   and	  
allocating	   it	  to	  competitors.255	  This	   is	  particularly	   likely	  to	  happen	  when	  buyers	  are	  able	  to	  monitor	  
supply	   costs	   and	  other	   pricing	  parameters	   and	   thus	   to	   control	   any	  misconduct	   by	  upstream	   firms.	  
Such	   customer	   retaliation	   would	   not	   only	   jeopardize	   the	   results	   of	   a	   non-­‐coordinated	  
anticompetitive	   conduct	   but	   could	   also	   be	   used	   to	   counteract	   a	   tacit	   collusion	   or	   an	   attempted	  
input/customers	  foreclosure.	  256	  
Although	  large	  consumer	  goods	  companies’	  buyer	  power	  has	  been	  mostly	  analysed	  in	  cases	  related	  
to	  mergers	  between	  packaging	  producers,	  it	  is	  nevertheless	  likely	  to	  be	  exercised	  towards	  any	  type	  of	  
supplier.257	  Such	  strong	  countervailing	  buying	  power,	  combined	  with	  a	  significant	  market	  power	  on	  
the	   selling	   side	   -­‐	   which	   is	   hardly	   counteracted	   by	   retailers’	   buyer	   power	   -­‐	  make	   those	   companies	  
particularly	  powerful	  players	  on	  the	  markets.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253	  CVC/Danone/Gerresheimer,	  op.cit.,	  at	  36.	  
254	  Sun	  capital/DSM	  Special	  Products,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5785,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  2	  December	  2010,	  at	  
202.	  This	  case	  does	  not	  concern	  the	  packaging	  industry	  but	  chemical	  products	  sold	  to	  soft	  drinks	  manufacturers	  
who	  use	  them	  for	  low	  sodium	  variants	  of	  their	  products.	  
255	  Ibid.,	  at	  151.	  
256	  Ibid.,	  at	  151	  and	  195.	  The	  Commission	  considered	  that	  the	  two	  largest	  customers,	  namely	  Coca-­‐Cola	  and	  
Pepsi,	  had	  all	  the	  required	  power	  to	  control	  any	  misconduct	  by	  the	  merged	  entity	  and	  to	  retaliate	  against	  any	  
attempted	  foreclosure.	  It	  was	  also	  maintained	  that	  the	  foreseeable	  reaction	  of	  current	  customers	  would	  
jeopardize	  the	  results	  expected	  from	  a	  common	  policy	  between	  suppliers.	  See	  also:	  Manitowoc/Enodis,	  Case	  
No	  COMP/M.5280,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  19	  September	  2008,	  at	  156.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  Commission	  
considered	  that	  the	  three	  major	  customers	  of	  beverage	  dispensers,	  namely	  Coca-­‐Cola,	  Pepsi	  and	  McDonalds,	  
could	  exercise	  their	  buyer	  power	  if	  their	  bottlers	  were	  being	  disadvantaged	  by	  customer	  foreclosure	  behaviour	  
leading	  to	  higher	  prices.	  
257	  See	  for	  examples:	  Fox	  Paine/Advanta,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3506,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  20	  August	  2004.	  	  This	  
decision	  concerned	  a	  merger	  between	  seeds	  producers.	  Strong	  countervailing	  buyer	  power	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  
exercised	  by	  food	  processors	  in	  those	  markets.	  Indeed,	  the	  processing	  industry	  features	  a	  number	  of	  large	  
players	  with	  significant	  buyer	  power,	  upon	  whom	  the	  seed	  producers	  are	  reliant	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  their	  sales.	  
(at	  36)	  See	  also:	  Rhodia	  Chemie/Albright	  &	  Wilson,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1517,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  13	  July	  1999	  
and	  Solvay/Montedison-­‐Ausimont,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.2960,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  9	  April	  2002.	  In	  those	  two	  
decisions,	  large	  soapers	  such	  as	  Unilever,	  Procter&	  Gamble	  and	  Henkel,	  were	  recognized	  to	  exercise	  a	  
significant	  countervailing	  power	  when	  buying	  detergent	  builders	  from	  chemical	  companies.	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E. OTHER	  BUYER’S	  MARKETS	  AND	  COMPANIES	  ENJOYING	  SIGNIFICANT	  BUYER	  POWER	  
Market	  power	  of	  buyers	  has	  also	  been	  highlighted	  in	  other	  sectors.	  Even	  though	  the	  issue	  of	  buyer	  
power	  has	  been	  addressed	  in	  fewer	  decisions,	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  the	  degree	  of	  such	  
power	   is	   lower	   in	   those	   markets.	   The	   number	   of	   cases	   in	   which	   buyers’	   countervailing	   power	   is	  
examined	   in	   a	   particular	   sector	   only	   depends	   on	   the	   number	   of	   mergers	   occurring	   in	   the	  
procurement	   markets	   of	   those	   buyers.	   Among	   the	   powerful	   customers	   recognised	   by	   the	  
Commission,	   we	   can	  mention	   electronics	   manufacturers,	   oil	   and	   gas	   companies	   and,	   to	   a	   certain	  
extent,	  paper	  producers	  and	  publishers.	  In	  some	  decisions,	  rather	  than	  referring	  to	  the	  whole	  buying	  
side,	  the	  Commission	  specifically	  emphasized	  a	  particular	  company’s	  buyer	  power.	  
1. Electronics	  sector	  
Large	   OEMs	   (Original	   Equipment	  Manufacturers)	   such	   as	   Apple,	   Dell,	   Nokia,	   Sony,	   HP	   and	   Philips	  
constitute	   very	   sophisticated	   customers	   and	   tend	   to	   be	   highly	   concentrated.258	   Those	   electronics	  
manufacturers	   generally	   procure	   electronic	   devices	   through	   tenders	   and	   adopt	   a	   multi-­‐sourcing	  
strategy.259	  They	  have	  generally	  sufficient	  possibilities	  to	  switch	  between	  suppliers	  or	  can	  sponsor	  a	  
new	  entry	   if	  an	  additional	   supplier	  was	  needed.260	  As	   in	   the	  car	   industry,	  OEMs	   in	   this	   sector	  have	  
also	   the	   ability	   to	   switch	   to	   in-­‐house	   production	   should	   their	   suppliers	   do	   no	   longer	   meet	   their	  
pricing	   requirements	  or	  other	   specifications.261	  Given	   those	  elements,	   it	   can	  be	  asserted	   that	   large	  
electronic	  devices	  manufacturers	  are	  likely	  to	  use	  their	  market	  power	  and	  exert	  pressure	  in	  upstream	  
buyer	   markets.	   Despite	   the	   possibly	   high	   combined	   market	   share	   of	   the	   merging	   parties,	   the	  
Commission	  is	  therefore	  more	  likely	  to	  authorize	  the	  transaction.262	  
2. Oil/Gas	  sectors	  
Oil	   and	   gas	   exploration	   and	   production	   companies,	   such	   as	   Shell,	   BP,	  Mobil	   and	   Statoil,	   have	   also	  
significant	  buyer	  power	  and	  are	   thereby	  able	   to	   contain	   an	   increase	   in	  market	  power	   in	  upstream	  
markets	   that	  may	   result	   from	  a	  proposed	  merger.	   Such	   countervailing	  power	  may	  be	  used	  against	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258	  Foxconn/Sony	  LCB	  TV	  Manufacturing	  Company	  in	  Slovakia,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5870,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  
25	  June	  2010,	  at	  36	  and	  Foxconn/Dell	  (Products)	  Poland,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5765,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  28	  
September	  2010.	  
259	  Flextronics/Italdata,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.2116,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  25	  September	  2000,	  at	  16;	  
Toshiba/Samsung/JV,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3349,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  2	  March	  2004,	  at	  15	  and	  Toshiba/Fujitsu	  
HDD	  Business,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5483,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  11	  May	  2009,	  at	  32.	  
260	  Seagate/Maxtor,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1400,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  27	  April	  2006,	  at	  30	  and	  32.	  
261	  Foxconn/Sony	  LCB	  TV	  Manufacturing	  Company	  in	  Slovakia,	  op.cit.,	  at	  36.	  
262	  See	  for	  example:	  Seagate/Maxtor,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1400,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  27	  April	  2006.	  In	  this	  
decision,	  the	  Commission	  mainly	  justified	  the	  merger	  authorization	  on	  basis	  of	  customers’	  buyer	  power.	  Even	  
though	  the	  combined	  market	  share	  of	  the	  parties	  amounted	  to	  more	  than	  60%	  in	  a	  specific	  market	  of	  data	  
storage	  devices,	  that	  percentage	  was	  considered	  as	  volatile	  and	  any	  anticompetitive	  effect	  unlikely	  due	  to	  the	  
strong	  countervailing	  strength	  on	  the	  buying	  side.	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services	   providers	   or	   products	   manufacturers.263	   Bidding	   and	   multi-­‐sourcing	   strategies	   used	   by	  
vertically	   integrated	   oil	   and	   gas	   companies	   contribute	   to	   maintaining	   competitive	   pressures	   on	  
suppliers.264	   In	   addition,	   their	   detailed	   knowledge	   on	   cost	   structures	   and	   prices	   of	   upstream	  
producers	   generally	   prevents	   the	   latter	   from	   increasing	   prices	   above	   the	   competitive	   level.265	   The	  
Commission	   takes	   therefore	   particularly	   into	   consideration	   those	   customers’	   buyer	   power	   in	   its	  
mergers	  assessment.266	  
3. Paper	  and	  publication	  industries	  
Paper	  manufacturers	  and	  publishers	  are	  generally	  considered	  as	  enjoying	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  buyer	  
power.	  However,	   their	  bargaining	   strength	   is,	   in	   some	  cases,	  not	   sufficient	   to	  offset	  attempts	  by	  a	  
merging	  firm	  to	  increase	  prices.	  
The	  paper	  industry	  in	  Europe	  is	  relatively	  concentrated	  and	  possesses	  a	  particular	  bargaining	  power	  
which	   can	   successfully	  be	  used	   in	   the	  procurement	  market	  of	  paper	   chemicals	   such	  as	   fixatives	  or	  
dyes	  for	  example.267	  Yet,	  the	  Commission	  did	  not	  come	  to	  the	  same	  conclusion	  with	  regard	  to	  pulp	  
mill	  equipment.	  When	  those	  paper	  producers	  run	   integrated	  pulp	  and	  paper	  mills,	   their	  position	   in	  
the	   procurement	   market	   of	   pulp	   mill	   equipment	   is	   indeed	   different	   since	   the	   customer	   base,	  
consisting	  of	  pulp	  mills	  as	  well	  as	  integrated	  pulp	  and	  paper	  mills,	  is	  more	  fragmented.	  Even	  though	  a	  
certain	  group	  of	  customers,	  such	  as	  paper	  producers,	  dispose	  of	  buyer	  power,	  this	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  
off-­‐set	   adverse	   effects	   of	   a	  merger,	   since	   it	   only	   ensures	   that	   these	  particular	   buyers	   are	   shielded	  
from	  price	  increases.268	  
The	  assessment	  of	  publishers’	  buyer	  power	  may	  also	  lead	  to	  different	  conclusions.	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  
merger	  case	  in	  2001,	  the	  Commission	  held	  that	  firms	  involved	  in	  the	  publication	  industry	  were	  not	  in	  
a	  position	  to	  exercise	  buyer	  power	  towards	  newsprints	  and	  other	  magazine	  paper	  producers	  due	  to	  
the	   high	   degree	   of	   concentration	   and	   vertical	   integration	   in	   that	   sector	   as	   mentioned	   above.269	  
Customers	   are	   not	   only	   large	   publishers	   but	   also	   atomized	   regional	   newspapers	   and	   specialized	  
magazines	   who	   are	   unlikely	   to	   neutralize	   possible	   parallel	   oligopolistic	   behaviour	   in	   the	   paper	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263	  See	  for	  examples:	  Halliburton/Dresse,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1140,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  7	  July	  1998	  and	  
Mannesmann/Vallourec,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.906,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  3	  June	  1997.	  In	  the	  first	  case,	  the	  market	  
affected	  by	  the	  merger	  was	  the	  provision	  of	  drilling	  services	  to	  oil	  and	  gas	  companies.	  In	  the	  second	  case,	  the	  
merger	  concerned	  producers	  of	  gas	  cylinders.	  
264	  Schlumberger/Smith	  International,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5839,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  26	  July	  2010,	  at	  43.	  	  
265	  Mannesmann/Vallourec,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.906,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  3	  June	  1997.	  
266	  See	  also	  :	  Shell/Halliburton/Well	  Dynamics	  JV,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1976,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  15	  March	  2001	  
and	  PKN/Mazeikiu,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.4348,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  7	  November	  2006.	  
267	  See	  :	  BASF/CIBA,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5355,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  12	  March	  2009,	  at	  88	  and	  162.	  
268	  Metso/Aker	  Kvaerner,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.4187,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  12	  December	  2006,	  at	  98-­‐99.	  	  
269	  UPM-­‐Kymmene/Haindl,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.2498,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  21	  November	  2001.	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industry.	  In	  addition,	  switching	  to	  a	  new	  supplier	  takes	  time	  and	  involves	  costs	  for	  publishers	  who	  are	  
therefore	  willing	   to	  accept	  higher	  prices	   in	  order	   to	   continue	  with	   their	   current	  paper	   suppliers.270	  
The	  transaction	  in	  question,	  namely	  a	  merger	  between	  two	  newsprints	  producers,	  was	  therefore	  not	  
allowed	  without	  undertakings	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  any	  anticompetitive	  outcome.	  This	  decision	  shows	  
that	  the	  more	  concentrated	   is	   the	  upstream	  market,	   the	   less	  buyer	  power	   is	   likely	  to	  be	  exercised.	  
Indeed,	   in	   1998,	   the	   Commission	   authorized	   a	   merger	   between	   producers	   of	   newsprints	   and	  
magazine	  paper	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  largest	  customers,	  due	  to	  their	  high	  volumes	  of	  purchases,	  
would	   be	   able	   to	   discipline	   paper	   suppliers	   and	   to	   prevent	   the	   creation	   of	   an	   oligopolistically	  
dominant	  position.271	  This	  assessment	  contrasts	  thus	  with	  the	  analysis	  made	  a	  few	  years	  later	  in	  the	  
first	   decision	   mentioned	   above	   but	   is	   nevertheless	   quite	   understandable.	   The	   exercise	   of	   buyer	  
power	  mainly	  depends	  on	  the	  level	  of	  concentration	  in	  upstream	  markets.	  In	  2001,	  the	  Commission	  
considered	   that,	   in	   view	   of	   the	   previous	  mergers	   which	   took	   place	   in	   the	   paper	   industry,	   further	  
consolidation	  in	  that	  sector	  through	  a	  new	  operation	  of	  concentration	  would	  remove	  any	  possibility	  
of	  exercising	  a	  competitive	  constraint	  from	  the	  buying	  side.	  
Publishers	  can	  nevertheless	  still	  exercise	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  buying	  power	  in	  other	  products	  markets,	  
such	  as	  the	  market	  of	  printing	  inks.272	  A	  limited	  number	  of	  large	  customers	  account	  for	  a	  substantial	  
part	  of	  demand	  in	  that	  market	  while	  smaller	  customers	  bundle	  their	  purchases	  in	  buying	  cooperation	  
to	  increase	  their	  leverage.	  The	  loss	  of	  a	  single	  customer	  may	  therefore	  lead	  to	  a	  significant	  decrease	  
in	  inks	  manufacturers’	  market	  shares.273	  The	  use	  of	  European-­‐wide	  or	  global	  tenders	  and	  the	  limited	  
brand	   awareness	   and	   loyalty	   for	   a	   particular	   manufacturer’s	   inks	   constitute	   elements	   reinforcing	  
customers’	  bargaining	  power	  in	  that	  market.274	  
Those	  different	  decisions	  show	  that	  buyer	  power	  may	  vary	  over	  time	  and	  depends	  on	  the	  relevant	  
product	   market	   involved.	   The	   number	   and	   the	   position	   of	   the	   players	   on	   the	   buying	   and	   on	   the	  
selling	  side	  are	  indeed	  different	  on	  each	  market	  and	  not	  immutable.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270	  Ibid.,	  at	  102.	  Switching	  costs	  result	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  publisher	  has	  to	  optimize	  the	  paper	  quality	  from	  a	  
particular	  machine	  to	  the	  pressrooms	  where	  that	  quality	  is	  to	  be	  run.	  Changing	  into	  a	  new	  paper	  supplier	  
would	  therefore	  be	  time	  consuming	  and	  increase	  risks	  given	  the	  different	  technical	  adaptation	  that	  has	  to	  be	  
made.	  
271	  Enso/Stora,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1225,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  25	  November	  1998,	  at	  63-­‐68.	  	  
272	  See	  :	  CVC/Ani	  Printing	  Inks,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3564,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  28	  October	  2004	  and	  Aster	  2/Flint	  
Ink,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3886,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  25	  August	  2005.	  
273	  Aster	  2/Flint	  Ink,	  op.cit.,	  at	  26.	  
274	  CVC/Ani	  Printing	  Inks,	  op.cit.,	  at	  18.	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4. Particular	  companies	  enjoying	  significant	  buyer	  power	  
Whereas	   the	   Commission	   generally	   mentions	   some	   companies’	   names	   as	   examples	   of	   powerful	  
customers,	   in	   some	   decisions,	   the	   firm(s)	  mentioned	   are	   considered	   as	   the	   only	   buyer(s)	   likely	   to	  
exercise	   countervailing	  buying	  power,	   even	   though	   the	   customer	  base	   is	   larger.	  Depending	  on	   the	  
number	  of	  smaller	  buyers	  acting	  besides	  those	  large	  companies,	  the	  Commission	  may	  decide	  that	  the	  
latter	  are	  able,	  by	  themselves,	  to	  mitigate	  the	  effects	  of	  a	  merger	  between	  suppliers.	  
a) Boeing/Airbus	  
The	   strong	  bargaining	   power	   of	   Boeing	   and	  Airbus,	   two	   aircraft	  manufacturers,	  was	   highlighted	   in	  
different	   cases.	   However,	   on	   basis	   of	   the	   product	   market	   and	   the	   corresponding	   client	   base,	   the	  
Commission	  considered	  such	  power	  as	  sufficient	  only	   in	  a	  few	  decisions.	   	  For	  examples,	  concerning	  
landing	  gear	  systems,	  those	  two	  constructors	  were	  recognized	  to	  exercise	  significant	  buyer	  power	  in	  
the	   procurement	   market	   due	   to	   their	   large	   share	   of	   purchases.275	   While	   in	   that	   product	   market,	  
Boeing	   and	   Airbus’	   buyer	   power	   was	   held	   to	   be	   sufficient	   to	   mitigate	   the	   increase	   in	   suppliers’	  
market	  power	  following	  the	  merger,	  the	  conclusion	  on	  that	  issue	  was	  different	  in	  other	  spare	  parts	  
markets	  where	  airlines	  were	  also	   included	   in	   the	  customer	  base.276	  Those	  buyers	  are	   indeed	  much	  
more	   fragmented	   and	   need	   to	   maintain	   a	   good	   commercial	   relationship	   with	   spare	   parts	  
manufacturers	  in	  order	  to	  have	  access	  to	  those	  products	  but	  also	  to	  the	  needed	  licences	  and	  repair	  
processes	  which	  imply	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  know-­‐how.277	  Given	  those	  elements,	  airlines	  are	  not	  likely	  or	  
willing	   to	  exert	   significant	  buyer	  power.	   The	  Commission	  held	   therefore	   that	   such	   larger	   customer	  
base,	   even	   though	   it	   included	   powerful	   aircraft	  manufacturers,	  was	   not	   able	   to	   exercise	   sufficient	  
countervailing	  power.	  
b) Tetra	  Pak	  
In	   two	   decisions,	   the	   Commission	   put	   the	   emphasis	   on	   the	   strong	  market	   power	   of	   another	   firm,	  
namely	   the	   multinational	   packaging	   company	   Tetra	   Pak.278	   	   On	   basis	   of	   this	   single	   competitive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275	  See	  :	  Snecma/TI,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.368,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  17	  January	  1994	  and	  Snecma/Messier	  Dowty,	  
Case	  No	  IV/M.1159,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  18	  June	  1998.	  Boeing	  and	  Airbus	  accounted	  for	  approximately	  
80%	  of	  all	  purchases	  of	  landing	  gear	  for	  civil	  application.	  See	  also:	  Precision	  Castparts/Titanium	  Metals,	  Case	  No	  
COMP/M.6765,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  19	  December	  2012.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  Commission	  considered	  that	  large	  
airframe	  manufacturers,	  such	  as	  Airbus	  and	  Boeing,	  were	  able	  to	  deploy	  effective	  and	  timely	  counter-­‐strategies	  
to	  prevent	  input	  foreclosure	  strategy	  by	  the	  merged	  entity.	  
276	  See	  :	  AlliedSignal/Honeywell,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.1601,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  1	  December	  1999	  and	  
General	  Electric/Honeywell,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.2220,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  3	  July	  2001.	  This	  decision	  was	  
confirmed	  by	  the	  General	  Court.	  See:	  T-­‐210/01,	  General	  Electric	  v	  Commission	  [2005]	  ECR	  II-­‐5575.	  
277	  General	  Electric/Honeywell,	  op.cit.,	  at	  228.	  
278	  Enso/Stora,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1225,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  25	  November	  1998	  and	  Korsnäs/AssiDomän	  
Cartonboard,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.4057,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  12	  May	  2006.	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constraint,	  mergers	   in	   the	   liquid	   packaging	   board	   (LPB)	  market	   were	   authorized,	   despite	   the	   very	  
high	  market	   share	  held	  by	   the	  new	  entity	   following	   the	   transactions	   in	  question.	   LPB	   is	  one	  of	   the	  
components	   used	   by	   Tetra	   Pak	   in	   its	   food	   packaging	   production.	   The	   considerable	   bargaining	  
strength	  of	  that	  company	  played	  a	  major	  role	   in	  the	  assessment	  of	  concentrations	  occurring	   in	  the	  
upstream	  market.	  
In	   1998,	   the	   Commission	   authorised	   a	   merger	   between	   suppliers	   of	   LPB	   (Enso	   and	   Stora)	   even	  
though	  those	  merging	  parties	  had	  a	  combined	  market	  share	  of	  more	  than	  60%,	  a	  position	  far	  ahead	  
of	   the	  other	  players	   in	   that	  market.	  The	  position	  of	   the	  merged	  entity	  was	  all	   the	  more	  significant	  
because	   barriers	   to	   entry	  were	   high	   and	   potential	   competition	  was	   limited.279	   	   The	   operation	  was	  
nevertheless	  cleared	  given	  the	  domination	  of	  Tetra	  Pak	  in	  the	  buying	  market	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  prevent	  
suppliers	  from	  increasing	  prices.	  The	  Commission	  considered	  that,	  after	  the	  merger,	  the	  structure	  of	  
the	  supply	  side	  would	  mirror	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  demand	  side	  of	  the	  market	  for	  LBP	  with	  one	  large	  
supplier	   (StoraEnso)	   and	   two	   smaller	   suppliers	   facing	   one	   large	  buyer	   (Tetra	   Pak)	   and	   two	   smaller	  
buyers.280	  The	  merging	  parties	  were	  in	  fact	  dependent	  on	  Tetra	  Pak	  which	  purchased	  more	  than	  50%	  
of	   their	   total	   output.	   In	   addition,	   the	   production	   of	   LPB	   was	   recognized	   to	   be	   a	   high	   fixed-­‐cost	  
industry	  where	  high	  rates	  of	  capacity	  utilization	  are	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  satisfactory	  levels	  
of	  profitability.	  The	   loss	  of	   such	  a	  customer	  would	   thus	  entail	   serious	   financial	   consequences	  since	  
finding	  other	  customers	  to	  fill	   the	  capacity	  would	  not	  be	  an	  easy	  task.281	   In	  view	  of	  those	  elements	  
and	  the	  possibility	  for	  Tetra	  Pak	  to	  develop	  alternative	  sources	  of	  supply,	   it	  was	  concluded	  that	  the	  
latter	  had	  sufficient	  countervailing	  buyer	  power	  to	  neutralize	  the	  potential	  increase	  in	  market	  power	  
of	  the	  merged	  entity.282	  
In	  2006,	   further	  consolidation	  was	  authorized	   in	   the	  market	  of	  LPB	  through	  a	  merger	  between	  the	  
second	  and	  third	  suppliers.	  The	  transaction	  resulted	  therefore	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  near	  duopoly	  with,	  
on	  the	  one	  hand,	  StoraEnso	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  new	  merged	  entity.283	  However,	  again,	  the	  
strong	   position	   of	   Tetra	   Pak	   on	   the	   demand	   side	   was	   highlighted	   and	   considered	   as	   sufficient	   to	  
counter	  any	  attempt	  by	  the	  merged	  entity	  and	  StoraEnso	  to	  increase	  prices.	  As	  already	  mentioned	  in	  
the	   previous	   decision,	   suppliers	   are	   dependent	   upon	   that	   powerful	   customer	   for	   a	   large	   share	   of	  
their	  respective	  sales	  and	  profitability	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  LBP	  activities.	  By	  contrast,	  Tetra	  Pak	  has	  the	  
ability	  to	  sponsor	  a	  new	  entry	  or	  to	  support	  an	  increase	  in	  capacity	  of	  an	  existing	  player	  as	  well	  as	  to	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  Enso/Stora,	  op.cit.,	  at	  74-­‐83.	  
280	  Ibid.,	  at	  84-­‐85.	  
281	  Ibid.,	  at	  90.	  
282	  Ibid.,	  at	  91-­‐92.	  
283	  Korsnäs/AssiDomän	  Cartonboard,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.4057,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  12	  May	  2006,	  at	  27-­‐30.	  On	  
that	  case,	  see:	  J.Karlsson,	  Clearance	  of	  near	  duopoly,	  9	  European	  Competition	  Law	  Review	  514	  (2006)	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play-­‐off	   the	  merged	  entity	  and	  StoraEnso	  against	  each	  other.284	   It	   is	  worth	  mentioning	   that,	   in	   this	  
decision,	  the	  Commission	  excluded	  the	  risk	  that	  the	  merged	  entity	  would	  discriminate	  against	  Tetra	  
Pak’s	  competitors.	  Where	  in	  some	  cases	  it	  was	  held	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  some	  powerful	  customers	  	  
was	  not	  sufficient	   to	  ensure	   the	  protection	  of	  smaller	  players	  against	  a	  potential	   increase	   in	  prices	  
post-­‐merger,	   the	   Commission	   maintained	   that,	   in	   this	   case,	   such	   discriminatory	   policy	   would	   be	  
counter-­‐productive	   in	  medium	  to	   long-­‐term	   for	  LPB	  suppliers.	   Imposing	  higher	  prices	  only	   to	  Tetra	  
Pak’s	  competitors	  would	  indeed	  put	  those	  customers	  at	  risk	  of	  being	  foreclosed	  from	  the	  market	  and	  
would	   in	   turn	   leave	   the	   LPB	   suppliers	   with	   Tetra	   Pak	   as	   a	   monopsonistic	   buyer.285	   Such	   situation	  
would	   worsen	   the	   merged	   entity’s	   bargaining	   position	   since	   the	   removal	   of	   the	   few	   existing	  
alternatives	  would	  make	  it	  totally	  dependent	  on	  Tetra	  Pak.	  
Even	   though	   Tetra	   Pak	   was	   not	   the	   only	   customer	   of	   the	   merging	   parties,	   the	   Commission	   thus	  
concluded	   that	   the	   firm’s	   buyer	   power	   was	   such	   that	   it	   could,	   by	   itself,	   constitute	   a	   sufficient	  
competitive	  constraint	  exerted	  on	  suppliers.	  Whatever	  the	  degree	  of	  market	  power	  held	  by	  the	  new	  
entity	   and	   the	   weaker	   position	   of	   other	   buyers,	   a	   single	   customer	   may	   therefore,	   in	   some	  
circumstances,	  be	  able	  to	  maintain	  effective	  competition	  in	  the	  upstream	  seller	  market.	  
c) Apple	  
While	   Apple	   was	   already	   mentioned	   as	   a	   powerful	   customer	   in	   the	   markets	   of	   electronic	  
components,	  the	  Commission	  also	  noted	  its	  strong	  buying	  power	  in	  a	  relatively	  new	  market,	  namely	  
the	   procurement	   market	   for	   recorded	  music	   in	   digital	   formats.286	   Apple’s	   online	   service	   iTunes	   is	  
indeed	   the	   leading	   digital	  music	   retailer	   and	   provides	   thus	   that	   company	  with	   a	   certain	   degree	   of	  
countervailing	  buyer	  power.	  That	  particular	  position	  of	  Apple	  was	  an	   important	  element	  taken	   into	  
consideration	  by	  the	  Commission	  when	  assessing	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  recorded	  music	  joint	  
venture,	  “Sony	  BMG”,	  jointly	  controlled	  by	  two	  major	  record	  companies.287	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  Ibid.,	  at	  46.	  
285	  Ibid.,	  at	  52.	  
286	  Sony/BMG,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.3333,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  3	  October	  2007.	  	  
287	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  Commission	  took	  a	  first	  clearance	  decision	  in	  2004.	  However,	  the	  independent	  record	  
companies	  and	  more	  specifically	  their	  industry	  association	  Impala	  brought	  an	  action	  before	  the	  Court	  of	  First	  
Instance	  against	  that	  decision,	  considering	  that	  the	  Commission	  had	  not	  assessed	  properly	  whether	  the	  merger	  
would	  create	  or	  strengthen	  a	  collective	  dominant	  position	  in	  the	  market	  for	  recorded	  music.	  In	  its	  judgment,	  
the	  Court	  found	  that	  the	  Commission	  had	  made	  manifest	  errors	  on	  its	  assessment	  and	  that	  there	  was	  
insufficient	  evidence	  for	  the	  Commission	  to	  clear	  the	  operation.	  (See:	  T-­‐464/04,	  Independent	  Music	  Publishers	  
and	  Labels	  Association	  (Impala,	  international	  association)	  v	  Commission	  [2006]	  ECR	  II-­‐2289)	  Consequently,	  it	  
annulled	  the	  decision.	  Sony	  and	  BGM	  had	  therefore	  to	  re-­‐notify	  their	  JV	  so	  that	  the	  Commission	  could	  re-­‐assess	  
the	  transaction.	  In	  its	  second	  assessment,	  the	  Commission	  took	  into	  consideration	  developments	  since	  2004	  
and,	  in	  particular,	  developments	  with	  regard	  to	  online	  music	  markets.	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That	   concentration	   took	   place	   in	   a	   context	   where	   the	   growth	   of	   the	   Internet	   and	   its	   related	  
technologies	  has	  been	   fundamentally	  changing	   the	  music	   industry.	   In	  view	  of	   the	  success	  of	  digital	  
music	   delivered	   online,	   record	   companies	   have	   digitized	   and	   licensed	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   their	  
catalogue	  to	  online	  music	  platforms	  that	  make	  music	  available	  to	  consumers	  through	  various	  means.	  
One	  particularity	  of	   the	  digital	  market	   is	   that,	  compared	  to	  the	  physical	  market,	   there	   is	  much	   less	  
price	   differentiation	   regarding	   genres,	   the	   release	   date,	   the	   popularity	   of	   an	   artist	   or	   the	   chart	  
success	  of	  a	  specific	  release.288	  In	  its	  market	  investigation,	  the	  Commission	  noted	  that,	  whilst	  the	  four	  
major	  record	  companies	  have	  repeatedly	  called	  for	  Apple	  to	  change	  its	  policy	  of	  charging	  a	  flat	  rate	  
of	  EUR	  0.99/song,	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  the	  prices	  for	  releases	  with	  high	  demand	  and	  vice	  versa,	  Apple	  
have	  resisted	  so	  far,	  saying	  that	  such	  pricing	  policy	  was	  crucial	   in	  helping	  the	  digital	  music	  business	  
take	   off.	   Apple	   is	   therefore	   not	   generating	   significant	   profits	   from	   its	   iTunes	   online	   music	   retail	  
business	   but	   its	   profit	   largely	   comes	   from	   the	   sale	   of	   iPods,	   PCs	   and	   related	   products.289	   The	  
successful	   maintenance	   of	   the	   “one	   size	   fits	   all”	   pricing	   model	   to	   end	   users	   through	   non-­‐
differentiated	  wholesale	  prices	  was	  considered	  as	  the	  indication	  that	  iTunes	  was	  effectively	  using	  its	  
buyer	  power	  against	  the	  record	  companies.290	  It	  appeared	  in	  fact	  that	  the	  strong	  demand	  position	  of	  
iTunes	   and	   its	   correlated	   strong	   negotiation	   power	   had	   a	   significant	   impact	   on	   those	   companies’	  
pricing	   structure	   decisions	   regarding	   the	   online	   download	   market.291	   Given	   those	   elements,	   the	  
Commission	  considered	  that	  the	  transaction	  was	  not	  likely	  to	  impede	  competition	  in	  the	  market	  for	  
recorded	  music	  in	  digital	  format,	  even	  though	  the	  recorded	  music	  industry	  was	  already	  concentrated	  
prior	  to	  the	  notification	  of	  the	  Sony/BMG	  merger.	  Countervailing	  buyer	  power	  of	  customers,	  and	  in	  
particular	   iTunes,	  was	  one	  of	   the	  main	   factors	   leading	   the	  Commission	   to	  exclude	  any	   risk	  of	   tacit	  
collusion	   between	   the	  major	   record	   companies.292	   The	   presence	   of	   such	   strong	   buyer	  was	   indeed	  
viewed	   as	   negatively	   affecting	   the	   ability	   to	   reach	   a	   coordinated	   effect.	   Representing	   a	   significant	  
portion	   of	   market	   demand,	   iTunes	   could	   easily	   offer	   firms	   incentives	   to	   deviate	   from	   a	   tacit	  
agreement	  and	  thus	  destabilize	  any	  potential	  coordination.293	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  Sony/BMG,	  op.cit.,	  at	  50.	  
289	  Ibid.,	  at	  71.	  That	  pricing	  policy	  is	  also	  likely	  to	  affect	  rivals	  in	  the	  digital	  music	  retail	  market.	  The	  Commission	  
noted	  that	  digital	  music	  retailers	  do	  not	  enjoy	  large	  profit	  margins	  at	  the	  current	  EUR	  0.99	  per	  track	  download	  
price.	  These	  retailers	  can	  therefore	  only	  remain	  long	  term	  viable	  players	  when	  they	  receive	  the	  input	  of	  the	  
record	  companies	  at	  terms	  below	  those	  charged	  to	  iTunes	  or	  when	  they	  sell	  digital	  music	  at	  a	  retail	  price	  above	  
that	  of	  iTunes.(at	  76)	  
290	  Ibid.,	  at	  146.	  
291	  Ibid.,	  at	  147.	  
292	  The	  issue	  of	  non-­‐coordinated	  effects	  was	  shortly	  addressed	  since	  Sony	  BMG’s	  market	  shares	  remained	  
below	  a	  level	  that	  could	  generally	  be	  considered	  as	  constituting	  a	  single	  dominant	  position	  in	  any	  of	  the	  
national	  markets.	  
293	  Sony/BMG,	  op.cit.,	  at	  146.	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We	   mentioned	   above	   that	   the	   degree	   of	   buyer	   power	   may	   be	   fluctuating	   over	   time	   due	   to	   the	  
changing	  characteristics	  of	  the	  market.	  This	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  in	  a	  sector	  like	  the	  current	  digital	  
music	   market.	   Indeed,	   in	   2012,	   the	   Commission	   drew	   a	   different	   conclusion	   with	   regard	   to	   the	  
existence	   of	   countervailing	   buyer	   power	   when	   assessing	   a	  merger	   reducing	   the	   four	  major	  music	  
publishers	  to	  three	  in	  the	  markets	  for	  the	  licensing	  of	  online	  rights.294	  It	  was	  noted	  that	  the	  customer	  
base	   on	   those	   markets	   is	   highly	   dynamic	   and	   that,	   since	   2007,	   besides	   Apple’s	   iTunes,	   different	  
online	  music	  platforms	  have	  been	   launched	  successfully,	   such	  as	   the	  streaming	  service	  Spotify	  and	  
Deezer.	  According	  to	  the	  Commission,	  the	  demand	  side	   is	  therefore	   less	  concentrated	  and	  includes	  
smaller	  buyers	  that	  are	  unlikely	  to	  countenance	  rate	   increases	  or	  worsening	  of	   licensing	  terms	  and	  
conditions	  by	  the	  merged	  entity.295	  In	  addition,	  different	  characteristics	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  
publishing	  companies	  and	  their	  customers	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  an	  exercise	  of	  the	  former’s	  market	  
power	   and	   thereby	   rule	   out	   the	   existence	   of	   sufficient	   countervailing	   power.	   For	   examples,	  
customers	  highlighted	  that	  they	  were	  forced	  to	  make	  non-­‐refundable	  advance	  payments	  and	  other	  
lump	  sum	  payments	  to	  music	  publishers	  and	  therefore	  to	  bear	  the	  business	  risk	  normally	  incurred	  by	  
the	   publishing	   companies.296	   All	   those	   elements	   are	   in	   fact	   counter-­‐indicative	   of	   online	   customers	  
exerting	   sufficient	   countervailing	  buyer	  power.	   The	  Commission	  hence	   concluded	   in	   that	   case	   that	  
online	  platforms	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  prevent	  the	  anticompetitive	  effects	  that	  would	  likely	  arise	  from	  
the	  proposed	  concentration.	  
In	   view	   of	   the	   rapid	   developments	   occurring	   in	   the	   digital	  music	  markets,	   it	   is	   inevitable	   that	   the	  
players,	  their	  bargaining	  strength	  and	  the	  characteristics	  of	  that	  sector	  sector	  will	  still	  evolve	  further	  
in	  the	  future.	  
F. CONCLUSIVE	  REMARKS	  
The	   emphasis	   put	   on	   the	   selected	   sectors	   reflects	   the	   high	   number	   of	   merger	   cases	   occurring	   in	  
those	   industries	   which	   lead	   the	   Commission	   to	   frequently	   assess	   the	   bargaining	   strength	   of	   the	  
respective	   client-­‐base.	   This	   does	   definitely	   not	   exclude	   the	   exercise	   of	   significant	   buyer	   power	   in	  
other	  sectors	  or	  by	  other	  customers	  not	  analysed	  in	  this	  paper.	  However,	   it	  may	  be	  suggested	  that	  
the	  high	  number	  of	  mergers	  among	  suppliers	  of	  a	  same	  customer	  category	  is	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  strong	  
bargaining	   power	   of	   the	   latter.	   Even	   though	   different	   reasons	   may	   justify	   a	   concentration,	   the	  
presence	  of	  powerful	  buyers,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  car	  industry,	  may	  be	  a	  strong	  incentive	  for	  suppliers	  to	  
merge.	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  Sony/Mubadala	  Development/EMI	  Music	  Publishing,	  Case	  No	  OMP/M.6459,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  19	  
April	  2012.	  
295	  Ibid.,	  at	  251.	  
296	  Ibid.,	  at	  252.	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In	  the	  different	  decisions,	  some	  factors	  were	  repetitively	  mentioned	  as	  sources	  of	  buyer	  power.	  If	  the	  
bidding	   nature	   of	   the	   procurement	   procedures	   used	   by	   some	   customers	   has	   been	   recognized	   as	  
enhancing	   the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power,	   the	  decisive	  element	   in	   the	  Commission	  assessment	   is	   the	  
availability	  of	   alternative	   sources	  of	   supply.	   Even	  a	  monopsonist,	   as	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Defence	  when	  
buying	  military	  equipment,	  would	  be	  indeed	  deprived	  of	  its	  bargaining	  strength	  if	  it	  could	  not	  threat	  
to	   switch	   to	   another	   supplier.	   This	   confirms	   hence	   the	   theoretical	   examination	   of	   buyer	   power	  
carried	   out	   in	   Chapter	   1	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   factors	   giving	   buyers	   significant	  market	   power	   in	   the	  
upstream	  procurement	  market.	  	  
Recognition	  of	  buyer	  power	  in	  a	  particular	  merger	  decision	  cannot	  be	  taken	  for	  granted	  in	  the	  future,	  
even	  if	  the	  new	  transaction	  takes	  place	  in	  similar	  circumstances.	  The	  perpetual	  change	  occurring	  in	  a	  
product	  market	   implies	   that	  market	   power	   of	   the	   different	   actors	   is	   not	   frozen	   data	   but	   likely	   to	  
evolve,	   especially	   in	   new	   technological	   markets.	   This	   notion	   is	   thus	   not	   immutable	   and	  may	   vary	  
depending	  on	  different	  factors.	  
Firstly,	  the	  position	  of	  the	  players	  on	  the	  buying	  and	  on	  the	  selling	  side	  and,	  in	  particular,	  the	  level	  of	  
concentration	   in	   the	   different	  markets,	   play	   a	  major	   role	   in	   the	   assessment	   of	   buyer	   power.	   It	   is	  
therefore	   important	   to	  determine	  rightly	   the	  customer-­‐base,	   its	  degree	  of	  concentration	  as	  well	  as	  
the	   number	   of	   alternatives	   available	   in	   the	   procurement	   market.	   For	   example,	   since	   car	  
manufacturers	  are	  generally	  more	  concentrated	  than	  independent	  resellers,	  the	  former	  can	  exercise	  
a	  stronger	  bargaining	  strength	  on	  their	  suppliers.	  A	  similar	  difference	  in	  buyer	  power	  has	  been	  noted	  
between	  the	  national	  railway	  operator	  and	  the	  local	  transport	  companies.	  
Secondly,	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  buyers	  and	  suppliers	  may	  vary	  from	  one	  product	  to	  another	  
due	  to	  the	  different	  characteristics	  of	  each	  product	  or	  geographic	  market.	  The	  level	  of	  brand	  loyalty	  
for	   a	   particular	   consumer	   good	   and	   the	   correlated	  presence	  of	   private	   labels	   in	   that	  market	   is	   for	  
example	  determinant	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  retailers’	  buyer	  power.	  Between	  the	  same	  customers	  and	  
suppliers,	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  may	  therefore	  tilts	   in	  favour	  of	  one	  or	  the	  other	  depending	  on	  the	  
characteristics	  of	  the	  product	  in	  question	  and	  consumer	  preferences	  with	  regard	  to	  that	  product.	  
Thirdly,	  buyer	  power	  of	  customers	  is	  not	  homogeneous	  within	  the	  European	  Union.	  	  The	  definition	  of	  
the	  relevant	  geographic	  market	  may	  therefore	  influence	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  degree	  of	  countervailing	  
power	  in	  a	  particular	  product	  market.	  The	  level	  of	  concentration	  on	  the	  buying	  side,	  consumer	  habits	  
or	   a	   different	   organization	   of	   the	   market	   in	   question	   constitute	   some	   of	   the	   elements	   likely	   to	  
influence	  the	  negotiation	  strength	  of	  each	  player.	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The	  high	  degree	  of	  countervailing	  buyer	  power	  recognized	  in	  merger	  decisions	  shows	  that	  powerful	  
buyers	  are	  likely	  to	  influence	  competition	  on	  the	  markets.	  They	  are	  indeed	  in	  a	  position	  to	  mitigate	  
or	   even	   to	   neutralize	   a	   significant	   increase	   in	   market	   power	   occurring	   in	   the	   upstream	   market	  
through	  a	  merger.	  That	  ability	  of	  customers	   to	  prevent	  a	  merged	  entity	   -­‐	  holding	  sometimes	  much	  
more	  than	  50%	  of	  market	  share	   -­‐	   from	   increasing	  prices	  post-­‐merger	  or	   from	  tacitly	  colluding	  with	  
other	   suppliers,	   attests	   of	   the	   degree	   of	   their	   power.	   So	   far,	   such	   strength	   has	   been	   mainly	  
considered	  as	  a	  positive	  competitive	  constraint	   in	  merger	  decisions.	   It	   remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  
the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  is	  always	  promoting	  effective	  competition	  on	  the	  markets.	  
	  
SECTION	  II	  –	  FOCUS	  ON	  BUYER	  POWER	  IN	  THE	  RETAIL	  AND	  PROCESSING	  INDUSTRY	  
A	  good	  illustration	  of	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  market	  power	  occurs	  in	  the	  consumer	  goods	  retail	  sector	  
where	  supermarket	  chains	  are	  becoming	  highly	  concentrated.	  Facing,	  in	  many	  product	  categories,	  a	  
larger	  number	  of	  dispersed	  sellers,	  those	  actors	  enjoy	  generally	  a	  much	  stronger	  bargaining	  power	  in	  
the	  negotiations	  with	  their	  suppliers.	  As	  a	  result,	  large	  retail	  chains	  are	  able	  to	  extract	  lower	  prices	  or	  
other	   favourable	   terms	   from	   their	   suppliers.	   While	   it	   is	   commonly	   admitted	   that	   the	   exercise	   of	  
buyer	   power	   in	   the	   retail	   sector	   may	   lead	   to	   unfair	   trading	   practices,	   uncertainties	   arise	   as	   to	  
whether	   this	   may	   also	   impair	   undistorted	   competition	   on	   the	   markets.	   As	   the	   presence	   of	   big	  
supermarkets	   generally	   leads	   to	   lower	   prices	   for	   consumers,	   competition	   authorities	   tend	   to	  
categorize	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  as	  harmless	  or	  even	  procompetitive	  conduct.	  However,	   the	  
erosion	   of	   competition	   in	   the	   upstream	   markets	   and	   the	   use	   of	   some	   practices	   detrimental	   to	  
suppliers	  and	  smaller	  retailers	  might,	  in	  the	  long-­‐term,	  affect	  consumers	  as	  well.	  
A. SUPERMARKETS’	  BUYER	  POWER	  
Due	  in	  particular	  to	  their	  size	  and	  their	  role	  of	  gatekeeper,	  big-­‐box	  stores	  enjoy	  a	  significant	  degree	  
of	  market	  power	  in	  the	  input	  markets.	  Their	  strong	  bargaining	  position	  enables	  them	  to	  extract	  lower	  
prices	   and	   other	   concessions	   from	   their	   suppliers	   but	   also	   to	   put	   their	   rivals	   at	   a	   competitive	  
disadvantage	  both	  in	  the	  upstream	  and	  in	  the	  downstream	  markets.	  
1. Development	  of	  large	  chain	  stores	  in	  the	  EU	  
The	  consumer	  goods	  retail	  sector	  has	  been	  constantly	  changing	  for	  the	  last	  decades	  in	  the	  European	  
Union.	  A	  process	  of	  concentration	  of	  distributors	  has	  led	  to	  a	  situation	  where	  a	  small	  number	  of	  large	  
supermarket	  chains	  dominate	  the	  market,	  often	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  local	  and	  specialized	  retailers.	  In	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some	  Member	  States,	  the	  top	  2	  or	  3	  retail	  stores	  may	  account	  for	  more	  than	  75%	  of	  the	  market.297	  
Owning	   large	   stores	   as	  well	   as	   smaller	   convenience	   stores298,	   these	   big	   retail	   chains	   influence	   the	  
lives	  of	  all	  consumers	  and	  the	  business	  activities	  of	  other	  market	  participants	  in	  the	  supply	  chain.	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	   increasing	  concentration	  of	   that	  sector,	  different	   factors	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  
emergence	  of	  supermarkets’	  buyer	  power.	  Firstly,	   the	   large	  market	  share	  held	  by	  a	  few	  retailers	   in	  
the	   downstream	  market	   gives	   rise	   to	   a	   gatekeeper	   effect.	   In	   order	   to	   have	   access	   to	   a	   sufficient	  
number	   of	   consumers,	   it	   is	   all	   but	   vital	   for	   producers	   to	   guarantee	   shelf	   space	   in	   those	   market	  
leaders’	   outlets.	   	   Control	   over	   access	   to	   end-­‐users	   turns	   thus	   big-­‐box	   stores	   into	   unavoidable	  
business	  partners	   for	  any	   supplier	  willing	   to	  efficiently	  market	   their	  products	   through	  a	   large	   scale	  
distribution	  channel.	  Secondly,	  the	  high	  barriers	  to	  entry	  existing	  in	  the	  retail	  sector	  make	  the	  threat	  
of	   new	   entrants	   unlikely.	   Besides	   the	   significant	   investment	   needed	   to	   open	   a	   supermarket,	  
regulatory	   and	   administrative	   barriers	   are	   present	   in	  many	  Member	   States,	   impeding	   the	   entry	   of	  
potential	   competitors.	  To	  name	  but	  a	   few,	   those	   restrictions	  may	   include	  planning	   laws	  or	  ex-­‐ante	  
authorization	  required	  for	  the	  opening	  or	  extension	  of	  retail	  stores.299	  Thirdly,	  the	  creation	  of	  buying	  
alliances	  among	  retailers,	  such	  as	  central	  buying	  agencies	  in	  France,	  or	  other	  centralized	  purchasing	  
systems	  reduces	  the	  number	  of	  alternatives	  available	  to	  suppliers	  to	  sell	  their	  products	  and	  thereby	  
increases	   buyers’	   market	   power.	   Through	   the	   purchases	   of	   a	   large	   share	   of	   a	   supplier’s	   outputs,	  
buying	   groups	   make	   the	   latter	   highly	   dependent	   on	   them.	   Fourthly,	   the	   increasing	  
internationalization	  of	  economic	  activities	  gives	  retailers	  the	  opportunity	  to	  source	  globally,	  enlarging	  
their	  outside	  options	  and	  thereby	  increasing	  their	  market	  power	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  local	  producers.300	  Finally,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297	  There	  are	  significant	  differences	  in	  concentration	  ratios	  among	  the	  different	  Member	  States.	  For	  example,	  
the	  UK	  top	  retailers	  have	  a	  combined	  market	  share	  of	  65%	  in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market,	  the	  Dutch	  top	  3	  of	  
83%	  and	  the	  Finish	  top	  2	  of	  75%,	  while	  in	  other	  Member	  States	  the	  retail	  sector	  is	  more	  atomized,	  as	  in	  
Romania	  where	  the	  top	  10	  retailers	  account	  only	  for	  19%	  of	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market.	  See:	  Commission	  
Staff	  working	  document,	  Competition	  in	  the	  food	  supply	  chain,	  SEC(2009)	  1449,	  at	  8.	  
298	  Many	  independent	  convenience	  stores	  have	  been	  bought	  out	  by	  large	  retail	  chains	  or	  are	  in	  fact	  controlled	  
by	  the	  latter	  through	  franchising.	  Franchise	  stores	  can	  (or	  are	  forced	  to)	  buy	  all	  or	  an	  important	  part	  of	  their	  
merchandise	  through	  a	  centralized	  purchasing	  system	  that	  the	  franchisor	  administers	  or	  participates	  in	  so	  that	  
those	  smaller	  shops	  also	  benefit	  indirectly	  from	  large	  supermarkets	  chains’	  buyer	  power.	  
299	  See:	  OECD,	  Land	  use	  restrictions	  as	  barriers	  to	  entry,	  Policy	  Roundtables,	  DAF/COMP(2008)25,	  28	  November	  
2008,	  available	  at:	  
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/abuseofdominanceandmonopolisation/41763060.pdf	  ;	  The	  retail	  
planning	  system	  as	  applied	  to	  the	  grocery	  sector:	  2001-­‐2007,	  Grocery	  monitor:	  Report	  No	  3,	  The	  (Irish)	  
Competition	  Authority,	  July	  2008,	  available	  at:	  
http://www.tca.ie/images/uploaded/documents/grocery_monitor_report_3.pdf	  ;	  Avis	  n°	  10-­‐A-­‐26	  du	  7	  
décembre	  2010	  relatif	  aux	  contrats	  d’affiliation	  de	  magasins	  indépendants	  et	  les	  modalités	  d’acquisition	  de	  
foncier	  commercial	  dans	  le	  secteur	  de	  la	  distribution	  alimentaire,	  Autorité	  (française)	  de	  la	  Concurrence.	  
300	  While	  imports	  concern	  mainly	  non-­‐food	  items,	  it	  appears	  that	  retailers	  are	  also	  turning,	  yet	  to	  a	  lesser	  
extent,	  to	  global	  markets	  for	  the	  purchase	  of	  food	  products.	  However,	  only	  large	  retailers	  have	  sufficient	  
resources	  to	  source	  directly	  from	  foreign	  manufacturers	  due	  to	  the	  high	  costs	  required	  to	  establish	  and	  enforce	  
contracts	  abroad	  as	  well	  as	  to	  make	  sure	  those	  producers	  comply	  with	  product	  and	  process	  standards	  in	  the	  
importing	  country.	  See:	  H.K.Nordas,	  M.Geloso	  Grosso	  &	  E.Pinali,	  Market	  Structure	  in	  the	  Distribution	  Sector	  and	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the	  growing	  presence	  and	  success	  of	  own-­‐label	  products	  on	  the	  shelves	  reinforces	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  
supermarkets’	  buyer	  power.	  This	  last	  issue	  will	  be	  further	  developed	  below.	  
It	  is	  undeniable	  that	  consolidation	  in	  the	  retail	  sector	  has	  entailed	  economic	  advantages	  for	  retailers	  
and	  greater	   convenience	   for	   consumers	  with	   the	  development	  of	  one-­‐stop	   shops	  offering	   loads	  of	  
different	  products.301	  Thanks	  to	  their	  size,	  supermarkets	  have	  been	  able	  to	  make	  heavy	   investment	  
leading	   to	   economies	   of	   scale	   and	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   sophisticated	   and	   efficient	   distribution	  
networks.302	   Nevertheless,	   the	   report	   of	   these	   changes	   is	   not	   all	   roses	   and	   includes	   competitive	  
concerns	  as	  well.	   Indeed,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  that	  concentration,	  the	  number	  of	  traditional	  and	  specialist	  
retailers,	  constituting	  competitive	  forces,	  has	  been	  sharply	  declining,	  leading	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  both	  
an	  oligopolistic	  market	  on	  the	  selling	  retail	  side	  and	  an	  oligopsonistic	  market	  on	  the	  buying	  side.	  With	  
regard	   to	   the	   latter,	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   by	   large	   retailers	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   their	   suppliers	   is	   a	  
controversial	   issue	  which	  has	  raised	  debates	  concerning	  the	  effects	  of	  such	  power	  on	  the	  markets.	  
While	  some	  consider	  that	  pressuring	  on	  suppliers	  leads	  to	  considerable	  benefits	  for	  end	  consumers,	  
others	  view	  supermarkets’	  practices	  as	  a	  cause	  of	  competitive	  distortions	  which	  is	  likely	  to	  affect	  not	  
only	  the	  price	  but	  also	  the	  quality	  and	  variety	  of	  products	  available	  on	  the	  shelves.	  
The	  EU	  Institutions	  and	  Member	  States	  are	  not	  remaining	  insensitive	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  buyer	  power.	  In	  
2008,	  in	  a	  written	  declaration,	  the	  European	  Parliament	  expressed	  concerns	  about	  abuse	  of	  power	  by	  
large	   supermarkets	   and	   called	   upon	   the	   Commission	   to	   investigate	   the	   impact	   that	   retail	  
concentration	  is	  having	  on	  the	  different	  market	  participants	  and	  to	  propose	  appropriate	  measures	  to	  
protect	   consumers	   but	   also	   producers	   from	   any	   abuse	   in	   that	   sector.303	   At	   the	   national	   level,	   a	  
significant	  number	  of	  sector	  inquiries	  have	  been	  carried	  out,	  especially	  in	  the	  food	  industry.304	  Those	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Merchandise	  trade,	  OECD	  Trade	  Policy	  Working	  Papers	  No.68	  (2008),	  at	  18.	  Actually,	  imports	  of	  food	  products	  
are	  more	  likely	  when	  the	  retailer	  is	  established	  in	  the	  foreign	  country.	  As	  such,	  suppliers	  in	  the	  host	  country	  
may	  be	  given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  export	  their	  products	  to	  the	  retailer’s	  home	  country.	  (at	  31)	  The	  reasons	  why	  
food	  products	  are	  generally	  sourced	  locally	  may	  be	  that	  food	  is	  perishable	  and	  that	  those	  products	  are	  more	  
likely	  to	  be	  replenished	  every	  day.	  In	  addition,	  consumer	  tastes	  generally	  vary	  from	  one	  place	  to	  another	  for	  
food	  than	  non-­‐food	  products.	  (at	  25)	  
301	  One-­‐stop	  shops	  refer	  to	  stores	  offering	  the	  shopper	  a	  very	  large	  number	  of	  product	  categories	  ranging	  from	  
food	  and	  general	  household	  or	  garden	  items	  ,	  to	  health/beauty	  products,	  clothes,	  books,	  toys	  or	  electrical	  
appliances.	  	  
302	  P.W.Dobson,	  Retailer	  Buyer	  Power	  in	  European	  Markets	  :	  Lessons	  from	  grocery	  supply,	  Business	  School	  
Research	  Series	  Paper,	  2002,	  at	  4.	  
303	  Written	  declaration	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  on	  investigating	  and	  remedying	  the	  abuse	  of	  power	  by	  large	  
supermarkets	  operating	  in	  the	  EU,	  DCL-­‐0088/2007,	  February	  2008.	  On	  the	  different	  declarations	  of	  the	  EU	  
Parliament	  on	  that	  matter	  and	  other	  actions	  taken	  at	  EU	  level	  to	  investigate	  the	  degree	  of	  competition	  in	  the	  
food	  supply	  chain,	  see	  Part	  III,	  Chapter	  2,	  Section	  I,	  Point	  A.	  
304	  Details	  on	  the	  various	  sector	  inquiries	  carried	  out	  by	  national	  authorities	  may	  be	  found	  in	  a	  report	  of	  the	  
European	  Competition	  Network.	  See:	  ECN	  activities	  in	  the	  food	  sector	  –	  Report	  on	  competition	  law	  enforcement	  
and	  market	  monitoring	  activities	  by	  European	  competition	  authorities	  in	  the	  food	  sector,	  ECN	  subgroup	  food,	  
may	  2012,	  at	  92-­‐136,	  available	  at:	  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/food_report_en.pdf	  As	  the	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monitoring	   investigations	   have	   looked	   at	   various	   issues.	   Some	   of	   them	   have	   examined	   the	  
functioning	  of	   the	   food	   supply	   chain	   as	   a	  whole	  while	   others	   have	   focused	  on	   specific	   agricultural	  
products.	  	  Most	  actions	  however	  have	  been	  concentrated	  on	  the	  multi-­‐product	  retail	  sector.	  Among	  
the	  recurrent	  issues	  dealt	  with	  by	  national	  competition	  authorities	  (NCAs)	  in	  their	  market	  monitoring	  
investigations,	  priority	  has	  been	  given	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  consolidation	  and	  the	  use	  of	  alleged	  abusive	  
practices	   linked	   to	   imbalances	  of	   bargaining	  power	  between	  market	  participants.	   	   The	   conclusions	  
drawn	  on	  that	  matter	  in	  the	  resulting	  reports	  were,	  however,	  not	  unanimous.	  	  Some	  NCAs	  consider	  
that	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  implies	  no	  harm	  for	  consumers	  and	  may	  even	  bring	  positive	  effects	  
if	   competition	   among	   retailers	   in	   the	   downstream	   markets	   leads	   buyers	   to	   pass	   on	   the	   lower	  
purchasing	   costs	   to	   end-­‐users.305	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   established	   consumer	   injury,	   the	   practices	   in	  
question	  can	  consequently	  not	  be	  qualified	  as	  anticompetitive.	  From	  that	  approach,	   instead	  of	   the	  
EU	  or	  national	  competition	  rules,	  other	  instruments	  should	  therefore	  be	  enforced	  to	  tackle	  this	  issue	  
such	  as	   the	  enactment	  of	   laws	  against	  unfair	   trading	  practices	  or	   the	   implementation	  of	  a	   code	  of	  
conduct.	   In	   contrast,	   other	  NCAs	  point	  out	   that	   some	   commercial	   practices	  used	  by	   large	   retailers	  
may	   ultimately	   have	   a	   detrimental	   effect	   on	   the	   competitive	   process	   and	   on	   consumers	   by	  
decreasing	  suppliers’	  incentives	  to	  invest	  or	  innovate	  and	  thereby	  affecting	  consumer	  choice.306	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Commission,	  many	  NCAs	  have	  the	  powers	  to	  conduct	  sector	  inquiries	  when	  circumstances	  suggest	  that	  
competition	  may	  be	  restricted	  or	  distorted.	  In	  addition,	  NCAs	  may	  also	  conduct	  market	  monitoring	  
investigations	  to	  enable	  them	  to	  provide	  opinions	  on	  legislative	  projects	  which	  may	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  
competition	  conditions	  on	  markets.	  In	  total,	  since	  2004,	  25	  NCAs	  have	  carried	  out	  103	  market	  monitoring	  
actions.	  A	  large	  number	  of	  NCAs	  have	  paid	  greater	  attention	  to	  the	  food	  retail	  sector	  where	  36	  market	  
monitoring	  actions	  are	  reported	  in	  Austria,	  Bulgaria	  (3),	  Belgium,	  Czech	  Republic,	  Denmark,	  Finland,	  France	  (5),	  
Germany,	  Ireland	  (4),	  Italy,	  Lithuania	  (3),	  Norway,	  Poland	  (2),	  Portugal	  (3),	  Romania,	  Slovakia,	  Slovenia,	  Spain	  
(3),	  Sweden	  and	  UK.	  
305	  For	  examples,	  the	  report	  of	  the	  Portuguese	  NCA	  on	  buyer	  power	  and	  pass	  through	  revealed	  that	  lower	  
prices	  paid	  to	  suppliers	  tended	  to	  be	  partially	  passed	  on	  to	  final	  consumer	  in	  terms	  of	  lower	  retail	  prices	  and	  
did	  not	  raise	  competition	  concerns	  on	  that	  matter.	  The	  Romanian	  NCA	  came	  to	  similar	  conclusions	  concerning	  
the	  effects	  of	  buyer	  power	  and	  considered	  that	  unfair	  trading	  practices	  should	  be	  tackled	  under	  commercial	  
law	  rather	  than	  competition	  law.	  It	  is	  worth	  yet	  noting	  that	  the	  degree	  of	  concentration	  in	  the	  Romanian	  
grocery	  sector	  is	  relatively	  low	  so	  that	  retailers	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  pass	  on	  the	  benefits	  obtained	  from	  suppliers	  
to	  consumers.	  Concerning	  the	  increasing	  use	  of	  own-­‐label	  products	  by	  retailers,	  NCAs	  consider	  that	  it	  is	  a	  factor	  
to	  take	  into	  account	  when	  examining	  buyer	  power.	  However,	  the	  Austrian	  NCA	  for	  example	  concluded	  that	  
private	  effects	  had	  no	  adverse	  effect	  on	  consumers	  in	  terms	  of	  price	  competition.	  
306	  For	  examples,	  the	  UK	  NCA	  found	  that	  buyer	  power	  can	  have	  positive	  effects	  in	  terms	  of	  lower	  retail	  prices	  
for	  consumers	  but	  nevertheless	  considered	  that	  when	  retailers	  transferred	  excessive	  risks	  or	  unexpected	  costs	  
to	  suppliers,	  the	  latter	  were	  less	  incited	  to	  invest	  in	  new	  capacity,	  products	  and	  production	  processes.	  
Consequently,	  those	  practices	  could	  ultimately	  have	  a	  detrimental	  impact	  on	  consumers.	  The	  Spanish	  report	  on	  
the	  relations	  between	  manufacturers	  and	  retailers	  in	  the	  food	  sector	  also	  highlighted	  that	  buyer	  power	  may	  
have	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  competition	  among	  manufacturers	  and	  among	  retailers	  in	  the	  medium	  and	  long-­‐term	  
and	  may	  stifle	  innovation	  in	  the	  food	  industry.	  As	  regards	  commercial	  payments	  from	  suppliers	  to	  retailers,	  the	  
Norwegian	  NCA	  pointed	  out	  that	  certain	  types	  of	  fees	  and	  payments	  may	  have,	  in	  some	  cases	  and	  in	  
conjunction	  with	  other	  arrangements,	  foreclosure	  effects.	  On	  that	  matter,	  the	  Finnish	  NCA	  found	  that	  slotting	  
fees	  may	  lead	  suppliers	  to	  increase	  prices	  and	  reduce	  innovation.	  Concerning	  private	  labels,	  the	  Spanish	  NCA	  
recognized	  that,	  in	  the	  short	  term,	  those	  products	  can	  entail	  positive	  effects	  for	  consumers.	  However,	  it	  also	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Despite	   the	  different	   investigations	   carried	  out	   in	   the	  European	  Union,	   the	  debate	  on	   the	  positive	  
versus	   negative	   effects	   of	   buyer	   power	   is	   thus	   still	   open.	  We	   cannot	   but	   admit	   that	   the	   different	  
practices	  used	  in	  the	  retail	  sector	  may	  benefit	  consumers,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  short	  term,	  if	  we	  consider,	  
as	  the	  Commission	  does,	  that	  fierce	  competition	  still	  exist	  between	  the	  few	  large	  retail	  chains	  in	  most	  
geographical	  markets.	  However,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  long-­‐term	  impact	  of	  those	  practices,	  there	  is	  less	  
certainty.	  	  
2. Common	  practices	  in	  the	  retail	  sector	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  their	  superior	  bargaining	  power,	  large	  retailers	  are	  able	  to	  impose	  buying	  conditions	  to	  
their	   advantage	   on	  most	   of	   their	   suppliers.	   However,	   such	   buyer	   power	  may	   be	   weakened	  when	  
negotiations	   occur	   with	   large	   multinational	   suppliers	   which	   produce	   “must-­‐carry”	   brands	   such	   as	  
Kellog’s	  or	  Coca-­‐Cola.307	  The	  presence	  of	  those	  brands	  is	   indeed	  one	  of	  the	  sine	  qua	  non	  conditions	  
for	   attracting	   consumers	   in	   the	   retailer’s	   premises.308	   It	  may	   hence	   be	   assumed	   that	   the	   resulting	  
interdependence	  between	  buyers	  and	  sellers	  leads	  to	  a	  more	  balanced	  business	  relationship.	  In	  such	  
a	   situation	  of	  bilateral	  market	  power,	   the	  presence	  of	   large	  buyers	   is	  more	   likely	   to	  entail	  positive	  
effects	  on	  the	  markets,	  provided	  that	  the	  downstream	  market	  is	  competitive.	  It	  may	  indeed	  prevent	  
powerful	   producers	   from	   imposing	   prices	   above	   the	   competitive	   level	   or	   other	   selling	   conditions	  
which	   turn	   out	   to	   be	   harmful	   to	   final	   consumers.	   Retailers	   are	   nonetheless	   not	   deprived	   of	   any	  
weapon	   in	   their	   negotiations	   with	   must-­‐carry	   brands	   manufacturers	   who	   may	   be	   only	   partially	  
insulated	   from	   retailer	   coercion.309	   As	   the	   latter	   generally	   also	   produce	   lesser-­‐known	   brands,	   the	  
buyer	  may	  use	  its	  stronger	  bargaining	  power	  with	  regard	  to	  those	  products	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  leverage	  
in	  negotiations	  related	  to	  the	  purchasing	  of	  must-­‐carry	  brands.	  The	  prevalence	  of	  either	  buyer	  power	  
or	   seller	  power	  will	  depend	  on	  various	   circumstances	  and,	   in	  particular,	  on	   the	   relative	  number	  of	  
alternatives	   available	   to	   each	   party.	   The	   practices	   described	   below	   may	   probably	   be	   more	  
successfully	  used	  against	  small	  and	  medium	  sized	  enterprises	  (SMEs)	  which	  are	  active	  in	  a	  significant	  
number	  in	  the	  processing	  sector.310	  It	  is	  specifically	  with	  regard	  to	  suppliers	  with	  little	  market	  power	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
pointed	  out	  that,	  in	  the	  long-­‐term,	  own-­‐brand	  products	  may	  reduce	  inter-­‐brand	  competition	  due	  to	  elimination	  
of	  secondary	  brands	  of	  manufacturers.	  
307Commission	  Staff	  working	  document,	  Competition	  in	  the	  food	  supply	  chain,	  SEC(2009)	  1449,	  at	  7.	  
308	  This	  argument	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  hard-­‐discount	  retailers	  such	  as	  Aldi	  or	  Lidl	  which	  generally	  offer	  a	  limited	  
assortment	  of	  products	  and	  focus	  mainly	  or	  only	  on	  own-­‐label	  products.	  
309	  P.C.CARSTENSEN,	  Buyer	  Power,	  Competition	  Policy,	  and	  Antitrust	  :	  The	  Competitive	  effects	  of	  discrimination	  
among	  suppliers,	  53	  The	  Antitrust	  Bulletin	  271,	  at	  292	  (2008)	  
310	  SMEs	  represent	  approximately	  99%	  of	  all	  enterprises	  active	  in	  the	  food	  supply	  chain.	  Creating	  almost	  48%	  of	  
the	  total	  value-­‐added	  in	  the	  sector,	  they	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  promoting	  growth	  and	  diversity	  of	  food	  and	  drink	  
products.	  See:	  Report	  on	  the	  Competitiveness	  of	  the	  European	  Agro-­‐Food	  Industry,	  High	  level	  Group	  on	  the	  
Competitiveness	  of	  the	  Agro-­‐Food	  Industry,	  17	  March	  2009,	  at	  38,	  available	  at:	  
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/food/files/high_level_group_2008/documents_hlg/final_report_hlg_1
7_03_09_en.pdf	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that	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   is	   likely	   to	   lead	   to	   a	   systematic	   and	   significant	   imbalance	   in	   the	  
parties’	  bargaining	  power.	  
a) Low	  prices	  and	  non-­‐cost	  related	  discounts	  
Reduced	   prices	   obtained	   by	   large	   retailers	   which	   are	   justified	   by	   the	   size	   of	   purchases	   and	   the	  
exploitation	  of	  economies	  of	  scale	  and	  scope	  do	  not	  raise	  policy	  concerns.	  Even	  though	  that	  leads	  to	  
differences	   in	  prices	  with	  regard	  to	  smaller	  purchasers,	   this	   is	  part	  of	  normal	  business	  practice	  and	  
generally	  benefits	  both	  parties	  as	  well	  as	  consumers.311	  The	  huge	  volumes	  bought	  and	  sold	  by	  big-­‐
box	  stores	  may	  indeed	  create	  economies	  of	  scale	  for	  the	  supplier,	   leading	  to	  a	  decrease	  in	  per-­‐unit	  
production	  cost.	  The	  problem	  arises	  when	  efficiency	  gains	  have	  been	  exhausted	  but	  the	  retailer	  still	  
requires	  that	  the	  price	  be	  further	  reduced.312	  Due	  to	  their	  market	  power,	  some	  supermarkets	  are	  in	  
fact	  able	  to	  extract	  non-­‐cost	  related	  discounts	  from	  their	  suppliers	  and	  to	   impose	  prices	  below	  the	  
competitive	  level.	  It	  is	  also	  not	  unusual	  that	  retailers	  unilaterally	  impose	  extra	  discounts	  or	  after-­‐sale	  
rebates	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year	  on	  basis	  of	  the	  total	  sales	  made	  from	  the	  supplier’s	  products	  during	  
that	   year.	   In	  most	   cases,	   this	   is	   done	   in	   a	  non-­‐transparent	  way	  without	   any	  negotiation	   through	  a	  
reduction	  of	  the	  total	  sum	  owned	  to	  the	  supplier.313	  The	  demand	  for	  very	  low	  prices,	  deep	  discounts	  
and	   other	   retro-­‐active	   payments	   erodes	   profit	   margins	   of	   suppliers	   and	   precludes	   them	   from	  
anticipating	  the	  amount	  of	  financial	  means	  that	  will	  be	  available	  for	  investment.314	  On	  a	  short-­‐term	  
consumer	  welfare	  basis,	   those	  advantageous	  financial	  conditions	  obtained	  by	   large	  retailers	  can	  be	  
viewed	   positively,	   provided	   that	   they	   are	   passed	   on	   to	   consumers.	   However,	   as	   it	   is	   developed	  
below,	  they	  could	  also	  entail	  harmful	  consequences.	  
b) Listing	  charges,	  slotting	  allowances	  and	  other	  commercial	  payments	  
While	   suppliers	  may	   receive	   only	   low	   prices	   for	   their	   products,	   they	   often	   see	   their	   profit	  margin	  
further	  whittled	  away	  due	  to	  additional	  costs	  imposed	  by	  larger	  supermarkets	  such	  as	  listing	  fees	  and	  
slotting	   allowances.	   The	   former	   constitutes	   a	   payment	   required	   by	   the	   retailer	   before	   agreeing	   to	  
stock	  the	  supplier’s	  products	  in	  its	  stores.	  The	  latter	  represents	  the	  payment	  made	  by	  the	  supplier	  for	  
favourable	   shelf	   location,	  more	   shelf	   space	   or	   advertising	   in	   retail	   outlets.315	   	   Since	   positioning	   on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
311	  P.W.Dobson,	  M.Waterson	  &	  A.Chu,	  The	  Welfare	  Consequences	  of	  the	  Exercise	  of	  Buyer	  Power,	  Research	  
paper	  prepared	  for	  the	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading,	  1998,	  at	  27.	  
312	  A.A.Foer,	  Mr.Magoo	  visits	  Wal-­‐Mart:	  Finding	  the	  right	  lens	  for	  antitrust,	  39	  Connecticut	  Law	  Review	  1307,	  at	  
1324-­‐1325	  (2007)	  
313	  See	  for	  example:	  UK	  Competition	  Commission,	  Groceries	  Market	  Investigation	  (2008),	  available	  at:	  
http://www.competition-­‐commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/2008/538grocery.htm,	  at	  165-­‐173.	  
314	  M.Vander	  Stichele	  &	  B.Young,	  The	  abuse	  of	  supermarket	  buyer	  power	  in	  the	  EU	  food	  retail	  sector	  –	  
Preliminary	  survey	  of	  evidence,	  Agribusiness	  Accountability	  Initiative,	  Amsterdam,	  March	  2009,	  at	  17.	  
315	  G.Mills,	  Buyer	  Power	  of	  Supermarkets,	  10	  Agenda	  145,	  at	  152-­‐154	  (2003)	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shelves	  can	  have	  a	  great	   influence	  on	  the	  success/failure	  of	  a	  product,	  manufacturers	  are	  urged	  to	  
pay	   those	   fees	   in	   order	   to	  make	   their	  merchandise	   the	  most	   visible	   and	   attractive	   for	   consumers.	  	  
The	  payment	  of	   listing	  fees	  and	  slotting	  allowances	   is	  widely	  used	  in	  the	  retail	  grocery	   industry	  but	  
the	   issue	   as	   to	   whether	   that	   practice	   tends	   to	   impair	   or	   not	   retail	   competition	   is	   subject	   to	  
disagreements	  among	  economists	  and	  policy	  makers.316	  
The	  main	  reasons	  invoked	  in	  favour	  of	  those	  charges	  are	  that,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  helps	  retailers	  to	  
allocate	  shelf	  space	  -­‐	  which	  is	  a	  scarce	  resource	  in	  the	  supermarkets	  –	  in	  an	  appropriate	  way	  and,	  on	  
the	   other	   hand,	   it	   increases	   the	   chances	   to	  make	   a	   new	  product	   accepted	   by	   the	   retailer.317	  With	  
regard	   to	   the	   latter,	   since	  new	  product	   failure	   rates	   tend	   to	  be	   very	  high,	   the	  payment	  of	   slotting	  
allowances	  would	  enable	  retailers	  to	  cover,	  not	  only	  the	  new	  product	  introduction	  costs	  but	  also	  the	  
risk	  of	  that	  new	  product	  failure.	  Indeed,	  such	  failure	  constitutes	  a	  major	  concern	  for	  retailers	  as	  well	  
who	  have	  to	  bear	  additional	  costs	  for	  listing	  the	  new	  product	  in	  their	  stores	  and	  will	  suffer	  from	  the	  
loss	  of	  unsold	  failed	  products.	  The	  different	  fees	  required	  from	  suppliers	  would	  therefore	  provide	  a	  
kind	  of	  indemnification	  for	  retailers	  in	  case	  the	  products	  fail	  to	  sell	  well.	  318	  
However,	  the	  opponents	  to	  those	  practices	  consider	  that	  requesting	  such	  payments	  may	  affect	  the	  
competitiveness	  of	   some	  suppliers.	   Indeed,	   according	   to	   them,	   supermarkets	   could	  not	  necessarily	  
select	  the	  best	  products,	  those	  preferred	  by	  consumers	  or	  the	  most	  efficient	  suppliers	  but,	   instead,	  
choose	  sellers	  which	  are	  the	  best	  able	  to	  bear	  those	  costs,	  leaving	  the	  others	  out	  of	  the	  shelves.	  As	  a	  
result,	  efficient	  suppliers	  could	  be	  induced	  to	  limit	  the	  number	  of	  retailers	  through	  which	  they	  make	  
their	  products	  available,	  limiting	  thus	  intra-­‐brand	  competition.	  319	  Slotting	  allowances	  may	  in	  addition	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
316	  O.Foros	  &	  H.J.Kind,	  Do	  Slotting	  Allowances	  Harm	  Retail	  Competition?,	  110	  Scandinavian	  Journal	  of	  
Economics	  367	  (2008).	  	  
317	  On	  the	  efficiency	  arguments	  of	  slotting	  allowances,	  see:	  K.Kelly,	  The	  antitrust	  analysis	  of	  grocery	  slotting	  
allowances:	  the	  procompetitive	  case,	  10	  Journal	  of	  Public	  Policy	  and	  Marketing	  187	  (1991)	  &	  M.W.Sullivan,	  
Slotting	  allowances	  and	  the	  market	  for	  new	  products,	  40	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Economics	  461	  (1997).	  See	  also:	  
W.Chu,	  Demand	  signaling	  and	  screening	  in	  channels	  of	  distribution,	  11	  Marketing	  Science	  327	  (1992).	  
According	  to	  Chu,	  slotting	  allowances	  enable	  manufacturers	  to	  convey	  information	  about	  the	  likelihood	  of	  their	  
products’	  success	  or	  failure	  as,	  by	  paying	  those	  fees,	  they	  in	  fact	  signal	  their	  quality.	  	  
318K.	  Sudhir	  &	  V.R.Rao,	  Are	  Slotting	  Allowances	  Efficiency-­‐Enhancing	  or	  Anti-­‐Competitive?,	  43	  Journal	  of	  
Marketing	  Research	  137,	  at	  140	  (2006).	  See	  also:	  H.Mullan,	  Banning	  payments	  for	  slotting	  and	  shelf-­‐space:	  
Ireland	  set	  to	  follow	  the	  United	  kingdom’s	  example,	  31	  European	  Competition	  Law	  Review	  151	  (2010).	  
319	  See:	  G.T.Gundlach,	  Antitrust	  analysis	  of	  exclusionary	  arrangements	  involving	  slotting	  allowances	  and	  fees:	  
issues	  and	  insights,	  American	  Antitrust	  Institute	  wording	  paper	  N°	  05-­‐03	  (2005),	  available	  at:	  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1103520	  See	  also:	  Guidelines	  on	  vertical	  restraints	  (text	  
with	  EEA	  relevance),	  J.O.	  C	  130/1	  of	  19/05/2010,	  at	  204.	  The	  Commission	  points	  out	  in	  those	  guidelines	  that	  
such	  payments	  may	  induce	  the	  supplier	  to	  channel	  its	  products	  through	  only	  one	  or	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  
distributors	  and	  that	  this	  may	  lead	  to	  the	  same	  downstream	  foreclosure	  effect	  as	  an	  exclusive	  supply	  type	  of	  
obligation.	  See	  also:	  L.Marx	  &	  G.Shaffer,	  Upfront	  payments	  and	  exclusion	  in	  downstream	  markets,	  38	  The	  RAND	  
Journal	  of	  Economics	  822	  (2007).	  Marx	  and	  Shaffer	  show	  that	  the	  use	  of	  upfront	  payments	  can	  also	  lead	  to	  the	  
exclusion	  of	  rival	  retailers.	  “The	  idea	  is	  that	  having	  given	  the	  dominant	  retailer	  an	  upfront	  payment	  to	  buy	  its	  
input,	  the	  manufacturer	  will	  not	  then	  want	  to	  trade	  with	  the	  rival	  retailer	  because	  of	  fears	  that	  if	  it	  did,	  the	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result	   in	  anticompetitive	  foreclosure	  of	  other	  suppliers	  as	  the	  widespread	  use	  of	  those	  payments	   is	  
likely	   to	  raise	  barriers	   to	  entry	   for	  small	  entrants.320	  Deprived	  of	  adequate	  distribution	  due	  to	  such	  
downstream	  foreclosure	  effect,	  some	  manufacturers	  could,	  as	  a	  result,	  be	  prevented	  from	  entering	  
or	  forced	  to	  leave	  the	  market	  even	  though	  their	  products	  may	  be	  socially	  desirable.	  Finally,	  slotting	  
allowances	   and	   other	   fees	   required	   by	   retailers	  may	   result	   in	  weakening	   price	   competition	   in	   the	  
downstream	   retail	   market.	   At	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   negotiations	   between	   retailers	   and	   suppliers	   lies	  
indeed	   the	   issue	  of	   slotting	  allowances	  and	  other	  commercial	  promotions	  so	   that	  buyers	  are	  more	  
likely	  to	  accept	  higher	  prices	  knowing	  that	  their	  buyer	  power	  will	  enable	  them	  to	  offset	  the	  cost	  of	  
this	   through	   the	   extraction	   of	   various	   payments.	   Higher	   prices	   paid	   to	   manufacturers	   may,	   in	  
addition,	   be	   profitable	   for	   retailers	   as	   they	   signal	   competitors	   the	   intent	   to	   be	   less	   aggressive	   in	  
pricing	  in	  the	  retail	  market,	  softening	  as	  a	  result	  downstream	  price-­‐competition.321	  
Where	   commercial	   payments	  may	  offer	   advantages	   to	   the	   supplier	   through	  extra	   sales	   generated,	  
for	  example,	  by	  end-­‐of-­‐aisle	  displays	  or	  other	  promotional	  actions,	  those	  payments	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  
harm	  them	  when	  no	  service	   is	  offered	   in	  return.	  This	  may	  occur	  when	  a	  retailer	  request	  additional	  
discounts	  or	  other	  concessions	  for	  the	  opening	  of	  a	  new	  store,	  for	  the	  anniversary	  of	  an	  existing	  store	  
or	   following	   a	   merger	   (“wedding	   gift”),	   to	   name	   but	   a	   few.	   322	   	   Acceptance	   of	   such	   unjustified	  
payments	   by	   suppliers	   reveals	   therefore	   the	   presence	   of	   significant	   buyer	   power	   in	   the	   hands	   of	  
retail	  chains	  and	  may	  cause	  harm	  to	  suppliers	  but	  also	  to	  competing	  buyers	  and	  consumers.	  
c) Other	  (non-­‐)contractual	  conditions	  imposed	  on	  suppliers	  
In	  addition	  to	  obtaining	  financial	  concessions	  such	  as	   low	  prices	  and	  discounts,	  retailers	  are	  able	  to	  
exploit	   their	   buyer	   power	   through	  other	   practices	  which	   have	   been	  pointed	  out	   by	   some	  national	  
competition	   authorities	   in	   their	   reports	   on	   the	   retail	   sector.	   323	   We	   can	   mention,	   for	   examples,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
dominant	  retailer	  would	  cut	  back	  on	  some	  or	  all	  of	  its	  planned	  purchases.	  Consumers	  lose	  in	  this	  case	  because	  
retail	  prices	  are	  potentially	  higher,	  and	  with	  fewer	  retailers	  buying	  form	  the	  manufacturer,	  choice	  in	  the	  market	  
place	  is	  reduced”.	  (at	  838)	  In	  addition,	  where	  payments	  are	  initiated	  by	  suppliers,	  they	  can	  be	  used	  to	  raise	  
rivals’	  cost	  by	  bidding	  up	  the	  price	  of	  shelf	  space.	  See:	  G.Shaffer,	  Slotting	  allowances	  and	  optimal	  product	  
variety,	  5	  Advances	  in	  economic	  analysis	  &	  Policy,	  article	  3	  (2005)	  
320	  Commission	  notice	  -­‐	  Guidelines	  on	  vertical	  restraints,	  SEC(2010)411,	  O.J.	  C	  130	  of	  19/05/2010,	  at	  205.	  
321	  See:	  G.Shaffer,	  Slotting	  allowances	  and	  resale	  price	  maintenance…,	  op.cit.	  See	  also:	  Commission	  notice	  -­‐	  
Guidelines	  on	  vertical	  restraints,	  SEC(2010)411,	  O.J.	  C	  130	  of	  19/05/2010	  ,	  at	  206:	  “In	  addition	  to	  possible	  
foreclosure	  effects,	  upfront	  access	  payments	  may	  soften	  competition	  and	  facilitate	  collusion	  between	  
distributors.	  Upfront	  access	  payments	  are	  likely	  to	  increase	  the	  price	  charged	  by	  the	  supplier	  for	  the	  contract	  
products	  since	  the	  supplier	  must	  cover	  the	  expense	  of	  those	  payments.	  Higher	  supply	  prices	  may	  reduce	  the	  
incentive	  of	  the	  retailers	  to	  compete	  on	  price	  on	  the	  downstream	  market,	  while	  the	  profits	  of	  distributors	  are	  
increased	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  access	  payments.”	  
322	  -­‐	  P.W.Dobson,	  R.Clarke,	  S.Davies	  &	  M.Waterson,	  Buyer	  power	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  competition	  in	  the	  food	  
retail	  distribution	  sector	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  1	  Journal	  of	  Industry,	  Competition	  &	  Trade	  247,	  at	  269	  (2001)	  
323	  See	  for	  example:	  UK	  Commission,	  Groceries	  Market	  Investigation	  (2008),	  available	  at:	  
http://www.competition-­‐commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/2008/538grocery.htm.	  Among	  the	  other	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transfer	  of	  excessive	  and	  unjustified	  risks	  and	  costs	  to	  the	  suppliers,	  such	  as	  for	  goods	  lost	  or	  stolen	  
in	  the	  retailer’s	  premises,	  retrospective	  changes	  to	  contractual	  terms,	  delayed	  payment,	  unforeseen	  
change	   in	   quantities	   or	   product-­‐quality	   specifications	   in	   a	   very	   short-­‐term,	   request	   to	   buy	   back	  
unsold	  items	  or	  failure	  to	  pay	  for	  them,	  introduction	  of	  a	  most	  favoured	  customer	  clause324,	  absence	  
of	  written	  contract	  or	  obligation	  to	  provide	  exclusive	   information	  regarding	  new	  products.325	  While	  
directly	   benefiting	   retailers,	   those	   practices	   are	   less	   likely	   to	   entail	   a	   change	   in	   the	   latter’s	   pricing	  
policy	  and	  may	  incite	  suppliers	  to	  raise	  prices	  to	  compensate	  those	  unexpected	  costs	  and	  risks.	  As	  a	  
result,	  consumers	  are	  unlikely	  to	  reap	  any	  benefit	  of	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  and	  may	  even	  end	  
up	   paying	   higher	   prices	   as	   the	   ability	   of	   retailers	   to	   increase	   their	   profits	   by	   extracting	   unjustified	  
payments	   and	   by	   transferring	   excessive	   risks	   and	   costs	   to	   their	   suppliers	   tends	   to	   reduce	   price	  
competition	  in	  the	  retail	  market.326	  
d) De-­‐listing	  threat	  
As	  a	  “gatekeeper”,	  a	  powerful	  supermarket	  has	  a	  strong	  weapon	  to	  make	  its	  contractual	  conditions	  
accepted	   by	   suppliers	   which	   is	   the	   threat	   to	   de-­‐list	   a	   product.	   Since	   large	   retail	   chains	   buy	   an	  
important	  proportion	  of	  the	  supplier’s	  total	  output,	  the	  loss	  of	  that	  distribution	  channel	  can	  lead	  to	  
serious	   financial	   consequences	   for	   the	   latter.	   Even	   though	   a	   retailer	   is	   likely	   to	   reduce	   its	   profits	  
when	  it	  stops	  selling	  a	  product,	  the	  effect	  of	  such	  de-­‐listing	  will	  probably	  be	  more	  significant	  for	  the	  
manufacturer.327	   The	   risk	   for	   suppliers	   is	   therefore	   high	   as	   it	   is	   recognized	   that	   consumers	   switch	  
more	   easily	   to	   another	   brand	   than	   seek	   the	   de-­‐listed	   product	   at	   a	   rival	   store.	   As	   a	   result,	   due	   in	  
particular	   to	   the	   sunk	   costs	   incurred	   in	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   business	   relationship	   to	   meet	   the	  
retailer’s	  demand	  for	  large-­‐scale	  production	  and	  due	  to	  the	  difficulty	  in	  replacing	  a	  customer	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
practices	  found	  by	  the	  Competition	  Commission,	  we	  can	  note:	  delaying	  payments	  to	  suppliers,	  changing	  
quantities	  or	  product-­‐quality	  specifications	  in	  a	  short-­‐term,	  requiring	  suppliers	  to	  make,	  and	  support	  the	  costs	  
of,	  changes	  to	  packaging	  and	  labeling.	  
324	  A	  most	  favoured	  customer	  clause	  is	  a	  contractual	  obligation	  that	  guarantees	  the	  retailer	  to	  obtain	  the	  
lowest	  price	  charged	  to	  any	  other	  buyer.	  
325	  Commission	  Staff	  working	  document	  on	  Retail	  services	  in	  the	  Internal	  Market,	  accompanying	  document	  to	  
the	  Retail	  market	  monitoring	  report,	  Towards	  more	  efficient	  and	  fairer	  retail	  services	  in	  the	  Internal	  Market	  for	  
2020,	  SEC(2010)	  807,	  at	  40-­‐41.	  	  
326	  Such	  as	  the	  extraction	  of	  slotting	  allowances	  or	  other	  payments	  by	  retailers,	  the	  transfer	  of	  excessive	  costs	  
and	  risks	  may	  lead	  the	  latter	  to	  support	  the	  payment	  of	  higher	  prices	  as	  they	  will	  find	  alternatives	  to	  reduce	  
their	  costs.	  The	  resulting	  reduction	  in	  price	  competition	  is	  even	  more	  likely	  to	  happen	  in	  countries	  where	  sales	  
below	  costs	  are	  prohibited	  such	  as	  in	  Belgium,	  France,	  Luxembourg,	  Denmark	  and	  Greece	  as	  the	  different	  
concessions	  extracted	  by	  retailers	  from	  their	  suppliers	  are	  generally	  not	  included	  in	  the	  calculation	  of	  the	  
below-­‐cost	  sales	  threshold.	  Even	  though	  higher	  prices	  paid	  to	  suppliers	  are	  more	  than	  compensated	  by	  other	  
concessions,	  retailers	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  sell	  below	  wholesale	  prices	  so	  that	  competitors	  are	  assured	  that	  price	  
competition	  is	  not	  going	  to	  decrease	  prices	  below	  that	  threshold.	  	  
327	  G.Mills,	  op.cit.,	  at	  46.	  When	  delisting	  one	  product,	  retailers	  are	  unlikely	  to	  lose	  a	  large	  share	  of	  their	  
customers,	  especially	  if	  the	  product	  in	  question	  is	  not	  a	  must-­‐carry	  brand.	  However,	  removing	  and	  replacing	  
products	  nevertheless	  cause	  some	  inconveniences	  due	  in	  particular	  to	  the	  changes	  of	  data,	  coding	  and	  other	  
organizational	  matters.	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may	  account	  for	  20-­‐30%	  of	  the	  national	  market,	  	  it	  becomes	  unthinkable	  for	  suppliers	  to	  run	  the	  risk	  
of	  losing	  that	  customer.328	  This	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  when	  suppliers	  are	  local	  SME	  or	  farmers	  who	  
do	  not	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  equivalent	  alternatives.	  However,	  one	  cannot	  but	  notice	  that,	  nowadays,	  
even	  large	  multinational	  companies	  are	  not	  shielded	  from	  delisting	  threat	  as	  illustrated	  for	  example	  
in	  Belgium	  where,	   in	  2008,	  one	  of	   the	   largest	   supermarket	   chains,	  namely	  Delhaize,	  delisted	   some	  
250	  products	  including	  well-­‐known	  brands	  such	  as	  Knorr,	  Dove	  or	  Lipton	  produced	  by	  Unilever	  due	  to	  
a	  disagreement	  on	  the	  terms	  of	  supply.329	  Where	  delisting	  such	  very	  popular	  brands	  was	  unthinkable	  
some	   time	  ago	  because	  of	   retailers’	   fear	   of	   losing	   customers,	   this	   case	  proves	   that	   the	  balance	  of	  
power	  between	  producers	  and	  supermarkets	  may	  in	  some	  cases	  shift	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  a	  latter.	  Where	  
delisting	  products	   is	  not	  as	   such	  prohibited	  under	   the	  competition	   rules	   since	   firms	   remain	   free	   to	  
break	  off	  a	  business	  relationship,	  a	  refusal	  to	  deal	  with	  existing	  trading	  partners	  might	  nevertheless,	  
in	  some	  circumstances,	  constitute	  an	  abuse	  just	  as	  a	  refusal	  to	  supply	  on	  the	  selling	  side.330	  
e) Restriction	  regarding	  rival	  retailers	  
Through	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power,	  retailers	  do	  not	  only	  aim	  at	  capturing	  welfare	  from	  producers	  
but	  may	   also	   seek	   to	   exclude	   competitors	   either	   on	   the	   buying	   side	   or	   on	   the	   selling	   side	   of	   the	  
market.	   In	   some	   circumstances,	   retailers	   may	   indeed	   have	   sufficient	   leverage	   to	   induce	   their	  
suppliers	   to	   refuse	   to	   deal	   with	   a	   competing	   supermarket.	   To	   achieve	   such	   foreclosure	   of	  
competitors,	  retail	  chains	  may	  either	  “bribe”	  suppliers	  or	  threaten	  to	  stop	  doing	  business	  with	  them	  
in	  case	  they	  do	  not	  comply	  with	  the	  exclusivity	  dealing.331	  Exclusive	  supply	  agreements,	  imposing	  on	  
a	   supplier	   to	   sell	   a	   particular	   final	   product	   only	   to	   a	   single	   retail	   chain,	   or	   even	   less	   drastic	  
agreements	  prohibiting	  sellers	  from	  offering	  better	  conditions	  to	  competitors,	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328	  A.A.Foer,	  op.cit.,	  at	  1324-­‐1325.	  
329	  The	  spat	  between	  Delhaize	  and	  Unilever	  arises	  after	  the	  latter	  asked	  for	  better	  promotion	  and	  higher	  prices	  
in	  order	  to	  reflect	  the	  higher	  raw	  material	  costs.	  Following	  Delhaize’s	  decision,	  most	  consumers	  replaced	  
Unilever	  products	  with	  those	  of	  competitors	  or	  Delhaize’s	  private	  label	  lines.	  Some	  reports	  revealed	  that	  30%	  
of	  consumers	  shopped	  elsewhere	  to	  find	  the	  delisted	  products.	  However,	  Delhaize	  denied	  that	  the	  row	  had	  
dented	  its	  sales.	  The	  dispute	  was	  settled	  one	  month	  later.	  
330	  See:	  Case	  27/76,	  United	  Brands	  Company	  and	  United	  Brands	  Continental	  v	  Commission	  [1978]	  ECR	  207	  and	  
BBI/Boosey	  &	  Hawkes	  –	  Interim	  measures,	  Case	  No	  IV/32.279,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  29	  July	  1987.	  In	  those	  
cases,	  it	  was	  held	  that	  the	  refusal	  to	  supply	  was	  anticompetitive	  because	  by	  doing	  so	  the	  dominant	  firm	  was	  
trying	  to	  impair	  rivals’	  competitiveness	  by	  denying	  them	  access	  to	  distribution.	  In	  United	  Brands,	  the	  dominant	  
supplier	  refused	  to	  deal	  with	  its	  distributor	  the	  latter	  was	  engaged	  in	  promotional	  activities	  for	  a	  competitor	  of	  
the	  supplier	  while	  in	  BBI/Boosey,	  the	  dominant	  firm	  refused	  further	  suppliers	  to	  a	  customer	  who	  had	  started	  
selling	  a	  competing	  brand.	  On	  abusive	  refusal	  to	  deal	  on	  the	  selling	  side,	  see:	  R.Subiotto	  &	  R.O’Donoghue,	  
Defining	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  duty	  of	  dominant	  firms	  to	  deal	  with	  existing	  customers	  under	  Article	  82	  EC,	  12	  
European	  Compeittion	  Law	  Review	  683	  (2003).	  
331	  R.Inderst	  &	  N.Mazzarotto,	  Buyer	  power	  in	  distribution,	  in	  W.D.	  Collins,	  ed.,	  ABA	  Antitrust	  Section	  Handbook	  -­‐	  
Issues	  in	  Competition	  Law	  and	  Policy	  (2008),	  at	  1968-­‐1969.	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harm	   competition.332	   Indeed,	   such	   a	   restriction	   imposed	   on	   suppliers,	   either	   explicitly	   or	   under	   an	  
implicit	  threat	  of	  de-­‐listing,	  will	  prevent	  other	  retail	  chains	  from	  obtaining	  the	  products	   in	  question	  
and	  therefore	  deprive	  consumers	  of	  lower	  prices	  resulting	  from	  intra-­‐brand	  competition.333	  A	  retailer	  
is	  not	  prohibited	  from	  obtaining	  favourable	  price	  and	  terms	  for	  itself	  since	  it	  may	  lead	  to	  benefits	  and	  
efficiency.	  However,	  the	  requirement	  to	  sell	  at	  higher	  prices	  or	  not	  to	  offer	  the	  same	  advantageous	  
condition	   to	   its	   rivals	   does,	   without	   any	   doubt,	   restrict	   free	   competition	   and	   prevent	   economic	  
entities	  from	  acting	  on	  a	  level	  playing	  field.334	  
If	  those	  agreements	  may	  be	  justified	  in	  some	  sectors,	   it	  seems	  that,	  concerning	  the	  grocery	  market	  
and	  its	  mass	  consumer	  goods,	  no	  benefits	  are	  likely	  to	  off-­‐set	  the	  adverse	  effects	  on	  competition.	  It	  is	  
indeed	  not	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  suppliers	  to	  forego	  additional	  sales	  and	  the	  exclusivity	  given	  to	  particular	  
retailer	   will	   not	   provide	   consumers	   with	   better	   offers	   or	   services.	   Among	   the	   different	   situations	  
where	   vertical	   restraints	   may	   help	   realise	   efficiencies	   and	   provide	   benefits	   to	   consumers,	   the	  
Guidelines	   of	   the	   Commission	   on	   that	   matter	   point	   out,	   among	   other	   things,	   arrangements	  
concluded	  to	  avoid	  a	  free	  riding	  or	  hold-­‐up	  problem335.	  However,	  one	  cannot	  but	  notice	  that	  such	  a	  
problem	  is	  unlikely	  to	  arise	  in	  that	  sector	  as	  food	  and	  non-­‐food	  products	  sold	  in	  supermarkets	  are	  not	  
information	  intensive	  goods	  requiring	  consumer	  education	  through	  dealer	  demonstration	  or	  advice.	  
The	  only	  additional	  services	  that	  retailers	  may	  provide	  for	  consumers	  are	  in	  fact	  invulnerable	  to	  free	  
riding	   and	   may	   consist	   in	   a	   more	   pleasant	   shopping	   environment,	   a	   prestigious	   store	   location,	  
convenient	  opening	  hours	  or	  a	  fuller	  inventory	  for	  examples.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  consumers	  cannot	  benefit	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
332	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission	  to	  the	  Council,	  the	  European	  Parliament,	  the	  European	  Economic	  and	  
Social	  Committee	  and	  the	  Committee	  of	  the	  Regions,	  Food	  prices	  in	  Europe,	  COM(2008)	  821,	  at	  9.	  
333T.A.	  Piraino,	  	  A	  proposed	  Antitrust	  approach	  to	  the	  conduct	  of	  retailers,	  dealers,	  and	  other	  resellers,	  73	  
Washington	  Law	  Review	  799,	  at	  844	  (1998).	  
334	  Ibid.,	  at	  856.	  
335	  See:	  Guidelines	  on	  vertical	  restraints,	  op.cit.,	  at	  107	  and	  192-­‐202.	  	  Among	  the	  different	  reasons	  which	  may	  
justify	  the	  application	  of	  certain	  vertical	  restraints,	  the	  Guidelines	  point	  out	  the	  free-­‐rider	  problem.	  “One	  
distributor	  may	  free-­‐ride	  on	  the	  promotion	  efforts	  of	  another	  distributor.	  This	  type	  of	  problem	  is	  most	  common	  
at	  the	  wholesale	  and	  retail	  level.	  Exclusive	  distribution	  or	  similar	  restrictions	  may	  be	  helpful	  in	  avoiding	  such	  
free-­‐riding.	  (…)For	  there	  to	  be	  a	  problem,	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  a	  real	  free-­‐rider	  issue.	  Free-­‐riding	  between	  buyers	  
can	  only	  occur	  on	  pre-­‐sales	  services	  and	  other	  promotional	  activities,	  but	  not	  on	  after-­‐sales	  services	  for	  which	  
the	  distributor	  can	  charge	  its	  customers	  individually.	  The	  product	  will	  usually	  need	  to	  be	  relatively	  new	  or	  
technically	  complex	  or	  the	  reputation	  of	  the	  product	  must	  be	  a	  major	  determinant	  of	  its	  demand,	  as	  the	  
customer	  may	  otherwise	  very	  well	  know	  what	  he	  or	  she	  wants,	  based	  on	  past	  purchases.	  And	  the	  product	  must	  
be	  of	  a	  reasonably	  high	  value	  as	  it	  is	  otherwise	  not	  attractive	  for	  a	  customer	  to	  go	  to	  one	  shop	  for	  information	  
and	  to	  another	  to	  buy.	  Lastly,	  it	  must	  not	  be	  practical	  for	  the	  supplier	  to	  impose	  on	  all	  buyers,	  by	  contract,	  
effective	  promotion	  or	  service	  requirements.	  Free-­‐riding	  between	  suppliers	  is	  also	  restricted	  to	  specific	  
situations,	  namely	  to	  cases	  where	  the	  promotion	  takes	  place	  at	  the	  buyer's	  premises	  and	  is	  generic,	  not	  brand	  
specific.”	  (at	  107(1))The	  so-­‐called	  hold-­‐up	  problem	  involves	  situations	  where	  client-­‐specific	  investments	  are	  to	  
be	  made	  such	  as	  in	  special	  equipment	  or	  training.	  It	  is	  required	  that	  the	  investment	  be	  relationship-­‐specific,	  not	  
recouped	  in	  the	  short	  term	  and	  asymmetric.	  (See	  at	  107(4))	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from	  those	  services	  while	  patronizing	  another	  store	  so	  that	  any	  type	  of	  exclusive	  arrangement	  in	  the	  
grocery	  retail	  sector	  is	  hardly	  justifiable.336	  
Where	   vertical	   restrictions	   may	   hardly	   result	   in	   the	   exclusion	   of	   large	   retailers	   which	   are	   able	   to	  
remain	   competitive	   on	   the	   different	   markets	   by	   using	   similarly	   their	   market	   power,	   it	   is	   a	   very	  
different	  story	  for	  smaller	  competitors.	  The	  latter	  are	  indeed	  highly	  vulnerable	  to	  exclusive	  conduct	  
of	  large	  supermarket	  chains	  and	  efficiency	  does	  not	  always	  suffice	  to	  protect	  them	  against	  exclusion.	  
Exclusive	  and	  other	  restrictive	  vertical	  arrangements	  may	  thereby	  enable	  a	   large	  retailer	  to	  acquire	  
monopsony	  power	  or	   strengthen	   its	  buyer	  power	   in	   the	  upstream	  market	  but	   also	   to	   reinforce	   its	  
position	   in	  the	  downstream	  market.	  This	  would	  be	  the	  case	  where	  competing	  buyers	  are	  active	  on	  
the	  same	  relevant	  retail	  market.	  
f) Category	  management	  
Besides	   vertical	   agreements	   containing	   restrictions	   on	   competition	   and	   limiting	   the	   ability	   of	  
suppliers	   to	   define	   their	   own	   trading	   strategy,	   retailers	   may	   resort	   to	   other	   types	   of	   vertical	  
arrangements	  with	  their	  business	  partners	  such	  as	  category	  management	  agreements.	  Based	  on	  the	  
cooperation	   and	   synergy	   of	   expertise	   of	   each	   party,	   those	   agreements	   raise	   some	   competitive	  
concerns.	  
Category	  management	   is	   a	   business	   technique	  which	   aims	   at	   studying	   consumer	  demand	  within	   a	  
particular	   category	   in	   order	   to	   help	   retailers	   make	   decisions	   about	   product	   selection,	   placement,	  
promotion	   and	   pricing	   so	   that	   they	   can	   best	   meet	   consumer	   preferences.337	   To	   this	   end,	   the	  
management	  of	  a	  retail	  establishment	   is	  broken	  down	  into	  categories	  of	   like	  products,	  such	  as	  hair	  
care	  or	  breakfast	  foods,	  and	  the	  retailer’s	  strategy	  is	  defined	  on	  a	  category-­‐by-­‐category	  basis	  rather	  
than	  on	  a	  brand-­‐by-­‐brand	  basis.338	  Because	  effective	  management	  require	  marketing	  expertise	  and	  
continual	   analysis	   of	   data,	   retailers	   have	   recently	   started	   appointing	   a	   manufacturer,	   generally	   a	  
leading	  supplier	   in	  the	  particular	  category,	  as	  “category	  captain”	  which	   is	   then	   in	  charge	  of	  making	  
decision	  or	  giving	  advice	  to	  the	  retailer	  about	   its	  own	  products	  but	  also	  those	  of	  competitors.339	   In	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336	  M.Lao,	  Free	  riding:	  an	  overstated	  and	  unconvincing	  explanation	  for	  resale	  price	  maintenance,	  in	  How	  the	  
Chicago	  School	  overshot	  the	  mark	  –	  The	  effect	  of	  conservative	  economic	  analysis	  on	  U.S.	  Antitrust,	  R.Pitofsky	  
(ed.)	  (2008),	  at	  202.	  
337	  FTC,	  Report	  on	  the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  Workshop	  on	  slotting	  allowances	  and	  other	  marketing	  
practices	  in	  the	  grocery	  industry,	  February	  2001,	  at	  46,	  available	  at:	  
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/02/slottingallowancesreportfinal.pdf	  	  
338	  L.S.Carameli,	  Jr,	  The	  anti-­‐competitive	  effects	  and	  antitrust	  implications	  of	  category	  management	  and	  
category	  captains	  of	  consumer	  products,	  79	  Chicago-­‐Kent	  Law	  Review	  1313,	  at	  1314	  (2004)	  
339	  B.J.Lorden,	  Category	  management:	  The	  antitrust	  implications	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Europe,	  23	  Loyola	  
Consumer	  Law	  Review	  541,	  at	  542	  (2010-­‐2011).	  The	  category	  captain	  carries	  analysis	  about	  the	  category	  and	  
provides	  retailer	  with	  a	  detailed	  plan	  including	  a	  “plan-­‐o-­‐grams”,	  that	  is	  a	  visual	  depiction	  of	  where	  each	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most	   cases,	   supermarket	   chains	   rely	   on	   a	   single	   supplier	   to	  manage	   a	   category	   but	   they	  may	   also	  
appoint	   another	  manufacturer	   of	   the	   same	   category	   (co-­‐captain)	   for	   second	   opinions	   or	   call	   upon	  
third-­‐party	   advisor	   with	   no	   vested	   interest	   in	   the	   category.340	   Where	   the	   category	   captain	   is	  
supposed	  to	  only	  give	  recommendations	  and	  advice,	  it	  is	  sometimes	  given	  much	  more	  responsibility	  
and	   in	   many	   cases,	   the	   retailer	   simply	   accept	   the	   suggested	   decisions	   about	   which	   brands	   and	  
products	  should	  be	  on	  the	  shelves	  with	  no	  or	  only	  few	  changes.341	  
Category	  management	   is	   likely	  to	  provide	  various	  benefits	  for	  retailers	  but	  also	  for	  consumers.	   It	   is	  
indeed	   an	   effective	   retail	  marketing	   practice	   that	   enables	   supermarket	   chains	   to	   use	   their	   limited	  
shelf-­‐space	   efficiently	   and	   to	   enhance	   consumers’	   shopping	   experience	   by	   placing	   products	   in	   the	  
most	  convenient	   location	  and	  by	  offering	  the	  best	  product	  assortment	  at	  the	  prices	  consumers	  are	  
willing	   to	   pay.342	   By	   resorting	   to	   category	   captaincy,	   retailers	   can	   in	   addition	   benefit	   from	   their	  
suppliers’	  expertise	  and	  knowledge	  in	  marketing	  the	  different	  categories.343	  However,	  despite	  those	  
benefits,	  anti-­‐competitive	  issues	  may	  also	  arise	  from	  category	  management	  arrangements	  and	  some	  
of	  them	  may	  be	  related	  to	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  by	  large	  supermarket	  chains.	  Pointed	  out	  by	  
competition	   authorities	   and	   the	   European	   Commission344,	   those	   potential	   harmful	   effects	   concern	  
exclusion	  of	  rival	  suppliers	  and	  collusion	  among	  suppliers	  or	  retailers.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
product	  in	  a	  given	  category	  should	  be	  shelved,	  and	  recommendations	  on	  product	  additions	  or	  deletions,	  
promotions	  and	  possibly	  retail	  prices.	  
340	  R.L.Steiner,	  Category	  Management	  –	  A	  pervasive,	  new	  vertical/horizontal	  format,	  15	  Antitrust	  77,	  at	  78	  
(2001)	  
341	  B.J.Lorden,	  op.cit.,	  at	  544.	  
342	  L.S.Carameli,	  Jr,	  op.cit.,	  at	  1314.	  	  
343	  Manufacturers	  have	  more	  information	  about	  the	  market	  and	  its	  trends	  and	  can	  use	  various	  data	  to	  
determine	  which	  factors	  specifically	  drive	  category	  sales	  (e.g.,	  prices,	  promotions	  and	  product	  placement).	  In	  
addition,	  suppliers	  have	  more	  resources	  including	  the	  necessary	  highly	  trained	  personnel	  to	  analyze	  data	  and	  
implement	  category	  management	  suggestions.	  See:	  D.M.Desrochers,	  G.T.Gundlach	  &	  A.A.Foer,	  Analysis	  of	  
antitrust	  challenges	  to	  category	  captain	  arrangements,	  22	  Journal	  of	  Public	  Policy	  &	  Marketing	  201,	  at	  202	  
(2003).	  The	  Commission	  also	  recognizes	  the	  benefits	  brought	  about	  by	  category	  management	  agreements	  in	  its	  
Guidelines	  on	  Vertical	  restraints	  and	  affirms	  that	  “category	  management	  agreements	  may	  allow	  distributors	  to	  
have	  access	  to	  the	  supplier's	  marketing	  expertise	  for	  a	  certain	  group	  of	  products	  and	  to	  achieve	  economies	  of	  
scale	  as	  they	  ensure	  that	  the	  optimal	  quantity	  of	  products	  is	  presented	  timely	  and	  directly	  on	  the	  shelves.	  As	  
category	  management	  is	  based	  on	  customers'	  habits,	  category	  management	  agreements	  may	  lead	  to	  higher	  
customer	  satisfaction	  as	  they	  help	  to	  better	  meet	  demand	  expectations.	  In	  general,	  the	  higher	  the	  inter-­‐	  brand	  
competition	  and	  the	  lower	  consumers'	  switching	  costs,	  the	  greater	  the	  economic	  benefits	  achieved	  through	  
category	  management.”	  See:	  Guidelines	  on	  vertical	  restraints,	  op.cit.,	  at	  213.	  
344	  See	  for	  examples:	  FTC,	  Report	  on	  the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  Workshop	  on	  slotting	  allowances,	  op.cit.	  
and	  Avis	  n°10-­‐A-­‐25	  du	  7	  décembre	  2010	  relatif	  aux	  contrats	  de	  «	  management	  catégoriel	  »	  entre	  les	  opérateurs	  
de	  la	  grande	  distribution	  à	  dominante	  alimentaire	  et	  certains	  de	  leurs	  fournisseurs	  (France).	  The	  European	  
Commission	  refers	  to	  category	  management	  agreements	  in	  its	  Guidelines	  on	  vertical	  restraints.	  See:	  Guidelines	  
on	  vertical	  restraints,	  op.cit.,	  at	  209-­‐213.	  The	  Commission	  defines	  category	  management	  agreements	  as	  
“agreements	  by	  which,	  within	  a	  distribution	  agreement,	  the	  distributor	  entrusts	  the	  supplier	  (the	  "category	  
captain")	  with	  the	  marketing	  of	  a	  category	  of	  products	  including	  in	  general	  not	  only	  the	  supplier's	  products,	  but	  
also	  the	  products	  of	  its	  competitors.”	  (at	  209)	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First	  of	  all,	  concerns	  have	  been	  raised	  concerning	  the	  category	  captain’s	  ability	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  
its	  role	  to	  exclude	  rivals	  or	  hinder	  their	  entry	  or	  expansion	  on	  the	  market.345	  Some	  argue	  indeed	  that,	  
given	  the	  substantial	  investment	  of	  time	  and	  money	  required	  by	  a	  category	  captaincy	  and	  the	  extra	  
fee	  paid	  by	  some	  suppliers	  to	  take	  on	  the	  role	  of	  category	  captain346,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  conceive	  that	  the	  
chosen	  manufacturer	  does	  not	  derive	  some	  benefits	   from	  such	  arrangements,	  other	  than	  the	  well-­‐
being	  of	  the	  category	  as	  a	  whole,	  such	  as	  the	  opportunity	  to	  leverage	  its	  position	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  
competitors.347	  Due	  to	  its	  influence	  over	  marketing	  decisions,	  the	  category	  captain	  might	  indeed	  gain	  
anticompetitive	   advantages	   over	   its	   rival	   and	   improve	   the	   return	   on	   its	   investment	   by	   simply	  
excluding	   competing	   products	   or	   by	   making	   recommendations	   about	   product	   placement	   and	  
promotions	   to	   the	  detriment	  of	   its	   competitors.348	   Competitive	   exclusion	  may	  also	   result	   from	   the	  
misuse	  of	  information	  acquired	  by	  the	  category	  captain.	  Such	  business	  technique	  requires	  indeed	  the	  
sharing	   of	   sensitive	   information	   between	   manufacturers	   and	   retailers	   about	   further	   promotional	  
plans	  or	   innovations	   for	  examples.	  Supermarket	  chains	  generally	  provide	  the	  category	  captain	  with	  
this	  information	  to	  help	  it	  manage	  efficiently	  the	  relevant	  category.	  Knowing	  its	  competitors’	  pricing,	  
merchandising	   and	   promotional	   strategies	   in	   advance,	   the	   category	   captain	   may	   therefore	   be	  
tempted	   to	  misuse	  such	   information	   to	  disadvantage	   its	   competitors	  by	  counteracting	   for	  example	  
the	  latter’s	  promotional	  efforts.349	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345	  FTC,	  Report	  on	  the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  Workshop	  on	  slotting	  allowances	  op.cit.,	  at	  52.	  This	  is	  not	  an	  
hypothetical	  case	  as,	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  a	  captain	  manufacturer’s	  conduct	  was	  found	  o	  exclusionary	  to	  
competition	  and	  harmful	  to	  consumers.	  See:	  Conwood	  Co.	  v.	  United	  States	  Tobacco.	  Co.,	  290	  F.3d	  768	  (6th	  Cir.	  
2002).	  The	  case	  concerned	  the	  category	  of	  smokeless	  tobacco.	  Conwood,	  a	  tobacco	  manufacturer,	  sued	  one	  of	  
its	  competitors,	  USTC,	  claiming	  that	  the	  later	  used	  its	  role	  of	  category	  captain	  to	  exclude	  competition.	  It	  was	  
indeed	  recognized	  that	  USTC	  provided	  retailers	  with	  misleading	  and	  false	  information	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  its	  
poorer-­‐selling	  items	  and	  disadvantage	  competitors’	  products.	  
346	  Even	  though	  the	  French	  Competition	  Authority	  maintained	  in	  its	  report	  on	  category	  management	  
arrangements	  that	  category	  management	  services	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  payment	  either	  from	  the	  retailer	  or	  the	  
manufacturer,	  it	  nevertheless	  also	  recognized	  that	  the	  procedure	  for	  appointing	  a	  category	  captain	  was	  very	  
informal	  and	  opaque.	  In	  practice,	  it	  appears	  that	  many	  suppliers	  have	  been	  willing	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  privilege	  and	  
that	  it	  is	  not	  uncommon	  that	  retailers	  use	  an	  auction	  process	  to	  assign	  captaincies.	  See:	  J.Tenser,	  Vendors	  
paying	  a	  high	  price	  to	  be	  category	  catpains,	  Brand	  marketing:	  A	  supplement	  to	  supermarket	  new,	  May	  1996,	  
available	  at:	  http://supermarketnews.com/archive/vendors-­‐paying-­‐high-­‐price-­‐be-­‐category-­‐captains	  	  
347	  L.S.Carameli,	  Jr,	  op.cit.,	  at	  1327.	  If	  the	  only	  benefit	  was	  the	  increased	  sales	  within	  the	  category,	  including	  
sales	  of	  competitors,	  the	  manufacturer	  would	  be	  better	  off	  not	  spending	  resources	  and	  free-­‐riding	  on	  the	  
efforts	  of	  others.	  See	  also:	  Commission	  notice	  -­‐	  Guidelines	  on	  vertical	  restraints,	  SEC(2010)411,	  O.J.	  C	  130	  of	  
19/05/2010,	  at	  210.	  
348	  Retailers	  are	  not	  necessarily	  affected	  by	  such	  practices	  if	  consumers	  shift	  to	  another	  product	  of	  the	  same	  
category	  to	  satisfy	  their	  needs.	  Provided	  that	  the	  overall	  profit	  in	  each	  product	  category	  is	  maximized,	  
regardless	  of	  brand,	  retailers	  will	  indeed	  be	  satisfied	  with	  the	  category	  captaincy.	  However,	  opportunistic	  
behavior	  may	  affect	  consumers	  as	  they	  will	  have	  to	  turn	  to	  other	  products	  and	  face	  a	  reduced	  choice	  on	  the	  
shelves.	  
349	  FTC,	  Report	  on	  the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  Workshop	  on	  slotting	  allowances,	  op.cit.,	  at	  51.	  See	  also:	  
D.M.Desrochers,	  G.T.Gundlach	  &	  A.A.Foer,	  Analysis	  of	  antitrust	  challenges	  to	  category	  captain	  arrangements,	  
22	  Journal	  of	  Public	  Policy	  &	  Marketing	  206	  (2003)	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The	   potential	   exclusionary	   effects	   that	   category	   captaincy	   entails	   affect	   mostly	   smaller	   suppliers	  
which	   cannot	   afford	   to	   compete	   for	   captaincies	   and	   are	   therefore	   at	   the	   mercy	   of	   the	   leading	  
manufacturer’s	   decisions.	   Already	   subject	   to	   retailers’	   buyer	   power	   to	   a	   greater	   extent	   than	   their	  
larger	   rivals	  which	  are	  sometimes	  able	   to	  exercise	  countervailing	  power,	   those	   firms	  may	  see	   their	  
sales	  through	  the	  grocery	  channel	  even	  more	  hindered	  by	  a	  category	  captain’s	  decisions.	  As	  reported	  
by	  Steiner,	  “smaller	  producers	  also	  fear	  that	  the	  always-­‐difficult	  task	  of	  obtaining	  entry	  to	  the	  retail	  
shelves	  of	  the	   large	  chains	   is	  exacerbated	  when	  the	  keys	  to	  that	  kingdom	  are	   in	  the	  hands	  of	  their	  
more	  powerful	  competitors.”350	  The	  possible	  misuse	  of	  power	  by	  category	  captains	  and	  the	  obvious	  
competitive	  advantages	  they	  acquire	  through	  the	  sharing	  of	  information	  with	  retailers	  contribute	  to	  
weakening	   or	   excluding	   smaller	   suppliers	   and	   thereby	  may	   adversely	   affect	   product	   diversity	   and	  
consumer	  choice.	  
Concerning	   the	   second	   competitive	   concern,	   namely	   possible	   collusive	   outcomes	   resulting	   from	  
category	  captaincy,	  the	  Guidelines	  of	  the	  Commission	  and	  reports	  of	  national	  competition	  authorities	  
highlight	   the	   risk	   that,	  when	   the	   same	   supplier	   serves	   as	   category	   captain	   for	   competing	   retailers,	  
category	   management	   arrangements	   may	   facilitate	   collusion	   between	   the	   latter	   as	   the	   supplier	  
provides	  common	  point	  of	  reference	  for	  pricing,	  promotion	  and	  product	  placement	  decisions.351	  Such	  
conspiracy,	  known	  as	  the	  “hub-­‐and-­‐spoke”	  theory,	  may	   in	   fact	  be	  driven	  and	  orchestrated	  by	   large	  
retailers	  or	   retailer	   cartels	  which	   can	  use	   their	   significant	  market	  power	   to	   coerce	   anticompetitive	  
conduct	   from	   manufacturers.352	   Buyer	   power	   may	   indeed	   be	   exercised	   to	   persuade	   a	   category	  
captain	   to	   administer	   minimum	   resale	   price	   fixing	   at	   competing	   retailers.	   As	   such,	   a	   retailer	   may	  
coerce	  a	  captain	  manufacturer	  to	  recommend	  supra-­‐competitive	  prices	  to	  the	  other	  retailers	  that	  the	  
captain	  in	  question	  also	  serves	  or	  to	  sell	  to	  those	  competing	  retailers	  only	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  the	  
latter	   do	   not	   resell	   the	   products	   below	   an	   agreed	   price.353	   Category	   captaincy	   and	   the	   close	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
350	  R.L.Steiner,	  op.cit.,	  at	  79.	  
351	  Guidelines	  on	  vertical	  restraints,	  op.cit.,	  at	  211.	  See	  also:	  FTC,	  Report	  on	  the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  
Workshop	  on	  slotting	  allowance,	  op.cit.,	  at	  52	  and	  Avis	  n°10-­‐A-­‐25	  du	  7	  décembre	  2010	  (France),	  op.cit.,	  at	  29-­‐
32.	  For	  example,	  “the	  category	  captain	  could	  make	  identical	  recommendations	  to	  all	  of	  the	  retailers	  and	  if	  each	  
retailer	  were	  aware	  of	  this	  practice,	  there	  would	  be	  less	  incentive	  for	  any	  one	  of	  them	  to	  deviate	  from	  the	  
recommendation”.	  (FTC	  Report,	  at	  52)	  
352	  See	  for	  examples	  in	  the	  United	  States:	  Klor’s	  v.	  Broadway-­‐Hale	  Stores,	  359	  U.S.	  207	  (1959)	  and	  Toys	  “R”	  Us,	  
Inc.	  v.	  FTC,	  221	  F.3d	  928	  (7th	  Cir.	  2000).	  Those	  cases	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  Chapter	  X	  devoted	  to	  the	  legislation	  
and	  case	  law	  in	  United	  States.	  
353	  L.S.Carameli,	  Jr,	  op.cit.,	  at	  1336.	  A	  retailer	  willing	  to	  raise	  prices	  is	  likely	  to	  lose	  a	  substantial	  number	  of	  
customers	  if	  it	  acts	  alone.	  Therefore,	  the	  retailer	  is	  incited	  to	  make	  its	  rivals	  set	  a	  similar	  high	  price	  for	  the	  
targeted	  product.	  	  A	  good	  illustration	  of	  such	  indirect	  exchange	  of	  information	  leading	  to	  a	  trilateral	  
anticompetitive	  agreement	  is	  the	  Replica	  Kit	  case	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  
upheld	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  Competition	  Appeal	  Tribunal	  concluding	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  anticompetitive	  
agreement	  between	  competing	  retailers	  even	  if	  exchange	  of	  information	  between	  those	  retailers	  was	  not	  
direct	  but	  took	  place	  through	  a	  common	  supplier.	  See:	  Cases	  1021/1/1/03	  and	  1022/1/1/03,	  JJB	  Sports	  Plc	  v	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relationship	  between	  retailers	  and	  suppliers	  involved	  by	  that	  practice	  is	  therefore	  likely	  to	  facilitate	  
indirect	   anticompetitive	   exchange	   of	   information	   between	   competitors	   leading	   to	   harmful	   tacit	  
collusion.	  
Category	   management	   could	   also	   lead	   to	   collusion	   between	   suppliers,	   especially	   when	   multiple	  
manufacturers	   act	   as	   co-­‐captains	   for	   a	   retailer.	   In	   such	   circumstances,	   increased	   opportunities	   to	  
exchange	   sensitive	   information	   are	   indeed	   likely	   to	   facilitate	   a	   common	   understanding	   between	  
competing	   suppliers	   on	   future	   pricing	   or	   promotional	   plans	   for	   instance.354	   As,	   in	   many	   cases,	  
retailers	   use	   to	   implement	   captains’	   recommendations	   without	   any	   change,	   it	   is	   easy	   for	   captain	  
manufacturers	  make	  their	  anticompetitive	  agreements	  effective	  in	  the	  shadow	  of	  their	  captaincy.	  
Finally,	  some	  argue	  that	  category	  management	  arrangements	  may	  dampen	  vertical	  competition	  and	  
lead	  to	  higher	  prices	  at	  the	  wholesale	  and	  the	  retail	  levels	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  consumers.	  According	  
to	  Steiner,	   just	  as	  do	   firms	  competing	  at	   the	   same	   level	  of	   the	   supply	   chain	  over	   sales,	  margins	  or	  
market	   shares,	   suppliers	   and	   retailers	   compete	   over	   prices	   in	   order	   to	   obtain	   a	   larger	   share	   of	   a	  
product’s	   retailer	   price	   and	   should	   as	   such	   be	   considered	   competitors.355	   If	   those	   firms	   cease	   to	  
compete	  and	  cooperate	  in	  order	  to	  raise	  margins	  at	  both	  stages,	  such	  truce	  on	  vertical	  competition	  
would	  ultimately	  result	   in	  higher	  prices	  for	  consumers.	  Where	  collaboration	  between	  suppliers	  and	  
retailers	  may	  create	  efficiencies	  and	  bring	  about	  better	  responses	  to	  consumers	  ‘need	  and	  wish,	  the	  
business	   technique	   of	   category	   captaincy	   lies	   in	   fact	   at	   the	   border	   line	   between	   pro-­‐	   and	   anti-­‐
competitive	  practices	  so	  that	  competition	  authorities	  should	  be	  attentive	  to	  the	  potential	  abuses	   it	  
may	  lead	  to.	  
Along	  with	  unjustified	  payments,	  transfer	  of	  risks/costs	  and	  other	  restrictions	  imposed	  on	  suppliers,	  
category	   management	   arrangements	   may	   therefore,	   in	   some	   circumstances,	   affect	   the	  
competitiveness	   of	   efficient	   suppliers	   and	   limit	   competition	   on	   the	  markets.	   Some	  harmful	   effects	  
resulting	   from	  such	  arrangements	  may	   in	   fact	  be	   the	  direct	   consequence	  of	   retailers’	  buyer	  power	  
exerted	   to	   restrict	   competition	   in	   the	   downstream	   retail	   market.	   All	   those	   practices	   mentioned	  
above	   can	   easily	   be	   implemented	   by	   big	   supermarket	   chains	   due,	   in	   particular,	   to	   their	   size,	   their	  
market	  share	   in	   the	  downstream	  market	  or	   the	   large	  part	   they	  account	   for	   in	  suppliers’	   total	   sales	  
but	   also	   due	   to	   their	   private	   label	   lines	   which	   increase	   even	   further	   their	   market	   power	   in	   the	  
upstream	  market.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
OFT;	  Allsport	  limited	  v	  OFT	  [2004]	  CAT	  17	  and	  Case	  2005/1071,	  1074	  and	  1623	  Argos	  Limited	  and	  Littlewoods	  
Limited	  v	  OFT	  and	  JJB	  Sports	  Plc	  v	  OFT	  [2006]	  EWCA	  Civ	  1318.	  
354	  Guidelines	  on	  vertical	  restraints,	  op.cit.,	  at	  212.	  
355	  R.L.Steiner,	  op.cit.,	  at	  79.	  See	  also:	  D.M.Desrochers,	  G.T.Gundlach	  &	  A.A.Foer,	  op.cit.,	  at	  207.	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3. Particular	  role	  of	  private	  label	  
Large	   supermarket	   chains	   are	   able	   to	   extract	   beneficial	   conditions	   from	   their	   suppliers	   due,	   in	  
particular,	   to	   their	   size	   and	   their	   market	   power	   in	   the	   downstream	   markets.	   However,	   another	  
factor,	   less	  obvious,	  has	  significantly	   improved	  the	  power	  of	   the	  retailers,	  namely	  the	  marketing	  of	  
their	   own-­‐brands.	   Also	   known	   as	   private	   labels,	   those	   products	   are	   sold	   under	   the	   brand	   of	   the	  
retailer	  or	  under	  another	  brand-­‐name	  controlled	  by	  the	  retailer.356	  Private	  label	  branding	  has	  evolved	  
from	  a	  single	  house	  brand	   to	  a	  more	  complicated	  structure	   included	  “value/low-­‐price”,	   “standard”	  
and	   “premium/high-­‐price”	   own-­‐brands	   and	   often	   supplemented	   with	   niche	   products	   such	   as	  
“organic”	   or	   “allergen-­‐free”	   private	   label	   lines.357	   The	   percentage	   of	   sales	   of	   own-­‐brand	   products	  
varies	   depending	   on	   the	   retailer,358	   the	   country359	   and	   the	   product	   category.360	   Even	   though	   own-­‐
brands	   can	   provide	   cost-­‐efficient	   alternatives	   to	   branded	   products	   for	   consumers,361	   they	   also	  
reinforce	   retailers’	   bargaining	   power	   in	   relation	   to	   their	   suppliers.	   Indeed,	   the	   existence	   and	   the	  
success	  of	  private	  labels	  increase	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  retailers’	  threats	  of	  de-­‐listing	  when	  suppliers	  
do	  not	  comply	  with	  their	  demands.	  
In	   addition,	   when	   those	   products	   are	   supplied	   by	   brand	   manufacturers,	   supermarkets	   are	   both	  
customers	   and	   direct	   competitors	   of	   their	   suppliers.	  Wearing	   those	   two	  hats,	   retailers	   are	   able	   to	  
exploit	  their	  position	  to	  their	  advantage.	  They	  may	  indeed,	  for	  examples,	  influence	  the	  sales	  of	  own-­‐
brand	   goods	   by	   putting	   them	   at	   customers’	   eye	   level,	   by	   reducing	   the	   shelf	   space	   available	   for	  
competitive	  brands	  or	  by	  pushing	  up	  prices	  of	  those	  branded	  products.362	  Branded	  manufacturers	  are	  
sometimes	  discontented	  with	   or	   even	   shocked	  by	   the	  high	  price	   set	   for	   some	  of	   their	   products	   in	  
supermarkets	  but	  are	   forced	  to	  accept	   the	  pricing	  policy	  of	   their	  customers.	   It	   is	  worth	  also	  noting	  
that,	  as	  customers	  of	  branded	  product	  suppliers,	  retailers	  are	  in	  possession	  of	  sensitive	  commercial	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
356	  The	  economic	  benefits	  of	  retailer	  own-­‐brands,	  prepared	  for	  the	  European	  Retail	  Round	  Table,	  Oxera,	  
September	  2010,	  at	  3.	  	  
357	  Ibid.,	  at	  16.	  
358	  Some	  supermarkets	  stock	  almost	  exclusively	  private	  labels,	  such	  as	  Aldi,	  while	  others	  offer	  a	  mix	  of	  private	  
labels	  and	  branded	  products	  (Carrefour,	  Delhaize,	  Albert	  Heijn	  or	  Tesco)	  	  
359	  The	  average	  percentage	  of	  sales	  represented	  by	  own-­‐brands	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  amounts	  to	  25-­‐30%	  but	  
this	  percentage	  can	  go	  up	  to	  more	  than	  40%	  in	  some	  countries,	  as	  in	  Switzerland	  or	  in	  the	  UK.	  
360	  Huge	  differences	  in	  the	  success	  of	  private	  labels	  can	  be	  observed	  between	  product	  categories.	  The	  highest	  
market	  shares	  concern	  products	  like	  milk,	  meat,	  fish,	  ready	  meals	  or	  vegetables.	  For	  beauty	  products,	  care	  
products	  or	  baby	  food	  consumers	  show	  a	  clear-­‐cut	  preference	  for	  branded	  goods.	  See:	  H.K.Nordas,	  M.Geloso	  
Grosso	  &	  E.Pinali,	  Market	  Structure	  in	  the	  Distribution	  Sector	  and	  Merchandise	  trade,	  OECD	  Trade	  Policy	  
Working	  Papers	  No.68,	  at	  19-­‐21	  (2008)	  
361	  Price	  differences	  between	  brands	  and	  own-­‐brands	  amount	  up	  to	  more	  than	  48%	  in	  some	  European	  
countries.	  	  
362	  M.	  Vander	  Stichele	  &	  B.Young,	  op.cit.,	  at	  28.	  On	  other	  tactics	  used	  by	  retailers	  to	  promote	  own-­‐brand	  sales	  
to	  the	  detriment	  of	  industrial	  brands,	  see:	  The	  impact	  of	  private	  labels	  on	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  European	  
food	  supply	  chain,	  LEI	  Study	  commissioned	  by	  the	  European	  Commission,	  DG	  for	  Enterprise	  and	  Industry,	  The	  
Hague,	  January	  2011,	  at	  43-­‐44.	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information	   such	   as	   promotions	   or	  marketing	   plans	   of	   the	   branded	   products.363	   Such	   information,	  
normally	  unknown	  by	  competitors,	  gives	  supermarkets	  an	  additional	  advantage	  for	  the	  marketing	  of	  
its	  own	  products.	  It	  happens	  for	  example	  that	  a	  retailer	  asks	  for	  more	  details	  about	  a	  new	  product	  a	  
supplier	  is	  willing	  to	  sell	  and,	  while	  finally	  refusing	  stock	  that	  product,	  uses	  the	  same	  details	  to	  create	  
a	  similar	  product	  sold	  under	  their	  own	  label.	  
The	  Commission	  has	  recognised	  in	  different	  merger	  decisions	  those	  various	  competitive	  advantages	  
that	  private	  labels	  give	  to	  supermarket	  chains.	  For	  examples,	  it	  noted	  that,	  as	  those	  products	  are	  not	  
sold	  by	  competitors,	  the	  retailer	  may	  fix	  the	  prices	  without	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  reaction	  of	  other	  
retail	   chains	   as	   it	   is	   generally	   the	   case	   with	   branded	   products.	   Furthermore,	   even	   though	   private	  
labels	  are	  generally	  sold	  at	  lower	  retail	  price	  than	  branded	  products,	  the	  margins	  on	  the	  former	  are	  
generally	  higher.364	  365	  The	  incentive	  to	  launch	  private	  labels	  is	  therefore	  high.	  
Where	   the	   success	   of	   private	   label	   products	   reinforces	   retailers’	   buyer	   power	   with	   regard	   to	  
branded-­‐products	  manufacturers,	  producers	  of	  those	  own-­‐brand	  products	  are	  not	  spared	  from	  large	  
retailers’	   pressures	   either.	   It	   appears	   that	   the	   creation	   of	   private	   label	   lines	   has	   allowed	   the	  
development	  of	  small	  and	  medium	  sized	  enterprises	  (SMEs)	  by	  increasing	  their	  market	  outlets	  and	  by	  
giving	  them	  additional	  opportunities	   to	  have	  access	  to	  various	  consumer	  bases	  that	   they	  could	  not	  
have	   reached	  but	   through	   the	  production	  of	  own-­‐brand	  products.	  However,	   the	   situation	  of	   those	  
suppliers	   is	  unsecure	  as	   they	  are	  also	  subject	   to	  retailers’	  significant	  buyer	  power.	  The	  purchase	  of	  
private	  label	  products	  is	  often	  made	  through	  bidding	  procedures	  based	  on	  specifications	  with	  regard	  
to	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   products	   and	   other	   contractual	   terms.	   Using,	   in	   addition,	   a	   multi-­‐source	  
procurement	   strategy,	   retailers	   are	   hence	   able	   to	   compare	   price	   offers	   from	   suppliers	   in	   several	  
countries	  and	  to	  select	  multiple	  sources	  of	  supply	  so	   that	   they	  are	  not	  dependent	  upon	  one	  single	  
supplier.	   The	   short-­‐term	   nature	   of	   those	   arrangements,	   and	   the	   availability	   of	   other	   sources	   of	  
supply,	  give	  indeed	  supermarkets	  the	  possibility	  to	  switch	  easily	  at	  minimal	  cost	  to	  another	  business	  
partner	  should	  their	  suppliers	  be	  no	  longer	  capable	  of	  meeting	  their	  requirements.366	  Such	  unstable	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
363	  R.Scheelings,	  &	  R.S.Wright,	  ‘Sui	  Generis’?:	  An	  Antitrust	  Analysis	  of	  Buyer	  Power	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  
European	  Union,	  39	  Akron	  Law	  Review	  207,	  at	  242	  (2006).	  
364	  See:	  Kesko/Tuko,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.784,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  20	  November	  1996,	  at	  130.	  Those	  merger	  
cases	  will	  be	  further	  developed	  in	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  II,	  Point	  B.	  
365	  Private	  labels	  may	  indeed	  be	  supplied	  at	  significantly	  lower	  cost	  than	  branded	  products	  as	  suppliers	  do	  not	  
have	  to	  pay	  slotting	  allowances	  or	  other	  fees	  to	  market	  their	  products	  and	  may	  save	  on	  brand	  marketing	  costs.	  
As	  a	  result,	  retailers	  are	  able	  to	  price	  private	  labels	  below	  brands	  while	  still	  earning	  a	  high	  margin.	  See:	  The	  
impact	  of	  private	  labels	  on	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  European	  food	  supply	  chain,	  LEI	  Study	  commissioned	  by	  
the	  European	  Commission,	  DG	  for	  Enterprise	  and	  Industry,	  The	  Hague,	  January	  2011.	  
366	  See	  for	  examples:	  Granaria/Ültje/Intersnack/May	  Holding,	  Case	  No	  COMP/JV.32,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  28	  
February	  2000,	  at	  48;	  SCA	  Hygiene	  Prodcuts/Cartoinvest,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.2522,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  21	  March	  
2002,	  at	  31;	  Sovion/S	  Fleisch,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3968,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  21	  December	  2005,	  at	  76.	  Those	  
merger	  cases	  will	  be	  further	  developed	  below.	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situation	   is	   risky	   for	   manufacturers	   as	   the	   specific	   investments	   made	   to	   meet	   their	   customer’s	  
specifications	  are	  very	   likely	  to	  be	   lost	   in	  case	  of	  sudden	  termination	  of	  business	  relationships	  with	  
that	  retailer.	  
The	   result	   of	   such	  power,	  which	   enables	   large	  distributors	   to	   dictate	   the	   rules	   to	   their	   advantage,	  
may	  lead	  to	  a	  reduced	  choice	  on	  the	  shelves	  between,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  private	  label	  and,	  on	  the	  
other	  hand,	  only	  one	  primary	  and	  possibly	  another	  secondary	  brands.	  The	  proliferation	  of	  own-­‐labels	  
in	  consumer	  goods	  may	  also	  have	  some	  effects	  on	  innovation.	  Concerning	  that	  matter,	  the	  opinions	  
are	  not	  unanimous	  and	  are	  even	  contradictory.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  introduction	  of	  private	   labels	  
may	   increase	   the	   competitive	   pressure	   on	   branded	  manufacturers	   and	   incite	   them	   to	   lower	   their	  
prices	  as	  well	  as	  to	  increase	  quality	  and	  innovation	  to	  differentiate	  their	  products.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
the	  proliferation	  of	  own-­‐brand	  products	  may	   lead	   to	   the	  opposite	   result.	   Facing	  distributors	  which	  
systematically	   copy	   their	   innovative	   products,	   branded	   products	   suppliers	   have	   to	   bear	   the	  
consequences	  of	  private	  label	  “free-­‐riding”	  with	  reduced	  returns	  to	  innovation	  and	  may	  be	  therefore	  
discouraged	   from	  making	   further	   investments.367	   It	   is	   though	   through	   such	   investment	   in	   product	  
innovation,	  quality	  and	  advertising	  that	  producers	  ensure	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  strong	  brand	  image	  and	  
thereby	  protect	  their	  precious	  shelf-­‐space.	  
This	  controversy	  about	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  increasing	  presence	  of	  own-­‐brand	  products	  on	  the	  shelves	  
is	  part	  of	  the	  greater	  debate	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  on	  the	  markets.	  
4. Potential	  effects	  within	  the	  supply	  chain	  
The	  practices	  described	  above	  may	  entail	  positive	  and/or	  negative	  effects	  on	  the	  markets.	  
However,	  no	  actual	  consensus	  exists	  on	  that	  matter.	   Indeed,	  politicians,	  economists	  and	  academics	  
present	   different	   views	   concerning	   the	   possible	   benefits	   and	   drawbacks	   of	   supermarkets’	   buyer	  
power.	   While	   the	   short-­‐term	   beneficial	   effects	   of	   buyer	   power	   on	   consumers	   are	   generally	   not	  
disputed,	  dissension	  emerges	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  potential	  long-­‐run	  harmful	  effects	  of	  some	  practices,	  
not	  only	  on	  smaller	  retailers	  and	  other	  market	  participants	  in	  the	  upstream	  markets	  but	  also	  on	  end-­‐
users.	  The	  difficulty	   is	  probably	   to	   separate	   the	  natural	  and	  necessary	  consequences	  of	   strong	  and	  
beneficial	   competition	  on	   the	  markets	  –	  which	  may	  be	   the	  exclusion	  of	   smaller	   firms	   -­‐	   from	   those	  
which	   in	   fact	   constitute	   restrictions	   on	   competition	   in	   the	   retail	   or	   procurement	  market.	  Only	   the	  
latter	  may	  justify	  action	  against	  the	  practices	  which	  originally	  cause	  those	  anticompetitive	  effects.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
367	  See:	  A.Ezrachi,	  Unchallenged	  market	  power?	  The	  tale	  of	  supermarkets,	  private	  labels	  and	  competition	  law,	  
33	  World	  competition	  257	  (2010)	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a) (Potential)	  Effects	  on	  suppliers368	  
Suppliers	   are	   directly	   subject	   to	   buyer	   power	   of	   large	   retailers.	   Forced	   to	   cut	   prices,	   to	   pay	  
allowances	  to	  remain	  on	  the	  shelves	  and	  to	  bear	  other	  (non-­‐)financial	  burden,	  they	  may	  be	  forced	  to	  
continue	   operations	  which	   are	   less	   or	   no	   longer	   profitable.	   In	   the	   long-­‐term,	   the	   exercise	   of	   such	  
power	  may	   therefore	   threaten	   the	   viability	  of	   some	  of	   those	  processors.369	   In	   addition,	   as	  pointed	  
out	   for	   example	   by	   the	   UK	   Competition	   Commission	   in	   its	   report	   on	   the	   grocery	   markets,	   some	  
practices	  may	  adversely	  affect	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  some	  suppliers	  and	  distort	  competition	  in	  the	  
procurement	  market.	  The	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  may	  in	  fact	  discourage	  suppliers	  to	  invest	  on	  new	  
product	   development	   and	   innovation,	   leading	   to	   a	   decrease	   in	   product	   variety	   and	   quality	   for	  
consumers.370	  With	   regard	   to	   that	   last	   concern	  and	  as	   it	  has	  already	  be	  mentioned	  concerning	   the	  
success	   of	   private	   labels,	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   may	   also	   enhance	   suppliers’	   incentives	   to	  
innovate	  and	  invest	  in	  order	  to	  differentiate	  their	  product	  or	  make	  them	  more	  attractive	  and	  ,	  as	  a	  
result,	  to	  strengthen	  their	  own	  bargaining	  power	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  their	  distributors.	  With	  a	  superior	  product	  
at	   hand,	   the	   supplier	   is	   indeed	   likely	   to	   expand	   its	   outside	   options	   -­‐	   as	   it	   will	   be	   easier	   to	   find	  
alternative	  retailers	  interested	  in	  buying	  its	  new	  or	  improved	  product	  -­‐,	  but	  also	  to	  increase	  the	  loss	  
inflicted	  to	  its	  customer	  in	  case	  of	  failure	  in	  negotiation.371	  The	  theoretical	  prediction	  on	  the	  effects	  
of	  buyer	  power	  on	   investment	  and	   innovation	  are	   in	   fact	  mixed	  and	  quite	  unclear.	   The	  High	   Level	  
Group	  on	  the	  Competitiveness	  of	  the	  Agro-­‐Food	   Industry	   (HLG)372	  nevertheless	  notes	  that	  pressure	  
on	  industry	  actors	  is	  considerable,	  especially	  on	  the	  SMEs	  which	  have	  a	  persistent	  lack	  of	  resources.	  
As	   a	   result,	   they	   have	   very	   limited	   capability	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   uncertainties	   and	   risks	   inferred	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368	  Most	  of	  those	  effects	  described	  below	  with	  regard	  to	  suppliers	  and	  smaller	  retailers	  have	  been	  highlighted	  
by	  national	  competition	  authorities	  in	  various	  reports	  on	  the	  distribution	  sector.	  See	  for	  example:	  	  Avis	  n°	  04-­‐A-­‐
18	  du	  18	  octobre	  2004	  relatif	  à	  une	  demande	  d’avis	  présentée	  par	  l’Union	  Fédérale	  des	  Consommateurs	  (UFC-­‐
Que	  Choisir)	  relative	  aux	  conditions	  de	  la	  concurrence	  dans	  le	  secteur	  de	  la	  grande	  distribution	  non	  spécialisée;	  
Report	  of	  the	  Nordic	  Competition	  Authorities	  –“Nordic	  Food	  Markets	  -­‐	  a	  taste	  for	  competition”,	  November	  
2005;	  UK	  Competition	  Commission,	  Groceries	  Market	  Investigation	  (2008).	  	  
369	  P.W.Dobson,	  &	  R.Inderst,	  The	  Waterbed	  Effect:	  Where	  buying	  and	  selling	  power	  come	  together,	  2008	  
Wisconsin	  Law	  Review	  331,	  at	  345.	  
370	  UK	  Competition	  Commission,	  Supermarkets:	  A	  Report	  on	  the	  Supply	  of	  Groceries	  from	  Multiple	  Stores	  in	  the	  
United	  Kingdom	  (2000)	  
371	  Doyle,	  C.	  &	  Inderst,	  R.,	  Some	  Economics	  on	  the	  treatment	  of	  Buyer	  Power	  in	  Antitrust,	  28	  European	  
Competition	  Law	  Review	  210,	  at	  217	  (2007).	  See	  also:	  R.Inderst	  &	  C.Wey,	  Countervailing	  power	  and	  dynamic	  
efficiency,	  9	  Journal	  of	  the	  European	  Economic	  Association	  702	  (2011).	  “"The	  presence	  of	  fewer	  but	  larger	  
buyers	  can	  keep	  a	  supplier	  on	  its	  toes	  and,	  thereby,	  increase	  incentives	  to	  invest	  in	  greater	  efficiency."	  	  
372	  The	  HLG	  was	  set	  up	  in	  2008	  and	  is	  mandated	  to	  identity	  the	  factors	  that	  can	  influence	  the	  competitive	  
position	  of	  the	  European	  Agri-­‐Food	  Industry	  and	  to	  formulate	  recommendations	  for	  actions	  addressed	  to	  policy	  
makers	  in	  order	  to	  enhance	  the	  sustainable	  development	  and	  competitive	  position	  of	  the	  sector.	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research	   and	   innovation	   project.373	   On	   that	   matter,	   the	   HLG	   points	   out	   that	   the	   level	   of	   R&D	  
investments	  is	  low	  and	  that	  further	  opportunities	  are	  to	  be	  exploited.374	  
Some	  argue	  that	  it	  would	  not	  be	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  retailers	  to	  squeeze	  their	  suppliers	  so	  hard	  as	  to	  
force	   them	  to	  give	  up	  business	   since	   this	  might	   in	   turn	  weaken	   their	  own	  bargaining	  position	  with	  
regard	   to	   the	   few	   remaining	   sellers.375	   It	   would	   neither	   be	   in	   their	   interest	   to	   affect	   suppliers’	  
incentives	  to	  innovate	  as	  retailers’	  position	  in	  the	  downstream	  market	  is	  closely	  linked	  to	  the	  quality	  
and	  variety	  of	  the	  products	  they	  offer	  to	  consumers.376	  Where	  those	  arguments	  are	  rational,	  it	  seems	  
nevertheless	  that	  they	  do	  not	  always	  prevail,	  especially	  for	  undifferentiated	  products.	  Indeed,	  where	  
retailers	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  maintaining	  viable	  sources	  of	  supply,	   it	   is	  doubtful	  whether	  they	  would	  
be	  willing	  to	  forego	  exercising	  their	  market	  power	  and	  benefiting	  from	  non-­‐cost	  related	  concessions	  
in	   view	   of	   the	   potential	   long-­‐term	   negative	   impact	   that	   may	   cause	   to	   suppliers.	   Although	   the	  
resulting	   outcome	   is	   often	   not	   intended,	   pressures	   exercised	   by	   a	   large	   retailer	   do	   drive	   some	  
suppliers	  out	  of	   the	  market	  because	   firms	  generally	   look	  at	   their	   short-­‐term	  profit	   rather	   than	   the	  
dire	   consequences	   their	   conduct	   is	   likely	   to	   cause.	   	   In	   addition,	   as	   each	   retailer	  may	   assume	   that	  
other	   large	   competing	   buyers	   will,	   in	   all	   likelihood,	   exert	   their	   market	   power	   over	   suppliers,	   it	  
becomes	   obvious	   that	   no	   one	  will	   run	   the	   risk	   of	   losing	   a	   competitive	   advantage	   by	   giving	   better	  
conditions	   to	   branded	  manufacturers	   for	   the	   same	   products.	   377	   In	   fact,	   the	   recent	   financial	   crisis	  
confirms	   that	  market	  participants	  often	   act	   in	   accordance	  with	   their	   short-­‐term	   interests	  only	   and	  
seem	  to	  minimize	  or	  to	  overshadow	  the	  long-­‐term	  effects	  of	  their	  action.378	  
b) (Potential)	  Effects	  on	  smaller	  retailers	  
Concerning	  the	  other	  retailers,	   it	   is	  clear	  that	  smaller	  distributors	  are	  unable	  to	  negotiate	  discounts	  
and	   other	   benefits	   like	   those	   obtained	   by	   their	   powerful	   competitors.	   They	   are	  de	   facto	   in	   a	   less	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
373	  Report	  on	  the	  Competitiveness	  of	  the	  European	  Agro-­‐Food	  Industry,	  High	  level	  Group	  on	  the	  
Competitiveness	  of	  the	  Agro-­‐Food	  Industry,	  17	  March	  2009,	  at	  13.	  
374	  Ibid.,	  at	  10.	  
375T.A.	  Piraino,	  	  op.cit.,	  at	  834.	  
376	  H.Mullan,	  op.cit.,	  at	  152.	  	  
377	  J.B.Kirkwood,	  Powerful	  buyers	  and	  merger	  enforcement,	  Seattle	  University	  School	  of	  Law	  Research	  Paper	  
No.	  13-­‐04	  (2012),	  at	  55,	  available	  at:	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1809985	  	  
	  
378	  See:	  A.R.Ganesh,	  The	  Right	  to	  Food	  and	  Buyer	  Power,	  11	  German	  Law	  Journal	  1190,	  at	  1212	  (2010).	  Ganesh	  
refers	  to	  banks’	  practices	  which	  led	  to	  the	  worldwide	  banking	  and	  financial	  crisis.	  “The	  events	  of	  the	  past	  two	  
years	  have	  not	  inspired	  confidence	  in	  the	  propensity	  of,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  the	  banking	  sector	  to	  self-­‐regulate	  in	  
accordance	  with	  its	  long-­‐term	  interests,	  and	  nothing	  particularly	  distinguished	  in	  this	  regard	  them	  from	  other	  
private	  profit-­‐making	  actors.	  Indeed,	  on	  may	  suspect	  that	  a	  firm	  that	  gets	  into	  particular	  habits	  of	  dealing	  with	  
its	  suppliers	  over	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time	  will	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  change	  them.	  Again	  in	  the	  2008	  Groceries	  Market	  
Investigation	  in	  the	  UK,	  the	  CC	  found	  that	  of	  the52	  practices	  identified	  in	  a	  similar	  market	  investigation	  carried	  
out	  in	  2000	  and	  accordingly	  listed	  in	  the	  Supermarkets	  Code	  of	  Practice	  (SCOP),	  20	  of	  them	  still	  being	  practices	  
eight	  years	  later	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  2008	  investigation.”	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advantageous	  situation	  to	  compete	  in	  the	  retail	  downstream	  market.	  Those	  competitive	  advantages	  
acquired	   by	   large	   supermarkets	   may	   yet	   result	   from	   totally	   lawful	   practices	   and	   reflect	   higher	  
efficiencies.379	  The	  harm	  inflicted	  to	  smaller	  rivals,	  such	  as	  lower	  margins	  or	  exclusion	  in	  some	  cases,	  
is	   therefore	  not	  necessarily	   the	   result	  of	  unlawful	   conduct	  but	  may	  be	   the	  natural	   consequence	  of	  
fierce	   competition	   on	   the	   markets.	   However,	   practices	   inciting	   suppliers	   to	   boycott	   a	   competing	  
retailer	  for	  example	  or	  restricting	  their	  freedom	  to	  offer	  better	  conditions	  to	  rivals	  do	  not	  result	  from	  
higher	   efficiency	   but	   from	   the	   unlawful	   exercise	   of	  market	   power	  which	   is	   only	  meant	   to	   restrict	  
competition	  on	  the	  markets.	  Less	  advantageous	  contractual	  conditions	  obtained	  by	  small	  retailers	  or	  
exclusion	  of	  those	  firms	  from	  the	  market	  become	  therefore	  a	  competitive	  concern	  only	  where	  they	  
result	  or	  are	  likely	  to	  result	  from	  conduct	  restricting	  competition.	  
According	   to	   some	   analysts,	   differentials	   in	   contractual	   conditions	   between	   large	   and	   smaller	  
retailers	   may	   be	   strengthened	   by	   a	   possible	   phenomenon	   called	   the	   “waterbed	   effect”.	   Such	   an	  
effect	   occurs	   where	   suppliers,	   in	   order	   to	   recoup	   the	   squeezed	   margins	   resulting	   from	   their	  
transactions	   with	   powerful	   supermarkets,	   charge	   higher	   prices	   to	   smaller	   retailers.	   Consequently,	  
large	  buyers	  are	  given	  a	  twofold	  advantage:	  they	  obtain	  better	  terms	  of	  supply	  while	  their	  rivals	  are	  
facing	  higher	  purchasing	  costs.	   380	   It	   is	  nevertheless	  a	  debatable	  relationship	  since	  one	  may	  wonder	  
why	   the	   supplier	  would	  be,	  as	  a	   result	  of	   the	  exercise	  of	   large	   supermarkets’	  power,	   in	  a	   stronger	  
position	   to	   extract	   a	   higher	   price	   from	   the	   other	   distributors	  while	   it	   was	   apparently	   not	   feasible	  
beforehand.	   Different	   reasons	   may	   yet	   be	   put	   forward	   to	   explain	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   waterbed	  
effect.	  Firstly,	  some	  argue	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  powerful	  buyers	  will	  force	  suppliers	  to	  exit	  or	  merge	  
with	  other	   suppliers,	   leading	   to	   a	  more	   consolidated	  upstream	  market.	  As	   a	   result,	   smaller	  buyers	  
will	  be	  more	  affected	  by	  the	  emergence	  of	  stronger	  sellers	  and	  be	  unable	  to	  prevent	  a	  deterioration	  
of	  their	  purchasing	  conditions.	  Secondly,	  the	  bargaining	  position	  of	   less	  powerful	  retailers	  may	  also	  
be	  weakened	  due	  the	  growth	  of	  large	  retail	  chains	  in	  the	  downstream	  market	  as	  their	  smaller	  volume	  
of	  purchases	  makes	  them	  less	  attractive	  for	  suppliers.	  The	  costs	  advantage	  of	  big	  supermarkets	  may	  
indeed	   enable	   those	   firms	   to	   take	   sales	   from	   smaller	   retailers	   who	   will,	   thereby,	   be	   in	   a	   weaker	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
379	  A.Piraino,	  op.cit.,	  at	  833.	  	  Ganesh	  refers	  to	  banks’	  practices	  which	  led	  to	  the	  worldwide	  banking	  and	  financial	  
crisis.	  	  
380	  P.Dobson	  &	  R.Inderst,	  op.cit.,	  at	  336-­‐337.	  See	  also:	  P.Dobson	  &	  R.Inderst,	  Differential	  Buyer	  Power	  and	  the	  
Waterbed	  Effect	  :	  Do	  Strong	  Buyers	  Benefit	  or	  Harm	  Consumers	  ?,	  28	  European	  Competition	  Law	  Review	  393	  
(2007).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  some	  argue	  that	  an	  “anti-­‐waterbed	  effect”	  may	  arise	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  presence	  
of	  powerful	  distributors	  is	  likely	  to	  improve	  the	  purchasing	  conditions	  of	  all	  other	  retailers	  as	  well.	  One	  of	  the	  
reasons	  invoked	  to	  justify	  such	  an	  allegation	  is	  that	  suppliers,	  by	  granting	  the	  same	  advantages	  to	  smaller	  
buyers,	  ensure	  that	  those	  parties,	  which	  constitute	  alternative	  channels	  to	  access	  consumers,	  will	  remain	  active	  
in	  the	  market.	  It	  is	  indeed	  not	  in	  the	  suppliers’	  interest	  to	  indirectly	  contribute	  to	  a	  further	  increase	  in	  
concentration	  in	  the	  retail	  market.	  See:	  P.Dobson	  &	  R.Inderst,	  The	  waterbed	  effect…,	  op.cit.,	  at	  353.	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position	  to	  negotiate	  discounts,	  especially	  if	  these	  depend	  on	  the	  buyer’s	  size.381	  	  Finally,	  the	  decision	  
to	   charge	   higher	   prices	   to	   smaller	   buyers	   may	   be	   a	   last	   resort	   solution	   available	   for	   suppliers	   to	  
maintain	  sufficient	  margin.	  Although	  they	  may	  not	  be	  willing	  to	  worsen	  their	  small	  customers’	  buying	  
conditions	  to	  prevent	  further	  consolidation	  in	  the	  buyer	  market,	  producers	  are	  nevertheless	  likely	  to	  
end	  up	  increasing	  prices	  where	  they	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  do	  so	  if	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  no	  other	  option	  
is	  available	  to	  compensate	  the	  sharp	  drop	  in	  profits	  caused	  by	  large	  retailers’	  buyer	  power.	  
Regarding	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  differentials	  in	  supply	  terms,	  it	  may	  be	  expected	  that,	   in	  the	  short-­‐run,	  
all	   retail	   prices	   will	   decrease	   as	   large	   retailers	   will	   pass	   on	   their	   lower	   costs	   to	   consumers	   while	  
smaller	  retailers,	  despite	  their	  higher	  purchasing	  costs,	  will	  be	  incited	  to	  lower	  prices	  as	  well	  in	  order	  
to	   remain	   competitive	   in	   the	   downstream	   market.	   However,	   facing	   squeezed	   profit-­‐margins,	   the	  
latter	  may	   end	   up	   exiting	   the	  market	   in	   the	   longer-­‐term.	   Furthermore,	   as	   size	   and	   the	   volume	   of	  
purchase	  of	  big-­‐box	  stores	  enable	  them,	  among	  other	  things,	  to	  exercise	  buyer	  power	  and	  to	  extract	  
a	  better	  deal	   from	  suppliers,	   this	  may	  deter	  any	   small-­‐scale	  entry.	  The	   fear	   to	  be	  at	  a	   competitive	  
disadvantage	   compared	   to	   the	   large	   incumbents,	  who	  enjoy	   lower	  purchasing	  prices,	   and	   the	   fear	  
that	  a	  waterbed	  effect	  might	  further	  worsen	  their	  position,	  constitutes	  indeed	  a	  barrier	  to	  entry	  for	  
potential	   new	  entrants.	   	   Added	   to	   the	   exit	   of	   existing	   retailers,	   this	  may	   amplify	  market	   power	   of	  
large	  retail	  chains	  both	  in	  the	  upstream	  and	  in	  the	  downstream	  markets.382	  
In	  its	  market	  investigation	  in	  the	  supply	  of	  groceries,	  the	  UK	  Competition	  Commission	  addressed	  the	  
issue	  of	  discrepancies	  between	  the	  prices	  paid	  to	  suppliers	  by	  large	  retailers	  and	  the	  prices	  paid	  by	  
convenience	  store	  operators.	  It	  was	  established	  that,	  in	  some	  cases,	  the	  four	  largest	  retail	  chains	  may	  
pay	   10%	   less	   than	   their	   competitors.	  However,	   even	   if	   those	  better	   conditions	  may	  be	  due	   to	   the	  
exercise	  of	  buyer	  power,	   the	  analysis	   showed	   that	   there	   is	   also	  a	   close	   relationship	  between	  price	  
and	   volume	   which	   reflect	   economies	   of	   scale.	   In	   addition,	   the	   UK	   Competition	   Commission	  
considered	  that	  smaller	  retailers	  often	  act	  in	  the	  procurement	  market	  through	  buying	  groups	  and	  are	  
hence	  able	  to	  exercise	  greater	  bargaining	  power	  over	  suppliers.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  difference	  in	  prices	  
was	   found	   not	   to	   have	   an	   anticompetitive	   effect	   on	   the	   markets.383	   With	   regard	   to	   the	   possible	  
waterbed	  effect,	  the	  report	  reveals	  that	  the	  circumstances	  under	  which	  such	  an	  effect	  would	  occur	  
were	  unlikely	  to	  arise	  in	  the	  UK	  grocery	  retailing.384	  Underlining	  that	  the	  waterbed	  effect	  might	  also	  
be	  based	  on	  non-­‐price	  factors,	  the	  UK	  Competition	  Commission	  noted	  that	  when	  demand	  from	  large	  
customers	   increases	   or	  when	   those	   firms	   require	   improved	   services,	   smaller	   retailers	   are	   likely	   to	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  R.Inderst	  &	  N.Mazzarotto,	  op.cit.,	  at	  1966.	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  P.Dobson	  &	  R.Inderst,	  The	  waterbed	  effect…,	  op.cit.,	  at	  352.	  
383	  UK	  Competition	  Commission,	  Groceries	  Market	  Investigation	  (2008),	  at	  5.26.	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  Ibid.,	  at	  5.28.	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experience	  supply	  shortages	  or	  lower	  levels	  of	  services.385	  However,	  it	  was	  held	  that	  for	  a	  waterbed	  
effect	   to	   arise,	   those	   differentials	   would	   need	   to	   persist	   and	   widen	   over	   time.	   Considering	   that	  
readjustment	  may	  be	  expected	  in	  UK	  grocery	  retailing,	  the	  Competition	  Commission	  concluded	  that	  a	  
non-­‐price	  waterbed	  effect	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  present.386	  
c) Virtuous	  or	  vicious	  circle?	  
The	  long-­‐run	  effects	  of	  large	  retailers’	  power	  can	  be	  envisaged	  either	  in	  a	  virtuous	  or	  a	  vicious	  circle.	  
In	  its	  positive	  version,	  buyer	  power	  will	  enable	  supermarkets	  to	  offer	  lower	  prices	  to	  their	  customers	  
and	   will	   thus	   lead	   to	   a	   further	   growth	   in	   sales.	   As	   a	   result	   of	   that	   reinforced	   power	   in	   the	   retail	  
market,	  they	  will	  be	  able	  to	  obtain	  additional	  discounts	  and	  better	  conditions	  from	  their	  suppliers	  to	  
the	  benefit	  again	  of	  consumers	  in	  the	  downstream	  markets.	  
In	  its	  negative	  version,	  however,	  the	  exercise	  of	  excessive	  market	  power	  on	  the	  buying	  side	  will	  give	  
rise	   to	   a	   spiral	   effect	   harming	  most	   actors	   in	   the	   supply	   chain.	   In	   fact,	   as	   already	  mentioned,	   the	  
lower	  costs	  and	  other	  benefits	  enjoyed	  by	  large	  buyers	  will	  constitute	  competitive	  advantages	  in	  the	  
retail	  market	  when	  they	  act	  as	  sellers.387	  They	  will	  be	  able,	  without	  even	  practicing	  predatory	  prices,	  
to	  offer	   lower	  prices	  to	  consumers	  and	  to	  force	  therefore	  some	  smaller	  retailers	  to	  withdraw	  from	  
the	  market.	  The	  strengthened	  position	  acquired	  by	  those	  distributors	  in	  the	  sales	  market	  combined	  
with	  the	  resulting	  reinforced	  power	  in	  the	  procurement	  market	  will	  lead	  to	  reducing	  the	  intensity	  of	  
competition	   in	  both	  the	  up-­‐	  and	  downstream	  markets.388	  As	  a	   result,	  consumers	  will	   face	  a	   limited	  
number	   of	   distributors,	   probably	   less	   incited	   to	   pass	   on	   the	   lower	   prices	   obtained	   from	   their	  
suppliers,	  and	  will	  suffer	  from	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  quality	  and	  variety	  of	  the	  products	  on	  the	  shelves.	  
While	  the	  virtuous	  circle	  described	  above	  is	  probably	  too	  idealistic	  a	  view	  of	  the	  long-­‐run	  effects	  of	  
buyer	  power	  on	  the	  markets,	  the	  negative	  spiral	  effect	  may	  be,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  too	  pessimistic.	  
However,	   despite	   the	   uncertainties	   surrounding	   supermarkets’	   buyer	   power,	   one	   can	   assume	   that	  
buyer	  power	  is	  likely	  to	  reinforce	  seller	  power	  in	  the	  downstream	  market	  and	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  
d) (Potential	  )Effects	  on	  consumers	  
The	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  is	  generally	  viewed	  as	  beneficial	  for	  consumers,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  short-­‐run.	  
Indeed,	  the	  lower	  prices	  obtained	  by	  retailers	  from	  their	  suppliers	  will	  in	  most	  cases	  be	  passed	  on	  to	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  Ibid.,	  at	  5.39.	  
386	  Ibid.,	  at	  5.40.	  
387	  Those	  competitive	  advantages	  will	  be	  even	  greater	  in	  case	  of	  a	  “waterbed	  effect”.	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  P.W.DOBSON,	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  A.CHU,	  op.cit.,	  at	  28.	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consumers.389	  The	  European	  Commission	  has	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  retail	  sector	  remains	  competitive	  
with	   frequent	  “price	  wars”	  between	  supermarkets,	   forcing	   them	  thus	   to	  deliver	   the	  best	  prices	   for	  
their	   customers.390	   Furthermore,	   in	   some	   circumstances,	   buyer	   power	   can	   be	   used	   as	   a	  
countervailing	   power	   against	   powerful	   manufacturers	   producing	   “must-­‐carry”	   brands.	   In	   such	  
situations	  of	  bilateral	  market	  power,	  the	  pressures	  exercised	  by	  retailers	  will	  prevent	  those	  powerful	  
suppliers	  from	  increasing	  prices	  and	  help	  to	  bring	  them	  down	  toward	  the	  competitive	  level.391	  
However,	  the	  long-­‐run	  effects	  of	  buyer	  power	  on	  consumers	  are	  much	  less	  certain.	  	  In	  the	  worst	  case	  
scenario	  and	  following	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  spiral	  effect	  described	  above,	  supermarkets’	  power	  may	  lead	  
to	   long-­‐run	   harm	   to	   consumers.	   First	   of	   all,	   as	   supermarkets	   tend	   to	   absorb	   a	   large	   fraction	   of	  
suppliers’	   benefits,	   investments	   in	  new	  products	  or	  product	   improvements	  may	  be	   reduced	  at	   the	  
processing	  and	  production	   levels,	   leading	  to	  a	  decrease	   in	  quality	  and	  diversity	  of	  products.392	  That	  
argument	  is	  nevertheless	  to	  be	  mitigated	  in	  view	  of	  the	  opposite	  opinion	  developed	  above.	  Secondly,	  
as	   already	   mentioned,	   large	   supermarkets	   may	   be	   tempted	   to	   favour	   their	   private	   labels	   to	   the	  
detriment	  of	  secondary	  brands	  which	  would	  result	  in	  reduced	  choices	  for	  consumers.393	  Finally,	  since	  
buyer	  power	  tends	  to	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  seller	  power,	  there	  may	  be	  a	  lessening	  of	  competition	  on	  
the	   retail	  market	   due	   to	   the	   exit	   of	   smaller	   and	   local	   retailers.	   Consumers	  might	   therefore	   in	   the	  
future	   face	   a	   considerably	   reduced	   choice	   of	   stores	   which	   would	   give	   the	   few	   big	   retail	   chains	  
remaining	   on	   the	  markets	   a	   greater	   seller	   power.	   This	  will	   reinforce	   the	   gatekeeper	   role	   of	   those	  
large	   retailers	   and	   further	   increase	   their	   ability	   to	   influence	   the	   success	   of	   product	   innovations	  by	  
dictating	  the	  choice	  of	  products	  that	  come	  to	  market.	  
If	  those	  harmful	  effects	  were	  accurate,	  requiring	  the	  proof	  of	  direct	  consumer	  harm	  in	  buyer	  power	  
cases	  would	   be	  misplaced	   to	   ensure	   an	   effective	   and	   long-­‐term	  protection	   of	   competition.	   By	   the	  
time	  the	  negative	  impact	  of	  buyer	  power	  manifests	  itself	  on	  the	  markets,	  it	  might	  indeed	  be	  too	  late	  
to	  correct	  it	  through	  a	  sanction	  or	  remedy	  but	  for	  imposing	  important	  structural	  remedies.	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  The	  result	  of	  this	  economic	  
analysis	  shows	  that	  retailer	  buyer	  power	  lowers	  consumer	  prices	  but	  reduces	  product	  diversity.	  The	  alleviation	  
of	  the	  distortion	  in	  prices	  is	  however	  outweighed	  by	  the	  exacerbation	  of	  the	  distortion	  of	  product	  diversity	  so	  
that	  consumers	  are	  worse	  off.	  
393	  P.W.Dobson,	  R.Clarke,	  S.Davies	  &	  M.Waterson,	  op.cit.,	  at	  4.	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The	  various	  and	  opposite	  views	  about	  the	  effects	  of	  buyer	  power	  continue	  however	  to	  fuelling	  the	  
debate	  on	  the	  appropriateness	  to	  address	  more	  severely	  supermarkets’	  practices.	  We	  will	  see	  yet	  in	  
Part	   III	   that	   different	   factors	   in	   the	   grocery	   retail	   sector	   increase	   the	   likelihood	   that	   some	   buyer	  
practices	  impede	  the	  achievement	  of	  the	  competition	  law	  objectives.	  
B. FARMERS	  SUBJECTED	  TO	  BUYER	  POWER	  
Among	   the	   various	  market	   chains	   in	  which	   retailers	  may	  exercise	   their	  market	   power,	   a	   particular	  
attention	   has	   been	   drawn	   on	   the	   food	   supply	   chain	   which	   connects	   three	   main	   sectors:	   the	  
agricultural	  sector,	   the	  food	  processing	   industry	  and	  the	  distribution	  sectors	   (wholesale	  and	  retail).	  
As	  agricultural	  commodities	  often	  undergo	  a	  series	  of	  intermediate	  alterations,	  farmers	  do	  not	  deal	  
directly	   with	   retailers	   but	   instead	   sell	   their	   products	   to	   food	   processing	   firms	   or	   other	  
intermediaries.394	  Specific	  supply	  chain	  exists	  for	  every	  food	  product.	  Without	  analysing	  in	  details	  the	  
functioning	  of	  each	  particular	  agricultural	  sector,	  the	  following	  paragraphs	  will	  be	   limited	  to	  a	  brief	  
description	  of	  producers’	  position	  in	  the	  food	  supply	  chain	  and	  on	  the	  effects	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  
power	  may	  bring	  about	  in	  that	  industry.	  
1. Successive	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  along	  the	  supply	  chain	  
Big	   as	  well	   as	   very	   small	   players	   are	   present	   at	   the	   different	   levels	   of	   the	   food	   supply	   chain.	   The	  
degree	  of	  bargaining	  power	  of	  each	  market	  participant	  varies	  by	  product	  category	  depending	  on	  the	  
market	   structure	   and	  on	   the	  outside	  options	   available	   to	   each	  of	   them.	  However,	   due	   to	   the	  high	  
concentration	  of	  the	  retail	  sector	  and	  the	  role	  of	  gatekeeper	  played	  by	  large	  retail	  chains,	  it	  appears	  
that	   the	   latter	   act	   as	   a	   buyer-­‐driver	   and	   strongly	   influence	   the	   rules	   and	   conditions	   for	   all	   players	  
willing	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  supply	  chain.	  In	  fact,	  the	  imbalances	  in	  trading	  relations	  between	  big-­‐box	  
stores	  and	  their	  suppliers	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  some	  implications	  back	  up	  the	  chain,	  namely	  for	  farmers	  
which	  constitute	  the	  least	  concentrated	  sector	  in	  many	  product	  categories.	  In	  response	  to	  a	  powerful	  
buyer,	  food	  processors	  may	  indeed	  transfer	  the	  harm	  upstream	  by	  requesting	  low	  prices	  and	  other	  
concessions	  from	  their	  own	  suppliers	  over	  whom	  they	  have	  a	  strongest	  bargaining	  power.	  As	  a	  result	  
of	  such	  ratchet	  effect,	  downstream	  pressures	  exercised	  by	  retailers	  have	  hence	  an	  impact	  on	  farmer	  
margins.395	  In	  most	  cases,	  huge	  disparities	  in	  power	  exist	  between	  agricultural	  producers	  and	  the	  rest	  
of	  the	  supply	  chain	  so	  that	  the	  former	  are	  kept	  under	  strong	  pressure.	  Where	  some	  food	  processors	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
394	  L.Bukeviciute,	  A.Dierx	  &	  F.Ilzkovitz,	  The	  functioning	  of	  the	  food	  supply	  chain	  and	  its	  effect	  on	  food	  prices	  in	  
the	  European	  Union,	  Occasional	  Papers	  47	  –	  DG	  for	  Economic	  and	  Financial	  Affairs,	  2009,	  at	  4.The	  food	  
processing	  industry	  is	  very	  heterogeneous.	  It	  includes	  activities	  such	  as	  refining	  (sugar),	  milling	  (cereals),	  
cleaning,	  cutting	  or	  drying	  (fruit	  and	  vegetables)	  and	  slaughtering	  (livestock).	  	  
395	  M.Schwartz,	  Should	  Antitrust	  Assess	  Buyer	  Market	  Power	  Differently	  than	  Seller	  Market	  Power?,	  DOJ/FTC	  
Workshop	  on	  Merger	  Enforcement,	  Washington	  DC,	  February	  2004,	  at	  5.	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may	   countervail	   or	   even	   supersede	   supermarkets’	   buyer	   power	   due	   to	   the	   must-­‐have	   status	   of	  
branded	  products,	   farmers	  are,	   for	  their	  part,	  often	  deprived	  of	  any	  bargaining	  tool	   in	  negotiations	  
with	  buyers.	   Indeed,	  producing	  non-­‐differentiated	  products	   for	  which	  brand	  awareness	   is	  not	  high	  
and	   acting	   in	   a	   more	   fragmented	   sector,	   they	   are	   in	   a	   much	   weaker	   position.396	   Packers	   and	  
processors	   are	   generally	   able	   to	   find	   easily	   alternatives	   to	   buy	   agricultural	   commodities	   while	  
farmers	   are	   highly	   dependent	   on	   them	   to	   sell	   quickly	   their	   products	   which	   may	   be	   perishable	   in	  
nature.	  
In	  response	  to	  that	  asymmetry	  of	  bargaining	  power,	  producers	  have	  adopted	  different	  strategies	  and	  
in	  particular	  the	  creation	  of	  producer	  groups	  and	  cooperatives	  to	  strengthen	  their	  position	  in	  relation	  
to	  the	  other	  market	  players.397	   	  Associations	  between	  producers	  may	  pursue	  different	  aims	  such	  as	  
concentrating	   supply	  and	  marketing	   the	  products	  of	   the	  members,	  ensuring	   that	   the	  production	   is	  
planned	  and	  adjusted	   to	  demand	  or	  promoting	   the	  rationalisation	  and	   improvement	  of	  production	  
and	   processing.398	   EU	   Competition	   rules	   grant	   a	   favourable	   treatment	   to	   those	   types	   of	   farmers’	  
organizations	  which	  are	  deemed	  to	  be	  procompetitive	  and	  are	  hence	  most	   likely	   to	  benefit	   from	  a	  
block	  exemption	  or	  to	  be	  justified	  under	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU.399	  The	  Court	  of	  Justice	  maintained	  that	  
organizing	   an	   undertaking	   in	   the	   specific	   legal	   form	  of	   a	   cooperative	   association	   does	   not	   in	   itself	  
constitute	   anti-­‐competitive	   conduct	   as	   it	   encourages	   modernization	   and	   rationalization	   in	   the	  
agricultural	   sector	   and	   improves	   efficiency.400	   It	   is	   also	   recognized	   that	   such	   forms	   of	   cooperation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
396	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission	  to	  the	  Council,	  the	  European	  Parliament,	  the	  European	  Economic	  and	  
Social	  Committee	  and	  the	  Committee	  of	  the	  Regions,	  Food	  prices	  in	  Europe,	  COM(2008)	  821.	  
397	  The	  legislation	  applicable	  to	  agricultural	  products	  provides	  for	  three	  exceptions	  to	  the	  application	  of	  the	  EU	  
competition	  rules	  to	  the	  agricultural	  sector.	  However,	  those	  derogations	  from	  the	  applicability	  of	  Article	  101	  
TFEU	  to	  certain	  agreements	  between	  farmers	  must	  fulfill	  particular	  conditions	  which	  have	  been	  restrictively	  
interpreted	  by	  the	  European	  Courts.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  those	  agreements	  do	  not	  meet	  the	  
requirements	  for	  such	  exceptions	  to	  apply.	  The	  various	  forms	  of	  cooperation	  between	  farmers	  are	  hence	  
analysed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  general	  competition	  rules.	  See:	  Council	  Regulation	  (EC)	  1234/2007	  of	  22	  October	  
2007	  establishing	  a	  common	  organization	  of	  agricultural	  markets	  and	  on	  specific	  provisions	  for	  certain	  
agricultural	  products	  (Single	  CMO	  Regulation),	  J.O.	  L	  299/1	  of	  16/11/2007	  and	  Council	  Regulation	  (EC)	  
1184/2006	  of	  24	  July	  2006	  applying	  certain	  rules	  of	  competition	  to	  the	  production	  of,	  and	  trade	  in,	  agricultural	  
products	  (codified	  version),	  J.O.	  L	  214/7	  of	  04/08/2006.	  On	  the	  exceptions	  to	  the	  application	  of	  the	  competition	  
rules	  and	  the	  interpretation	  given	  by	  the	  European	  Courts,	  see:	  The	  interface	  between	  EU	  competition	  policy	  
and	  the	  Common	  Agriculture	  Policy	  (CAP):	  Competition	  rules	  applicable	  to	  cooperation	  agreements	  between	  
farmers	  in	  the	  dairy	  sector,	  Working	  Paper,	  European	  Commission	  DG	  Competition,	  Brussels,	  16	  February	  2010,	  
at,	  5-­‐13,	  available	  at:	  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/agriculture/working_paper_dairy.pdf	  
398	  See:	  Council	  Regulation	  1234/2007	  establishing	  a	  common	  organization	  of	  agricultural	  markets,	  op.cit.,	  
Article	  122.	  
399	  For	  more	  details	  on	  the	  assessment	  of	  cooperation	  agreements	  such	  as	  joint	  production	  agreement	  and	  
commercialization	  agreements,	  see:	  The	  interface	  between	  EU	  competition	  policy	  and	  the	  Common	  Agriculture	  
Policy	  (CAP):	  Competition	  rules	  applicable	  to	  cooperation	  agreements	  between	  farmers	  in	  the	  dairy	  sector,	  
Working	  Paper,	  European	  Commission	  DG	  Competition,	  Brussels,	  16	  February	  2010,	  at,	  13-­‐27,	  available	  at:	  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/agriculture/working_paper_dairy.pdf	  
400	  See	  for	  example:	  C-­‐399/93,	  H.G.	  Oude	  Luttikhuis	  and	  others	  v.	  Verenigde	  Coöperative	  Meklindustrie	  Coberco	  
BA	  [1995]	  ECR	  I-­‐4520.	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“constitute	  a	   significant	  counterweight	   to	   the	  contractual	  power	  of	   large	  producers	  and	  make	  way	  
for	  more	  effective	  competition”.401	  
Where	   the	   EU	   competition	   rules	   do	  not	   preclude	   farmers	   from	   strengthening	   their	   position	   in	   the	  
supply	   chain,	   strong	   imbalances	  of	  power	  yet	   remain	  as	   concentration	   in	   the	  processing	  and	   retail	  
sectors	  are	  evolving	  at	  a	  much	  faster	  pace.	  More	  intensive	  cooperation	  between	  producers	  would	  be	  
needed	   to	   improve	   their	   bargaining	   position	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   other	  market	   players.	   However,	   no	  
agreement	  will	  be	  exempted	  if	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  create	  or	  increase	  the	  participants’	  market	  power.	  Such	  
safeguards	  are	  necessary	  to	  maintain	  effective	  competition	  on	  the	  markets	  but	  may	  somewhat	  limit	  
the	   ability	   of	   farmers	   to	   gain	   sufficient	   negotiating	   leverage	   with	   their	   large	   customers.	   Potential	  
negative	   effects	   resulting	   from	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power,	   such	   as	   price	   manipulation,	   are	  
therefore	  not	  excluded.	  
2. Potential	  price	  manipulation	  
In	   order	   to	   ensure	   steady	   supplies	   of	   commodities,	   packers	   and	   processors	   mostly	   resort	   to	  
contracting	   and	   vertical	   integration.402	   Through	   the	   use	   of	   marketing	   or	   production	   agreements,	  
farmers	  commit	  to	  sell	  a	  specific	  quantity	  and	  quality	  of	  agricultural	  products	  to	  a	  particular	  buyer	  at	  
a	   price	   negotiated	   before	   harvesting	   or	   slaughter	   of	   animals.403	  Where	   those	   contracts	   may	   yield	  
some	   benefits	   for	   farmers,	   such	   as	   reduced	   transaction/marketing	   costs,	   assurance	   of	   a	   buyer	   for	  
their	   products	   or	   better	   access	   to	   capital,	   they	   are	   often	   drafted	   only	   to	   the	   buyer’s	   advantage,	  
leaving	   producers	   liable	   for	   losses	   and	   shifting	   on	   them	   the	   risk	   of	   poor	   quality	   produce	   or	  
insufficient	  production	  for	  example.404	  
In	   addition,	   evidence	   tends	   to	   prove	   that	   processors	   use	   such	   arrangements	   to	   manipulate	   cash-­‐
market	   prices	   for	   agricultural	   commodities.	   Various	   economic	   studies	   indeed	   establish	   a	   negative	  
relationship	  between	  the	  use	  of	  forward	  contracts	  and	  cash	  market	  prices	  so	  that	  the	  latter	  tend	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
401	  T-­‐90/92	  and	  T-­‐71/92,	  joined	  cases,	  Florimex	  BV	  and	  Vereniging	  van	  Groothandelaren	  in	  
Bloemkwekerijprodukten	  v.	  Commission	  of	  the	  European	  Communities	  [1997]	  ECR	  II-­‐697.	  
402	  A	  processor	  or	  packer	  is	  vertically	  integrated	  when	  it	  has	  complete	  control	  on	  farm	  production.	  The	  use	  of	  
contracts	  may	  in	  some	  cases	  enable	  buyers	  to	  have	  some	  degree	  of	  control	  on	  some	  assets	  or	  production	  
decision	  without	  leading	  to	  vertical	  integration.	  
403	  Farmers	  retain	  more	  control	  over	  their	  production	  process	  in	  marketing	  contracts	  which	  only	  specify	  output,	  
quantities	  and	  delivering	  timing.	  In	  contrast,	  in	  production	  agreements,	  farmers	  often	  only	  provide	  labor,	  
equipment	  and	  housing	  while	  the	  contractor	  provide	  and	  retain	  ownership	  of	  the	  commodity	  during	  the	  
production	  process.	  This	  is	  particularly	  common	  in	  the	  poultry	  industry.	  For	  more	  details	  on	  the	  different	  ways	  
to	  organize	  the	  vertical	  coordination	  of	  products,	  see:	  J.MacDonald	  &	  others,	  Contracts,	  markets	  and	  prices	  –	  
Organizing	  the	  production	  and	  use	  of	  agricultural	  commodities,	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  Agriculture,	  
Agricultural	  economic	  report	  No	  837,	  November	  2004,	  available	  at:	  
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/34013/1/ae040837.pdf.	  
404	  S.Murphy,	  Concentrated	  Market	  Power	  and	  Agricultural	  Trade,	  Ecofair	  Trade	  Dialogue,	  Discussion	  Paper	  
No.1,	  August	  2006,	  at	  15-­‐16.	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be	  lower	  when	  the	  former	  increases.405	  In	  fact,	  as	  the	  share	  of	  commodities	  committed	  to	  processors	  
through	   ownership	   or	   contracts	   increases,	   the	   volume	   traded	   on	   the	   open	   market	   declines.	   The	  
thinning	  of	  spot	  markets	  gives	  hence	  buyers	  the	  possibility	  to	  manipulate	  market-­‐prices	  by	  delaying	  
purchases	  when	   the	  market	  price	   is	  high	  or	  vice	   versa.406	   They	  are	  even	   incited	   to	  do	   so	   since	   the	  
prices	  they	  pay	  to	  farmers	  under	  contract	  are	  somehow	  tied	  to	  the	  cash	  market	  on	  basis	  of	  a	  specific	  
formula.407	  As	  a	  result,	   the	  role	  of	  cash-­‐markets	  which	  consists	   in	  establishing	  equilibrium	  between	  
supply	  and	  demand	  is	  highly	  weakened	  as	  all	  processor	  contracts	  are	  not	  reported	  as	  public	  market	  
activity.	   Although	   the	   action	   of	   processors	   and	   packers	   distort	   the	   price	   discovery	   process,	   cash-­‐
market	  prices	  are	  still	  considered	  as	  competitive	  prices	  and	  used	  as	  a	  benchmark	  in	  the	  entire	  sector,	  
be	  it	  for	  transactions	  on	  the	  spot	  market	  or	  for	  supplies	  committed	  through	  contracts.	  
This	   shows	   that	   buyer	   power	   may	   be	   used	   in	   different	   ways	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   producers.	   In	  
addition	   to	   imposing	   unfair	   contractual	   terms	   to	   their	   suppliers,	   buyers	  may	   further	  weaken	   their	  
situation	  through	  market	  manipulation.	  
3. Effects	  in	  the	  agricultural	  sector	  
As	   already	   mentioned	   above,	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   may	   oblige	   sellers	   to	   operate	   under	  
reduced	  profitability,	  limiting	  consequently	  their	  incentives	  to	  invest	  in	  new	  product	  and	  innovation.	  
Actually,	  the	  share	  of	  agriculture	  value-­‐added	  in	  food	  supply	  chain	  has	  been	  consistently	  decreasing	  
for	  the	  last	  decades	  while	  that	  share	  has	  been	  taken	  up	  by	  the	  food	  processing	  industry	  and	  the	  retail	  
sector.408	   The	   drop	   in	   farm	   income,	   in	   addition,	   reduces	   the	   attractiveness	   of	   entry	   in	   agricultural	  
activities	   and	   leaves	   existing	   farmers	   dependent	   on	   non-­‐agricultural	   income	   sources	   such	   as	  
subsidies.409	  The	  damage	  caused	  to	  producers	  may	  even	  be	  exacerbated	  by	  a	  phenomenon	  called	  the	  
“commodity	  problem”,	  that	  is,	  the	  tendency	  to	  increase	  the	  production	  of	  agricultural	  commodities	  
in	  response	  to	  a	  reduction	  in	  price.	  As	  it	  is	  particularly	  difficult	  for	  farmers	  to	  shift	  to	  the	  production	  
of	  alternative	  commodities	  due	  to	  huge	  investment	  that	  such	  a	  change	  would	  require,	  they	  have	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
405	  See	  for	  example:	  M.Zhang	  &	  R.J.Sexton,	  Captive	  supplies	  and	  the	  cash	  market	  price:	  A	  spatial	  markets	  
approach,	  25	  Journal	  of	  Agricultural	  and	  Resource	  Economics	  88	  (2000).	  
406	  C.R.Taylor,	  The	  Many	  Faces	  of	  Power	  in	  the	  Food	  System,	  Comments	  presented	  at	  the	  DoJ/FTC	  Workshop	  on	  
Merger	  Enforcement,	  February	  17,	  2004.	  
407	  B.Vorley,	  Food,	  Inc.	  Corporate	  concentration	  from	  farm	  to	  consumer,	  UK	  Food	  Group,	  London	  (2003),	  at	  24.	  
408	  See:	  	  Commission	  Staff	  working	  document,	  The	  evolution	  of	  value-­‐added	  repartition	  along	  the	  European	  
food	  supply	  chain,	  SEC(2009)1445.	  
409	  P.C.Carstensen,	  Buyer	  power	  and	  merger	  analysis	  –	  the	  need	  for	  different	  metrics,	  Statement	  prepared	  for	  
the	  workshop	  on	  Merger	  Enforcement	  held	  by	  the	  Antitrust	  Division	  and	  the	  Feral	  Trade	  Commission,	  
Washington,	  DC,	  February	  17,	  2004,	  at	  11.	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most	  cases	  no	  other	  choice	  than	  increasing	  even	  more	  their	  production	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  earn	  income	  
in	  the	  short-­‐term,	  reinforcing	  thereby	  the	  drop	  in	  price	  due	  to	  oversupply.410	  
Where	  many	  producers	  are	  pushed	  out	  of	  business,	  the	  question	  arises	  of	  the	  future	  of	  the	  European	  
food	   production.	   In	   a	   recent	   resolution,	   the	   European	   Parliament	   put	   special	   emphasis	   on	   the	  
producers’	  position	  in	  the	  Union	  which	  has	  been	  deteriorating	  due	  to	  power	  imbalances	  in	  the	  food	  
chain	  and	  called	  on	  the	  Commission	  “to	  urgently	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  unfair	  distribution	  of	  profit	  
(…),	  especially	  with	  regard	  to	  adequate	  incomes	  for	  farmers”.411	  The	  Commission	  has	  also	  repeated	  in	  
various	  documents	   that	  a	   strong	  EU	  agricultural	   sector	   is	   vital	   for	   the	  highly	  competitive	  European	  
food	  industry	  to	  remain	  an	  important	  supplier	  of	  high	  quality	  and	  safe	  agricultural	  and	  food	  products	  
and	   to	   contribute	   to	   global	   food	   security.412	   The	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   is	   certainly	   not	   the	   only	  
cause	   of	   the	   precarious	   situation	   of	   small	   farmers.	   413	   	   Other	   factors	   may	   indeed	   affect	   the	  
profitability	   of	   farming	   activities	   such	   as	   competition	   from	   third	   countries’	   products,	   extreme	  
weather	  events,	  disease	  outbreaks,	  the	  sharp	  rise	  in	  energy	  prices	  and	  other	  farm	  input	  prices	  as	  well	  
as	   excessive	   speculation	   in	   food	   commodities	   derivatives414.	   Where	   various	   measures	   may	   be	  
envisaged	   to	   help	   the	   farm	   industry,	   enforcement	   of	   the	   competition	   rules	   may,	   in	   some	  
circumstances,	  be	  part	  of	  those	  remedies.	  If	  buyers’	  practices	  distort	  competition	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  
farmers,	  action	  under	   competition	   law	  may	   indeed	  contribute	   to	  helping	   farmers	  by	  offering	   them	  
the	  opportunity	  to	  act	  in	  a	  competitive	  market.	  While	  the	  protection	  of	  upstream	  firms	  is	  not	  part	  as	  
such	   of	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	   competition	   policy,	  maintaining	   effective	   competition	   for	   all	   market	  
participants	  may	  nevertheless	  be	  seen	  as	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  the	  long-­‐term	  welfare	  of	  consumers.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410	  A.R.Ganesh,	  The	  Right	  to	  Food	  and	  Buyer	  Power,	  11	  German	  Law	  Journal	  1190,	  at	  1196	  (2010)	  
411	  European	  Parliament	  resolution	  of	  7	  September	  2010	  on	  faire	  revenues	  for	  farmers:	  A	  better	  functioning	  
food	  supply	  chain	  in	  Europe,	  2009/2237(INI)	  
412	  See	  :	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission	  to	  the	  European	  Parliament,	  the	  Council,	  the	  European	  
economic	  and	  social	  committee	  and	  the	  Committee	  of	  the	  regions	  –	  Tackling	  the	  challenges	  in	  commodity	  
markets	  and	  on	  raw	  material,	  Brussels,	  02/02/2011,	  COM(2011)25	  final	  and	  Commission	  Staff	  working	  paper	  –	  
Impact	  assessment,	  Common	  Agricultural	  Policy	  towards	  2020,	  SEC(2011)1153	  final.	  
413	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  farming	  sector	  does	  not	  only	  face	  concentration	  in	  the	  downstream	  market	  but	  
also	  in	  the	  upstream	  market	  where	  a	  few	  large	  firms	  dominate	  the	  supply	  of	  farm	  inputs	  such	  as	  fertilizers,	  
seeds	  or	  animal	  feed.	  See:	  Report	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  on	  the	  farm	  input	  supply	  chain:	  structure	  and	  
implications	  (2011/2114(INI)),	  Committee	  on	  agriculture	  and	  rural	  development,	  28/11/2011.	  
414	  Financial	  firms	  and	  speculators	  trade	  in	  the	  commodity	  markets	  with	  the	  only	  aim	  to	  make	  maximum	  money	  
from	  short-­‐term	  changes	  in	  price	  with	  no	  physical	  ownership	  of	  the	  commodities	  involved.	  	  On	  the	  trend	  
towards	  greater	  financialisation	  of	  commodity	  trading	  and	  the	  need	  to	  regulate	  excessive	  speculation,	  see:	  
Institute	  for	  Agriculture	  Trade	  Policy,	  Excessive	  speculation	  in	  agriculture	  commodities:	  Selected	  writings	  from	  
2008-­‐2011,	  2011,	  available	  at:	  http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2011/08247.pdf	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Some	   of	   the	   adverse	   effects	   highlighted	   above	   have	   been	   reported	   by	   the	   Commission	   in	   various	  
documents	  but	  no	  strong	  response	  seems	  to	  be	  on	  the	  agenda	  to	  address	  those	  concerns	  under	  the	  
scope	  of	  EU	  competition	  law.415	  
C. CONCLUSIVE	  REMARKS	  
The	   emergence	   of	   large	   retail	   chains	   and	   their	   resulting	   buyer	   power	   in	   the	   upstream	   market	  
generate	  positive	  effects,	  especially	   for	   consumers.	   Indeed,	   increasing	  efficiencies,	   consolidation	   in	  
that	  sector	  also	  enables	  retailers	  to	  act	  as	  countervailing	  power	  against	  powerful	  suppliers	  producing	  
must-­‐carry	  brands.	  However,	  when	  the	  better	  terms	  and	  conditions	  obtained	  by	  big	  supermarkets	  do	  
no	   longer	   result	   from	   economic	   efficiencies	   but	   only	   from	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power,	   the	   issue	  
arises	   as	   to	   whether	   the	   presence	   of	   large	   buyers	   is	   beneficial	   in	   all	   circumstances	   or	   whether	   it	  
should	  be	  supervise	  by	  appropriate	  rules	  to	  prevent	  potential	  negative	  impacts	  on	  the	  markets.	  	  
No	  one	  would	  contest	  that	  suppliers	  are	  subjected	  to	  significant	  pressure	  from	  supermarket	  chains.	  
Such	   pressure	   exerted	   by	   all	   large	   retailers	   shows	   in	   fact	   that	   the	   latter	   are	   incited	   to	   exert	   their	  
buyer	   power	   in	   the	   upstream	   procurement	   market.	   This	   result	   in	   most	   cases	   in	   in	   unfair	   trading	  
practices	  to	  the	  retailers’	  advantage.	  However,	  some	  practices	  are	  also	  likely	  to	  cause	  broader	  effects	  
on	  the	  markets.	  Among	  the	  possible	  harmful	  effects,	  we	  can	  mention	  the	  reinforcement	  of	  retailers’	  
market	  power	  both	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market	  and	  in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market,	  likely	  to	  lead	  
to	  higher	   consumer	  prices,	   but	   also	   a	   reduction	   in	  product	  quality	   and	  diversity.	   If	   these	  potential	  
harmful	  effects	  prove	  to	  be	  true,	  the	  issue	  of	  addressing	  supermarket	  chains’	  buyer	  practices	  under	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  On	  the	  different	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  taken	  at	  EU	  level,	  see	  Part	  III,	  Chapter	  2,	  Section	  I,	  Point	  A.	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CONCLUSION	  PART	  I	  
	  
Theory	  and	  models	  of	  market	  power	  concern	  sellers’	  market	  power	  but	  also	  buyers’	  market	  power.	  
However,	  the	  elements	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration	  to	  assess	  the	  degree	  of	  market	  power	  vary	  on	  
each	  side	  of	  the	  market.	  Indeed,	  instead	  of	  focusing	  on	  the	  level	  of	  concentration	  and	  on	  the	  firm’s	  
market	  share,	  the	  assessment	  of	  buyer	  power	  rather	  focuses	  on	  the	  vertical	  relationships	  between	  a	  
buyer	   and	   its	   suppliers	   and,	   in	   particular,	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   economic	   dependency.	   The	   more	  
suppliers	  are	  economically	  dependent	  on	  their	  customers,	  the	  more	  the	  latter	  are	  able	  to	  exert	  buyer	  
power	  over	   them.	  Accordingly,	   the	  degree	  of	  buyer	  power	  depends	  on	   the	   relative	  dependence	  of	  
suppliers	  which	  can	  be	  determined	  mainly	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  two	  factors,	  that	  is,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  
number	   of	   alternatives	   available	   for	   those	   suppliers	   and,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   share	   the	   buyer	  
accounts	  for	  in	  the	  suppliers’	  turnover.	  A	  buyer	  is	  able	  to	  exert	  market	  power	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  
market	  especially	  when	  suppliers	  have	  few	  alternatives	  and	  are	  in	  relation	  with	  that	  buyer	  for	  a	  large	  
part	  of	  their	  business.	  Such	  buyer	  power	  is	  further	  reinforced	  if	  each	  of	  those	  suppliers	  can	  be	  easily	  
replaced	  and	  is	  not	  indispensable	  for	  the	  buyer’s	  business	  activity.	  In	  these	  circumstances,	  the	  buyer	  
has	  much	  more	  value	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  suppliers	  than	  the	  other	  way	  round	  so	  that	  market	  power	  lies	  on	  
the	  buying	  side.	  
Although	  buyer	  power	   can	  be	  understood	   in	   the	   sense	  of	  monopsony	  power	   and	   refers	   to	  buyers	  
who	  are	  able	   to	   lower	  prices	  by	  decreasing	   their	  volume	  of	  purchases,	   in	  most	  cases,	  buyers	  exert	  
their	  market	  power	  without	  affecting	  the	  quantity	  purchased	  in	  the	  upstream	  procurement	  market.	  
In	   different	  markets,	   buyers	   are	   indeed	   able	   to	   extract	   concessions	   from	   their	   suppliers	   by	   simply	  
threatening	  them	  to	  switch	  to	  other	  sources	  of	  supply.	  	  
Various	   sectors	   have	   been	   pointed	   out	   as	   having	   a	   strong	   buying	   side.	   Those	   sectors	   have	   in	   fact	  
been	   highlighted	   by	   the	   European	   Commission	   in	  merger	   cases	  where	   buyers’	  market	   power	  was	  
examined	  as	  a	  countervailing	  strength.	  It	  is	  considered	  that	  buyers	  exert	  countervailing	  power	  when	  
the	   upstream	   selling	   side	   of	   the	   market	   is	   concentrated	   and	   includes	   strong	   market	   players.	   The	  
analysis	  of	  buyers’	  countervailing	  power	  in	  the	  merger	  decisions	  yet	  confirmed	  that	  the	  assessment	  
of	  buyer	  power	  relies	  on	  factors	  different	  from	  those	  used	  when	  assessing	  seller	  power.	  	  
One	  sector	  is	  drawing	  particular	  attention,	  namely	  the	  grocery	  retail	  sector	  where	  large	  supermarket	  
chains	   enjoy	   significant	   buyer	   power	   and	   have	   a	   particularly	   strong	   incentive	   to	   exploit	   it.	   This	   is	  
explained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  suppliers	  are	  highly	  dependent	  on	  those	  customers.	  Large	  retail	  chains	  play	  
indeed	  a	  role	  of	  gatekeeper.	  As	  no	  equivalent	  alternatives	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  other	  sales	  channels,	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supermarkets	  constitute	  unavoidable	  trading	  partners	   to	  reach	  consumers.	  Most	  of	  suppliers’	  sales	  
go	   hence	   through	   the	   supermarket	   distribution	   channel.	   In	   addition,	   given	   the	   high	   degree	   of	  
concentration	  in	  the	  grocery	  retail	  sector,	  only	  a	  few	  large	  companies	  have	  in	  fact	  the	  power	  to	  give	  
suppliers	  access	  to	  that	  distribution	  channel.	  Each	  of	  those	  incumbents	  represents	  therefore	  a	  very	  
large,	  if	  not	  vital,	  proportion	  in	  suppliers’	  business	  activity.	  
Controversies	   exist	   regarding	   the	   potential	   effects	   of	   buyer	   power	   in	   the	   short	   and	   longer	   term.	  
Concerns	   are	   being	   raised,	   especially	   with	   regard	   to	   supermarkets’	   buyer	   power.	   It	   is	   generally	  
considered	  that	  pressure	  exerted	  on	  suppliers	  leads	  to	  lower	  purchasing	  prices	  and	  thereby	  to	  lower	  
consumer	   prices	   at	   the	   retail	   level.	   However,	   such	   a	   conclusion	  might	   be	   too	   a	   hasty	   conclusion.	  
Indeed,	  in	  view	  of	  the	  objectives	  of	  EU	  competition	  law	  shortly	  described,	  one	  may	  wonder	  whether	  
the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   constitutes	   a	   positive	   strength	   in	   all	   circumstances.	   The	   concept	   of	  
consumer	  welfare	  does	  not	  only	   include	  to	   lower	  prices	  but	  also	  product	  quality	  and	  choice.	  Under	  
that	  perspective,	   it	   is	  not	  excluded	  that	  buyer	  power	   impedes	   the	  achievement	  of	   the	  competition	  
law	  objectives.	  	  
We	  will	   try	   to	   provide	   an	   answer	   to	   all	   the	   questions	   that	   have	   been	   raised	   in	   this	   first	   Part.	   The	  
objective	   will	   be	   to	   ascertain	   whether,	   how	   and	   to	   what	   extent	   buyer	   power	   is	   likely	   to	   affect	  
competition	   in	   the	   European	   Union.	   Given	   the	   particular	   interest	   of	   European	   and	   national	  
authorities	  in	  supermarkets’	  buyer	  power,	  the	  focus	  will	  be	  put	  on	  the	  grocery	  retail	  sector	  so	  as	  to	  
determine	  whether	   some	   characteristics	   of	   that	   sector	   could	   differentiate	   it	   from	  other	   industries	  
and	   require	   a	   specific	   attention	   from	   competition	   authorities.	   If	   those	   characteristics	   make	   the	  
exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   potentially	   harmful	   for	   competition	   and	   consumer	   welfare,	   a	   suggested	  
answer	   to	   the	   question	   of	   the	   necessity	   of	   taking	   action	   and	   of	   which	   action	   to	   be	   taken	   in	   the	  
grocery	  retail	  sector	  will	  be	  put	  forward.	  	  
But	   first,	   in	   the	   next	   Part,	   we	   will	   examine	   EU	   as	   well	   as	   some	   national	   legislation	   and	   case	   law	  
related	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  buyer	  power.	  In	  theory,	  buyer	  power	  should	  be	  assessed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  
specific	  criteria	  described	  above.	  We	  have	  noted	  that,	  in	  merger	  cases,	  when	  assessing	  the	  existence	  
of	   countervailing	   buyer	   power,	   the	   Commission	   underlined	   the	   limited	   number	   of	   alternative	  
customers	   and	   the	   large	   share	   accounted	   for	   by	   a	   particular	   customer	   in	   the	   merging	   party’s	  
turnover	   as	   factors	   giving	   that	   latter	   customer	   countervailing	   buyer	   power.	   It	   remains	   to	   be	   seen	  
whether,	  in	  practice,	  EU	  and	  national	  competition	  authorities	  take	  the	  specificity	  of	  buyer	  power	  into	  
consideration	   when	   such	   power	   is	   not	   examined	   as	   a	   possible	   positive	   countervailing	   strength	  
exerted	  against	  powerful	  sellers	  but	  as	  a	  competitive	  concern	  which	  could	  require	  the	  application	  of	  
the	  competition	  rules	  against	  some	  large	  buyers	  misusing	  that	  power.	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PART	  II	  –	  BUYER	  POWER	  IN	  EU	  AND	  NATIONAL	  LAWS	  
	  
Buyer	  power	  is	  a	  complex	  issue	  as	  its	  impact	  on	  competition	  is	  rather	  controversial.	  The	  exercise	  of	  
market	   power	   in	   upstream	   buyer	   markets	   may	   indeed	   bring	   consumers	   benefits	   through,	   for	  
example,	  lower	  consumer	  prices	  but	  may	  also,	  in	  some	  cases,	  affect	  the	  competitive	  process	  in	  both	  
the	  up-­‐and	  downstream	  markets	  and,	   thereby,	   consumer	  welfare.	  To	  deal	  with	  buyer	  power	  while	  
protecting	  competition	  and	  consumer	   interests	  may	  therefore	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  a	  delicate	  task	  for	  EU	  
institutions	  and/or	  national	  authorities.	  	  
We	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  first	  Part	  that	  the	  definition	  given	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  buyer	  power	  is	  focused	  on	  
the	   vertical	   relationship	   between	   a	   buyer	   and	   its	   suppliers	   and	   depart,	   to	   some	   extent,	   from	   the	  
definition	   of	   market	   power	   used	   in	   seller	   power	   cases.	   Buyer	   power	   indeed	   depends	   less	   on	   the	  
firm’s	  market	  share	  in	  the	  relevant	  upstream	  market	  than	  on	  the	  actual	  importance	  it	  represents	  for	  
its	  suppliers	  and	  vice	  versa.	  Turning	  to	  legislative	  instruments	  and	  competition	  law	  cases,	  this	  second	  
Part	   examines	   whether	   such	   specificity	   in	   the	   definition	   of	   buyer	   power	   is	   reflected	   and	   finds	   an	  
adequate	  answer	  in	  the	  competition	  law	  policy.	  
The	  issue	  of	  buyer	  power	  and	  its	  consequences	  on	  the	  markets	  may	  in	  fact	  be	  addressed	  at	  the	  EU	  
level	  but	  also	  by	  national	  authorities.	  The	  first	  chapter	  considers	  the	  EU	  competition	  rules	  and	  their	  
enforcement	   in	   buyer	   power	   cases.	   As	   developed	   in	   Part	   I,	   buyer	   power	   may	   manifest	   itself	   in	  
different	   forms	   and	   to	   varying	   degrees	   depending	   on	   different	   factors.	   This	   raises	   the	   question	   of	  
whether	  and	  how	  the	  concept	  of	  buyer	  power	  is	  treated	  in	  the	  EU	  legislation	  and	  other	  instruments	  
published	  by	  the	  Commission.	  We	  will	  examine,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  rules	  applicable	  under	  Article	  
101	   TFEU	   on	   restrictive	   agreements	   and	   under	   Article	   102	   TFEU	   on	   abusive	   conduct,	   and,	   on	   the	  
other	  hand,	  the	  various	  instruments	  used	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  EU	  merger	  control.	  	  
The	  second	  chapter	  turns	  to	  some	  national	  laws	  in	  order	  to	  give	  an	  insight	  into	  how	  buyer	  power	  has	  
been	   dealt	   with	   by	   national	   authorities.	   To	   this	   end,	   three	   countries	   have	   been	   selected	   on	   a	  
discretionary	   basis,	   namely	   France,	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   and	   the	   United	   States.	   The	   first	   two	  
countries	   provide	   examples	   of	   the	   variety	   of	   national	  measures	   that	  may	   be	   implemented	   by	   the	  
Member	  states	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  to	  address	  buyer	  practices.	  Besides	  those	  two	  member	  states,	  
we	  will	  also	  examine	  the	  way	  competition	  authorities	  and	  national	  courts	   tackle	  the	   issue	  of	  buyer	  
power	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  It	  is	  indeed	  worthwhile	  examining	  the	  situation	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  
Atlantic	   since	   the	  EU	   institutions	  have	  often	  been	   inspired	  by	   the	  US	  antitrust	   legislation	   to	  design	  
the	  EU	  competition	  rules.	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CHAPTER	  1	  –	  BUYER	  POWER	  IN	  EU	  COMPETITION	  LAW	  
Under	   the	  EU	   competition	   rules,	  market	  power	  held	  by	   some	  buyers	  may	  be	  examined	  within	   the	  
framework	  of	  Article	   101	   TFEU416,	   Article	   102	   TFEU	  or	   under	   the	  Merger	  Regulation.417	   The	   Treaty	  
provisions	   prohibit	   anticompetitive	   conduct,	   namely	   and	   respectively	   restrictive	   agreements	   and	  
abuses	   of	   dominance.	   In	   practice,	   the	   Commission	   assesses	   whether	   a	   practice	   occurring	   on	   the	  
market	   harms	   or	   is	   likely	   to	   harm	   competition	   (ex	   post	   control).	   Various	   infringements	   of	   the	  
competition	  rules	  have	  been	  sanctioned	  by	  the	  Commission,	  such	  as	  agreements	  fixing	  selling	  prices	  
or	   abusive	   conduct	   leading	   to	   the	  exclusion	  of	   competitors.	  Article	  101	  and	  102	  TFEU	  have	   in	   fact	  
mainly	   be	   enforced	   against	   powerful	   sellers	   colluding	   with	   each	   other	   or	   abusing	   their	   dominant	  
position.	   	   The	   objective	   of	   Section	   1	   of	   this	   chapter	   is,	   in	   particular,	   to	   determine	  whether	   buyer	  
practices	  may	   also	   fall	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   those	   provisions	   and,	   if	   it	   be	   so,	   how	   the	   Commission	  
addresses	  buyer	  power	  cases.	  	  
As	  it	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  Section	  2	  of	  this	  chapter,	  the	  issue	  of	  buyer	  power	  is	  mostly	  analysed	  by	  the	  
Commission	   in	   the	   enforcement	   of	   the	  merger	   policy.	   The	  Merger	   Regulation	   aims	   to	   prevent	   the	  
creation	  or	  strengthening	  of	  market	  power	  and	   thereby	   to	  maintain	  competitive	  market	  structures	  
(ex	  ante	  control).418	   It	  has	  already	  been	  noted	  that,	   in	   its	  competition	  assessment,	   the	  Commission	  
may	  consider	  buyer	  power	  as	  a	  competitive	  constraint	  exerted	  on	  the	  merging	  parties	  (countervailing	  
buyer	   power)	   that	   is	   likely	   to	   prevent	   the	   latter	   from	   exploiting	   their	   seller	   power	   following	   the	  
merger.419	  However,	  buyer	  power	  of	  the	  merged	  entity	   itself	   is	  also	  taken	   into	  consideration	   in	  the	  
assessment.	  In	  a	  forward-­‐looking	  analysis,	  the	  Commission	  in	  fact	  examines	  whether	  the	  merger	  will	  
increase	  the	  parties’	  market	  power	  in	  the	  relevant	  upstream	  buyer	  market	  and	  decides	  whether	  the	  
operation	  is	  or	  not	  likely	  to	  impede	  effective	  competition.	  In	  some	  cases,	  increased	  buyer	  power	  may	  
indeed	  be	  a	  source	  of	  competitive	  concern	  and	  stands	  in	  the	  way	  of	  a	  merger	  approval.	  The	  different	  
Merger	  Guidelines	  develop	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  how	  buyer	  power	  is	  to	  be	  assessed	  in	  (non-­‐)horizontal	  
merger	  cases.	  Different	  decisions,	  especially	  in	  the	  retail	  and	  agricultural	  sectors,	  will	  be	  analysed	  in	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
416	  Treaty	  on	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  O.J.	  C	  115	  of	  9	  may	  2008.	  
417	  Council	  Regulation	  (EC)	  No	  139/2004	  of	  20	  January	  2004	  on	  the	  control	  of	  concentrations	  between	  
undertakings,	  O.J.	  L	  24	  of	  29/01/2004.	  
418	  R.Wish,	  Competition	  law,	  6th	  ed.	  (2009,	  at	  806.	  
419	  See:	  Part	  1,	  Chapter	  2,	  Section	  1.	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SECTION	  I	  -­‐	  TACKLING	  BUYER	  POWER	  UNDER	  ARTICLE	  101	  AND	  102	  TFEU	  
This	   chapter	   is	   devoted	   to	   the	   Treaty’s	   competition	   provisions	   and	   their	   enforcement	   by	   the	  
Commission	   and	   the	   European	   Courts	   in	   buyer	   power	   cases.	   The	   prohibition	   on	   anticompetitive	  
agreements	  and	  abusive	  conduct	  is	  indeed	  likely	  to	  apply	  both	  to	  the	  sell	  and	  to	  the	  buy-­‐side	  of	  the	  
market	  even	  though	  the	  focus	  has	  been	  so	  far	  mainly	  on	  the	  former	  in	  the	  various	  legal	  instruments.	  	  
The	   first	   part	   describes	   the	  Treaty	   competition	   rules,	   namely	  Article	   101	  and	  102	  TFEU,	   and	  other	  
documents	   related	   to	   those	   provisions	   and	   referring	   somehow	   to	   the	   issue	   of	   buyer	   power.	   The	  
second	  part	  focuses	  on	  the	  enforcement	  of	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  and	  102	  TFEU	  against	  buyer	  practices	  at	  
the	   EU	   level.	   We	   will	   see	   that,	   in	   the	   application	   of	   those	   various	   instruments,	   the	   existence	   or	  
creation	  of	  buyer	  power	  is,	  depending	  on	  the	  situation,	  viewed	  as	  a	  source	  of	  competitive	  concerns	  
or	  as	  a	  positive	  countervailing	  strength	  which	  can	  be	  used	  to	  mitigate	  the	  exercise	  of	  market	  power	  
by	  upstream	  firms	  or	  to	  achieve	  efficiency	  gains.	  	  
A. BUYER	  POWER	  IN	  EU	  INSTRUMENTS420	  
Where	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  and	  102	  TFEU	  do	  not	  expressively	  refer	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  buyer	  power,	  the	  
terms	  used	   in	  those	  provisions	  clearly	  show	  that	  buyers	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  competition	  rules	   in	  the	  
same	   way	   as	   sellers	   even	   though	   the	   Commission	   may	   be	   more	   inclined	   to	   find	   procompetitive	  
effects	  in	  some	  buyer	  practices.	  	  
1. Assessment	  of	  buyer	  power	  under	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  
	  
Buyer	   power	   may	   be	   exercised	   by	   a	   single	   firm	   but	   may	   also	   be	   the	   result	   of	   a	   group	   of	   buyers	  
colluding	  with	   each	   other	   to	   extract	   higher	   profits	   or	   to	   exclude	   competitors.	   A	   buyer	   cartel	  may	  
indeed	  be	  formed	  to	  fix	  lower	  prices,	  to	  share	  input	  markets	  so	  that	  the	  buyers	  involved	  do	  no	  longer	  
compete	  in	  certain	  territories,	  to	  alter	  bidding	  processes	  by	  designating	  the	  winning	  buyer	  in	  advance	  
or	  by	  agreeing	  on	  the	  maximum	  high	  bid	   (bid-­‐rigging),	   to	  extract	  exclusive	  rights	  or	   to	  put	   in	  place	  
group	  boycott	  by	  convincing	  sellers	  to	  not	  deal	  with	  a	  competitor,	  to	  name	  but	  a	  few.	  	  
Horizontal	   agreements,	  between	  buyers,	   as	  well	   as	   vertical	   agreements,	  between	  buyers	  and	   their	  
suppliers,	  may	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  Article	  101	  TFEU.	  A	  combination	  of	  vertical	  agreements	  may	  
also	   lead	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   horizontal	   restraints.	   Known	   as	   hub	   and	   spoke	   conspiracy,	   such	  
arrangements	  may	  also	  violate	  the	  rules	  prohibiting	  anticompetitive	  agreements.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
420	  It	  must	  be	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  some	  of	  the	  principles	  developed	  below,	  especially	  these	  mentioned	  in	  the	  
Guidelines	  of	  the	  Commission,	  merely	  confirm	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  European	  Courts.	  However,	  we	  first	  provide	  
the	  details	  of	  the	  legislation	  and	  other	  instruments	  that	  could	  be	  applicable	  in	  buyer	  power	  cases	  before	  
turning	  to	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  competition	  rules	  and	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  European	  Courts	  on	  that	  matter.	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a) Horizontal	  agreements	  
The	   prohibition	   on	   anticompetitive	   agreements	   applies	   to	   both	   buyers	   and	   sellers.	   Section	   1	   of	  
Article	  101	  TFEU	  indeed	  states	  that:	  	  
	  
“The	   following	   shall	   be	   prohibited	   as	   incompatible	   with	   the	   internal	   market	   all	  
agreements	  between	  undertakings,	  decisions	  by	  associations	  of	  undertakings	  and	  
concerted	  practices	  which	  may	   affect	   trade	  between	  Member	   States	   and	  which	  
have	   as	   their	   object	   or	   effect	   the	   prevention,	   restriction	   or	   distortion	   of	  
competition	  within	  the	  internal	  market,	  and	  in	  particular	  those	  which:	  
(a) directly	  or	  indirectly	  fix	  purchase	  or	  selling	  prices	  or	  any	  other	  trading	  	  conditions;	  	  	  
(b) limit	  or	  control	  production,	  markets,	  technical	  development,	  or	  investment;	  
(c) share	  markets	  or	  sources	  of	  supply;	  
(d) apply	   dissimilar	   conditions	   to	   equivalent	   transactions	   with	   other	   trading	  
parties,	  thereby	  placing	  them	  at	  a	  competitive	  disadvantage;	  
(e) make	  the	  conclusion	  of	  contracts	  subject	   to	  acceptance	  by	   the	  other	  parties	  
of	   supplementary	   obligations	   which,	   by	   their	   nature	   or	   according	   to	  
commercial	  usage,	  have	  no	  connection	  with	  the	  subject	  of	  such	  contracts.”	  
	  
Under	   the	   terms	   of	   that	   provision,	   hard-­‐core	   cartels	   between	   buyers	   should	   be	   sanctioned	   in	   the	  
same	   way	   as	   sellers’	   cartels.	   The	   prohibition	   on	   agreements	   fixing	   purchase	   prices	   or	   allocating	  
suppliers	   is	   indeed	   clearly	   aimed	   at	   buyers	   when	   acting	   in	   the	   upstream	   buyer	   market	   while	   the	  
other	  examples	  provided	  for	  in	  the	  provision	  may	  equally	  concern	  sellers’	  or	  buyers’	  conduct.	  The	  EU	  
legislator	   was	   therefore	   willing	   to	   subject	   collusion	   among	   purchasers	   to	   the	   same	   treatment	   as	  
collusion	   among	   sellers,	   assuming	   that	   both	   types	   of	   agreements	   are	   likely	   to	   distort	   effective	  
competition	  on	  the	  markets.	  
However,	   one	   type	   of	   agreements	   on	   the	   buying	   side	   is	   given	   a	   particular	   status,	   namely	   joint	  
purchasing	   agreements	   which	   are	   mentioned	   in	   the	   Guidelines	   on	   horizontal	   cooperation	  
agreements.421	   Those	   arrangements	   are	   generally	   viewed	   as	   pro-­‐competitive	   or,	   at	   least,	   not	  
problematic	   from	   a	   competition	   point	   of	   view.	   Their	   objective	   is	   to	   combine	   demand	   of	   different	  
buyers	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  lower	  prices,	  better	  quality	  products	  and	  better	  terms	  or	  conditions.	   	  The	  
joint	   purchase	   of	   products	   generally	   increases	   the	   negotiating	   capacity	   of	   the	   participants	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
421	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  applicability	  of	  Article	  101	  of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  the	  Functioning	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  to	  
horizontal	  co-­‐operation	  agreements,	  O.J.	  C	  11/1	  of	  04/01/2011,	  at	  197-­‐225.	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enables	   them	   to	   get	   a	   treatment	   similar	   to	   that	   of	   their	   larger	   competitors.422	   	   In	   addition,	  
aggregating	  purchases	   through	  buying	  groups	  can	   lead	   to	  cost	   savings	   such	  as	   reduced	   transaction	  
and	  storage	  costs,	  thereby	  facilitating	  economies	  of	  scale.423	  	  Buying	  arrangement	  are	  therefore	  more	  
likely	   than	  horizontal	   agreements	  between	   sellers	   to	   yield	  benefits.	   Lower	  prices	   and	  better	   terms	  
may	  indeed	  allow	  the	  members	  of	  the	  alliance	  to	  increase	  investment	  in	  innovation	  and	  lead	  them	  to	  
pass	  on	  those	  benefits	  to	  end	  consumers.	  This	  would	  be	  the	  case	  if	  sufficient	  competitive	  constraints	  
exist	   in	   the	   downstream	   market	   inciting	   each	   player	   to	   offer	   the	   best	   conditions	   to	   their	  
customers.424	   As	   a	   result,	   while	   price-­‐fixing	   agreements	   are	   usually	   considered	   as	   restricting	  
competition	  by	  object,	  the	  Commission	  states	  in	  the	  Guidelines	  that	  	  
“this	  does	  not	  apply	  where	  the	  parties	  to	  a	  joint	  purchasing	  arrangement	  agree	  on	  the	  
purchasing	   prices	   the	   joint	   purchasing	   arrangement	   may	   pay	   to	   its	   suppliers	   for	   the	  
products	   subject	   to	   the	   supply	   contract.	   In	   that	   case	   an	   assessment	   is	   required	   as	   to	  
whether	  the	  agreement	  is	   likely	  to	  give	  rise	  to	  restrictive	  effects	  on	  competition	  within	  
the	  meaning	  of	  Article	  101(1).”425	  
Despite	   the	   positive	   effects	   entailed	   by	   the	   conclusion	   of	   a	   joint	   purchasing	   agreement,	   different	  
competitive	   concerns	   may	   nevertheless	   arise.	   First	   of	   all,	   the	   buying	   group	   may	   in	   fact	   not	   truly	  
concern	   joint	  purchasing	  but	   instead	  be	  used	  as	  a	   tool	   to	   facilitate	   the	  coordination	  of	   the	  parties’	  
conduct	   in	   output	   markets.	   In	   such	   cases,	   the	   Guidelines	   on	   horizontal	   co-­‐operation	   agreements	  
provide	  that	  the	  joint	  purchasing	  arrangement	  will	  be	  deemed	  to	  restrict	  competition	  by	  object.426	  	  
In	   addition,	   the	   conclusion	   of	   the	   agreement	   may	   lead	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   buyer	   power.	   With	  
regard	   to	   that	   particular	   issue,	   some	   of	   the	   negative	   effects	   deriving	   from	   the	   exercise	   of	  market	  
power	  on	  the	  buying	  side	  are	  mentioned	  by	  the	  Commission	  in	  its	  Guidelines.	  	  
“Buying	   power	   may,	   under	   certain	   circumstances,	   cause	   restrictive	   effects	   on	  
competition.	   Anti-­‐	   competitive	   buying	   power	   is	   likely	   to	   arise	   if	   a	   joint	   purchasing	  
arrangement	   accounts	   for	   a	   sufficiently	   large	   proportion	   of	   the	   total	   volume	   of	   a	  
purchasing	   market	   so	   that	   access	   to	   the	   market	   may	   be	   foreclosed	   to	   competing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
422	  M.A.LINDSAY,	  Antitrust	  and	  Group	  Purchasing,	  23	  Antitrust	  66	  (2009)	  
423	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  applicability	  of	  Article	  101	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  at	  217.	  
424	  OFT,	  The	  competitive	  effects	  of	  buyer	  groups,	  Economic	  Discussion	  Paper,	  January	  2007,	  at	  12.	  See	  also:	  
A.Ezrachi,	  Buying	  alliances	  and	  input	  price	  fixing:	  In	  search	  of	  a	  European	  enforcement	  standard,	  8	  Journal	  of	  
Competition	  Law	  &	  Economics	  47,	  at	  51	  (2012)	  
425	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  applicability	  of	  Article	  101	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  at	  206.	  
426	  Ibid.,	  at	  205	  and	  213.	  That	  would	  be	  the	  case	  if	  the	  parties	  jointly	  purchase	  a	  large	  percentage	  of	  their	  input	  
costs	  and	  that	  they	  have	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  their	  variable	  costs	  in	  common	  in	  the	  selling	  markets.	  The	  
exchange	  of	  commercially	  sensitive	  information	  required	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  joint	  purchasing	  
agreement	  may	  also	  facilitate	  a	  collusive	  outcome	  in	  downstream	  markets.	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purchasers.	  A	  high	  degree	  of	  buying	  power	  may	  indirectly	  affect	  the	  output,	  quality	  and	  
variety	  of	  products	  on	  the	  selling	  market.”427	  
Although	  described	  as	  potential	  consequences	  of	  a	  joint	  purchasing	  agreement,	  those	  effects	  may	  be	  
caused	  by	  the	  action	  of	  single	  powerful	  buyer’s	  conduct	  as	  well.	  A	  first	  concern	  on	  that	  matter	  is	  that	  
buyer	   power	   could	   be	   used	   to	   foreclose	   competing	   purchasers	   by	   limiting	   their	   access	   to	   efficient	  
suppliers	   through	   exclusive	   supply	   deal	   for	   example.	   As	   a	   result,	   competitive	   constraints	   will	   be	  
weaker	   in	   the	   downstream	  market	   reducing	   the	   buyer’s	   incentive	   to	   pass	   on	   the	   lower	   prices	   to	  
consumers.428	   A	   second	   concern	   refers	   to	   the	   ability	   of	   large	   buyer	   to	   force	   prices	   below	   a	  
competitive	   level	  which	  might	  affect	   in	   the	   long-­‐run	  the	  output,	  quality	  and	  variety	  of	  products	  on	  
the	  selling	  market.429	  
Given	   those	   possible	   positive	   and	   negative	   effects,	   the	   Commission	   has	   placed	   the	   formation	   of	  
buying	   groups	  within	   guidelines.	   A	   safe	   harbor	   threshold	   is	   established	   so	   that	   a	   joint	   purchasing	  
agreement	   is	  presumed	   to	  be	  procompetitive,	  or	  at	   least	  no	  harmful	   to	   competition,	   if	   the	  parties	  
have	  a	  combined	  market	  share	  not	  exceeding	  15%	  on	  both	  the	  purchasing	  and	  the	  selling	  markets.	  In	  
such	  a	  case,	   the	  Commission	  considers	  that	  market	  power	   is	  unlikely	  to	  arise	  or	  that,	   in	  any	  event,	  
the	  conditions	  of	  Article	  101(3)	  will	  most	  likely	  be	  fulfilled.430	  A	  detailed	  assessment	  of	  the	  effects	  on	  
the	  market	  is	  required	  when	  the	  agreement	  does	  not	  fall	  within	  that	  safe	  harbor	  or	  when	  it	  facilitates	  
the	   coordination	   of	   the	   parties’	   conduct	   on	   the	   selling	   side.431	   Indeed,	   in	   those	   situations,	  market	  
power	  created	  through	  the	  agreement	  might	   lead	  to	  restrictive	  effects	  on	  competition	  and	  prevent	  
lower	  prices	  from	  being	  passed	  on	  to	  consumers.	  A	  balance	  is	  therefore	  to	  be	  stricken	  between	  the	  
positive	  and	   the	  negative	  effects	  of	   the	  buying	  alliance	   in	  order	   to	  determine	   its	  overall	   impact	  on	  
competition.	  
b) Vertical	  agreements	  
Some	  buyers	  use	  their	  power	  to	  force	  or	  incite	  their	  suppliers	  to	  adopt	  a	  particular	  behavior	  in	  order	  
to	   foreclose	  rivals.	  A	  buyer	  may,	   for	  example,	   impose	  exclusive	  supply	  agreements	  on	  his	  suppliers	  
which	   preclude	   sales	   of	   inputs	   to	   his	   competitors.	   Less	   drastic	   arrangements	   such	   as	   prohibiting	  
sellers	   from	   offering	   better	   or	   similar	   conditions	   to	   other	   buyers	   or	   imposing	   a	   “most	   favoured	  
nation”	  treatment	  can	  also	  be	  detrimental	  to	  competitors.	  Such	  a	  use	  of	  buyer	  power	  is	  likely	  to	  lead	  
to	   the	   conclusion	   of	   an	   explicit	   or	   tacit	   vertical	   agreement	   under	   EU	   law.	   Indeed,	   the	   concept	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
427	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  applicability	  of	  Article	  101	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  at	  210.	  
428	  OFT,	  The	  competitive	  effects…,	  op.cit.,	  at	  16.	  
429	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  applicability	  of	  Article	  101	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  at	  210.	  
430	  Ibid.,	  at	  208.	  
431	  Ibid.,	  at	  209.	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agreement	  encompasses	  unilateral	  instructions	  given	  by	  one	  party	  which	  have	  been	  tacitly	  accepted	  
by	   the	   other	   one.432	   Specific	   requirements	   imposed	   by	   a	   buyer,	   and	  which	   his	   suppliers	   abide	   by,	  
constitute	  therefore	  vertical	  agreements	  under	  Article	  101	  TFEU.	  	  
However,	   in	   most	   cases,	   those	   agreements	   will	   fall	   within	   the	   block	   exemption	   on	   vertical	  
restraints.433	  Indeed,	  the	  different	  practices	  mentioned	  above	  do	  not	  constitute	  hardcore	  or	  excluded	  
restriction	   in	  the	  view	  of	  the	  Regulation434	   -­‐	  which	  rather	  focuses	  on	  restrictive	  conditions	   imposed	  
by	  suppliers	  on	  their	  customers	  -­‐,	  and	  the	  market	  share	  threshold	  of	  30%	  which	  is	  applied	  from	  2010	  
to	   both	   sellers	   and	   buyers,	   will	   probably	   rarely	   be	   exceeded,	   even	   by	   powerful	   buyers.435	   In	   the	  
Guidelines	  on	  vertical	  restraints,	  the	  Commission	  recognizes	  that	  exclusive	  supply	  agreement	  may,	  in	  
some	   cases,	   foreclose	   other	   buyers	   from	   access	   to	   supplies.	   It	   nevertheless	   considers	   that	   such	   a	  
competition	   problem	   is	   unlikely	   to	   arise	   when	   the	   market	   share	   of	   the	   buyer	   on	   the	   upstream	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
432	  See	  for	  examples	  :	  Case	  107/82,	  AEG-­‐Telefunken	  v	  Commission	  [1983]	  ECR	  3151	  and	  C-­‐277/87,	  Sandoz	  
prodoti	  farmaceutici	  SpA	  v	  Commission	  [1990]ECR	  I-­‐45.	  The	  AEG	  case	  occurs	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  selective	  
distribution	  system	  where	  a	  manufacturer,	  with	  a	  view	  to	  maintaining	  a	  high	  level	  of	  prices,	  refused	  to	  approve	  
distributors	  who	  satisfied	  the	  qualitative	  criteria	  of	  the	  system.	  Admission	  to	  the	  network	  was	  in	  fact	  based	  on	  
adherence	  to	  the	  manufacturer’s	  pricing	  policy.	  It	  was	  considered	  therefore	  considered	  that	  the	  distributors	  
had	  accepted	  that	  policy	  so	  that	  the	  manufacturer’s	  decision	  was	  part	  of	  an	  agreement	  with	  its	  distributors.	  In	  
the	  Sandoz	  case,	  a	  pharmaceutical	  company	  expressly	  introduced	  an	  export	  ban	  into	  all	  the	  invoices	  sent	  to	  its	  
customers.	  It	  was	  considered	  that	  the	  successive	  payments	  without	  protest	  by	  the	  customers	  who	  de	  facto	  
complied	  with	  the	  clause	  restraining	  competition	  demonstrated	  a	  tacit	  acquiescence	  in	  the	  supplier’s	  policy.	  
The	  restriction	  did	  not	  constitute	  unilateral	  conduct	  but	  formed	  part	  of	  the	  general	  framework	  of	  the	  
contractual	  relations	  between	  the	  pharmaceutical	  company	  and	  its	  customers.	  See	  also:	  Joint	  cases	  25	  &	  
26/84,	  Ford	  Werke	  &	  Ford	  of	  Europe	  Inc.	  v	  Commission	  [1985]	  ECR	  2725;	  T-­‐62/98,	  Volkswagen	  AG	  v	  Commission	  
[2000]	  ECR	  II-­‐2707;	  T-­‐368/00,	  General	  Motor	  Nederland	  BV,	  Opel	  Nederland	  BV	  v	  Commission	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐
4491.	  However,	  the	  European	  Courts	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  if	  no	  concurrence	  of	  will	  has	  been	  established,	  the	  
decision	  to	  restrict	  competition	  must	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  genuinely	  unilateral	  conduct	  which	  escapes	  the	  
prohibition	  in	  Article	  101	  TFEU.	  See:	  T-­‐41/96,	  Bayer	  v	  Commission	  [2000]	  ECR	  II-­‐3383.	  That	  case	  was	  upheld	  on	  
appeal	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  see:	  C-­‐2	  &	  3/01P,	  BAI	  and	  Commission	  v	  Bayer	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐23.	  See	  on	  that	  
matter:	  I.Lianos,	  Collusion	  in	  vertical	  relations	  under	  Article	  81	  EC,	  45	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  1027	  (2008).	  
433	  Commission	  Regulation	  (EU)	  No	  330/2010	  of	  20	  April	  2010	  on	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  101(3)	  of	  the	  Treaty	  
on	  the	  Functioning	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  to	  categories	  of	  vertical	  agreements	  and	  concerted	  practices	  (Text	  
with	  EEA	  relevance),	  O.J.	  L	  102/1	  of	  23/04/2010.	  
434	  Ibid.,	  Articles	  4	  and	  5.	  
435	  The	  Block	  Exemption	  Regulation	  provides	  that	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU	  shall	  not	  apply	  to	  vertical	  agreements	  
provided	  that	  the	  market	  share	  held	  by	  the	  supplier	  does	  not	  exceed	  30%	  of	  the	  relevant	  market	  on	  which	  it	  
sells	  the	  contract	  goods	  or	  services	  and	  that	  the	  market	  share	  held	  by	  the	  buyer	  does	  not	  exceed	  30%	  of	  the	  
relevant	  market	  on	  which	  it	  purchases	  the	  contract	  goods	  or	  services.	  (Article	  3)	  In	  the	  previous	  Block	  
Exemption	  Regulation	  (Regulation	  2790/1999),	  only	  the	  supplier’s	  market	  share	  was	  relevant.	  The	  30%	  
threshold	  only	  applied	  to	  the	  buyer’s	  market	  share	  when	  the	  vertical	  agreement	  contained	  exclusive	  supply	  
obligations.	  The	  “black	  list”	  of	  “hardcore”	  restrictions	  and	  the	  list	  of	  excluded	  restrictions	  remain	  yet	  the	  same	  
in	  the	  2010	  Regulation.	  (Articles	  4	  and	  5)	  An	  agreement	  containing	  hardcore	  restrictions	  is	  excluded	  as	  a	  whole	  
from	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  Block	  Exemption	  Regulation.	  The	  presence	  of	  excluded	  restrictions,	  however,	  only	  leads	  
to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  those	  vertical	  restraints	  while	  the	  Block	  Exemption	  Regulation	  continues	  to	  apply	  to	  the	  
remaining	  part	  of	  the	  vertical	  agreement	  if	  that	  part	  is	  severable	  from	  the	  non-­‐exempted	  vertical	  restraints.	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purchase	   market	   and	   on	   the	   downstream	   supply	   market	   do	   not	   exceed	   30%	   and	   when	   the	  
agreement	  does	  not	  last	  longer	  than	  five	  years.436	  	  
With	   regard	   to	   upfront	   access	   payments,	   the	   Commission	   underlines	   in	   its	   Guidelines	   on	   vertical	  
restraints	  that	  	  
“[these	   payments]	   may	   sometimes	   result	   in	   anticompetitive	   foreclosure	   of	   other	  
distributors	   if	   such	  payments	   induce	   the	   supplier	   to	   channel	   its	  products	   through	  only	  
one	  or	  a	   limited	  number	  of	  distributors.	  A	  high	  fee	  may	  make	  that	  a	  supplier	  wants	  to	  
channel	  a	   substantial	   volume	  of	   its	   sales	   through	   this	  distributor	   in	  order	   to	  cover	   the	  
costs	  of	  the	  fee.	  In	  this	  case,	  upfront	  access	  payments	  may	  have	  the	  same	  downstream	  
foreclosure	  effect	  as	  an	  exclusive	  supply	  type	  of	  obligation”.437	  
In	  such	  a	  case,	  upfront	  payments	  may	  be	  assimilated	  to	  an	  exclusive	  supply	  type	  of	  obligation	  
and	  will	  be	  treated	  accordingly.	  	  
The	   large	  number	  of	  payments	   imposed	  by	   retailers	  on	   suppliers	  may	  also	   lead	   to	   increased	  
supply	  prices	  and	  reduced	  price	  competition	  at	  the	  retail	  level.	  The	  Guidelines	  on	  that	  matter	  
read	  as	  follows:	  
“upfront	   access	   payments	   may	   soften	   competition	   and	   facilitate	   collusion	  
between	   distributors.	   Upfront	   access	   payments	   are	   likely	   to	   increase	   the	   price	  
charged	  by	   the	   supplier	   for	   the	   contract	  products	   since	   the	   supplier	  must	   cover	  
the	  expense	  of	  those	  payments.	  Higher	  supply	  prices	  may	  reduce	  the	  incentive	  of	  
the	  retailers	  to	  compete	  on	  price	  on	  the	  downstream	  market,	  while	  the	  profits	  of	  
distributors	  are	  increased	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  access	  payments”.438	  
However,	   again,	   provided	   that	   the	   30%	   thresholds	   mentioned	   above	   are	   not	   exceeded,	  
agreements	  involving	  payments	  extracted	  by	  retailers	  will	  be	  block	  exempted.	  The	  Commission	  
in	   fact	  considers	   that	   the	  use	  of	  upfront	  payments	  may	  generate	  positive	  effects.	   It	  may,	   for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
436	  Commission	  notice	  -­‐	  Guidelines	  on	  vertical	  restraints,	  SEC(2010)411,	  O.J.	  C	  130	  of	  19/05/2010,	  at	  194-­‐195.	  
The	  Guidelines	  state	  that	  exclusive	  supply	  agreements	  shorter	  than	  five	  years	  entered	  into	  by	  non-­‐dominant	  
companies	  usually	  require	  a	  balancing	  of	  pro-­‐	  and	  anti-­‐competitive	  effects,	  while	  agreements	  lasting	  longer	  
than	  five	  years	  are	  for	  most	  types	  of	  investments	  not	  considered	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  the	  claimed	  efficiencies	  
or	  the	  efficiencies	  are	  not	  sufficient	  to	  outweigh	  the	  foreclosure	  effect	  of	  such	  long-­‐term	  exclusive	  supply	  
agreements.	  	  
437	  Guidelines	  on	  vertical	  restraints,	  op.cit.,	  at	  204.	  The	  Commission	  also	  point	  out	  that	  “exceptionally,	  upfront	  
access	  payments	  may	  also	  result	  in	  anticompetitive	  foreclosure	  of	  other	  suppliers,	  if	  the	  widespread	  use	  of	  
upfront	  access	  payments	  increases	  barriers	  to	  entry	  
for	  small	  entrants.	  The	  assessment	  of	  this	  possible	  negative	  effect	  is	  made	  by	  analogy	  to	  the	  assessment	  of	  
single	  branding	  obligations”	  (at	  205).	  
438	  Ibid.,	  at	  206.	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example,	   contribute	   to	   an	   efficient	   allocation	   of	   shelf-­‐space	   for	   new	   products	   by	   giving	  
retailers	  a	  signal	  of	  which	  products	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  successful	  or	  prevent	  suppliers	  from	  
free-­‐riding	  on	  distributors'	  promotional	  efforts	  in	  order	  to	  introduce	  suboptimal	  products.439	  
It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  same	  criterion	  is	  used	  to	  measure	  sellers’	  and	  buyers’	  market	  power,	  
namely	  their	  market	  share	  respectively	  in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market	  and	  in	  the	  upstream	  
purchasing	  market.	  The	  specificities	  of	  buyer	  power	  described	  in	  Part	  I	  seem	  hence	  not	  to	  be	  
taken	  into	  consideration	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  vertical	  agreements.	  	  
c) “Trilateral”	  agreements	  
Although	   indirectly	   related	   to	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power,	   another	   issue	   is	   worth	   mentioning,	  
namely	   that	   of	   “hub-­‐and-­‐spoke”	   conspiracy,	   also	   known	  as	  A	   to	  B	   to	  C	   coordination.	   Such	   type	  of	  
collusion	  involves	  a	  purchaser	  or	  supplier	  B	  (the	  “hub”)	  who	  enters	  into	  different	  vertical	  agreements	  
or	  shares	  information	  with	  his	  suppliers	  or	  distributors	  A	  and	  C	  (the	  “spokes”).	  Where	  that	  situation	  
leads	   to	   an	   indirect	   transfer	   of	   information	   between	   competitors,	   the	   trilateral	   relationship	   may	  
amount	   to	   a	   horizontal	   arrangement	   prohibited	   by	   Article	   101(1)	   TFEU.440	   Indeed,	   the	   sharing	   of	  
information	  between	  firms	  operating	  at	  the	  same	  level	  of	  the	  production/distribution	  chain	  (A	  and	  C)	  
via	   an	   intermediary	   (B)	  may	   constitute	   a	   concerted	   practice	   if	   those	   rivals	   become	   aware	   of	   each	  
other’s	  trade	  policy.	  441	  	  
The	   Commission	   highlights	   that	   issue	   in	   its	   Guidelines	   on	   horizontal	   co-­‐operation	   agreements	  
concerning	   the	  assessment	  of	   information	  exchange.	   It	   points	  out	   that	   information	   can	  be	  directly	  
shared	   between	   competitors	   but	   also	   indirectly	   through	   a	   common	   agency,	   a	   third	   party	   or	   the	  
companies’	  suppliers	  or	  retailers.442	  The	  Commission	  also	  notes	  in	  its	  Guidelines	  on	  vertical	  restraints	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
439	  Ibid.,	  at	  207	  and	  208.	  “Distributors	  often	  have	  less	  information	  than	  suppliers	  on	  the	  potential	  for	  success	  of	  
new	  products	  to	  be	  introduced	  on	  the	  market	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  amount	  of	  products	  to	  be	  stocked	  may	  be	  
sub-­‐optimal.	  Upfront	  access	  payments	  may	  be	  used	  to	  reduce	  this	  asymmetry	  in	  information	  between	  suppliers	  
and	  distributors	  by	  explicitly	  allowing	  suppliers	  to	  compete	  for	  shelf	  space.	  (…)	  Furthermore,	  due	  to	  the	  
asymmetry	  in	  information	  mentioned	  above,	  suppliers	  may	  have	  incentives	  to	  free-­‐ride	  on	  distributors'	  
promotional	  efforts	  in	  order	  to	  introduce	  suboptimal	  products.	  If	  a	  product	  is	  not	  successful,	  the	  distributors	  
will	  pay	  part	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  product	  failure.	  The	  use	  of	  upfront	  access	  fees	  may	  prevent	  such	  free	  riding	  by	  
shifting	  the	  risk	  of	  product	  failure	  back	  to	  the	  suppliers,	  thereby	  contributing	  to	  an	  optimal	  rate	  of	  product	  
introduction.	  »	  
440	  	  For	  more	  details	  on	  A-­‐B-­‐C	  information	  exchange	  and	  cases	  involving	  that	  type	  of	  conspiracy,	  see	  :	  
P.WHELAN,	  Trading	  negotiations	  between	  retailers	  and	  suppliers:	  a	  fertile	  ground	  for	  anti-­‐competitive	  
horizontal	  information	  exchange?,	  5	  European	  Competition	  Journal	  823	  (2009)	  and	  O.ODUDU,	  Indirect	  
information	  exchange:	  the	  constituent	  elements	  of	  hub	  and	  spoke	  collusion,	  7	  European	  Competition	  Journal	  
205	  (2011).	  See	  also,	  below,	  Part	  III,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  II,	  Point	  C	  and	  Part	  III,	  Chapter	  2,	  Section	  II,	  Point	  b,	  4,	  
b).	  
441	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  restriction	  on	  competition	  includes	  a	  horizontal	  element	  turns	  that	  restriction	  into	  a	  more	  
serious	  infringement	  of	  the	  competition	  law	  rules	  leading	  to	  a	  stricter	  legal	  analysis.	  
442	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  applicability	  of	  Article	  101	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  at	  55.	  	  .	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that,	   in	  case	  of	  category	  management	  agreements	  for	  example,	  collusion	  between	  distributors	  may	  
be	  facilitated	  	  
“when	  the	  same	  supplier	  serves	  as	  a	  category	  captain	  for	  all	  or	  most	  of	  the	  competing	  
distributors	   on	   the	   market	   and	   provides	   these	   distributors	   with	   a	   common	   point	   of	  
reference	  for	  their	  marketing	  decisions.”443	  	  
However,	   discussions	   between	   operators	   at	   different	   levels	   of	   the	   supply	   chain	   about	   prices,	  
investment	   or	   innovation	   plans	   are	   not	   as	   such	   unlawful	   as	   the	   share	   of	   commercially	   sensitive	  
information	  between	   retailers	  and	   suppliers	   is	  a	  normal	   feature	  of	   commercial	   relations.444	   In	   fact,	  
indirect	   information-­‐disclosure	  will	   constitute	  an	  unlawful	  horizontal	   restraint	   if	   two	  conditions	  are	  
fulfilled:	   (1)	   the	   hub	   and	   spoke	   arrangement	   leads	   to	   an	   exchange	   of	   information	   that	   may	   be	  
conceptualized	  as	  a	  horizontal	  exchange	  between	  rivals	  and	  (2)	  results	  in	  restricting	  competition	  on	  
the	   relevant	   market.	   If,	   in	   the	   first	   stage	   of	   the	   competitive	   assessment,	   it	   is	   concluded	   that	   the	  
triangular	   arrangement	   involving	   a	   flow	   of	   information	   from	   retailer	   to	   supplier	   to	   competitor	   is	  
equivalent	  to	  a	  direct	  competitor-­‐to-­‐competitor	  information	  exchange,	  the	  next	  step	  of	  the	  analysis	  
will	  then	  focus	  on	  the	  possible	  anticompetitive	  object	  or	  effect	  of	  such	  arrangement.445	  	  
On	   that	   matter,	   the	   EU	   decisional	   practice	   and	   case	   law	   provide	   that	   any	   information	   exchange	  
between	  competitors	  amounts	  to	  a	  form	  of	  coordination	  prohibited	  by	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU	  if	  it	  leads	  
the	   parties	   to	   knowingly	   substituting	   practical	   cooperation	   between	   them	   for	   the	   risk	   of	  
competition.446	   Effective	   competition	   on	   the	   markets	   indeed	   requires	   that	   each	   firm	   determines	  
independently	   its	  market	   policies	   and	   the	   conditions	   offered	   to	   its	   trading	   partners.	   Any	   direct	   or	  
indirect	  contact	  between	  competitors	  which	  has	   the	  object	  or	  effect	  of	   influencing	  conduct	  on	   the	  
market	   of	   a	   competitor	   or	   of	   disclosing	   to	   such	   competitor	   the	   course	   of	   conduct	   which	   they	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
443	  Guidelines	  on	  vertical	  restraints,	  op.cit.,	  at	  211.	  Category	  management	  agreements	  are	  defined	  as	  
agreements	  by	  which,	  the	  distributor	  entrusts	  the	  supplier	  (the	  “category	  captain”)	  with	  the	  marketing	  of	  a	  
category	  of	  products	  including	  in	  general	  not	  only	  the	  supplier’s	  products	  but	  also	  the	  products	  of	  its	  
competitors.	  (at	  209)	  
444	  O.Odudu,	  op.cit.,	  at	  230.	  
445	  P.Whelan,	  op.cit.,	  at	  833-­‐834.	  
446	  See	  for	  examples:	  Joined	  cases	  48,	  49	  and	  51-­‐57/69,	  Imperial	  Chemical	  Industries	  Ltd.	  v	  Commission	  of	  the	  
European	  Communities	  [1979]	  ECR	  619,	  at	  64;	  Joined	  cases	  C-­‐89/85,	  C-­‐104/85,	  C-­‐114/85,	  C-­‐116/85,	  C-­‐117/85	  
and	  C-­‐125/85	  to	  C-­‐129/85,	  A.	  Ahlström	  Osakeyhtiö	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  (Wood	  Pulp)	  [1993]	  ECR	  1307,	  at	  
63;	  C-­‐8/08,	  T-­‐Mobile	  Netherlands	  BV	  and	  others	  v	  Raad	  van	  bestuur	  van	  de	  Nederlandse	  
Mededingingsautoriteit	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐4529,	  at	  26.	  See	  also:	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  applicability	  of	  Article	  101	  of	  the	  
Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  at	  56.	  On	  the	  issue	  of	  information	  exchanges	  between	  competitors,	  see:	  OECD,	  Information	  
exchanges	  between	  competitors	  under	  competition	  law,	  Policy	  Roundtables,	  DAF/COMP(2010)39.	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themselves	   have	   decided	   to	   adopt	   or	   contemplate	   adopting	   on	   the	   market	   must	   therefore	   be	  
regarded	  as	  a	  concerted	  practice	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU.	  447	  
The	   Commission	   recognizes	   that	   information	   exchange	   may,	   in	   some	   circumstances,	   be	  
procompetitive.448	  However,	  it	  considers	  that	  when	  information-­‐disclosure	  enables	  firms	  to	  be	  aware	  
of	   future	  market	   strategies	   of	   their	   competitors,	   it	   reduces	   the	   degree	   of	   uncertainty	  which	  must	  
prevail	  on	  the	  markets	  and	  gives	  thereby	  competing	  firms	  the	  opportunity	  to	  reach	  easily	  a	  common	  
understanding	  on	  the	  terms	  of	  coordination.449	  Indirect	  exchange	  of	  information	  between	  competing	  
retailers	   on	   individual	   pricing	   intentions,	   investment	   or	   promotional	   plans	   for	   example	   reduces	  
significantly	   strategic	   uncertainty	   in	   the	   market	   and	   facilitates	   coordination	   of	   firms’	   competitive	  
behavior.	  Conveying	   information	   to	  competitors	   through	  a	   triangular	   route	  may	   therefore	   result	   in	  
an	  anticompetitive	  horizontal	  arrangement	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  Article	  101	  TFEU.	  	  
Although	   no	   decision	   exists	   on	   that	   matter	   at	   EU	   level,	   some	   authors,	   inspired	   by	   national	  
jurisprudence	   on	   indirect	   exchange	   of	   information450	   and	   by	   the	   interpretation	   given	   by	   the	   EU	  
institutions	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  horizontal	  agreement	  and	  concerted	  practice,	  have	  shed	  some	  light	  	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
447	  See:	  Joined	  cases	  40-­‐48,	  50,	  54-­‐56,	  111,	  113,	  114/73,	  Coöperatieve	  Vereniging	  "Suiker	  Unie"	  UA	  and	  others	  v	  
Commission	  of	  the	  European	  Communities	  [1975]	  ECR	  1663,	  at	  173;	  C-­‐7/95	  P,	  John	  Deer	  Ltd	  v	  Commission	  
[1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐3111,	  at	  86.	  See	  also:	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  applicability	  of	  Article	  101	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  at	  61.	  
448	  The	  share	  of	  information	  between	  market	  participants	  may	  indeed	  lead	  to	  increased	  competition	  (by	  
reducing	  or	  eliminating	  information	  asymmetries	  for	  example)	  or	  generate	  efficiency	  gains.	  Information	  
exchanges	  may	  for	  example	  help	  firms	  allocate	  production	  towards	  high-­‐demand	  markets	  or	  lead	  to	  cost	  
savings.	  When	  information-­‐disclosure	  is	  public,	  it	  may	  also	  help	  consumers	  make	  a	  more	  informed	  choice.	  See:	  
Guidelines	  on	  the	  applicability	  of	  Article	  101	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  at	  88-­‐93.	  
449	  Ibid.,	  at	  58-­‐62.	  
450	  It	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  two	  decisions	  adopted	  in	  the	  UK	  where	  the	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  (OFT),	  upheld	  by	  the	  
Competition	  Appeal	  Tribunal	  and	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	  considered	  that,	  in	  some	  circumstances,	  A-­‐B-­‐C	  
coordination	  (or	  hub	  and	  spoke	  collusion)	  amounts	  to	  an	  unlawful	  horizontal	  agreement.	  See:	  Case	  CP/0871/01	  
Price-­‐Fixing	  of	  Replica	  Football	  Kit	  [2003]	  1	  August	  and	  Case	  CP/0480-­‐01	  Agreements	  between	  Hasbro	  UK	  Ltd,	  
Argos	  Ltd	  and	  Littlewood	  Ltd	  Fixing	  the	  Price	  of	  Hasbro	  Toys	  and	  Games	  [2003]	  21	  November.	  On	  appeal	  before	  
the	  Competition	  Appeal	  Tribunal:	  Case	  1021/1/1/03	  and	  1022/1/1/03	  JJB	  Sports	  Plc	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading;	  
Allsports	  Limited	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  [2004]	  CAT	  17	  and	  Case	  1014/1/1/03	  and	  1015/1/1/03	  Argos	  Limited	  &	  
Littlewoods	  Limited	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  [2004]	  CAT	  24.On	  appeal	  before	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal:	  Case	  Nos	  
2005/1071,	  1074	  and	  1623	  Argos	  Limited	  and	  Littlewoods	  Limited	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  and	  JJB	  Sports	  Plc	  v	  	  
Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  [2006]	  EWCA	  Civ	  1318.	  In	  the	  Hasbro,	  Argos	  and	  Littlewood	  case,	  Hasbro,	  a	  leading	  
manufacturer	  of	  children	  toys	  and	  games,	  entered	  into	  restrictive	  agreements	  with	  two	  influential	  retailers,	  
Argos	  and	  Littlewood,	  to	  fix	  the	  retail	  prices	  of	  its	  products.	  In	  addition,	  in	  order	  to	  reassure	  those	  two	  retailers	  
that	  the	  recommended	  retail	  prices	  will	  not	  be	  undercut	  by	  rivals,	  Hasbro	  conveyed	  information	  between	  
competing	  retailers	  so	  as	  to	  share	  the	  future	  pricing	  policy	  of	  the	  leading	  retailers	  and	  ensure	  that	  other	  
retailers	  will	  sell	  at	  the	  same	  price.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  investigator	  of	  the	  price-­‐fixing	  agreement	  was	  Hasbro,	  the	  
supplier.	  Conversely,	  in	  the	  Replica	  football	  kit	  case,	  it	  is	  a	  retailer,	  JJB	  Sports,	  which	  initiated	  the	  trilateral	  
agreement.	  JJB	  Sports	  complained	  to	  its	  supplier,	  Umbro,	  that	  a	  competing	  retailer,	  Sport	  Soccer,	  was	  
discounting	  replica	  football	  shirts	  and	  incited	  it	  to	  take	  measures	  preventing	  such	  discounts.	  Following	  
discussions	  with	  Umbro,	  Sport	  Soccer	  agreed	  reluctantly	  to	  raise	  its	  prices	  on	  the	  understanding	  that	  other	  
retailers,	  in	  particular	  JJB	  Sports,	  would	  not	  discount.	  Despite	  the	  absence	  of	  direct	  contact	  between	  the	  
competing	  retailers,	  the	  CAT	  and	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  found	  that	  they	  were	  part	  of	  an	  anticompetitive	  
horizontal	  agreement. 
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the	  possible	  horizontal	  nature	  of	  hub	  and	  spoke	  arrangements.	  Some	  leads	  are	  thereby	  given	  to	  firms	  
to	  help	  them	  distinguish	  situations	  where	  information	  exchange	  between	  trading	  partners	  is	  allowed	  
or	  even	  necessary	  to	  build	  a	  meaningful	  business	  relationship	  from	  those	  where	  the	  intervention	  of	  a	  
common	   trading	   partner	   between	   competing	   firms	  may	   give	   rise	   to	   an	   anticompetitive	   horizontal	  
agreement	  or	  concerted	  practice.	  As	  such,	  according	  to	  P.Whelan,	  where	  every	  party	  involved	  in	  the	  
trilateral	   relationship	   is	   aware	   that	   the	   supplier	   is	   simply	   acting	   as	   a	   conduit	   for	   the	   exchange	   of	  
information	  between	  competing	  retailers,	  there	  should	  be	  no	  doubt	  about	  the	  horizontal	  nature	  of	  
the	   arrangement.451	   However,	   when	   awareness	   of	   the	   role	   that	   the	   supplier,	   as	   intermediary,	   is	  
supposed	  to	  be	  playing	  is	  not	  present	  in	  either	  the	  retailer	  or	  its	  rival,	  questions	  arise	  as	  to	  whether	  
horizontal	  information	  exchange	  occurs	  or	  not.452	  Looking	  at	  EU	  case	  law,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  definition	  
given	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  concerted	  practice	  requires	  that	  the	  competing	  firms	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  role	  
being	  played	  by	  the	  supplier.453	  According	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  a	  concerted	  practice	  is	  defined	  as	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
451	  P.Whelan,	  op.cit.,	  at	  834.	  
452	  P.Whelan	  considers	  that	  awareness	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  supplier	  is	  for	  the	  hub-­‐and-­‐spoke	  arrangement	  to	  have	  
a	  horizontal	  character.	  Provided	  that	  the	  competing	  retailers	  are	  aware	  of	  using	  the	  supplier	  as	  a	  conduit	  to	  
pass	  on	  information	  to	  each	  other,	  the	  supplier	  in	  question	  does	  not	  have	  to	  have	  knowledge	  of	  its	  actual	  role	  
to	  consider	  the	  flow	  of	  information	  to	  be	  horizontal.	  P.Whelan,	  op.cit.,	  at	  835.	  
453	  The	  UK	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  in	  Argos	  and	  Littlewoods	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  and	  JJB	  Sports	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  
trading	  followed	  that	  interpretation.	  Even	  though	  it	  upheld	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  Competition	  Appeal	  Tribunal	  
(CAT),	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  nevertheless	  narrowed	  the	  formulation	  of	  the	  test	  to	  be	  used	  in	  case	  of	  indirect	  
exchange	  of	  information.	  The	  CAT	  had	  approved	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  OFT	  and	  considered	  that	  indirect	  contact	  
between	  competitors	  via	  an	  intermediary	  constitutes	  indeed	  a	  concerted	  practice	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  
retailer	  has	  actual	  knowledge	  of	  the	  role	  being	  played	  by	  the	  supplier.	  According	  to	  the	  CAT,	  “if	  one	  retailer	  A	  
privately	  discloses	  to	  supplier	  B	  its	  future	  pricing	  intentions	  in	  circumstances	  where	  it	  is	  reasonably	  foreseeable	  
that	  B	  might	  make	  use	  of	  that	  information	  to	  influence	  market	  conditions,	  and	  B	  then	  passes	  that	  pricing	  
information	  on	  to	  a	  competing	  retailer	  C,	  then	  (…)	  A,	  B	  and	  C	  are	  all	  to	  be	  regarded	  on	  those	  facts	  as	  parties	  to	  
a	  concerted	  practice	  having	  as	  tis	  object	  or	  effect	  the	  prevention,	  restriction	  or	  distortion	  of	  competition.”	  (See:	  
Case	  1021/1/1/03	  and	  1022/1/1/03	  JJB	  Sports	  Plc	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading;	  Allsports	  Limited	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  
Trading	  [2004]	  CAT	  17,	  at	  659)	  P.Whelan	  points	  out	  that	  for	  the	  CAT	  constructive	  knowledge	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
supplier	  is	  in	  fact	  sufficient	  to	  conclude	  that	  a	  concerted	  practice	  has	  occurred.	  This	  broad	  approach	  to	  the	  
prohibition	  of	  indirect	  contact	  between	  competing	  firms	  was	  yet	  not	  followed	  by	  the	  UK	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  which	  
maintained	  that	  the	  CAT	  might	  have	  gone	  too	  far	  if	  it	  intended	  to	  extend	  the	  prohibition	  to	  “cases	  in	  which	  A	  
did	  not,	  in	  fact,	  foresee	  that	  B	  would	  make	  use	  of	  the	  pricing	  information	  to	  influence	  market	  conditions	  or	  in	  
which	  C	  did	  not,	  in	  fact,	  appreciate	  that	  the	  information	  was	  being	  passed	  to	  him	  with	  A’s	  concurrence”.	  (See:	  
Case	  Nos	  2005/1071,	  1074	  and	  1623	  Argos	  Limited	  and	  Littlewoods	  Limited	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  and	  JJB	  
Sports	  Plc	  v	  	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  [2006]	  EWCA	  Civ	  1318,	  at	  91)	  According	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	  actual	  
knowledge	  of	  both	  the	  retailer	  and	  its	  competitor	  must	  be	  established	  to	  conclude	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  
concerted	  practice	  and	  the	  following	  more	  restrictive	  test	  is	  to	  be	  applied:	  “if	  (i)	  retailer	  A	  discloses	  to	  supplier	  
B	  its	  future	  pricing	  intentions	  in	  circumstances	  where	  A	  may	  be	  taken	  to	  intend	  that	  B	  will	  make	  use	  of	  that	  
information	  to	  influence	  market	  conditions	  by	  passing	  that	  information	  to	  other	  retailers	  (of	  whom	  C	  is	  or	  may	  
be	  one),	  (ii)	  B	  does,	  in	  fact,	  pass	  that	  information	  to	  C	  in	  circumstances	  where	  C	  may	  be	  taken	  to	  know	  the	  
circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  information	  was	  disclosed	  by	  A	  to	  B	  and	  (iii)	  C	  does,	  in	  fact,	  use	  the	  information	  in	  
determining	  its	  own	  future	  pricing	  intentions,	  then	  A,	  B	  and	  C	  are	  all	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  parties	  to	  a	  concerted	  
practice	  having	  as	  its	  object	  the	  restriction	  or	  distortion	  of	  competition.”	  (at	  141)	  In	  the	  case	  at	  hand,	  the	  
narrower	  formulation	  of	  the	  test	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  a	  different	  result	  as	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  also	  found	  a	  
competition	  law	  infringement	  on	  basis	  of	  that	  formulation.	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“co-­‐ordination	  between	  undertakings	  which,	  without	  having	  reached	  the	  stage	  where	  an	  
agreement,	  properly	  so	  called,	  has	  been	  concluded,	  knowingly	  substitutes	  practical	  co-­‐
operation	  between	  them	  for	  the	  risks	  of	  competition.”454	  	  
Accordingly,	  for	  a	  trilateral	  arrangement	  to	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  that	  definition,	  the	  retailer	  must	  
intent	  or	  actually	  know	  that	  the	  information	  it	  has	  passed	  to	  its	  suppliers	  will	  be	  convey	  to	  its	  rival455	  
and	  the	  latter	  must	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  flow	  of	  information	  via	  the	  hub	  and	  take	  that	  information	  into	  
account	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  determining	  its	  conduct	  on	  the	  market.456	  However,	  no	  matter	  whether	  
the	   information	   is	  exchanged	  with	  or	  without	   reciprocity.	   It	   is	   indeed	  considered	   that	   the	   share	  of	  
information	  between	  competitors	  is	  conceptualized	  as	  a	  concerted	  practice	  “where	  one	  competitor	  
discloses	  its	  future	  intentions	  or	  conduct	  on	  the	  market	  to	  another	  when	  the	  latter	  requests	  it	  or,	  at	  
the	  very	   least,	   accepts	   it.”457	   If	   those	  conditions	  are	   fulfilled,	   indirect	   contact	  between	   retailers	   via	  
their	  common	  supplier	  will	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  direct	  exchange	  of	  information	  between	  competitors	  and	  
be	  therefore	  held	  unlawful	  if	  it	  as	  the	  object	  or	  effect	  to	  reduce	  or	  remove	  uncertainties	  inherent	  in	  
the	  process	  of	  competition.	  	  
Once	  it	  is	  established	  that	  the	  exchange	  from	  retailer	  to	  supplier	  to	  competing	  retailer	  is	  tantamount	  
to	  a	  direct	  competitor-­‐to-­‐competitor	  arrangement,	  the	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  applicability	  of	  Article	  101	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
454	  See	  for	  example:	  Joined	  Case	  48,	  49	  and	  51-­‐57/69,	  Imperial	  Chemical	  Industries	  Ltd.	  v	  Commission	  of	  the	  
European	  Communities	  [1979]	  ECR	  619,	  at	  64.	  (emphasis	  added)	  
455	  According	  to	  O.Odudu,	  intention	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  retailer	  may	  be	  inferred	  from	  three	  situations:	  (i)	  when	  
there	  is	  a	  bidirectional	  flow	  of	  information,	  that	  is	  when	  the	  retailer	  not	  only	  provides	  information	  to	  its	  
supplier	  but	  also	  receives	  similarly	  sensitive	  information	  concerning	  a	  competitor	  from	  the	  same	  supplier;	  (ii)	  
when	  information	  is	  disclosed	  	  after	  agreement	  has	  been	  reached	  as	  once	  the	  terms	  are	  settled,	  there	  is	  no	  
longer	  any	  legitimate	  basis	  for	  sharing	  information;	  and	  (iii)	  when	  the	  retailer	  complains	  to	  its	  supplier	  about	  
the	  market	  activities	  of	  another	  competing	  retailer	  in	  order	  to	  make	  that	  supplier	  take	  action	  in	  response	  of	  its	  
complaint.	  See:	  O.Odudu,	  op.cit.,	  at	  234-­‐235.	  
456	  In	  case	  of	  direct	  exchange	  of	  information	  between	  competitors,	  it	  is	  presumed	  that	  the	  firm	  getting	  
information	  from	  its	  competitor	  takes	  account	  of	  it	  when	  determining	  its	  conduct	  on	  the	  market.	  See	  for	  
examples:	  C-­‐49/92	  P,	  Commission	  v	  Anic	  Partecipazioni	  Spa	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐4125,	  at	  121	  and	  C-­‐199/92	  P,	  Hüls	  AG	  v	  
Commission	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐4287,	  at	  162.	  “Subject	  to	  proof	  to	  the	  contrary,	  which	  the	  economic	  operators	  
concerned	  must	  adduce,	  the	  presumption	  must	  be	  that	  the	  undertakings	  taking	  part	  in	  the	  concerted	  action	  
and	  remaining	  active	  on	  the	  market	  take	  account	  of	  the	  information	  exchanged	  with	  their	  competitors	  for	  the	  
purposes	  of	  determining	  their	  conduct	  on	  that	  market.”	  However,	  according	  to	  O.Odudu,	  in	  case	  of	  indirect	  
exchange	  of	  information,	  it	  would	  be	  perverse	  to	  presume	  that	  the	  competing	  retailer	  has	  relied	  on	  the	  
information	  received	  from	  its	  supplier.	  In	  case	  of	  direct	  contact	  between	  competing	  firms,	  the	  presumption	  of	  
reliance	  is	  triggered	  because	  one	  may	  assume	  that	  the	  information	  disclosed	  is	  reliable	  so	  that	  the	  competing	  
retailer	  is	  very	  likely	  to	  rely	  on	  it.	  However,	  when	  the	  information	  is	  provided	  via	  an	  intermediary,	  it	  is	  not	  
always	  possible	  to	  imply	  credibility	  so	  that	  the	  competing	  retailer,	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  circumstances	  in	  
which	  the	  information	  was	  disclosed,	  could	  decide	  not	  to	  rely	  on	  it.	  The	  author	  suggests	  therefore	  that	  the	  
presumption	  of	  reliance	  be	  applied	  only	  after	  credibility	  of	  the	  information	  provided	  being	  independently	  
established.	  See:	  O.Odudu,	  op.cit.,	  at	  226-­‐227.	  
457	  T-­‐25/95,	  Cimenteries	  CBR	  v	  Commission	  [2000]	  ECR	  II-­‐491,	  at	  1849.	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TFEU	   can	   be	   used	   for	   assessing	   the	   pro-­‐	   and/or	   anti-­‐competitiveness	   of	   the	   resulting	   share	   of	  
information	  between	  competitors.	  458	  
Hub	   &	   spoke	   conspiracies	   can	   be	   initiated	   by	   (a)	   supplier(s)	   or	   by	   (a)	   buyer(s).	   Only	   the	   latter	  
situations	  are	  relevant	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  this	  thesis	  because,	  in	  those	  cases,	  buyers’	  market	  power	  
may	   be	   of	   particular	   importance	   and	   even	   a	   necessary	   condition	   to	   orchestrate	   a	   trilateral	  
arrangement	   with	   competing	   buyers	   and/or	   suppliers.	   Indirect	   exchange	   of	   information	   between	  
competitors	   may	   in	   fact	   result	   from	   pressure	   exerted	   by	   one	   or	   several	   strong	   buyer(s)	   on	   their	  
suppliers.	   Buyer	   power	   could	   indeed	  be	  used	   to	   force	   a	   supplier	   to	   play	   a	   role	   of	   intermediary	   by	  
passing	   on	   information	   to	   competing	   buyers	   or	   to	   convince	   some	   suppliers	   to	   abide	   by	   a	   specific	  
policy,	  such	  as	  a	  boycott	  policy	  targeting	  competing	  buyers,	   leading	   in	  fact	  those	  suppliers	  to	  enter	  
into	   an	   anticompetitive	   horizontal	   arrangement,	   possibly	   against	   their	   will.	   Examples	   of	   such	  
practices	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  case	  law	  of	  some	  Member	  states.	  These	  will	  be	  developed	  below	  in	  Part	  
III,	  Chapter	  2,	  Section	  II,	  Point	  C.	  
2. Assessment	  of	  buyer	  power	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  
	  
Where	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   may	   result	   in	   the	   creation	   of	   anticompetitive	   agreements	   or	  
concerted	  practices	  prohibited	  by	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU,	   it	  may	  also	  be	  examined	  under	   the	   rules	  on	  
unilateral	  conduct	  contained	  in	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  The	  issue	  of	  market	  power	  on	  the	  buying	  side	  may	  
in	   fact	   arise	   in	   two	   different	   situations	   under	   that	   provision.	   The	   first	   situation	   involves	   cases	   of	  
alleged	   abuses	  of	   dominance	   committed	  by	  buying	   firms	  where	   the	  Commission	  has	   to	   assess	   the	  
degree	  of	  market	  power	  held	  by	  those	  buyers	  in	  the	  procurement	  market	  and	  the	  abusive	  nature	  of	  
their	  conduct.	  The	  second	  situation	  refers	  to	  cases	  where	  the	  existence	  of	  buyer	  power	  is	  considered	  
as	  a	  countervailing	  power	  ruling	  out	  an	  upstream	  undertaking	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  dominance.	  
a) Prohibition	  of	  abuses	  of	  buyer	  power	  
Article	  102	  TFEU	  reads	  as	  follows:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
458	  Exchanging	  information	  on	  intentions	  of	  future	  conduct	  regarding	  prices	  or	  quantities	  is	  particularly	  likely	  to	  
lead	  to	  a	  collusive	  outcome	  and	  constitutes	  therefore	  a	  restriction	  on	  competition	  by	  object.	  See:	  Guidelines	  on	  
the	  applicability	  of	  Article	  101	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  at	  67.	  Informing	  each	  other	  about	  intentions	  of	  future	  
conduct	  regarding	  prices	  and	  quantity	  may	  indeed	  allow	  competitors	  “to	  arrive	  at	  a	  common	  higher	  price	  level	  
without	  incurring	  the	  risk	  of	  losing	  market	  share	  or	  triggering	  a	  price	  war	  during	  the	  period	  of	  adjustment	  to	  
new	  prices.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  less	  likely	  that	  this	  type	  of	  information	  exchange	  is	  done	  for	  pro-­‐competitive	  
reasons.”	  Exchanges	  of	  information	  which	  do	  not	  constitute	  restrictions	  of	  competition	  by	  object	  are	  analysed	  
on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  assessment	  depend	  on	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  type	  of	  
information	  exchanged	  (the	  strategic	  nature	  of	  its	  subject	  matter,	  its	  age,	  frequency,	  aggregation,…)	  and	  the	  
structural	  characteristics	  of	  the	  market	  involved	  (such	  as	  concentration,	  transparency,	  stability,	  complexity,	  
symmetry,	  etc.).	  See:	  Guidelines,	  at	  69-­‐87.	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“Any	   abuse	   by	   one	   or	   more	   undertakings	   of	   a	   dominant	   position	   within	   the	   internal	  
market	  or	  in	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  it	  shall	  be	  prohibited	  as	  incompatible	  with	  the	  internal	  
market	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  may	  affect	  trade	  between	  Member	  States.	  
Such	  abuse	  may,	  in	  particular,	  consist	  in:	  
(a)	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  imposing	  unfair	  purchase	  or	  selling	  prices	  or	  other	  unfair	  trading	  
conditions;	  
(b)	   limiting	   production,	   markets	   or	   technical	   development	   to	   the	   prejudice	   of	  
consumers;	  
(c)	   applying	  dissimilar	   conditions	   to	  equivalent	   transactions	  with	  other	   trading	  parties,	  
thereby	  placing	  them	  at	  a	  competitive	  disadvantage;	  
(d)	   making	   the	   conclusion	   of	   contracts	   subject	   to	   acceptance	   by	   the	   other	   parties	   of	  
supplementary	   obligations	   which,	   by	   their	   nature	   or	   according	   to	   commercial	   usage,	  
have	  no	  connection	  with	  the	  subject	  of	  such	  contracts.	  »	  
	  
Even	   though	   the	   Commission	   has	   hardly	   ever	   sanctioned	   an	   abuse	   of	   buyer	   power	   so	   far,	   the	  
prohibition	  on	  abusive	  conduct	  applies	  to	  dominant	  undertakings	  either	  in	  the	  selling	  or	  in	  the	  buying	  
market.	  Indeed,	  according	  to	  the	  wording	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  and	  to	  the	  examples	  of	  abuses	  given	  in	  
that	   provision,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	   European	   legislator	   has	   taken	   into	   account	   the	   potential	  
anticompetitive	  outcomes	  that	  powerful	  buyers’	  conduct	  may	  lead	  to.	  As	  such,	  that	  Article	  provides	  
that	  an	  abuse	  may,	   in	  particular,	  consist	   in	  directly	  or	   indirectly	   imposing	  unfair	  purchase	  or	  selling	  
prices	   or	   other	   unfair	   trading	   conditions.	   The	   first	   example,	   namely	   the	   requirement	   of	   unfair	  
purchase	   prices,	   is	   specifically	   designed	   to	   address	   undertakings’	   behaviour	   when	   acting	   in	   the	  
procurement	   market,	   while	   the	   prohibition	   on	   unfair	   trading	   conditions	   is	   likely	   to	   apply	   to	   both	  
sellers	  and	  buyers.	  Therefore,	  the	  same	  principles	  as	  those	  applied	  to	  sell-­‐side	  conduct	  may	  be	  used	  
to	  enforce	  the	  competition	  rules	  on	  dominance	  against	  firms	  acting	  in	  the	  upstream	  markets.	  	  
The	  first	  step	  in	  the	  enforcement	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  is	  to	  assess	  the	  degree	  of	  market	  power	  held	  by	  
the	   buyer	   in	   question	   in	   the	   procurement	  market	   in	   order	   to	   determine	  whether	   it	   is	   or	   not	   in	   a	  
dominant	  position	  with	   regard	   to	   its	   suppliers.	   Based	  on	   the	  definition	  of	  dominance	  given	  by	   the	  
Court	  of	  Justice	  in	  previous	  seller	  power	  cases459,	  this	  would	  be	  the	  case	  if	  the	  firm	  enjoys	  a	  position	  
of	   economic	   strength,	   which	   enables	   it	   to	   prevent	   effective	   competition	   being	   maintained	   on	   a	  
relevant	  market,	  by	  affording	   it	   the	  power	  to	  behave	  to	  an	  appreciable	  extent	   independently	  of	   its	  
competitors,	  its	  customers	  and	  ultimately	  of	  the	  consumers.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
459	  See	  Case	  27/76,	  United	  Brands	  Company	  and	  United	  Brands	  Continental	  v	  Commission	  [1978]	  ECR	  207,	  at	  65	  
and	  Case	  85/76,	  Hoffmann-­‐La	  Roche	  &	  Co.	  v	  Commission	  [1979]	  ECR	  461,	  at	  38.	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  In	   a	   case	   of	   buyer	   power,	   the	   issue	   of	   independence	   should	   not	   only	   be	   analysed	  with	   regard	   to	  
competitors,	  customers	  and	  consumers	  but	  also,	  and	  more	  particularly,	  with	  regard	  to	  suppliers	  since	  
those	  actors	  are	  in	  the	  firing	  line	  of	  a	  potential	  abuse	  of	  buyer	  power.	  If	  the	  market	  share	  of	  the	  firm	  
under	   examination	   is	   a	   useful	   first	   indication	   of	   its	   power	   in	   the	   procurement	   market,	   the	  
Commission	   will	   not	   come	   to	   a	   final	   conclusion	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   dominance	   only	   based	   on	   that	  
information.	  All	  factors	  which	  may	  constitute	  a	  competitive	  constraint,	  coming	  from	  suppliers,	  rivals	  
or	  customers,	  will	  be	  assessed	  by	  the	  Commission.460	  	  
It	   is	  worth	  nothing	  that,	   in	  the	  current	  Guidance	  on	  the	  Commission’s	  enforcement	  priorities	  in	  the	  
application	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  no	  distinction	   is	  made	  between	  seller	  and	  buyer	  power	  so	  that	  the	  
same	  criteria	  are	  to	  be	  used	  to	  assess	  market	  power	  on	  each	  side	  of	  the	  market.	  The	  particularities	  of	  
buyer	  power	  mentioned	  in	  Part	  I,	  which	  should	  lead	  competition	  authorities	  to	  measure	  the	  degree	  
of	  buyer	  power	  on	  basis	  of	  the	  vertical	  relationships	  between	  buyers	  and	  their	  suppliers,	  are	  hence	  
not	  addressed	  in	  the	  texts	  of	  the	  Commission.	  
If	   a	   firm	   holds	   a	   dominant	   position	   in	   the	   upstream	   buyer	   market,	   the	   Commission	   must	   next	  
examine	  whether	  an	  abuse	  has	  been	  committed.	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  would	  be	  infringed	  if	  a	  dominant	  
buyer	  had	  not	  complied	  with	  its	  special	  responsibility	  and	  had	  impaired	  competition	  on	  the	  common	  
market	   through	   its	   conduct.461	   Imposing	   unfair	   purchase	   prices,	   such	   as	   excessively	   low	   prices,	   or	  
unfair	  trading	  conditions	  on	  suppliers	  constitute	  mere	  examples	  of	  abusive	  buying	  conduct.	  Nothing	  
precludes	   the	   Commission	   from	   sanctioning	   other	   practices,	   provided	   that	   they	   are	   used	   by	   a	  
dominant	  buyer	  and	  that	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  distort	  effective	  competition.	  
b) Buyer	  power	  as	  a	  competitive	  constraint	  
As	  mentioned	  above,	  dominance	  has	  been	  defined	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  as	  
	  “a	  position	  of	  economic	  strength	  enjoyed	  by	  an	  undertaking	  which	  enables	  it	  to	  prevent	  
effective	  competition	  being	  maintained	  on	  a	  relevant	  market,	  by	  affording	  it	  the	  power	  
to	  behave	  to	  an	  appreciable	  extent	  independently	  of	  its	  competitors,	  its	  customers	  and	  
ultimately	  of	  consumers.”462	  	  
Different	  competitive	  constraints	  may	  be	  exerted	  on	  a	  firm	  by	  competitors,	  customers	  or	  consumers	  
which	   prevent	   it	   from	   acting	   independently	   and	   therefore	   exclude	   it	   from	   the	   definition	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
460	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission	  –	  Guidance	  on	  the	  Commission’s	  enforcement	  priorities	  in	  applying	  
Article	  82	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty	  to	  abusive	  exclusionary	  conduct	  by	  dominant	  undertakings	  (Text	  with	  EEA	  
relevance),	  O.J.	  C	  45/7	  of	  24/02/2009,	  at	  13-­‐15.	  
461	  Case	  322/81,	  Nederlandsche	  Banden	  Industrie	  Michelin	  (Michelin	  I)	  v	  Commission	  [1983]	  ECR	  3461,	  at	  57.	  
462	  See	  Case	  27/76,	  United	  Brands	  Company,	  op.cit.,	  at	  65	  and	  Case	  85/76,	  Hoffmann-­‐La	  Roche,	  op.cit.,	  at	  38.	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dominance	   under	   Article	   102	   TFEU.	   In	   the	   assessment	   of	   a	   selling	   firm’s	   market	   power,	   the	  
Commission	  takes	  therefore	  into	  account	  the	  competitive	  structure	  of	  the	  market,	  and	  in	  particular	  
the	   constraints	   imposed	   not	   only	   by	   actual	   and	   potential	   competitors	   but	   also	   by	   the	   firm’s	  
customers	   through	   their	   bargaining	   strength.463	   	   Called	   countervailing	   buyer	   power	   in	   such	   a	  
situation,	  market	  power	  on	  the	  buying	  side	  may	  constitute	  an	   important	   factor	   in	   the	  analysis	  of	  a	  
seller’s	   position	   as,	   even	   with	   a	   large	   market	   share,	   a	   firm	   may	   in	   fact	   be	   unable	   to	   act	   to	   an	  
appreciable	  extent	  independently	  if	  its	  customers	  have	  sufficient	  bargaining	  strength.	  Indeed,	  where	  
a	  buyer	  is	  able	  to	  exercise	  significant	  countervailing	  power,	  it	  may	  deter	  or	  defeat	  any	  attempt	  by	  its	  
suppliers	  to	  profitably	  increase	  prices	  or	  to	  affect	  competition	  in	  some	  other	  way.464	  
According	  to	  the	  guidance	  of	  the	  Commission	  on	  abusive	  exclusionary	  conduct,	  such	  countervailing	  
buying	  power	  may	  result	  from	  the	  customers‘size	  or	  their	  commercial	  significance	  for	  the	  dominant	  
firm.	   A	   buyer	   would	   constitute	   an	   important	   trading	   partner	   for	   a	   supplier	   when,	   for	   example,	   it	  
accounts	   for	   a	   significant	   share	   in	   the	   latter’s	   total	   turnover	  or	  when	   its	   large	  market	   share	   in	   the	  
retail	   market	   turns	   it	   into	   an	   avoidable	   customer	   to	   access	   final	   consumers.	   The	   loss	   of	   such	   a	  
customer	  would	  entail	  serious	  financial	  consequences	  for	  the	  supplier	  who	  can	  therefore	  not	  afford	  
to	  ignore	  the	  possible	  reactions	  on	  the	  buying	  side	  when	  defining	  its	  trading	  policy.	  	  	  
Another	   factor	   taken	   into	   consideration	  by	   the	  Commission	   to	   assess	   the	  degree	  of	   countervailing	  
buyer	  power	  is	  the	  customers’	  ability	  to	  find	  quickly	  alternative	  sources	  of	  supply	  either	  by	  switching	  
to	  competing	  suppliers,	  by	  promoting	  new	  entry	  or	  by	  vertically	   integrating.	  Those	  outside	  options	  
are	  the	  main	  sources	  of	  pressures	  since	  they	  enable	  customers	  to	  (threat	  to)	  change	  suppliers	  should	  
the	  upstream	  undertaking	  try	  to	  increase	  prices	  and	  make	  therefore	  such	  an	  attempt	  less	  likely.	  
However,	   where	   only	   a	   limited	   segment	   of	   customers	   is	   shielded	   from	   the	   market	   power	   of	   the	  
dominant	  firm	  due	  to	  their	  ability	  to	  exercise	  some	  degree	  of	  buyer	  power,	  that	  countervailing	  power	  
may	  not	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  sufficient	  competitive	  constraint.	  Attention	  must	  also	  be	  paid	  to	  smaller	  
buyers	   which	   are	   in	   no	   way	   in	   a	   position	   to	   counteract	   their	   supplier’s	   conduct	   and	   to	   prevent	  
anticompetitive	  outcome.	  	  
The	  issue	  of	  dominance	  on	  the	  selling	  side	  is	  therefore	  linked	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  market	  power	  held	  by	  
buyers	  facing	  the	  alleged	  dominant	  seller	  firm.	  When	  pressures	  exercised	  by	  concentrated	  buyers	  are	  
sufficient	   to	  prevent	   a	   firm	   from	  acting	   independently,	   the	   criteria	   of	   dominance	   are	  not	  met	   and	  
Article	  102	  TFEU	  is	  hence	  not	  applicable.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
463	  Guidance	  on	  the	  Commission’s	  enforcement	  priorities	  in	  applying	  Article	  82	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  at	  12.	  
464	  Ibid.,	  at	  18.	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Noteworthy	  are	  the	  criteria	  to	  be	  used	  to	  assess	  buyers’	  countervailing	  power.	  Instead	  of	  focusing	  on	  
buyers’	  market	  share,	  the	  Commission	  indeed	  put	  the	  emphasis,	  among	  other	  things,	  on	  the	  share	  a	  
customer	  accounts	   for	   in	   the	  dominant	   firm’s	   total	   turnover	  and	  on	  the	  ability	  of	   that	  customer	  to	  
easily	  switch	  to	  alternative	  sources	  of	  supply.	  One	  can	  note	  that	  those	  criteria	  correspond,	  to	  some	  
extent,	  to	  the	  factors	  mentioned	  in	  Part	  I	  as	  giving	  buyers	  the	  ability	  to	  exert	  market	  power	  over	  their	  
suppliers.	  When	   buyers’	   market	   power	   is	   assessed	   from	   the	   angle	   of	   “countervailing	   power”,	   the	  
Commission	  seems	  therefore	  better	  to	  take	  account	  of	  the	  specificities	  of	  that	  power.	  	  
It	   appears	   from	   those	   EU	   instruments	   that	   buyer	   power	   is	   generally	   considered	   to	   be	   a	   positive	  
constraint	   from	   a	   competition	   law	   perspective	   as	   it	   may	   be	   used	   to	   prevent	   anticompetitive	  
behaviour	  in	  upstream	  seller	  markets.	  EU	  competition	  authorities	  are	  in	  fact	  rarely	  concerned	  about	  
buyer	  power	   issues.	  As	  a	  result,	  only	  a	  few	  cases	   involve	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  competition	  rules	  
against	  powerful	  buyers.	  
B. ENFORCEMENT	  OF	  ARTICLE	  101	  TFEU	  AND	  102	  TFEU	  AGAINST	  BUYER	  PRACTICES	  
The	  enforcement	  of	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  and	  102	  TFEU	  has	  only	  given	  rise	  to	  a	  few	  buyer	  power	  cases	  at	  
EU	  level.	  Except	  when	  hard-­‐core	  buyer	  cartels	  are	  involved,	  most	  buyers’	  practices	  are	  in	  fact	  viewed	  
as	  benign	  from	  a	  competition	  law	  perspective	  or	  even	  procompetitive.	  
1. Article	  101	  TFEU	  
Three	   types	  of	  horizontal	  buying	  agreements	  may	  be	  distinguished.465	   First,	   agreements	   containing	  
hard-­‐core	  restrictions,	  such	  as	  price-­‐fixing	  or	  market	  sharing,	  which	  are	  condemned	  under	  the	  object	  
standard.	  	  Second,	  agreements	  which	  follow,	  for	  example,	  from	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  buying	  alliance	  and,	  
due	  to	  the	  efficiencies	  that	  stem	  from	  such	  activities,	  are	  subject	  to	  an	  effects-­‐based	  approach.	  Third,	  
joint	  purchasing	  arrangements	  which	  in	  fact	  serve	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  disguised	  cartel,	  that	  is	  to	  
say,	   otherwise	   prohibited	   price	   fixing,	   output	   limitation	   or	   market	   allocation	   and	   which	   are	  
consequently	  regarded	  as	  restrictions	  of	  competition	  by	  object.466	  
The	   fixing	  of	   purchase	  prices	   and	  other	  hard-­‐core	   restrictions,	   such	  as	   the	   allocation	  of	   sources	  of	  
supply,	   fall	  within	   the	  mischief	   of	  Article	   101	   TFEU	  and	   are	   in	   fact	   treated	   as	   having	   the	  object	   of	  
restricting	   competition.467	   In	   different	   decisions,	   the	   Commission	   and	   the	   European	   Courts	   have	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
465	  This	  distinction	  is	  based	  on	  the	  analysis	  carried	  out	  by	  Ariel	  Ezrachi	  who	  examined	  the	  EU	  competition	  law	  
approach	  with	  regard	  to	  input	  price	  fixing.	  He	  defined	  a	  benchmark	  used	  to	  determine	  which	  case	  will	  be	  dealt	  
with	  under	  an	  object	  approach	  and	  which	  situation	  would	  rather	  call	  for	  an	  effects-­‐based	  analysis.	  See:	  
A.Ezrachi,	  Buying	  alliances	  and	  input	  price	  fixing:	  In	  search	  of	  a	  European	  enforcement	  standard,	  8	  Journal	  of	  
Competition	  Law	  &	  Economics	  47	  (2012)	  
466	  See	  :	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  applicability	  of	  Article	  101	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  at	  205.	  
467	  An	  agreement	  is	  considered	  as	  a	  restriction	  of	  competition	  by	  object	  when	  it	  has,	  by	  its	  very	  nature,	  the	  
potential	  to	  injure	  the	  proper	  functioning	  of	  normal	  competition.	  It	  is	  sufficient	  to	  establish	  the	  anticompetitive	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confirmed	  that	  buyer	  cartels	  are	  to	  be	  condemned	  as	  strictly	  as	  seller	  cartels.	  For	  examples,	   in	  two	  
cases	  related	  to	  the	  purchase	  of	   raw	  tobacco,	   the	  Commission	  condemned	  an	  agreement	  between	  
tobacco	  processors	  which	  consisted	   in	   fixing	  common	  purchase	  prices	  and	  other	  trading	  conditions	  
as	  well	  as	   in	  allocating	  suppliers	  and	  quantities.468	  By	  so	  doing,	  the	  processors	  in	  question	  aimed	  at	  
avoiding	   that	   negotiations	  with	  producers	   could	  push	  prices	   beyond	   the	   level	   they	  were	  willing	   to	  
pay.	  The	  Commission	  restated	  that	  agreements	  which	  fix	  transaction	  prices	  or	  share	  quantities	  are	  by	  
their	   very	   object	   restrictive	   of	   competition,	   even	   when	   those	   agreements	   occur	   in	   the	   upstream	  
buyer	  market.	  	  
“Purchase	  price	  is	  a	  fundamental	  aspect	  of	  the	  competitive	  conduct	  of	  any	  undertaking	  
operating	   in	   a	   processing	   business	   and	   is	   also,	   by	   definition,	   capable	   of	   affecting	   the	  
behaviour	  of	  the	  same	  companies	  in	  any	  other	  market	  in	  which	  they	  compete,	  including	  
downstream	  markets.”469	  
The	   Commission	   considered	   that	   the	   coordination	   by	   the	   processors	   of	   their	   purchasing	   conduct	  
sheltered	   them	   from	   full	   exposure	   of	   market	   forces	   and	   eliminated	   the	   autonomy	   of	   strategic	  
decision-­‐making	  so	  that	  fundamental	  aspects	  of	  their	  competitive	  conduct	  were	  affected.	  
“By	  fixing	  volume	  quotas	  and	  allocating	  suppliers,	  the	  processors	  were	  prevented	  from	  
competing	  for	  market	  shares	  and	  might	  have	  gradually	  succeeded	  in	  preventing	  or	  
limiting	  the	  increase	  of	  purchase	  prices	  given	  that	  each	  allocated	  supplier	  would	  not	  be	  
able	  to	  play	  buyers	  one	  against	  each	  other	  as	  happens	  in	  the	  normal	  competitive	  
market.	  In	  other	  words,	  allocation	  of	  suppliers	  is	  a	  strategy	  to	  prevent	  price	  increases	  as	  
a	  supplier	  allocated	  to	  a	  specific	  processor	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  sell	  to	  other	  processors	  
and	  would	  find	  itself	  price-­‐constrained	  by	  its	  allocated	  processor.”470	  
	  
“In	  this	  case,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  agreements	  and/or	  concerted	  practices	  of	  the	  processors	  
(…)	  have	  by	  their	  very	  nature	  the	  object	  to	  restrict	  competition	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  
Article	  [101(1)]	  as	  they	  shelter	  processors	  and	  producers	  of	  raw	  tobacco	  in	  Italy	  from	  full	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
object	  of	  an	  agreement	  to	  conclude	  to	  an	  infringement	  of	  Article	  101	  TFEU,	  without	  examining	  the	  actual	  or	  
potential	  effects	  of	  that	  agreement	  on	  the	  market.	  See	  for	  example:	  C-­‐209/07,	  Competition	  Authority	  v.	  Beef	  
Industry	  Development	  Society	  Ltd.	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐08637.	  If	  a	  horizontal	  co-­‐operation	  agreement	  does	  not	  restrict	  
competition	  by	  object,	  it	  must	  be	  examined	  whether	  it	  has	  appreciable	  restrictive	  effects	  on	  competition.	  See:	  
Guidelines	  on	  the	  applicability	  of	  Article	  101	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  at	  26-­‐31.	  
468	  Spanish	  Raw	  Tobacco,	  Case	  No	  COMP/C.38.238/B.2,	  Commission	  decision	  of	  20	  October	  2004	  and	  Italian	  
Raw	  Tobacco,	  Case	  No	  COMP/C.38.281/B.2,	  Commission	  decision	  of	  20	  October	  2005.	  For	  other	  examples,	  see:	  
Aluminium	  Imports	  from	  Eastern	  Europe,	  Case	  IV/26.870,	  Commission	  decision	  of	  19	  December	  1984	  and	  
French	  beef,	  Case	  COMP/C.38.279/F3,	  Commission	  decision	  of	  2	  April	  2003.	  
469	  Italian	  Raw	  Tobacco,	  op.cit.,	  at	  280.	  
470	  Ibid.,	  at	  281.	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exposure	  to	  market	  forces.	  By	  eliminating	  the	  autonomy	  of	  strategic	  decision-­‐making	  
and	  competitive	  conduct,	  they	  prevent	  such	  undertakings	  from	  competing	  on	  the	  merits	  
and	  enhancing	  their	  position	  on	  the	  market	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  less	  efficient	  firms.	  The	  result	  
could	  be	  reduced	  pressure	  to	  control	  costs,	  to	  improve	  quality	  and	  to	  innovate,	  thereby	  
limiting	  productive	  and	  dynamic	  efficiencies.”471	  
	  
Buyer	   cartels	   are	   hence	   considered	   anticompetitive	   because	   such	   a	   restriction	   on	   competition	   is	  
likely	   to	  negatively	  affect	  different	  aspects	   included	   in	   the	  concept	  of	  consumer	  welfare.	  However,	  
the	   proof	   of	   direct	   consumer	   harm	   is	   not	   required	   to	   find	   an	   infringement	   of	   Article	   101TFEU.	  
Although,	   in	  some	  cases,	  buyer	  agreements	   lead	   to	   lower	  consumer	  prices	   in	   the	  short-­‐term	  or,	  at	  
least,	  do	  not	  directly	  harm	  end-­‐users,	  they	  nevertheless	  violate	  the	  competition	  rules	  because	  they	  
prevent	  the	  undertakings	  concerned	  from	  independently	  determining	  their	  strategic	  trade	  policy	  and	  
are	  as	  such	  anticompetitive.	  This	  was,	   in	  particular,	  affirmed	  in	  T-­‐Mobile	  where	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  
maintained	   that	   a	   concerted	   practice	  may	   be	   regarded	   as	   having	   an	   anti-­‐competitive	   object	   even	  
though	  there	  is	  no	  direct	  connection	  between	  that	  practice	  and	  consumer	  prices.472	  The	  case	  at	  hand	  
concerned	  an	  arrangement	  between	  mobile	  operators	  to	  reduce	  dealer	  remunerations	  for	  postpaid	  
subscriptions.	   The	   concerted	  practice	   did	   not	   relate	   to	   consumer	  prices	   to	   be	   applied	   in	   the	   retail	  
market	   but	   to	   the	   remuneration	   that	   those	   mobile	   operators	   intended	   to	   pay	   for	   the	   services	  
supplied	   to	   them	  by	  dealers.	  The	  Court	  nevertheless	   treated	   that	  buyer	  cartel	  as	   severely	  as	   seller	  
cartels	   even	   though	   the	   agreement	   in	   question	   did	   not	   directly	   impact	   consumers.	   It	   underlined	  
indeed	  that	  nothing	   in	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  indicates	  that	  only	  concerted	  practices	  which	  have	  a	  direct	  
effect	  on	  the	  prices	  paid	  by	  end	  users	  are	  prohibited	  and	  added	  that	  	  
“Article	  [101	  TFEU],	  like	  the	  other	  competition	  rules	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  is	  designed	  to	  protect	  
not	   only	   the	   immediate	   interests	   of	   individual	   competitors	   or	   consumers	   but	   also	   to	  
protect	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  market	  and	  thus	  competition	  as	  such.”473	  	  
Consequently,	   and	   as	   repeated	   in	  GlaxoSmithKline	   Services	   Unlimited	   v.	   Commission,	   for	   a	   finding	  
that	  an	  agreement	  has	  an	  anticompetitive	  object,	  is	  it	  not	  necessary	  that	  final	  consumers	  be	  deprived	  
of	  certain	  advantages.474	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
471	  Ibid.,	  at	  285.	  
472	  C-­‐8/08,	  T-­‐Mobile	  Netherlands	  BV	  and	  others	  v	  Raad	  van	  bestuur	  van	  de	  Nederlandse	  Mededingingsautoriteit	  
[2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐4529,	  at	  36.	  
473	  Ibid.,	  at	  38.	  
474	  Joined	  cases	  C-­‐501/06	  P,	  C-­‐513/06	  P,	  C-­‐515/06	  P	  &	  C-­‐519/06	  P,	  GlaxoSmithKline	  Services	  Unlimited	  v.	  
Commission	  [2010]	  ECR	  I-­‐9291,	  at	  63.	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Those	  cases	   show	  that,	   in	   the	  assessment	  of	  anticompetitive	  conduct,	   the	   focus	   is	  not	  only	  on	   the	  
downstream	  market	  and	  on	  potential	  harm	  to	  final	  consumers	  but	  that	  distortion	  of	  competition	  in	  
the	  upstream	  market	  may	  be	  sufficient	  to	  find	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  competition	  rules.475	  However,	  such	  
disregard	   for	   the	  potential	  effects	  buyer	  cartels	  have	  on	  consumers	   is	   justified	  by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  
agreements	  in	  question	  included	  restrictions	  of	  competition	  by	  object	  so	  that	  they	  were	  considered,	  
as	   such,	   as	   anticompetitive,	   no	   matters	   their	   impact	   on	   the	   markets	   or	   even	   on	   consumers.	   In	  
addition,	  even	  if	  hardcore	  restrictions	  may,	  in	  theory,	  be	  justified	  under	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU,	  it	  is	  very	  
unlikely	  that	  the	  possible	  efficiencies	  or	  consumer	  benefits	  flowing	  out	  such	  restrictions	  be	  sufficient	  
to	  reverse	  the	  presumption	  of	  illegality.476	  
In	  contrast,	  the	  impact	  on	  consumers	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  play	  a	  role	  when	  a	  restriction	  is	  assessed	  under	  
an	   effects-­‐based	   approach	   -­‐	   because,	   for	   example,	   it	   is	   part	   of	   a	   joint	   purchasing	   agreement	   -­‐,	  
especially	  at	  the	  justification	  stage.477	  An	  agreement	  restricting	  competition	  by	  effect	  in	  the	  upstream	  
buyer	  market	  may,	   in	   some	   cases,	   be	   justified	   if	   the	   conditions	   laid	  out	   in	  Article	   101(3)	   TFEU	  are	  
met.	   One	   of	   these	   requires	   that	   a	   fair	   share	   of	   the	   efficiency	   gains	   yielded	   by	   the	   agreement	   be	  
passed	  on	  to	  consumers.	  Accordingly,	  where	  the	  proof	  of	  direct	  consumer	  harm	   is	  not	  a	  necessary	  
condition	  for	  finding	  a	  violation	  of	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU,	  the	  proof	  of	  consumer	  benefits	  resulting	  from	  
an	  arrangement	  may	  contribute	  to	  justifying	  the	  challenged	  conduct.	  On	  that	  matter,	  the	  Guidelines	  
on	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU	  provide	  that:	  	  
“The	   concept	   of	   ‘fair	   share’	   implies	   that	   the	   pass-­‐on	   of	   benefits	   must	   at	   least	  
compensate	  consumers	   for	  any	  actual	  or	   likely	  negative	   impact	  caused	  to	  them	  by	  the	  
restriction	  of	  competition	  found	  under	  [Article	  101(1)	  TFEU].”478	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  A.Ezrachi,	  op.cit.,	  at	  58.	  
476	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU	  can	  be	  invoked	  as	  a	  defense	  by	  proving	  that	  the	  agreement	  is	  sufficiently	  likely	  to	  give	  
rise	  to	  procompetitive	  effects.	  The	  application	  of	  an	  individual	  exemption	  is	  subject	  to	  four	  cumulative	  
conditions:	  (1)	  the	  agreement	  must	  contribute	  to	  improving	  the	  production	  or	  distribution	  of	  products	  or	  
contribute	  to	  promoting	  technical	  or	  economic	  progress,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  lead	  to	  efficiency	  gains;	  (2)	  the	  
restrictions	  must	  be	  indispensable	  to	  the	  attainment	  of	  those	  objectives,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  efficiency	  gains;	  (3)	  
consumers	  must	  receive	  a	  fair	  share	  of	  the	  resulting	  benefits,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  efficiency	  gains,	  including	  
qualitative	  efficiency	  gains,	  attained	  by	  the	  indispensable	  restrictions	  must	  be	  sufficiently	  passed	  on	  to	  
consumers	  so	  that	  they	  are	  at	  least	  compensated	  for	  the	  restrictive	  effects	  of	  the	  agreement;	  hence,	  
efficiencies	  only	  accruing	  to	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  agreement	  will	  not	  suffice;	  (4)	  the	  agreement	  must	  not	  afford	  
the	  parties	  the	  possibility	  of	  eliminating	  competition	  in	  respect	  of	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  the	  products	  in	  question.	  
See:	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  81(3)	  of	  the	  Treaty	  (Text	  with	  EEA	  relevance),	  O.J.	  C	  101	  of	  
27/04/2004.	  
477	  For	  examples	  of	  joint	  purchasing	  agreement	  exempted	  under	  Article	  101(3),	  see:	  National	  Sulphuric	  Acid	  
Association,	  Case	  IV/27.958,	  Commission	  decision	  of	  9	  July	  1980	  and	  EBU/Eurovision	  System,	  Case	  IV/32.150,	  
Commission	  decision	  of	  11	  June	  1993.	  
478	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  81(3)	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  at	  85.	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However,	  when	  the	  restriction	  takes	  place	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market,	  the	  efficiency	  test	  requires	  
competition	   authorities	   to	   balance	   the	   negative	   effects	   resulting	   from	   that	   restriction	   in	   the	  
upstream	   market	   against	   the	   benefits	   passed	   on	   to	   consumers	   in	   the	   downstream	   market.	   The	  
Guidelines	  on	  applicability	  of	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  to	  horizontal	  co-­‐operation	  agreements	  provide	  indeed	  
concerning	  common	  purchase	  agreements	  that:	  	  
“[The	  efficiency	  gains]	  must	  be	  passed	  on	  to	  consumers	  to	  an	  extent	  that	  outweighs	  the	  
restrictive	   effects	   of	   competition	   caused	   by	   the	   joint	   purchasing	   arrangement.	   Hence,	  
cost	   savings	   or	   other	   efficiencies	   that	   only	   benefit	   the	   parties	   to	   the	   joint	   purchasing	  
arrangement	  will	  not	  suffice.”479	  	  
In	   case	  of	   sell-­‐side	   restriction,	   the	  balancing	   test	   refers	   to	  elements	   confined	   in	  one	  market,	  
namely	  to	  the	  positive	  and	  negative	  effects	  the	  restriction	  causes	  to	  consumers	  in	  the	  relevant	  
seller	  market.	  However,	  in	  case	  of	  buy-­‐side	  restriction,	  the	  test	  involves	  weighing	  the	  harmful	  
impact	  of	   the	  restriction	   in	   the	  upstream	  buyer	  market	  against	   the	  consumer	  benefits	   in	   the	  
downstream	   seller	   market.	   The	   reason	   why	   the	   Commission	   cares	   about	   the	   likely	   positive	  
effects	   of	   a	   practice	   on	   consumers	   instead	   of	   looking	   at	   whether	   the	   affected	   market	  
participants	  in	  the	  upstream	  market	  are	  in	  fact	  compensated	  for	  the	  negative	  impact	  caused	  to	  
them	  by	  the	  restriction	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  objective	  of	  EU	  competition	  which	  aims	  primarily	  
at	  enhancing	  consumer	  welfare.	  
2. Article	  102	  TFEU	  
One	  can	  hardly	  find	  cases	  on	  buyers’	  unilateral	  conduct	  treated	  at	  EU	  level.	  Few	  complaints	  on	  abuse	  
of	  buyer	  power	  have	  been	  brought	  to	  the	  Commission	  up	  to	  now	  and	  the	  latter	  rarely	  concluded	  to	  a	  
violation	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  In	  the	  FENIN	  case,	  the	  claim	  was	  rejected	  without	  any	  further	  analysis	  
on	  that	  particular	  issue.	  The	  Commission	  and	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  took	  nevertheless	  the	  opportunity	  
to	  make	  a	  number	  of	  passing	  observations	  on	  the	  abuse	  of	  excessively	  low	  prices	  in	  the	  CICCE	  case.	  A	  
last	   case,	   however,	   is	   particularly	  worth	  mentioning,	   namely	   the	  British	  Airways	   case	   in	  which	   the	  
Commission,	  but	  also	  and	  especially	   the	  European	  Courts,	  made	   important	  statements	  with	   regard	  
to,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   factors	   to	   be	   taken	   into	   consideration	   in	   the	   assessment	   of	   a	   dominant	  
position	  in	  the	  upstream	  market	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  type	  of	  conduct	  which	  may	  be	  qualified	  
as	  abusive.	  Where	  those	  cases	  reveal	  that	  action	  against	  powerful	  buyers	  is	  not	  only	  theoretical	  in	  EU	  
law,	   the	   enforcement	   of	   Article	   102	   TFEU	   against	   those	   players	   remains	   nevertheless	   limited	   and	  
hesitant.	  The	  main	  obstacle	  standing	  in	  the	  way	  of	  such	  enforcement	  is	  probably	  the	  criteria	  defining	  
the	  notion	  of	  dominance	  which	  are	  ill-­‐suited	  to	  address	  buyer	  power	  cases.	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  Guidelines	  on	  the	  applicability	  of	  Article	  101	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  at	  219.	  




The	   Commission	   and	   the	   European	   Courts	   have	   hardly	   ever	   dealt	   with	   buyer	   power	   cases	   in	   the	  
framework	   of	   Article	   102	   TFEU	   on	   abuses	   of	   dominance.	   Three	   cases	   nevertheless	   show	   that	  
complaints	  against	  buyer	  practices	  are	  not	  illusory	  and	  that	  the	  EU	  Institutions	  are	  not	  that	  hostile	  to	  
the	  idea	  of	  condemning	  buyers	  for	  their	  conduct	  in	  the	  procurement	  market.	  
a) FENIN	  case480	  
In	   1997,	   a	   complaint	  was	   submitted	   to	   the	   Commission	   by	   an	   association	   of	   undertakings	   (FENIN)	  
which	   market	   medical	   goods	   and	   equipment	   used	   in	   Spanish	   hospitals.	   It	   was	   alleged	   that	   the	  
organisation	   managing	   the	   social	   health	   service	   was	   in	   a	   dominant	   position	   on	   the	   Spanish	  
procurement	  market	  of	  those	  products	  and	  that	  it	  had	  abused	  that	  position	  by	  delaying	  payment	  of	  
their	   debts.	   While	   that	   case	   would	   have	   been	   a	   good	   opportunity	   to	   set	   some	   principles	   and	  
guidelines	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  buyer	  power,	   the	  Commission	  missed	   it	  by	   rejecting	   the	  claim	  on	  basis	  
that	  the	  organization	  in	  question	  was	  not	  an	  undertaking	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  competition	  rules.	  It	  was	  
considered	   that	  where	  an	  organization	  purchases	  goods	   in	  order	   to	  use	   them	   in	   the	   context	  of	   an	  
activity	  of	  a	  purely	  social	  nature,	  it	  does	  not	  carry	  on	  an	  economic	  activity	  and	  does	  not	  therefore	  act	  
as	   an	  undertaking.	  An	   entity	  which	  operates	   according	   to	   the	  principle	   of	   solidarity	   such	   as	   in	   the	  
present	   case	   is,	   as	   a	   result,	   classified	   in	   that	   particular	   category	   not	   subject	   to	   the	   prohibition	  
provided	  by	  Article	  102	  TFEU.481	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  Fenin/SNS+Spain,	  Case	  No	  IV.F.1./36.834,	  Commission	  decision	  of	  26	  August	  1999.	  
481	  The	  organisation	  managing	  the	  social	  health	  service	  is	  indeed	  funded	  from	  social	  security	  contributions	  and	  
other	  State	  funding	  and	  it	  provides	  services	  free	  of	  charge	  to	  its	  members	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  universal	  cover.	  That	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  undertaking	  was	  upheld	  by	  the	  General	  Court	  (See:	  Case	  T-­‐319/99,	  Fenin	  v	  
Commission,	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐357)	  and	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (See:	  Case	  C-­‐205/03,	  Fenin	  v	  Commission	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐
6295).	  It	  was	  confirmed	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  purchasing	  activity	  must	  be	  determined	  according	  to	  whether	  or	  
not	  the	  subsequent	  use	  of	  the	  purchased	  goods	  amounts	  to	  an	  economic	  activity.	  	  The	  applicant	  tried	  to	  submit	  
a	  new	  argument	  in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  case	  examined	  by	  the	  General	  Court,	  invoking	  that	  in	  
some	  circumstances,	  where	  hospitals	  provide	  private	  care	  for	  which	  patients	  are	  charged,	  the	  organisation	  in	  
question	  necessarily	  acts	  as	  an	  undertaking.	  However,	  since	  that	  argument	  had	  not	  been	  brought	  to	  the	  
Commission’s	  attention	  in	  the	  initial	  complaint,	  the	  General	  Court	  considered	  that	  the	  applicant	  could	  not	  
include	  it	  in	  its	  action	  against	  the	  contested	  decision	  and	  criticise	  the	  Commission	  for	  failing	  to	  take	  account	  of	  
those	  facts.	  Although	  the	  FENIN	  case	  does	  not	  provide	  any	  information	  on	  the	  way	  to	  assess	  buyer	  power,	  it	  
sheds	  light	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  “undertaking”	  in	  buyer	  power	  cases.	  According	  to	  the	  European	  judge,	  a	  firm	  is	  
considered	  an	  undertaking	  acting	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  power	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  EU	  competition	  law	  if	  and	  
only	  if	  it	  is	  considered	  as	  such	  when	  acting	  in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market,	  that	  is,	  if	  it	  is	  engaged	  in	  an	  
economic	  activity	  in	  that	  downstream	  market.	  The	  concept	  of	  undertaking	  in	  buyer	  power	  cases	  is	  not	  
developed	  in	  this	  thesis	  because,	  in	  our	  opinion,	  it	  does	  not	  call	  for	  a	  specific	  approach	  but,	  as	  the	  General	  
Court	  asserted,	  it	  can	  be	  defined	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  firm’s	  business	  activity	  in	  the	  downstream	  market.	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The	  issue	  of	  abuse	  of	  buyer	  power	  was	  therefore	  evaded	  in	  that	  particular	  case	  related	  to	  an	  activity	  
of	  social	  nature.	  The	  only	  attention	  paid	  to	  that	  question	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  Advocate	  
General	  who	  maintained	  that:	  
“The	  existence	  of	  a	  monopsony	  does	  not	  pose	  a	   serious	   threat	   to	  competition	  since	   it	  
does	   not	   necessarily	   have	   any	   effect	   on	   the	   downstream	   market.	   Furthermore,	   an	  
undertaking	   in	   a	   monopsonistic	   position	   has	   no	   interest	   in	   bringing	   such	   pressure	   to	  
bear	  on	  its	  suppliers	  that	  they	  become	  obliged	  to	  leave	  the	  upstream	  market”.482	  	  
It	   is	   difficult	   to	   determine	   whether	   that	   opinion	   would	   have	   been	   followed	   or	   not.	   However,	   the	  
statements	  made	   in	   the	  CICCE	  case	  and	   in	   the	  British	  Airways	  case	  developed	  hereafter	   show	  that	  
the	  Court	  does	  not	  rule	  out	  the	  finding	  of	  an	  abuse	  even	  though	  the	  buyer’s	  conduct	  in	  question	  does	  
not	  lead	  to	  any	  adverse	  effect	  in	  the	  downstream	  market.	  	  
b) CICCE	  case483	  
The	   issue	  of	  unfairly	   low	  prices	  was	  addressed	   in	  the	  CICCE	  case	  where	  an	  association	  of	  cinematic	  
companies	  (CICCE)	  claimed	  to	  the	  Commission	  that	  undertakings	  with	  exclusive	  broadcasting	  rights	  in	  
France	  had	  paid	  excessively	   low	  prices	  for	  the	  purchase	  of	  movies.	  Following	  a	  Commission’s	   letter	  
suspending	  the	  procedure,	  CICCE	  brought	  the	  case	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  in	  order	  to	  make	  that	  letter	  
declared	   void.	   The	   Court	   dismissed	   the	   action	   but	   developed	   somewhat	   the	   question	   of	   abuse	   of	  
buyer	  power	  by	  joining	  the	  Commission’s	  approach	  on	  that	  matter.	  It	  was	  held	  that	  unfair	  purchase	  
prices	   imposed	   by	   an	   undertaking	   in	   a	   dominant	   position	   may	   constitute	   an	   abuse	   within	   the	  
meaning	   of	   Article	   102	   of	   the	   Treaty.	   Like	   in	   the	   case	   of	   excessively	   high	   prices,	   such	   an	   abuse	  
depends	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   cost	   and	   the	   economic	   value	   of	   the	   product	   or	   of	   the	  
service	  provided.484	  In	  this	  particular	  case	  of	  film	  broadcasting	  rights,	  the	  Commission,	  upheld	  by	  the	  
Court,	  considered	  that	  various	  criteria	  may	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration	  to	  assess	  the	  value	  of	  films	  so	  
that	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	  determine	  a	   yardstick	   that	   is	   valid	   for	   all	   films.	   The	   claimant	  was	   therefore	  
required	  to	  prove	  the	  alleged	  abuse	  by	  reference	  to	  actual	  cases	  involving	  specific	  films	  rather	  than	  
by	   reference	   to	   the	   average	   licence	   fee	   paid	   for	   all	   the	   films	   for	   which	   the	   television	   companies	  
acquired	  broadcasting	  rights.485	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
482	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Poiares	  Maduro	  delivered	  on	  10	  November	  2005	  ,	  Fenin	  v	  Commission,	  case	  C-­‐205/03,	  at	  66.	  
483	  Case	  298/83,	  Comité	  des	  industries	  cinématographiques	  des	  Communautés	  européennes	  (CICCE)	  v	  
Commission	  [1985]	  ECR	  1105.	  
484	  Ibid.,	  at	  22.	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  Ibid.,	  at	  24.	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Where	  that	  decision	  does	  not	  define	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  rules	  circumscribing	  unilateral	  buying	  conduct,	  
at	   least	   it	   confirms	   that	  Article	  102	  TFEU	   is	   likely	   to	  be	  applied	   to	  one	   type	  of	  buyer	  power	  abuse,	  
namely	   excessively	   low	   purchasing	   prices	   imposed	   on	   sellers.	   In	   addition,	   the	   Courts	   seems	   to	  
consider	   that	   the	   negative	   effects	   that	   uncompetitive	   prices	  would	   entail	   in	   the	   upstream	  market	  
would	   as	   such	   be	   sufficient	   to	   conclude	   to	   a	   violation	   of	   Article	   102	   TFEU,	   regardless	   of	   whether	  
those	   lower	  prices	  are	  obtained	   through	  a	   reduction	   in	   input	  purchases	  or	   through	  other	  practices	  
and	   without	   considering	   whether	   the	   buyer’s	   conduct	   in	   question	   is	   or	   not	   likely	   to	   affect	   the	  
downstream	  market	  as	  well.	  Abuses	  of	  buyer	  power	  could	  therefore	  be	  condemned	  even	  though	  no	  
consumer	  harm	  has	  been	  established.	  	  
The	  CICCE	  case	  attests	  of	  the	  difficulty	  of	  determining	  what	  constitutes	  an	  excessively	  low	  price.	  The	  
problem	  of	   identifying	  unlawful	  excessive	  prices	  has	  already	  been	  pointed	  out	   in	  different	  cases	  on	  
abuses	   of	   market	   power	   on	   the	   selling	   side.	   According	   to	   the	   case	   law	   of	   the	   Court,	   a	   price	   is	  
excessive	  when	  it	  bears	  no	  relationship	  to	  the	  economic	  value	  of	  the	  product	  supplied	  or	  the	  service	  
provided.486	  However,	   calculating	   the	  difference	  between	   the	   costs	   actually	   incurred	  and	   the	  price	  
charged	   by	   a	   firm	   is	   not	   an	   easy	   task.	   That	   is	   why	   the	   Commission	   generally	   places	   a	   greater	  
emphasis	   in	   price	  differentials	   between	  Member	   States,	   price	  discrepancies	  between	  branded	  and	  
unbranded	   products	   or	   prices	   charged	   by	   competitors.487	   	   It	   is	   therefore	   not	   surprising	   that	   the	  
Commission	  rarely	  concludes	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  excessively	  high	  prices	  and	  adopts	  a	  similar	  cautious	  
approach	  with	  regard	  to	  excessively	  low	  prices.	  
One	  can	  nevertheless	  point	  out	  that	  the	  situation	  is	  slightly	  different	  in	  case	  of	  excessively	  low	  prices.	  
The	   justifications	   generally	   invoked	   to	   justify	   high	   prices	   -­‐	   such	   as	   the	   necessity	   to	  make	   profit	   in	  
order	  to	  reward	  beneficial	  investment	  in	  risky	  projects,	  to	  compensate	  firms	  for	  failed	  projects	  or	  to	  
incite	   investments	   in	   research	  and	  development	   -­‐	   are	  hardly	   sustainable	   in	   case	  of	  excessively	   low	  
prices.	  Indeed,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  buyers	  do	  not	  normally	  make	  more	  profit	  since	  they	  are	  supposed	  
to	   pass	   on	   lower	   prices	   to	   their	   customers.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   excessively	   low	   prices	  will	   in	   fact	  
affect	   the	   suppliers’	   incentives	   to	   invest	   in	   improved	  and	  new	  products.	  As	   a	   result,	   that	   situation	  
risks	   leading	   to	   a	   decrease	   in	   the	   products	   quality	   and	   variety	   available	   for	   consumers.	   Where	  
obtaining	   lower	   prices	   is	   positive	   to	   enhance	   competition	   in	   the	   downstream	   markets,	   imposing	  
excessively	  low	  prices	  is	  not.	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  Case	  27/76,	  United	  Brands	  Company	  v	  Commission	  [1978]	  ECR	  207,	  at	  250.	  
487	  R.O’DONOGHUE	  &	  J.PADILLA,	  The	  law	  and	  economics	  of	  Article	  82	  EC,	  2006,	  at	  609.	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c) British	  Airways	  case488	  
The	  British	  Airways	  case	   is	  mainly	  known	  as	   the	   first	  case	  where	  the	  Commission	  concluded	  to	  the	  
existence	  of	  a	  dominant	  position	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  firm	  in	  question	  having	  a	  market	  share	  slightly	  below	  
40%	  (39.7%	  more	  precisely).	  However,	  few	  have	  highlighted	  that	  the	  decision	  concentrated	  on	  British	  
Airways	  (BA)	  as	  a	  buyer.	  Although	  the	  case	  presents	  some	  specific	  characteristics	  and	  thereby	  differs	  
from	   the	   different	   situations	   involving	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   described	   in	   Part	   I,	   it	   is	  
nevertheless	  relevant	  to	  examine	  the	  assessment	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  European	  
Courts	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   position	   and	   conduct	   of	   BA.	  Where	   that	   assessment	  was	   not	   drastically	  
different	  from	  the	  analysis	  commonly	  used	  in	  seller	  power	  cases,	  various	  elements	  pertaining	  to	  the	  
issue	  of	  buyer	  power	  are	  yet	  worth	  pointing	  out.	  	  
The	   case	   arose	   from	   a	   complaint	   lodged	   by	   Virgin,	   an	   airline	   company,	   against	   the	   travel	   agency	  
commission	  schemes	  offered	  to	  travel	  agents	  by	  its	  competitor	  British	  Airways	  which	  was	  accused	  of	  
abusing	  its	  dominant	  position	  as	  a	  purchaser	  of	  travel	  agency	  services.	  Where	  airlines	  companies	  are	  
suppliers	  of	  air	   transport	  services,	   they	  also	  purchase	  air	   travel	  agency	  services	   from	  travel	  agents.	  
These	   services	   consist	   in	   undertaking	   the	   administrative	  work	   of	   issuing	   a	   ticket,	   collecting	  money	  
from	   travelers	   and	   remitting	   it	   to	   the	   airline	   company.	   In	   return,	   travel	   agents	   are	   paid	   through	  
commission	  based	  on	   the	  sales	  of	   tickets.	  This	   is	   therefore	  a	  particular	  situation	  where	  buyers	  and	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In	   that	   context,	   BA	   implemented	   a	   particular	   system	   of	   commission	   through	  which	   it	   intended	   to	  
increase	   the	   sales	   of	   its	   tickets	   by	   offering	   additional	   financial	   incentives	   to	   travel	   agents.	   The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
488	  Virgin/British	  Airways,	  Case	  No	  IV/D-­‐2/34.780,	  Commission	  decision	  of	  14	  July	  1999.	  The	  decision	  was	  
upheld	  by	  both	  the	  CFI	  (General	  Court)	  and	  the	  CJE	  (Court	  of	  Justice).	  See:	  T-­‐219/99,	  British	  Airways	  v.	  
Commission	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐5917	  and	  C-­‐95/04	  P,	  British	  Airways	  v.	  Commission	  [2007]	  ECR	  I-­‐2331.	  
489	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  op.cit.,	  para.	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contested	  performance	  reward	  schemes	  provided	  that	  if	  travel	  agents	  attained	  their	  BA	  tickets	  sales	  
growth	   targets,	   they	  would	  get	  an	   increase	   in	   the	   rate	  of	   the	  commission	  paid	   to	   them	  by	  BA,	  not	  
only	   on	   BA	   tickets	   sold	   after	   the	   target	  was	   reached	   but	   also	   on	   all	   BA	   tickets	   sold	   by	   the	   agents	  
during	   the	   period	   of	   reference.	   Following	   the	   complaint	   against	   those	   commission	   schemes,	   the	  
Commission	  decided	  to	  initiate	  a	  proceeding	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  at	  the	  end	  of	  which	  it	  adopted	  a	  
decision	  holding	  that	  BA	  abused	   its	  dominant	  position	  on	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  for	  air	   travel	  agency	  
services.	  
Concerning	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  position	  of	  BA	  on	  the	  UK	  market	  for	  air	  travel	  agency	  services,	  different	  
elements	  led	  the	  Commission	  to	  conclude	  that	  BA	  was	  the	  dominant	  purchaser	  on	  that	  market.	  First	  
of	  all,	  the	  Commission	  pointed	  out	  the	  large	  market	  share	  of	  BA	  which	  accounted	  for	  39.7%	  of	  sales	  
through	   travel	   agents	  while	   its	  nearest	   rival	   (Virgin)	  had	  only	   a	   share	  of	  5.5%	  of	   that	  market.489	   In	  
addition,	  the	  economic	  strength	  of	  BA	  was	  considered	  as	  further	  reinforced	  due	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  
range	  of	  its	  transport	  services	  and	  to	  its	  network	  operations	  which	  allowed	  it	  to	  offer	  a	  wider	  choice	  
of	  routes	  and	  more	  frequent	  flights.490	  Finally,	  the	  Commission	  noted	  that	  BA’s	  strong	  position	  on	  the	  
markets	  for	  air	  transport	  made	  it	  an	  obligatory	  business	  partner	  for	  travel	  agents.	  Indeed,	  the	  large	  
number	   of	   BA	   air	   tickets	   purchased	   by	   travelers	   led	   in	   turn	   to	   a	   large	   number	   of	   transactions	  
between	  BA	   and	   the	   travel	   agents	   for	   the	   sales	   of	   air	   travel	   agency	   services.	  Hence,	   travel	   agents	  
needed	   to	   deal	   with	   BA	   as	   a	   very	   large	   proportion	   of	   their	   income	   was	   received	   from	   BA	   in	  
consideration	   for	   their	   services.491	   Accordingly,	   based	   on	   those	   various	   elements,	   the	   Commission	  
concluded	  to	  BA’s	  dominance	  since	  it	  was	  in	  a	  position	  to	  behave	  independently	  in	  its	  purchases	  of	  
travel	  agency	  services.	  	  
Turning	  to	  BA’	  s	  alleged	  abusive	  conduct,	  the	  Commission	  decided	  that	  the	  commission	  schemes	  in	  
question,	  by	  rewarding	   loyalty	   from	  the	  travel	  agents	  and	  by	  discriminating	  between	  travel	  agents,	  
constituted	   abuses	   of	   dominance	   prohibited	   under	   Article	   102	   TFEU.492	   The	   performance	   reward	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  Virgin/British	  Airways,	  op.cit.,	  para.	  88.	  
490	  Ibid.,	  para.	  90-­‐91.	  
491	  Ibid.,	  para.	  92.	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  On	  loyalty	  discounts	  and	  price	  discrimination,	  see	  :	  R.O’Donoghue	  &	  A.J.Padilla,	  op.cit.,	  at	  374-­‐406;	  
D.Ridyard,	  Exclusionary	  Pricing	  and	  Price	  Discrimination	  Abuses	  Under	  Article	  82	  -­‐	  	  an	  Economic	  Analysis,	  23	  
European	  Competition	  Law	  Review	  286	  (2003);	  J.Kallaugher	  &	  B.Sher,	  Rebates	  revisited:	  Anti-­‐competitive	  
effects	  and	  exclusionary	  abuse	  under	  Article	  82,	  25	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  Law	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  263	  (2004);	  D.Géradin	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N.Petit,	  price	  discrimination	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  EC	  Competition	  Law:	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  Need	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  Case-­‐By-­‐Case	  approach,	  Global	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  Law	  Centre	  Working	  Papers	  Series,	  GCLC	  Working	  Paper	  07/05;	  S.M.Martinez	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R.Allendesalazar,	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  Policy	  on	  Discriminatory	  Pricing:	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  in	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  Annual	  2003:	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  C.Ahlborn	  &	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  selective	  pricing	  by	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  firms:	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  Competition	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  101	  (2006);	  G.Faella,	  The	  antitrust	  assessment	  of	  loyalty	  discounts	  
and	  rebates,	  4	  Journal	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  Competition	  Law	  &	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  375	  (2008);	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  and	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  and	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schemes	   applied	   to	   travel	   agents	  were	   indeed	   clearly	   related	   to	   loyalty	   rather	   than	   efficiencies	   so	  
that	   they	   entailed	   exclusionary	   effects	   on	   BA’s	   competitors	   and	   potential	   new	   entrants.493	   The	  
Commission	   considered	   therefore	   that	   they	   harmed	   competition	   in	   general	   and	   so	   consumers.494	  
With	   regard	   to	   the	   discriminatory	   nature	   of	   the	   commission	   schemes,	   it	   was	   maintained	   that	   it	  
placed	  certain	  travel	  agents	  at	  a	  competitive	  disadvantage	  relative	  to	  each	  other	  as	   it	  distorted	  the	  
level	   of	   commission	   income	   earned	   by	   travel	   agents.495	   The	   Commission	   consequently	   concluded	  
that,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   these	   schemes	   affected	   the	   ability	   of	   travel	   agents	   to	   compete	  with	   each	  
other	   and,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   they	   distorted	   competition	   between	   BA	   and	   other	   airlines	   on	   the	  
markets	  for	  air	  transport	  services.496	  
It	   is	  worth	  noting	   that	  BA’s	  position	   in	   the	  buyer	  market	   for	   travel	  agency	   services	   resulted	   in	   fact	  
only	  from	  its	  position	  on	  the	  air	  travel	  markets.	  The	  large	  market	  share	  of	  BA	  on	  those	  markets	  made	  
travel	  agents	  economically	  dependent	  on	  that	   firm	  as	  they	  could	  not	  but	  offer	  BA’s	   flight	  tickets	   in	  
order	  to	  carry	  out	  successfully	  their	  business	  activity.	  The	  preponderant	  number	  of	  BA’s	  flight	  tickets	  
bought	  by	  travellers	  through	  travel	  agents	   led	  consequently	  to	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  transactions	  
between	   BA	   and	   those	   agents	   for	   the	   purchase	   of	   air	   travel	   agency	   services	   related	   to	   the	  
distribution	   of	   BA	   air	   tickets.	   The	   commissions	   were	   indeed	   paid	   on	   basis	   of	   the	   sales	   of	   tickets.	  
Travel	  agents	  were	  hence	  dependent	  on	  BA	  because	  their	  revenue	  resulted	  mainly	  from	  the	  services	  
provided	  to	  BA	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  sales	  of	  BA	  tickets.	  On	  basis	  of	  that	  correlation	  between	  the	  sales	  of	  
air	  tickets	  and	  the	  services	  provided	  by	  travel	  agents	  to	  BA,	  the	  Commission	  took	  into	  consideration	  
the	  market	  share	  of	  BA	  in	  the	  seller	  market	  for	  air	  tickets	  to	  assess	  the	  firm’s	  position	  in	  the	  buyer	  
market	  for	  air	  travel	  agency	  services.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  the	  share	  in	  the	  sales	  of	  air	  tickets	  through	  
travel	   agents	   corresponded	  with	   the	   share	   in	   the	   purchases	   of	   air	   travel	   agency	   services.	   This	   is	   a	  
particular	   situation	   which	   results	   from	   the	   interdependence	   of	   the	   different	   markets	   described	  
above.	  In	  most	  buyer	  power	  cases,	  though,	  the	  relevant	  upstream	  buyer	  market	  needs	  to	  be	  defined	  
separately	   so	   that	   the	   firm’s	  position	   in	   that	  market	   is	   likely	   to	  differ	   from	   the	  one	   it	   holds	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
493	  Virgin/British	  Airways,	  op.cit.,	  para.	  97-­‐107.	  Rebates	  based	  upon	  an	  economically	  justified	  consideration	  will	  
not	  infringe	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  However,	  a	  system	  of	  rebates	  which	  as	  the	  effect	  of	  preventing	  customers	  from	  
obtaining	  supplies	  from	  market	  competitors	  will	  be	  regarded	  as	  contrary	  to	  that	  provision	  if	  it	  is	  applied	  by	  an	  
undertaking	  in	  a	  dominant	  position.	  See:	  Case	  85/76,	  Hoffmann-­‐La	  Roche	  [1979]	  ECR	  541	  and	  Case	  322/81,	  
Michelin	  [1983]	  ECR	  3461.	  	  
494	  Virgin/British	  Airways,	  op.cit.,	  para.	  106.	  
495	  In	  fact,	  on	  basis	  of	  the	  commission	  schemes	  at	  hand,	  two	  agents	  handling	  the	  same	  number	  of	  BA	  tickets	  
and	  providing	  the	  same	  level	  of	  service	  to	  BA	  would	  receive	  a	  different	  commission	  rate,	  that	  is,	  a	  different	  
price	  for	  their	  air	  travel	  agency	  services	  if	  their	  sales	  of	  BA	  tickets	  were	  different	  in	  the	  previous	  year.	  
Conversely,	  two	  agents	  selling	  different	  volumes	  of	  BA	  tickets	  and	  providing	  a	  different	  level	  of	  service	  to	  BA	  
could	  earn	  the	  same	  commission	  rate,	  that	  is,	  to	  be	  paid	  the	  same	  price	  by	  BA	  for	  air	  travel	  agency	  services	  if	  
their	  sales	  of	  BA	  tickets	  have	  increased	  by	  the	  same	  percentage	  over	  the	  previous	  year.	  BA	  applied	  therefore	  
dissimilar	  conditions	  to	  equivalent	  transactions	  and	  vice	  versa.	  See:	  Virgin/British	  Airways,	  op.cit.,	  para.	  109.	  	  
496	  Ibid.,	  para.	  111.	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downstream	   seller	  market.	   This	   is	   why	   the	  British	   Airways	   case	   can	   be	   defined	   as	   a	   “fake”	   buyer	  
power	  case.	  The	  competition	  assessment	  made	  by	  the	  Commission	  in	  that	  case	  remains	  yet	  of	  some	  
importance	  such	  as	  the	  judgments	  of	  the	  European	  Courts.	  
The	  decision	  of	  the	  Commission	  was	  indeed	  upheld	  by	  both	  the	  Tribunal	  and	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  The	  
former	   confirmed	   that	   Article	   102	   TFEU	   applies	   to	   firms	  which	   are	   dominant	  with	   regard	   to	   their	  
customers	  but	  also	  to	  those	  which	  are	  in	  the	  same	  position	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  suppliers.	  	  
“With	   regard	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   restrictions	   on	   competition	   which	   the	   Commission	  
imputes	  to	  BA's	  performance	  reward	  schemes	  arise	  from	  the	  position	  which	  BA	  holds	  in	  
its	   capacity	   not	   as	   supplier	   but	   as	   purchaser	   of	   air	   travel	   agency	   services,	   this	   is	  
irrelevant	  having	  regard	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  market	  in	  question.	  Article	  82	  EC	  applies	  
both	  to	  undertakings	  whose	  possible	  dominant	  position	  is	  established,	  as	  in	  this	  case,	  in	  
relation	  to	  their	  suppliers	  and	  to	  those	  which	  are	  capable	  of	  being	  in	  the	  same	  position	  
in	  relation	  to	  their	  customers.”	  497	  
It	  also	  considered	  that	  the	  Commission	  rightly	  concluded	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  dominant	  position	  on	  
basis	   of	   BA’s	   economic	   strength	   in	   the	   relevant	   market	   but	   also	   of	   travel	   agents’	   economic	  
dependence	  on	  BA.	  The	  Tribunal	   indeed	  pointed	  out	  that	  travel	  agents	  substantially	  depend	  on	  the	  
income	  they	  receive	  from	  BA	  so	  that	  the	  latter	  was	  an	  obligatory	  business	  partner	  of	  those	  agents.498	  	  
With	  regard	  to	  BA’s	  abusive	  practices,	  the	  Tribunal	  held	  that	  the	  Commission	  did	  not	  make	  any	  errors	  
of	  assessment	  in	  deciding	  that	  BA	  contravened	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  by	  applying	  its	  performance	  reward	  
schemes	  that	  were	  both	  discriminatory	  and	  had	  the	  object	  and	  effect	  of	  excluding	  rival	  airlines	   for	  
the	  market	  of	  air	  travel	  agency	  services	  and,	  consequently,	  from	  the	  air	  travel	  markets.499	  Following	  
the	  judgment	  of	  the	  Tribunal,	  BA	  brought	  an	  action	  before	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  invoking,	  among	  other	  
things,	   in	   support	   of	   its	   appeal,	   that	   the	   Tribunal	   erred	   in	   law	   by	   failing	   to	   consider	   whether	   the	  
practice	   condemned	   by	   the	   Commission	   had	   led	   to	   consumer	   harm.	   We	   noted	   above	   that	   the	  
Commission	   carefully	   mentioned	   in	   its	   decision	   that	   the	   commission	   schemes	   at	   hand	   distorted	  
competition	   between	   BA	   and	   its	   competitors,	   resulting	   in	   competition	   and	   consumer	   harm.	   	   The	  
Court	  of	  Justice	  however	  made	  it	  clear	  in	  its	  judgment	  that	  consumer	  injury	  is	  in	  no	  way	  a	  condition	  
to	  conclude	  to	  an	  abuse	  of	  dominance.	  It	  stated	  that:	  
“Article	   [102	   TFEU]	   is	   aimed	   not	   only	   at	   practices	   which	   may	   cause	   prejudice	   to	  
consumers	   directly,	   but	   also	   at	   those	   which	   are	   detrimental	   to	   them	   through	   their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
497	  T-­‐219/99,	  British	  Airways	  v.	  Commission	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐5917,	  para.	  101.	  
498	  Ibid.,	  para	  215-­‐217.	  
499Ibid.,	  para.	  299.	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impact	   on	   an	   effective	   competition	   structure	   (…).	   It	   follows	   that,	   in	   order	   to	   assess	  
whether	   the	   conduct	   of	   an	   undertaking	   in	   a	   dominant	   position	   is	   abusive,	   it	   is	   not	  
necessary	  to	  examine	  whether	  that	  conduct	  has	  caused	  prejudice	  to	  consumers.	  Rather,	  
it	  is	  sufficient	  to	  examine	  whether	  it	  had	  a	  restrictive	  effect	  on	  competition.”500	  	  
“The	  commercial	  behaviour	  of	   the	  undertaking	   in	  a	  dominant	  position	  may	  not	  distort	  
competition	  on	  an	  upstream	  or	  a	  downstream	  market,	  in	  other	  words	  between	  suppliers	  
or	  customers	  of	  that	  undertaking.”501	  
Accordingly,	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  commercial	  behavior	  of	  a	  firm	  in	  a	  dominant	  position	  tends	  to	  hinder	  the	  
competitive	  position	  of	  some	  of	  the	  business	  partners	  of	  that	  firm	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  others,	  either	  in	  
the	  downstream	  or	  in	  the	  upstream	  market,	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  is	  violated.502	  	  
In	  conclusion,	  even	  though	  the	  assessment	  made	  in	  the	  British	  Airways	  case	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  firm’s	  
position	  as	  a	  purchaser	  and	  its	  conduct	  in	  the	  upstream	  market	  was,	  to	  a	  great	  extent,	  similar	  to	  that	  
generally	   carried	   out	   in	   cases	   of	   sellers’	   abusive	   practices,	   two	   elements	   can	   nevertheless	   be	  
highlighted.	  First,	  when	  examining	  the	  position	  of	  BA	   in	  the	  upstream	  market,	  the	  Commission	  and	  
the	  European	  Courts	  took	  a	  specific	  element	  into	  consideration,	  namely	  the	  travel	  agents’	  economic	  
dependence	   on	   BA.503	   Although	   the	   firm’s	   market	   share	   was	   still	   in	   the	   center	   of	   the	   dominant	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
500	  C-­‐95/04	  P,	  British	  Airways	  v.	  Commission	  [2007]	  ECR	  I-­‐2331,	  para.	  106-­‐107.	  In	  its	  decision,	  the	  Court	  of	  
Justice	  referred	  to	  an	  effective	  competition	  structure,	  as	  mentioned	  in	  former	  Article	  3(1)(g)	  EC	  which	  provided	  
that	  “the	  activities	  of	  the	  Community	  shall	  include	  (…)	  a	  system	  ensuring	  that	  competition	  in	  the	  internal	  
market	  is	  not	  distorted.”	  	  Even	  though	  that	  provision	  has	  been	  removed	  by	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty,	  its	  terms	  have	  
been	  included	  in	  a	  new	  legally-­‐binding	  Protocol	  which	  provides	  that	  the	  internal	  market	  as	  set	  out	  in	  Article	  3	  
of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  European	  Union	  includes	  a	  system	  ensuring	  that	  competition	  is	  not	  distorted.”	  See:	  Protocol	  
No	  27	  on	  the	  internal	  market	  and	  competition,	  OJ	  C	  115	  of	  09/05/2008.	  	  
501	  C-­‐95/04	  P,	  British	  Airways,	  op.cit.,	  para.	  143.	  
502	  Ibid.,	  para.	  144.	  
503	  It	  is	  not	  the	  first	  time	  that	  the	  economic	  dependence	  of	  trading	  partners	  is	  mentioned	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  
dominance.	  	  The	  Commission	  had	  already	  noted	  in	  some	  cases	  that	  the	  position	  of	  economic	  dependence	  of	  
third	  parties	  was	  characteristic	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  dominant	  position.	  See	  for	  example:	  Magill	  TV	  Guide/ITP,	  
BBC	  and	  RTE,	  Case	  No	  IV/31.851,	  Commission	  decision	  of	  21	  December	  1988	  and	  Michelin,	  Case	  No	  COMP/E-­‐
2/36.041/PO,	  Commission	  decision	  of	  20	  June	  2001.	  In	  that	  last	  case,	  the	  Commission	  considered	  that	  three	  
elements	  showed	  the	  dominant	  position	  of	  Michelin.	  First,	  its	  large	  market	  share;	  second,	  its	  behavior	  on	  the	  
relevant	  market	  which	  brought	  to	  light	  certain	  attitudes	  and	  practices	  which	  were	  typical	  of	  a	  company	  in	  a	  
dominant	  position;	  and	  third,	  the	  position	  of	  economic	  dependence	  in	  which	  specialized	  dealers	  found	  
themselves	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Michelin,	  a	  necessary	  trading	  partner	  (See:	  at	  173	  and	  200-­‐208	  of	  the	  decision).	  The	  
economic	  dependence	  of	  trading	  partners	  was	  generally	  viewed	  as	  the	  consequence	  of	  the	  very	  large	  market	  
share	  of	  the	  firm	  in	  question	  which	  exceeded	  50%	  in	  those	  cases.	  Dominance	  was	  hence	  presumed	  and	  the	  
factor	  of	  economic	  dependence	  only	  consolidated	  the	  Commission’s	  conclusion	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  dominant	  
position.	  See	  also:	  Soda	  ash-­‐Solvay,	  Case	  No	  COMP/33.133-­‐C,	  Commission	  decision	  of	  13	  December	  2000	  
(upheld	  by	  the	  General	  Court.	  See:T-­‐57/01,	  Solvay	  SA	  v.	  Commission	  [2009]	  ECR	  II-­‐4621)	  and	  Soda	  ash-­‐ICI,	  Case	  
No	  COMP/33.133-­‐D,	  Commission	  decision	  of	  13	  December	  2000	  (upheld	  by	  the	  General	  Court.	  See:	  T-­‐66/01,	  
Imperial	  Chemical	  Industries	  Ltd	  v.	  Commission	  [2010]	  ECR	  II-­‐2631).	  In	  the	  British	  Airways	  case,	  however,	  the	  
market	  of	  the	  firm	  was	  definitely	  not	  sufficient	  to	  presume	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  dominant	  position,	  on	  the	  
contrary.	  The	  fact	  that	  BA	  was	  an	  avoidable	  trading	  partner	  constituted	  therefore	  a	  factor	  on	  its	  own	  in	  the	  
Final	  version	  -­‐	  Mai	  2014	   	  
159	  
	  
position	   analysis,	   the	   factor	   related	   to	   the	   agents’	   dependency	   was	   nonetheless	   of	   particular	  
importance	   in	   the	  overall	  assessment	  as	  BA’s	  market	   share	  was	   far	   from	  sufficient	   to	  presume	  the	  
existence	  of	  dominance.504	  Secondly,	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  clearly	  affirmed	  that	  the	  competition	  rules	  
were	  aimed	  at	  protecting	  effective	  competition	  both	  in	  the	  downstream	  and	  in	  the	  upstream	  market.	  
Therefore,	  any	  practice	  which	  distorts	  competition	  between	  suppliers	  and	  prevents	  them	  from	  acting	  
in	  a	  competitive	  environment	  must	  be	  condemned,	  provided	  that	  it	  is	  carried	  out	  by	  a	  firm	  holding	  a	  
dominant	  position	  in	  the	  relevant	  market.	  	  
C. CONCLUSIVE	  REMARKS	  
Although	   the	   use	   of	   market	   power	   is	   more	   commonly	   examined	   from	   the	   selling	   side,	   the	  
Commission	  is	  not	  deprived	  of	  instruments	  to	  address	  the	  potential	  competitive	  concerns	  which	  may	  
arise	  from	  the	  exercise	  of	  market	  power	  on	  the	  buying	  side.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  may	  
be	   enforced	   against	   buyer	   cartels	   and	   other	   agreements	   involving	   buyers	   provided	   that	   the	  
restrictive	   effects	   on	   competition	   of	   those	   arrangements	   outweigh	   their	   positive	   effects.	   On	   the	  
other	  hand,	  Article	   102	  TFEU,	  which	  prohibits	   abuses	  of	  dominance,	   is	   likely	   to	   apply	   to	  dominant	  
buyers	  if	  they	  abuse	  their	  position	  in	  the	  procurement	  market.	  	  
However,	   in	   the	   different	   instruments	   used	   by	   the	   Commission	   to	   enforce	   the	   competition	   rules,	  
buyer	   power	   is	   more	   often	   analysed	   as	   a	   countervailing	   strength.	   From	   that	   perspective,	   the	  
presence	  of	  powerful	  buyers	  may	  have	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  the	  competition	  process	  by	  removing,	  or	  
at	  least	  attenuating,	  some	  of	  the	  negative	  effects	  which	  might	  come	  from	  a	  concentrated	  upstream	  
market.	   Countervailing	   buying	   power	   may	   indeed	   be	   sufficient	   to	   prevent	   a	   seller	   from	   acting	  
independently,	   excluding	   that	   seller	   from	   the	   definition	   of	   dominance	   and	   hence	   precluding	   the	  
application	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  The	  extensive	  reference	  to	  buyer	  power	  as	  a	  countervailing	  strength	  
in	   EU	   instruments	   reveals	   that,	   until	   now,	   such	   power	   has	   been	  mostly	   considered	   as	   a	   source	   of	  
benefits	  for	  competition	  rather	  than	  a	  source	  of	  competitive	  concerns.	  	  
The	  very	   little	  case	   law	  and	  Commission	  action	  addressing	  the	   issue	  of	  buyer	  power	  as	  a	  source	  of	  
competition	   distortion	   confirms	   that	   observation.	   However,	   it	   results	   clearly	   from	   the	   few	   buyer	  
power	  cases	  dealt	  with	  at	  EU	   level	   that	  practices	  used	   in	  upstream	  buyer	  markets	  are	   likely	   to	   fall	  
within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  Treaty	  competition	  rules.	  Accordingly,	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  applies	  to	  both	  seller	  
and	  buyer	   cartels	   even	   if	   the	   latter	   aim	  at	  decreasing	  prices.	  With	   regard	   to	  Article	   102	  TFEU,	   the	  
case	   law	   confirms	   that	   the	   exploitation	   of	   buyer	   power	   over	   suppliers	   may	   constitute	   an	   abuse.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
assessment	  of	  dominance	  and	  attested	  that	  such	  position	  may	  be	  acquired	  from	  a	  lower	  market	  share,	  
especially	  in	  the	  upstream	  market.	  	  
504	  P.Këllezi,	  Abuse	  below	  the	  threshold	  of	  dominance?,	  in	  Abuse	  of	  dominant	  position:	  new	  interpretation,	  new	  
enforcement	  mechanisms?	  (2008),	  at	  55.	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Provided	  that	  they	  are	  in	  a	  dominant	  position	  in	  the	  relevant	  upstream	  market,	  firms	  are	  therefore	  
required	  not	  to	  engage	  in	  conduct	  that	  might	  restrict	  competition.	  	  
To	   assess	   the	  degree	  of	   a	   buyer’s	  market	   power,	   the	  Commission	  examines	   the	   traditional	   factors	  
used	  in	  seller	  power	  cases,	  such	  as	  the	  firm’s	  market	  share	  and	  the	  different	  competitive	  constraints	  
present	  on	  the	  market.	  However,	   in	  the	  British	  Airways	  case,	  the	  concept	  of	  economic	  dependence	  
was	  of	  particular	  relevance	   in	  the	  competition	  assessment.	  Although	  that	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  
“fake”	  buyer	  power	  case,	  based	  on	  a	  system	  of	  commission,	  it	  shows	  that	  the	  firm’s	  market	  share	  is	  
not	  always	  determinant	   in	   the	  assessment	  of	  dominance.	   In	   that	  case,	   the	  Commission	  put	   indeed	  
rather	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  travel	  agents’	  economic	  dependence	  on	  British	  Airways	  to	  conclude	  that	  
the	  latter	  was	  in	  a	  dominant	  position	  on	  the	  buyer	  market	  for	  travel	  agency	  services.	  	  
However,	   it	   remains	   that	   no	   specific	   approach	   has	   been	   defined	   to	   deal	   with	   buyer	   power	   cases	  
under	   Article	   101	   and	   102	   TFEU.	   The	   concept	   of	   economic	   dependency	   is	   hence	   unlikely	   to	   take	  
precedence	  over	  the	  market	  share	  threshold	  used	  to	  assess	  a	  firm’s	  market	  power	  in	  the	  upstream	  
buyer	  market.	  	  As	  such,	  if	  a	  buyer’s	  share	  in	  that	  market	  is	  much	  below	  the	  threshold	  of	  40%,	  the	  fact	  
that	  most	  suppliers	  are	  dependent	  on	   that	  customer	  will	  probably	  not	  affect	   the	  conclusion	  of	   the	  
Commission	  according	  to	  which	  the	  buyer	  in	  question	  is	  not	  in	  a	  dominant	  position.	  	  
The	   failure	   to	   take	   into	   account	   the	  particularities	   of	   buyer	  power	  might	   therefore	   let	   outside	   the	  
scope	  of	  EU	  competition	  law	  practices	  which	  in	  fact	  affect	  effective	  competition.	  Suppliers’	  economic	  
dependence	  on	  a	  particular	  customer	  gives	  indeed	  the	  latter	  significant	  buyer	  power	  which	  could	  be	  
used	  to	  restrict	  competition.	  In	  those	  circumstances,	  one	  could	  argue	  that,	  despite	  the	  relatively	  low	  
market	  share	  involved,	  competition	  authorities	  should	  be	  entitled	  to	  scrutinize	  the	  buyer’s	  conduct	  in	  
order	  to	  prevent	  any	  conduct	  restricting	  or	  distorting	  competition.	  	  
	  
SECTION	  II	  -­‐	  BUYER	  POWER	  AND	  THE	  EU	  MERGER	  POLICY	  
In	   the	   enforcement	   of	   the	  Merger	   Regulation,	   the	   role	   of	   the	   Commission	   is	   to	   examine	   both	   the	  
positive	   and	   the	   negative	   impact	   of	   the	   transaction	   on	   competition.	  Where	   combining	   forces	  may	  
increase	  efficiency	  and	  thereby	  bring	  benefits	  to	  the	  economy	  and	  to	  consumers,	  some	  mergers	  may	  
also	   reduce	   competition	   in	   a	  market.	   In	   particular,	  when	   a	   concentration	   leads	   to	   the	   creation	   or	  
strengthening	  of	  a	  dominant	  position	  in	  the	  downstream	  market,	  the	  new	  entity	  will	  probably	  be	  in	  a	  
position	  to	  increase	  prices	  post-­‐merger.	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In	   the	   application	   of	   the	  merger	   policy,	   the	   existence	   or	   creation	   of	   buyer	   power	  may	   be	   viewed,	  
depending	  on	  the	  situation,	  either	  as	  a	  source	  of	  competitive	  concerns	  or	  as	  a	  positive	  countervailing	  
strength	  which	  can	  be	  used	  to	  mitigate	  the	  exercise	  of	  market	  power	  by	  upstream	  firms.505	  	  
We	   have	   already	   noted	   that	   countervailing	   buyer	   power	   exists	   in	   various	   industries	   and	   that	   such	  
power	  may	  lead	  the	  Commission	  to	  clear	  a	  merger	  between	  suppliers	  in	  the	  upstream	  market,	  even	  
though	  the	  operation	  will	  reinforce	  the	  latter’s	  market	  power.506	  	  Customers	  may	  indeed	  be	  a	  source	  
of	   competitive	   constraints.	   Their	   bargaining	   strength	   is	   therefore	   taken	   into	   account	   by	   the	  
Commission	  when	  assessing	  the	  likely	  effects	  of	  an	  increase	  in	  market	  power	  of	  the	  merging	  parties.	  
However,	  the	  Commission	  does	  not	  only	  envisage	  the	  merged	  firm	  as	  a	  seller	  but	  also	  as	  a	  buyer	  who	  
might	   exercise	   itself	  market	   power	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   its	   suppliers	   in	   the	   upstream	  markets.	   In	   such	   a	   case,	  
buyer	  power	  may	  raise	  competitive	  concerns.	  The	  potential	  harmful	  impact	  of	  buyer	  power	  is,	  at	  first	  
sight,	  not	  obvious	  since	  the	  immediate	  effect	  of	  the	  exercise	  of	  such	  power	  is	  generally	  a	  decrease	  in	  
prices.	   The	   Commission	   nevertheless	   considers	   that,	   in	   some	   circumstances,	   pressures	   exerted	   by	  
buyers	  on	  their	  suppliers	  may	  lead	  to	  anticompetitive	  outcome	  in	  the	  longer-­‐term.	  	  
The	  first	  part	  of	  this	  Section	  describes	  the	  instruments	  used	  by	  the	  Commission	  when	  enforcing	  the	  
Merger	   Regulation	   and	   in	   particular	   the	   different	   parts	   dealing	   with	   the	   issue	   of	   (countervailing)	  
buyer	   power.	   In	   the	   second	   part,	   we	   will	   focus	   on	  merger	   cases	   where	   the	   Commission	   came	   to	  
assess	   the	   merging	   parties’	   buyer	   power	   and	   its	   effects	   on	   competition.	   Among	   the	   very	   large	  
number	   of	   merger	   cases	   dealt	   with	   by	   the	   Commission,	   only	   a	   few	   decisions	   concluded	   that	  
increased	  buyer	  power	  might	  impede	  effective	  competition.	  Those	  decisions	  mainly	  took	  place	  in	  the	  
agri-­‐food	   sector.	   Three	  of	   them	   concerned	  mergers	   between	   supermarket	   chains	  while	   the	   others	  
referred	   to	   increased	   buyer	   power	   of	   farmer	   cooperatives.	   The	   reasoning	   followed	   by	   the	  
Commission	  as	  regards	  the	  effects	  of	  buyer	  power	  on	  competition	  will	  be	  exhaustively	  developed.	  	  
A. 	  ASSESSMENT	   OF	   BUYER	   POWER	   UNDER	   THE	   MERGER	   REGULATION	   AND	   RELATED	  
INSTRUMENTS	  
Similarly	  to	  the	  analysis	  made	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  in	  merger	  cases	  
may	  be	   viewed	  either	   as	   a	   competitive	   concern	  or	   as	   a	   countervailing	   factor.	   In	   the	   first	   case,	   the	  
Commission	  may	  consider	  that	  a	  merger	   leading	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  buyer	  power	   in	  the	  procurement	  
market	  is	  likely	  to	  significantly	  impede	  effective	  competition.	  In	  the	  second	  situation,	  market	  power	  
exercised	  by	   some	  buyers	  may	  be	   considered	   as	   a	   sufficient	   countervailing	   power	   neutralizing	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
505	  On	  buyer	  power	  in	  merger	  decisions,	  see	  :	  A.Ezrachi	  &	  M.Ioannidou,	  Buyer	  power	  in	  European	  Union	  Merger	  
Control,	  10	  European	  Competition	  Journal	  69	  (2014).	  
506	  See:	  Part	  I,	  Chapter	  2,	  Section	  I.	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ability	   of	   the	   merging	   firm	   in	   the	   upstream	   market	   to	   raise	   prices	   in	   the	   future.	   The	   merger	  
Guidelines	  give	  more	  details	  on	  those	  issues,	   in	  particular	  concerning	  the	  sources	  and	  the	  potential	  
beneficial	  and	  harmful	  effects	  of	  buyer	  power.	  
1. Increase	  in	  buyer	  power	  through	  a	  merger	  
Mergers	   creating	  or	   strengthening	  buyer	  power	   in	  upstream	  markets	  may,	   in	   some	  circumstances,	  
significantly	  impede	  effective	  competition	  in	  the	  common	  market	  and	  hence	  not	  be	  approved	  by	  the	  
Commission,	  or	  at	  least	  not	  without	  undertakings.507	  The	  Commission	  is	  particularly	  concerned	  when,	  
following	   the	  merger,	   the	  new	  entity	  would	  be	   in	  a	  position	   to	  obtain	   lower	  prices	  by	   reducing	   its	  
purchase	  of	   inputs.	  This	  would	  be	  a	  case	  of	  pure	  monopsony	  which	  might,	   in	   turn,	   lead	  to	  a	   lower	  
level	  of	  output	  in	  the	  final	  product	  market	  where	  consumers	  would	  consequently	  face	  higher	  prices.	  
Such	   harmful	   effects	   on	   consumer	  welfare	   are	   likely	   to	   arise	  when	   upstream	   sellers	   are	   relatively	  
fragmented	  in	  comparison	  with	  the	  market	  structure	  on	  the	  buying	  side.	  Another	  source	  of	  concerns	  
mentioned	   in	   the	   Guidelines	   on	   horizontal	   mergers	   is	   related	   to	   the	   issue	   of	   output	   foreclosure.	  
Competition	  in	  the	  downstream	  markets	  could	  indeed	  also	  be	  adversely	  affected	  if	  the	  merged	  firm	  
uses	  its	  market	  power	  in	  the	  procurement	  market	  to	  foreclose	  its	  competitors.508	  
However,	   the	   Commission	   points	   out	   in	   its	   Guidelines	   that	   an	   increase	   in	   buyer	   power	   through	   a	  
merger	  does	  not	   always	   entail	   a	   negative	   impact	  on	   competition,	   even	   if	   the	  operation	   creates	  or	  
strengthens	  a	  dominant	  position	   in	  the	  procurement	  markets.	   Increased	  buyer	  power	  may	  even	  be	  
beneficial	   for	   competition	  when	   the	  merged	   entity	   is	   able	   to	   lower	   input	   costs	  without	   restricting	  
downstream	  competition	  or	  total	  output.	   In	  such	  a	  situation,	   it	   is	   likely	  that	  consumers	  will	  benefit	  
from	  these	  cost	  reductions	  through	  lower	  prices.509	  
In	  its	  assessment	  of	  mergers,	  the	  Commission	  has	  therefore	  to	  analyse	  the	  competitive	  conditions	  in	  
upstream	  markets	  and	  strike	  a	  balance	  between	   those	  potential	  negative	  and	  positive	  effects.510	  A	  
merger	  would	  be	  deemed	  to	  significantly	  impede	  effective	  competition	  only	  when	  its	  likely	  harmful	  
impact,	  in	  particular	  on	  consumers,	  outweighs	  its	  possible	  procompetitive	  effect.	  	  
2. Buyer	  power	  as	  a	  countervailing	  factor	  
Market	  power	  exercised	  on	  the	  buying	  side	  is	  also	  taken	  into	  consideration	  by	  the	  Commission	  in	  the	  
assessment	  of	   the	  potential	  effects	  a	  merger	  between	  upstream	  suppliers	  may	  bring	  about	  on	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
507	  Council	  Regulation	  (EC)	  No	  139/2004	  of	  20	  January	  2004	  on	  the	  control	  of	  concentrations	  between	  
undertakings,	  O.J.	  L	  24	  of	  29/01/2004,	  Article	  2	  (3).	  
508	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  assessment	  of	  horizontal	  mergers	  under	  the	  Council	  Regulation	  on	  the	  control	  of	  
concentrations	  between	  undertakings,	  O.J.	  C	  31	  of	  05/02/2004,	  at	  61.	  
509	  Ibid.,	  at	  62.	  
510	  Ibid.,	  at	  63.	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markets.	  The	  existence	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  countervailing	  buyer	  power	  are	  indeed	  likely	  to	  influence	  
the	  outcome	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  appraisal	  of	  mergers	  as	  powerful	  buyers	  are	  in	  fact	  able	  to	  mitigate	  
the	   negative	   impact	   of	   a	   concentration.	   The	   Commission	   takes	   hence	   account	   of	   the	   exercise	   of	  
buyer	   power	   when	   assessing	   the	   possible	   horizontal,	   vertical,	   non-­‐coordinated,	   coordinated	   and	  
conglomerate	  effects	  of	  mergers.	  	  
	  
a) Horizontal	  mergers	  
When	  firms	  decide	  to	  merge,	  the	  assessment	  of	  their	  customers’	  market	  power	  in	  the	  buyer	  market	  
is	   fully	   part	   of	   the	   Commission’s	   analysis.	   Depending	   on	   the	   relative	   bargaining	   strength	   of	   the	  
market	   participants	   on	   the	   selling	   and	   on	   the	   buying	   sides,	   the	   existence	   of	   buyer	   power	   may	  
constitute	  a	  decisive	  factor	  in	  the	  appraisal	  of	  a	  merger	  because	  the	  exercise	  of	  such	  power	  is	  likely	  
to	   counteract	   both	   the	   potential	   non-­‐coordinated	   and	   coordinated	   harmful	   effects	   of	   the	  
transaction.	  	  
i. Buyer	  power	  mitigating	  non-­‐coordinated	  effects	  
As	  already	  mentioned	  with	  regard	  to	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  competitive	  pressures	  on	  a	  supplier	  come	  not	  
only	  from	  its	  competitors	  but	  can	  also	  come	  from	  its	  customers.	  Even	  though	  a	  merger	  has	  the	  effect	  
of	  reducing	  or	  removing	  important	  competitive	  constraints	  exercised	  by	  other	  sellers,	  the	  operation	  
will	  not	  automatically	  constitute	  a	  significant	   impediment	   to	  effective	  competition	  since	  customers	  
may	   also	   be	   in	   a	   position	   to	   prevent	   the	   merged	   entity	   from	   acting	   to	   an	   appreciable	   extent	  
independently.	  Under	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  such	  countervailing	  buyer	  power	  could	  exclude	  an	  upstream	  
firm	  from	  falling	  into	  the	  definition	  of	  dominance.	  	  In	  merger	  cases,	  that	  power	  may	  be	  considered	  as	  
sufficient	  to	  counter	  the	  increase	  in	  market	  power	  that	  the	  concentration	  would	  otherwise	  be	  likely	  
to	  create	  and	  therefore	  lead	  the	  Commission	  to	  clear	  the	  operation.	  	  According	  to	  the	  Guidelines	  on	  
horizontal	  mergers,	  countervailing	  buyer	  power	  should	  be	  understood	  as:	  
“The	   bargaining	   strength	   that	   the	   buyer	   has	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   seller	   in	   commercial	  
negotiations	   due	   to	   its	   size,	   its	   commercial	   significance	   to	   the	   seller	   and	   its	   ability	   to	  
switch	  to	  alternative	  suppliers”.511	  	  
The	   sources	   of	   buyer	   power	   described	   in	   those	   Guidelines	   are	   similar	   to	   those	  mentioned	   in	   the	  
Guidance	   on	   abusive	   exclusionary	   conduct.	   The	   possibility	   of	   switching,	   within	   a	   reasonable	  
timeframe,	   to	   alternative	   sources	   of	   supply	   is	   again	   an	   important	   factor	   in	   the	   assessment	   of	   the	  
degree	  of	  buyer	  power.	  Those	  outside	  options	  may	  be	  existing	  suppliers	  which	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	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increase	  their	  production,	  a	  vertical	  integration	  into	  the	  upstream	  market	  or	  the	  sponsor	  of	  upstream	  
expansion	  or	  entry.	  The	  latter	  option	  may	  be	  possible	  by	  persuading	  a	  potential	  entrant	  to	  enter	  by	  
committing	   to	   placing	   larger	   orders	   with	   that	   new	   firm.	   	   Even	   though	   a	   buyer	   is	   not	   able	   to	   find	  
another	  source	  of	  supply	  for	  a	  particular	  product	  without	  excessive	  costs	  or	  delays,	  the	  Commission	  
considers	  that	  countervailing	  buying	  power	  may	  still	  be	  exercised	  by	  refusing	  to	  buy	  other	  products	  
produced	  by	  the	  supplier	  or,	  particularly	   in	  the	  case	  of	  durable	  goods,	  delaying	  purchases.512	  Those	  
pressures	  exercised	  from	  the	  buying	  side	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  in	  the	  upstream	  
market	  when	  exercised	  by	  large	  and	  sophisticated	  customers.	  The	  threat	  of	  losing	  important	  trading	  
partners	   will	   dissuade	   the	   merging	   parties	   from	   increasing	   prices	   or	   deteriorating	   quality	   or	   the	  
conditions	  of	  delivery.513	  	  
However,	   in	   some	  cases,	   it	   is	  not	   sufficient	   to	  note	   the	  existence	  of	  countervailing	  buyer	  power.	  A	  
particular	   attention	  must	   also	   be	   paid	   to	   the	   incentives	   of	   customers	   to	   exercise	   their	   power.	   For	  
example,	   a	   downstream	   firm	   may	   not	   be	   encouraged	   to	   invest	   in	   sponsoring	   new	   entry	   in	   the	  
upstream	  market	   if	   the	   lower	   input	  costs	  obtained	   through	   that	  action	  could	  also	  be	   reaped	  by	   its	  
rivals	   in	   the	  downstream	  market.514	   It	  may	   therefore	  be	   important	   to	  examine	  whether	   the	  use	  of	  
buyer	  power	  would	  be	  profitable	   for	   the	   firms	  which	  hold	   that	  weapon.	   It	   is	   only	  where	  powerful	  
buyers	  have	  an	   interest	   in	  exercising	  pressures	   in	  the	  upstream	  market	  that	  the	   increase	   in	  market	  
power	  of	  the	  merged	  entity	  will	  effectively	  be	  counteracted.	  
As	   in	   the	   assessment	   of	   dominance,	   the	   presence	   of	   smaller	   buyers	   must	   also	   be	   taken	   into	  
consideration.	  Point	  67	  of	  the	  Guidelines	  on	  horizontal	  mergers	  provides	  that:	  	  
“Countervailing	   buyer	   power	   cannot	   be	   found	   to	   sufficiently	   off-­‐set	   potential	   adverse	  
effects	   of	   a	   merger	   if	   it	   only	   ensures	   that	   a	   particular	   segment	   of	   customers,	   with	  
particular	  bargaining	  strength,	  is	  shielded	  from	  significantly	  higher	  prices	  or	  deteriorated	  
conditions	  after	  the	  merger”.	  	  
The	   protection	   of	   other	   actors	   who	   contribute	   to	   increasing	   consumer	   welfare	   is	   therefore	  
considered	  as	  a	  non-­‐negligible	  element	  in	  the	  objective	  of	  maintaining	  effective	  competition.	  	  
Finally,	   the	  Commission	  does	  not	  only	  examine	   the	  existence	  of	  buyer	  power	  prior	   the	  merger	  but	  
adopt	  a	  prospective	  approach	  by	  analysing	  whether	   it	  will	   remain	  an	  effective	  constraint	   following	  
the	  operation	  of	  concentration.515	  The	  exercise	  of	  countervailing	  buyer	  power	  mainly	  depends	  on	  the	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  Ibid.,	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  Ibid.,	  at	  65.	  
514	  Ibid.,	  at	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number	  of	  alternatives	  available	  for	  customers.	  A	  merger	  between	  two	  suppliers	  may	  remove	  one	  of	  
those	  outside	  options	  and	  therefore	  reduce	  significantly	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  threat	  of	  switching	  to	  
another	  source	  of	  supply.	  It	  is	  hence	  necessary	  that	  a	  sufficient	  number	  of	  suppliers	  remains	  on	  the	  
market	  after	  the	  merger	  so	  that	  buyers	  may	  still	  exercise	  countervailing	  pressures.	  	  
	  
	  
ii. Buyer	  power	  mitigating	  coordinated	  effects	  
Even	  though	  a	  merger	  does	  not	  create	  or	  strengthen	  the	  dominant	  position	  of	  one	  single	  entity,	   it	  
may	  still	  significantly	  impede	  effective	  competition	  if	  it	  occurs	  in	  a	  concentrated	  market	  through	  the	  
creation	  or	  the	  strengthening	  of	  a	  collective	  dominant	  position.	  In	  some	  markets	  the	  structure	  may	  
be	  such	  that	  firms	  are	  able	  to	  coordinate	  their	  behaviour	  and	  raise	  prices,	  even	  without	  entering	  into	  
an	   anticompetitive	   agreement	  within	   the	  meaning	  of	  Article	   101	   TFEU.516	  A	   tacit	   collusion	   is	  more	  
likely	   to	  happen	   in	  markets	  where	   it	   is	   relatively	   simple	   to	   reach	  a	   common	  understanding	  on	   the	  
terms	  of	  coordination	  and	  where	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  make	  it	  sustainable.	  In	  the	  assessment	  of	  that	  last	  
issue,	  namely	  the	  stability	  of	  coordination,	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  may	  play	  a	  role.	  	  
Indeed,	   before	   concluding	   that	   a	   merger	   will	   entail	   coordinated	   effects,	   the	   Commission	   has	   to	  
establish	   that	   any	   deviation	   from	   the	   common	   understanding	   is	   unlikely	   by	   proving	   that	   three	  
conditions,	   established	   by	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   and	   repeated	   in	   the	  Guidelines,	   are	   fulfilled.517	   The	  
first	   and	   second	   conditions	   are	   related	   to	   the	  possibility	   for	   the	   coordinating	   firms	   to	  monitor	   the	  
adherence	  to	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  understanding	  and	  to	  activate	  some	  form	  of	  deterrent	  mechanism	  in	  
case	   of	   deviation	   while	   the	   third	   condition	   refers	   to	   the	   possible	   reactions	   of	   outsiders,	   such	   as	  
competitors	   not	  participating	   in	   the	   coordination	   as	  well	   as	   customers.	   	   The	  presence	  of	   powerful	  
buyers	   will	   therefore	   be	   taken	   into	   consideration	   by	   the	   Commission	   when	   assessing	   that	   last	  
condition.	  To	  conclude	  that	  a	  merger	  will	  lead	  to	  coordinated	  effects,	  it	  must	  be	  established	  that	  no	  
customer	  is	  able	  to	  jeopardise	  the	  results	  expected	  from	  the	  tacit	  collusion.	  That	  condition	  would	  not	  
be	   met	   if	   customers	   are	   in	   a	   position	   to	   exercise	   countervailing	   buyer	   power	   impacting	   on	   the	  
stability	  of	  coordination.	  	  A	  large	  buyer	  may	  successfully	  make	  a	  common	  understating	  unsustainable	  
by	   inducing	   one	   of	   the	   coordinating	   firms	   to	   deviate	   through	   the	   offer	   of	   attractive	   conditions.	  
Concentrating	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  its	  requirements	  with	  that	  supplier	  or	  offering	  long-­‐term	  contracts	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  Ibid.,	  at	  41.	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constitute	  a	   few	  examples	  of	   the	  practices	   that	  may	  be	  used	  by	   strong	  buyers	   to	   save	   the	  market	  
from	  any	  coordinated	  effect	  that	  could	  otherwise	  have	  resulted	  from	  the	  merger.518	  
b) Non-­‐horizontal	  mergers	  
Without	   developing	   or	   illustrating	   the	   issue	   of	   buyer	   power,	   the	   Guidelines	   on	   non-­‐horizontal	  
mergers	  nevertheless	  refer	  to	  that	  concept	  as	  a	  factor	  which	  could	  in	  particular	  make	  unlikely	  input	  
or	   customer	   foreclosure	   to	   arise.519	   Large	   buyers	   may	   indeed	   have	   the	   ability	   to	   find	   alternative	  
sources	  of	  supply	  or	  to	  use	  their	  market	  power	  in	  the	  procurement	  market	  to	  prevent	  any	  restriction	  
on	  access	  to	   inputs	  or	  any	  increase	  in	  prices.	  Likewise,	  the	  presence	  of	  powerful	  downstream	  firms	  
will	   enable	   rivals	   of	   the	  merged	   entity	   in	   the	   upstream	  market	   to	   still	   have	   access	   to	   a	   sufficient	  
customer	  base	  under	  similar	  prices	  and	  conditions	  as	  absent	  the	  merger.	  
With	  regard	  to	  conglomerate	  mergers,	  the	  Guidelines	  provides,	  in	  the	  same	  words	  as	  those	  used	  in	  
the	   section	   on	   vertical	   mergers,	   that	   the	   effect	   on	   competition	   needs	   to	   be	   assessed	   in	   light	   of	  
countervailing	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  presence	  of	  countervailing	  buyer	  power.520	  In	  those	  cases,	  market	  
power	  on	  the	  buying	  side	  may	  make	  more	  difficult	  for	  the	  merged	  entity	  to	  leverage	  a	  strong	  market	  
position	  from	  one	  market	  to	  another	  by	  means,	  for	  example,	  of	  tying	  or	  bundling.	  
B. 	  BUYER	  POWER	  IN	  MERGER	  CASES	  
As	  developed	  in	  Part	  I,	  countervailing	  buyer	  power	  was	  taken	  into	  consideration	  by	  the	  Commission	  
in	  a	  large	  number	  of	  decisions.521	  The	  analysis	  of	  those	  decisions	  provided	  relevant	  information	  with	  
regard	  to	  the	  sources	  of	  buyer	  power,	  the	  factors	  which	  influence	  its	  existence	  or	  exercise	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  various	   sectors	   in	  which	   such	  power	   is	   likely	   to	  be	  exercised.	  The	  Commission	  highlighted	   that	  
some	  buyers	  have	  significant	  buyer	  power	  and	  are	  therefore	  able	  to	  prevent	  any	  misuse	  of	  market	  
power	  in	  the	  upstream	  seller	  markets.	  Strong	  countervailing	  buyer	  power	  may	  be	  a	  decisive	  factor	  in	  
the	   competition	   assessment.	   Powerful	   buyers’	  market	   power	  may	   indeed	   be	   sufficient	   to	   prevent	  
anticompetitive	   effects	   following	   the	   merger	   and	   hence	   lead	   the	   Commission	   to	   authorize	   the	  
creation	  of	  a	  very	  large	  merged	  entity,	  despite	  the	  presence	  of	  high	  barriers	  to	  entry	  in	  the	  relevant	  
market	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  other	  competitive	  constraints.522	  In	  those	  cases,	  buyer	  power	  is	  not	  addressed	  
as	  a	  competitive	  concern	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  positive	  strength	  protecting	  competition	  on	  the	  markets.	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  at	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519	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  assessment	  of	  non-­‐horizontal	  mergers	  under	  the	  Council	  Regulation	  on	  the	  control	  of	  
concentrations	  between	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  51	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  Ibid.,	  at	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  See:	  Part	  I,	  Chapter	  2,	  Section	  I.	  
522	  See	  for	  example:	  Enso/Stora,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1225,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  25	  November	  1998	  and	  
Korsnäs/AssiDomän	  Cartonboard,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.4057,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  12	  May	  2006.	  In	  those	  two	  
decisions,	  the	  Commission	  highlighted	  the	  strong	  market	  power	  of	  Tetra	  Pak,	  a	  company	  involved	  in	  the	  food	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This	   part	   B	   yet	   focuses	   on	   the	  other	   side	  of	   the	   coin	   and	  examines	   the	  dark	   side	  of	   buyer	   power.	  
Where	  customers’	  buyer	  power	   is	  a	   factor	   in	   favour	  of	  clearing	  a	  merger	  between	  upstream	  firms,	  
the	  increase	  of	  buyer	  power	  of	  the	  merged	  entity	  itself	  is	  however	  likely	  to	  jeopardize	  the	  operation.	  
The	  creation	  or	  strengthening	  of	  firms’	  buyer	  power	  through	  a	  concentration	  may	  indeed	  entail	  some	  
negative	  effects	  on	  the	  markets	  and	  as	  such	  raise	  competitive	  concerns.	  
1. Increase	  of	  buyer	  power:	  an	  issue	  to	  be	  assessed	  
Since	   the	   beginning	   of	   its	   merger	   policy,	   the	   Commission	   has	   recognized	   that	   an	   operation	   of	  
concentration	  must	   also	   include	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   potential	   effects	   on	   the	   procurement	  markets,	  
that	  is	  to	  say	  not	  only	  on	  consumers	  and	  competitors	  of	  the	  merged	  entity,	  but	  also	  on	  its	  suppliers.	  	  
The	  Commission	  often	  assesses	  the	  increase	  of	  buyer	  power	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  market	  position	  of	  the	  
merged	   entity	   in	   the	   downstream	   market.	   As	   it	   is	   further	   developed	   below,	   it	   is	   more	   easily	  
concluded	  that	   the	  creation	  or	  strengthening	  of	  buyer	  power	  will	   lead	  to	  a	  negative	   impact	  on	  the	  
markets	   when	   the	   merging	   parties	   hold	   a	   dominant	   position	   or	   significant	   market	   power	   on	   the	  
selling	  side.	  In	  such	  a	  situation,	  the	  operation	  is	  indeed	  less	  likely	  to	  benefit	  consumers	  and	  may	  put	  
competitors	   at	   a	   greater	   disadvantage,	   preventing	   them	   from	   exercising	   any	   credible	   competitive	  
pressure	  on	  the	  new	  entity.	  	  
Even	  though	  the	  assessment	  of	  a	  potential	  increase	  in	  buyer	  power	  is	  fully	  part	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  
analysis,	  that	  issue	  has	  been	  developed	  only	  in	  a	  few	  cases.	  Where	  generally	  considered	  as	  unlikely	  
to	  raise	  anticompetitive	  effects,	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  strong	  buyer	  through	  a	  concentration	  operation	  
has	  nevertheless	  led	  the	  Commission	  to	  block	  some	  transactions	  or	  to	  subject	  them	  to	  undertakings,	  
especially	   in	   the	  agri-­‐food	   industry.	   Competitive	   concerns	  were	  expressed	   in	  particular	  when	   large	  
supermarkets	   or	   farmer	   cooperatives	   were	   planning	   to	   merge.	   The	   reasons	   underlying	   those	  
concerns	  were	   though,	   to	   some	  extent,	  not	   similar	   in	  view	  of	   the	  different	  characteristics	  of	   those	  
players	  and	  of	  the	  markets	  they	  were	  playing	  in.	  	  	  
2. Retail	  chains’	  buyer	  power	  under	  close	  scrutiny	  
Since	  its	  early	  decisions,	  the	  Commission	  has	  taken	  the	  view	  that,	  in	  assessing	  a	  concentration	  in	  the	  
retail	   business	   sector,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   consider	   the	  market	  power	   that	   can	  be	  exercised	   towards	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
packaging	  production.	  On	  basis	  of	  that	  competitive	  constraint,	  the	  Commission	  cleared	  mergers	  in	  the	  liquid	  
packaging	  board	  market,	  despite	  the	  very	  high	  market	  share	  (>60%)	  held	  by	  the	  merging	  parties.	  On	  those	  
cases,	  see	  above,	  Part	  I,	  Chapter	  2,	  Section	  I,	  Point	  E,	  4,	  b).	  See	  also:	  Saab/Celsius,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1797,	  
Commission	  Decision	  of	  4	  February	  2000.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  Commission	  authorized	  a	  merger	  between	  suppliers	  
of	  defence	  equipment	  although	  the	  parties	  held	  a	  combined	  market	  share	  of	  80%.	  The	  main	  argument	  leading	  
the	  Commission	  to	  clear	  the	  operation	  was	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  single	  customer	  in	  each	  Member	  State,	  namely	  
the	  Ministry	  of	  Defence,	  which	  is	  able	  to	  exercise	  significant	  countervailing	  buyer	  power.	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both	   consumers	   and	   suppliers.523	   In	   three	   particular	   decisions	   on	  mergers	   between	   supermarkets,	  
namely	   in	   Kesko/Tuko524,	   in	   Rewe/Meinl525	   and	   in	   Carrefour/Promodes526,	   the	   Commission,	   after	  
pointing	  out	  the	  strong	  position	  of	  the	  merging	  parties	  on	  the	  retail	  markets,	  looked	  into	  the	  issue	  of	  
increased	   buying	   power	   and	   its	   possible	   consequences	   within	   the	   food	   supply	   chain.	   It	   clearly	  
expressed	  the	  potential	  harms	  that	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  may	  cause	  to	  different	  players	  and	  
to	   the	   competition	   process.	   Since	   the	   food	   retail	   sector	   is	   already	   highly	   concentrated	   in	   most	  
Member	   States,	   any	   further	   consolidation	   envisaged	   by	   supermarket	   chains	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   closely	  
scrutinized	  by	  the	  Commission.	  
a) Definition	  of	  the	  relevant	  procurement	  market	  
Unlike	   the	   definition	   of	   the	   downstream	  market	   to	   be	   taken	   into	   consideration	   in	   the	   analysis	   of	  
competition	  issues,	  the	  questions	  of	  how	  to	  define	  procurement	  product	  and	  geographic	  markets	  is	  
not	  addressed	  in	  the	  Commission	  Notice	  on	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  relevant	  market.527	  However,	  some	  
indications	  have	  been	  given	  by	  the	  Commission	  in	  the	  three	  decisions	  at	  hand.	  	  
i. Product	  market	  
While	   the	   consistent	   practice	   of	   the	   Commission	   has	   been	   to	   define	   the	   relevant	   selling	   markets	  
primarily	   from	   the	   viewpoint	   of	   consumers,	   the	   approach	   endorsed	   when	   defining	   the	   relevant	  
procurement	  markets	  is	  different.	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  relevant	  product	  market,	  the	  critical	  factors	  are	  
the	   suppliers’	   flexibility	   in	   producing	   another	   product	   and	   the	   alternative	   sales	   channels	   open	   to	  
them.	  	  
From	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  suppliers,	  the	  flexibility	  in	  changing	  the	  type	  of	  products	  manufactured	  is	  
very	  limited	  since	  they	  generally	  produce	  a	  single	  product	  or	  category	  of	  products	  and	  are	  unable	  to	  
switch	   easily	   to	   the	   production	   of	   other	   goods.528	   According	   to	   the	   Commission,	   each	   product	   or	  
product	  group	  constitutes	  thus	  an	  individual	  product	  market.	  However,	  since	  the	  pattern	  of	  demand	  
for	  each	  of	  them	  is	  broadly	  similar	  and	  concentrated,	  it	  is	  generally	  sufficient	  to	  examine	  the	  impact	  
of	  the	  increased	  buying	  power	  across	  the	  whole	  range	  of	  daily	  consumer	  goods.529	  	  
Concerning	   the	   distribution	   channels,	   even	   though	   various	   outlets	   are	   open	   to	   producers	   of	   food	  
products	   -­‐	   such	  as	   the	  specialized	  trade,	  cash-­‐and-­‐carry	  shops	  and	  other	  wholesales,	  delicatessens,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
523	  Ahold/Jeronimo	  Martins/Inovacao,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.320,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  19	  April	  1993,	  at	  18.	  
524	  Kesko/Tuko,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.784,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  20	  November	  1996	  
525	  Rewe/Meinl,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1221,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  3	  February	  1999	  
526	  Carrefour/Promodes,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.1684,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  25	  January	  2000.	  
527	  Commission	  Notice	  on	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  relevant	  market	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  Community	  competition	  law,	  
O.J.	  C	  372/3	  (1997)	  
528	  Rewe/Meinl,	  op.cit.,	  at	  76	  and	  Carrefour/Promodes,	  op.cit.,	  at	  15.	  
529	  Kesko/Tuko,	  op.cit.,	  at	  34.	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drugstores	   and	   the	   export	   trade	   -­‐,	   the	   food-­‐retailing	   trade	   is	   yet	   by	   far	   the	  most	   important	   sales	  
channel	  for	  most	  products.	  On	  basis	  of	  a	  supplier’s	  ability	  to	  find	  alternative	  buyers	  without	  incurring	  
significant	   additional	   costs	   or	   risks,	   the	   Commission	   considers	   that	   the	   other	   sales	   channels	   are	  
excluded	   from	   the	   relevant	   procurement	   market.	   In	   view	   of	   the	   considerable	   investment	   and	  
adaptation	  that	  would	  require	  the	  substitution	  of	  a	  lost	  retail	  customer	  from	  the	  producer’s	  point	  of	  
view,	   the	   Commission	   concludes	   that	   the	   procurement	   market	   is	   subdivided	   according	   to	   sales	  
channels,	  so	  that	  procurement	  for	  the	  food-­‐retailing	  trade	  constitutes	  a	  separate	  market.530	  	  
ii. Geographic	  market	  
In	  the	  different	  decisions	  on	  mergers	  in	  the	  food	  retail	  sector,	  the	  Commission	  defines	  the	  relevant	  
geographic	   market	   as	   national.	   Different	   elements	   are	   taken	   into	   consideration	   to	   reach	   that	  
conclusion.	  Firstly,	  demand	   for	  national	  products	   is	   generally	  higher	  due	   to	  consumer	  preferences.	  
Even	   in	   international	   branded	   goods,	   the	   procurement	   is	   effected	   almost	   exclusively	   through	  
national	  establishments	  because	  the	  content	  of	  the	  products	  in	  question	  often	  vary	  from	  country	  to	  
country	  according	  to	  different	  local	  tastes.531	  Secondly,	  supermarket	  chains	  buy	  predominantly	  from	  
national	   suppliers,	   especially	   for	   products	   such	   as	   meat,	   dairy	   products,	   soft	   drinks,	   bread	   and	  
pastries	   as	   well	   as	   fruit	   and	   vegetables.	   Such	   market	   definition	   mainly	   results	   from	   the	   fact	   that	  
buying	  abroad	  remains	  difficult	  even	  for	  non-­‐perishable	  goods	  owing	  to	  red	  tape,	  formal	  declaration	  
and	   packaging.	   In	   addition,	   retailers	   expect	   from	   their	   suppliers	   some	   services	   such	   as	   shelf	  
maintenance	  and	  market	  research	  which	  can	  only	  be	  effectively	  provided	  through	  a	  presence	  on	  the	  
national	  territory.532	  Lastly,	  as	  regards	  manufacturers	  of	  international	  branded	  goods,	  access	  to	  final	  
consumers	  can	  only	  be	  reached	  via	  the	  national	  distribution	  channels.533	  
It	  is	  therefore	  based	  on	  the	  characteristics	  of	  each	  national	  market	  that	  the	  Commission	  assesses	  an	  
increase	   in	   buyer	   power	   in	   the	   retail	   sector.	   The	   level	   of	   concentration	   in	   that	   sector,	   the	  market	  
shares	  of	  the	  merging	  parties,	  both	   in	  the	  selling	  and	  in	  the	  procurement	  markets,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  
factors,	  such	  as	  the	  success	  of	  private	  labels,	  may	  greatly	  differ	  from	  one	  Member	  State	  to	  another.	  
In	  the	  three	  decisions	  analysed	  below,	  the	  Commission	  dealt	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  supermarkets’	  buyer	  
power	  in	  three	  different	  geographic	  markets,	  namely	  in	  Finland,	  in	  Austria,	  and	  in	  France.	  
b) Kesko/Tuko	  decision	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
530	  Rewe/Meinl,	  op.cit.,	  at	  80	  and	  Carrefour/Promodes,	  op.cit.,	  at	  20.	  	  Concerning	  the	  investment	  and	  
adaptation	  required	  to	  replace	  a	  lost	  customer,	  the	  Commission	  considers	  that	  different	  container	  sizes,	  get-­‐up	  
and	  packaging	  –	  for	  which	  special	  machines	  or	  other	  production	  requisites	  may	  be	  needed	  -­‐,	  different	  sales	  
strategies,	  the	  need	  for	  variety	  of	  knowledge	  and	  contacts	  for	  different	  distribution	  channels	  and	  different	  
logistics	  make	  it	  difficult	  to	  switch	  between	  distribution	  channels.	  
531	  Rewe/Meinl,	  op.cit.,	  at	  83	  and	  Carrefour/Promodes,	  op.cit.,	  at	  29.	  
532	  Rewe/Meinl,	  op.cit.,	  at	  85	  and	  Carrefour/Promodes,	  op.cit.,	  at	  30.	  
533	  Rewe/Meinl,	  op.cit.,	  at	  86.	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In	   the	   Kesko/Tuko	   decision534,	   the	   Commission	   blocked	   a	   proposed	   merger	   between	   two	   Finnish	  
supermarkets.	   The	   retail	   of	   daily	   consumer	   goods	   in	   Finland	   at	   the	   time	   was	   already	   the	   most	  
concentrated	   in	   the	   European	   Union.	   The	   Commission	   therefore	   considered	   that	   further	  
consolidation	   in	   that	   market,	   through	   the	   acquisition	   of	   Tuko	   by	   Tesko,	   might	   impair	   effective	  
competition.	  That	  conclusion	  was	  based,	  not	  only	  on	  the	  parties’	  strong	  position	  on	  the	  distribution	  
market,	  but	  also	  on	  their	  significant	  buyer	  power	  on	  the	  upstream	  markets.	  	  
	  
i. 	  “Gatekeeper”	  position	  on	  the	  retail	  markets	  
With	   a	   combined	  market	   share	   of	   55%,	   three	   times	   larger	   than	   the	  market	   share	   of	   their	   largest	  
competitor,	   the	  merging	  parties	  were	  presumed	   to	  hold	  a	  dominant	  position	   in	   the	   relevant	   retail	  
markets.535	  Different	  elements	  revealed	  by	  the	  market	  investigation	  strengthened	  this	  presumption,	  
such	  as	  the	  parties’	  control	  of	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  all	  business	  premises	  suited	  for	  retail	  outlets,	  their	  
customer	  loyalty	  schemes	  and	  private	  label	  products,	  their	  distribution	  systems	  and	  their	  position	  as	  
buyers	  of	  daily	  consumer	  goods.536	  As	  regards	  this	  last	  element,	  the	  Commission	  acknowledged	  that	  
the	  high	  market	  shares	  held	  by	  the	  merging	  parties	  would	  create	  a	  unique	  purchasing	  power	  in	  the	  
hands	  of	  the	  new	  entity.	  	  
“The	   position	   of	   Kesko	   following	   the	   acquisition	   of	   Tuko	   (…)will	   create	   a	   unique	  
purchasing	   power	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   Kesko.	   (…)The	   strength	   created	   by	   this	   gate-­‐keeper	  
effect	  would	  be	  further	  increased	  by	  the	  combination	  of	  the	  successful	  Kesko	  and	  Tuko	  
private	   label	   products,	   which	   could	   be	   used	   as	   a	   further	   negotiating	   tool	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  
suppliers	   to	   achieve	   additional	   concessions	   on,	   inter	   alia,	   reduced	   prices	   or	   increased	  
marketing	  support.”537	  	  
Following	   the	  merger,	   suppliers	  would	  hence	  have	  no	   choice	  but	   to	  enter	   into	   an	  agreement	  with	  
Kesko	   in	   order	   to	   have	   an	   effective	   and	   sufficient	   access	   to	   consumers.	   The	   dominant	   position	  
enjoyed	   by	   the	   merged	   entity	   in	   the	   retail	   markets	   would	   thus	   give	   rise	   to	   a	   gatekeeper	   effect,	  
turning	  that	  entity	  into	  an	  avoidable	  trading	  partner	  for	  any	  supplier	  willing	  to	  guarantee	  shelf-­‐space	  
in	  retail	  outlets	  representing	  at	  least	  55%	  of	  the	  Finnish	  market.538	  That	  strength	  thereby	  created	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
534	  On	  that	  case,	  see,	  in	  particular:	  J.J.Curtin,	  D.L.Goldberg	  &	  D.S.Savrin,	  The	  EC’s	  rejection	  of	  the	  Kesko/Tuko	  
merger:	  leading	  the	  way	  to	  the	  application	  of	  a	  “gatekeeper”	  analysis	  of	  retailer	  market	  power	  under	  US	  
antitrust	  laws,	  40	  Boston	  College	  Law	  Review	  537	  (1999)	  
535	  Kesko/Tuko,	  op.cit.,	  at	  94.	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  Ibid.,	  at	  106.	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  Ibid.,	  at	  133.	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  Ibid.,	  at	  133.	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the	  procurement	  markets	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  significant	  imbalance	  in	  the	  negotiations	  between	  retailers	  
and	  their	  suppliers.	  
ii. A	  resulting	  strong	  position	  on	  the	  procurement	  markets	  
Since	   distribution	   channels	   other	   than	   those	   dominated	   by	   the	  merging	   parties	   did	   not	   constitute	  
viable	  alternatives	   for	   the	  majority	  of	  producers,	   the	   latter,	   including	   several	  major	  multinationals,	  
were	  considered	  to	  be	  dependent	  on	  the	  parties.	  Even	  though	  some	  large	  producers	  of	  “must-­‐carry”	  
brands	  might	  have	   some	  countervailing	  power	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Kesko,	   the	  Commission	  noted	   that	  most	  of	  
the	  suppliers	  relied	  on	  that	  retailer	  for	  approximately	  50	  to	  75%	  of	  their	  total	  sales	  in	  Finland.	  Due	  to	  
the	   lack	  of	  sufficient	  additional	  capacity	  of	  other	  retailers,	  producers	  would	  therefore	  be	  unable	  to	  
switch	  from	  Kesko	  post-­‐merger	  and	  would	  be	  deprived	  of	  any	  bargaining	  power.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  new	  
entity	   would	   not	   be	   dependent	   on	   an	   individual	   supplier	   to	   the	   same	   extent.	   The	   presence	   of	  
alternative	   producers	  with	   adequate	   capacity	   gave	   Kesko	   the	   possibility	   to	   switch	   easily	   from	  one	  
supplier	  to	  another.539	  	  
Such	   a	   situation	  would	   not	   only	   entail	   a	   negative	   impact	   in	   the	   upstream	  markets	   but	   also	   in	   the	  
retail	  markets.	  The	  Commission	  considered	  that,	  due	  to	   its	  strong	  position,	  Kesko	  would	  be	  able	  to	  
obtain	   lower	  prices	  from	  its	  suppliers	  and	  would	  thus	  enjoy	  an	  additional	  competitive	  advantage	  in	  
the	  downstream	  markets.	  	  
“Post-­‐merger,	  Kesko	  will	  thus	  be	  able	  to	  obtain	  lower	  prices	  from	  producers	  to	  an	  extent	  
that	  none	  of	  its	  competitors	  will	  be	  able	  to	  match.	  This	  will	  act	  as	  a	  further	  dis-­‐incentive	  
for	  Kesko's	  competitors	  to	  actively	  compete,	  in	  particular,	  on	  prices	  against	  Kesko.	  It	  will	  
also	  make	  new	  entry	  on	  the	  market	  more	  difficult	  and	  as	  such	  act	  as	  a	  significant	  barrier	  
to	  entry	  on	  the	  market.”540	  
The	   strong	   position	   of	   the	   merged	   entity	   in	   the	   upstream	   buyer	   market	   would	   hence	   further	  
reinforce	   its	  position	   in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market	  and	  raise	  additional	  barriers	   to	  entry	   in	  that	  
market.	  The	  possibility	  for	  any	  new	  retailer	  to	  access	  daily	  consumer	  goods	  at	  prices	  which	  allow	  it	  to	  
effectively	  compete	  in	  the	  retail	  markets	  is	  indeed	  a	  key	  element.	  
The	  market	  position	  of	  Kesko	  in	  the	  retail	  and	  procurement	  markets	  led	  the	  Commission	  to	  conclude	  
that	   the	   merged	   entity	   would	   have	   the	   ability	   to	   behave	   independently	   from	   its	   suppliers	   and	  
actual/potential	   competitors.	   It	  was	   also	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   success	   of	   the	   parties’	   private	   label	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  Ibid.,	  at	  150-­‐151.	  
540	  Ibid.,	  at	  134.	  
Final	  version	  -­‐	  Mai	  2014	   	  
172	  
	  
products	  would	  enhance	  even	  more	   the	  new	   firm’s	  buying	  power	  and	  would	   therefore	  exacerbate	  
the	  harmful	  effects	  on	  competition.	  
iii. The	  role	  of	  private	  labels	  
According	   to	   the	   Commission,	   private	   label	   development	   is	   a	   key	   element	   in	   retailers’	   buyer	  
power.541	   Own-­‐brand	   products,	   namely	   products	   sold	   under	   a	   retailer’s	   brand,	   offer	   different	   and	  
non-­‐negligible	  advantages.	  Firstly,	  since	  those	  products	  are	  not	  sold	  by	  competitors,	  the	  retailer	  may	  
fix	  the	  prices	  without	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  reaction	  of	  other	  retail	  chains	  as	  it	  is	  generally	  the	  case	  
with	  branded	  products.542	  Secondly,	   although	  private	   labels	  are	  generally	   sold	  at	   lower	   retail	  price	  
than	   branded	   products,	   the	  margins	   on	   the	   former	   are	   generally	   higher.543	  Thirdly,	   the	   success	   of	  
some	  private	  label	  products	  may	  be	  used	  as	  a	  negotiating	  tool	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  suppliers	  to	  obtain	  reduced	  
prices	   or	   increased	   marketing	   support.544	   The	   threat	   of	   delisting	   is	   indeed	   more	   credible	   when	  
suppliers	   may	   easily	   and	   are	   incited	   to	   replace	   branded	   products	   with	   their	   own-­‐brands.	   Lastly,	  
acting	   as	   competitors	   as	   well	   as	   key	   customers	   of	   their	   suppliers,	   retailers	   have	   access	   to	  
commercially	   sensitive	   details	   regarding	   the	   branded	   goods	   and	   promotional	   strategies.	  
Furthermore,	  with	   the	   increased	  use	  of	   store	  payment	   card	  and	   loyalty	   cards,	   retailers	  are	  able	   to	  
make	   targeted	   appeals	   to	   individual	   consumers	   based	   on	   known	   patterns	   of	   past	   purchases	   and	  
socio-­‐demographic	   profiles.	   Such	   access	   to	   sensitive	   information	   gives	   retail	   chains	   strong	  
competitive	   advantages	   for	   the	   marketing	   of	   their	   private	   labels	   and	   enhances	   their	   negotiating	  
power	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  branded	  products	  manufacturers.545	  Their	  market	  power,	  in	  the	  up-­‐	  and	  downstream	  
markets,	  is	  therefore	  reinforced	  and	  so	  is	  the	  likelihood	  of	  competition	  distortion	  in	  those	  markets.	  	  
Given	  all	  those	  elements,	  the	  Commission	  was	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  the	  combination	  of	  the	  successful	  
Kesko	   and	   Tuko	   private	   label	   products	  would	   increase	   to	   a	   significant	   extent	   the	   degree	   of	   buyer	  
power	  of	  the	  merged	  entity.	  In	  addition,	  it	  was	  maintained	  that:	  	  
“The	  increased	  buying	  power	  of	  Kesko	  would	  further	  reinforce	  the	  dominant	  position	  of	  
Kesko	  on	  the	  retail	  market.	  In	  particular,	  Kesko	  would	  be	  able	  to	  use	  its	  buying	  power	  to	  
employ	  different	  strategies,	  the	  long-­‐term	  effects	  of	  which	  would	  be	  to	  further	  weaken	  
the	  position	  of	  its	  competitors.”546	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  Ibid.,	  at	  152.	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  Ibid.,	  at	  130.	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  Ibid.,	  at	  128.	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  Ibid.,	  at	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In	  fact,	  in	  assessing	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  proposed	  merger,	  the	  Commission	  did	  not	  really	  dissociate	  the	  
impact	  on	  the	  selling	  side	  from	  the	  impact	  on	  the	  buying	  side.	  It	  rather	  considered	  that	  the	  different	  
effects	  were	  interlinked	  and	  that	  market	  power	  in	  the	  retail	  markets	  was	  reinforced	  by	  the	  parties’	  
buyer	  power	  in	  the	  procurement	  markets	  and	  vice	  versa.	  The	  links	  between	  buyer	  and	  seller	  power,	  
as	  well	  as	  the	  consequences	  of	  those	  combined	  strengths,	  were	  further	  developed	  in	  the	  Rewe/Meinl	  
decision.	  
c) Rewe/Meinl	  decision	  
The	   circumstances	   surrounding	   the	   Commission	   decision	   in	   Rewe/Meinl	  were	   relatively	   similar	   to	  
those	  in	  the	  previous	  case.	  The	  transaction	  involved	  two	  supermarket	  chains	  active	  in	  Austria	  where	  
the	   level	   of	   concentration	   in	   the	   food-­‐retailing	   trade	   was	   the	   highest	   after	   Finland.547	   The	  
Commission	   referred	   extensively	   to	   the	   interaction	   between	   the	   two	   different	   facets	   of	   market	  
power,	  namely	  seller	  power	  and	  buyer	  power,	  and	  described	  the	  vicious	  circle	  which	  could	  emerge	  
from	  an	  excessive	  concentration	  in	  the	  retail	  sector.	  
i. Concentration	  in	  the	  Austrian	  retail	  markets	  
The	  Commission	  noted	  that,	  following	  the	  proposed	  merger,	  the	  parties	  would	  have	  a	  market	  share	  
of	  up	  to	  40%.	  Even	  though	  that	  percentage	  was	  lower	  than	  in	  the	  previous	  case,	  it	  was	  nevertheless	  
considered	   that	   the	  merged	  entity	  would	  have	  a	   significant	  market	   share	  advantage	  over	  all	   other	  
competitors	  and	  that	  it	  would	  be	  by	  far	  the	  leading	  supplier	  in	  the	  key	  regions	  of	  eastern	  Austria.548	  
This	  was	  particularly	  true	  in	  Vienna	  where	  the	  parties	  had	  a	  65-­‐70%	  market	  share.	  The	  advantages	  of	  
the	   dominant	   position	   held	   in	   that	   region	  would	   provide	   the	   firm	  with	   additional	   resources	  which	  
could	  be	  used	  to	  further	  squeeze	  its	  competitors	  and	  leverage	  its	  position	  in	  other	  areas.549	  	  
In	   addition,	   the	   merged	   entity’s	   position	   in	   the	   Austrian	   retail	   markets	   was	   strengthened	   by	   its	  
centralized	  organization.	  Indeed,	  unlike	  their	  main	  competitors,	  the	  parties	  were	  centrally	  managed	  
chain	  store	  companies.	  They	  were	  therefore	  able	  to	  take	   important	  business	  decisions,	  such	  as	  the	  
listing	  or	  delisting	  of	  a	  product,	  in	  a	  very	  limited	  time	  and	  to	  implement	  those	  decisions	  in	  all	  shops	  
immediately.	   In	   contrast,	   competitors’	   outlets	  were	  mainly	   run	   by	   independent	   affiliated	   retailers.	  
Such	   an	   organization	   form	   was	   considered	   as	   less	   effective	   to	   react	   quickly	   to	   competitive	  
challenges.550	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  The	  five	  largest	  firms	  together	  controlled	  over	  80%	  of	  the	  market	  with	  the	  top	  two	  alone	  accounting	  for	  
nearly	  60%.	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  op.cit.,	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The	   merged	   entity	   enjoyed	   thus	   structural	   competitive	   advantages	   which	   enabled	   it	   to	   decide	  
centrally	   about	   important	   factors	   in	   competition	   but	   also	   to	   introduce	   more	   easily	   private	   label	  
products	  and	  to	  pursue	  an	  efficient	  own-­‐brand	  policy.551	  With	  regard	  to	  that	  last	  issue,	  the	  range	  of	  
private	   labels	   that	   the	   parties	   had	   at	   their	   disposal	   in	   several	   product	   categories	   constituted	   a	  
significant	  competitive	  advantage	  given	  the	  profits	  that	  retailers	  are	  able	  to	  make	  on	  that	  segment.	  
The	   Commission	   restated	   that,	   unlike	   for	   well-­‐known	   branded	   articles,	   consumers	   are	   unable	   to	  
make	   a	   direct	   price	   comparison	   between	   own-­‐brand	   products.	   Retailers	   can	   therefore	   achieve	   a	  
higher	   margin	   on	   those	   products	   while	   pricing	   branded	   goods	   keenly	   in	   order	   to	   appear	   to	   be	  
offering	  good	  value-­‐for-­‐money.552	  As	  it	  is	  further	  developed	  below,	  own-­‐brand	  products	  not	  only	  play	  
a	  particular	  role	  in	  the	  downstream	  markets	  but	  also	  constitute	  an	  additional	  strength	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  
retailers	  that	  may	  be	  used	  against	  their	  suppliers.	  
	  
ii. Increase	  in	  buyer	  power:	  the	  spiral	  effect	  and	  potential	  long-­‐term	  consequences	  	  
Regarding	   the	   increase	   in	   buyer	   power	   that	   would	   arise	   from	   the	   merger,	   the	   Commission	   first	  
maintained	  that:	  	  
“The	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  which	  leads	  to	  the	  securing	  of	  more	  favourable	  purchase	  
deal	  is	  not	  to	  be	  considered	  per	  se	  detrimental	  to	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole.”553	  	  
According	   to	   it,	   the	   effects	   on	   competition	  mainly	   depends	   on	   the	  market	   structure	   both	   on	   the	  
upstream	   buying	   side	   and	   on	   the	   downstream	   selling	   side.	   Where	   retailers	   face	   concentrated	  
suppliers	  and	  act	  in	  a	  competitive	  retail	  market,	  they	  can	  use	  their	  buyer	  power	  as	  a	  countervailing	  
strength	  to	  prevent	  monopoly	  or	  oligopoly	  profits	   from	  being	  earned	  on	  the	  supply	  side.	  Given	  the	  
competitive	  pressures	  exercised	  by	  rivals,	  they	  will	  hence	  be	  compelled	  to	  pass	  on	  the	  lower	  prices	  to	  
their	  own	  customers.554	  
However,	  the	  situation	  would	  be	  radically	  different	   if	  the	  powerful	  buyer	  himself	  occupied	  a	  strong	  
position	   in	   the	   seller	   downstream	   market	   since	   the	   incitement	   to	   pass	   on	   savings	   to	   consumers	  
would	  be	  greatly	  reduced	  in	  such	  circumstances.	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  Ibid.,	  at	  51.	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  Ibid.,	  at	  51.	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  Ibid.,	  at	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“if	   the	  powerful	  buyer	  himself	  occupies	   in	  his	  selling	  market	  a	  strong	  position	  which	   is	  
no	   longer	   kept	   sufficiently	   in	   check	   by	   the	   competition,	   any	   savings	   can	   no	   longer	   be	  
expected	  to	  be	  passed	  on	  to	  customers.”555	  	  
The	   Commission	   established	   the	   close	   interdependence	   existing	   between	   the	   distribution	   and	   the	  
procurement	  markets	  by	  describing	  the	  spiral	  that	   is	   likely	  to	  take	  place	  when	  a	  retailer	  occupies	  a	  
leading	   position	   in	   those	   two	   markets.	   It	   was	   maintained	   that	   the	   retailer’s	   market	   share	   in	   the	  
distribution	  market	  determines	  in	  fact	  its	  volume	  of	  purchases	  in	  the	  procurement	  market	  so	  that	  the	  
higher	   the	   market	   share	   in	   the	   downstream	   markets,	   the	   larger	   the	   procurement	   volume	   in	   the	  
upstream	  markets.	   In	   turn,	   the	  more	  a	   retailer	  buys	   in,	   the	  better	   its	  purchasing	  conditions	  will	  be	  
and	  the	  better	  conditions	  a	  retailer	  obtain,	  the	  more	  chance	  it	  will	  have	  of	  strengthening	  his	  position	  
in	   the	   distribution	   markets	   through	   low-­‐price	   or	   other	   strategies.	   This	   improved	   position	   in	   the	  
downstream	  markets	   leads	   again	   to	   a	   further	   strengthening	  of	   his	   buyer	  power,	   and	   so	  on.556	   The	  
Commission’s	  reasoning	  is	  thus	  circular	  and	  shows	  how	  buyer	  and	  seller	  powers	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  and	  
reinforce	  each	  other.	  	  
According	  to	  the	  Commission,	  the	  “vicious	  circle”	  described	  above	  –	  which	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  “virtuous	  
circle”	   from	   the	   powerful	   retailer’s	   viewpoint	   –	  would	   result	   in	   ever-­‐higher	   concentration	   both	   in	  
retail	  markets	  and	  in	  procurement	  markets	  and	  risk	  leading	  to	  consumer	  harm	  in	  the	  long-­‐run.	  	  
“The	   spiral	   described	   above	   leads	   to	   ever-­‐higher	   concentration	   both	   in	   distribution	  
markets	   and	   in	   procurement	  markets.	   In	   the	   short	   term,	   final	   consumers	  may	   benefit	  
from	   the	  process,	   as	   there	  may	  be	   a	   period	  of	   intense	   (predatory)	   competition	   in	   the	  
distribution	   market	   during	   which	   the	   powerful	   buyer/trader	   is	   forced	   to	   pass	   on	   his	  
savings	  to	  consumers.	  But	  this	  will	  last	  only	  until	  such	  time	  as	  a	  structure	  (as	  in	  this	  case,	  
an	  individual	  dominant	  position)	  is	  arrived	  at	  in	  the	  distribution	  market	  which	  leads	  to	  a	  
clear	   reduction	   in	   competitive	   intensity.	   At	   this	   stage,	   any	   consideration	   for	   the	   final	  
consumer	  goes	  by	  the	  board,	  as	  he	  is	  left	  with	  few	  alternatives.”557	  
	  In	  fact,	  final	  consumers	  might	  benefit	  in	  the	  short-­‐term	  from	  lower	  prices	  that	  the	  retailer	  would	  be	  
forced	  to	  pass	  on	  to	  them	  due	  to	  the	  still-­‐intense	  competition	  in	  the	  distribution	  market.	  However,	  
this	   would	   probably	   not	   last	   long.	   Given	   that	   the	   double	  market	   strengths	   held	   by	   the	   retailer	   in	  
question	  would	   enable	   him	   to	   squeeze	   existing	   competitors	   and	   to	   drive	   them	  out	   of	   the	  market,	  
competitive	  intensity	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  substantially	  reduced	  in	  the	  medium	  or	  long-­‐term.	  Consequently,	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  Ibid.,	  at	  73.	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the	  retailer	  would	  be	  able	  to	  act	  without	  any	  consideration	  for	  the	  final	  consumer,	  left	  with	  too	  few	  
alternatives	  to	  exercise	  credible	  pressure,	  and	  would	  therefore	  retain	  all	  the	  benefits	  resulting	  from	  
its	  favourable	  buying	  conditions	  wrested	  from	  his	  suppliers.	  	  
Furthermore,	  the	  Commission	  pointed	  out	  that	  powerful	  retailers	  have	  a	  considerable	  influence	  over	  
the	   choice	   of	   products	   available	   to	   consumers.	   Due	   to	   the	   high	   level	   of	   concentration	   and	   the	  
resulting	  lack	  of	  alternative	  outlets	  for	  suppliers,	  the	  marketing	  and	  the	  success	  of	  a	  product	  would	  
mainly	  depend	  on	  the	  dominant	  buyer’s	  will	  to	  buy	  that	  product.558	  Such	  an	  influence	  would	  end	  up	  
affecting	  consumer	  welfare	  as	  well	  since	  that	  concept	  includes	  not	  only	  low	  prices	  but	  also	  product	  
quality	  and	  variety.	  In	  the	  present	  case,	  the	  Commission	  concluded	  that	  the	  transaction	  would	  lead	  
to	  a	  less	  varied	  range	  of	  goods	  on	  the	  shelves	  since	  the	  two	  large	  retailers	  involved	  in	  the	  operation	  
would	  offer	  exactly	  the	  same	  products	  post-­‐merger	  and	  that,	  as	  a	  result,	  consumer	  choice	  would	  be	  
substantially	  limited.559	  	  
	  
	  
iii. Dependency	  of	  suppliers:	  the	  “threat	  point”	  
The	   existence	   of	   buyer	   power	   mainly	   relies	   on	   the	   limited	   number	   of	   alternatives	   available	   to	  
suppliers	  and	  on	  their	  dependence	  on	  a	  few	  powerful	  buyers.	  A	  key	  factor	  determining	  such	  power	  is	  
therefore	   the	  possibility	   for	   retailers	   to	  easily	   find	  alternative	  suppliers	   to	  buy	  their	  products	  while	  
producers	  do	  not	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  switch	  to	  other	  buyers	  without	  undue	  delay,	  risk	  or	  cost.	  The	  
market	   investigation	   in	   the	  Rewe/Meinl	   case	   indicated	   that,	   in	   the	  Austrian	  procurement	  markets,	  
the	  demand	  side	  was,	  and	  is	  still,	  far	  more	  concentrated	  than	  the	  supply	  side	  where	  most	  producers	  
were	   small	   and	  medium-­‐sized	   firms.560	   Big	   international	   firms	  were	   indeed	   the	   exception	   in	  many	  
categories	  of	  products,	   such	  as	  dairy	  products,	  meat	   and	   sausages,	   poultry	   and	  eggs	  or	  bread	  and	  
pastries,	   and	   constituted	   the	  main	   suppliers	   only	   in	   a	   limited	   number	   of	   sectors.561	   In	   contrast,	   as	  
mentioned	   above,	   the	   food-­‐retailing	   trade	   was	   considered	   to	   be	   highly	   concentrated	   and	   to	  
represent	   the	  most	   important	   sales	  channel.	   It	   follows	   that	   the	   loss	  of	  a	   large	  customer,	   such	  as	  a	  
leading	  supermarket	  chain,	  was	  not	  easy	  or	  even	  impossible	  to	  replace.	  According	  to	  some	  producers	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  Ibid.,	  at	  74.	  
559	  Ibid.,	  at	  35.	  
560	  Ibid.,	  at	  89.	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  Ibid.,	  at	  90-­‐92.	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surveyed,	   only	   small	   retailers,	   accounting	   on	   average	   for	   less	   than	   5%	   of	   their	   turnover,	   could	   be	  
replaced	  without	  difficulty.562	  
In	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  level	  of	  dependency	  of	  suppliers	  on	  the	  merging	  parties,	  300	  food	  producers	  
were	  asked	  what	  part	  of	  their	  turnover	  was	  accounted	  for	  by	  Rewe	  and	  Meinl.	  The	  average	  shares	  
being	  between	  25	  and	  40%,	  the	  Commission	  was	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  the	  transaction	  would	  increase	  
appreciably	   the	   dependence	  of	   those	   producers	   on	   the	  merged	   entity	   and	   lead	   to	   the	   creation	  or	  
strengthening	  of	  a	  dominant	  position	  in	  the	  procurement	  markets.563	  That	  conclusion	  was	  based	  on	  a	  
“threat	  point”	  proposed	  by	  the	  Commission	  and	  above	  which	   it	  was	  considered	  that	  a	  dependency	  
situation	  existed.	  To	  this	  end,	  producers	  were	  asked	  above	  what	  proportion	  of	  turnover	  with	  a	  given	  
customer	   could	   not	   be	   switched	   to	   other	   distribution	   channels	   without	   heavy	   financial	   losses.	   It	  
resulted	   that,	   on	   average,	   22%	   is	   the	  maximum	   share	   of	   revenues	   that	   a	   supplier,	   behaving	   in	   an	  
economically	  realistic	  manner,	  can	  afford	  to	  lose.564	  Where	  the	  sales	  to	  a	  particular	  retailer	  represent	  
a	  percentage	  of	  the	  supplier’s	  turnover	  exceeding	  that	  threshold,	  the	  loss	  of	  that	  amount	  of	  business	  
would	  seriously	  risk	  driving	  the	  dependent	  supplier	  to	  bankruptcy	  since	  the	  replacement	  of	  such	  an	  
important	  customer	  could	  only	  be	  done	  at	  very	  high	  cost,	  if	  at	  all.565	  This	  limit	  point	  is	  an	  average	  and	  
may	  thus	  vary	  from	  one	  supplier	  to	  another.	  	  
The	   reasoning	   of	   the	   Commission	   is	   mainly	   based	   on	   the	   share	   that	   a	   retailer	   accounts	   for	   in	   its	  
supplier’s	  turnover.	  Above	  the	  threshold	  of	  22%,	  the	  supplier	  in	  question	  is	  deemed	  to	  be	  dependent	  
on	  his	   customer	  who	   is,	   as	   a	   result,	   in	   a	   position	   to	   exercise	   significant	   buyer	   power	   and	   sets	   the	  
spiral	  described	  above	  in	  motion.	  	  
iv. Alternative	  options	  for	  retailers	  
The	  Commission	  assessment	  of	  buyer	  power	  was	  confirmed	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  merging	  parties	  had	  
outside	  options	  at	  their	  disposal	  which	  rendered	  the	  dependence	  of	  the	  supplier	  side	  much	  heavier	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  Ibid.,	  at	  97.	  
563	  Ibid.,	  99.	  
564	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that,	  in	  1985,	  the	  French	  Competition	  Authority	  came	  to	  a	  similar	  result	  in	  an	  opinion	  
about	  large	  buying	  agencies.	  See:	  Commission	  de	  la	  concurrence,	  14	  mars	  1985,	  Avis	  des	  super	  centrales,	  BOSP,	  
19	  avril	  1985.	  The	  French	  Commission	  considered	  that	  if,	  following	  a	  merger,	  the	  new	  entity	  has	  a	  market	  share	  
of	  20%	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  markets,	  any	  producer	  will	  be	  economically	  dependent,	  even	  though	  he	  has	  
made	  sure	  to	  diversify	  his	  market	  outlets.	  Such	  economic	  dependency	  justifies	  the	  possibility	  to	  control	  any	  
operation	  of	  concentration	  proposed	  by	  the	  retail	  sector	  and	  to	  attach	  some	  conditions	  to	  it	  or	  even	  to	  stand	  in	  
the	  way	  of	  the	  transaction	  if	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  outcome	  resulting	  from	  the	  economic	  analysis	  is	  globally	  
negative.	  
565	  Rewe/Meinl,	  op.cit.,	  at	  101.	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than	  the	  other	  way	  round.566	  Especially	  for	  Austrian	  products,	  the	  parties	  had	  sufficient	  alternatives	  
to	  replace	  the	  loss	  of	  any	  supplier.567	  	  
As	  regards	  branded	  goods,	  the	  issue	  of	  a	  retailer’s	  dependence	  on	  their	  suppliers	  was	  examined	  on	  
basis	  of	  the	  consequences	  that	  the	  non-­‐availability	  of	  certain	  “must-­‐carry”	  products	  would	  entail	  for	  
that	  retailer.	  The	  answer	  to	  that	  question	  was	  considered	  as	  depending	  on	  the	  consumers’	  reaction.	  	  
“The	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  as	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  trader	  is	  dependent	  on	  branded	  
goods	  producers	  depends	  on	  what	  consequences	  the	  non-­‐availability	  of	  certain	  brands	  
has	   for	   the	   trader.	   What	   matters	   here	   is	   how	   the	   trader’s	   customers	   react	   to	   the	  
absence	  of	  a	  product.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  foodstuffs	  purchases,	  the	  duration	  of	  a	  shopping	  trip	  
is	   an	   essential	   consideration	   to	   customers.	   One-­‐stop	   shopping,	   meaning	   buying	  
everything	   needed	   from	   one	   shop,	   is	   preferred.	   If	   a	   branded	   product	   which	   the	  
customer	  wants	   is	  not	  stocked	  by	  such	  an	  outlet,	  the	  risks	  have	  to	  be	  weighed	  up	  that	  
the	  customer	  might:	  (1)	  stop	  shopping	  or	  put	  off	  making	  the	  purchase	  till	  later,	  (2)	  go	  to	  
another	   shop	   to	   look	   for	   the	   desired	   article,	   but	   otherwise	   remain	   faithful	   to	   "his"	  
trader,	  (3)	  take	  his	  business	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  longer	  term,	  or	  (4)	  buy	  another	  brand.”568	  
	  In	   this	   case,	   the	   Commission	   noted	   that	   consumers,	   who	   purchase	   foodstuffs	   frequently,	   are	  
concerned	  with	  making	  their	  shopping	  trips	  as	  short	  as	  possible	  and	  would	  thus	  rather	  buy	  another	  
brand	  than	  try	  to	  find	  the	  product	  in	  another	  supermarket.	  The	  Commission	  added	  that	  this	  is	  all	  the	  
more	  true	  if	  the	  customer	  finds	  in	  his	  shopping	  environment	  almost	  nothing	  but	  outlets	  of	  one	  and	  
the	  same	  trader.569	  The	   large	  share	  of	   the	  distribution	  market	   in	   the	  hands	  of	   the	  merging	  parties,	  
especially	   in	   key	   regions	   of	   eastern	   Austria,	   significantly	   limited	   the	   reaction	   possibilities	   for	  
consumers	  who	  were	   considered	  as	   locked	   to	   their	   supermarket	   chain.	   It	  was	   therefore	  held	   that,	  
even	  for	  international	  branded	  products,	  the	  consequences	  of	  a	  delisting	  would	  be	  much	  heavier	  for	  
the	  supplier	  than	  for	  the	  merged	  entity.	  
In	   addition,	   the	   Commission	   noted	   that	   the	   growth	   and	   increasing	   importance	   of	   private	   labels	  
reduced	  even	  more	  the	  already	  limited	  dependence	  of	  the	  merging	  parties	  on	  their	  suppliers.	  
“The	  growth	  and	  increasing	  importance	  of	  own	  brands	  are	  having	  the	  effect	  of	  shifting	  
the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  traders	  and	  producers	  in	  favour	  of	  traders.”570	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  Ibid.,	  at	  103.	  
567	  Ibid.,	  at	  104.	  
568	  Ibid.,	  at	  105.	  
569	  Ibid.,	  at	  106.	  
570	  Ibid.,	  at	  112.	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  Since	   those	   products	   are	   sold	   under	   the	   retailer’s	   brand,	   the	   actual	   producer	   is	   unknown	   to	  
consumers	  and	  hence	  exchangeable	  almost	  at	  will.571	  With	  regard	  to	  branded	  products,	  the	  presence	  
of	  private	  labels	  makes	  delisting	  threats	  even	  more	  credible	  since	  they	  enter	  into	  direct	  competition	  
with	  the	  former.	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  concerning	  brands	  which	  do	  not	  number	  among	  the	  “must-­‐
have”	  products.572	  The	  large	  portfolio	  of	  successful	  private	  labels	  held	  by	  the	  parties	  would	  therefore	  
constitute	  an	  additional	  competitive	  advantage	  and	  reinforce	  their	  power	  in	  the	  procurement	  and	  in	  
the	  distribution	  markets.	  
Given	   the	  numerous	  competitive	  advantages	  of	   the	  merging	  parties	  and	   the	  strong	  dependence	  of	  
the	  suppliers,	  the	  Commission	  came	  to	  the	  natural	  conclusion	  in	  this	  case	  that	  the	  merger	  operation	  
would	  create	  or	  strengthen	  a	  dominant	  position	  in	  the	  procurement	  markets	  for	  a	   large	  number	  of	  
products.573	  	  
d) Carrefour/Promodes	  decision	  
In	   the	   Carrefour/Promodes	   decision,	   the	   Commission	   referred	   again	   to	   the	   “vicious	   circle”	   that	  
supermarkets’	  high	  degree	  of	  market	  power	  may	  lead	  to	  in	  the	  retail	  sector.	  However,	  unlike	  in	  the	  
two	  previous	  cases,	  the	  spiral	  mentioned	  by	  the	  Commission	  in	  this	  case	  did	  not	  find	  its	  source	  in	  the	  
parties’	  strong	  position	  in	  the	  distribution	  market	  but	  rather	  in	  their	  high	  degree	  of	  buyer	  power	  in	  
the	   procurement	   market.	   In	   addition,	   the	   Commission	   addressed	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   creation	   of	   a	  
potential	  collective	  dominant	  position	  in	  the	  procurement	  market.	  	  
i. No	  dominant	  position	  in	  the	  distribution	  markets	  
The	  market	  investigation	  showed	  that	  the	  acquisition	  of	  Promodes	  by	  Carrefour	  would	  increase	  the	  
latter’s	  market	   share	   from	  12-­‐17%	   to	  25-­‐30%	   in	   the	   French	  distribution	  markets.574	   In	   spite	  of	   the	  
new	   entity	   becoming	   the	   market	   leader	   in	   France	   and	   the	   high	   barriers	   to	   entry	   existing	   in	   that	  
country575,	   the	   Commission	   concluded	   that	   the	   transaction	   would	   not	   lead	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   a	  
dominant	  position.	  The	  French	  retail	  market	  was	  indeed	  viewed	  as	  sufficiently	  competitive	  with	  still-­‐
active	   rival	   supermarkets	   likely	   to	   constrain	   the	   merged	   entity.576	   However,	   it	   was	   held	   that	   the	  
parties’	  position	   in	   the	  downstream	  markets	  and	  the	  effects	  on	  competition	  could	  not	  be	  assessed	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  Ibid.,	  at	  112.	  
572	  Ibid.,	  at	  113.	  
573	  Ibid.,	  at	  117.	  In	  the	  first	  part	  of	  its	  decision,	  the	  Commission	  also	  concluded	  that	  it	  was	  expected	  that	  the	  
proposed	  operation	  would	  place	  the	  parties	  in	  a	  dominant	  position	  in	  the	  food-­‐retailing	  market	  in	  Austria.	  (at	  
70)	  
574	  Carrefour/Promodes,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.1684,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  25	  January	  2000,	  at	  40.	  
575	  Administrative	  barriers	  were	  provided	  by	  the	  French	  legislation	  which	  subjected	  the	  opening	  of	  food	  retail	  
outlets	  to	  an	  authorization.	  Limitations,	  or	  even	  prohibitions	  imposed	  on	  traders	  by	  the	  authorities	  constituted	  
a	  significant	  barrier	  to	  entry	  in	  the	  distribution	  market.	  
576	  Carrefour/Promodes,	  op.cit.,	  at	  41-­‐43.	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regardless	  of	  the	  potential	  developments	  in	  the	  upstream	  markets	  post-­‐merger.577	  Holding	  a	  strong	  
position	   as	   a	   buyer	  may	   indeed	   considerably	   strengthen	   a	   retailer’s	   seller	   power	   due	   to	   the	   close	  
interdependence	  between	  the	  distribution	  and	  the	  procurement	  markets.	  
ii. Strong	  buyer	  power	  and	  other	  competitive	  advantages	  
According	   to	   the	   Commission,	   measuring	   precisely	   retailers’	   market	   shares	   in	   the	   procurement	  
markets	  is	  particularly	  difficult.	  Based	  on	  information	  provided	  by	  suppliers	  as	  regards	  the	  share	  that	  
represented	   the	   merging	   parties	   in	   their	   total	   sales	   in	   France,	   it	   was	   estimated	   that	  
Carrefour/Promodes	  would	  have	  a	  market	  share	  of	  approximately	  25%.	  The	  Commission	  noted	  that	  
the	  transaction	  was	  taking	  place	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  a	  global	  consolidation	  in	  that	  sector	  given	  that	  
most	   competing	   retailers	   had	   already	   created	   central	   purchasing	   agencies,	   two	   of	   them	   holding	  
around	  15-­‐20%	  market	  shares.578	  Even	  though	  it	  was	  held	  in	  a	  previous	  decision	  that	  a	  market	  share	  
of	  25-­‐26%	  in	  the	  procurement	  market	  was	  not	  in	  itself	  an	  indicator	  of	  a	  dominant	  position	  likely	  to	  
impede	  effective	  competition579,	  different	  elements	  in	  the	  present	  case	  were	  considered	  as	  prone	  to	  
widen	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  new	  entity	  and	  its	  rivals.	  
Firstly,	   the	   Commission	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   merged	   firm	   would	   obviously	   exceed	   in	   different	  
products	   groups	   the	   “threat	   point”	   established	   in	   the	   Rewe/Meinl	   decision.	   A	   large	   number	   of	  
suppliers	   would	   therefore	   be	   economically	   dependent	   on	   the	   parties.580	   Secondly,	   the	   new	   entity	  
would	   be	   the	   only	   retail	   chain	   holding	   a	   significant	   position	   across	   all	   the	   different	   retail	   store	  
formats	   (hypermarkets,	   supermarkets,	   maxi	   discount	   shops,	   small	   food	   stores)	   and	   would	   be	   the	  
market	  leader	  in	  the	  hypermarkets	  segment	  which	  is	  the	  most	  profitable	  one.	  The	  considerable	  size	  
of	   those	   stores	   enables	   a	   retailer	   to	   offer	   his	   suppliers	   the	   possibility	   to	   display	   a	   large	   line	   of	  
products	   and,	   as	   a	   result,	   to	   obtain	   probably	   better	   buying	   conditions.581	   Thirdly,	   the	   Commission	  
was	  of	   the	  opinion	   that	   the	  high	  number	  of	   fidelity	  cards	  attached	   to	   the	  parties’	   shop	  sign	  would	  
constitute	   another	   competitive	   advantage.582	   That	   system	   would	   indeed	   provide	   the	   new	   group	  
Carrefour	   with	   detailed	   and	   sensitive	   information	   about	   consumer	   behaviour	   and	   give	   it	   the	  
possibility	   to	   pursue	   efficient	   customer	   loyalty	   strategies.583	   Furthermore,	   such	   information	   being	  
particularly	   valuable	   for	   brands	   producers,	   who	   do	   not	   have	   comparable	   instruments	   to	   know	  
consumer	  preferences,	   the	  parties’	   large	   share	   in	   the	   fidelity	   cards	   stock	  would	   further	   strengthen	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
577	  Ibid.,	  at	  43.	  
578	  Ibid.,	  at	  47-­‐48.	  
579	  See:	  Promodes/Casino,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.991,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  30	  October	  1997,	  at	  43.	  
580	  Carrefour/Promodes,	  op.cit.,	  at	  52-­‐53.	  
581	  Ibid.,	  at	  56-­‐63.	  
582	  The	  new	  entity	  could	  rely	  on	  more	  than	  5	  million	  fidelity	  cards.	  This	  represented	  more	  than	  50%	  of	  the	  total	  
cards	  stock	  in	  France.	  
583	  Carrefour/Promodes,	  op.cit.,	  at	  64.	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their	   buying	   strength	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   those	   suppliers.584	   Fourthly,	   as	   in	   Rewe/Meinl,	   the	   centralized	  
organization	   of	   Carrefour	  was	   viewed	   as	   a	   structural	   advantage	   reinforcing	   the	   parties’	   bargaining	  
power	   in	   negotiations	   with	   producers.585	   Finally,	   the	   Commission	   highlighted	   the	   strong	   financial	  
strength	  of	  the	  merged	  entity	  which	  would	  enlarge	   its	  room	  to	  manoeuvre	  both	   in	  the	  distribution	  
and	  in	  the	  procurement	  markets.	  For	  example,	  the	  new	  entity	  would	  be	  able	  to	  further	  develop	  their	  
own-­‐brands	  and	  thus	  to	  increase	  the	  pressure	  on	  branded	  products	  suppliers.	  
In	  Conclusion,	  the	  Commission	  decided	  that	  the	  parties’	  market	  position	  in	  the	  procurement	  market,	  
combined	  with	  the	  competitive	  strengths	  described	  above,	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  situation	  where	  the	  new	  
entity	   would	   be	   able	   to	   obtain	   much	   better	   buying	   conditions.	   Such	   a	   situation	   would	   therefore	  
enable	   Carrefour	   to	  widen	   the	   gap	  with	   its	   competitors	   in	   the	   upstream	  markets	   and,	   in	   turn,	   to	  
reinforce	   its	   position	   in	   the	   downstream	  markets.586	   Even	   though	   the	  Commission	   recognized	   that	  
the	  emergence	  of	  that	  spiral	  depended	  on	  a	  number	  of	  other	  factors,	  it	  nevertheless	  concluded	  that	  
the	  creation	  of	  a	  single	  dominant	  position	  in	  the	  procurement	  markets	  could	  not	  be	  excluded	  in	  this	  
case.	   To	   this	   end,	   the	  merging	  parties	   suggested	   structural	   undertakings	   to	   the	  Commission	  which	  
were	  considered	  as	  sufficient	  to	  remove	  the	  competition	  concerns.587	  
	  
	  
iii. Potential	  creation	  of	  a	  collective	  dominant	  position	  
The	   Commission	   also	   examined	   the	   likelihood	   that	   the	   merger	   would	   lead	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   a	  
collective	  dominant	  position	  in	  the	  procurement	  market	  because	  of	  the	  high	  degree	  of	  concentration	  
on	   the	   demand	   side	   that	   would	   result	   from	   the	   transaction.	   Carrefour,	   with	   two	   other	   central	  
purchasing	  agencies,	  would	  represent	  around	  60-­‐70%	  of	  the	  total	  demand.588	  The	  characteristics	  of	  
the	   market	   were	   though	   not	   likely	   to	   give	   rise	   to	   a	   collective	   dominance.	   Indeed,	   the	   conditions	  
generally	  examined	  by	  the	  Commission	  when	  assessing	  that	   issue	  seemed	  not	  to	  be	  fulfilled	   in	  this	  
case	  due	  to	  a	   lack	  of	  transparency	  on	  the	  markets,	  a	   lack	  of	  homogeneity	  between	  the	  products	   in	  
question,	   a	   high	   variation	   in	   the	   structure	   and	   functioning	   of	   central	   purchasing	   agencies	   and	   the	  
absence	   of	   structural	   links	   between	   the	   different	   retailers.589	   However,	   the	   Commission	   drove	   its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
584	  Ibid.,	  at	  65.	  Retailers	  can	  indeed	  sell	  information	  about	  consumer	  trends	  and	  behavior	  to	  their	  suppliers.	  In	  
fact,	  they	  use	  to	  negotiate	  lower	  prices	  and	  better	  conditions	  in	  exchange	  of	  such	  information.	  They	  can	  also	  
use	  such	  information	  to	  put	  additional	  pressures	  on	  producers	  or	  to	  promote	  their	  own-­‐brands.	  
585	  Ibid.,	  at	  66-­‐69.	  
586	  Ibid.,	  at	  87.	  
587	  Ibid.,	  at	  89.	  
588	  Ibid.,	  at	  98.	  
589	  Ibid.,	  at	  99.	  
Final	  version	  -­‐	  Mai	  2014	   	  
182	  
	  
reasoning	  a	  bit	  further	  and	  maintained	  that	  the	  present	  transaction	  might,	  in	  the	  future,	  give	  rise	  to	  
other	  rapprochements	  in	  the	  retail	  sector	  and	  that,	  on	  certain	  conditions,	  such	  further	  consolidation	  
might	   lead	   to	   a	   situation	   of	   collective	   dominance.	   This	   conclusion	   resulted	   from	   the	   particular	  
negotiation	  conditions	  in	  place	  between	  retailers	  and	  suppliers	  which	  provided	  that	  the	  latter	  could	  
ask	   for	  adaptations	  of	   the	  buying	  terms	  only	   if	   they	  could	   justify	   the	   legitimacy	  of	   their	   request	  on	  
basis	   of	   their	   cost	   evolution.	   According	   to	   the	   Commission,	   such	   a	   requirement	  would,	   inevitably,	  
enable	   each	   retailer	   to	   acquire	   a	   particular	   knowledge	   on	   the	   costs	   borne	   by	   its	   suppliers.	   It	   was	  
hence	  considered	  that,	  if	  the	  number	  of	  distributors	  still	  continued	  to	  decrease,	  each	  of	  them	  having	  
the	  same	  information	  on	  the	  same	  suppliers,	  buying	  conditions	  would	  come	  to	  be	  standardized.	  The	  
Commission	   committed	   therefore	   itself	   to	   draw	   a	   particular	   attention	   on	   those	   elements	   in	   the	  
assessment	  of	  future	  rapprochements	  submitted	  to	  it.590	  
e) Similar	  approach	  likely	  to	  be	  held	  in	  other	  sectors	  
The	   reasoning	   followed	   by	   the	   Commission	   about	   the	   increase	   in	   retailers’	   buyer	   power	   may	   be	  
transposed	   in	  other	  sectors.	  Shortly	  after	   the	  Rewe/Meinl	  decision,	   similar	  arguments	  were	   indeed	  
held	   in	   the	   assessment	   of	   a	   merger	   between	   two	   television	   services	   providers	   in	   the	   Nordic	  
countries.	   Since	  TV-­‐distributors	  are	  active	  both	  on	   the	  downstream	  market	   for	   the	  provision	  of	  TV	  
services	   to	   viewers	   and	  on	   the	  upstream	  market	   for	   the	  acquisition	  of	   rights	   to	   content,	   the	   likely	  
effects	   of	   increased	   buyer	   power	   were	   also	   taken	   into	   consideration	   in	   the	   evaluation	   of	   the	  
transaction.591	  
The	  large	  market	  shares	  of	  the	  parties	  on	  the	  downstream	  market,	  amounting	  to	  60-­‐70%,	  were	  again	  
a	  central	  element	   in	  the	  conclusion	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  buyer	  power.	  Such	  customer-­‐base	  size	  was	  
considered	   as	   a	   competitive	   advantage	   giving	   the	   parties	   the	   ability	   to	   achieve	   significantly	   better	  
conditions	   from	   broadcasters	   or	   exclusive	   distribution	   rights.592	   Indeed,	   what	   matters	   for	   such	  
broadcasters	   is	   to	   address	   a	   sufficient	   number	   of	   viewers	   in	   order	   to	   attract	   advertising	   and/or	  
subscription	  revenue.	  However,	  post-­‐merger,	  the	  access	  to	  those	  households	  would	  not	  be	  possible	  
without	  dealing	  with	  the	  merged	  entity	  which	  would	  thus	  become	  an	  obligatory	  partner.	  As	  a	  result,	  
it	  was	  held	  that	  the	  parties	  would	  have	  an	  even	  stronger	  position	  as	  a	  buyer	  of	  content.593	  Following	  
a	  circular	  movement,	  similar	  to	  that	  described	  in	  the	  retail	  sector,	  the	  increase	  in	  buying	  power	  in	  the	  
procurement	  market	  would	  in	  turn	  strengthen	  the	  dominant	  position	  of	  the	  parties	  on	  the	  market	  for	  
retail	   TV	   distribution.	   The	   preferential	   distribution	   rights	   obtained	   by	   the	   merged	   entity	   would	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  Ibid.,	  at	  104.	  
591	  See	  :	  Telia/Telenor,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1439,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  13	  October	  1999.	  
592	  Ibid.,	  at	  316.	  
593	  Ibid.,	  at	  318.	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indeed	  enable	  it	  to	  offer	  more	  preferential	  distribution	  agreements	  to	  its	  own	  customers	  and	  hence	  
further	  reduce	  the	  ability	  to	  compete	  of	  the	  other	  TV-­‐operators.594	  	  
As	  regards	  the	  issue	  of	  dependence	  of	  each	  trader,	  the	  Commission	  noted	  that	  the	  new	  entity	  would	  
be	  much	  less	  dependent	  on	  any	  content-­‐supplier	  than	  the	  other	  way	  round.	  Furthermore,	  the	  parties	  
could	   take	   advantage	   of	   that	   situation	   and	   credibly	   threaten	   to	   take	   broadcasters	   off	   their	  
distribution	   if	   they	   had	   not	   satisfied	   with	   their	   purchasing	   conditions.595	   All	   those	   competitive	  
advantages	  enjoyed	  by	  the	  merged	  entity	  on	  both	  markets	  would	  lead	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  dominant	  
position	  in	  the	  procurement	  market.	  
The	  Commission	  also	  mentioned	   the	  adverse	  effects	  on	   competition	   that	  would	  occur	   in	   the	   long-­‐
term.	  Although	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  would	  allow	  the	  parties	   to	  offer	  attractive	  conditions	  to	  their	  
customers,	  the	  inability	  of	  rivals	  to	  compete	  on	  an	  equal	  footing	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  further	  lessening	  of	  
competition	   in	   a	   longer-­‐term	   and	   hence	   would	   give	   the	   merged	   entity	   the	   possibility	   to	   act	  
independently	  of	  consumers.	  Moreover,	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  dominant	  purchaser	  would	  not	  only	  have	  
a	   negative	   impact	   on	   the	   content-­‐suppliers’	   profitability	   but	   also	   on	   their	   incentives	   to	   invest	   in	  
improving	  quality	  and/or	  innovation	  of	  new	  content.	  Combined	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  number	  and	  the	  
type	  of	  TV	  programmes	  available	  to	  viewers	  would	  remain	  almost	  exclusively	  at	  the	  merged	  entity’s	  
discretion,	  consumer	  choice	  and	  quality	  content	  in	  the	  markets	  for	  TV	  distribution	  would	  be	  reduced	  
as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  proposed	  concentration.596	  
The	   reasoning	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   reinforcement	   of	   market	   power	   in	   the	   procurement	   and	   the	  
distribution	   markets,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   long-­‐run	   effects	   on	   competition,	   were	   analogous	   to	   those	  
developed	   in	   the	  Kesko/Tuko,	  Rewe/Meinl	   and	  Carrefour/Promodes	  decisions.	   This	   shows	   that	   the	  
competitive	  concerns	  arising	  from	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  are	  not	  confined	  to	  the	  retail	  sector	  
but	   are	   likely	   to	   emerge	   whenever	   the	   buying	   side	   of	   a	   market	   is	   concentrated	   and	   suppliers	  
deprived	   of	   any	   outside	   option.	   However,	   the	   Commission,	   through	   its	  merger	   policy,	   only	   blocks	  
concentrations	  that	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  strengthening	  the	  parties’	  buyer	  power	  to	  a	  significant	  extent	  
and	  is	  likely	  to	  affect	  the	  competition	  process.	  Where	  a	  trader	  already	  enjoys	  a	  strong	  position	  in	  the	  
procurement	  market	   but	  will	   not	   see	   its	   position	   be	   further	   reinforced	  post-­‐merger,	   or	  where	   the	  
parties	   both	   have	   a	   certain	   degree	   of	   buyer	   power	   but	  will	   not	   have	   the	   ability	   to	   combine	   their	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  Ibid.,	  at	  321.	  
595	  Ibid.,	  at	  356.	  
596	  Ibid.,	  at	  368.	  
Final	  version	  -­‐	  Mai	  2014	   	  
184	  
	  
strengths	   to	   foreclose	   competitors,	   the	   Commission	   will	   generally	   not	   be	   opposed	   to	   the	  
transaction.597	  
f) Remarks	  on	  the	  assessment	  of	  grocery	  retailers’	  buyer	  power	  
The	  prospective	  approach	  adopted	  by	  the	  Commission	  in	  these	  decisions	  took	  into	  consideration	  the	  
long-­‐run	  effects	  of	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power.	  Instead	  of	  focusing	  on	  the	  low	  prices	  that	  consumers	  
may	   benefit	   from	   in	   the	   short-­‐term,	   it	   also	   addressed	   the	   long-­‐term	   impact	   that	   an	   excessive	  
concentration	   may	   have	   on	   prices	   and	   product	   variety.	   The	   parties’	   buyer	   power	   was	   generally	  
deemed	   to	   derive	   from	   their	   strong	   position	   in	   the	   distribution	   market.	   However,	   in	  
Carrefour/Promodes,	   the	   spiral	   took	   rather	   its	   source	   in	   the	  merged	  entity’s	  market	   power	  on	   the	  
procurement	  markets.	  The	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  may	  indeed	  constitute	  a	  competitive	  advantage	  
sufficient	   to	   trigger	  a	  circular	   reinforcement	  of	  market	  power	   in	   the	  up-­‐	  and	  downstream	  markets,	  
which	  might	  affect	  suppliers,	  competitors	  but	  also	  consumers.	  	  
The	   decisions	   analysed	   above	   show	   that	   the	   Commission	   may	   adopt	   an	   innovative	   reasoning	   in	  
analysing	   the	   issue	   of	   increased	   buyer	   power	   and	   its	   potential	   consequences	   post-­‐merger.	   Such	  
reasoning	  takes	  in	  fact	  into	  consideration	  the	  specificities	  described	  in	  Part	  I	  regarding	  the	  ability	  and	  
incentive	  to	  exert	  buyer	  power.	  The	  “threat	  point”	  established	  in	  the	  Rewe/Meinl	  decision	  seems	  to	  
initiate	  a	  new	  approach	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  market	  power,	  specific	  to	  the	  buying	  side.	  The	  notion	  of	  
economic	  dependence	  developed	  in	  that	  decision,	  and	  the	  effects	  that	  it	  may	  lead	  to,	  may	  indeed	  be	  
viewed	  as	  confirming	  that	  specific	  criteria	  should	  be	  used	  to	  assess	  the	  potential	  harmful	   impact	  of	  
the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power.	   The	   threshold	   of	   22%	   indicates	   that	   impediment	   to	   effective	  
competition	   is	   likely	   to	   arise	   when	   the	   new	   entity	   holds	   a	   relatively	   low	   market	   share	   in	   the	  
procurement	   market.	   In	   such	   a	   case,	   buyer	   power,	   combined	   with	   a	   strong	   -­‐	   but	   not	   necessarily	  
dominant	  -­‐	  position	   in	  the	  downstream	  markets,	  may	   indeed	  enable	  the	  buying	  firm	  in	  question	  to	  
behave	  independently	  of	  its	  suppliers,	  of	  its	  competitors	  and,	  finally,	  of	  its	  customers.	  
3. Farmer	  cooperatives:	  a	  specific	  approach	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
597	  See	  :	  B	  Sky	  B/Kirch	  Pay	  TV,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.0037,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  21	  March	  2000	  and	  
KKR/Permira/Prosiebensat.1,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.4547,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  22	  February	  2007.	  In	  the	  first	  case,	  
the	  Commission	  noted	  that	  one	  of	  the	  merging	  parties	  already	  dominated	  the	  market	  for	  acquisition	  of	  
broadcasting	  rights,	  in	  particular	  for	  films	  and	  sport,	  but	  considered	  that	  the	  concentration	  would	  not	  
significantly	  strengthen	  that	  position.	  The	  second	  case	  concerned	  a	  merger	  between	  two	  TV	  operators	  active	  in	  
two	  different	  Member	  States.	  The	  Commission	  examined	  whether,	  through	  a	  joint	  acquisition	  of	  TV	  
broadcasting	  rights,	  the	  pooling	  of	  the	  parties	  would	  give	  rise	  to	  adverse	  effects	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  rights	  owners	  and/or	  
to	  foreclosure	  issues	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  competing	  TV	  operators	  as	  regards	  access	  to	  TV	  rights.	  It	  was	  concluded	  however	  
that	  acquisition	  of	  TV	  rights	  on	  a	  wider	  geographic	  basis	  was	  hardly	  possible	  and	  that	  the	  transaction	  would	  
therefore	  not	  bring	  about	  any	  significant	  change	  on	  the	  parties’	  position	  on	  a	  national	  basis.	  See	  also:	  Liberty	  
Global/Virgin	  Media,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.6880,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  15	  April	  2013.	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In	   the	   agro-­‐food	   industry,	   some	   mergers	   among	   farmer	   cooperatives	   have	   also	   prompted	  
competitive	   concerns	   concerning	   the	   increased	   buyer	   power	   of	   the	   parties	   involved	   following	   the	  
transaction.	   In	   two	   decisions,	   the	   Commission	   reached	   indeed	   the	   conclusion	   that	   the	   merger	  
operation,	   involving	   cooperative	   slaughterhouses	   in	   the	   first	   case	   and	   dairy	   cooperatives	   in	   the	  
second	  one,	   by	   significantly	   increasing	   the	  parties’	   share	   in	   the	  procurement	  market,	  would	   affect	  
effective	   competition.598	   Whereas	   the	   close	   interdependence	   between	   the	   up-­‐	   and	   downstream	  
markets	  was	   also	  mentioned	   in	   those	   cases,	   the	   reasoning	  of	   the	  Commission	   seemed	   to	   follow	  a	  
slightly	  different	  logic	  due	  to	  the	  characteristics	  of	  a	  cooperative	  organization.	  In	  fact,	  the	  mergers	  in	  
question	  were	  considered	  to	   impair	  mainly	  competitors’	  access	  to	  farm	  products	  and	  to	  affect	  to	  a	  
lesser	  extent	  suppliers’	  interests.	  	  
a) The	  particular	  structure	  of	  a	  cooperative	  organization	  	  
Cooperatives	  are	  companies	  characterized	  by	  their	  dual	  relationship	  with	  their	  member-­‐farmers.	  On	  
the	  one	  hand,	   farmers	  are	   the	  owners	  of	   the	  cooperative	  and,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   they	  supply	   the	  
cooperative	  with	   raw	  material,	   namely	   raw	  milk	   and	   animals	   intended	   for	   slaughtering	   in	   the	   two	  
cases	   at	   hand.599	   Generally,	   each	   member	   is	   obliged	   to	   deliver	   100%	   of	   his	   production	   to	   the	  
cooperative	   on	   an	   exclusive	   basis	  while	   the	   latter	   is	   obliged	   to	   buy	   all	   raw	  materials	   its	  members	  
produce.600	  The	  price	  paid	   to	   farmers	   includes	  a	  guaranteed	  payment,	  which	   is	   independent	  of	   the	  
business	   results	   of	   the	   company,	   and	   a	   payment	   calculated	   ex-­‐post	   to	   reflect	   the	   financial	  
performance	   achieved	   by	   the	   cooperative	   in	   the	   selling	   markets.	   Such	   method	   of	   remuneration	  
creates	  thus	  a	  strong	   link	  between	  the	  down-­‐	  and	  upstream	  markets,	  which	   is	  particularly	  relevant	  
for	  the	  assessment	  of	  a	  merger	  between	  cooperatives.601	  	  
Entrance	   and	   withdrawal	   requirements	   are	   imposed	   on	   farmers	   who	   want	   to	   join	   or	   leave	   the	  
cooperative.	  While	  becoming	  a	  member	  is	  relatively	  easy602,	  membership	  may	  only	  be	  cancelled	  on	  a	  
given	  date	  and/or	  with	  a	  notice	  period.603	  Such	  a	  withdrawal	  policy	  creates	  hence	  barriers	  for	  farmers	  
willing	  to	  switch	  from	  one	  cooperative	  to	  another.	  This	  issue,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  other	  peculiarities	  of	  the	  
cooperative	  structure,	  must	  therefore	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  by	  the	  Commission	  when	  assessing	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
598	  See	  :	  Danish	  Crown/Vestyjyske	  Slagerier,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1313,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  9	  March	  1999	  and	  
Friesland	  Foods/Campina,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5046,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  17	  December	  2008.	  
599	  Friesland	  Foods/Campina,	  op.cit.,	  at	  29.	  
600	  Danish	  Crown/Vestyjyske	  Slagerier,	  op.cit.,	  at	  115	  and	  Friesland	  Foods/Campina,	  op.cit.,	  at	  32.	  
601	  Friesland	  Foods/Campina,	  op.cit.,	  at	  36-­‐40.	  
602	  In	  some	  cases,	  farmers	  can	  become	  member	  of	  the	  cooperative	  on	  simple	  request.	  In	  others,	  they	  have	  to	  
pay	  an	  entrance	  fee	  which	  is	  intended	  to	  compensate	  existing	  members	  for	  the	  past	  investment	  made	  in	  the	  
cooperative.	  
603Danish	  Crown/Vestyjyske	  Slagerier,	  op.cit.,	  at	  116	  and	  	  Friesland	  Foods/Campina,	  op.cit.,	  at	  44.	  In	  the	  first	  
case,	  a	  farmer	  had	  to	  give	  12	  to	  24	  months’	  notice	  before	  he	  could	  leave.	  In	  the	  second	  case,	  a	  membership	  
could	  only	  be	  cancelled	  as	  of	  1	  January	  of	  each	  year	  with	  a	  notice	  period	  of	  three	  months.	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impact	  of	   a	  merger	  between	  cooperatives.	   Those	  elements	   can	  be	  expected	   to	  have	  an	   impact	  on	  
access	  to	  agricultural	  products	  for	  competitors.	  	  
b) Danish	  Crown/Vestjyske	  Slagterier	  decision	  
The	  concentration	  in	  this	  case	  involved	  the	  two	  largest	  cooperative	  slaughterhouses	  in	  Denmark.	  The	  
Commission	   examined	   separately	   the	   impact	   of	   the	  merger	   on	   the	  market	   of	   live	   pigs	   and	   on	   the	  
market	  of	  live	  cattle.	  	  
i. Dominance	  in	  the	  procurement	  market	  of	  live	  pigs	  and	  potential	  consequences	  	  
The	  market	  investigation	  showed	  that,	  post-­‐merger,	  the	  new	  entity	  would	  buy	  76%	  of	  the	  production	  
of	  Danish	  pigs	  while	  the	  other	  two	  cooperatives	  active	  in	  that	  market	  would	  have	  respectively	  13	  and	  
5%	  of	   the	  market.604	  The	  existing	  competitors	  would	   thus	  be	  unable	   to	  constrain	   the	  merged	   firm.	  
The	   Commission	   also	   considered	   that	   potential	   competition	   was	   almost	   non-­‐existent	   due	   to	   the	  
exclusive	   supply	   obligation	   imposed	   on	   farmers	   who	   were	   members	   of	   the	   cooperatives	   and	  
represented	  94%	  of	  the	  Danish	  production	  of	  pigs.	  Other	  Danish	  as	  well	  as	  foreign	  slaughterhouses	  
could	   indeed	   only	   obtain	   supplies	   of	   Danish	   live	   pigs	   if	   farmers	   accepted	   to	   terminate	   their	  
membership.	  In	  view	  of	  the	  costs	  that	  such	  a	  withdrawal	  would	  cause	  to	  producers,	  in	  particular	  the	  
loss	   of	   their	   annual	   profit-­‐share	   in	   the	   cooperative,	   they	   were	   unlikely	   to	   switch	   to	   another	  
slaughterhouse,	  even	  though	  prices	  were	  consistently	  higher	  in	  other	  countries,	  such	  as	  in	  Germany	  
where	   the	   slaughterhouses	  at	   the	   time	  operated	  below	   full	   capacity	  utilization.605	  The	  Commission	  
therefore	  concluded	  that	  the	  new	  entity	  would	  have	  a	  dominant	  position	  in	  the	  procurement	  market	  
of	  live	  pigs	  in	  Denmark	  and	  that	  such	  a	  situation	  was	  likely	  to	  entail	  harmful	  consequences	  both	  for	  
farmers	  and	  for	  private	  slaughterhouses.	  	  
With	  regard	  to	  producers,	  it	  was	  held	  that	  the	  merger	  would	  not	  affect	  their	  profits	  but	  rather	  their	  
possibility	   to	   switch	   to	   another	   customer.	   The	   merged	   firm	   would	   indeed	   not	   be	   able	   to	   extract	  
monopsonistic	   profits	   from	   their	   suppliers	   since,	   as	   a	   cooperative,	   it	   would	   share	   out	   back	   such	  
profits	   to	   the	   farmer-­‐members	   in	   the	   form	   of	   performance	   payment.606	   However,	   the	   transaction	  
would	  significantly	  reduce	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  farmers.	  They	  would	  in	  fact	  be	  deprived	  of	  the	  possibility	  
of	   terminating	   their	  membership	  with	   one	   of	   the	   parties	   and	   joining	   the	   other	   should	   the	   former	  
were	  to	  become	  less	  profitable.	  The	  two	  remaining	  cooperatives	  running	  at	  full	  capacity	  and	  private	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  Danish	  Crown/Vestyjyske	  Slagerier,	  op.cit.,	  at	  121.	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  Ibid.,	  at	  125-­‐126.	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  Ibid.,	  at	  128.	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slaughterhouses	  not	  constituting	  real	  alternatives,	  it	  was	  concluded	  that	  the	  parties’	  members	  would	  
be	  locked	  into	  the	  new	  entity.607	  	  
Concerning	  the	  effects	  on	  private	  slaughterhouses	  that	  had	  access	  to	  only	  6%	  of	  the	  pig	  production	  
that	   was	   accounted	   for	   by	   non-­‐members	   of	   a	   cooperative,	   the	   Commission	   considered	   that	   the	  
merger	   would	   make	   their	   position	   even	   worse.	   The	   new	   entity	   would	   indeed	   try	   to	   attract	   new	  
farmers,	   especially	   those	   supplying	   to	   private	   slaughterhouses	   since	   the	   others	   were	   tied	   to	   a	  
cooperative.	   Based	   on	   its	   economic	   power	   on	   the	  market	   for	   purchase	   of	   live	   pigs,	   it	   could	   offer	  
those	  producers	  higher	  prices	  and	  thus	  capture	  a	  part	  of	  the	  private	  slaughterhouses’	  suppliers.	  As	  
capacity	  utilization	   is	  particularly	   important	   in	   terms	  of	  profitability,	   the	   loss	  of	  one	  supplier	  would	  
entail	   heavy	   financial	   consequences	   for	   private	   slaughterhouses	   and	   risk	   driving	   them	   out	   of	  
business.608	  	  
The	  impact	  of	  the	  merger	  would	  therefore	  be	  more	  drastic	  for	  the	  new	  entity’s	  competitors	  than	  for	  
producers.	   The	   latter,	   being	   in	   control	   of	   the	   cooperative,	   would	   indeed	   be	   able	   to	   prevent	   any	  
exploitation	  of	  a	  dominant	  position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  themselves	  and	  would	  mainly	  benefit	  from	  the	  increase	  
of	   buyer	   power	   of	   the	   new	   entity	   even	   though	   their	   choice	   would	   thereby	   be	   limited.	   The	  
Commission	  nevertheless	  considered	  that	  sufficient	  competition	  should	  remain	  on	  the	  markets	  and	  
that	  competitors’	  access	  to	  live	  pigs	  should	  be	  protected.	  
ii. No	  dominance	  in	  the	  procurement	  market	  of	  live	  cattle	  
The	   parties’	   position	   in	   the	  market	   for	   the	   purchase	   of	   live	   cattle	  was	   slightly	  weaker	   than	   in	   the	  
procurement	  market	  of	  live	  pigs.	  	  The	  market	  investigation	  revealed	  that	  58%	  of	  Danish	  live	  cattle	  for	  
slaughter	   were	   bought	   by	   the	  merging	   parties	   with	   guaranteed	   supplies	   by	   cooperative	  members	  
accounting	   for	   48%.609	   The	   new	   entity’s	   competitors	   were	   mainly	   private	   slaughterhouses.	   Their	  
supply	  was	  less	  secure	  than	  that	  of	  cooperatives	  but	  it	  was	  nevertheless	  held	  that	  they	  had	  sufficient	  
access	   to	   producers,	   given	   that	   half	   of	   the	   Danish	   cattle	   production	   was	   accounted	   for	   by	   non-­‐
members	  of	   a	   cooperative.	  With	   regard	   to	   farmers,	   it	  was	   concluded	   that	   both	  non-­‐members	   and	  
members	  of	  a	  cooperative	  had	  viable	  alternatives	  to	  sell	  their	  production.	  On	  that	  relevant	  market,	  
the	  Commission	  therefore	  concluded	  that	  no	  dominant	  position	  or	  other	  impediment	  to	  competition	  
was	  likely	  to	  emerge	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  transaction.610	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  Ibid.,	  at	  131.	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  Ibid.,	  at	  132.	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  Ibid.,	  at	  136.	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  Ibid.,	  at	  137-­‐140.	  
Final	  version	  -­‐	  Mai	  2014	   	  
188	  
	  
The	   focus	   of	   the	   Commission	  was	   thus	  mainly	   on	   farmers’	   choice	   and	   competitors’	   access	   to	   live	  
animals.	  In	  the	  following	  decision,	  that	  latter	  issue	  was	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  competition	  
concerns	  and	  constituted	  the	  source	  of	  a	  new	  spiral.	  
c) Friesland	  Foods/Campina	  decision	  
This	   Commission	   decision	   on	   the	   effects	   in	   the	   Netherlands	   of	   the	   merger	   between	   two	   dairy	  
cooperatives	  highlighted	   the	   link	  between	  market	  power	   in	   the	  down-­‐	  and	  upstream	  markets.	  The	  
spiral	   effect,	   however,	   seems	   to	   turn	   in	   a	   different	   way	   than	   in	   the	   retail	   sector,	   harming	  mostly	  
competitors.	  
i. Dominant	  position	  in	  the	  up-­‐	  and	  downstream	  markets	  
The	  Commission	  considered	  that	  the	  merger	  would	  lead	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  dominant	  buyer	  in	  the	  
procurement	  market	   given	   the	   very	   high	  market	   shares	   of	   the	  merging	   parties,	   amounting	   to	   78-­‐
80%.611	  Furthermore,	  the	  new	  entity	  was	  held	  to	  be	  able	  to	  exercise	  significant	  market	  power	  in	  the	  
Dutch	  downstream	  markets	  for	  cheese	  and	  dairy	  products	  in	  which	  it	  would	  hold	  a	  market	  share	  of	  
around	  60-­‐70%	  following	  the	  merger.612	  The	  Commission	  noted	  that	  transaction	  would	  in	  fact	  bring	  
together	   the	   closest	   competitors	   in	   those	   markets.	   It	   was	   also	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   new	   firm	   so	  
created	   would	   be	   the	   only	   company	   offering	   the	   full	   range	   of	   fresh	   dairy	   products	   in	   sufficient	  
volumes	   and	   quality,	   turning	   it	   into	   an	   unavoidable	   trading	   partner	   for	   supermarkets.613	   The	  
Commission	   concluded	   that	   the	   lessening	   of	   competition	   in	   the	   fresh	   dairy	   products	   and	   cheese	  
markets	  would	  enable	  the	  new	  entity	  to	  charge	  higher	  selling	  prices	  and	  secure	  higher	  margins.614	  	  
ii. No	  lower	  prices	  for	  farmers	  
In	   its	   assessment	   of	   the	   effects	   of	   the	  merger,	   the	   Commission	   first	   examined	   the	   impact	   of	   the	  
transaction	  in	  the	  upstream	  market	  for	  the	  procurement	  of	  raw	  milk	  in	  order	  to	  analyze	  whether	  the	  
increase	  of	  buyer	  power	  was	   likely	   to	  significantly	   impede	  effective	  competition.	   In	  contrast	   to	   the	  
situation	  in	  the	  retail	  sector,	  it	  was	  held	  on	  that	  matter	  that	  the	  parties	  would	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  use	  
their	  market	  power	  to	  reduce	  milk	  procurement	  prices	  post-­‐merger.	  Such	  a	  policy	  would	  indeed	  be	  
unsustainable	   since	   it	   would	   result	   in	   lower	   income	   for	   the	   cooperative’s	  members	   and	  would	   as	  
such	  be	  contrary	  to	  the	  primary	  aim	  of	  the	  parties	  which	  was	  to	  achieve	  long-­‐term	  optimal	  pay-­‐out	  
prices	  for	  their	  member-­‐farmers.615	  The	  Commission	  thus	  concluded	  that:	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  Friesland	  Foods/Campina,	  op.cit.,	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  83.	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  Ibid.,	  at	  107.	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  at	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“The	  merged	   entity	  would	   therefore	   hold	   a	   dominant	   position	   in	   the	   procurement	   of	  
conventional	  raw	  milk.	  However,	   in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  present	  case,	  the	  strong	  market	  
position	  of	  the	  merged	  entity	  would	  not,	  in	  itself,	  allow	  it	  to	  exert	  buyer	  power	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  
member-­‐as	  a	  result	  in	  particular	  of	  the	  cooperative	  structure	  of	  the	  merged	  entity.”616	  
iii. Risk	  of	  input	  foreclosure	  
The	  Commission	  also	  examined	  whether	  the	  merged	  entity	  would	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  use	   its	  strong	  
position	  in	  the	  procurement	  market	  in	  order	  to	  foreclose	  downstream	  rivals	  by	  impeding	  their	  access	  
to	  raw	  milk.617	   In	  assessing	  that	  issue,	  the	  Commission	  noted	  the	  close	  link	  between	  the	  position	  in	  
the	  down-­‐	  and	  upstream	  markets.	  According	  to	  it,	  the	  profits	  raised	  in	  the	  downstream	  markets	  due	  
to	  the	  increased	  market	  power	  of	  the	  parties	  would	  result	  in	  higher	  prices	  paid	  to	  farmers	  since	  part	  
of	  those	  prices	  depends	  on	  the	  cooperative’s	  performance	  in	  the	  selling	  markets.618	  Those	  favourable	  
conditions	  offered	  by	   the	  merging	  parties,	   linked	   to	   their	  downstream	  market	  power,	  would	  make	  
their	  members	  less	  likely	  to	  switch	  to	  other	  buyers	  and	  would	  even	  attract	  new	  farmers.	  As	  a	  result,	  
the	  merged	  firm’s	  position	  on	  the	  procurement	  market	  for	  raw	  milk	  would	  be	  further	  reinforced.619	  
The	  Commission	  continued	  its	  reasoning	  by	  stating	  that:	  
“In	   a	   situation	   where	   the	   merged	   entity	   would	   have	   the	   possibility	   of	   increasing	   its	  
already	  very	   large	  farmers’	  base,	  these	  competitors	  would	  find	   it	  more	  difficult	  to	  gain	  
access	   to	   independent	   sources	   of	   Dutch	   raw	   milk.	   It	   would	   therefore	   further	   reduce	  
their	  ability	  to	  compete	  effectively	  in	  their	  respective	  Dutch	  downstream	  dairy	  markets	  
by	   raising	   barriers	   to	   entry	   or	   expansion	   and	   strengthen	   the	   market	   power	   of	   the	  
merged	  parties	  in	  these	  markets.”620	  	  
The	   reinforced	   position	   of	   the	   new	   entity	   in	   the	   downstream	  markets	   would	   in	   turn	   enable	   it	   to	  
further	   increase	   their	   profits	   and	   raise	   pay-­‐out	   prices	   for	   its	   members	   and	   so	   on.	   That	   circular	  
reasoning	   led	   the	   Commission	   to	   conclude	   that	   the	   notified	   concentration,	   by	   limiting	   access	   to	  
sources	   of	   raw	   milk,	   was	   likely	   to	   significantly	   impede	   effective	   competition	   in	   the	   Dutch	  
procurement	  market.	  
d) Remarks	  on	  the	  assessment	  of	  farmer	  cooperatives’	  buyer	  power	  
Unlike	   in	   the	   cases	   analysed	   above	   in	   the	   retail	   sector,	   the	   merging	   parties	   in	   the	   Friesland	  
Foods/Campina	  case	  were	  already	   sufficiently	  powerful	   in	   the	  downstream	  markets	   to	   raise	  prices	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
616	  Ibid.,	  at	  103.	  
617	  Ibid.,	  at	  104.	  
618	  Ibid.,	  at	  112.	  
619	  Ibid.,	  at	  118.	  
620	  Ibid.,	  at	  121.	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and	   thus	   to	   behave	   independently	   of	   their	   competitors.	   Even	   though	   the	   latter	   could	   follow	   that	  
pricing	   policy,	   their	   very	   limited	   share	   in	   the	   dairy	   products	   and	   cheese	  markets	  would	   not	   allow	  
them	  to	  make	  sufficiently	  high	  profits	  to	  compete	  with	  the	  merged	  entity	  in	  the	  upstream	  markets	  by	  
offering	  farmers	  equal	  favourable	  buying	  conditions.	  The	  resulting	   loss	  of	  suppliers	   in	  favour	  of	  the	  
merged	  entity	  would	  prevent	  those	  competitors	  from	  having	  access	  to	  the	  minimum	  volume	  of	  raw	  
milk	  needed	  to	  carry	  on	  a	  profitable	  activity	  on	  the	  downstream	  markets	  and	  would	  therefore	  force	  
them	  to	  stop	  their	  business.	  	  
In	   the	   retail	   sector,	   a	   similar	  harmful	   impact	  on	   competitors	   and	   consumers	  was	  envisaged	  by	   the	  
Commission.	   The	   latter	   was	   indeed	   concerned	   about	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   mergers	   between	   large	  
supermarket	  chains	  would	  lead	  to	  driving	  competing	  retailers	  out	  of	  the	  markets	  and	  that	  consumers	  
would,	   as	   a	   result,	   be	   charged	   higher	   prices	   in	   the	   longer	   term	   due	   to	   reduced	   competitive	  
constraints	  exerted	  on	  incumbent	  retailers.	  However,	  two	  differences	  may	  be	  pointed	  out	  between	  
mergers	  in	  the	  retail	  sector	  and	  agricultural	  cooperative	  mergers.	  Firstly,	  where	  potentially	  harming	  
competitors	   and	   consumers,	   the	   mergers	   among	   supermarket	   chains	   were	   regarded	   as	   also	   and	  
primarily	   affecting	   the	  merged	   entity’s	   suppliers.	   In	   contrast,	   the	   Commission	   highlighted	   that	   the	  
particular	   structure	   of	   the	   cooperative	   insulated	   farmers	   from	   any	   exploitation	   of	   buyer	   power.	  
Secondly,	  the	  spiral	  process	  described	  by	  the	  Commission	  in	  its	  decisions	  related	  to	  the	  retail	  sector	  
and	  leading	  to	  the	  lessening	  of	  competition	  was	  a	  bit	  longer	  than	  the	  reasoning	  held	  in	  its	  decisions	  
on	   mergers	   between	   cooperatives.	   In	   the	   first	   case,	   the	   Commission	   maintained	   that,	   to	   exclude	  
rivals	  and	  thereby	  acquire	  sufficient	  market	  power	  in	  the	  up-­‐	  and	  downstream	  markets,	  the	  retailers	  
would	   first	   have	   to	   decrease	   prices	   in	   the	   downstream	  markets.	   By	   so	   doing,	   they	  would	   acquire	  
higher	   market	   shares	   in	   the	   downstream	   markets	   and	   thereby	   reinforce	   their	   position	   in	   the	  
procurement	  markets.	  It	  is	  only	  when	  all	  competitors	  would	  be	  sufficiently	  squeezed	  and	  compelled	  
to	   leave	  the	  markets,	  because	   in	  particular	  of	  their	  higher	  purchasing	  costs,	  that	  the	  merged	  entity	  
would	  have	  the	  possibility	  to	  raise	  prices	  in	  the	  distribution	  markets.	  The	  elimination	  of	  competition	  
would	   therefore	  occur	   from	   the	  downstream	  markets	   -­‐	   namely	   through	   lower	   (but	   not	   predatory)	  
prices	   in	  the	  retail	  markets,	  made	  possible	  due	  to	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	   in	  the	  procurement	  
market.	   In	   case	   of	   merger	   between	   cooperatives,	   however,	   the	   Commission	   maintained	   that	  
exclusion	  of	  competitors	  would	  in	  fact	  occur	  from	  the	  upstream	  markets	  through	  input	  foreclosure.	  
The	  high	  market	  shares	  of	  the	  merging	  parties	  in	  the	  procurement	  markets	  were	  indeed	  regarded	  as	  
likely	   to	   hinder	   competitors’	   access	   to	   raw	   material.	   The	   Commission	   hence	   concluded	   that	   the	  
transactions	  in	  question	  would	  reduce	  significantly	  competition	  not	  only	  in	  the	  upstream	  markets	  but	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also	   in	   the	   downstream	  markets	   as,	  without	   sufficient	   access	   to	   inputs,	   rivals	  would	   be	   unable	   to	  
compete	  effectively	  in	  those	  downstream	  markets.621	  	  
It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  competition	  concerns	  raised	  by	  the	  Commission	  in	  its	  decisions	  on	  mergers	  
between	  cooperatives	   resulted	   less	   from	   the	   specificities	  of	   such	  organizations	   than	   from	   the	  very	  
high	  market	  shares	  they	  held	  both	  in	  the	  up-­‐	  and	  downstream	  markets.622	  In	  both	  cases,	  objection	  to	  
the	   transaction	  was	  expressed	  because	   the	  share	  of	   the	  parties	  exceeded	  70%	   in	   the	  procurement	  
market	  and	  40%	  in	  the	  selling	  market.	  However,	  in	  the	  first	  case,	  a	  market	  share	  of	  near	  60%	  in	  the	  
procurement	  market	  for	  live	  cattle	  combined	  with	  a	  limited	  market	  share	  in	  the	  downstream	  market	  
for	  fresh	  beef	  was	  not	  considered	  as	  impeding	  effective	  competition.	  Actually,	  the	  characteristics	  of	  
the	  cooperative	   structure	  do	  not	   raise	  additional	  but	   specific	   competition	  concerns	  which	   seem	  to	  
arise	   only	   when	   the	   merging	   parties	   have	   a	   significant	   market	   share	   in	   the	   buying	   and	   selling	  
markets.	  	  
The	   specificity	   of	   those	   concerns	  mainly	   derive	   from	   the	   exclusivity	   and	  withdrawal	   requirements	  
imposed	  by	  the	  cooperative	  on	  its	  members	  since,	  if	  the	  parties	  have	  a	  considerable	  market	  share	  in	  
the	  upstream	  market,	  such	  conditions	  lead	  to	  input	  foreclosure.	  In	  comparison	  with	  the	  decisions	  on	  
mergers	  between	  supermarkets,	   the	  Commission	  seems,	  however,	   to	  be	  more	   lenient	   towards	   the	  
reinforcement	   of	   cooperatives’	  market	   power.	   Two	   arguments	  may	   be	   put	   forward	   to	   justify	   that	  
assertion.	  Firstly,	   the	  creation	  or	   strengthening	  of	  a	  cooperative	   is	  generally	  viewed	  positively	  as	   it	  
gives	  additional	  power	   to	   farmers	  who	  are	   the	  weaker	  actors	  within	   the	   food	   supply	   chain.623	   This	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
621	  Exclusion	  from	  the	  upstream	  markets	  would	  also	  occur	  in	  the	  retail	  sector.	  Incumbent	  retailers	  could	  indeed	  
impede	  smaller	  retailers’	  access	  to	  some	  products	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  markets	  through,	  for	  example,	  
exclusive	  dealings	  or	  other	  arrangements.	  
622	  For	  example,	  the	  Commission	  did	  not	  oppose	  a	  merger	  between	  dairy	  cooperatives	  which	  together	  held	  a	  
market	  share	  of	  15-­‐25%	  in	  the	  market	  for	  the	  procurement	  of	  raw	  milk	  and	  a	  market	  share	  of	  around	  25-­‐35%	  in	  
the	  market	  for	  the	  supply	  of	  long-­‐lie	  and	  fresh	  flavoured	  milk	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  See:	  Arla	  Foods/Express	  
Dairies,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3130,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  10	  June	  2003.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  Commission	  also	  rejected	  
the	  possibility	  of	  a	  collective	  dominant	  position	  on	  the	  buyer	  side.	  Buyers	  of	  raw	  milk	  were	  indeed	  considered	  
as	  fragmented	  and	  very	  heterogeneous	  in	  their	  need	  due	  to	  their	  different	  usage	  of	  the	  raw	  milk.	  The	  
Commission	  thus	  concluded	  that	  any	  coordination	  between	  buyers	  was	  unlikely	  or,	  at	  least,	  unsustainable.	  	  See	  
also:	  Arla	  Foods/Milk	  Link,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.6611,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  27	  September	  2012.	  In	  that	  case,	  
the	  Commission	  considered	  that	  the	  parties’	  combined	  market	  share	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market	  of	  raw	  milk	  
(20-­‐30%)	  was	  unlikely	  to	  raise	  any	  concerns	  as	  any	  attempt	  to	  change	  the	  procurement	  conditions	  in	  that	  
market	  would	  result	  in	  farmers	  switching	  their	  supply	  to	  other	  processors,	  co-­‐operatives	  and	  traders.	  However,	  
given	  the	  high	  market	  share	  of	  the	  merged	  entity	  at	  the	  retail	  level	  for	  the	  supply	  of	  long-­‐life	  milk	  (70-­‐80%),	  it	  
was	  concluded	  that	  neither	  competitors	  nor	  customers	  would	  be	  able	  to	  prevent	  price	  increases.	  It	  was	  indeed	  
found	  that	  retailers’	  countervailing	  buyer	  power	  was	  not	  sufficient	  to	  offset	  potential	  adverse	  effect	  of	  the	  
merger	  as	  the	  operation	  in	  question	  would	  remove	  a	  credible	  alternative	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  power	  and	  
thereby	  reduce	  significantly	  buyer	  power.	  
623	  We	  have	  indeed	  noted	  that	  the	  European	  Union	  promotes	  the	  creation	  of	  producer	  groups	  and	  
cooperatives.	  See:	  Council	  Regulation	  (EC)	  1234/2007	  of	  22	  October	  2007establising	  a	  common	  organization	  of	  
agricultural	  markets	  and	  on	  specific	  provisions	  for	  certain	  agricultural	  products	  (Single	  CMO	  Regulation),	  J.O.	  L	  
299/1	  of	  16/11/2007.	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enables	  them,	  in	  particular,	  to	  reinforce	  their	  bargaining	  power	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  strong	  buyers	  such	  as	  large	  
supermarket	  chains	  or	  industrial	  food	  processors.	  Secondly,	  while	  suppliers	  are	  the	  first	  affected	  by	  
an	   increase	   of	   retailers’	   buyer	   power,	   farmer-­‐members	   instead	   benefit	   from	   the	   cooperative’s	  
stronger	   market	   power	   due	   to	   the	   resulting	   higher	   prices	   paid	   to	   them.	   The	   “threat	   point”	  
established	  by	   the	  Commission	   in	  Rewe/Meinl	   is	   therefore	  not	   relevant	  when	  cooperatives	  are	   the	  
main	   subject	   in	   the	  assessment	  of	  buyer	  power.	  That	   is	  why,	   in	  mergers	  between	  supermarkets,	   a	  
combined	   market	   share	   of	   25%	   in	   the	   procurement	   market,	   such	   as	   in	   Carrefour/Promodes,	   was	  
already	  considered	  as	  likely	  to	  trigger	  the	  spiral	  effect	  and	  the	  resulting	  longer-­‐term	  harmful	  effects	  
for	  competitors	  and	  consumers.	  In	  contrast,	  a	  higher	  share	  in	  the	  procurement	  market	  seems	  to	  be	  
needed	  to	  entail	  input	  foreclosure.	  
4. Increased	  buyer	  power:	  rarely	  a	  competition	  concern	  
In	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   decisions	   in	   which	   an	   increase	   in	   buyer	   power	   was	   assessed	   by	   the	  
Commission,	  it	  was	  concluded	  that	  the	  transaction	  was	  not	  likely	  to	  impede	  effective	  competition	  on	  
the	  relevant	  markets.	  In	  most	  cases,	  the	  market	  share	  of	  the	  parties	  remained	  very	  low	  on	  the	  buying	  
and	  on	  the	  selling	  side	  or	   the	  transaction	  only	  added	  a	  small	  market	  share	   increment.	  However,	   in	  
several	  decisions	  on	  mergers	  between	  non-­‐cooperative	  slaughterhouses,	  the	  share	  of	  the	  parties	  was	  
definitely	  not	  insignificant	  but	  the	  Commission	  was	  nevertheless	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  competition	  was	  
not	  endangered	  by	  the	  operation	  due,	  in	  particular,	  to	  the	  sufficient	  number	  of	  alternatives.	  
a) Mergers	  between	  non-­‐cooperative	  slaughterhouses:	  large	  buyers	  deemed	  inoffensive	  
Different	  mergers	   among	   slaughterhouses	   were	   not	   blocked	   by	   the	   Commission	   even	   though	   the	  
combined	   market	   shares	   of	   the	   merging	   parties	   sometimes	   amounted	   to	   over	   40%	   both	   on	   the	  
procurement	  market	  for	  live	  animals	  and	  on	  the	  downstream	  market	  for	  the	  supply	  of	  fresh	  meat	  to	  
retailers	   and	   food	   processors.624	   This	   seems	   thus,	   at	   first	   sight,	   to	   be	   in	   contradiction	   with	   the	  
reasoning	  held	   in	   the	  merger	  decisions	   in	   the	   retail	   sector.	  However,	  when	   reading	   the	  arguments	  
invoked	  by	   the	  Commission	   to	   reach	   that	   conclusion,	   this	  only	   confirms	   that	   the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  
power	   is	   closely	   linked	   to	   the	   number	   of	   alternatives	   available	   to	   suppliers.	   The	   threshold	   of	   22%	  
established	  in	  Rewe/Meinl	  is	  indeed	  relevant	  only	  when	  a	  supplier	  lacks	  sufficient	  outside	  options	  to	  
replace	  a	  customer	  representing	  that	  share	  of	  his	  turnover.	  Where	  alternative	  buyers	  are	  present	  on	  
the	  market	  and	  have	   the	  capacity	   to	   increase	   their	  volume	  of	  purchases,	  no	  matter	   the	   share	  of	  a	  
particular	  customer	  in	  a	  supplier’s	  turnover	  since	  the	  latter	  will	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  switch	  to	  another	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
624	  See	  :	  Sovion/HMG,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3605,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  21	  December	  2004	  ;	  Sovion/Südfleisch,	  Case	  
No	  IV/M.3968,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  21	  December	  2005	  and	  Vion/Weyl,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5935,	  
Commission	  Decision,	  of	  28	  August	  2010.	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trading	  partner	  should	  a	  customer	  stop	  purchasing	  its	  products	  or	  require	  unacceptable	  contractual	  
conditions.	  
It	   seems	   nevertheless	   that	   the	   Commission	   showed	   more	   clemency	   to	   those	   mergers	   between	  
slaughterhouses	  than	  it	  did	  to	  concentrations	  among	  large	  supermarkets.	  It	  was	  maintained	  that,	  	  
“in	   any	   event,	   a	   merger	   that	   leads	   to	   increased	   buyer	   power	   is	   liable	   to	   significantly	  
impede	  effective	  competition	  only	  under	  specific	  circumstances	  in	  particular	  where	  it	  is	  
likely	   to	   lead	   to	   a	   reduction	   in	   output	   of	   the	   final	   products	   or	   the	   foreclosure	   of	  
competitors	  of	  the	  merged	  entity”.625	  	  
The	  main	  arguments	  advanced	  by	  the	  Commission	  to	  conclude	  that	  increased	  buyer	  power	  in	  those	  
cases	   did	   not	   raise	   competition	   concerns	   were	   the	   large	   number	   of	   alternative	   purchasers,	   the	  
transparent	   pricing	   system	   and	   the	   presence	   of	   strong	   competition	   on	   the	   downstream	   selling	  
markets.	  As	  regards	  the	  first	  argument,	  the	  market	  investigation	  revealed	  that	  rival	  slaughterhouses	  
could	  raise	  their	  slaughtering	  capacity	   if	  needed	  and	  that	  producers,	  not	  bound	  to	  slaughterhouses	  
by	   supply	   obligations	   or	   long-­‐term	   contracts,	   could	   thus	   easily	   turn	   to	   those	   competitors.626	  
Concerning	  the	  second	  argument,	  the	  Commission	  noted	  that	  slaughter	  prices	  were	  published	  on	  a	  
weekly	   basis	   and	   that	   even	   a	   small	   downward	   price	   correction	   imposed	   by	   a	   slaughterhouse	   led	  
suppliers	   to	   switch	   to	   other	   purchasers.627	   Finally,	   it	   was	   considered	   that	   the	  mergers	   in	   question	  
were	  not	   likely	   to	  give	   the	  parties	  a	   significant	  market	  power	  on	   the	   selling	   side.	   The	  new	  entity’s	  
share	   in	   the	  market	   for	   the	   sale	   of	   fresh	  meat	   to	   retailers	   and	   food	   processors	   remained	   indeed	  
limited628	   or	   the	   market	   share	   increment	   was	   de	   minimis.629	   Interestingly,	   the	   Commission	   also	  
pointed	  out	  supermarkets	  and	  industrial	  processors’	  considerable	  buyer	  power	  which	  would	  prevent	  
the	  merged	  firm,	  even	  when	  holding	  a	  higher	  market	  share,	  from	  exerting	  excessive	  market	  power	  in	  
the	   downstream	   markets.	   The	   significant	   pricing	   pressure	   exercised	   by	   those	   buyers	   on	  
slaughterhouses	  was	  viewed	  as	  sufficient	  to	  exclude	  any	  increase	  in	  price	  following	  the	  merger.630	  	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
625	  Sovion/Südfleisch,	  op.cit.,	  at	  40.	  
626	  See:	  Sovion/HMG,	  op.cit.,	  at	  50	  and	  Sovion/Südfleisch,	  op.cit.,	  at	  53.	  
627	  See:	  Sovion/Südfleisch,	  op.cit.,	  at	  51	  and	  Vion/Weyl,	  op.cit.,	  at	  27.	  
628	  See	  :	  Sovion/HMG,	  op.cit.	  In	  this	  case,	  even	  on	  basis	  of	  a	  narrow	  geographic	  market,	  the	  combined	  market	  
shares	  of	  the	  parties	  for	  the	  supply	  of	  fresh	  pork	  and	  fresh	  beef	  to	  supermarkets	  and	  industrial	  processors	  did	  
not	  exceed	  15-­‐25%.	  
629	  See:	  Vion/Weyl,	  op.cit.	  Even	  though	  the	  merged	  firm’s	  market	  share	  was	  higher	  in	  this	  case,	  amounting	  to	  
20-­‐30%,	  the	  Commission	  considered	  that	  the	  transaction	  only	  added	  a	  small	  increment.	  
630	  See	  :	  Sovion/Südfleisch,	  op.cit.,	  at	  73	  and	  78.	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b) No	  competitive	  concerns	  raised	  in	  the	  other	  cases	  
The	  Commission	  generally	  rejects	  any	  alleged	  impediment	  to	  effective	  competition	  when	  the	  parties	  
have	  a	  market	  share	  not	  exceeding	  20%	  in	  the	  procurement	  market.	  In	  such	  a	  situation,	  it	  is	  indeed	  
held	   that	   the	   merged	   entity	   would	   not	   acquire	   sufficient	   buyer	   power	   so	   as	   to	   be	   qualified	   as	  
dominant	   in	   the	   upstream	   market	   and	   would	   not	   be	   in	   a	   position	   to	   enter	   into	   anticompetitive	  
behaviour.631	  Where	  the	  parties	  have	  a	  market	  share	  above	  that	  percentage,	  the	  Commission	  takes	  
into	  consideration	  different	  factors	  to	  exclude	  the	  possibility	  of	  competition	  harm.	  
Firstly,	   the	  presence	  of	  powerful	  sellers	   in	  the	  upstream	  markets	  may	  play	  a	  role	   in	  preventing	  the	  
new	  entity	  from	  exerting	  excessive	  buyer	  power.632	  The	  mutual	  dependency	  between	  suppliers	  and	  
the	  merged	  buying	  firm	  is	  indeed	  viewed	  as	  an	  element	  excluding	  potential	  harmful	  effects.	  	  
Secondly,	  in	  its	  assessment,	  the	  Commission	  also	  examines	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  downstream	  markets	  
and	   considers	   that,	   when	   fierce	   competition	   is	   present	   on	   those	   markets,	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	  
power	  would	  not	  adversely	  affect	  competition	  as	  it	  would	  yield	  benefits	  for	  final	  consumers	  in	  terms	  
of	  lower	  prices.633	  
Thirdly,	  if	  buyer	  power	  is	  not	  a	  direct	  consequence	  of	  the	  merger	  itself,	  the	  Commission	  is	  unlikely	  to	  
pay	  a	  great	  deal	  of	   attention	   to	   that	   issue.	   Indeed,	   through	   its	  merger	  policy,	   the	  Commission	   can	  
object	  to	  a	  concentration	  but	  only	  where	  the	  transaction	  in	  question	  strengthens	  the	  parties’	  market	  
power	   to	   a	   significant	   extent	   so	   as	   to	   possibly	   affect	   the	   competition	   process.	   However,	   if	   it	   is	  
established	   that,	  before	   the	  merger,	   (one	  of)	   the	  merging	  parties	  already	  detained	  buyer	  power	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
631	  See	  for	  examples	  :	  Vodafone	  Airtouch/Mannesmann,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1795,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  12	  April	  
2000;	  Norddeutsche	  Affinerie/Cumerio,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.4781,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  23	  January	  2008;	  
Henkel/Adhesives	  &	  Electronic	  Business,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.4941,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  15	  February	  2008	  	  
and	  Akzonobel/Rhom	  and	  Hass	  Powder	  Coating	  Business,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5745,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  22	  
April	  2010.	  See	  also	  these	  different	  decisions	  concerning	  buying	  power	  of	  leisure	  travel	  operators	  on	  the	  
procurement	  market	  for	  hotel	  accommodation:	  Kuoni/First	  Choice,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1502,	  Commission	  Decision	  
of	  6	  May	  1999;	  Preussag/Thomson,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.2002,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  26	  July	  2000;	  C&N/Thomas	  
Cook,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.2228,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  26	  July	  2001	  and	  Karstadtquelle/Mytravel,	  Case	  No	  
IV/M.4601,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  4	  May	  2007.	  In	  those	  cases,	  even	  though	  the	  parties’	  market	  shares	  
amounted	  up	  to	  20-­‐30%	  on	  very	  specific	  procurement	  markets,	  the	  Commission’s	  investigation	  indicated	  that	  
the	  merger	  would	  not	  create	  significant	  dependency	  of	  hotel	  owners	  on	  the	  bedstock	  purchases	  of	  the	  new	  
entity	  since	  most	  of	  those	  hotels	  diversified	  their	  supply	  of	  rooms	  to	  more	  than	  one	  tour	  operator.	  	  
632	  See	  for	  example:	  Kingfisher/Asda,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1541,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  15	  June	  1999.	  In	  this	  case,	  
the	  Commission	  recognized	  that	  the	  transaction	  would	  enhance	  the	  parties’	  buying	  power	  in	  the	  procurement	  
market	  of	  recorded	  videos	  but	  also	  noted	  that	  the	  new	  entity	  would	  still	  face	  suppliers	  with	  significant	  
bargaining	  power	  like	  Sony,	  Warner	  or	  EMI.	  See	  also:	  Carnival	  Corporation/P&O	  Princess,	  Case	  No	  
COMP/M.2706,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  24	  July	  2002	  and	  Rexel/Hagemeyer,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.4963,	  
Commission	  Decision	  of	  22	  February	  2008.	  	  In	  this	  last	  case,	  the	  parties	  held	  a	  market	  share	  of	  20-­‐30%	  in	  the	  
UK	  procurement	  market	  of	  electrical	  products.	  The	  Commission	  noted	  that	  large	  suppliers	  represented	  a	  
significant	  part	  of	  the	  parties’	  total	  purchases	  and	  would	  therefore	  be	  able	  to	  mitigate	  the	  effects	  of	  increased	  
buyer	  power	  post-­‐merger.	  	  
633	  See:	  Kvaerner/Trafalgar,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.731,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  15	  April	  1996.	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the	  procurement	  market	  and	  that	  the	  operation	  does	  not	  reinforce	  significantly	  the	  position	  of	  the	  
merged	  entity	  in	  that	  market,	  the	  issue	  of	  buyer	  power	  will	  not	  constitute	  a	  competition	  concern.634	  	  
Concerning	   the	  different	   actors	  who	  might	  be	   affected	  by	   the	  exercise	  of	   buyer	  power,	   it	   appears	  
that,	   in	   most	   decisions,	   the	   Commission	   examined	   mainly	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   merger	   on	   the	   new	  
entity’s	  competitors.	   It	  emerges	  yet	   from	  the	  cases	  developed	  above	   that	   the	  assessment	  of	   those	  
effects	  has	   rarely	   results	   in	   the	  Commission	  blocking	  a	   concentration.	   It	  was	   indeed	  maintained	   in	  
several	  cases	  that,	  even	  though	  increased	  buyer	  power	  might	  enable	  the	  parties	  to	  negotiate	  more	  
favourable	  conditions	  for	  supplies,	  the	  transaction	  would	  not	  allow	  them	  to	  control	  access	  to	  inputs	  
or	   lead	   to	   any	   foreclosure	   effects	   for	   rivals.635	   As	   it	  was	   noted	   in	   the	  mergers	   among	   cooperative	  
slaughterhouses,	  a	  very	  large	  market	  share	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market	  is	  in	  fact	  needed	  to	  make	  
such	  a	  foreclosure	  effect	  possible.	  	  
However,	   in	   the	   food	   retail	   sector,	   the	   Commission	   also	   examined	   the	   potential	   exclusion	   of	  
competitors	   from	   a	   different	   point	   of	   view.	   It	   asserted	   that	   the	   better	   conditions	   obtained	   by	   a	  
powerful	   supermarket	  would	  allow	   it	   to	  undercut	   its	   rivals	  prices	  on	   the	  downstream	  markets	  and	  
thus	   to	   force	   those	   competitors	   to	   exit	   the	   market	   over	   time.	   One	   cannot	   but	   notice	   that	   such	  
reasoning	   was	   not	   followed	   in	   other	   sectors.	   For	   example,	   about	   a	   merger	   between	   large	   paper	  
distributors	   -­‐	   which	   took	   place	   within	   an	   on-­‐going	   consolidation	   process	   in	   that	   sector	   -­‐,	   the	  
Commission	   maintained	   that	   any	   competitive	   disadvantage	   of	   smaller	   players	   resulting	   from	   the	  
increased	  buyer	  power	  post-­‐merger	  could	  at	   least	  be	  offset.	  The	  main	  argument	  invoked	  to	  sustain	  
that	  assertion	  was	  the	  possibility	  of	  those	  weaker	  buyers	  to	  set	  up	  buying	  consortia.636	  By	  excluding	  a	  
potential	   spiral	   effect	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	   circular	   reinforcement	   of	   market	   power	   in	   the	   up-­‐	   and	  
downstream	  markets,	  the	  Commission	  did	  not	  envisage	  any	  potential	  harmful	  effect	  for	  consumers	  
in	  the	  longer-­‐term.	  	  
It	   is	   worth	   noting	   that,	   even	   though	   the	   merged	   entity’s	   increased	   buyer	   power	   is	   not	   likely	   to	  
impede	   effective	   competition,	   it	   can	   nevertheless	   be	   considered	   as	   a	   sufficient	   countervailing	  
pressure	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  a	  future	  merger	  between	  upstream	  suppliers.	  The	  Commission	  had	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
634	  See	  for	  example:	  T-­‐405/08,	  Spar	  Österreichische	  Warenhandels	  AG	  v	  Commission	  [2013]	  Not	  yet	  published.	  
The	  Tribunal	  confirmed	  a	  decision	  of	  the	  Commission	  authorizing	  a	  merger	  between	  two	  supermarket	  chains	  in	  
Austria,	  namely	  Rewe	  and	  Adeg.	  See:	  Rewe/Adeg,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5047,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  23	  June	  
2008.	  The	  Commission	  and	  the	  Tribunal	  considered	  in	  that	  case	  that	  Rewe	  already	  had	  buyer	  power	  in	  the	  
procurement	  market	  and	  that	  Adeg	  was	  a	  weak	  player	  in	  that	  market.	  Consequently,	  the	  acquisition	  of	  Adeg	  by	  
Rewe	  would	  not	  increase	  appreciably	  the	  latter’s	  leveraging	  power	  on	  the	  procurement	  side.	  
635	  See	  for	  examples	  :	  Carnival	  Corporation/P&O	  Princess,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.2706,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  24	  
July	  2002,	  at	  274	  and	  Akzonobel/Rhom	  and	  Hass	  Powder	  Coating	  Business,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5745,	  
Commission	  Decision	  of	  22	  April	  2010,	  at	  36.	  
636	  See	  :	  Paperlinx/Buhrmann	  paper	  merchanting	  division,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3227,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  10	  
October	  2003,	  at	  23.	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example	  considered,	  in	  February	  2008,	  that	  a	  merger	  between	  electrical	  products	  wholesalers	  would	  
not	   affect	   any	   upstream	  procurement	  market	   in	   the	  Netherlands	   given	   the	   limited	  position	   of	   the	  
new	  entity	  on	  those	  markets.637	  Less	  than	  two	  months	  later,	  in	  April	  2008,	  a	  concentration	  between	  
electrical	   products	   manufacturers	   was	   examined	   by	   the	   Commission.638	   In	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	  
different	   competitive	   constraints	   exercised	   on	   the	   merging	   parties,	   customers’	   significant	  
countervailing	  buyer	  power	  was	  held	  to	  be	  likely	  to	  prevent	  the	  merged	  firm	  from	  exerting	  excessive	  
market	   power	   following	   the	   transaction.	   Among	   those	   customers,	   the	   Commission	  mentioned	   the	  
wholesale	   company	   which	   was	   the	   fruit	   of	   the	   merger	   cleared	   in	   February.	   This	   shows	   that,	  
depending	   on	   its	   intensity,	   buyer	   power	   may	   be	   either	   a	   positive	   strength	   protecting	   the	  
effectiveness	  of	  competition	  or	  a	  harmful	  force	  leading	  to	  competition	  distortions.	  	  
C. CONCLUSIVE	  REMARKS	  
Even	  though	  buyers’	  increased	  market	  power	  acquired	  through	  a	  merger	  has	  been	  rarely	  considered	  
as	   impeding	   effective	   competition	   on	   the	   markets,	   it	   may	   raise	   competition	   concerns	   in	   some	  
circumstances.	  The	   few	  cases	   in	  which	   the	  Commission	  developed	   the	  potential	  harmful	   impact	  of	  
buyer	   power	   attest	   of	   those	   concerns.	   In	   the	   retail	   sector,	   different	   decisions	   focused	   on	  merging	  
supermarkets’	   buying	   power.	   It	   resulted	   from	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   Kesko/Tuko,	   Rewe/Meinl	   and	  
Carrefour/Promodes	   decisions	   that	   the	   exercise	   of	  market	   power	   in	   the	   procurement	  market	  may	  
distort	  competition	  only	  when	  the	  parties	  also	  hold	  a	  particularly	  strong	  position	  in	  the	  distribution	  
market.	   It	   is,	   however,	   not	   required	   that	   the	   merged	   entity	   is	   in	   a	   dominant	   position	   in	   the	  
downstream	  seller	  markets	  to	  oppose	  the	  transaction.	  The	  mere	  fact	  that	  suppliers	  are	  economically	  
dependent	  on	  the	  merging	  parties	  –	  that	  is	  when	  they	  rely	  on	  the	  latter	  for	  more	  than	  22%	  of	  their	  
turnover	  –	  may	  be	  deemed	  sufficient	  to	  put	  a	  spiral	  effect	  in	  motion.	  Even	  if	  competition	  is	  still	  fierce	  
in	   the	  distribution	  market,	   the	   lower	  prices	  obtained	  by	   the	  new	  entity,	  due	  to	   its	   increased	  buyer	  
power,	  may	  enable	  it	  to	  eliminate	  gradually	  competitors	  and	  thereby	  to	  reinforce	  its	  position	  in	  the	  
up-­‐	  and	  downstream	  markets.	  Such	  a	  strengthening	  of	  market	  power	  will	  be	  facilitated	  by	  different	  
competitive	   advantages	   and	   in	   particular	   by	   the	   success	   of	   the	   parties’	   private	   label.	   This	   might	  
result,	  in	  the	  long-­‐term,	  in	  harming	  consumer	  welfare	  as	  well	  due	  to	  higher	  prices	  and	  lower	  product	  
diversity	  on	  the	  shelves.	  
In	  mergers	  between	   farmer	  cooperatives,	   the	   reasoning	  of	   the	  Commission	  regarding	  buyer	  power	  
was	   slightly	   different	   but	   led	   to	   the	   same	   result,	   namely	   that	   increased	   market	   power	   in	   the	  
procurement	   market	   was	   likely	   to	   lessen	   competition	   both	   in	   the	   up-­‐	   and	   downstream	   markets.	  
Although	   farmer	   cooperatives	   are	   generally	   viewed	   as	   a	   positive	   instrument	   to	   combine	   those	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
637	  Rexe/Hagemeyer,	  op.cit.,	  at	  77.	  
638	  EATON/Moeller,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5050,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  1	  April	  2008.	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weaker	  players’	  forces,	  the	  Commission	  keep	  nevertheless	  an	  eye	  on	  those	  organisations	  in	  order	  to	  
prevent	  any	  input	  foreclosure.	  
The	  cases	  analysed	  in	  this	  Section	  constitute	  rather	  exceptions	  in	  the	  EU	  merger	  enforcement	  policy.	  
The	  Commission	  generally	  considers	  that	  the	  merged	  entity	  is	  unlikely	  to	  affect	  competition	  through	  
its	  buyer	  power	  due	  to	  its	  relatively	  low	  market	  share	  or	  to	  the	  large	  number	  of	  alternatives	  available	  
to	   suppliers.	   A	   merger	   is	   usually	   blocked	   when	   the	   transaction	   would	   create	   or	   strengthen	   a	  
dominant	  position.	   In	   the	  selling	  markets,	   it	   is	   rarely	  concluded	   to	   the	  existence	  of	   such	  a	  position	  
when	  the	  parties’	  combined	  market	  shares	  do	  not	  exceed	  40%.	  This	  contrasts	  with	  the	  much	  lower	  
“threat	   point”	   of	   22%	   established	   in	   Rewe/Meinl	   and	   regarded	   as	   particularly	   relevant	   when	  
suppliers	   lack	   sufficient	   outside	   options	   to	   sell	   their	   products.	  We	   cannot	   but	   notice	   that,	   in	   the	  
following	  decisions	  –	  except	   in	  Carrefour/Promodes	  –	   the	  Commission	  seems	  to	  have	  dropped	  that	  
threshold	  and	  to	  stick	  to	  the	  approach	  used	  to	  assess	  market	  power	  in	  the	  selling	  markets.	  This	  may	  
indicate	   that	   the	   Commission	   is	   relaxing	   the	   criteria	   applied	   to	   handle	   buyer	   power	   cases.	   It	  may	  
indeed	  consider	  that	  positive	  effects	  are	  paramount	  in	  most	  situations	  and	  that	  competitors	  are	  able	  
to	  counteract	  any	  potential	  negative	   impact.	  But	  this	  may	  also	   indicate	  that	  the	  “threat	  point”	  and	  
the	  spiral	  described	  in	  the	  retail	  sector	  are	  only	  relevant	  and	  accurate	  in	  very	  specific	  situations.	  The	  
elements	  characterising	  those	  situations	  would	  be,	  in	  particular,	  a	  fragmented	  supply	  side,	  a	  lack	  of	  
alternative	   buyers,	   competitive	   advantages	   as	   well	   as	   strong	   market	   power	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	  
merged	   entity,	   both	   in	   the	   procurement	   and	   the	   downstream	   markets.	   In	   those	   circumstances,	  
whatever	   the	   sector	   concerned	   by	   the	  merger,	   the	   parties’	   conduct	   is	   likely	   to	   sensibly	   affect	   the	  
competition	  process	  and	  harm	  consumer	  welfare	  even	  though	  their	  market	  share	  in	  the	  procurement	  
market	  remains	  relatively	  low.	  	  
Where,	   in	   EU	   law,	   the	   specificity	   of	   buyer	   power	   is	   not	   recognised	   as	   such	   in	   the	   texts	   and,	   in	  
practice,	  has	  been	  taken	  into	  consideration	  only	  in	  a	  few	  cases,	  one	  may	  wonder	  whether	  and	  how	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CHAPTER	  2	  –	  BUYER	  POWER	  IN	  NATIONAL	  LAWS	  
Noteworthy	  are	  the	  various	  instruments	  implemented	  by	  national	  authorities	  to	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  
buyer	   power.	   The	   analysis	   of	   national	   legislation	   dealing	   with	   that	   issue	   in	   different	   countries	  
provides	  in	  fact	  relevant	  examples	  and	  food	  for	  thought	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  way	  buyer	  practices	  may	  
be	   supervised	   at	   the	   EU	   level.	   The	   study	   carried	   out	   in	   this	   chapter	   is	   not	   exhaustive.	   There	   are	  
indeed	  numerous	  and	  various	  measures	  that	  may	  be	  adopted	  to	  regulate	  the	  use	  of	  buyer	  power.	  To	  
illustrate	  such	  diversity,	  we	  selected	  three	  countries	  on	  a	  discretionary	  basis	  -­‐	  namely	  France	  (Section	  
1),	   the	  United	   Kingdom	   (Section	   2)	   and	   the	  United	   States	   (Section	   3)	   -­‐	  where	   national	   authorities	  
enacted	  new	  rules	  to	  tackle	  buyer	  power	  problems,	  especially	  in	  the	  retail	  sector.	  
According	   to	   Regulation	   No	   1/2003	   on	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   rules	   on	   competition,	  Member	  
States	   are	  not	  precluded	   from	  adopting	   stricter	  national	   laws	  which	  prohibit	  or	   sanction	  unilateral	  
conduct	  engaged	   in	  by	  undertakings.639	  Accordingly,	  some	  countries	  such	  as	  France	  have	  expanded	  
the	  scope	  of	  the	  prohibition	  on	  abusive	  conduct	  to	  abuses	  of	  a	  state	  of	  economic	  dependence.	  The	  
introduction	  of	   the	  concept	  of	  economic	  dependence	  seemed	  promising	  to	   facilitate	  action	  against	  
powerful	   buyers	   as	   the	   notion	   of	   buyer	   power	   is	   mostly	   defined	   with	   reference	   to	   that	   concept.	  
However,	   in	  practice,	  the	  provision	  prohibiting	  such	  conduct	  has	  hardly	  been	  successfully	  enforced.	  
Acting	   at	   another	   level,	   outside	   the	   scope	   of	   competition	   law,	   French	   authorities	   have	   also	  
implemented	   contract	   laws	   in	   order	   to	   ensure	   fairness	   in	   the	   commercial	   relationships	   between	  
buyers	   and	   suppliers.	   It	   has	   yet	   appeared	   that	   those	   rules	   backfired	   and	   required	   therefore	  
successive	   legislative	  modification.	   It	   remains	   that	   they	   constitute	   a	  particular	  way	  of	   dealing	  with	  
buyer	  power	  issues,	  a	  priori	  more	  easily	  enforceable	  than	  the	  competition	  rules.	  
In	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	   authorities	   also	   took	   action	   outside	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   competition	   rules	  
through	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  soft	  law	  measure.	  Following	  different	  investigations	  into	  the	  grocery	  retail	  
sector,	   national	   competition	   authorities	   recommended	   indeed	   the	   implementation	   of	   a	   code	   of	  
conduct	  to	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  largest	  supermarket	  chains	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  The	  Code	  has	  been	  
adopted	  to	  eradicate	  some	  practices	  which	  were	  considered	  to	  be	  likely	  to	  chill	  competition.	  Such	  a	  
measure	  lacks	  however	  serious	  teeth	  so	  that	  one	  can	  cast	  doubt	  on	  its	  dissuasive	  effect.	  
Finally,	  we	  will	  turn	  to	  the	  legislation	  in	  the	  United	  States	  where	  competition	  authorities	  and	  courts	  
have	   been	   dealing	   with	   competition	   law	   issues	   for	   decades.	   The	   enforcement	   of	   the	   general	  
competition	  rules	  related	  to	  anticompetitive	  agreements	  and	  abuses	  shows	  that	  the	  prohibition	  on	  
those	  practices	  applies	  to	  both	  sellers	  and	  buyers,	  even	  though	  some	  courts	  are	  still	  more	  reluctant	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
639	  Article	  3,	  §2,	  in	  fine	  of	  Regulation	  No	  1/2003	  on	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  rules	  on	  competition	  laid	  down	  
in	  Article	  81	  and	  82	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  JO	  L	  1	  of	  04/01/2003,	  p.1.	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to	  sanction	   the	   latter.	  To	  address	   the	  question	  of	   large	   retailers’	  buyer	  power,	  US	  authorities	  have	  
also	   implemented	   specific	   rules	   which,	   in	   practice,	   failed	   to	   achieve	   the	   expected	   objective.	  
Measures	   were	   also	   adopted	   to	   tackle	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   further	   up	   the	   supply	   chain.	  
However,	   as	   in	   other	   countries,	   the	   focus	   on	   the	   effects	   of	   buyer	   practices	   in	   the	   downstream	  
markets	  only	   in	  terms	  of	  price	  and	  quantity	  restrains	  the	  effective	  enforcement	  of	  the	  competition	  
rules	  against	  large	  buyers.	  
SECTION	  I	  -­‐	  FRANCE:	  LEGISLATION	  TARGETING	  SUPERMARKETS’	  BUYER	  POWER	  
Since	  the	  eighties	  and	  the	  growing	  concentration	  in	  the	  food	  retail	  sector,	  France	  has	  been	  trying	  to	  
address	  large	  supermarkets’	  buyer	  power	  and	  to	  restore	  a	  balance	  in	  retailer-­‐supplier	  relationships.	  
Original	   legislative	   measures	   have	   been	   enacted	   to	   this	   end.	   Competition	   rules	   have	   first	   been	  
modified	  to	  encompass	  a	  new	  concept,	  namely	  abuse	  of	  a	  state	  of	  economic	  dependence.	  However,	  
the	   strict	   conditions	   assigned	   to	   that	   concept	   have	   made	   its	   enforcement	   difficult	   and	   rather	  
ineffective	  to	  tackle	  the	  issue	  of	  buyer	  power.	  Given	  the	  difficulties	  in	  protecting	  smaller	  retailers	  and	  
suppliers	   through	   those	   rules,	   the	   French	   legislator,	   in	   the	   nineties,	   added	   new	   provisions	   in	   the	  
Commercial	   Code	   prohibiting	   “anticompetitive	   restrictive	   practices”.	   Enacted	   specifically	   with	   the	  
aim	  of	  establishing	  fairness	  in	  business	  relations,	  the	  rules	  on	  restrictive	  practices	  have	  nevertheless	  
shown	   their	   limits.	   The	   prohibition	   to	   discriminate	   and	   the	   obligations	   imposed	   on	   retailers	   as	  
regards	   resale	   prices	   have	   in	   fact	   entailed	   adverse	   effects	   on	   competition	   and	   led	   to	   various	  
legislative	   modifications.	   French	   authorities	   mainly	   attempt	   to	   address	   the	   issue	   of	   buyer	   power	  
outside	   the	   framework	   of	   competition	   through	   rules	   regulating	   negotiation	   between	   retailers	   and	  
suppliers.	   However,	   other	   avenues	   may	   be	   suggested	   to	   ensure	   the	   maintenance	   of	   effective	  
competition	  on	  the	  retail	  and	  procurement	  markets.	  
A. CONCENTRATION	  IN	  THE	  FRENCH	  RETAIL	  SECTOR	  
Since	   the	   sixties,	   as	   in	   most	   Member	   States,	   the	   French	   food	   retail	   market	   has	   been	   facing	   the	  
development	  of	  big	  retail	  chains.	  Through	  various	  strategies	  of	  mergers	  and	  acquisitions,	  the	  degree	  
of	   concentration	   in	   that	   sector	   has	   been	   continuously	   increasing	   and	   led	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   an	  
oligopoly.	   That	   growing	   consolidation	   has	   given	   rise	   to	   two	   types	   of	   concerns.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	  
consumers	  may	   be	   deprived	   of	   a	   free	   choice	   between	   different	   retailers,	   especially	   in	   some	   local	  
areas.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  big	  supermarket	  chains	  may	  use	  their	  bargaining	  power	  to	  exclude	  smaller	  
retailers	  and	  impose	  unfair	  conditions	  on	  their	  suppliers.640	  We	  will	  focus	  on	  that	  last	  issue.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
640	  See	  :	  Opinion	  of	  the	  French	  Competition	  Authority,	  Avis	  n°	  00-­‐A-­‐02	  du	  4	  février	  2000	  relatif	  à	  une	  demande	  
d’avis	  sur	  un	  projet	  de	  réforme	  de	  l’ordonnance	  du	  1er	  décembre	  1986.	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The	   unceasing	   opening	   of	   supermarkets	   and	   hypermarkets	   (“big-­‐box	   stores”)	   has	   particularly	  
affected	   smaller	   and	   specialized	   grocery	   stores	   whose	   parts	   in	   the	   food	   retail	   market	   have	   been	  
shrinking.	   In	  addition,	   the	  predominant	  position	  of	  a	   limited	  number	  of	   large	   supermarkets	  groups	  
has	  modified	  the	  balance	  of	  powers	  between	  retailers	  and	  suppliers.	  Market	  power	  within	  the	  food	  
supply	  chain	  has	  moved	  from	  the	  upstream	  to	  the	  downstream	  market	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  suppliers,	  
especially	   small	  and	  medium	  sized	  enterprises	   (SME).641	  Buyer	  power	  of	   those	   large	  customers	  has	  
been	  even	  more	  reinforced	  by	   the	  creation	  of	  central	  buying	  agencies	   (centrales	  d’achat).	  As	  such,	  
the	  different	  outlets	  do	  no	  longer	  buy	  their	  products	  from	  the	  producers	  or	  manufacturers	  but	  from	  
the	  agency	  which	  negotiates	  the	  purchasing	  conditions	  for	  all	  its	  members.642	  Currently,	  five	  central	  
buying	  agencies	  account	  together	   for	  more	  than	  90%	  of	  the	  food	  retail	  market	   in	  France.643	  Such	  a	  
limited	  number	  of	  players	  on	  the	  buying	  side	  has	  dramatically	  impacted	  suppliers’	  bargaining	  power.	  
Various	  practices,	   nowadays	   common	   in	   the	   retail	   sector,	   attest	   of	   the	   shift	   of	   power	   in	   favour	  of	  
those	  oligopsonistic	  retail	  chains.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  demanding	  very	   low	  prices,	   large	  retailers	   impose	  different	   financial	  burden	  on	  their	  
suppliers	   such	   as,	   for	   examples,	   listing	   fees,	   slotting	   allowances	   or	   contribution	   for	   opening	   new	  
stores.	   Retrospective	   changes	   to	   contracts,	   excessive	   transfer	   of	   risks	   and	   late	   payments	   may	  
constitute	   another	   expression	   of	   supermarkets’	   buyer	   power.644	   All	   those	   practices	   and	   pressures	  
exerted	   by	   large	   retail	   chains	   are	   likely	   to	   harm	   producers	   and	   food	   processors	   but	   also	   smaller	  
retailers.	   	  Weaker	  competitors	   in	   the	  retail	  market,	  who	  do	  not	  have	  a	  similar	  bargaining	  strength,	  
may	   indeed	   face	   disadvantageous	   purchasing	   conditions	   affecting	   their	   position	   both	   in	   the	  
procurement	  and	  selling	  markets.	  
In	  order	   to	  address	  buyer	  power	  concerns,	   French	  authorities	  have	  been	  enacting	  many	   legislative	  
reforms	   in	   the	   last	  decades.	   Instead	  of	  using	   the	  competition	  rules,	   the	   legislator	  has	  mainly	   taken	  
actions	   under	   the	   title	   of	   “competitive	   restrictive	   practices”	   in	   the	   Commercial	   Code.	   Despite	  
linguistic	  appearances	  to	  the	  contrary,	  those	  prohibited	  practices	  do	  not	  fall	  under	  the	  framework	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
641	  Small	  and	  medium	  sized	  enterprises	  are	  particularly	  active	  in	  the	  production	  of	  own-­‐brand	  products.	  In	  
France,	  90%	  of	  private	  label	  products	  are	  supplied	  by	  SMEs.	  Where	  the	  development	  of	  large	  food	  retail	  stores	  
may	  have	  enlarged	  or	  opened	  new	  selling	  channels	  for	  those	  enterprises,	  it	  has	  also	  affected	  their	  bargaining	  
position	  in	  the	  negotiations.	  Retailers	  require	  very	  low	  prices	  for	  those	  products	  and	  impose	  strict	  conditions	  
with	  regard	  to	  the	  quality,	  packaging,	  delivery,	  and	  so	  on.	  
642	  M.-­‐L.	  Allain	  and	  C.	  Chambolle,	  «	  Les	  relations	  entre	  producteurs	  et	  distributeurs	  :	  bilan	  et	  limites	  de	  trente	  
ans	  de	  régulation	  »,	  Revue	  française	  d’économie,	  2003,	  at	  2,	  available	  at	  :	  http://hal.archives-­‐
ouvertes.fr/docs/00/24/30/00/PDF/2005-­‐06-­‐09-­‐964.pdf.	  
643	  Those	  central	  buying	  agencies	  are	  :	  Carrefour,	  Lucie	  (Leclerc	  and	  Système	  U),	  Opéra	  (Casino,	  Cora,	  Franprix,	  
Leader	  Price	  and	  Monoprix-­‐Prisunic),	  Intermarché	  and	  Auchan.	  	  
644	  See	  :	  F.Bergès-­‐Sennou	  and	  S.Caprice,	  «	  Les	  rapports	  ‘producteurs-­‐distributeurs’	  :	  Fondements	  et	  
implications	  de	  la	  puissance	  d’achat	  »,	  Revue	  Economie	  Rurale,	  2003,	  available	  at	  :	  
http://www2.toulouse.inra.fr/centre/esr/CV/berges/PROD.pdf	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the	   competition	  policy	   but	   are	   specifically	   designed	   to	  deal	  with	   the	   imbalance	   in	   supplier-­‐retailer	  
relationships	  	  
B. TWO	   SET	   OF	   RULES	   TO	   ADDRESS	   SUPERMARKETS’	   BUYER	   POWER,	   TWO	   DIFFERENT	  
OBJECTIVES	  
At	  first	  sight,	  the	  French	  legislation	  seems	  to	  be	  well	  equipped	  to	  apprehend	  some	  buyers’	  practices	  
harming	   other	   traders	   within	   the	   food	   supply	   chain.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   provision	   on	   abusive	  
conduct	   is	   better	   devised	   to	   encompass	   supermarkets’	   abuses	   than	   its	   counterpart	   in	   EU	   law	   by	  
including	  the	  concept	  of	  abuse	  of	  a	  state	  of	  economic	  dependence.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  various	  rules	  
on	   restrictive	   practices	   complement	   the	   Commercial	   Code	   in	   order	   to	   regulate	   supplier-­‐retailer	  
relations	  and	  to	  prevent	  unfair	  practices.	  Different	  objectives	  are	  assigned	  to	  those	  provisions.	  The	  
qualification	  of	  a	  conduct	  as	  anti-­‐competitive	  and/or	  restrictive	  is	  closely	  linked	  to	  the	  objectives	  to	  
be	  protected.	  
1. Anti-­‐competitive	  practices	  
Articles	  L420-­‐1	  and	  L420-­‐2	  of	  the	  French	  Commercial	  Code	  prohibit	  anticompetitive	  agreements	  and	  
abusive	   conducts.645	   With	   regard	   to	   the	   latter,	   its	   scope	   of	   application	   was	   extended	   in	   1986	   to	  
encompass	   not	   only	   abuses	   of	   a	   dominant	   position	   but	   also	   abuses	   of	   a	   state	   of	   economic	  
dependence	   (abus	  de	  dépendance	  économique).646	  That	  new	  concept,	  unknown	   in	  EU	   law647,	   could	  
have	   constituted	   a	   suitable	   instrument	   to	   act	   against	   some	   supermarkets’	   abusive	   practices.	  
However,	  we	  will	  see	  in	  the	  next	  section	  that	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  provision	  in	  question	  has	  been	  
particularly	  unsuccessful.	  The	  main	  reason	  relies	  on	  the	  objective	  assigned	  to	  the	  competition	  rules.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
645	  Code	  de	  Commerce,	  livre	  IV,	  Titre	  II,	  Articles	  L420-­‐1	  and	  L420-­‐2.	  
646	  Ordonnance	  n°86-­‐1243	  du	  1er	  décembre	  1986,	  Article	  8.	  	  
647	  The	  concept	  of	  abuse	  of	  economic	  dependence	  is	  also	  included	  in	  the	  competition	  rules	  of	  other	  Member	  
States	  such	  as	  in	  Germany	  (Act	  against	  restraints	  on	  competition,	  Article	  20.2)	  and	  Portugal	  (Competition	  Act,	  
Article	  7).	  In	  Belgium,	  in	  2006,	  a	  proposal	  for	  the	  modification	  of	  the	  Act	  on	  the	  protection	  of	  economic	  
competition	  provided	  for	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  competition	  authority’s	  competences	  through	  the	  introduction	  of	  
a	  new	  provision	  prohibiting	  the	  abusive	  exploitation	  of	  a	  situation	  of	  economic	  dependence.	  However,	  the	  
Competition	  Counsel	  at	  that	  time	  considered	  that	  such	  a	  provision	  would	  be	  a	  redundant	  duplicate	  of	  some	  
provisions	  of	  the	  Act	  on	  commercial	  practices	  and	  consumer	  protection	  and	  information	  whose	  violations	  can	  
be	  brought	  by	  private	  parties	  before	  a	  court.	  To	  introduce	  a	  cumulative	  competence	  between	  the	  competition	  
authority,	  an	  administrative	  authority,	  and	  the	  courts,	  which	  hand	  down	  decisions	  on	  private	  disputes,	  was	  
therefore	  deemed	  to	  be	  inappropriate.	  (See:	  Avis	  du	  Conseil	  de	  la	  concurrence	  sur	  l’avant-­‐projet	  de	  loi	  
modifiant	  la	  loi	  du	  5	  août	  1991	  sur	  la	  protection	  de	  la	  concurrence	  économique)	  The	  EU	  rules	  on	  competition	  
do	  not	  prohibit	  abuses	  of	  a	  state	  of	  economic	  dependence.	  However,	  the	  Commission	  has	  referred	  to	  that	  
concept	  in	  merger	  cases.	  We	  have	  indeed	  pointed	  out	  above	  that,	  in	  its	  assessment	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  a	  
concentration,	  the	  Commission	  also	  examines	  the	  potential	  consequences	  of	  increased	  buyer	  power	  following	  
the	  operation	  in	  question.	  In	  different	  cases,	  instead	  of	  looking	  at	  the	  market	  share	  of	  the	  merged	  entity	  in	  the	  
procurement	  market,	  the	  Commission	  examined	  whether	  suppliers	  were	  economically	  dependent	  on	  the	  
merging	  parties.	  When	  such	  state	  of	  dependency	  exists,	  the	  operation	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  negative	  impact	  
on	  effective	  competition.	  See	  for	  examples:	  Rewe/Meinl,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1221,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  3	  
February	  1999	  and	  Carrefour/Promodes,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.1684,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  25	  January	  2000.	  On	  
those	  cases,	  see	  above,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  2,	  Point	  B,	  2.	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The	   role	   of	   the	   authorities	   in	   that	  matter	   is	   to	   ensure	   that	   enterprises’	   behaviour	   on	   the	  markets	  
contribute	  to	  consumer	  welfare	  through	  lower	  prices	  and	  high	  variety	  and	  quality	  products/services.	  
They	   are	   only	   required	   to	   intervene	   when	   players’	   conduct	   negatively	   affects	   the	   degree	   of	  
competition	   on	   a	   particular	   market.	   The	   provision	   on	   abusive	   conduct	   is	   therefore	   not	   meant	   to	  
protect	  suppliers	  or	  smaller	  retailers	  against	  dominant	  or	  powerful	  supermarkets,	  unless	  the	  exercise	  
of	   such	  power	   leads	   to	  competition	   restrictions.648	  According	   to	   the	  French	  Competition	  Authority,	  
even	  though	  large	  retailers’	  practices	  affect	  the	  viability	  of	  some	  producers	  and	  food	  processors,	  the	  
risk	  that	  such	  conduct	  restricts	  the	  intensity	  of	  competition	  is	  too	  low	  to	  justify	  measures	  protecting	  
those	  weaker	  parties.649	  
Given	  the	  shift	  of	  powers	  between	  suppliers	  and	  retailers	  and	  the	  impossibility	  of	  acting	  under	  Article	  
L420-­‐2	   of	   the	   Commercial	   Code,	   the	   French	   authorities	   have	   enacted	   new	   provisions	   aimed	  
specifically	  at	  regulating	  the	  large	  retail	  sector.650	  
2. Competitive	  restrictive	  practices	  
The	   provisions	   included	   in	   the	   chapter	   on	   competitive	   restrictive	   practices651	   meet	   different	  
objectives	   related	   to	   the	   fairness	   of	   the	   commercial	   relationships	   between	   suppliers	   and	   retailers.	  
Governed	  by	  civil	   law	  and	  enforced	  by	  the	  national	  courts,	  those	  rules	  do	  not	  require	  any	  effect	  on	  
consumers	   or	   on	   competition	   to	   be	   sanctioned.	  Many	   practices	   are	   in	   fact	   prohibited	   per	   se.	   For	  
example,	  Article	  L442-­‐6	  mainly	  focuses	  on	  abusive	  transfers	  of	  wealth	  from	  a	  supplier	  to	  a	  retailer.	  
Among	  the	  objectionable	  practices	  we	  can	  mention:	  subjecting	  a	  partner	  to	  unjustified	  obligations	  or	  
trading	   conditions,	   obtaining	   an	   advantage	  which	   does	   not	   correspond	   to	   any	   commercial	   service	  
effectively	   provided	   or	   manifestly	   disproportionate	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   service	   provided,	   sudden	  
severance	   of	   established	   business	   relations,	   subjecting	   a	   partner	   to	   obligations	   which	   create	   a	  
significant	  imbalance	  in	  the	  contract	  as	  well	  as	  requiring	  listing	  fees	  or	  retroactive	  rebates.	  	  
Should	   a	   retailer	   do	  not	   comply	  with	   those	   rules,	   he	  will	   be	   liable	   and	  obliged	   to	   compensate	   the	  
harm	   caused	   thereby.	  An	  original	   system	  of	   action	   is	   provided	   in	   order	   to	   sanction	  offenders.	   The	  
case	  may	   be	   brought	   to	   the	   court	   by	   any	   person	   justifying	   an	   interest	   but	   also	   by	   the	  Ministry	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
648	  See	  :	  M.-­‐D.Hagelsteen,	  «	  La	  négociabilité	  des	  tarifs	  et	  des	  conditions	  générales	  de	  vente	  »,	  Rapport	  au	  
ministre	  de	  l’économie,	  des	  finances	  et	  de	  l’emploi	  et	  au	  secrétaire	  d’Etat	  chargé	  de	  la	  consommation	  et	  du	  
tourisme,	  Bercy,	  12	  February	  2008,	  at	  19.	  
649	  Opinion	  of	  the	  French	  Competition	  Authority,	  Avis	  n°00-­‐A-­‐02	  du	  4	  février	  2000,	  op.cit.,	  p.2.	  
650	  M.-­‐L.Allain	  and	  C.Chambolle,	  op.cit.,	  2003,	  at	  22.	  
651	  Code	  de	  Commerce,	  livre	  IV,	  Titre	  IV,	  Chapters	  II	  and	  III.	  Most	  of	  those	  provisions	  have	  been	  introduced	  in	  
the	  Commercial	  Code	  by	  the	  Loi	  Galland	  and	  Loi	  Dutreuil	  (Loi	  n°96-­‐588,	  1er	  juillet	  1996,	  sur	  la	  loyauté	  et	  
l’équilibre	  des	  relations	  commerciales,	  JORF	  3	  juillet,	  p.9983	  and	  Loi	  n°2005-­‐882,	  2	  août	  2005,	  en	  faveur	  des	  
petites	  et	  moyennes	  entreprises,	  JO	  3	  août,	  p.12639).	  Different	  modifications	  have	  since	  been	  made	  in	  order	  to	  
remedy	  some	  adverse	  effects	  that	  the	  Loi	  Galland	  caused	  on	  the	  markets.	  See	  below,	  Point	  D.	  
Final	  version	  -­‐	  Mai	  2014	   	  
203	  
	  
economy.	  The	  latter	  may	  request	  a	  whole	  battery	  of	  sanctions	  such	  as	  the	  suspension	  of	  the	  unlawful	  
practices,	  the	  nullity	  of	  the	  clauses	  in	  question,	  the	  recovery	  of	  undue	  payments	  and	  a	  civil	  fine	  up	  to	  
€	   2	   million.	   Civil	   cases	   involving	   the	   Ministry	   of	   economy	   are	   rising.	   In	   2010,	   21	   decisions	   were	  
rendered	   following	  an	  action	  brought	  by	   the	  Ministry	  and	   the	   latter	   intervened	   in	  6	  other	  pending	  
cases.652	   Giving	   the	   possibility	   to	   a	   third	   party	   to	   act	   against	   restrictive	   practices	   is	   particularly	  
important	   since	  most	   suppliers	   refrain	   from	   complaining	   about	   supermarkets’	   abusive	   conduct.	   In	  
most	   cases,	   the	   fear	   of	   losing	   a	   large	   customer	   constrains	   producers	   to	   accept	   unfair	   contractual	  
conditions.	  
Where	   the	   provisions	   on	   restrictive	   practices	  may	   constitute	   a	   suitable	   instrument	   to	   restore	   the	  
balance	   in	   supplier-­‐retailer	   relations,	   the	   Competition	   Authority	   has	   nevertheless	   highlighted	   that	  
fairness	  objectives	  may	  not	  be	  pursued	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  competition	  on	  the	  markets.	  Rigidifying	  
trading	   relations	  and	   limiting	   the	   free	  determination	  of	  prices	  may	   indeed	  damage	   the	   intensity	  of	  
competition	  and	  in	  the	  end	  penalize	  consumers.653	  The	  current	  anticompetitive	  practices	  included	  in	  
the	  Commercial	  Code	  are	   the	   result	  of	  many	  and	   still	   ongoing	   legislative	   changes.	   It	   seems	   indeed	  
that	   some	   of	   the	   first	   rules	   introduced	   by	   the	   Loi	   Galland	   in	   1996	   had	   an	   adverse	   impact	   on	  
competition	   and	   consumer	   prices.	   The	   different	   modifications	   which	   have	   been	   made	   so	   far,	   in	  
particular	  on	  the	  applicable	  threshold	  for	  below-­‐cost	  prices	  and	  on	  the	  prohibition	  of	  discrimination,	  
will	  be	  developed	  in	  Point	  D.	  
C. ABUSE	  OF	  ECONOMIC	  DEPENDENCE	  
Article	   L420-­‐2	   of	   the	   French	   Commercial	   Code	   prohibits	   both	   abuses	   of	   a	   dominant	   position	   and	  
abuses	  of	  a	  state	  of	  economic	  dependence.	  Such	  a	  broad	  approach	  of	  abusive	  conduct	  was	  meant	  to	  
remedy	  the	  strict	  conditions	  required	  to	  characterize	  a	  position	  as	  dominant	  and	  to	  give	  authorities	  
an	   instrument	   to	   protect	   suppliers	   against	   some	   large	   retail	   outlets’	   practices.	   However,	   the	  
Competition	  Authority	   has	   limited	   the	   application	  of	   the	   second	  prohibition.	   It	   has	   strictly	   defined	  
the	   concept	  of	   economic	  dependence	   and	   the	  notion	  of	   abuse	   so	   that,	   since	   1986,	   the	   conditions	  
required	  to	  apply	  the	  provision	  in	  question	  have	  rarely	  been	  met.	  
1. Abuse	  of	  dominance	  versus	  abuse	  of	  economic	  dependence	  
The	   first	   part	   of	  Article	   L420-­‐2	  prohibits	   abuses	  of	   dominance	   and	   is	   drawn	  up	   in	   similar	   terms	   to	  
Article	   102	   TFEU.	   In	   most	   cases,	   that	   rule	   is	   of	   little	   use	   to	   address	   retailers’	   behaviour	   in	   the	  
procurement	  market	   as	  even	   the	   largest	   supermarket	  hardly	  holds	   a	   sufficient	  market	   share	   to	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
652	  «	  Bilan	  de	  l’action	  contentieuse	  civile	  et	  pénale	  de	  la	  DGCCRF	  en	  2010	  »,	  Paris,	  2	  May	  2010,	  available	  at	  :	  
http://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/bilanpcr_civil_penal2010.pdf	  	  
653	  Opinion	  of	  the	  French	  Competition	  Authority,	  Avis	  n°00-­‐A-­‐02	  du	  4	  février	  2000,	  op.cit.	  p.4.	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considered	  as	  dominant.654	  That	  is	  why,	  in	  1986,	  the	  French	  Competition	  Authority	  has	  been	  entitled	  
to	   control	   inter-­‐business	   relations	   with	   the	   enactment	   of	   the	   second	   paragraph	   of	   Article	   L420-­‐2	  
which	  reads	  as	  follows:	  	  
“Also	   prohibited,	   whenever	   it	   is	   susceptible	   to	   affect	   the	   functioning	   or	   structure	   of	  
competition,	   is	   the	   abusive	   exploitation,	   by	   a	   company	  or	   group	  of	   companies,	   of	   the	  
condition	  of	  economic	  dependence	  in	  which	  a	  customer	  company	  or	  supplier	  finds	  itself	  
vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  such	  company.	  These	  abuses	  may	  consist	  of	  the	  refusal	  of	  sale,	  tied	  sales	  or	  the	  
discriminatory	  practices	  mentioned	  in	  article	  L442-­‐6.”655	  	  
The	  prohibition	  on	  abuses	  of	  dominance	  seeks	  to	  control	  the	  conduct	  of	  undertakings	  which	  hold	  a	  
dominant	   position	   in	   a	   particular	   market.	   The	   prohibition	   on	   abuses	   of	   economic	   dependence,	  
however,	  targets	  undertakings	  which	  have	  a	  dominant	  position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  a	  particular	  trading	  partner.	  
The	   concept	   of	   economic	   dependence	   therefore	   focuses	   on	   the	   business	   relations	   between	   two	  
contractors	   and	   on	   the	   economic	   power	   one	   of	   them	  may	   be	   tempted	   to	   abuse.656	   In	   an	   opinion	  
about	  the	  concentration	  in	  the	  retail	  sector,	  the	  French	  Competition	  Authority	  defined	  the	  condition	  
of	  economic	  dependence	  as	   the	   situation	  where	  a	   retailer	   is	   in	  a	  position	  of	  power	   in	   the	   relation	  
with	  a	  supplier	  so	  that	  the	  latter	  cannot	  escape	  from	  the	  business	  relationship	  in	  question.	  In	  such	  a	  
case,	  the	  economic	  viability	  of	  the	  supplier	  which	  is	  in	  a	  situation	  of	  dependence	  is	  no	  longer	  secured	  
should	  the	  relationship	  with	  the	  powerful	  retailer	  be	  put	  to	  an	  end.657	  
In	  order	  to	  sanction	  a	  supermarket	  under	  Article	  L420-­‐2,	  the	  situation	  of	  dependence	  of	  its	  supplier	  
must	  therefore	  be	  first	  established.	  The	  authorities	  have	  then	  to	  assess	  the	  abusive	  character	  of	  the	  
criticized	  practice	  with	  regard	  to	  its	  effects	  on	  competition.	  	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
654	  OECD,	  Monopsony	  and	  buyer	  power,	  Policy	  roundtables,	  DAF/COMP(2008)38,	  at	  164.	  	  Market	  shares	  
constitute	  an	  important	  factor	  is	  the	  assessment	  of	  dominance	  even	  tough	  other	  factors	  must	  also	  be	  taken	  
into	  account	  such	  as	  barriers	  to	  entry	  or	  expansion.	  According	  to	  the	  case	  law	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  a	  firm	  holding	  a	  
market	  share	  of	  50%	  may	  be	  held	  to	  have	  a	  dominant	  position.	  Between	  40%	  and	  50%	  market	  share,	  the	  
dominant	  position	  needs	  to	  be	  supported	  by	  other	  factors.	  	  Below	  40%,	  dominance	  is	  unlikely	  even	  though	  not	  
excluded.	  See:	  R.Wish,	  Competition	  Law,	  6th	  edition,	  at	  175-­‐183	  (2009)	  
655	  P.Këllezi,	  “Abuse	  below	  the	  threshold	  of	  dominance	  ?	  Market	  power,	  market	  dominance,	  and	  abuse	  of	  
economic	  dependence”,	  in	  Abuse	  of	  a	  dominant	  position:	  new	  interpretation,	  new	  enforcement	  mechanisms?,	  
2008,	  at	  63.	  
656	  L.Vogel	  and	  J.Vogel,	  “Abuse	  of	  dominance	  under	  French	  law:	  desirable	  evolutions”,	  Global	  Competition	  
Review,	  2011,	  at	  108.	  	  
657	  Opinion	  of	  the	  French	  Competition	  Authority,	  Avis	  n°97-­‐A-­‐04	  du	  21	  janvier	  1997	  relatif	  à	  diverses	  questions	  
portant	  sur	  la	  concentration	  de	  la	  distribution,	  p.32.	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2. Factors	  leading	  to	  economic	  dependence	  
The	  French	  Competition	  Authority,	  in	  different	  decisions,	  has	  put	  forward	  four	  criteria	  to	  be	  used	  to	  
assess	   the	   existence	  of	   a	   state	  of	   economic	  dependence.658	  Applied	   to	   the	   relationship	  between	   a	  
supermarket	   and	   its	   suppliers,	   those	   criteria	   are:	   Firstly,	   the	   popularity	   of	   the	   retail	   chain	   and	   the	  
importance	   of	   its	   market	   shares	   in	   the	   downstream	  market;	   secondly,	   the	   share	   of	   the	   retailer’s	  
purchases	   in	   the	   supplier	   turnover;	   thirdly,	   the	   reasons	   why	   the	   supplier’s	   sales	   are	   mostly	  
concentrated	   in	   that	   retailer,	   namely	   whether	   it	   is	   a	   deliberate	   choice	   based	   on	   a	   commercial	  
strategy	   or	   whether	   the	   supplier	   could	   not	   but	   deal	   mainly	   with	   that	   customer;	   and	   lastly,	   the	  
existence	  of	  equivalent	  alternatives	  (outside	  options)	  for	  the	  supplier.	  	  
In	  each	  case,	  the	  Competition	  Authority	  examines	  carefully	  all	  those	  criteria	  but	  rarely	  concludes	  to	  
the	   existence	   of	   a	   condition	   of	   economic	   dependence.	   For	   example,	   in	   the	   sector	   of	   parcel	   post	  
delivery,	  it	  was	  considered	  that,	  although	  more	  than	  80%	  of	  an	  undertaking’s	  turnover	  relies	  on	  the	  
orders	  of	  only	  one	  customer,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  former	  is	  economically	  dependent	  on	  the	  
latter.	  The	  main	  reasons	  excluding	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  L420-­‐2	  in	  that	  case	  were	  the	  existence	  of	  
alternative	   customers	   and	   the	   position	   of	   the	   buyer	   in	   the	   downstream	   market	   which	   was	   not	  
significant,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  popularity	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  market	  share.	  It	  was	  therefore	  concluded	  that	  
the	  customer	  in	  question	  did	  not	  constitute	  an	  obligatory	  trading	  partner.659	  The	  same	  reasoning	  was	  
held	  in	  a	  case	  involving	  the	  relationship	  between	  a	  cider	  apples	  producer	  and	  a	  cider	  manufacturer.	  
The	   Competition	   Authority	   recognized	   that	   the	   cider	   sector	   was	   highly	   concentrated	   and	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
658	  We	  only	  examine	  cases	  and	  criteria	  related	  to	  a	  condition	  of	  economic	  dependence	  on	  the	  upstream	  side	  of	  
the	  vertical	  relationship,	  namely	  the	  economic	  dependence	  of	  a	  supplier	  on	  a	  particular	  retailer.	  However,	  
most	  cases	  dealt	  with	  by	  the	  Competition	  Authority	  concerned	  the	  potential	  economic	  dependence	  of	  a	  buyer	  
on	  his	  seller	  in	  various	  sectors.	  See	  for	  examples:	  Décision	  n°01-­‐D-­‐49	  du	  31	  août	  2001	  relative	  à	  une	  saisine	  et	  à	  
une	  demande	  de	  mesures	  conservatoires	  présentées	  par	  la	  société	  Concurrence	  concernant	  la	  société	  Sony;	  
Décision	  n°02-­‐D-­‐77	  du	  27	  décembre	  2002	  relative	  à	  une	  saisine	  de	  la	  Société	  anonyme	  Daniel	  Grenin	  à	  
l’encontre	  des	  sociétés	  Imphy	  Ugine	  Précision,	  Sprint-­‐Métal	  et	  Usinor	  Achats	  ;	  Décision	  n°04-­‐D-­‐44	  du	  15	  
septembre	  2004	  relative	  à	  une	  saisine	  présentée	  par	  le	  Ciné-­‐Théâtre	  du	  Lamentin	  dans	  le	  secteur	  de	  la	  
distribution	  et	  de	  l’exploitation	  de	  films	  ;	  Décision	  n°05-­‐D-­‐44	  du	  21	  juillet	  2005	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  
œuvre	  par	  le	  groupe	  La	  Provence	  dans	  le	  secteur	  de	  la	  publicité	  dans	  la	  presse	  quotidienne	  régionale	  à	  
Marseille	  ;	  Décision	  n°06-­‐D-­‐10	  du	  12	  mai	  2006	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  par	  la	  société	  Bouygues	  
Télécom	  contre	  le	  grossiste	  Stock-­‐Com	  ;	  Décision	  n°10-­‐D-­‐08	  du	  3	  mars	  2010	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  
œuvre	  par	  Carrefour	  dans	  le	  secteur	  du	  commerce	  d’alimentation	  générale	  de	  proximité	  ;	  Décision	  n°11-­‐D-­‐04	  
du	  23	  février	  2011	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  par	  Carrefour	  dans	  le	  secteur	  de	  la	  distribution	  
alimentaire.	  
659	  Décision	  n°04-­‐D-­‐36	  du	  23	  juillet	  2004	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  dans	  le	  secteur	  du	  transport	  
de	  petits	  colis,	  para.9.	  This	  decision	  reveals	  that	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  buyer’s	  share	  on	  the	  seller’s	  turnover	  is	  
not	  decisive,	  especially	  when	  outside	  options	  are	  available.	  The	  same	  is	  true	  when	  the	  plaintiff	  is	  on	  the	  buying	  
side.	  For	  example,	  it	  was	  maintained	  that	  a	  telecom	  wholesale	  dealer	  who	  made	  100%	  of	  his	  turnover	  with	  the	  
sales	  of	  a	  particular	  supplier’s	  products	  was	  not	  dependent	  on	  that	  supplier.	  The	  importance	  of	  the	  share	  of	  the	  
telecom	  operator	  in	  question	  in	  the	  plaintiff’s	  turnover	  did	  not	  resulted	  from	  the	  impossibility	  to	  find	  
alternative	  operators	  but	  from	  a	  deliberate	  choice.	  See:	  Décision	  n°06-­‐D-­‐10	  du	  12	  mai	  2006	  relative	  à	  des	  
pratiques	  mises	  en	  oeuvre	  par	  la	  société	  Bouygues	  Télécom	  contre	  le	  grossiste	  Stock-­‐Com.	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processors	  enjoyed	  a	  significant	  bargaining	  strength	  with	  regard	  to	  apples	  producers.	  However,	  the	  
availability	  of	  various	  equivalent	  alternatives,	  such	  as	  the	  possibility	  to	  export	  apples,	  excluded	  that	  
business-­‐relation	  from	  the	  scope	  of	  Article	  L420-­‐2.660	  
The	   concepts	   of	   dominance	   and	   of	   economic	   dependence	   are	   different	   but	   not	   exclusive	   of	   each	  
other.	  As	  such,	  the	  same	  facts	  may	  be	  examined	  under	  both	  qualifications,	  each	  of	  them	  relying	  on	  
distinct	  constitutive	  elements.	   In	   its	  analysis,	  the	  French	  Competition	  Authority	  may	  reach	  different	  
conclusions	   as	   regards	   the	   position	   of	   a	   buyer	   in	   the	   procurement	  market.	   (1)	   It	  may	   exclude	   the	  
application	   of	   the	   whole	   Article	   L420-­‐2,	   considering	   that	   the	   buying	   firm	   has	   neither	   a	   dominant	  
position	   in	   the	   upstream	  market,	   nor	   a	   significant	   economic	   power	   over	   a	   particular	   supplier.	   (2)	  
Based	  on	  the	  criteria	  developed	  above,	  it	  may	  also	  consider	  that,	  even	  though	  the	  accused	  firm	  is	  not	  
a	  dominant	  buyer,	  the	  supplier	  subject	  to	  the	  alleged	  abusive	  practices	  is	  economically	  dependent	  on	  
that	   firm.	   (3)	   A	   third	   possible	   conclusion	  may	   be	   that	   an	   undertaking	   is	   dominant	   in	   the	   relevant	  
market	  and	  one	  or	  several	  trading	  partners	  are	  in	  a	  state	  of	  economic	  dependence.661	  (4)	  And	  lastly,	  
the	   qualification	   of	   dominance	   may	   be	   upheld	   while	   that	   of	   economic	   dependence	   rejected.	   For	  
example,	   following	   a	   complaint	   by	   a	   services	   provider	   for	   the	   maintenance	   of	   electrical	   wiring	  
devices,	   it	   was	   considered	   that	   the	   national	   electricity	   network	   operator	   was	   a	   near-­‐monopsony	  
customer	   for	   a	   particular	   type	   of	   services	   and	  was	   therefore	   in	   a	   dominant	   position	   in	   the	   buyer	  
upstream	   market	   of	   those	   services.	   However,	   the	   Competition	   Authority	   highlighted	   that	   the	  
concentration	  of	   the	  plaintiff’s	  activities	   in	  that	  operator	  was	  the	  result	  of	  a	  deliberate	  commercial	  
strategy	  and	  that	  alternatives	  were	  available	  in	  the	  electricity	  sector	  for	  the	  provision	  of	  different	  and	  
less	   specific	   services.	   As	   a	   result,	   that	   services	   provider	   could	   not	   be	   considered	   as	   economically	  
dependent	  under	  Article	  L420-­‐2.662	  
Those	  decisions	  prove	   that	   strict	   conditions	  are	   required	   to	   characterize	  a	  buyer	  as	  dominant	  or	   a	  
supplier	   as	   economically	   dependent.	   Getting	   through	   that	   step	   is	   not	   the	   only	   difficulty	   in	   the	  
application	  of	  Article	  L420-­‐2	  since,	  to	  find	  a	  violation	  of	  that	  provision,	  an	  abuse	  must	  be	  established.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
660	  Décision	  n°07-­‐D-­‐18	  du	  16	  mai	  2007	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  sur	  le	  secteur	  du	  cidre	  et	  des	  
pommes	  à	  cidre.	  
661	  See	  for	  example	  :	  Décision	  n°04-­‐D-­‐44	  du	  15	  septembre	  2004	  relative	  à	  une	  saisine	  présentée	  par	  le	  Ciné-­‐
Théâtre	  du	  Lamentin	  dans	  le	  secteur	  de	  la	  distribution	  et	  de	  l’exploitation	  de	  films.	  In	  that	  decision,	  it	  was	  
considered	  that	  a	  film	  distributor	  had	  a	  quasi-­‐monopoly	  in	  the	  relevant	  market	  and	  that	  cinemas	  were	  
economically	  dependent	  on	  it	  since	  they	  did	  not	  have	  any	  alternative.	  
662	  Décision	  n°09-­‐D-­‐21	  du	  23	  juin	  2009	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  par	  la	  société	  RTE	  sur	  le	  marché	  
de	  travaux	  de	  lignes	  aérienne	  haute	  tension.	  See	  also	  :	  Décision	  n°05-­‐D-­‐44	  du	  21	  juillet	  2005	  relative	  à	  des	  
pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  par	  le	  groupe	  La	  Provence	  dans	  le	  secteur	  de	  la	  publicité	  dans	  la	  presse	  quotidienne	  
régionale	  à	  Marseille.	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3. Abuses	  and	  effect	  on	  competition	  
The	  rules	  under	  Article	  L420-­‐2	  of	  the	  Commercial	  Code	  only	  apply	  when	  a	  particular	  conduct	  is	  likely	  
to	  restrict	  competition	  on	  a	  market.	  That	  requirement	   is	  strictly	   interpreted.	  Even	  if	  a	  practice	  may	  
lead	   to	   the	   exclusion	  of	   a	   player	   in	   the	  upstream	  market,	   the	  Competition	  Authority	   is	   unlikely	   to	  
consider	   that	   such	   an	   effect	   is	   sufficient	   to	   justify	   an	   intervention	   in	   the	   business	   relationship	  
between	  trading	  partners.	  We	  will	  analyse	  different	  decisions	  to	  illustrate	  the	  approach	  followed	  in	  
the	   assessment	   of	   a	   potential	   abuse	   and	   the	   circumstances	   in	  which	   such	   an	   abuse	   is	   deemed	   to	  
exist.	  
The	   first	   case	   does	   not	   concern	   the	   retail	   sector	   but	   the	   cinematographic	   industry.663	   A	   cinema	  
owner,	   holding	   a	  monopolistic	   position	   in	   some	   parts	   of	   the	   French	   territory,	   used	   that	   power	   to	  
reinforce	  its	  position	  in	  different	  territories	  where	  he	  was	  in	  competition	  with	  other	  cinemas.	  In	  fact,	  
he	   subjected	   the	  purchase	  of	   film	   rights	   in	   the	  areas	  where	  he	  had	  a	  monopoly	   to	   the	  granting	  of	  
exclusive	   rights	   in	   other	   parts	   of	   the	   country.	   The	   Competition	   Authority	   established	   that	   the	  
monopolistic	  position	  of	  the	  cinema	  owner	  in	  some	  geographic	  markets	  was	  sufficient	  to	  give	  him	  a	  
dominant	  position	  in	  the	  corresponding	  procurement	  markets.664	  The	  practice	  in	  question	  was	  hence	  
analysed	  under	   the	   concept	  of	  dominance.	   It	   is	  nevertheless	   relevant	   to	  examine	   the	   reasoning	  of	  
the	  court	  in	  that	  case	  since,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  abuse,	  an	  effect	  on	  competition	  is	  required	  in	  
cases	  of	  both	  a	  dominant	  position	  and	  a	  state	  of	  economic	  dependence.	  Even	  though	  the	  wording	  of	  
Article	  L420-­‐2	  (1)	  is	  not	  exactly	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  (2)665,	  we	  may	  assume	  that	  the	  Authority	  will	  equally	  
condemn	  a	  dominant	  buying	   firm	  and	  a	   firm	  on	  which	  a	   supplier	   is	  economically	  dependent	   if	   the	  
practices	  used	  by	  those	  buyers	  lead	  to	  the	  same	  restrictive	  effect	  on	  competition.	  It	  is	  indeed	  not	  the	  
nature	   of	   the	   conduct	   in	   question	   which	   matters	   to	   determine	   its	   abusive	   character	   but	   well	   its	  
impact	  on	  competition	  in	  a	  particular	  market.	  	  In	  the	  case	  at	  hand,	  it	  was	  concluded	  that	  the	  practice	  
of	  the	  cinema	  owner	  towards	  films	  distributors	  had	  an	  anticompetitive	  effect	  since	  that	  conduct	  gave	  
the	  former	  an	  undue	  competitive	  advantage	  in	  areas	  where	  he	  was	  competing	  with	  rivals.	  The	  use	  of	  
his	   market	   power	   in	   a	   particular	   market	   to	   exclude	   competitors	   in	   another	   one	   was	   therefore	  
considered	  as	  contrary	  to	  Article	  L420-­‐2.666	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
663	  Décision	  n°07-­‐D-­‐44	  du	  11	  décembre	  2007	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  par	  le	  GIE	  Ciné	  Alpes.	  
664	  Ibid.,	  at	  112	  and	  113.	  
665	  Article	  L420-­‐2	  (1)	  refers	  to	  Article	  L420-­‐1	  on	  anticompetitive	  agreements	  which	  provides	  that	  a	  practice	  is	  
prohibited	  when	  it	  has	  the	  object	  or	  effect	  to	  prevent,	  restrict	  or	  distort	  competition	  on	  a	  market.	  Article	  L420-­‐
2	  (2)	  provides	  that	  an	  abuse	  of	  economic	  dependence	  is	  prohibited	  when	  it	  affects	  the	  functioning	  or	  the	  
structure	  of	  competition.	  We	  may	  ask	  whether	  the	  choice	  of	  a	  different	  wording	  for	  the	  provision	  on	  economic	  
dependence	  was	  expected	  to	  be	  given	  a	  different	  meaning.	  
666	  Décision	  n°07-­‐D-­‐44	  du	  11	  décembre	  2007,	  op.cit.,	  at	  121-­‐130.	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In	   the	   second	   case,	   the	   Competition	   Authority	   dealt	   specifically	   with	   the	   issue	   of	   a	   supplier’s	  
economic	  dependence	  on	  a	  food	  retailer.667	  Following	  an	  operation	  of	  concentration	   leading	  to	  the	  
constitution	   of	   the	   buying	   group	   agency	   Opéra,	   the	   supermarkets	   involved	   in	   that	   operation	  
demanded	   that	   the	   procurement	   conditions	   be	   renegotiated.	   Suppliers	   were	   required	   to	   offer	  
various	  additional	  advantages	  without	  any	  compensation	  such	  as,	   the	  harmonization	  of	  the	  trading	  
conditions	   between	   the	   supermarkets	   based	   on	   the	   most	   favourable	   ones,	   retroactive	  
compensations	   to	   make	   such	   harmonization	   effective	   even	   before	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   agency,	  
payments	  of	  fees	  as	  an	  act	  of	  recognition	  of	  the	  new	  entity	  (“wedding	  gift”)	  and	  compensations	  for	  
virtual	   commercial	   cooperation	   services.	   Threat	   of	   de-­‐listing	   were	   added	   to	   those	   requirements	  
should	   suppliers	   refuse	   to	   comply	   with	   them.	   In	   some	   cases	   such	   a	   threat	   took	   effect	   since	  
recalcitrant	   suppliers	   were	   partly	   delisted	   and	   subjected	   to	   boycotts.	   Even	   though	   some	   of	   those	  
practices	  were	  unfair	  and	  unjustifiable,	  it	  was	  decided	  that	  they	  did	  not	  violate	  the	  competition	  rules.	  	  
Without	   excluding	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   situation	   of	   economic	   dependence	   as	   regards	   some	   of	   the	  
complaining	   suppliers,	   the	   Competition	   Authority	   considered	   that	   the	   renegotiation	   of	   the	  
agreements	  and	  the	  delisting	  of	  certain	  products	  did	  not	  constitute	  abusive	  conduct.	  The	  importance	  
of	  the	  buyer’s	  free	  choice	  was	  emphasized	  as	  the	  main	  tool	  to	  stimulate	  the	  suppliers’	  productivity,	  
the	   improvement	   of	   product	   quality	   and	   the	   cut	   in	   prices.	  Negotiation	   of	   agreements	   and	   trading	  
conditions,	  refusal	  to	   list	  or	  delisting	  of	  a	  product	  were	  recognized	  as	   lawful	  and	  not	   in	  themselves	  
anticompetitive.668	  Even	  though	  the	  practices	  mentioned	  above	  have	  led	  to	  a	  transfer	  of	  wealth	  from	  
suppliers	  to	  retailers	  due	  to	  the	  increased	  buyer	  power	  of	  the	  new	  agency,	  they	  were	  not	  declared	  
contrary	   to	   Article	   L420-­‐2.	   Indeed,	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   wording	   of	   that	   provision,	   retailers’	  
conduct	   is	  prohibited	  only	  when	   it	   restricts	  competition	   in	   the	  procurement	  market	  or	   in	   the	  retail	  
market	   in	   question.669	   According	   to	   the	   Competition	   Authority,	   obtaining	   advantages	  without	   real	  
compensation	  could	  not	  be	  considered	  as	  limiting,	  restricting	  or	  distorting	  competition	  in	  that	  case.	  
Concerning	   the	   delisting	   threat	   used	   in	   the	   negotiation,	   it	   resulted	   from	   the	   facts	   that	   only	   a	   few	  
suppliers	   were	   affected	   by	   that	   threat	   and	   for	   a	   limited	   number	   of	   products.	   In	   addition,	   it	   was	  
maintained	  that	  suppliers’	  access	  to	  consumers	  was	  not	  hindered	  because	  of	  the	  retailers’	  conduct,	  
excluding	  hence	  any	  restriction	  on	  competition.670	  	  
	  Examples	   of	   practices	   restricting	   competition	   in	   the	   retail	   sector	   may	   yet	   be	   found	   in	   two	   other	  
decisions.	   However,	   in	   those	   cases,	   the	   Competition	   Authority	   did	   not	   sanction	   the	   use	   of	   buyer	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
667	  Décision	  n°03-­‐D-­‐11	  du	  21	  février	  2003	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  par	  la	  centrale	  de	  
référencement	  Opéra.	  
668	  Ibid.,	  at	  67.	  
669	  Ibid.,	  at	  68.	  
670	  Ibid.,	  at	  82.	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power	  as	  such	  but	  well	  an	  agreement	  or	  concerted	  practice	  giving	  rise	  to	  such	  a	  power	  and	  affecting	  
suppliers	   or	   competitors.	   	   In	   the	   Lessives	   case671,	   a	   central	   buying	   agency	   delisted	   a	   supplier’s	  
products	   and	   organized	   a	   boycott	   against	   those	   consumer	   items	   by	   preventing	   its	  members	   from	  
buying	  them	  through	  any	  other	  channel.	  Where	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  central	  buying	  agency	  to	  negotiate	  
listing	   agreements	   is	   not	   prohibited,	   the	   Competition	   Authority	   nevertheless	   asserted	   that	   such	  
entity	   cannot	   implement	   practices	   affecting	   competition	   between	   suppliers	   or	   between	   retailers.	  
With	   regard	   to	   the	   practice	   at	   hand,	   it	   was	   held	   that	   the	   boycott	   limited	   the	   supplier’s	   access	   to	  
consumers	   and	   violated	   therefore	   the	   competition	   rules.	   Abuse	   of	   buyer	   power	   resulting	   from	   a	  
concerted	   practice	   was	   also	   sanctioned	   in	   a	   case	   involving	   a	   professional	   organization	   rallying	  
manufacturers	  and	  installers	  of	  heating	  and	  plumbing	  devices.672	  In	  order	  to	  limit	  competition	  coming	  
from	  hardware	   shops,	   the	  members	  of	   that	  organization	   jointly	   force	   their	   suppliers	  not	   to	   supply	  
competitors	   by	   threatening	   them	   to	   boycott	   or	   delist	   their	   products	   if	   they	   did	   not	   comply.	   The	  
object	  of	  the	  practice	  was	  clearly	  anticompetitive	  as	  access	  to	  the	  procurement	  market	  is	  essential	  to	  
compete	  in	  the	  downstream	  market	  on	  an	  equal	  playing	  field.	  	  
Those	   decisions	   show	   that	   the	   finding	   of	   an	   effect	   on	   competition	   resulting	   from	   buyer	   power	  
practices	   is	   rather	   exceptional.	   Practices	  were	  deemed	   to	  be	   anticompetitive	  when	   they	   restricted	  
suppliers’	  access	  to	  consumers	  or	  prevented	  rivals	  from	  buying	  a	  particular	  product.	  Due	  to	  the	  strict	  
application	   of	   the	   conditions	   related	   to	   the	   state	   of	   dependency	   and	   to	   the	   restrictive	   effect	   on	  
competition,	  Article	  L420-­‐2	  has	  rarely	  been	  applied	  to	  buyers	  and	  has	  never	  been	  used	  to	  sanction	  
unilateral	  conduct	  engaged	  in	  by	  a	  large	  retail	  chain.	  The	  notion	  of	  economic	  dependence	  seems	  in	  
fact	  unable	   to	  meet	   the	  political	  will	  which	  was	   to	  protect	   suppliers	  against	   supermarkets’	  abusive	  
practices.673	  	  In	  the	  nineties,	  another	  instrument	  was	  therefore	  implemented	  to	  restore	  the	  balance	  
in	  supplier-­‐retailer	  relationships.	  
D. COMPETITIVE	  RESTRICTIVE	  PRACTICES	  AND	  THE	  DRAWBACKS	  OF	  THE	  LOI	  GALLAND	  
Alongside	   the	   competition	   rules,	   the	   French	   Commercial	   Code	   includes	   provisions	   on	   restrictive	  
practices.	  Most	  of	   those	  provisions	  have	  been	   introduced	   in	  1996	  by	   the	  Loi	  Galland674	   in	  order	   to	  
overcome	   the	   difficulties	   in	   enforcing	   Article	   L420-­‐2	   against	   large	   retailers.	   That	   legislation	   was	  
enacted	  in	  order	  to	  level	  the	  playing	  field	  in	  the	  trading	  relations	  between	  small	  businesses	  and	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
671	  Décision	  n°94-­‐D-­‐60	  du	  13	  décembre	  94	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  relevées	  dans	  le	  secteur	  des	  lessives.	  See	  
also	  in	  the	  medical	  sector	  :	  Décision	  n°99-­‐D-­‐01	  du	  5	  janvier	  1999	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  par	  la	  
société	  Distri	  club	  médical.	  	  
672	  Décision	  n°06-­‐D-­‐03	  du	  9	  mars	  2006	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  dans	  le	  secteur	  des	  appareils	  de	  
chauffage,	  sanitaires,	  plomberie,	  climatisation.	  
673	  M.-­‐L.Allain	  and	  C.Chambolle,	  op.cit.,	  at	  10.	  
674	  Loi	  n°96-­‐588,	  1er	  juillet	  1996,	  sur	  la	  loyauté	  et	  l’équilibre	  des	  relations	  commerciales,	  JORF	  3	  juillet,	  p.9983	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rapidly	  growing	  large	  retail	  chains.675	  Where	  the	  objective	  pursued	  is	   laudable,	  some	  of	  the	  rules	  in	  
question	   led	  nevertheless	   to	  an	  adverse	   impact	  on	   competition.	  We	  will	   focus	   in	  particular	  on	   the	  
rule	  banning	  below-­‐cost	  prices	  as	  clarified	  by	  the	  Loi	  Galland	  and	  on	  the	  effects	  that	  such	  prohibition,	  
combined	  with	   a	   non-­‐discrimination	  provision,	   entailed	  on	   the	  markets.	  Other	   restrictive	  practices	  
introduced	  or	  modified	  by	  subsequent	  instruments	  are,	  for	  examples,	  imposing	  or	  attempt	  to	  impose	  
obligations	  creating	  a	  significant	   imbalance	   in	   the	  rights	  and	  obligations	  of	   the	  parties676,	  obtaining	  
conditions	  that	  are	  manifestly	  abusive	  by	  threatening	  to	  terminate	  commercial	  relations,	  imposing	  to	  
automatically	  benefit	  from	  the	  most	  favourable	  terms	  granted	  to	  competitors,	   imposing	  retroactive	  
rebates	  or	  breaking	  off	  commercial	  relationships	  without	  written	  notice.	  	  
1. Prohibition	  on	  resale	  below	  cost	  and	  on	  discriminatory	  general	  terms	  of	  sales	  
Resale	   below	   cost	   in	   the	   retail	   sector	   is	   prohibited	   in	   France	   since	   1963.677	   However,	   the	   unclear	  
definition	  of	  the	  threshold	  led	  the	  French	  legislator	  to	  clarify	  the	  rule	  in	  the	  Loi	  Galland.	  The	  below-­‐
cost	  prices	  threshold	  defined	  in	  1996	  corresponds	  to	  the	  “net	  wholesale	  price”	  which	  is	  the	  invoice	  
price.	  That	  price	  includes	  only	  rebates	  vested	  at	  the	  time	  of	  purchase.	  However,	  other	  discounts,	  not	  
mentioned	  on	  the	  invoice,	  may	  be	  granted	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year.	  The	  “double	  net	  wholesale	  price”	  
includes	   conditional	   rebates	   which	   cannot	   be	   evaluated	   at	   the	   time	   of	   invoicing	   such	   as	   quantity	  
rebates.678	  The”triple	  net	  price”	  is	  the	  price	  effectively	  paid	  by	  the	  buyer	  since	  it	  takes	  into	  account	  
all	   the	  rebates	  mentioned	  above	  as	  well	  as	  additional	  discounts	  resulting	  from	  commercial	  services	  
offered	  by	  the	  retailer	  to	  the	  supplier.	  Those	  services	  aim	  at	  stimulating	  the	  resale	  of	  the	  supplier’s	  
products	  and	  consist,	  for	  examples,	  in	  placing	  the	  products	  in	  question	  at	  the	  end-­‐aisle	  displays	  or	  in	  
launching	  promotional	  activities.	  The	  difference	  between	   the	  net	  and	   the	   triple	  net	  prices	   is	   called	  
“hidden	   margin”	   (marges	   arrière).679	   Under	   the	   Loi	   Galland,	   the	   hidden	   margin	   was	   hence	   only	  
benefitting	   retailers	   and	   could	   not	   be	   passed	   on	   to	   final	   consumers.	   Any	   price	   below	   the	   net	  
wholesale	   price	   was	   indeed	   prohibited.	   That	   threshold,	   combined	   with	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   general	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
675	  P.Biscourp,	  X.Boutin	  &	  T.Vergé,	  «	  The	  effects	  of	  retail	  regulations	  on	  prices	  :	  Evidence	  from	  the	  loi	  Galland	  »,	  
INSEE-­‐DESE	  Discussion	  Paper	  G2008/02,	  at	  1,	  available	  at:	  http://www.diw.de/sixcms/detail.php/86155	  	  
676	  That	  provision	  has	  been	  modified	  by	  the	  Loi	  de	  modernisation	  de	  l’économie	  (Loi	  n°2008-­‐776,	  4	  août	  2008).	  	  
Before	  that	  modification,	  the	  provision	  in	  question	  prohibited	  abusive	  exploitation	  of	  buyer	  power	  or	  of	  a	  state	  
of	  economic	  dependence.	  However,	  the	  courts	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  strict	  criteria	  established	  under	  Article	  
L420-­‐2	  as	  regards	  anticompetitive	  abuses	  of	  economic	  dependence.	  In	  order	  to	  simplify	  and	  make	  the	  provision	  
more	  effective,	  the	  French	  legislator	  enacted	  the	  concept	  of	  “significant	  imbalance”	  which	  is	  likely	  to	  apply	  to	  
more	  practices.	  
677	  Loi	  de	  finances	  n°63-­‐628	  du	  2	  juillet	  1963.	  	  Sales	  below	  cost	  are	  considered	  as	  unfair	  for	  different	  reasons.	  
Firstly,	  large	  retailers	  may	  use	  such	  practice	  to	  eliminate	  smaller	  and	  specialized	  competitors.	  Secondly,	  sales	  
below	  price	  may	  harm	  producers.	  Where	  a	  retailer	  sets	  very	  low	  prices,	  rivals	  may	  suspect	  their	  supplier	  of	  
giving	  additional	  advantages	  to	  the	  first	  retailer	  and	  require	  price	  reductions.	  Lastly,	  such	  practice	  may	  also	  
harm	  the	  brand	  image	  of	  a	  product.	  See:	  M.-­‐L.Allain	  and	  C.Chambolle,	  op.cit.,	  at	  11.	  
678	  P.Biscourp,	  X.Boutin	  &	  T.Vergé,	  op.cit.,	  at	  3.	  
679	  Ibid.,	  at	  4.	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terms	   of	   sales	   had	   to	   be	   non-­‐discriminatory	   between	   the	   different	   retailers680,	   entailed	   adverse	  
effects	  on	  the	  markets.	  	  
2. Negative	  impact	  of	  the	  Loi	  Galland	  on	  the	  markets	  
The	   enactment	   of	   the	   Loi	   Galland	   gave	   rise	   to	  many	   criticisms	   due	   to	   different	   adverse	   effects	   it	  
caused	   on	   the	   markets.681	   Where	   that	   instrument	   was	   supposed	   to	   protect	   smaller	   retailers	   and	  
suppliers,	   it	   seems	   that	   it	   failed	   to	   achieve	   that	   objective	   and,	   in	   addition,	   was	   detrimental	   to	  
consumers.	  
First	  of	  all,	  as	  the	  general	  terms	  of	  sale	  were	  transparent	  and	  non-­‐discriminatory,	  collusion	  on	  prices	  
between	  competing	  suppliers	  was	  easier	  to	  maintain.	  Indeed,	  lower	  retail	  prices	  of	  a	  particular	  brand	  
could	  only	  be	  the	  result	  of	  a	  deviation	  by	  one	  of	  the	  manufacturers	  involved	  in	  the	  agreement	  since	  
retailers	  were	  forbidden	  by	  law	  to	  sell	  below	  the	  (agreed)	  invoice	  price.	  Such	  transparency	  facilitated	  
the	  monitoring	  of	  the	  coordinated	  policy	  and	  enabled	  suppliers	  to	  take	  quickly	  retaliatory	  measures	  
against	  the	  deviating	  player.682	  
Secondly,	  it	  was	  maintained	  that	  the	  Loi	  Galland	  led	  in	  fact	  to	  minimum	  resale	  prices	  maintenance.683	  
Indeed,	   as	   retailers	   were	   not	   allowed	   to	   resale	   below	   cost,	   the	   invoice	   price	   resulting	   from	   the	  
general	  terms	  of	  sales	  -­‐	  common	  to	  all	  retailers	  due	  to	  the	  non-­‐discriminatory	  principle	  -­‐	  constituted	  
de	  facto	  a	  minimum	  price.684	  In	  addition,	  the	  Loi	  Galland	  enabled	  suppliers	  to	  impose	  relatively	  high	  
prices.	   Indeed,	  because	  of	  the	  prohibition	  on	  discrimination,	  retailers	  were	  not	   incited	  to	  negotiate	  
lower	   prices	   as	   they	   knew	   that	   any	   reduction	   would	   also	   benefit	   competitors.	   They	   were	   also	  
guaranteed	  that	  the	  same	  conditions	  were	  imposed	  on	  rivals	  who	  could	  therefore	  not	  sell	  products	  
under	  the	  same	  invoice	  price	  threshold.685	  Besides,	  it	  was	  pointed	  out	  that	  suppliers	  could	  “buy”	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
680	  It	  was	  nevertheless	  still	  possible	  to	  obtain	  different	  terms	  of	  sale	  on	  basis	  of	  objective	  criteria	  such	  as	  the	  
characteristics	  of	  the	  distribution	  channel.	  The	  prohibition	  on	  discrimination	  was	  imposed	  on	  suppliers	  in	  order	  
to	  prevent	  a	  powerful	  retailer	  from	  obtaining	  exclusive	  rebates	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  excluding	  competitors.	  With	  
regard	  to	  arguments	  in	  favour	  or	  against	  such	  prohibition,	  see:	  M.-­‐L.Allain,	  C.Chambolle	  &	  T.Vergé,	  “La	  loi	  
Galland	  sur	  les	  relations	  commerciales	  –	  Jusqu’où	  la	  reformer?”,	  Opuscules	  du	  CEPREMAP,	  2008,	  at	  51-­‐52.	  




682	  Avis	  n°04-­‐A-­‐18	  du	  18	  octobre	  2004	  relatif	  à	  une	  demande	  d’avis	  présentée	  par	  l’Union	  Fédérale	  des	  
Consommateurs	  (UFC-­‐Que	  Choisir)	  relative	  aux	  conditions	  de	  la	  concurrence	  dans	  le	  secteur	  de	  la	  grande	  
distribution	  non	  spécialisée,	  at	  45.	  
683	  Different	  cases	  of	  resale	  price	  maintenance	  were	  sanctioned.	  See:	  Décision	  n°03-­‐D-­‐45	  du	  25	  septembre	  
2003	  relative	  aux	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  dans	  le	  secteur	  des	  calculatrices	  à	  usage	  scolaire	  ;	  Décision	  n°05-­‐D-­‐
45	  du	  19	  décembre	  2005	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  dans	  le	  secteur	  des	  vidéocassettes	  
préenregistrées	  ;	  Décision	  n°07-­‐D-­‐50	  du	  20	  décembre	  2007	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  dans	  le	  
secteur	  de	  la	  distribution	  des	  jouets.	  
684	  M.-­‐L.Allain,	  C.Chambolle	  &	  T.Vergé,	  op.cit.,	  at	  21.	  
685	  Avis	  n°04-­‐A-­‐18	  du	  18	  octobre	  2004,	  op.cit.,	  at	  38.	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retailers’	   agreement	   on	   increased	   prices	   through	   the	   guaranty	   of	   a	   higher	   hidden	   margin.686	   The	  
heart	  of	  the	  negotiation	  therefore	  shifted	  from	  “upfront	  margins”,	  namely	  rebates	  vested	  at	  the	  time	  
of	   the	   invoice,	   to	   “hidden	  margins”.687	   Large	   retailers	  were	   allowed	   to	   exert	   buyer	   power	   only	   to	  
their	   own	   benefit	   as	   they	   could	   not	   integrate	   additional	   discounts	   into	   the	   resale	   below	   cost	  
threshold.	  
As	  a	  result,	  intra-­‐brand	  competition	  was	  affected	  and	  retail	  prices	  were	  on	  the	  rise.688	  The	  intrusion	  
of	   regulatory	   instruments	   into	   the	   business-­‐relationship	   between	   retailers	   and	   suppliers	   caused	  
adverse	   effects	   to	   the	   retail	   markets	   in	   France.	   In	   addition,	   the	   achievement	   of	   the	   Loi	   Galland	  
objective	  was	  not	  fully	  ensured	  since	  buyer	  power	  could	  still	  be	  exercised	  through	  the	  negotiation	  of	  
hidden	   margins	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   weaker	   suppliers	   and	   retailers.	   Noting	   those	   drawbacks,	   the	  
French	  legislator	  enacted	  different	  reforms	  in	  the	  2000s.	  
3. Subsequent	  modifications	  of	  the	  Loi	  Galland	  
In	   2005,	   through	   the	   Loi	   Dutreuil689,	   the	   threshold	   for	   below	   cost	   pricing	   was	   slightly	   modified.	  
However,	   it	   is	  only	  in	  2008	  that	  the	  Loi	  Châtel690	  reduced	  that	  threshold	  to	  the	  triple	  net	  wholesale	  
price.	   All	   financial	   advantages	   granted	   by	   suppliers	   to	   retailers	   can	   henceforth	   be	   passed	   on	   to	  
consumers	   through	   lower	  prices.	  As	   regards	   the	  prohibition	   to	  discriminate,	   it	  was	   lifted	   the	   same	  
year	   by	   the	   Loi	   de	   modernisation	   de	   l’économie.691	   Retailers	   and	   suppliers	   can	   therefore	   freely	  
negotiate	  prices	  and	  do	  no	  longer	  have	  to	  justify	  any	  advantage	  given	  to	  one	  or	  the	  other	  retail	  chain.	  
The	  objective	   is	   to	  enhance	  competition	  both	   in	   the	  procurement	  and	   in	   the	   retail	  markets	  and	   to	  
facilitate	  the	  passing-­‐on	  of	  rebates	  to	  consumers.692	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
686	  Ibid.,	  at	  39.	  
687	  P.Biscourp,	  X.Boutin	  &	  T.Vergé,	  op.cit.,	  at	  2.	  
688	  Where,	  between	  1996	  and	  2001,	  food	  retail	  prices	  were	  decreasing	  in	  most	  Member	  States,	  French	  
consumers	  were	  facing	  a	  rise	  in	  prices	  in	  their	  supermarkets.	  Food	  prices	  were	  indeed	  increasing	  faster	  than	  
the	  general	  consumer	  price	  index	  in	  France.	  See:	  P.Biscourp,	  X.Boutin	  &	  T.Vergé,	  op.cit.	  That	  paper	  provides	  an	  
empirical	  evaluation	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  Loi	  Galland	  and	  established	  that	  the	  correlation	  between	  retail	  prices	  
and	  the	  level	  of	  concentration	  has	  vanished	  following	  the	  enactment	  of	  that	  legislation	  confirming	  that	  retail	  
chains	  did	  no	  longer	  compete	  fiercely.	  A	  similar	  effect	  was	  noticed	  in	  Ireland	  where	  a	  comparable	  instrument	  
to	  the	  Loi	  Galland	  (prohibition	  on	  resale	  below	  cost	  with	  the	  same	  threshold	  and	  prohibition	  on	  tariff	  
differentiation)	  was	  in	  force	  since	  1987	  (Grocery	  Order	  Act).	  That	  piece	  of	  legislation	  was	  held	  responsible	  for	  
the	  inflationary	  spiral	  and	  repealed	  in	  2006.	  See:	  A.Collins	  &	  S.Burt,	  “Below	  cost	  legislation:	  lessons	  from	  the	  
Republic	  of	  Ireland”,	  International	  Review	  of	  Retail	  Distribution	  and	  Consumer	  Research,	  at	  33-­‐49	  (2011).	  
689	  Loi	  n°2005-­‐882,	  2	  août	  2005,	  en	  faveur	  des	  petites	  et	  moyennes	  entreprises,	  JO	  3	  août,	  p.12639.	  
690	  Loi	  n°2008-­‐3,	  3	  janvier	  2008,	  pour	  le	  développement	  de	  la	  concurrence	  au	  service	  des	  consommateurs,	  JO	  4	  
janvier,	  p.258.	  
691	  Loi	  n°2008-­‐776,	  4	  août	  2008,	  de	  modernisation	  de	  l’économie,	  JO	  5	  août,	  p.12471.	  
692	  OECD,	  Monopsony	  and	  buyer	  power,	  Policy	  roundtables,	  DAF/COMP(2008)38,	  at	  164.	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E. OTHER	  OPTIONS	  TO	  ADDRESS	  THE	  EXERCISE	  OF	  BUYER	  POWER?	  
As	  illustrated	  by	  the	  Loi	  Galland,	  too	  strict	  supervision	  of	  supplier-­‐retailer	  relationships	  may	  lead	  to	  
competition	  restriction,	  increase	  in	  prices	  and	  harm	  to	  final	  consumers.	  Where	  the	  legislator	  may	  be	  
entitled,	  in	  some	  circumstances,	  to	  take	  measures	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  weaker	  players	  on	  the	  markets,	  
this	   cannot	   be	   made	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   competition.	   On	   that	   matter,	   the	   French	   competition	  
authority	   asserted	   that	   excessive	   interventionism	   in	   the	   business	   relations	   is	   likely	   to	  weaken	   the	  
competition	   process.693	   Different	   other	   solutions	   have	   therefore	   been	   suggested	   to	   address	   the	  
adverse	  effects	  that	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  may	  cause	  to	  suppliers,	  smaller	  retailers	  but	  also	  to	  
the	  market	  structure	  as	  a	  whole.	  
Firstly,	   the	   balance	   of	   negotiating	   power	   between	   retailers	   and	   suppliers	   may	   be	   improved	   by	  
reinforcing	   the	   latter’s	   position	   in	   the	   upstream	   market.	   This	   is	   particularly	   encouraged	   in	   the	  
procurement	  markets	   for	   agricultural	   products	   where	   derogations	   from	   the	   competition	   rules	   are	  
provided	  for	  at	  EU	  level.	  Facing	  a	  much	  concentrated	  buying	  side,	  farmers	  are	  allowed,	  under	  specific	  
conditions,	  to	  group	  together	   in	  producer	  organizations	  to	  offer	  their	  products.	  Such	  concentration	  
of	  supply	  can	  be	  achieved	  by	  the	  creation	  of	  cooperatives	  or	  associations	  of	  farmers.694	  In	  particular,	  
on	   that	   matter,	   the	   French	   legislator	   has	   enacted	   new	   rules	   imposing	   on	   milk	   producers	   and	  
processors	  to	  contractualise	  their	  relationships	  and	  allowing	  the	  former	  to	  negotiate	  collectively	  the	  
contract	  terms	  and	  conditions.695	  The	  French	  Competition	  Authority	  encourages	  producers	  to	  gather	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
693	  Avis	  n°00-­‐A-­‐02	  du	  04	  février	  2000,	  op.cit.,	  p.10.	  
694	  Under	  the	  status	  of	  a	  cooperative,	  producers	  transfer	  the	  ownership	  of	  their	  products	  to	  the	  organization.	  
Profits	  deriving	  from	  the	  cooperative’s	  activity	  are	  then	  shared	  between	  farmer	  members.	  Under	  the	  status	  of	  
an	  association,	  the	  organization	  markets	  the	  products	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  farmers	  on	  basis	  of	  a	  mandate.	  The	  
selling	  price	  is	  individualized	  for	  each	  producer.	  Those	  types	  of	  agreements	  between	  farmers	  are	  concluded	  in	  
the	  framework	  of	  the	  common	  organization	  of	  agricultural	  products	  in	  EU	  law.	  That	  legal	  framework	  
established	  at	  EU	  level	  provides	  for	  common	  rules	  concerning,	  in	  particular,	  public	  intervention	  in	  agricultural	  
markets,	  quota	  and	  aid	  schemes,	  marketing	  and	  production	  standards,	  and	  trade	  with	  third	  countries.	  See:	  
Council	  Regulation	  (EC)	  No	  1234/2007	  of	  22	  October	  2007	  establishing	  a	  common	  organisation	  of	  agricultural	  
markets	  and	  on	  specific	  provisions	  for	  certain	  agricultural	  products	  (Single	  CMO	  Regulation),	  OJ	  L	  299,	  16	  July	  
2009,	  p.I-­‐149.	  	  
695	  See	  :	  Loi	  n°	  2010-­‐874	  du	  27	  juillet	  2010	  de	  modernisation	  de	  l'agriculture	  et	  de	  la	  pêche.	  This	  act	  provides	  
that	  contract	  agreements	  can	  be	  made	  compulsory	  within	  a	  sector.	  In	  application	  of	  that	  act,	  a	  decree	  declares	  
it	  compulsory	  for	  the	  dairy	  industry	  to	  propose	  contracts	  in	  writing	  and	  provides	  for	  compulsory	  provisions	  to	  
be	  included	  in	  each	  contract.	  (See	  :	  Décrets	  n°	  2010-­‐1753	  30	  décembre	  2010	  pris	  pour	  l’application	  de	  l’article	  
L.631-­‐24	  du	  code	  rural	  et	  de	  la	  pêche	  maritime	  dans	  le	  secteur	  laitier.	  See	  also	  :	  Décret	  2012-­‐512	  du	  19	  avril	  
2012	  relatif	  à	  l’organisation	  économique	  dans	  le	  secteur	  du	  lait	  de	  vache)	  Those	  provisions	  are	  in	  compliance	  
with	  EU	  law.	  See	  :	  Regulation	  (UE)	  n°261/2012	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  14	  March	  2012	  
amending	  Council	  Regulation	  (EC)	  N°1234/2007	  as	  regards	  contractual	  relations	  in	  the	  milk	  and	  milk	  products	  
sector,	  JO	  L	  94,	  p.38.	  The	  Regulation	  recognizes	  the	  role	  of	  producer	  organizations	  and	  authorizes	  those	  
organizations,	  under	  some	  conditions,	  to	  negotiate	  collectively	  contracts	  terms	  with	  processors,	  including	  the	  
price	  of	  raw	  milk.	  However,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  French	  legislation	  which	  provides	  that	  delivery	  of	  raw	  
milk	  must	  be	  covered	  by	  a	  written	  contract	  has	  been	  adopted	  before	  the	  entry	  into	  force	  of	  the	  EU	  Regulation.	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in	  order	   to	   strengthen	   their	  bargaining	  weight	  when	  negotiating	  with	   large	  buyers.696	   	  However,	   it	  
also	   recognized	   that	   such	   derogations	   from	   the	   competition	   rules	   are	   justified	   by	   the	   economic	  
specificities	  of	  the	  agricultural	  markets	  and	  could	  therefore	  not	  be	  extended	  to	  other	  sectors.697	  
Secondly,	   the	   oligopolistic	   and	   oligopsonistic	   position	   of	   large	   retail	   chains,	   which	   creates	   the	  
imbalance	  of	  power,	  may	  be	  fought	  by	  lessening	  entry	  barriers	  in	  the	  French	  retail	  sector.	  Since	  1963,	  
competition	  in	  that	  sector	  has	  been	  hindered	  by	  different	  pieces	  of	  legislation	  introducing	  structural	  
regulatory	   barriers	   to	   entry.698	   As	   such,	   the	   Loi	   Royer699	   introduced	   a	  mandatory	   retail	   permit	   for	  
stores	  over	  1000	  m2.	  In	  1996,	  those	  planning	  restrictions	  were	  reinforced	  by	  the	  Loi	  Raffarin700	  which	  
reduced	  the	  threshold	  to	  300	  m2.	  The	  objective	  of	  such	  regulation	  was	  to	  protect	  smaller	  retailers	  by	  
preventing	   an	   excessive	   development	   of	   big	   box	   stores.	   However,	   the	   limitation	   of	   new	   retailers’	  
entry	  has	  insulated	  existing	  big	  supermarkets	  from	  competitive	  pressures	  coming	  from	  the	  potential	  
setting	  up	  of	  new	  players.	  In	  addition,	  the	  strict	  conditions	  imposed	  on	  the	  opening	  or	  extension	  of	  
retail	  outlets	  led	  powerful	  retailers	  to	  develop	  their	  business	  through	  the	  buyout	  of	  other	  stores.	  The	  
strong	  position	  of	  leading	  players	  was	  therefore	  protected	  and	  even	  reinforced	  both	  in	  the	  retail	  and	  
in	  the	  procurement	  markets.701	  In	  2008,	  to	  reintroduce	  competitive	  pressures	  in	  the	  retail	  sector	  but	  
also	   to	   comply	   with	   EU	   legislation	   on	   the	   internal	   market702,	   the	   Loi	   de	   modernisation	   de	  
l’économie703	   raised	   the	   threshold	   to	   its	   former	   level	   so	   that	   retail	   outlets	   up	   to	   1000	  m2	   	  may	  be	  
established	  without	  restrictions.	   	  The	  objective	   is	   therefore	  to	  restore	  competition	  dynamics	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
696	  See	  :	  Avis	  n°	  08-­‐A-­‐07	  du	  7	  mai	  2008	  relatif	  à	  l’organisation	  économique	  de	  la	  filière	  fruits	  et	  légumes	  and	  
Avis	  n°	  09-­‐A-­‐48	  du	  2	  octobre	  2009	  relatif	  au	  fonctionnement	  du	  secteur	  laitier.	  In	  order	  to	  improve	  the	  
situation	  of	  farmers	  and	  to	  protect	  them	  against	  the	  price	  volatility	  of	  agricultural	  products,	  the	  French	  
competition	  authority	  also	  encourages	  the	  contractualisation	  of	  the	  relationships	  between	  producers	  and	  their	  
customers.	  	  However,	  it	  raised	  some	  criticisms	  with	  regard	  to	  two	  projects	  of	  decrees	  relating	  to	  that	  matter.	  
Those	  criticisms	  mainly	  concerned	  the	  term	  of	  the	  contract	  as	  well	  as	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  mandatory	  
volume	  and	  price	  clauses.	  See:	  Avis	  n°10-­‐A-­‐28	  du	  13	  décembre	  2010	  relatif	  à	  deux	  projets	  de	  décret	  imposant	  
la	  contractualisation	  dans	  des	  secteurs	  agricoles.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  contractualisation	  in	  the	  agricultural	  
sector	  was	  enacted	  in	  the	  Loi	  de	  modernisation	  de	  l’agriculture	  et	  de	  la	  pêche	  (loi	  n°2010-­‐874	  du	  27	  juillet	  
2010)	  with	  the	  laudable	  objective	  of	  balancing	  the	  relations	  of	  power	  between	  producers	  and	  their	  customers,	  
especially	  retailers.	  	  
697	  Avis	  n°	  08-­‐A-­‐07	  du	  7	  mai	  2008,	  op.cit.,	  at	  79.	  
698	  To	  these	  regulatory	  barriers	  may	  be	  added	  other	  types	  of	  barriers	  which	  make	  entry	  of	  new	  rivals	  more	  
difficult	  such	  as	  huge	  investment	  requirements,	  high	  customer	  loyalty,	  large	  retailers’	  buyer	  power,	  etc.	  
699	  Loi	  n°	  73-­‐1193	  du	  27	  décembre	  1973	  d'orientation	  du	  commerce	  et	  de	  l'artisanat.	  
700	  Loi	  n°	  96-­‐603	  du	  5	  juillet	  1996	  relative	  au	  développement	  et	  à	  la	  promotion	  du	  commerce	  et	  de	  l'artisanat.	  
For	  more	  details	  on	  the	  Loi	  Royer	  and	  the	  Loi	  Raffarin,	  see	  :	  M.-­‐L.Allain	  and	  C.Chambolle,	  op.cit.,	  at	  20-­‐21.	  
701	  OECD,	  Monopsony	  and	  buyer	  power,	  Policy	  roundtables,	  DAF/COMP(2008)38,	  at	  164.	  
702	  According	  to	  the	  Commission,	  the	  authorisation	  process	  to	  acquire	  the	  permit	  was	  not	  based	  on	  precise	  and	  
objective	  criteria.	  The	  legislation	  in	  force	  was	  considered	  as	  contrary	  to	  the	  freedom	  of	  establishment.	  See:	  
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/1794&format=HTML&aged=0&language=FR
&guiLanguage=fr	  	  
703	  Loi	  n°2008-­‐776,	  4	  août	  2008,	  de	  modernisation	  de	  l’économie,	  JO	  5	  août,	  p.12471.	  See	  on	  that	  new	  
instrument	  :	  A.Grabay-­‐Grobesco,	  «	  La	  loi	  de	  modernisation	  de	  l’économie	  et	  la	  nouvelle	  réforme	  du	  droit	  de	  
l’urbanisme	  commercial	  »,	  RDI,	  2008,	  p.470-­‐487.	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retail	  sector	  characterized	  by	  significant	  concentration	  at	  the	  national	  but	  also	  and	  particularly	  at	  the	  
local	  level.704	  Due	  to	  the	  close	  link	  between	  market	  power	  in	  the	  selling	  market	  and	  buyer	  power	  in	  
the	  procurement	  market,	  a	  lower	  degree	  of	  concentration	  in	  the	  retail	  sector	  is	  likely	  to	  also	  have	  a	  
positive	  impact	  in	  retailer-­‐supplier	  relationships.	  
The	   third	   avenue	   to	   address	   the	   issue	  of	   buyer	   power	   is	   to	   supervise	   retailers’	   conduct	   under	   the	  
competition	   rules	   on	   basis	   of	   a	   new	   approach	   as	   regards	   the	   effects	   on	   competition.	   Currently,	  
unequal	  share	  of	  profits	  in	  supplier-­‐retailer	  relations	  is	  deemed	  not	  to	  come	  within	  the	  competence	  
of	   competition	   authorities	   since	   this	   does	   not	   restrict	   competition,	   at	   least	   in	   the	   short-­‐term.	   The	  
competitive	  process	  leads	  indeed	  some	  market	  participants	  to	  suffer	  loss	  or	  to	  exit	  a	  market.	  Due	  to	  
the	  development	  of	  new	   techniques,	  products	  or	   to	  a	   change	   in	   consumer	   tastes,	   some	  producers	  
may	   indeed	   show	   a	   lesser	   degree	   of	   innovation	   or	   adaptation	   and,	   consequently,	   face	   financial	  
difficulties	   or	   even	   be	   forced	   to	   leave	   the	   market.	   That	   process	   is	   yet	   part	   of	   a	   well-­‐functioning	  
competitive	  market.	  	  
However,	  the	  French	  competition	  authority	  has	  nevertheless	  pointed	  out	   in	  an	  opinion	  on	  the	  fruit	  
and	   vegetable	   sector	   that	   the	  weakening	   of	   upstream	   suppliers	   through	   the	   exercise	   of	   excessive	  
buyer	   power	   is	   likely,	   in	   the	   medium-­‐term,	   to	   reduce	   diversity	   and	   choice	   on	   the	   markets	   and	  
thereby	   to	   affect	   consumer	  welfare.705	   Some	   large	   retailers’	   practices	  may	   indeed	   affect	   suppliers’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
704	  On	  the	  local	  retail	  concentration,	  see	  :	  Avis	  n°12-­‐A-­‐01	  du	  11	  janvier	  2012	  relatif	  à	  la	  situation	  concurrentielle	  
dans	  le	  secteur	  de	  la	  distribution	  alimentaire	  à	  Paris.	  	  In	  this	  opinion,	  the	  French	  competition	  authority	  
addressed	  the	  issue	  of	  food	  retail	  concentration	  in	  Paris.	  It	  noted	  that	  the	  retail	  chain	  Casino	  represents	  60%	  of	  
the	  food	  retail	  stores	  in	  Paris	  and,	  in	  22%	  of	  the	  city	  territory,	  the	  only	  food	  outlets	  that	  inhabitants	  can	  found	  
at	  less	  than	  300m	  from	  home	  belong	  to	  the	  Casino	  group.	  According	  to	  the	  Authority,	  lowering	  entry	  barriers	  is	  
probably	  not	  enough	  to	  modify	  the	  market	  structure	  in	  the	  food	  retail	  sector.	  It	  recommends	  the	  
reinforcement	  of	  ex	  ante	  supervision	  through	  the	  concentration	  policy	  as	  well	  as	  ex	  post	  supervision	  of	  market	  
structures.	  On	  that	  last	  issue,	  a	  direct	  and	  immediate	  action	  on	  the	  structures	  could	  be	  deemed	  necessary	  to	  
enable	  new	  players	  to	  entry	  the	  market	  and	  to	  reduce	  the	  weight	  of	  existing	  large	  retailers.	  The	  French	  
competition	  authority	  is	  allowed	  to	  impose	  remedies	  of	  a	  structural	  nature,	  such	  as	  the	  selling	  of	  some	  stores,	  
but	  only	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  anticompetitive	  abusive	  conduct.	  As	  such,	  Article	  L752-­‐26	  of	  the	  Commercial	  Code	  
stipulates	  that	  “in	  the	  event	  of	  the	  abuse	  of	  a	  dominant	  position	  or	  of	  a	  state	  of	  economic	  dependence	  by	  a	  
company	  or	  group	  of	  companies	  operating	  one	  or	  more	  retail	  outlets,	  the	  French	  competition	  authority	  may	  
have	  recourse	  to	  the	  injunctions	  and	  financial	  penalties	  provided	  for	  in	  article	  L.	  464-­‐2.	  If	  such	  injunctions	  as	  
are	  issued	  and	  such	  financial	  penalties	  as	  are	  set	  do	  not	  result	  in	  an	  end	  being	  put	  to	  said	  abuse	  of	  a	  dominant	  
position	  or	  said	  state	  of	  economic	  dependence,	  the	  French	  competition	  authority	  may,	  by	  means	  of	  a	  reasoned	  
decision	  made	  after	  cognizance	  has	  been	  taken	  of	  any	  observations	  made	  by	  the	  company	  or	  group	  of	  
companies	  concerned,	  enjoin	  the	  latter	  to	  modify,	  supplement	  or	  terminate,	  within	  a	  given	  time	  limit,	  all	  
agreements	  and	  all	  deeds	  by	  means	  of	  which	  the	  economic	  power	  enabling	  the	  aforementioned	  abuse	  to	  occur	  
was	  obtained.	  The	  French	  competition	  authority	  may	  likewise	  enjoin	  the	  company	  or	  group	  of	  companies	  
concerned	  to	  divest	  themselves	  of	  retail	  outlets	  if	  such	  divestment	  is	  deemed	  to	  be	  the	  only	  means	  of	  ensuring	  
a	  sufficient	  degree	  of	  actual	  competition	  in	  the	  catchment	  area	  concerned”.	  	  In	  order	  to	  impose	  such	  structural	  
remedies,	  it	  is	  therefore	  necessary	  to	  get	  through	  the	  difficulties	  of	  establishing	  abuse	  of	  a	  dominant	  position	  
or	  of	  a	  state	  of	  economic	  dependence	  and	  the	  abuse	  must	  be	  found	  to	  have	  continued	  despite	  a	  decision	  of	  the	  
French	  Authority	  condemning	  it.	  
705	  See	  :	  Avis	  n°	  08-­‐A-­‐07	  du	  7	  mai	  2008,	  op.cit.,	  at	  12.	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capacity	  to	  invest	  and	  innovate	  or	  may,	  in	  some	  cases,	  threaten	  their	  viability.	  The	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  
power	   may	   therefore	   lead	   to	   a	   higher	   degree	   of	   concentration	   in	   the	   upstream	   markets	   and	   a	  
reduction	  in	  product	  variety	  and	  quality.706	  In	  order	  to	  prevent	  such	  adverse	  effects	  on	  competition,	  
it	   is	   suggested	   to	   adopt	   a	   broader	   view	   of	   buyer	   power	   potential	   consequences	   on	   the	   markets.	  
Anticipating	  the	  long-­‐term	  impact	  of	  a	  buyer’s	  conduct	  on	  the	  competition	  structure	  should	  be	  part	  
of	   the	   assessment.	   The	   application	   of	   the	   competition	   rules	   on	   retailers	   when	   acting	   in	   the	  
procurement	  market	  would	  therefore	  imply	  a	  reconsideration	  of	  the	  strict	  conditions	  of	  Article	  L420-­‐
2	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  criteria	  relating	  to	  both	  the	  state	  of	  economic	  dependence	  and	  the	  effects	  on	  
competition.	  However,	  we	  cannot	  but	  notice	   that	   rethinking	   the	  enforcement	  of	   the	  provisions	  on	  
abusive	  conducts	  to	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  buyer	  power	  is	  not	  in	  the	  French	  legislative	  agenda.	  
F. CONCLUSIVE	  REMARKS	  	  
It	   is	   undeniable	   that	   the	   political	   will	   in	   France	   is	   to	   fight	   against	   supermarkets’	   excessive	   buyer	  
power	  and	  to	  protect	  consumers	  against	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  excessive	  concentration	  in	  the	  retail	  
sector.	   However,	   the	   various	   legislative	  measures	   attesting	   such	  willingness	   seem	   to	   have	  missed	  
their	   aim.	   The	   innovative	   concept	   of	   abuse	   of	   a	   state	   of	   economic	   dependence	   has	   indeed	   never	  
been	  applied	  in	  a	  case	  involving	  powerful	  retail	  chains.	  Except	  when	  an	  anticompetitive	  agreement	  is	  
established,	   large	   supermarkets	   are	   in	   fact	   insulated	   from	   the	  application	  of	   the	   competition	   rules	  
when	  acting	  on	  the	  buying	  side.	  The	  narrow	  definition	  of	  the	  condition	  of	  economic	  dependence	  as	  
well	   as	   the	   focus	   on	   the	   direct	   and	   immediate	   effects	   of	   the	   challenged	   practices	   on	   competition	  
prevents	  the	  French	  Competition	  Authority	  from	  effectively	  enforcing	  the	  rules	  in	  question.	  	  
As	  regards	  the	  rules	  on	  restrictive	  practices,	  different	  adverse	  effects	  have	  been	  noted	  following	  their	  
enactment.	  Intervention	  in	  the	  trading	  relations	  may	  indeed	  lead	  to	  restrictions	  of	  competition	  and	  
higher	  consumer	  prices,	  as	  exemplified	  by	  the	  Loi	  Galland.	  In	  addition,	  the	  sharp	  increase	  in	  hidden	  
margins	   which	   resulted	   from	   the	   new	   definition	   of	   the	   resale	   below	   cost	   threshold	   shows	   that	  
powerful	  players	  on	  the	  markets	  have	  been	  able	  to	  circumvent	  the	  rules	  so	  that	  they	  could	  continue	  
exercising	   their	  buyer	  power	  but	   through	  a	  different	   channel.	  Most	  practices	  prohibited	  under	   the	  
Commercial	  Code,	  such	  as	  imposing	  retroactive	  rebates	  or	  other	  unjustified	  fees	  on	  suppliers,	  are	  still	  
commonly	   used	   by	   large	   retail	   chains	   even	   though	   they	   are	   not	   formally	   included	   in	   contracts.	  
However,	   fear	   of	   delisting	   dissuades	   suppliers	   from	   complaining	   and	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Economy	  
probably	  lacks	  sufficient	  means	  of	  investigation	  to	  act	  against	  every	  infringement.	  	  
The	  basic	  principle	  should	  therefore	  remain	  the	  freedom	  of	  the	  parties	  to	  negotiate.	  Action	  against	  
supermarkets	  must	  be	  carried	  out	  only	  when	  their	  conduct	  is	  likely	  to	  affect	  the	  competition	  process.	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  F.Bergès-­‐Sennou	  and	  S.Caprice,	  op.cit.,	  at	  10.	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This	  must	  include	  a	  strict	  a	  priori	  control	  over	  the	  creation	  of	  central	  buying	  agencies	  and	  a	  close	  a	  
posteriori	  supervision	  of	  retailers’	  practices	  in	  the	  upstream	  market.	  Restricting	  competitors’	  access	  
to	  the	  procurement	  market,	  through	  exclusivity	  obligations	  imposed	  on	  suppliers	  for	  example,	  must	  
as	   such	   be	   prohibited	   as	   well	   as	   any	   conduct	   which	   may	   affect,	   in	   the	   longer-­‐term,	   effective	  
competition	   or	   product	   variety/diversity	   offered	   to	   consumers.	   Such	   broader	   view	   would	   remedy	  
some	   of	   the	   limits	   encountered	   in	   France	   as	   regards	   effective	   supervision	   of	   supermarkets’	   buyer	  
power.	  Competition	  policy	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  applied	  to	  every	  player	  acting	  within	  the	  food	  supply	  chain	  
and	  may,	  in	  some	  cases,	  contribute	  to	  restoring	  more	  balanced	  relationships	  between	  suppliers	  and	  
retailers	  when	  the	  latter’s	  practices	  also	  affect	  effective	  competition	  on	  the	  markets.	  In	  view	  of	  the	  
level	  of	  the	  fines	  provided	  for	  under	  the	  competition	  rules,	  the	  threat	  of	  their	  enforcement	  may	  be	  in	  
addition	  much	  more	  dissuasive	  than	  the	  possible	  sanctions	  under	  the	  rules	  on	  restrictive	  practices.	  	  
Choosing	   suitable	   instruments	   to	   tackle	   buyer	   power	   problems	   is	   hence	   not	   an	   insignificant	   issue.	  
France	   is	   still	   swinging	   between	   the	   competition	   rules	   and	   the	   rules	   on	   restrictive	   practices	   to	  
address	   supermarket	   chains’	   growing	   power.	   That	   choice	   may	   yet	   be	   crucial	   to	   ensure	   a	   well-­‐
functioning	  competitive	  market.	  Direct	  intervention	  into	  the	  business	  relations	  of	  market	  participants	  
through	  contractual	  rules	  may	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  ineffective	  to	  solve	  unbalanced-­‐relationship	  problems	  
and	  lead,	  in	  addition,	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  competition	  distortions.	  Such	  an	  approach	  is	  therefore	  very	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SECTION	  2	  -­‐	  BUYER	  POWER	  IN	  THE	  UNITED	  KINGDOM	  
The	  UK	  Competition	  Authorities	  are	  dealing	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  buyer	  power	  from	  different	  angles.	  On	  
the	  one	  hand,	  they	  do	  not	  exclude	  using	  the	  general	  competition	  rules	  to	  sanction	  abusive	  conduct	  of	  
a	  dominant	  buyer.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  they	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  specific	  measures	  
to	  address	  buyer	  power	  in	  a	  particular	  sector,	  namely	  the	  grocery	  retailing	  industry.	  Each	  set	  of	  rules	  
aims	   at	   protecting	   effective	   competition	   on	   the	   markets	   but	   relies	   on	   different	   conditions	   to	   be	  
enforced.	   The	   specific	  measures	   applying	   to	   large	   supermarkets	   have	   been	   introduced	   following	   a	  
market	   investigation	   into	  the	  retail	  sector	  which	  revealed	  anticompetitive	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power.	  
To	   eliminate	   those	   harmful	   practices	   in	   the	   upstream	   markets	   and	   discipline	   supermarkets’	  
behaviour,	  a	  code	  of	  conduct	  has	  been	  draft.	  However,	  it	  appears	  some	  years	  later	  that	  the	  code	  was	  
rather	   ineffective	  and	  suppliers	  still	  subjected	  to	  abusive	  practices.	  The	  UK	  Competition	  Authorities	  
did	  not	  yet	  give	  up	  the	  code	  but	  decided	  rather	   to	  modify	   it	   in	  order	  to	  deal	  more	  effectively	  with	  
some	  specific	  concerns.	  
We	  will	  first	  examine	  the	  different	  cases	  dealt	  with	  under	  the	  general	  competition	  rules.	  The	  second	  
part	   will	   focus	   on	   the	   grocery	   retailing	   sector	   and	   on	   the	   conclusions	   drawn	   from	   the	   different	  
investigations	   carried	   out	   in	   that	   sector.	   This	   includes	   a	   description	   of	   the	   practices	   used	   by	   large	  
supermarkets	   towards	   their	   suppliers,	   of	   their	   harmful	   impact	   on	   the	   markets	   as	   well	   as	   of	   the	  
remedial	   actions	   implemented	   to	   address	   the	   adverse	   effects	   of	   buyer	   power.	   The	   last	   part	   will	  
assess	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  a	  code	  of	  practice	  in	  tackling	  those	  buyer	  power	  concerns	  compared	  with	  
the	  general	  competition	  rules.	  	  
A. COMPETITION	  RULES	  APPLIED	  TO	  BUYER	  POWER	  CASES	  
The	   laws	  on	  anticompetitive	  behavior	  under	   the	  UK	  Competition	  Act	  are	   similar	   to	  Article	  101	  and	  
102	  TFEU	  in	  EU	  law.	  As	  such,	  are	  prohibited	  anticompetitive	  agreements	  between	  businesses707	  and	  
abuse	  of	  a	  dominant	  position708.	  The	  UK	  Competition	  Authority	  has	  dealt	  with	  a	  few	  cases	  on	  alleged	  
abuses	   of	   buyer	   power	   but	   has	   never	   reached	   the	   conclusion	   that	   the	   practices	   invoked	   were	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
707	  Competition	  Act	  1998	  (CA98),	  Chapter	  I.	  
708	  Competition	  Act,	  Chapter	  II.	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1. BetterCare	  Case	  
In	   the	   Bettercare	   case709,	   an	   organisation	   providing	   health	   and	   social	   services	   (the	   North	   &	  West	  
Belfast	  Health	   and	   Social	   Services	   Trust)	  was	   accused	   of	   abusing	   its	   dominant	   position	   as	   the	   sole	  
purchaser	   of	   residential	   and	   nursing	   home	   care	   services	   from	   the	   BetterCare	   Group,	   by	   offering	  
excessively	   low	   contract	   prices	   and	  unfair	   terms.	   It	  was	  held	   that	   the	  public	   body	   in	  question	  was	  
carrying	  out	  an	  economic	  activity	  and	  was	  as	  such	  an	  undertaking	  subject	  to	  the	  competition	  rules.710	  
On	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   alleged	   abusive	   practices,	   the	  British	   Competition	  Authority,	   the	  Office	   of	   Fair	  
Trading	   (OFT),	   ruled	   that	   charging	   excessively	   low	   purchases	   prices	   is	   only	   likely	   to	   constitute	   an	  
abuse	  of	  a	  dominant	  position	  in	  exceptional	  circumstances.	  It	  added	  that	  	  
“in	   the	  absence	  of	  barriers	   to	  exit	   by	   suppliers	   from	   the	   relevant	  market,	   a	  purchaser	  
which	  paid	   excessively	   low	  prices	  would	  be	  unable	   to	  obtain	   supply	   beyond	   the	   short	  
term	  even	  if	  it	  was	  a	  monopsonist.	  (...)	  Excessively	  low	  purchase	  prices	  will	  normally	  be	  
self-­‐correcting	  and	  would	  not,	  absent	  price	  discrimination,	  usually	  justify	  action”.711	  	  
Considering	   that	   no	   exceptional	   circumstances	   arose	   in	   that	   case,	   the	   OFT	   found	   that	   the	  
organisation	  had	  not	  abused	  a	  dominant	  position.	  
2. British	  Airways	  Case	  
The	   British	   Airways	   case712	   resulted	   from	   a	   complaint	   by	   the	   Association	   of	   British	   Travel	   Agents	  
(ABTA)	  concerning	  British	  Airways	  (BA)’	  alleged	  abuse	  of	  buyer	  power.	  	  The	  association	  claimed	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
709	  Decision	  of	  the	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  No	  CA/98/09/2003,	  BetterCare	  Group	  Ltd/North	  and	  West	  Belfast	  
Health	  &	  Social	  Services	  Trust	  (remitted	  case),	  18	  December	  2003,	  Case	  no	  CE/1836-­‐02.	  
710	  In	  a	  first	  decision,	  the	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  (OFT)	  considered	  that,	  in	  the	  circumstances	  at	  hand,	  the	  Trust	  
was	  not	  an	  undertaking	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  Competition	  Act.	  See:	  	  North	  &	  West	  Belfast	  Health	  and	  Social	  
Services	  Trust,	  30	  April	  2002,	  [2002]	  UKCLR	  428.	  That	  decision	  was,	  however,	  reversed	  on	  appeal	  by	  the	  
Competition	  Appeal	  Tribunal	  (CAT)	  which	  held	  that	  the	  public	  body	  in	  question	  was	  indeed	  an	  undertaking.	  
See:	  Competition	  Commission	  Appeal	  Tribunal,	  BetterCare	  Group	  limited	  v	  DGFT,	  Case	  No	  1006/2/1/01,	  1st	  
August	  2002.	  The	  case	  was	  hence	  remitted	  to	  the	  OFT	  to	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  alleged	  abusive	  conduct.	  The	  
decision	  of	  the	  CAT	  in	  fact	  contrasted	  with	  the	  FENIN	  case	  dealt	  with	  at	  the	  EU	  level.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  
Commission	  and	  the	  European	  Courts	  concluded	  that,	  where	  an	  organization	  purchases	  goods	  in	  order	  to	  use	  
them	  in	  the	  context	  of	  an	  activity	  of	  a	  purely	  social	  nature,	  it	  does	  not	  carry	  on	  an	  economic	  activity	  and	  does	  
consequently	  not	  act	  as	  an	  undertaking.	  See:	  Fenin/SNS+Spain,	  Case	  No	  IV.F.1./36.834,	  The	  decision	  of	  the	  EU	  
Commission	  was	  upheld	  on	  appeal.	  See:	  Case	  T-­‐319/99,	  Fenin	  v	  Commission,	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐357	  and	  Case	  C-­‐
205/03,	  Fenin	  v	  Commission	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐6295.	  (On	  the	  FENIN	  case,	  see:	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  I,	  Point	  B.2.a)i)	  In	  
the	  light	  of	  the	  legal	  development	  at	  EU	  level	  on	  the	  test	  to	  determine	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  economic	  activity,	  
the	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  drafted	  a	  note	  on	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  a	  public	  body	  engaging	  in	  purchasing	  
may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  an	  undertaking.	  On	  basis	  of	  that	  document,	  it	  emerges	  that	  the	  OFT	  will	  
henceforth	  stick	  to	  the	  interpretation	  given	  by	  the	  EU	  institutions.	  See:	  OFT,	  The	  Competition	  Act	  1998	  and	  
public	  bodies,	  Policy	  note	  1/2004,	  August	  2004.	  
711	  OFT	  Decision,	  BetterCare,	  op.cit.,	  at	  56.	  
712	  Decision	  of	  the	  Director	  General	  of	  FairTrading	  No	  CA98/19/2002,	  The	  Association	  of	  British	  Agents	  and	  
British	  Airways	  plc,	  11	  December	  2002,	  Case	  CE/1471/02.	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BA,	  which	  was	  a	  dominant	  purchaser	  of	  air	   travel	  agency	  services713,	  abused	   its	  position	  by	  making	  
excessively	   low	  booking	  payments	  that	  did	  not	  cover	  travel	  agents’	  costs.	   In	   its	  assessment,	  the	  UK	  
Competition	   Authority	   did	   not	   exclude	   that	   excessive	   low	   prices	   might	   constitute	   abuse	   of	   a	  
dominant	  position.714	  However,	   in	   this	   case,	   the	  allegation	  of	   abuse	  was	   rejected.	   Even	   though	  BA	  
held	  a	  dominant	  position	  as	  a	  buyer	  of	  travel	  agency	  services,	  the	  Director	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  considered	  
that:	  
“BA	  is	  [not]	  obliged	  obliged,	  simply	  by	  virtue	  of	  any	  market	  power	  that	  it	  may	  have	  as	  a	  
buyer	  of	  travel	  agency	  services,	  to	  make	  booking	  payments	  to	  travel	  agents	  that	  cover	  
the	  full	  cost	  they	  incur	  in	  issuing	  tickets	  since	  travel	  agents	  can	  supplement	  their	  income	  
by	  charging	  service	  fees.”715	  
It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  a	  case	  involving	  similar	  parties	  was	  dealt	  by	  the	  Irish	  Competition	  Authority.	  In	  
Reduction	  In	  Travel	  Agent	  Commissions	  By	  Aer	  Lingus	  plc716,	  a	  complaint	  that	  Aer	  Lingus	  was	  abusing	  
its	   dominant	   position	   by	   reducing	   travel	   agent	   commissions	   was	   rejected.	   Considering	   that	   the	  
decrease	   in	   price	   did	   not	   affect	   either	   consumers	   or	   the	   competitive	   process,	   the	   Competition	  
Authority	  added	  that:	  
“For	   the	  exercise	  of	  any	  monopsony	  power	   that	  Aer	   Lingus	  might	  have	   to	  be	  harmful,	  
this	   requires	   that	   it	   must	   be	   correlated	   with	   market	   power	   on	   the	   seller	   side.	  
Specifically,	   a	   firm	  with	  market	   power	   on	   both	   sides	   can	   reduce	   the	   price	   it	   pays	   for	  
inputs	  –	  the	  services	  of	  travel	  agents	  –	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  overall	  supply	  of	  airline	  tickets	  
sold	  so	  that	  prices	  to	  the	  consumer	  can	  be	  raised.”717	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
713	  To	  conclude	  to	  the	  dominant	  position	  of	  BA	  in	  the	  procurement	  market	  for	  travel	  agency	  services,	  ABTA	  
referred	  to	  the	  Commission’s	  conclusion	  on	  that	  matter	  in	  the	  Virgin/British	  Airways	  decision.	  See:	  Case	  IV/D-­‐
2/34.780,	  Virgin/British	  Airways,	  OJ	  [2000]	  L	  30/1,	  upheld	  on	  appeal	  to	  the	  CFI:	  Case	  T-­‐219/99,	  British	  Airways	  
plc	  v	  Commission	  of	  the	  European	  Communities,	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐5917.	  	  The	  UK	  Competition	  Authority	  
nevertheless	  asserted	  that	  the	  competitive	  conditions	  in	  a	  market	  change	  over	  time	  and	  that	  the	  market	  and	  
the	  players’	  position	  must	  therefore	  always	  “be	  defined	  in	  any	  particular	  case	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  facts	  
prevailing	  at	  the	  time	  and	  not	  simply	  be	  reference	  to	  precedents”.	  In	  this	  case,	  given	  the	  findings	  on	  the	  
allegedly	  abusive	  behavior	  of	  BA,	  the	  Competition	  Authority	  did	  not	  find	  necessary	  to	  consider	  further	  whether	  
BA	  has	  or	  not	  a	  dominant	  position	  in	  the	  relevant	  market.	  
714	  The	  Competition	  Authority	  referred	  to	  the	  case	  CICCE	  v	  Commission	  in	  which	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  asserted	  
that	  imposing	  excessively	  low	  prices	  is	  in	  principle	  capable	  of	  constituting	  an	  infringement	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  
See:	  Case	  298/83,	  CICCE	  v	  Commission,	  [1985]	  ECR	  1105.	  
715	  Decision	  No	  CA98/19/2002,	  op.cit.,	  at	  37.	  The	  UK	  Competition	  Authority	  considered	  that	  whether	  
consumers	  are	  charged	  an	  inclusive	  price	  by	  airlines,	  from	  which	  travel	  agents	  receive	  a	  payment,	  or	  a	  price	  for	  
the	  fare	  plus	  a	  service	  fee	  to	  cover	  the	  booking	  costs,	  the	  end	  price	  to	  customers	  and	  the	  income	  received	  by	  
travel	  agents	  is	  the	  same	  	  
716	  Irish	  Competition	  Authority	  Decision,	  Reduction	  In	  Travel	  Agent	  Commissions	  By	  Aer	  Lingus	  plc.,	  Case	  
COM/15/02,	  10	  June	  2003.	  
717	  Ibid.,	  at	  2.13.	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Again	   in	   this	   last	   decision,	   a	   double	   abuses	   requirement	   seems	   to	  be	   applied.	  A	  particular	   buyer’s	  
conduct	  might	  only	  be	  viewed	  as	  abusive	   if	  combined	  with	  another	  abusive	  behavior	  on	  the	  selling	  
side.	  Instead	  of	  referring	  to	  double	  abuses	  of	  buyer	  power,	  the	  Irish	  Competition	  Authority	  imposes	  a	  
combination	  between	  an	  abuse	  on	   the	  buying	   side	  and	  an	  abuse	  on	   the	   selling	   side.	   Should	  buyer	  
power	   abuses	   only	   be	   sanctioned	   in	   conjunction	   with	   seller-­‐side	   abusive	   conduct,	   one	   can	   only	  
wonder	  what	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  buyer	  power	  is.718	  Such	  an	  interpretation	  of	  abuses	  on	  the	  
buying	  side	  would	  in	  fact	  be	  more	  lenient	  than	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  Treaty	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  contrary	  to	  
EU	   law	  so	   far	  as	   the	  conduct	  affects	   trade	  between	  Member	  States.719	   Indeed,	  national	  authorities	  
are	   not	   precluded	   from	   applying	   stricter	   national	   laws	   which	   prohibit	   unilateral	   conduct	   but	   are	  
required	  to	  apply	  the	  prohibitions	  laid	  down	  in	  the	  Treaty.	  In	  this	  regard,	  Article	  102(2)(a)	  TFEU	  states	  
that	  an	  abuse	  may	  consist	  in,	  for	  example,	  “directly	  or	  indirectly	  imposing	  unfair	  purchase	  or	  selling	  
prices	  or	  unfair	  trading	  conditions”.720	  Excessively	  low	  prices	  or	  other	  anticompetitive	  buying	  conduct	  
may	   therefore	   constitute	   an	   abuse	   in	   itself,	   even	   if	   not	   combined	   with	   abusive	   behavior	   in	   the	  
downstream	  market.	  
In	  view	  of	  those	  decisions,	  one	  may	  conclude	  that	  the	  UK	  Competition	  Authority	   is	  not	  reluctant	  to	  
address	  the	  issue	  of	  buyers’	  market	  power	  but	  that	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  involving	  that	  issue	  remains	  
very	  limited.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  general	  rules	  on	  abusive	  conduct,	  action	  has	  been	  taken	  in	  the	  UK	  to	  
deal	  with	  supermarkets’	  buyer	  power.	  The	  growing	  concerns	  arising	  from	  the	  use	  of	  some	  practices	  
in	   the	   concentrated	   grocery	   retailing	   sector	   indeed	   compel	   the	   UK	   Authorities	   to	   decide	   on	   new	  
measures	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  effective	  supervision	  of	  retailers’	  conduct.	  
B. SPECIFIC	  APPROACH	  TO	  ADDRESS	  SUPERMARKETS’	  BUYER	  POWER	  
The	  high	  degree	  of	   concentration	   in	   the	  UK	  grocery	   retailing,	  where	   four	   large	   supermarkets	  have	  
three	  quarters	  of	  the	  market,	   led	  the	  authorities	  to	   investigate	   into	  that	  sector.721	  The	  Competition	  
Commission	   (CC)	  delivered	   two	  reports,	   in	  2000	  and	  2008,	  on	   retailers’	  practices	  used,	  both	   in	   the	  
downstream	   markets,	   as	   regards	   consumers	   and	   smaller	   rivals,	   and	   in	   the	   upstream	   markets,	   as	  
regards	   suppliers.	   Where	   the	   CC	   found,	   in	   many	   respects,	   that	   the	   different	   markets	   were	  
competitive	   and	   offered	   a	   good	   deal	   for	   consumers,	   it	   nevertheless	   objected	   to	   certain	  
anticompetitive	  practices	  deriving	  from	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
718	  R.O’DONOGHUE	  &	  J.PADILLA,	  The	  law	  and	  economics	  of	  Article	  82	  EC,	  2006,	  at	  645.	  
719	  Council	  Regulation	  (EC)	  No	  1/2003	  of	  16	  December	  2002	  on	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  rules	  on	  competition	  
laid	  down	  in	  Article	  81	  and	  82	  of	  the	  Treaty(Text	  with	  EEA	  relevance),	  O.J.	  L	  1/1	  of	  04/01/2003,	  Article	  3(2).	  
720	  Emphasis	  added.	  
721	  Concerning	  the	  degree	  of	  concentration	  in	  the	  UK	  groceries	  market	  and	  the	  practices	  used	  by	  large	  
supermarket	  chains,	  see:	  P.W.Dobson	  &	  R.Chakraborty,	  Buyer	  power	  in	  the	  UK	  groceries	  market,	  53	  The	  
Antitrust	  Bulletin	  333	  (2008)	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1. First	  investigation	  and	  conclusions	  on	  supermarkets’	  buyer	  power722	  
The	   first	  major	   inquiry	   concerning	   the	  UK	   grocery	  market	  was	   completed	   in	   2000	   and	   led	   to	   new	  
measures	   in	   order	   to	   regulate	   the	   relationships	   between	   the	   four	   largest	   supermarkets	   and	   their	  
suppliers.723	  	  
a) Why	  an	  investigation	  in	  the	  food	  retail	  sector?	  
The	  principal	  responsibility	  of	  enforcing	  competition	  law	  in	  the	  UK	  lies	  with	  the	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  
(OFT)	  and	  the	  Competition	  Commission	   (CC).	   In	  order	   to	  help	  ensure	  healthy	  competition	  between	  
companies,	   the	   former	   may	   refer	   an	   in-­‐depth	   investigation	   into	   markets	   to	   the	   latter	   if	   it	   is	  
concerned	  about	  potential	  competition	  problems.724	  The	  CC	  is	  then	  required	  to	  decide	  whether	  any	  
feature	   or	   combination	   of	   features	   in	   the	   market	   in	   question	   prevents,	   restricts	   or	   distorts	  
competition	  and,	  if	  need	  be,	  to	  introduce	  remedies.	  The	  2000	  investigation	  in	  the	  grocery	  retailing725	  
found	  its	  origin	  in	  a	  public	  perception	  that	  the	  prices	  of	  many	  consumer	  goods	  tended	  to	  be	  higher	  in	  
the	  UK	  than	   in	  other	  Member	  States	  and	   in	   the	  United	  States	  as	  well	  as	   in	  criticisms	  as	  regards	  an	  
apparent	  disparity	  between	  farm-­‐gate	  and	  retail	  prices.726	  The	  OFT	  launched	  an	  initial	  investigation	  in	  
1998	   and	   identified	   additional	   concerns	   about	   different	   issues,	   including	   the	   relationship	   between	  
supermarkets	  and	  their	  suppliers.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  led	  the	  Director	  General	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  
CC	  in	  April	  1999	  for	  investigation.	  	  
b) Findings	  of	  the	  Competition	  Commission	  
In	   October	   2000,	   the	   CC	   gave	   its	   final	   report.	   As	   regards	   price	   trends,	   based	   on	   international	  
comparisons,	   it	   was	   concluded	   that	   UK	   grocery	   retailers	   were	   not	   acting	   in	   an	   anti-­‐competitive	  
manner	   and	   that	   cost	   reductions	   at	   the	   farm	  gate	  were	  being	   reflected	   in	   retail	   prices	   charged	   to	  
consumers.	  Where	  there	  had	  not,	  higher	  prices	  were	  generally	  justified	  by	  cost	  increases	  elsewhere	  
in	   the	   food	   supply	   chain.727	   However,	   the	   CC	   found	   that	   two	   groups	   of	   practices	   carried	   out	   by	  
supermarkets	  operated	  against	  the	  public	  interest.728	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
722	  Competition	  Commission,	  Supermarkets	  –	  A	  report	  on	  the	  supply	  of	  groceries	  from	  multiple	  stores	  in	  the	  
United	  Kingdom,	  October	  2000.	  
723	  On	  the	  first	  market	  investigation,	  see	  for	  examples	  :	  G.Mills,	  Buyer	  power	  of	  supermarkets,	  10	  	  Agenda	  145	  
(2003);	  P.W.Dobson,	  Exploiting	  Buyer	  Power:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  British	  Grocery	  Trade,	  72	  Antitrust	  Law	  Journal	  
529	  (2005)	  
724	  Enterprise	  Act	  2002,	  Section	  131.	  For	  more	  details	  on	  UK	  competition	  authorities,	  see	  :	  
http://www.competition-­‐commission.org.uk	  and	  http://www.oft.gov.uk	  	  
725	  In	  the	  terms	  of	  reference	  from	  the	  OFT,	  «	  groceries	  »	  included	  food	  and	  drink,	  cleaning	  products,	  toiletries	  
and	  household	  goods.	  	  
726	  Report	  2000,	  at	  2.5.	  
727	  Report	  2000,	  at	  2.84	  to	  2.117	  and	  at	  2.140	  to	  2.161.	  
728	  The	  CC	  also	  considered	  that	  considerable	  barriers	  to	  entry	  existed,	  not	  just	  because	  of	  the	  existing	  strength	  
of	  the	  incumbents	  in	  a	  market	  but	  also	  because	  of	  the	  limitations	  on	  acquisitions	  of	  sites	  from	  planning	  
legislation.	  See:	  Report	  2000,	  2.162	  to	  2.212.	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i. Practices	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  downstream	  market	  
The	  first	  group	  of	  practices	  concerned	  pricing	  behavior	  of	  large	  retailers	  in	  the	  downstream	  market.	  
Persistent	   below-­‐cost	   selling	   was	   considered	   as	   distorting	   competition	   and	   damaging	   smaller	  
retailers.729	   The	   CC	   also	   asserted	   that	   price	   flexing,	   namely	   varying	   prices	   in	   different	   geographic	  
locations,	  operated	  against	  the	  public	  interest.730	  Yet,	  no	  remedial	  action	  was	  recommended	  for	  this	  
group	   of	   practices.	   Indeed,	   given	   the	   adverse	   effects	   of	   legislation	   on	   resale	   below	   cost	   noted	   in	  
some	  countries,	  including	  in	  France	  and	  in	  Ireland,	  and	  the	  difficulties	  presented	  by	  other	  suggested	  
measures,	  the	  CC	  decided	  to	  make	  no	  recommendation	  for	  remedial	  action	  in	  respect	  of	  persistent	  
below-­‐cost	  selling.731	  	  In	  light	  of	  the	  general	  finding	  that	  the	  market	  was	  competitive	  and	  consistent	  
with	   its	   duty	   to	   ensure	   that	   any	   intervention	   in	   a	   market	   must	   be	   proportionate,	   the	   CC	  
recommended	  no	  remedy	  either	  for	  identified	  problems	  deriving	  from	  price	  flexing.732	  
ii. Practices	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  upstream	  market	  
The	   second	   group	   of	   practices	   was	   related	   to	   the	   conduct	   of	   large	   retail	   chains	   towards	   their	  
suppliers.	   The	   CC	   received	   many	   allegations	   about	   large	   retailers’	   malpractices	   from	   suppliers.	  
However,	   almost	   all	   complainants,	   including	   large	   suppliers,	   were	   reluctant	   to	   give	   detailed	  
information	  or	  to	  name	  the	  supermarkets	  involved	  in	  the	  practices	  in	  question.	  The	  main	  reason	  of	  
this	   reluctance	  was	   the	   fear	  of	  being	  delisted	  by	  one	  of	   those	   large	   customers	  or	  being	   subject	   to	  
worse	   terms	   of	   supply.733	   A	   questionnaire	   was	   also	   sent	   to	   the	   main	   retailers	   in	   order	   to	   collect	  
further	   information	  on	  practices	  they	  were	  engaged	  in.734	  On	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	   investigation,	  the	  
CC	   drew	   different	   conclusions	   concerning	   the	   relationship	   between	   large	   supermarkets	   and	   their	  
suppliers.	  
To	  determine	  the	  existence	  of	  buyer	  power	  in	  the	  food	  retail	  industry,	  various	  elements	  were	  taken	  
into	  consideration.	  Retailers’	  power	  was	  assessed	  on	  basis	  of	  their	  volume	  of	  purchases,	  their	  buying	  
conditions	   and	   the	   degree	   of	   dependency	   of	   their	   suppliers.	   	   On	   basis	   of	   those	   factors,	   the	   CC	  
considered	  that	  any	  supermarket	  with	  more	  than	  an	  8	  percent	  share	  of	  grocery	  purchases	  for	  resale	  
from	   its	   stores	  enjoyed	  buyer	  power	   in	   the	  UK.	  At	   the	   time	  of	   the	   investigation,	   five	   retailers	  held	  
such	   a	   market	   share,	   namely	   Asda,	   Safeway,	   Sainsbury,	   Somerfield	   and	   Tesco.	   	   All	   the	   practices	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
729	  Report	  2000,	  2.377	  to	  2.393.	  
730	  Ibid.,	  at	  2.394	  to	  3.409.	  
731	  Ibid.,	  at	  2.558	  to	  2.565.	  
732	  Ibid.,	  at	  2.566	  to	  2.577.	  
733	  Ibid.,	  at	  2.437.	  
734	  The	  questionnaire	  included	  a	  list	  of	  52	  alleged	  practices	  and	  retailers	  were	  asked	  to	  tell	  the	  CC	  which	  of	  
them	  they	  had	  engaged	  in	  during	  the	  last	  five	  years.	  
Final	  version	  -­‐	  Mai	  2014	   	  
224	  
	  
invoked	  were	  examined	  only	  with	  regard	  to	  those	  five	  players	  since,	  without	  buyer	  power,	  retailers’	  
conduct	  is	  unlikely	  to	  prevent,	  restrict	  or	  distort	  competition.735	  	  
The	   CC	   reached	   the	   conclusion	   that	   some	   practices	   prevent,	   restrict	   or	   distort	   competition	   when	  
carried	  out	  by	  retailers	  that	  have	  buyer	  power.	  That	  conclusion	  was	  based	  on	  a	  thorough	  assessment	  
weighing	   up	   the	   specific	   benefits	   of	   each	   practice	   against	   their	   adverse	   effects.	   On	   balance,	   27	  
practices	   were	   considered	   to	   be	   against	   the	   public	   interest.	   Among	   them,	   we	   can	   mention	   for	  
examples,	   requiring	   various	   non-­‐cost-­‐related	   payments	   or	   discounts,	   sometimes	   retrospectively,	  
requiring	  a	  supplier	  to	  buy	  back	  unsold	  items,	  requiring	  compensation	  when	  the	  retailer’s	  profit	  on	  a	  
product	   turns	   out	   to	   be	   less	   than	   it	   had	   expected,	   delaying	   payments	   beyond	   the	   terms	   in	   the	  
contracts,	   unreasonably	   transferring	   risks	   to	   the	   supplier	   and	   other	   various	   unilateral	   changes	   to	  
prices	  and	  to	  related	  contractual	  terms.736	  	  	  
Concerning	  the	  effects	  of	  those	  practices,	  the	  CC	  asserted	  that	  suppliers	  were	  the	  most	  affected	  by	  
such	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power.	  Facing	  decreasing	  prices	  and	  additional	  costs,	  suppliers	  were	  viewed	  as	  
less	  likely	  to	  invest	  in	  new	  product	  development	  and	  innovation.	  In	  the	  longer	  term,	  large	  retailers’	  
practices	  could	  even	  force	  smaller	  suppliers	  to	   leave	  the	  market.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  process,	  the	  CC	  
underlined	   the	   risk	   that	  consumer	  product	  quality	  and	  choice	  could	  be	   reduced.737	   	  Besides,	   it	  was	  
pointed	   out	   in	   the	   report	   that	   some	   of	   the	   practices	  mentioned	   above	   also	   distorted	   competition	  
between	   retailers.	   Since	   the	   largest	   supermarket	   chains	   use	   their	   buyer	   power	   to	   extract	   more	  
favourable	   terms,	   they	   enjoy,	   as	   a	   result,	   a	   significant	   advantage	   over	   smaller	   rivals	   in	   the	  
downstream	  market.	   In	   some	  cases,	   this	   could	   therefore	  contribute	   to	  ousting	   small	   retailers	   from	  
the	  market	  place.	  As	  a	  knock-­‐on	  effect	  on	  consumers,	   the	  CC	  put	   forward	   the	   risk	  of	  higher	  prices	  
and	  reduced	  choice	  of	  retail	  store.738	  
In	  order	  to	  remedy	  the	  adverse	  effects	  resulting	  from	  the	  identified	  practices	  used	  in	  the	  upstream	  
market,	  a	  Code	  of	  practice	  governing	  the	  relationship	  between	  powerful	  retailers	  and	  their	  suppliers	  
was	  recommended.739	  
c) Solution	  suggested:	  Code	  of	  practice	  
The	  CC	  considered	  that	  the	  most	  effective	  way	  of	  addressing	  buyer	  power	  adverse	  effects	  would	  be	  a	  
code	   of	   practice	   imposed	   on	   large	   retailers.	   It	  was	   recommended	   that	   any	   supermarket	   holding	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
735	  Report	  2000,	  at	  2.439	  to	  2.459.	  
736	  Ibid.,	  at	  2.460	  to	  2.536.	  
737	  Ibid.,	  at	  2.543.	  
738	  Ibid.,	  at	  2.544.	  
739	  A	  code	  of	  buying	  practice	  in	  response	  to	  supplier	  complaints	  about	  supermarkets	  conduct	  has	  also	  been	  
established	  in	  Australia.	  For	  a	  comparative	  analysis,	  See:	  G.Mills,	  “Buyer	  power	  of	  Supermarkets”,	  Agenda,	  145-­‐
162	  (2003).	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market	  share	  of	  8	  percent	  in	  the	  upstream	  market	  should	  be	  required	  to	  give	  undertakings	  to	  comply	  
with	   the	   Code.	   Designed	   to	   meet	   the	   concerns	   pointed	   out	   in	   the	   report,	   the	   Code	   should	   also	  
include	   provisions	   for	   independent	   dispute	   resolution.740	   After	   consulting	   the	   supermarkets	   and	  
representatives	   of	   suppliers,	   the	  OFT	  drafted	   the	  Code	  of	   Practice	   on	   Supermarkets’	  Dealings	  with	  
Suppliers.	   The	   four	   companies	  meeting	   the	   8	   percent	   threshold	   signed	   undertakings	   in	   December	  
2001.741	  
During	  the	  drafting	  of	  the	  code,	  it	  was	  agreed	  not	  to	  intervene	  excessively	  within	  the	  supplier-­‐retailer	  
business-­‐relationships.	  It	  was	  indeed	  considered	  that	  	  
“[It	   is]	   legitimate	   for	   supermarkets	   to	   compete	   vigorously	   for	   supplies	   on	   terms	   that	  
provide	   good	   value	   in	   respect	   of	   price,	   quality	   and	   other	   characteristics	   that	   their	  
customers	   desire.	   That	   is	   an	   important	   aspect	   of	   competition	   between	   retailers,	   and	  
competition	   between	   them	   in	   turn	   brings	   benefit	   to,	   and	   is	   ultimately	   driven	   by	   the	  
demands	  of,	  the	  general	  public	  as	  consumers.”742	  
The	   OFT	   did	   not	   want	   the	   code	   to	   be	   overly	   prescriptive	   in	   order	   not	   to	   deter	   collaborative	  
arrangements	  which	  yield	  mutual	  benefit.	  As	  such,	  it	  was	  decided	  that	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  code	  could	  
not	  inhibit	  significantly	  retailers’	  freedom	  of	  negotiation.743	  A	  degree	  of	  flexibility	  in	  the	  application	  of	  
the	  code	  was	  therefore	  left	  by	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  “reasonableness”.	  	  Supermarkets	  were	  permitted	  
to	  seek	  payments	  or	  other	  contributions	  as	  well	  as	  make	  changes	  to	  agreements	  in	  order	  to	  respond	  
to	  competition	  provided	   their	   requests	  were	  “reasonable”.	  Basically,	   the	   following	  provisions	  were	  
included	  in	  the	  text:	  Terms	  of	  business	  to	  be	  available	  in	  writing,	  no	  retrospective	  reduction	  in	  price	  
without	   Reasonable	  Notice,	   no	  promotions	  without	   Reasonable	  Notice,	   no	   change	   to	   supply	   chain	  
procedures	   without	   Reasonable	   Notice	   or	   compensation,	   no	   unjustified	   payment	   for	   consumer	  
complaints,	   no	   tying	   third	   party	   goods	   and	   services	   for	   payment,	   obligatory	   training	   for	   buyers,	  
compliance	  and	  dispute	  resolution.	  
As	   regards	   the	   dispute	   resolution	   mechanism,	   when	   a	   supermarket	   and	   a	   supplier	   could	   not	  
themselves	  resolve	  a	  dispute	  arising	  under	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  code	  within	  90	  days,	  it	  was	  provided	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
740	  Report	  2000,	  at	  2.578	  to	  2.618.	  
741	  The	  code	  came	  into	  force	  on	  17	  March	  2002	  and	  applied	  only	  to	  contracts	  between	  supermarkets	  and	  
suppliers	  that	  were	  signed	  on	  or	  after	  1	  November	  2001.	  The	  four	  companies	  subject	  to	  the	  code	  were	  Asda,	  
Safeway,	  Sainsbury	  and	  Tesco.	  By	  the	  time	  the	  report	  was	  published,	  the	  market	  share	  of	  Somerfield	  had	  fallen	  
below	  eight	  per	  cent.	  The	  authorities	  hoped	  that	  the	  principles	  in	  the	  code	  would	  also	  be	  adopted	  voluntarily	  
by	  other	  traders	  within	  the	  food	  supply	  chain.	  	  
742	  OFT,	  Supermarkets:	  The	  code	  of	  practice	  and	  other	  competition	  issues,	  March	  2005,	  at	  3.33.	  
743	  OFT,	  The	  supermarkets	  code	  of	  practice	  –	  Report	  on	  the	  review	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  code	  of	  practice	  in	  the	  
undertakings	  given	  by	  Tesco,	  Asda,	  Sainsbury	  and	  Safeway	  to	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Trade	  and	  Industry	  on	  
18	  December	  2001,	  February	  2004,	  at	  3.5.	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the	  former	  would,	  at	   its	  own	  expense,	  offer	  the	  services	  of	  a	  mediator	  to	  assist.	   If	  a	  mediation	  had	  
failed,	  the	  supermarket	  was	  required	  to	  give	  notice	  to	  the	  Director	  of	  the	  OFT.744	  	  
The	  code	  was	  expected	  to	  put	  relations	  between	  supermarkets	  and	  their	  suppliers	  on	  a	  clearer	  and	  
more	  predictable	  basis	  and	  as	  such	  to	  effectively	  address	  anticompetitive	  concerns	  raised	  by	  the	  CC	  
about	   some	   retailers’	   practices.	   However,	   responding	   to	   retailers’	   buyer	   power	   through	   a	   code	   of	  
conduct	  has	  proved	  not	  to	  be	  working	  as	  intended	  and	  led	  the	  UK	  authorities	  to	  look	  again	  into	  that	  
issue	  a	  few	  years	  later.	  
2. Second	  investigation	  and	  conclusions	  on	  supermarkets’	  buyer	  power	  
Following	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   code,	   the	   OFT	   was	   committed	   to	   reporting	   the	   level	   of	  
compliance	   with	   it	   and	   whether	   it	   was	   working	   as	   expected.	   Some	   concerns	   about	   the	   code’s	  
effectiveness	  led	  to	  a	  second	  investigation	  into	  the	  grocery	  market	  and	  a	  new	  code	  of	  conduct.	  
a) Supervision	  of	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  Code	  	  
In	   2003,	   the	  OFT	   carried	   out	   a	   review	   of	   the	   code	   and	   consulted	   suppliers	   in	   order	   to	   know	   how	  
individual	   supermarkets	   were	   operating	   under	   the	   code.745	   That	   consultation	   exercise	   revealed	   a	  
widespread	  belief	  that	  the	  new	  measures	  were	  not	  working	  effectively.	  Suppliers	  alleged	  breaches	  of	  
provisions	   of	   the	   code	   and	   considered	   that	   the	   fundamental	   imbalance	   of	   negotiating	   strength	  
between	  them	  and	  supermarkets	  still	  remained.	  Where	  the	  code	  had	  not	  changed	  the	  dealings	  with	  
large	  retailers	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  suppliers,	  some	  reported	  that	  matters	  had	  even	  worsened	  since	  the	  
publication	   of	   the	   2000	   CC	   report.746	   However,	   none	   of	   the	   respondents	   provided	   detailed	  
information	  and	  were	  very	  sensitive	  about	  confidentiality.	  Such	  climate	  of	  apprehension	  among	  both	  
small	   and	   large	   suppliers	  made	   hence	   it	   hard	   for	   the	  OFT	   to	   identify	   key	   problems	   and	   formulate	  
solutions.	   The	   principal	   reason	   of	   that	   lack	   of	   cooperation	   was	   the	   fear	   of	   the	   supermarkets	  
worsening	  the	  terms	  of	  business	  or	  cutting	  off	  business	  to	  those	  which	  had	  complained.747	  This	  also	  
explained	   the	   absence	   of	   cases	   being	   taken	   to	   mediation.748	   The	   wide	   use	   of	   the	   term	  
“reasonableness”	  in	  the	  code	  added	  greatly	  to	  the	  fear	  of	  complaining	  because	  suppliers	  considered	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
744	  Code	  of	  Practice	  on	  Supermarkets’	  Dealings	  with	  Suppliers,	  part	  8.	  
745	  OFT,	  The	  supermarkets	  code	  of	  practice	  –	  Report	  on	  the	  review	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  code	  of	  practice	  in	  
the	  undertakings	  given	  by	  Tesco,	  Asda,	  Sainsbury	  and	  Safeway	  to	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Trade	  and	  Industry	  
on	  18	  December	  2001,	  February	  2004.	  
746	  OFT,	  The	  supermarkets	  code	  of	  practice,	  op.cit.,	  5.8.	  See	  also:	  A.Hollingsworth,	  Increasing	  Retail	  
Concentration,	  106	  British	  Food	  Journal	  629	  (2004)	  
747	  OFT,	  The	  supermarkets	  code	  of	  practice,	  op.cit.,at	  7.9.	  The	  OFT	  had	  no	  doubt	  that	  such	  fear	  is	  genuine	  but	  
did	  not	  receive	  any	  substantive	  evidence	  of	  those	  practices.	  
748	  OFT,	  The	  supermarkets	  code	  of	  practice,	  op.cit.,	  at	  5.24	  to	  5.27.	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that	   there	   was	   a	   high	   risk	   that	   the	   retailer’s	   definition	   of	   that	   concept	   would	   prevail	   to	   their	  
detriment.749	  	  
Suppliers’	  fear	  of	  complaining	  forced	  the	  OFT	  to	  find	  alternative	  sources	  of	  information.	  It	  was	  hence	  
decided	  to	  commission	  an	  audit	  of	   the	  supermarkets’	  dealings	  with	  their	  suppliers.750	  The	  auditors’	  
report	  indicated	  some	  breaches	  of	  the	  code	  but,	  since	  they	  were	  relatively	  minor	  in	  nature	  and	  that	  
no	   complaints	  were	  made	   about	   them,	   it	  was	   held	   that	   no	   formal	   action	  was	   needed.751	   The	  OFT	  
concluded	  that	  the	  main	  reason	  for	  the	  perceived	  ineffectiveness	  of	  the	  code	  was	  the	  retailers’	  fear	  
of	  complaining.	  According	  to	  it,	  	  
“No	   code	   can	   be	   effective	   in	   dealing	   with	   allegations	   of	   breaches	   unless	   evidence	   of	  
those	  breaches	  comes	  forward”.752	  	  
As	   far	  as	   suppliers	  were	  not	  prepared	   to	  assert	   their	   rights	  under	   the	  code,	   it	  was	  considered	   that	  
varying	  the	  rules	  or	  drafting	  them	  more	  rigorously	  would	  not	  improve	  the	  situation.753	  Suppliers	  and	  
trade	  associations	  were	  rather	  encouraged	  to	  report	  alleged	  no	  compliance	  with	  the	  code	  and	  to	  use	  
the	  dispute	  resolution	  procedure	  in	  the	  code.754	  The	  OFT	  repeated	  that	  its	  overall	  goal	  was	  to	  make	  
markets	   work	   well	   for	   consumers.	   In	   assessing	   the	   necessity	   to	   act	   on	   any	   ineffectiveness	   of	   the	  
code,	  the	  benefits	  of	  competitive	  relationships	  between	  supermarkets	  and	  their	  suppliers	  are	  hence	  
also	   to	   be	   examined.	   In	   this	   respect,	   the	   OFT	   found	   that	   the	   market	   at	   retail	   level	   was	   broadly	  
competitive	  and	  that	  further	  intervention	  in	  retailer-­‐supplier	  relations	  was	  not	  recommended	  at	  this	  
point.755	  
However,	   following	   the	   OFT	   decision	   to	   let	   the	   code	   unchanged,	   pressure	   was	   exercised	   by	   the	  
Association	  of	  Convenience	  Stores.	   In	  May	  2006,	  the	  OFT	  finally	  withdrew	  its	  decision	  and	  referred	  
the	  supply	  of	  groceries	  by	  retailers	  in	  the	  UK	  to	  the	  CC	  for	  investigation.	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
749	  Ibid.,	  at	  5.21	  to	  5.23.	  It	  was	  expected	  that	  the	  definition	  of	  reasonableness	  would	  be	  refined	  by	  the	  use	  of	  
the	  mediation	  process	  but	  this	  not	  happened.	  	  
750	  OFT,	  Supermarkets	  :	  The	  code	  of	  practice	  and	  other	  competition	  issues,	  March	  2005.	  Each	  of	  the	  four	  
supermarkets	  that	  had	  given	  undertakings	  was	  audited.	  In	  each	  case,	  a	  sample	  of	  the	  supply	  agreements	  
entered	  into	  over	  a	  time	  period	  was	  examined,	  covering	  both	  smaller	  and	  larger	  suppliers.	  
751	  Ibid.,	  at	  3.15	  to	  3.17.	  
752	  Ibid.,	  March	  2005,	  at	  3.30.	  
753	  OFT,	  The	  supermarkets	  code	  of	  practice	  –	  Report	  on	  the	  review	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  code	  of	  practice	  in	  
the	  undertakings	  given	  by	  Tesco,	  Asda,	  Sainsbury	  and	  Safeway	  to	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Trade	  and	  Industry	  
on	  18	  December	  2001,	  February	  2004,	  2.10.	  
754	  OFT,	  Supermarkets	  :	  The	  code	  of	  practice	  and	  other	  competition	  issues,	  March	  2005,	  at	  3.18.	  
755	  Ibid.,	  at	  3.25.	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b) Results	  of	  the	  second	  investigation	  
In	   April	   2008,	   the	   CC	   published	   its	   final	   report	   in	   its	   inquiry	   into	   UK	   groceries	   retailing.756	   Five	  
different	   issues	  were	  addressed	   in	  that	  report:	  potential	  distortion	   in	  competition	  between	  grocery	  
retailers,	   concentration	   in	   local	   markets	   for	   grocery	   retailing,	   barriers	   to	   entry	   and	   expansion	   for	  
grocery	   retailing,	   coordination	   between	   grocery	   retailers	   and	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   by	   certain	  
grocery	   retailers.	   In	  many	   respects,	   the	  CC	  concluded	   that	   supermarkets	   in	   the	  UK	  were	  delivering	  
good	  outcomes	  for	  consumers	  such	  as	  choice,	  value,	  innovation	  and	  convenience.	  However,	  The	  CC	  
found	   a	   feature	   or	   a	   combination	   of	   features	   which	   prevent,	   restrict	   or	   distort	   competition	   as	  
regards,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   strong	   position	   of	   several	   grocery	   retailers	   in	   a	   number	   of	   local	  
markets	   and,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   some	   supermarkets’	   practices	   used	   towards	   suppliers.757	  We	  will	  
focus	  on	  that	  last	  issue.	  
It	  was	  held	   that	   the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  may	  have	  a	  positive	   impact	  on	  consumers,	  especially	  
when	  it	  counteracts	  supplier	  market	  power.	  
“In	   general,	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   by	   grocery	   retailers	   is	   likely	   to	   have	   positive	  
implications	   for	   consumers.	  Where	   competition	   between	   grocery	   retailers	   is	   effective,	  
retailers	  will	   pass	   on	   to	   consumers	   a	   substantial	   portion	  of	   the	   lower	  prices	   that	   they	  
obtain	   from	   suppliers	   through	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power.	   Grocery	   retailers’	   buyer	  
power	   may	   also	   act	   as	   a	   countervailing	   force	   to	   any	   market	   power	   possessed	   by	  
suppliers.	   In	   addition,	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   can	   spur	   innovation	   in	   the	   supply	  
chain.”758	  	  
However,	  the	  CC	  recognized	  that	  some	  practices	  used	  by	  powerful	  supermarkets,	   if	   left	  unchecked,	  
might	  also	  harm	  consumers.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
756	  Competition	  Commission,	  The	  supply	  of	  groceries	  in	  the	  UK	  –	  Market	  investigation,	  30	  April	  2008.	  On	  that	  
second	  investigation,	  see:	  P.Davis	  &	  A.Reilly,	  The	  UK	  Competition	  Commission’s	  Groceries	  Market	  Investigation:	  
Market	  Power,	  Market	  Outcomes	  and	  Remedies,	  Presented	  at	  the	  27th	  International	  Association	  of	  Agricultural	  
Economists	  Conference,	  Beijing,	  August	  2009.	  
757	  Concerning	  the	  impact	  of	  large	  grocery	  retailer	  store	  entry	  on	  convenience	  stores	  and	  specialist	  grocery	  
stores,	  the	  CC	  found	  that	  the	  concerns	  examined	  about	  competition	  distortions	  were	  not	  substantiated.	  A	  
decline	  in	  the	  number	  of	  smaller	  grocery	  stores	  was	  deemed	  not	  to	  be	  conclusive	  evidence	  of	  competition	  
distortion.	  Better	  purchasing	  conditions	  obtained	  by	  large	  supermarkets	  may	  be	  explained	  by	  scale	  benefits	  
and	  by	  their	  greater	  buyer	  power.	  The	  CC	  did	  not	  find	  that	  the	  differences	  in	  supplier	  prices	  would	  be	  likely,	  in	  
themselves,	  to	  entail	  anticompetitive	  effects.	  As	  regards	  the	  potential	  waterbed	  effect,	  that	  is	  suppliers	  
charging	  higher	  prices	  to	  smaller	  retailers	  in	  order	  to	  compensate	  lower	  prices	  offered	  to	  powerful	  
supermarkets,	  it	  was	  held	  that	  the	  circumstances	  under	  which	  such	  an	  effect	  would	  occur	  were	  unlikely	  to	  arise	  
in	  the	  UK	  grocery	  retailing.	  Even	  though	  competing	  with	  large	  retailers	  is	  difficult,	  the	  CC	  found	  that	  smaller	  
retailers	  were	  not	  in	  terminal	  decline	  and	  that	  vigorous	  competition	  entailed	  significant	  benefits.	  For	  more	  
details	  on	  that	  issue,	  See:	  Report	  2008,	  at	  5.12	  to	  7.36.	  
758	  Report	  2008,	  at	  9.4.	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“The	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   by	   grocery	   retailers	   may,	   however,	   raise	   concerns	   in	  
certain	   limited	   circumstances	   if	   it	   allows	   retailers	   to	   impose	   excessive	   risks	   and	  
unexpected	  costs	  on	  suppliers,	  which	  reduces	  suppliers’	  incentive	  or	  ability	  to	  invest	  and	  
innovate.	  This	  could	   lead	   to	   reduced	  capacity,	   reduced	  product	  quality	  and	   fewer	  new	  
product	  offerings,	  and	  ultimately,	  to	  a	  detriment	  to	  consumers.”759	  
The	  emphasis	  was	  in	  fact	  put	  on	  practices	  implying	  the	  transfer	  of	  excessive	  risks	  or	  unexpected	  costs	  
to	   suppliers	   that	   may	   affect	   their	   willingness	   to	   invest	   in	   new	   products,	   capacity	   or	   production	  
processes.	   In	   particular,	   retrospective	   changes	   to	   previously	   agreed	   terms	   of	   supply	   in	   favour	   of	  
retailers,	  such	  as	  requirement	  for	  price	  adjustment	  or	  promotions,	  are	  source	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  add	  
costs/risks	  to	  suppliers.760	  As	  a	  result,	  they	  become	  unable	  to	  foresee	  those	  additional	  burdens	  and	  
to	   accurately	   calculate	   the	   degree	   of	   risk	   and	   the	   likely	   returns	   of	  making	   an	   investment.	   The	   CC	  
asserted	  that	  the	  reluctance	  of	  suppliers	  to	  launch	  new	  projects	  risks	  leading,	  in	  the	  longer-­‐term,	  to	  
reduced	   choice	   and	   product	   quality	   for	   consumers.761	   In	   addition	   to	   retrospective	   adjustments	   of	  
supply	  arrangements,	  the	  transfer	  of	  excessive	  risks,	  even	  agreed	  up-­‐front	  between	  a	  retailer	  and	  a	  
supplier,	   was	   also	   pointed	   out	   as	   leading	   to	   detrimental	   effects,	   especially	   where	   such	   a	   transfer	  
creates	   a	   “moral	   hazard”.	   This	   would	   be	   the	   case	   if	   the	   retailer	   is	   the	   best	   placed	   to	   control	   the	  
degree	  of	  risk	  incurred	  but	  is	  no	  longer	  incited	  to	  minimize	  that	  risk	  because	  it	  has	  been	  transferred	  
to	  the	  supplier.762	  
Even	  though	  the	  CC	  recognized	  that	  the	  trends	  in	  product	  innovation	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  investigation	  
did	  not	   indicate	  a	  cause	  of	  concern,	   it	  nevertheless	  underlined	  that	  the	   levels	  of	   investment	  would	  
not	  be	  maintained	  in	  the	  future	  were	  practices	  transferring	  excessive	  risks	  and	  unexpected	  costs	  to	  
continue.	  Furthermore,	  the	  CC	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  levels	  of	  investment	  and	  innovation	  might	  have	  
been	  even	  higher	   in	   the	   absence	  of	   those	  practices.	   763	   In	  order	   to	  better	   serve	   consumers	   and	   to	  
prevent	  any	  detrimental	  effect	  to	  their	  interests	  in	  the	  future,	  it	  was	  therefore	  recommended	  to	  take	  
remedial	  action	  and	  improve	  the	  existing	  system.	  
c) Solutions	  suggested:	  New	  code	  and	  Ombudsman	  
In	   order	   to	   address	   the	   anticompetitive	   effects	   related	   to	   some	   retailers’	   practices,	   the	   CC	  
established	  a	  Groceries	  Supply	  Code	  of	  Practice,	  based	  on	  the	  former	  Supermarkets	  Code	  of	  Practice	  
but	  with	   some	  amendments.	  Those	  new	  rules	   came	   into	   force	   in	  February	  2010.	  They	  aim,	  on	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
759	  Ibid.,	  at	  9.5.	  
760	  Ibid.,	  at	  9.45.	  
761	  Ibid.,	  at	  9.46.	  
762	  Ibid.,	  at	  9.47.	  
763	  Ibid.,	  at	  9.67.	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one	  hand,	  at	  preventing	  the	  transfer	  of	  excessive	  risks	  or	  unexpected	  costs	  to	  suppliers	  and,	  on	  the	  
other	  hand,	  at	  encouraging	  suppliers	  to	  complain	  about	  breaches	  of	  the	  code.	  
In	  order	  to	  bind	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  UK	  retailers	  likely	  to	  use	  the	  identified	  anticompetitive	  practices,	  
the	  scope	  of	  the	  code	  has	  been	  extended	  to	  all	  firms	  which	  are	  active	  in	  the	  supply	  of	  groceries	  at	  a	  
retail	  level	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  which	  are	  controlled	  by	  corporate	  groups	  with	  an	  annual	  UK	  retail	  groceries	  
turnover	  of	  1£	  billion	  or	  more.764	  As	  regards	  the	  content	  of	  the	  code,	  the	  provisions	  are	  the	  result	  of	  
a	   balance	   stricken	   by	   the	   CC	   between	   being	   prescriptive	   and	   allowing	   retailers	   a	   degree	   of	  
commercial	   flexibility.	   As	   such,	   retailers	   are	   only	   prohibited	   outright	   from	   making	   retrospective	  
adjustments	   to	   terms	   of	   supply	   and	   from	  holding	   suppliers	   liable	   for	   losses	   due	   to	   shrinkage765.	   A	  
provision	  that	  ensures	  that	  suppliers	  are	  less	  subject	  to	  customer	  complaint	  charges	  is	  also	  included	  
in	   the	   code.766	   For	   the	   rest,	   as	   a	   general	   safeguard	   against	   the	   transfer	   of	   excessive	   risk	   and	  
unexpected	  cost,	  an	  overarching	  “fair	  dealing”	  provision	  is	  introduced	  so	  that	  commercial	  flexibility	  is	  
not	  unreasonably	  constrained	  by	  additional	  outright	  prohibition.767	  	  	  
With	  the	  aim	  of	  improving	  suppliers’	  confidence	  in	  relying	  on	  the	  code,	  retailers	  must	  appoint	  an	  in-­‐
house	  code	  compliance	  officer	  who	  will	  assist	  resolution	  of	  queries	  raised	  by	  suppliers	  and	  report	  to	  
the	  audit	  committee	  (or	  non-­‐executive	  director).	   In	  addition,	  to	  make	  it	  easier	  to	  establish	  whether	  
retailers	  have	  complied	  with	  the	  code	  or	  not,	  different	  documents	  must	  be	  provided	  in	  writing	  such	  
as	  the	  retailer’s	  standard	  terms	  and	  conditions,	  the	  terms	  of	  supply	  between	  retailers	  and	  suppliers	  
as	  well	  as	  any	  notice	  in	  relation	  to	  de-­‐listing.768	  	  
As	  regards	  monitoring	  and	  enforcement	  of	  the	  code,	  the	  CC	  decided	  to	  establish	  an	  Ombudsman	  and	  
to	  change	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  dispute	   resolution	   from	  mediation	   to	  arbitration.	  Among	   the	  different	  
tasks	  assigned	   to	   the	  Ombusdman,	  we	  can	  mention:	  monitoring	  and	  enforcing	   the	  code;	  gathering	  
information	  and	  proactively	  investigating	  retailers’	  records	  in	  areas	  subject	  to	  complaint;	  arbitrating	  
disputes	  between	  retailers	  and	  suppliers;	  publishing	  guidance	  on	  specific	  provision	  of	  the	  code;	  and	  
reporting	   to	   the	  OFT	  on	  a	   regular	  basis	   regarding	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  complaints	  and	  disputes	   it	  has	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
764	  Ibid.,	  at	  11.280	  to	  11.282.	  Those	  grocery	  retailers	  would	  be:	  Tesco,	  Sainsbury’s,	  Asda,	  Morrisons,	  
Sommerfield,	  M&S,	  CGL,	  Aldi,	  Iceland	  and	  Lidl.	  
765	  Losses	  due	  to	  shrinkage	  are	  losses	  that	  arise	  when	  stock	  is	  recorded	  on	  a	  company’s	  books	  but	  is	  not	  on	  
hand,	  due	  to	  theft,	  the	  goods	  being	  lost	  or	  accounting	  error.	  In	  most	  cases,	  suppliers	  are	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  
control	  such	  a	  risk	  while	  retailers	  are	  able	  to	  take	  appropriate	  measures	  such	  as	  improving	  security	  at	  depots	  or	  
stores.	  
766	  Report	  2008,	  11.316	  to	  11.317.	  
767	  Ibid.,	  at	  11.314	  to	  11.315.	  
768	  Ibid.,	  at	  11.331.	  Different	  safeguards	  are	  provided	  for	  against	  “wild”	  de-­‐listing.	  A	  retailer	  must:	  provide	  
suppliers	  with	  a	  letter	  setting	  out	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  retailer	  taking	  this	  action;	  give	  suppliers	  notice	  of	  their	  
right	  to	  escalate	  a	  decision	  for	  de-­‐listing	  or	  having	  their	  business	  with	  the	  grocery	  retailer	  significantly	  reduced,	  
to	  a	  more	  senior	  person	  in	  the	  commercial	  team;	  and	  give	  suppliers	  an	  opportunity	  for	  an	  interview	  with	  the	  in-­‐
house	  code	  compliance	  officer	  prior	  to	  the	  decision	  taking	  effect.	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investigated.769	   In	   addition,	   the	   CC	   recommended	   giving	   the	   Ombudsman	   the	   power	   to	   levy	  
significant	   financial	   penalties	   on	   the	   retailers	   for	   non-­‐compliance.770	   In	   order	   to	   remedy	   the	  
significant	  imbalance	  of	  power	  between	  the	  parties	  that	  undermined	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  negotiation	  
under	  the	  mediation	  procedure,	  the	  new	  code	  provides	  for	  arbitration	  of	  disputes	  and	  reduces	  the	  
time	   period	   for	   instigating	   the	   dispute	   resolution	   process	   from	   90	   days	   to	   21	   days.771	   The	  
Ombudsman	   will	   be	   in	   charge	   of	   undertaking	   dispute	   resolution	   but	   will	   also	   have	   the	   power	   to	  
investigate	  complaints	  received	  on	  a	  confidential	  basis.772	  
Given	  that,	   in	  August	  2009,	  retailers	  had	  not	  voluntarily	  agreed	  to	  an	  Ombudsman,	  the	  CC	  formally	  
recommended	   that	   the	  Government	   should	  establish	  one.	   The	  25th	   June	  2013,	   the	  Groceries	  Code	  
Adjudicator	   Act	   came	   into	   force,	   establishing	   an	   independent	   adjudicator	   to	   oversee	   the	  
relationships	   between	   supermarkets	   and	   their	   suppliers.773	   Its	  mission	   is	   to	   enforce	   the	   Groceries	  
Supply	  Code	  of	  Practice.	  To	  do	  so,	  it	  has	  powers,	  in	  particular,	  to	  investigate	  confidential	  complaints	  
from	   any	   source	   about	   how	   supermarkets	   treat	   their	   suppliers;	   to	   make	   recommendations	   to	  
retailers	  is	  a	  complaint	  is	  upheld;	  to	  require	  retailer	  to	  publish	  details	  of	  a	  breach	  of	  the	  code;	  in	  the	  
most	   serious	   cases,	   impose	   a	   fine	   on	   the	   retailer;	   to	   arbitrate	   disputes	   between	   retailers	   and	  
suppliers.774	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  fines	  that	  can	  possibly	  be	  imposed	  in	  case	  of	  breaches	  of	  the	  Code,	  
the	   Government	   has	   not	   yet	   decided	   on	   how	   high	   these	   financial	   penalties	   should	   be.	   The	  
Adjudicator	  recommended	  on	  that	  matter	  a	  fine	  of	  maximum	  1%	  of	  UK	  turnover.	  This	  is	  much	  lower	  
than	  the	  maximum	  penalties	  for	  breaches	  of	  the	  competition	  rules	  which	  can	  amount	  up	  to	  10%	  of	  
worldwide	   turnover.775	   It	   remains	  hence	   to	  be	   seen	  whether	   such	  a	  maximum	   level	  of	   fine	  will	   be	  
such	  as	  to	  dissuade	  supermarkets	  from	  breaching	  the	  Code.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
769	  Report	  2008,	  at	  11.337	  to	  11.347.	  
770	  The	  CC	  considered	  that	  the	  payment	  of	  compensation	  by	  retailers	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  sufficient	  incentive	  to	  
comply	  with	  the	  code.	  
771	  Report	  2008,	  at	  11.354	  to	  11.360.	  
772	  Ibid.,	  at	  11.361	  to	  11.368.	  Anonymity	  cannot	  be	  ensured	  in	  case	  of	  a	  dispute	  notified	  to	  the	  Ombudsman	  
since	  due	  process	  requires	  that	  the	  defending	  retailer	  has	  the	  opportunity	  to	  answer	  and	  address	  any	  particular	  
allegations.	  Investigation	  carried	  out	  following	  a	  complaint	  is	  intended	  to	  be	  broad	  ranging	  and	  to	  be	  based	  on	  
general	  patterns	  of	  behavior	  by	  the	  retailers.	  It	  cannot	  result	  in	  imposing	  a	  sanction	  on	  a	  particular	  retailer.	  On	  
the	  results	  of	  the	  first	  and	  second	  investigation	  in	  the	  UK	  grocery	  sector,	  See	  also:	  A.Seely,	  Supermarket:	  
Competition	  inquiries	  into	  the	  groceries	  market	  –	  Commons	  Library	  Standard	  Note,	  Published	  2	  August	  2012,	  
Amended	  17	  July	  2013,	  available	  at:	  http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-­‐papers/SN03653	  	  
773	  Groceries	  Code	  Adjudicator	  Act	  2013,	  available	  at:	  
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/19/pdfs/ukpga_20130019_en.pdf	  	  
774	  See:	  The	  Groceries	  Code	  Adjudicator	  website:	  https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/groceries-­‐
code-­‐adjudicator/about	  	  
775	  The	  proposed	  maximum	  level	  of	  fine	  suggested	  by	  the	  Adjudicator	  will	  be	  established	  by	  Order	  by	  the	  
Secretary	  of	  State,	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  Adjudicator’s	  recommendation.	  Retailers	  would	  have	  a	  full	  right	  of	  
appeal	  against	  any	  fines	  imposed.	  See:	  Press	  release,	  Groceries	  Code	  Adjudicator	  Bill	  receives	  Royal	  Assent,	  
Published	  25	  April	  2013,	  available	  at:	  https://www.gov.uk/government/news/groceries-­‐code-­‐adjudicator-­‐bill-­‐
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C. GENERAL	  V	  SPECIFIC	  APPROACH	  TO	  DEAL	  WITH	  BUYER	  POWER	  
The	   UK	   competition	   authorities	   decided	   to	   tackle	   concerns	   about	   supermarkets’	   buyer	   power	  
through	   the	   introduction	  of	   specific	  measures,	   namely	   the	   adoption	  of	   a	   code	  of	   practice	   and	   the	  
establishment	  of	  an	  Ombudsman.	  Those	   rules	  applying	   in	   the	  grocery	   retail	   sector	   supplement	   the	  
general	   provisions	   on	   competition.	   Although	   they	   may	   remedy	   the	   strict	   conditions	   required	   to	  
enforce	  the	  competition	  rules,	   they	  nevertheless	  have	  some	   limits	  and	  might	  be	  unable	  to	  prevent	  
anticompetitive	  practices	  within	  the	  grocery	  supply	  chain.	  
1. Scope	  ratione	  personae	  
The	   Groceries	   Supply	   Code	   of	   Practice	   only	   applies	   to	   the	   UK	   largest	   retailers.	   This	   means	   that	  
possible	   anticompetitive	   practices	   adopted	   by	   intermediaries	   in	   their	   dealings	   with	   their	   own	  
suppliers	   are	   not	   subject	   to	   specific	   rules.	   However,	   it	   is	   not	   uncommon	   that	   pressure	   exerted	   by	  
grocery	   retailers	   influences	   the	  behavior	  of	   food	  processors	  or	  other	   intermediaries	   further	  up	   the	  
food	  supply	  chain.	  Those	  market	  participants	  are	  indeed	  incited	  to	  use	  similar	  practices	  against	  their	  
own	  suppliers	  to	  reduce	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  the	  loss	  of	  profit	  incurred	  due	  to	  retailers’	  buyer	  power.	  
Suppliers	   and	  especially	   primary	  producers	  may	  hence	   still	   be	   facing	   transfer	  of	   excessive	   risk	   and	  
unexpected	  costs.	  The	  OFT	  and	  the	  CC	  are	  expecting	  that	  the	  new	  measures	  introduced	  with	  regard	  
to	   supermarkets	   will	   have	   some	   spill-­‐over	   effect	   throughout	   the	   whole	   food	   supply	   chain	   and	  
alleviate	  buyer	  power	  problems	  	  encountered	  at	  any	  level	  of	  that	  chain.	  The	  CC	  nevertheless	  asserted	  
that,	  if	  such	  an	  effect	  did	  not	  occur,	  appropriate	  measure	  should	  be	  introduced	  such	  as	  the	  extension	  
of	  the	  code	  or	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  complementary	  code	  to	  deal	  with	  all	  buyer-­‐supplier	  relationships.776	  	  
2. Scope	  ratione	  materiae	  
The	  competition	  rules	  on	  abusive	  conduct	  can	  only	  be	  applied	  when	  a	  retailer’s	  behaviour	  amounts	  
to	   an	   abuse	   of	   a	   dominant	   position.	   Given	   that	   even	   the	   largest	   supermarket	   may	   not	   fulfill	   the	  
conditions	   of	   dominance,	   especially	   as	   regards	   the	   market	   share	   usually	   thought	   necessary	   to	  
characterize	   such	   a	   position,	   the	   practices	   used	   by	   powerful	   retailers	   in	   fact	   evade	   supervision	   of	  
competition	   authorities.777	   The	   Groceries	   Supply	   Code	   of	   Conduct	   constitutes	   therefore	   an	   useful	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
receives-­‐royal-­‐assent	  See	  also:	  Groceries	  Code	  Adjudicator,	  Statutory	  guidance	  on	  how	  the	  Groceries	  Code	  
Adjudicator	  will	  carry	  out	  investigation	  	  and	  enforcement	  functions,	  December	  2013,	  available	  at:	  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/267646/Statutory_Guidance
_Consultation_Summary_Response.pdf	  	  
776	  Report	  2008,	  at	  11.294	  to	  11.296.	  In	  its	  review	  of	  the	  code	  in	  2005,	  the	  OFT	  paid	  attention	  to	  proposals	  for	  a	  
new	  code	  known	  as	  Buyers’	  Charter	  which	  would	  have	  a	  broader	  scope.	  The	  OFT	  asserted	  that	  it	  stands	  ready	  
to	  advise	  and	  have	  constructive	  discussion	  with	  all	  parties	  in	  the	  food	  supply	  chain	  on	  this	  matter.	  See:	  OFT,	  
Supermarkets:	  The	  code	  of	  practice	  and	  other	  competition	  issues,	  March	  2005,	  3.31.	  
777	  Market	  shares	  constitute	  an	  important	  factor	  is	  the	  assessment	  of	  dominance	  even	  tough	  other	  factors	  must	  
also	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  such	  as	  barriers	  to	  entry	  or	  expansion.	  According	  to	  the	  case	  law	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  a	  
firm	  holding	  a	  market	  share	  of	  50%	  may	  be	  held	  to	  have	  a	  dominant	  position.	  Between	  40%	  and	  50%	  market	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instrument	   to	   tackle	   anticompetitive	   practices	   since,	   provided	   that	   a	   supermarket	   is	   controlled	   by	  
corporate	  groups	  with	  an	  annual	  UK	  retail	  groceries	  turnover	  of	  1£	  billion	  or	  more,	  it	  will	  be	  subject	  
to	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	   code.	   However,	   the	   code	   focuses	   on	   very	   specific	   practices	   which	   were	  
deemed	   anticompetitive	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   CC	   investigation.	   In	   order	   to	   prevent	   excessive	   rigidity	  
into	   retailer-­‐supplier	   relations	   and	   maintain	   the	   possibility	   for	   both	   parties	   to	   react	   to	   evolving	  
opportunities	  in	  the	  market,	  it	  was	  indeed	  agreed	  to	  introduce	  a	  very	  limited	  number	  of	  prohibitions	  
targeting	  specifically	  the	  transfer	  of	  excessive	  risks	  or	  unexpected	  costs	  to	  suppliers.	  Yet,	   it	  remains	  
to	  be	  seen	  whether	  retailers	  will	  be	  more	  inclined	  to	  comply	  with	  those	  new	  provisions	  and	  whether	  
new	  practices,	  distorting	  or	  restricting	  competition,	  will	  not	  emerge	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  Supermarkets	  
are	   in	   fact	   likely	   to	   use	   other	   trading	   arrangements,	   not	   covered	   by	   the	   code,	   to	   keep	   extracting	  
benefits	  from	  the	  imbalance	  of	  power	  between	  them	  and	  their	  suppliers.	  In	  that	  event,	  competition	  
authorities	  would	   therefore	  have	   again	   to	  bring	   the	   code	  up	   to	  date	   in	   order	   to	   encompass	   every	  
conduct	  considered	  to	  be	  anticompetitive.	  Such	  an	  a	  posteriori	  reaction	  may	  be	  time	  consuming,	  in	  
particular	  if	  another	  in-­‐depth	  investigation	  is	  referred	  to	  the	  CC	  before	  modifying	  the	  code.	  	  
In	  contrast,	  the	  general	  competition	  rules	  -­‐	  provided	  that	  the	  issue	  of	  dominance	  is	  resolved	  -­‐	  apply	  
to	   any	   conduct	   likely	   to	   prevent,	   restrict	   or	   distort	   competition.	   Each	   practice	   is	   examined	  
individually	   on	   basis	   of	   its	   potential	   effects	   on	   the	  markets	   at	   the	   time	   it	   was	   carried	   out	   by	   the	  
firm(s)	  involved.	  The	  broader	  and	  even	  unlimited	  range	  of	  practices	  which	  may	  fall	  within	  the	  ambit	  
of	   the	   competition	   rules	   gives	   EU	   and	   national	   authorities	   the	   possibility	   to	   immediately	   open	  
proceedings	  against	  any	  alleged	  violation	  of	  the	  competition	  rules	  and	  to	  impose	  sanctions	  or	  other	  
remedies	  if	  the	  practice	  under	  examination	  turns	  out	  indeed	  to	  be	  anticompetitive.	  	  
In	  conclusion,	  where	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  code	  of	  practice	  may	  be	  more	  effectively	  enforced	  against	  
buyers	   than	   the	   traditional	   competition	   rules,	   it	   remains	   that	   it	   only	   targets	   specific	   actors	   and	  
practices	  on	  basis	   of	   a	  market	   investigation	   carried	  out	   at	   a	   given	   time.	   It	   is	   therefore	   likely	   to	  be	  
overtaken	  by	  the	  fast	  changes	  occurring	  in	  the	  markets	  all	  along	  the	  food	  supply	  chain.	  
D. CONCLUSIVE	  REMARKS	  
A	   cautious	   approach	   is	   followed	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   deal	   with	   buyer	   power.	   The	   UK	   Competition	  
Authorities	  are	  prepared	  to	  apply	  the	  rules	  related	  to	  abuse	  of	  dominance	  to	  buyers	  but,	  given	  the	  
benefits	  that	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  is	  considered	  to	  provide	  for	  consumers,	  they	  will	  do	  so	  only	  
in	   exceptional	   circumstances.	   The	   same	   approach	   prevailed	   when	   it	   was	   decided	   to	   take	   specific	  
measures	  in	  the	  grocery	  retailing	  sector.	  The	  CC	  and	  the	  OFT	  recognize	  that	  pressure	  exerted	  by	  large	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
share,	  the	  dominant	  position	  needs	  to	  be	  supported	  by	  other	  factors.	  	  Below	  40%,	  dominance	  is	  unlikely	  even	  
though	  not	  excluded.	  See:	  R.Wish,	  Competition	  Law,	  6th	  edition,	  at	  175-­‐183	  (2009).	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supermarkets	   has	   secured	   lower	   retail	   prices	   and	   that,	   in	   general,	   consumers	   benefit	   from	   fierce	  
competition	  in	  the	  grocery	  market.	  However,	  on	  basis	  of	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  two	  investigations	  led	  
by	  the	  CC,	  it	  was	  concluded	  that,	  if	  exercised	  inappropriately	  and	  if	  left	  unchecked,	  buyer	  power	  may	  
damage	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  suppliers	  and	  ultimately	  harm	  consumers.	  Some	  practices,	  such	  has	  
retrospectively	   imposing	  charges	  or	   transferring	  excessive	  risks	  and	  costs	  on	  suppliers,	  are	   likely	   to	  
reduce	  their	  incentives	  to	  invest	  in	  new	  products	  and	  innovation.	  In	  the	  longer-­‐term,	  this	  may	  lead	  to	  
consumers	   facing	   lessened	   product	   choice	   and	   quality	   on	   the	   shelves.	   The	   UK	   competition	  
Authorities	   have	   therefore	   had	   the	   difficult	   task	   of	   finding	   the	   right	   measure	   likely	   to	   eradicate	  
anticompetitive	  practices	  while	  still	  ensuring	  a	  degree	  of	  commercial	  flexibility	  to	  allow	  both	  parties	  
to	   react	   to	  changes	   in	   the	  markets.	  The	  “soft”	  measure	   introduced	  to	  achieve	  that	  aim	  has	  been	  a	  
code	   of	   practice	   that	   the	   largest	   supermarkets	   have	   to	   comply	  with.	   In	   force	   since	   2010,	   the	   new	  
version	   of	   that	   code	   has	   little	   chance	   to	   reap	   the	   benefits	   expected	   without	   the	   participation	   of	  
suppliers.	   It	   remains	   to	   be	   seen	   whether	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   Ombudsman	   will	   help	   them	  
overcome	  the	  fear	  of	  complaining.	  	  
The	  introduction	  of	  a	  code	  of	  practice	  to	  address	  buyer	  power	  concerns	  is	  a	  good	  initiative.	  But	  it	  is	  
probably	  too	  a	  soft	  measure	  to	  effectively	  deter	  supermarkets	  from	  using	  anticompetitive	  practices	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SECTION	  3	  –	  BUYER	  POWER	  IN	  THE	  UNITED	  STATES	  
Buyer	  power	  concerns	  have	  been	  addressed	  by	  the	  U.S.	  authorities	  since	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  
antitrust	   policy.	   The	   traditional	   competition	   rules	   have	   been	   enforced	   against	   anticompetitive	  
buyers’	  practices,	  such	  as	  buyer	  cartels,	  arising	  in	  various	  sectors.	  As	  shown	  by	  the	  case	  law	  on	  that	  
matter,	   the	   issue	   of	   buyer	   power	   is	   not	   confined	   to	   the	   agri-­‐food	   industry.	   The	   high	   degree	   of	  
concentration	  within	  the	  food	  supply	  chain	  and	  the	  vital	  role	  of	  food	  in	  the	  society	  have	  yet	  led	  the	  
U.S.	  legislator	  to	  focus	  primarily	  on	  that	  sector.	  In	  the	  early	  1900’s,	  specific	  provisions	  were	  enacted	  
in	  order	  to	  curb	  large	  retail	  chains’	  bargaining	  power	  and	  to	  establish	  a	  level	  playing	  field	  in	  the	  retail	  
sector.	  However,	  we	  will	  see	  that	  the	  invasive	  intrusion	  into	  the	  retailer-­‐supplier	  relationships	  have	  
caused	  harmful	  effects	  to	  competition	  and	  to	  consumers.	  Moving	  up	  the	  supply	  chain,	  packers	  and	  
processors’	   buyer	   power	   have	   also	   drawn	   the	   attention	   of	   the	   U.S.	   authorities.	   In	   view	   of	   the	  
weakness	   of	   producers	   facing	   concentrated	   processing	   industries,	   specific	   rules	   have	   been	  
implemented	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  farmer’s	  bargaining	  power	  and	  to	  regulate	  the	  behavior	  of	  market	  
participants.	  
Where	  the	  U.S.	  set	  of	  antitrust	  rules	  may	  be	  viewed	  as	  adequate	  laws	  to	  tackle	  all	  potential	  harmful	  
practices,	  be	  it	  on	  the	  sell-­‐side	  or	  the	  buy-­‐side	  of	  the	  market,	  the	  enforcement	  regime	  deprives	  them	  
of	  their	  efficacy	  in	  many	  cases.	  The	  main	  issue	  is	  often	  the	  effects	  of	  buyers’	  conduct	  in	  the	  output	  
market.	  The	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  may,	  in	  some	  circumstances,	  also	  affect	  consumers	  but	  in	  most	  
cases	   it	   is	   unlikely	   to	   harm	   directly	   end-­‐users	   and	  may	   even	   benefit	   them	   in	   the	   short-­‐term.	   The	  
question	   is	   therefore	   whether	   the	   antitrust	   laws	   only	   protect	   consumers	   against	   improper	   use	   of	  
seller	   power	   or	   whether	   they	   can	   also	   be	   enforced	   against	   powerful	   buyers,	   assuming	   that	   a	  
competitive	   environment	   must	   be	   protected	   in	   all	   markets	   to	   ensure	   the	   long-­‐term	   interests	   of	  
consumers.	  
A. BUYER	  POWER	  CONCERNS	  IN	  THE	  AGRI-­‐FOOD	  INDUSTRY	  
Massive	   consolidation	  has	  been	   taking	  place	   in	   the	  US	  agri-­‐food	   industry	   for	   the	   last	  decades.	  The	  
resulting	   increased	  buyer	  power	   in	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  few	  market	  participants	  has	  particularly	  affected	  
producers	   which	   have	   become,	   in	   most	   cases,	   subject	   to	   those	   powerful	   buyers’	   diktat	   and	  
manipulation.	   However,	   buyer	   power	   concerns	   are	   not	   confined	   to	   that	   industry	   as	   revealed	   by	  
antitrust	  claims	  made	  in	  various	  sectors.	  
1. Consolidation	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  the	  food	  supply	  chain	  
Food	  retailer,	   food	  processor	  and	  meatpacker	  mergers	  have	  dramatically	  enhanced	   the	  exercise	  of	  
buyer	  power	  within	  the	  food	  supply	  chain.	  In	  the	  retail	  sector,	  four	  companies	  account	  for	  more	  than	  
half	   of	   the	   sales	   in	   the	   United	   States.	   Supermarket	   chains	   and	   especially	   Wal-­‐Mart,	   the	   largest	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retailer	  in	  the	  world,	  are	  therefore	  in	  a	  position	  to	  increase	  pressure	  on	  their	  suppliers	  in	  order	  to	  get	  
lower	  prices	  or	  other	  concessions.778	  Significant	  buyer	  power	  characterizes	  also	  giant	  agribusinesses	  
which	  buy	  crops	  and	  livestock	  from	  farmers.	  For	  example,	  the	  top	  four	  beef	  processors	  control	  more	  
than	   81%	  of	   the	  market	  whilst	   the	   top	   four	   firms	   for	   pork	   and	   broiler	   chicken	   processing	   account	  
respectively	   for	  64%	  and	  54%	  of	   the	  market.779	  Due	  to	   the	   limited	  number	  of	  competitors	   in	   those	  
markets,	   buyers	   do	   not	   bid	   up	   the	   price	   of	   agricultural	   commodities.	   In	   contrast,	   buyer	   power	  
derived	   from	   that	   concentration	  enables	   them	   to	  pass	   the	   lower	  prices	   imposed	  by	   retailers	  on	   to	  
producers.	  As	  a	   result,	   famers	   take	   the	  brunt	  of	   that	   successive	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  along	   the	  
food	  supply	  chain.780	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  exerting	  downward	  pressure	  on	  prices,	  food	  processors	  are	  increasingly	  using	  captive	  
supply	  contracts	  to	  buy	  livestock	  instead	  of	  competing	  in	  the	  spot	  market.	  According	  to	  the	  definition	  
given	   by	   the	   Grain	   Inspection,	   Packers	   and	   Stockyards	   Administration	   (GIPSA),	   the	   term	   “captive	  
supply”	   refers	   to	   livestock	   that	   is	  owned	  or	   fed	  by	  a	  packer	  more	   than	  14	  days	  prior	   to	   slaughter,	  
livestock	  that	   is	  procured	  by	  a	  packer	  through	  a	  contract	  or	  marketing	  agreement	  that	  has	  been	   in	  
place	  for	  more	  than	  14	  days,	  or	  livestock	  that	  is	  otherwise	  committed	  to	  a	  packer	  more	  than	  14	  days	  
prior	   to	   slaughter.781	   Control	   over	   the	   input	  market	   through	   livestock	   ownership	   or	   contracts	  may	  
adversely	  affect	  producers.	   Those	   contracts,	  which	  are	  presented	  on	  a	   take-­‐it-­‐or-­‐leave-­‐it	  basis,	   are	  
indeed	  drafted	  exclusively	  in	  favor	  of	  buyers	  and	  spot	  market	  prices,	  on	  which	  is	  based	  the	  formula	  
for	  calculating	  the	  contract	  price,	   tend	  consequently	  to	  drop.	  The	   involvement	  of	  processors	   in	  the	  
production	  process	   is	  particularly	   important,	  for	  example,	   in	  the	  poultry	   industry	  where	  farmers	  do	  
not	  own	  the	  birds	  but	  are	  only	  responsible	  for	  providing	  labor,	  facilities	  and	  services	  for	  processors.	  
Growers	  perform	  those	  services	  under	  strict	  conditions	  and	  are	  required	  to	  make	  substantial	  capital	  
investment	  to	  comply	  with	  them,	  without	  receiving	  any	  guaranteed	  long-­‐term	  contracts	  or	  not	  long	  
enough	   to	   cover	   the	   life	   of	   their	   investment.	   782	   In	   view	   of	   those	   considerable	   sunk	   costs,	   of	   the	  
perishable	   nature	   of	   their	   commodities,	   and	   short	   of	   alternative	   processors	   operating	   in	   the	   area,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
778	  Farm	  Bill	  101,	  Report	  of	  Food	  &	  Water	  Watch,	  January	  	  2012,	  at	  5,	  available	  at:	  
http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/reports/farm-­‐bill-­‐101/	  
779	  Ibid.,	  at	  4.	  
780	  T.A.Wise	  &	  S.E.Trist,	  Buyer	  Power	  in	  U.S.	  Hog	  Markets:	  A	  Critical	  Review	  of	  the	  Literature,	  Global	  
Development	  and	  environment	  Institute,	  Working	  Paper	  No.10-­‐04,	  August	  2010,	  at	  19.	  
781	  Captive	  supply	  of	  cattle	  and	  GIPSA’s	  reporting	  on	  captive	  supply,	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  Agriculture	  –	  
Grain	  Inspection,	  Packers	  and	  Stockyards	  Inspection,	  January	  11,	  2002,	  at	  2,	  available	  at:	  
http://www.gipsa.usda.gov/Publications/psp/captive_supply/captivesupplyreport.pdf	  	  
782	  C.R.Taylor,	  The	  Many	  Faces	  of	  Power	  in	  the	  Food	  System,	  Comments	  presented	  at	  the	  DoJ/FTC	  Workshop	  on	  
Merger	  Enforcement,	  February	  17,	  2004.	  	  “The	  system	  can	  best	  be	  described	  as	  feudal,	  with	  master	  (integrator)	  
and	  servant	  (contract	  producer).”	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farmers	  are	  thus	  reluctant	  to	  respond	  to	   lower	  prices	  or	  other	  exploitative	  contract	  terms	   imposed	  
by	  their	  contractors.783	  	  
Market	  consolidation	  in	  the	  agri-­‐food	  industry	  is	  hence	  particularly	  detrimental	  to	  producers.	  Those	  
concerns	   have	   been	  mentioned	   in	   a	   series	   of	  workshops	   exploring	   competition	   in	   the	   agricultural	  
sector	   and	   hosted	   by	   the	   Antitrust	   Division	   of	   the	   U.S.	   Department	   of	   Justice	   and	   the	   U.S.	  
Department	   of	   Agriculture	   in	   2010.784	   Interested	   parties,	   including	   ranchers,	   farmers,	   processors,	  
retailers,	   workers,	   academics,	   law	   enforcers	   and	   regulators,	   gathered	   to	   discuss	   competition	  
concerns	   in	   that	   sector.	   Those	   concerns	   were	   mainly	   related	   to	   market	   concentration,	   merger	  
enforcement,	   monopsony,	   bid	   rigging,	   market	   transparency,	   captive	   ownership,	   contracting,	   low	  
prices	   for	   commodities,	   lack	   of	   capital,	   and	   potential	   market	   manipulation.785	   Farmers	   had	   the	  
opportunity	   to	   provide	   examples	   of	   potentially	   anticompetitive	   conduct	   and	   to	  make	   their	   voices	  
heard	  on	   those	   issues.	  However,	   it	   remains	   to	  be	  seen	  whether	   the	  U.S.	  authorities	  will	   change	  or	  
enforce	  more	   strictly	   the	   antitrust	   rules	   to	   address	   effectively	   the	   alleged	   competition	   distortions	  
mentioned	  by	  the	  various	  market	  participants.	  
2. Market	  price	  manipulation	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  producers	  
The	  reduced	  number	  of	  buyers	  creates	  an	   imbalance	  of	  power	  between	  processors	  and	  producers.	  
As	   a	   result,	   the	   latter	   are	   often	   forced	   to	   take	   ever	   lower	   price	   offered	   to	   them	   or	   to	   accept	  
disadvantageous	   contracts,	   not	   to	   mention	   the	   fact	   that	   such	   arrangements	   are	   likely	   to	   entail	  
adverse	  effects	  on	  the	  market	  prices.	  Where	  contracts	  with	  processors	  may	  yield	  some	  benefits	  for	  
farmers,	   such	   as	   reduced	   transaction/marketing	   costs,	   assurance	   of	   a	   buyer	   for	   their	   products	   or	  
better	   access	   to	   capital786,	   some	   have	   indeed	   established	   a	   negative	   relationship	   between	   captive	  
supplies	   and	   cash	   market	   prices	   due	   to	   market	   manipulation.787	   As	   the	   share	   of	   commodities	  
committed	  to	  processors	  through	  ownership	  or	  contracts	  increases,	  the	  volume	  traded	  on	  the	  open	  
market	  declines,	  falling	  for	  example	  to	  less	  than	  10%	  for	  hogs	  and	  1%	  for	  cheese.	  The	  thinning	  of	  spot	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
783	  Abusive	  poultry	  contracts	  require	  Government	  action,	  Fact	  Sheet	  of	  Food	  &	  Water	  Watch,	  March	  2011,	  
available	  at:	  http://documents.foodandwaterwatch.org/doc/PoultryCompetition-­‐web.pdf	  	  
784	  Five	  joint	  public	  workshops	  were	  held	  on	  different	  topics	  and	  in	  different	  locations:	  Issues	  on	  concern	  to	  
farmers,	  Iowa,	  March	  12,	  2010;	  Poultry	  industry,	  Alabama,	  May	  21,	  2010;	  Dairy	  industry,	  Wisconsin,	  June	  25,	  
2010;	  Livestock	  industry,	  Colorado,	  August	  27,	  2010;	  Margins,	  Washington,	  December	  8,	  2010.	  Transcripts	  are	  
available	  at:	  http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/ag2010/index.html	  	  
785	  Competition	  and	  agriculture:	  Voices	  from	  the	  workshops	  on	  agriculture	  and	  antitrust	  enforcement	  in	  our	  21st	  
century	  –	  Economy	  and	  thoughts	  on	  the	  way	  forward,	  Report	  issued	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Justice,	  May	  
2012,	  available	  at:	  http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/283291.pdf	  	  
786	  Captive	  supply	  of	  cattle	  and	  GIPSA’s	  reporting	  on	  captive	  supply,	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  Agriculture	  –	  
Grain	  Inspection,	  Packers	  and	  Stockyards	  Inspection,	  January	  11,	  2002,	  at	  47,	  available	  at:	  
http://www.gipsa.usda.gov/Publications/psp/captive_supply/captivesupplyreport.pdf	  	  
787	  See	  for	  example:	  J.R.Schroeter	  &	  A.Azzam,	  Captive	  supplies	  and	  cash	  market-­‐prices	  for	  fed	  cattle:	  The	  role	  of	  
delivery	  timing	  incentives,	  20	  Agribusiness	  347	  (2004).	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markets	  and	  the	   information	   imbalance	  give	   in	   fact	  buyers	   the	  ability	   to	  manipulate	  market-­‐prices.	  
They	  are	  even	  incited	  to	  do	  so	  since	  the	  prices	  they	  pay	  to	  farmers	  under	  contract	  are	  somehow	  tied	  
to	   the	  cash	  market	  on	  basis	  of	  a	   specific	   formula.788	  Because	   future	  delivery	  arrangements	  are	  not	  
reported	  as	  a	  public	  market	  activity,	  producers	  cannot	  evaluate	  processors’	  immediate	  need.	  	  
Consequently,	  packers	  can	  assert	  that	  their	  demand	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  satisfied	  by	  captive	  supplies,	  which	  
they	  may	  or	  may	  not	  have,	   in	  order	  to	   influence	  the	  cash	  market	  price.789	  They	  may	  also	  decide	  to	  
delay	   their	   entry	   in	   the	   cash	   market	   to	   further	   lower	   prices.	   Due	   to	   the	   perishability	   of	   some	  
agricultural	   commodities,	   producers	   are	   in	   fact	  more	   inclined	   to	   receive	   lower	   prices	   as	   the	   time	  
running	  out	  makes	  them	  fear	  to	  lose	  all	  the	  benefits	  of	  their	  production.	  In	  addition,	  with	  their	  supply	  
arrangements,	  processors	  can	  push	  prices	  further	  down	  below	  the	  competitive	  level	  by	  acting	  on	  the	  
selling	   side	   of	   the	   cash	   market.	   When	   market-­‐prices	   are	   high,	   processors	   may	   indeed	   sell	  
commodities	  committed	  to	  them	  through	  contracts	  in	  order	  to	  make	  price	  move	  down	  and	  take	  back	  
the	  “buyer	  cap”	  when	  prices	  actually	  have	  gone	  down.790	  The	  result	  of	  such	  price	  manipulation	  is	  a	  
decline	  in	  prices	  paid	  on	  the	  cash	  market	  but	  also	  for	  commodities	  committed	  through	  contracts.	  By	  
using	  their	  buying	  power	  to	  force	  farmers	  to	  enter	   into	  supply	  contracts,	  buyers	  acquire	  hence	  the	  
ability	   to	   further	   foster	   their	   market	   power	   in	   the	   procurement	   market	   through	   market	  
manipulation.	  
Free	  and	  fair	  competition	  in	  the	  agricultural	  market	  is	  of	  crucial	  importance	  for	  producers	  but	  is	  also	  
a	  matter	  of	  national	  security	  and	  public	  health.791	  Various	  concerns	  have	  been	  expressed	  by	  farmers	  
at	   the	   workshops	   on	   competition	   in	   agriculture	   and,	   in	   particular,	   the	   issue	   of	   market	   price	  
manipulation	   which	   de	   facto	   runs	   counter	   to	   free	   and	   fair	   competition.	   At	   the	   close	   of	   those	  
workshops,	   the	   Antitrust	   Division	   recognized	   that	   antitrust	   rules	   are	   to	   be	   vigorously	   enforced	   in	  
order	  to	  ensure	  a	  healthy	  and	  competitive	  agriculture	  sector.792	  The	  following	  section	  describes	  the	  
basic	  rules	  of	  US	  antitrust	  law.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
788	  R.A	  .Mc	  Eowen,	  P.C.	  Carstensen	  &	  N.E.	  Harl,	  The	  2002	  Senate	  Farm	  Bill:	  the	  ban	  on	  packer	  ownership	  of	  
livestock,	  7	  Journal	  of	  Agricultural	  Law	  1,	  at	  9-­‐10	  (2002).	  Price	  is	  often	  determined	  at	  or	  after	  slaughter	  in	  the	  
livestock	  industry.	  While	  producers	  may	  generally	  choose	  the	  week	  in	  which	  they	  will	  deliver	  the	  livestock,	  
meatpackers	  keep	  the	  right	  to	  pick	  the	  day	  of	  the	  week	  the	  animals	  will	  be	  slaughtered.	  They	  are	  therefore	  
incited	  to	  make	  that	  decision	  on	  basis	  of	  the	  current	  market-­‐price	  or	  to	  manipulate	  it	  if	  need	  be.	  	  
789	  D.A.DOMINA	  &	  C.R.TAYLOR,	  The	  debilitating	  effects	  of	  concentration	  in	  markets	  affecting	  agriculture,	  15	  
Drake	  Agricultural	  Law	  Journal	  61,	  91	  (2010),	  available	  at:	  
http://farmfutures.com/mdfm/Faress1/author/2/OCM%20competition%20report.pdf	  
790	  C.R.Taylor,	  The	  Many	  Faces	  of	  Power	  in	  the	  Food	  System,	  Comments	  presented	  at	  the	  DoJ/FTC	  Workshop	  on	  
Merger	  Enforcement,	  February	  17,	  2004.	  
791	  See:	  Public	  workshop	  exploring	  competition	  issues	  in	  agriculture,	  A	  dialogue	  on	  competition	  issues	  facing	  
farmers	  in	  today’s	  agricultural	  marketplace,	  Iowa,	  March	  12,	  2010.	  
792	  Report	  issued	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Justice,	  Competition	  and	  agriculture…,	  op.cit.,	  at	  2.	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B. ANTITRUST	  LEGISLATION	  
The	   basic	   antitrust	   rules	   contained	   in	   the	   Sherman	   Act	   are,	   to	   a	   certain	   extent,	   similar	   to	   their	  
European	   counterparts,	   namely	   Article	   101	   and	   102	   TFEU.	   The	   Clayton	   Act	   and	   the	   Federal	   Trade	  
Commission	   (FTC)	   Act	   supplement	   those	   rules.	   These	   Acts	   target	   more	   specific	   practices	   likely	   to	  
cause	   anticompetitive	   effects	   or	   other	   type	   of	   conduct	   which	   could	   hardly	   be	   caught	   under	   the	  
Sherman	  Act.	  In	  addition,	  the	  U.S.	  legislator	  has	  enacted	  particular	  rules	  designed	  to	  address,	  directly	  
or	  indirectly,	  some	  buyer	  power	  concerns	  and	  to	  strengthen	  the	  bargaining	  power	  of	  weaker	  parties.	  
In	   the	   agricultural	   sector,	   the	   Packers	   and	   Stockyards	   Act	   and	   the	   Capper-­‐Volstead	   Act	   pursue	  
respectively	  these	  objectives	  in	  favor	  of	  producers.	  
1. General	  rules	  
Drafted	  in	  general	  terms,	  the	  U.S.	  antitrust	  rules	  may	  be	  enforced	  against	  either	  selling	  side	  or	  buying	  
side	  conduct.	  Dating	  back	   to	  1890,	   the	  Sherman	  Act	  prohibits	   trade	  restraints	  and	  monopolization.	  
Two	  additional	  instruments	  were	  passed	  by	  the	  Congress	  in	  1914.	  
a) Sherman	  Act	  
Section	  1	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  reads	  as	  follows:	  
“Every	   contract,	   combination	   in	   the	   form	   of	   trust	   or	   otherwise,	   or	   conspiracy,	   in	  
restraint	   of	   trade	   or	   commerce	   among	   the	   several	   states,	   or	   with	   foreign	   nations,	   is	  
declared	  to	  be	  illegal”.	  	  	  
Concerted	   practices	   among	   competitors	   are	   deemed	   to	   deprive	   society	   from	   the	   benefits	   of	  
competition.	  Regardless	  the	  issue	  of	  market	  power,	  the	  actors	  involved	  –	  be	  it	  sellers	  of	  buyers	  -­‐,	  or	  
in	  some	  cases	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  agreements	  on	  the	  markets,	  it	  is	  the	  participants’	  conduct	  or	  action	  
itself	   which	   triggers	   the	   application	   of	   that	   provision.	   A	   distinction	   may	   nevertheless	   be	   drawn	  
between	  naked	  restraints	  on	  competition	  falling	  in	  the	  per	  se	  category	  and	  agreements	  subject	  to	  the	  
rule	   of	   reason	   due	   to	   their	   possible	   procompetitive	   traits.793	   Are	   challenged	   under	   the	  per	   se	   rule	  
agreements	  which	  are	  so	  likely	  to	  harm	  competition	  without	  significant	  procompetitive	  benefit	  	  that	  
they	  do	  not	  require	  inquiry	  into	  their	  particular	  effects	  on	  the	  markets.794	  Drafted	  on	  basis	  of	  judicial	  
antitrust	  decisions,	  the	  Antitrust	  Guidelines	  for	  Collaborations	  Among	  Competitors	  provide	  examples	  
of	  per	  se	   illegal	  agreements	   including	  among	  others	  agreements	  to	   fix	  prices	  or	  output,	   rig	  bids,	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
793	  For	  a	  development	  of	  those	  two	  standards,	  see	  :	  Brooke	  Group	  Ltd.	  V.	  Brown	  &	  Williamson	  Tobacco	  Corp.,	  
509	  U.S.	  209	  (1993),	  at	  156-­‐222.	  
794	  Per	  se	  illegal	  agreements	  are	  prohibited	  regardless	  of	  any	  possible	  justification.	  This	  particularity	  
distinguishes	  per	  se	  agreements	  in	  the	  U.S.	  from	  hardcore	  restrictions	  in	  the	  EU.	  Indeed,	  in	  theory,	  nothing	  
precludes	  participants	  to	  an	  anticompetitive	  agreement,	  whatever	  its	  object,	  to	  invoke	  Article	  101	  (3)	  TFEU	  in	  
order	  to	  justify	  their	  conduct.	  However,	  in	  practice,	  the	  chances	  of	  convincing	  the	  Commission	  or	  the	  Tribunal	  
of	  the	  procompetitive	  benefits	  of	  such	  hardcore	  restrictions	  are	  very	  thin.	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share	   or	   divide	  markets	   by	   allocating	   customers,	   suppliers,	   territories,	   or	   lines	   of	   commerce.795	   All	  
other	   practices	   are	   examined	   under	   the	   rules	   of	   reason	   implying	   a	   factual	   inquiry	   in	   order	   to	  
determine	   the	   overall	   competitive	   effect	   of	   the	   agreement	   in	   question.	   If	   the	   latter	   is	   reasonably	  
necessary	  to	  achieve	  procompetitive	  benefits	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  outweigh	  anticompetitive	  harms,	  the	  
prohibition	  of	  Section	  1	  will	  not	  be	  applicable.796	  
Section	   2	   of	   the	   Sherman	   Act	   focuses	   on	   unilateral	   conduct	   by	   prohibiting	   monopolization	   and	  
attempts	  to	  monopolize.	  	  
“Every	  person	  who	  shall	  monopolize,	  or	  attempt	  to	  monopolize,	  or	  combine	  or	  conspire	  
with	   any	   other	   person	   or	   persons,	   to	  monopolize	   any	   part	   of	   the	   trade	   or	   commerce	  
among	  the	  several	  States,	  or	  with	  foreign	  nations,	  shall	  be	  deemed	  guilty	  of	  a	  felony.”	  
That	  provision	  does	  not	  outlaw	  monopoly	  power	  or	  the	  use	  of	  monopoly	  power	  as	  such	  but	  rather	  
the	   acquisition	   or	   maintenance	   of	   that	   position	   through	   anticompetitive	   means.797	   For	   examples,	  
predatory	  pricing	  and	  price	  squeezes,	  refusals	  to	  deal	  with	  competitors,	  or	  customer	  restrictions	  are	  
considered	  as	  exclusionary	  conduct	  prohibited	  under	  Section	  2.798	  Proof	  of	  monopoly	  power	   is	  not	  
needed	  in	  case	  of	  an	  attempt	  to	  monopolize.	  Instead,	  it	  must	  be	  proven	  that	  the	  defendant	  adopted	  
predatory	  or	  anticompetitive	  conduct	  with	  the	  specific	   intent	  to	  monopolize	  and	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  
dangerous	  probability	  of	  success.799	  
The	   Antitrust	   Division	   of	   the	   U.S.	   Department	   of	   Justice	   (DoJ)	   has	   exclusive	   jurisdiction	   in	   the	  
enforcement	   of	   the	   Sherman	   Act	   which	   provides	   for	   criminal	   penalties	   against	   corporations	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
795	  Antitrust	  Guidelines	  for	  Collaborations	  Among	  Competitors	  issued	  by	  the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  and	  the	  
U.S.	  Department	  of	  Justice,	  April	  2010,	  at	  1.2.	  	  
796	  Ibidem.	  
797	  Monopoly	  power	  has	  been	  defined	  as	  the	  power	  to	  control	  prices	  or	  exclude	  competition	  in	  a	  relevant	  
market.	  See:	  U.S.	  v.	  E.I.	  du	  Pont	  de	  Nemours	  &	  Co.,	  351	  U.S.	  377,	  391	  (1956).	  It	  generally	  requires	  a	  substantial	  
degree	  of	  market	  power.	  However,	  no	  meaningful	  criteria	  have	  been	  established	  to	  evaluate	  the	  existence	  of	  
such	  power.	  See:	  P.E.Areeda	  &	  H.Hoverkamp,	  Antitrust	  Law,	  3rd	  ed.	  (2008).	  Like	  the	  European	  Commission,	  US	  
courts	  take	  the	  market	  share	  of	  the	  firm	  in	  question	  as	  a	  starting	  point.	  The	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  held	  in	  United	  
States	  v.	  Aluminum	  Co.	  of	  America,	  377	  U.S.	  271	  (1964)	  that	  a	  percentage	  over	  90	  is	  enough	  to	  constitute	  a	  
monopoly	  while	  it	  is	  doubtful	  whether	  60	  or	  64%	  would	  be	  enough	  to	  support	  the	  existence	  of	  monopoly	  
power.	  On	  basis	  of	  the	  case	  law	  on	  that	  matter,	  it	  may	  be	  assumed	  that	  a	  market	  share	  in	  excess	  of	  70%	  will	  
infer	  a	  prima	  facie	  case	  of	  monopoly	  power.	  However,	  there	  is	  little	  chance	  that	  courts	  reach	  such	  a	  conclusion	  
when	  the	  market	  share	  is	  below	  50%.	  See:	  T.J.Klotz,	  Monopoly	  power:	  Use,	  proof	  and	  relationship	  to	  
anticompetitive	  effects	  in	  Section	  2	  cases,	  working	  paper,	  1st	  December	  2008,	  available	  at:	  
http://www.ftc.gov/of/sectionwohearings/doc/section2monopoly	  power.pdf	  	  
798	  See	  :	  D.F.Broder,	  A	  Guide	  to	  US	  Antitrust	  Law	  (2005),	  at	  99.	  
799	  See	  for	  examples	  :	  Swift	  &	  Co.	  v	  United	  States,	  196	  U.S.	  375,	  396	  (1905)	  and	  American	  Tobacco	  Co.	  v	  United	  
States,	  328	  U.S.	  781,	  785	  (1946).	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individuals	   involved	   in	   anticompetitive	   conduct.800	   In	   addition,	   consumers	   and	   business	   firms	  may	  
also	  bring	  civil	  suits	  to	  Federal	  courts.	  Private	  antitrust	   litigation	  is	  particularly	  attractive	  in	  the	  U.S.	  
since	  each	  person	  harmed	  by	  anticompetitive	  behavior	  may	  recover	  treble	  damages.801	  
b) Clayton	  Act	  as	  modified	  by	  the	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act	  
The	   Sherman	   Act	   has	   been	   supplemented	   by	   the	   Clayton	   Act	   in	   1914	   which	   specifies	   particular	  
prohibited	   conduct.	   The	   objective	   was	   to	   strengthen	   the	   antitrust	   laws	   and	   to	   capture	   specific	  
anticompetitive	  practices	  through	  the	  enactment	  of	  more	  detailed	  provisions.	  As	  such,	  are	  prohibited	  
price	  discrimination	  (Section	  2),	  tying	  and	  exclusive	  dealing	  contracts	  (Section	  3),	  corporate	  mergers	  
where	   the	   effect	   may	   substantially	   lessen	   competition	   (Section	   7)	   and	   common	   director	   among	  
competing	  companies	  (Section	  8).	  	  
The	  Clayton	  Act	  is	  a	  civil	  Statute	  carrying	  no	  criminal	  penalties.802	  Its	  enforcement	  is	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  
both	  the	  Antitrust	  Division	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Justice	  and	  the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission.	  Such	  as	  
under	   the	   Sherman	   Act,	   treble	   damage	   action	  may	   also	   be	   brought	   by	   private	   parties	   harmed	   by	  
violations	  of	  the	  Statute.	  
As	  regards	  Section	  2	  of	  the	  Act	  dealing	  with	  price	  discrimination,	  the	  prohibition	  was	  amended	  by	  the	  
Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act	  in	  1936.	  That	  modification	  was	  meant	  to	  protect	  smaller	  retailers	  which	  were	  
facing	  the	  emergence	  and	  rapid	  growth	  of	  large	  chain	  stores,	  principally	  in	  the	  grocery	  sector.	  Those	  
efficiently	  run	  retail	  chains	  were	  indeed	  in	  a	  position	  to	  obtain	  lower	  prices	  due,	  in	  particular,	  to	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
800	  Section	  1	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  provides	  “any	  combination	  or	  conspiracy	  hereby	  declared	  to	  be	  illegal	  shall	  be	  
deemed	  guilty	  of	  a	  felony,	  and,	  on	  conviction	  thereof,	  shall	  be	  punished	  by	  fine	  not	  exceeding	  $100,000,000	  if	  a	  
corporation,	  or,	  if	  any	  other	  person,	  $1,000,000,	  or	  by	  imprisonment	  not	  exceeding	  10	  years,	  or	  by	  both	  said	  
punishments,	  in	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  court”.	  Any	  person	  convicted	  of	  Sherman	  Act	  Section	  2	  violation	  “shall	  be	  
punished	  by	  fine	  not	  exceeding	  $100,000,000	  if	  a	  corporation,	  or,	  if	  any	  other	  person,	  $1,000,000,	  or	  by	  
imprisonment	  not	  exceeding	  10	  years,	  or	  by	  both	  said	  punishments,	  in	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  court”.	  
801	  Section	  4	  of	  the	  Clayton	  Act	  states:	  "any	  person	  who	  shall	  be	  injured	  in	  his	  business	  or	  property	  by	  reason	  of	  
anything	  forbidden	  in	  the	  antitrust	  laws	  may	  sue	  therefore	  in	  any	  district	  court	  of	  the	  United	  States	  ...	  and	  shall	  
recover	  threefold	  the	  damages	  by	  him	  sustained,	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  suit,	  including	  a	  reasonable	  attorney's	  fee."	  
This	  provision	  in	  fact	  constitutes	  a	  major	  inducement	  to	  sue	  so	  that	  90%	  of	  antitrust	  cases	  are	  brought	  by	  
private	  plaintiffs	  such	  as	  consumer	  or	  business	  firms.	  	  
802	  The	  Clayton	  Act	  is	  a	  civil	  Statute	  carrying	  no	  criminal	  penalties.	  Its	  enforcement	  is	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  both	  the	  
Antitrust	  Division	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Justice	  and	  the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission.	  Such	  as	  under	  the	  Sherman	  
Act,	  treble	  damage	  action	  may	  also	  be	  brought	  by	  private	  parties	  harmed	  by	  any	  violation	  of	  the	  Statute.	  The	  
first	  Section	  of	  the	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act	  expressly	  amends	  Section	  2	  of	  the	  Clayton	  Act.	  In	  contrast,	  Section	  3	  
does	  not	  amend	  the	  Clayton	  Act.	  This	  provision	  prohibits	  three	  kinds	  of	  trade	  practices,	  namely	  (a)	  general	  
price	  discriminations,	  (b)	  geographical	  price	  discriminations,	  and	  selling	  at	  unreasonably	  low	  prices	  for	  the	  
purpose	  of	  destroying	  competition	  or	  eliminating	  competitors.	  Penal	  sanctions	  are	  provided	  for	  in	  case	  of	  
violation.	  However,	  Section	  3	  of	  the	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  Ac	  is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  list	  of	  laws	  designated	  as	  “antitrust	  
laws”.	  As	  a	  result,	  even	  though	  there	  is	  a	  partial	  overlap	  between	  Section	  3	  of	  the	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act	  and	  
Section	  2	  of	  the	  Clayton	  Act,	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  former	  is	  left	  solely	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  public	  authorities.	  
The	  practices	  forbidden	  by	  Section	  3	  of	  the	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act	  could	  only	  be	  subject	  to	  private	  antitrust	  
actions	  if,	  and	  to	  the	  extent	  that,	  they	  also	  constitute	  a	  violation	  of	  Section	  2	  of	  the	  Clayton	  Act.	  See:	  Nashville	  
Milk	  Co.	  v.	  Carnation	  Company,	  355	  U.S.	  373	  (1958).	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bargaining	  power	  but	  also	   to	   their	  ability	   to	  purchase	   in	  bulk	  and	  directly	   from	   food	  processors.803	  
This	  alleged	  unequal	  playing	  field	  threatened	  independent	  single	  unit	  establishments	  which	  lobbied	  
the	   Congress	   to	   eliminate	   the	   competitive	   advantage	   “unfairly”	   held	   by	   large	   chain	   stores	   to	   the	  
detriment	  of	  traditional	  retailers.804	  Because	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  and	  the	  Clayton	  Act	  were	  ineffective	  in	  
halting	   the	   decline	   of	   individual	   merchants,	   Section	   2	   of	   the	   Clayton	   Act	   was	   amended	   by	   the	  
enactment	  of	  the	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act.	  
Section	  2	  (a)	  of	  the	  Clayton	  Act	  henceforth	  bars	  a	  seller	  of	  commodities	  from	  selling	  goods	  to	  equally-­‐
situated	  buyers	  at	  different	  prices.	  The	  provision	  states	  that:	  	  
“It	   shall	   be	   unlawful	   (…)	   to	   discriminate	   in	   price	   between	   different	   purchasers	   of	  
commodities	  (…)	  where	  the	  effect	  of	  such	  discrimination	  may	  be	  to	  substantially	  lessen	  
competition	  or	  tend	  to	  create	  a	  monopoly	  in	  any	  line	  of	  commerce,	  or	  to	  injure,	  destroy,	  
or	   prevent	   competition	   with	   any	   person	  who	   either	   grants	   or	   knowingly	   receives	   the	  
benefit	  of	  such	  discrimination,	  or	  with	  customers	  of	  either	  of	  them”.	  
	  Under	   the	   Clayton	   Act,	   discrimination	   is	   hence	   equated	   to	   a	   difference	   in	   price	   regardless	   of	   the	  
costs	   required	   to	   serve	   the	  different	  buyers	   in	  question.805	   	   The	  wording	  of	   the	  prohibition	  attests	  
that	   the	   objective	   of	   the	   Act	   was	   not	   only	   to	   prevent	   primary	   line	   injury	   but	   also	   secondary	   line	  
injury.	   Primary	   line	   price	   discrimination	   occurs	   when	   a	   selling	   firm	   sets	   lower	   prices	   in	   certain	  
markets	   in	   order	   to	   exclude	   or	   harm	   competitors	   in	   those	   markets.	   Secondary	   line	   price	  
discrimination,	   in	  contrast,	  entails	  a	  competitive	   injury	   in	  the	  downstream	  market	  where	  the	  buyer	  
receiving	  lower	  prices	  enjoys,	  as	  a	  result,	  a	  competitive	  advantage	  over	  its	  disfavored	  rivals	  which	  are	  
charged	  higher	  prices.806	  The	  origin	  of	  the	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act	  shows	  that	  protection	  of	  secondary	  
line	  competition	  was	  the	  principal	  reason	  for	  the	  enactment	  of	  that	  legislation.	  The	  US	  courts	  have	  in	  
fact	   interpreted	   the	   provision	   differently	   depending	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   injury	   invoked.	   	   In	   the	  
assessment	  of	   competition	  harm,	  primary	  and	   secondary	   line	  discriminations	  are	   indeed	  examined	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
803	  T.Calvani	  &	  G.Breidenbach,	  An	  introduction	  to	  the	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act	  and	  its	  enforcement	  by	  the	  
Government,	  59	  Antitrust	  Law	  Journal	  765,	  at	  766	  (1991).	  
804	  D.J.Gifford	  &	  R.T.Kudrle,	  The	  Law	  and	  Economics	  of	  Price	  Discrimination	  in	  Modern	  Economies:	  Time	  for	  
Reconciliation?,	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  –	  Legal	  Studies	  Research	  Paper	  Series	  No.	  08-­‐21,	  at	  21.	  
805	  The	  legal	  definition	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act	  differs	  from	  the	  economic	  definition	  of	  price	  
discrimination	  which	  takes	  into	  consideration	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  marginal	  costs	  of	  serving	  two	  buyers	  to	  
determine	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  discrimination.	  Where	  differences	  in	  the	  costs	  of	  manufacture,	  sale,	  or	  delivery	  
are	  not	  part	  of	  the	  legal	  definition	  of	  discrimination,	  those	  factors	  may	  nevertheless	  be	  used	  as	  a	  defense	  in	  
price	  discrimination	  actions.	  Article	  2(a)	  in	  fine	  of	  the	  Clayton	  Act	  reads	  indeed	  as	  follows:	  “nothing	  herein	  
contained	  shall	  prevent	  differentials	  which	  make	  only	  due	  allowance	  for	  differences	  in	  the	  cost	  of	  manufacture,	  
sale,	  or	  delivery	  resulting	  from	  the	  differing	  methods	  or	  quantities	  in	  which	  such	  commodities	  are	  to	  such	  
purchasers	  sold	  or	  delivered.”	  
806	  T.R.Beard,	  D.L.Kaserman	  &	  M.L.Stern,	  Price	  discrimination	  and	  secondary-­‐line	  competitive	  injury:	  The	  law	  
versus	  the	  economics,	  53	  The	  Antitrust	  Bulletin	  75,	  at	  76	  (2008).	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under	   different	   standards.	   We	   will	   see	   below	   that	   the	   enforcement	   of	   the	   Robinson-­‐Patman	   Act	  
against	   secondary	   line	   discrimination	   has	   been	   greatly	   facilitated,	   probably	   at	   the	   expense	   of	  
competition	  itself.	  
The	  ban	  on	  price	  discrimination	  does	  not	  constitute	  an	  outright	  prohibition.	  Two	  defenses	  are	  indeed	  
available	   to	   the	   defendant,	   namely	   the	   cost	   justification	   defense	   and	   the	   meeting	   competition	  
defense.	  Under	  the	  former,	  differentials	  may	  be	  justified	  if	  they	  result	  from	  differences	  in	  the	  cost	  of	  
manufacture,	  sale,	  or	  delivery.	  The	  second	  justification	  allows	  the	  selling	  at	  different	  prices	  in	  order	  
to	   meet	   an	   equally	   low	   price	   of	   a	   competitor	   on	   a	   similar	   product.	   However,	   in	   view	   of	   the	  
substantial	   burden	   imposed	   on	   defendants	   to	   invoke	   successfully	   one	   of	   those	   justifications,	  
suppliers	  will	  rather	  avoid	  any	  price	  discrimination	  than	  risk	  relying	  on	  the	  defenses	  provided	  by	  the	  
Act.807	  
In	   order	   to	   prevent	   disguised	   price	   reductions,	   the	   Robinson-­‐Patman	   Act	   also	   prohibits	   false	  
brokerage,	   discriminatory	   	   discounts	   or	   any	   allowance	   if	   not	   related	   to	   a	   service	   rendered	   in	  
connection	   with	   the	   sale	   or	   purchase	   of	   goods	   and	   made	   available	   to	   all	   other	   customers	   on	  
proportionally	   equal	   terms	   (Section	   2	   (c)	   and	   (d)).	   	   The	   granting	   of	   such	   advantages	   is	   unlawful,	  
regardless	  of	  the	  impact	  it	  might	  yield	  on	  competition.	  The	  only	  way	  to	  rebut	  the	  prima	  facie	  case	  of	  
discrimination	  is	  to	  show	  that	  the	  allowance	  or	  service	  was	  made	  in	  good	  face	  to	  meet	  competition	  
(Section	  2	  (b)).	  
Finally,	  Section	  2	  (f)	  of	  the	  Act	  provides	  that	  it	  is	  unlawful	  for	  a	  buyer	  to	  knowingly	  induce	  or	  receive	  
discriminatory	  price.	  That	  provision	  is	  derivative	  of	  Section	  2	  (a)	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  a	  buyer	  cannot	  be	  
liable	  if	  a	  prima	  facie	  case	  of	  price	  discrimination	  is	  not	  established	  against	  a	  seller	  or	  if	  the	  seller	  can	  
successfully	   rely	  on	  one	  of	   the	   justifications.808	   The	  FTC	  has	   the	  burden	  of	   showing	   that	   the	  buyer	  
knew	  or	  should	  have	  known	  the	  illegality	  of	  the	  price.809	  If	  the	  primary	  aim	  of	  the	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  
Act	   was	   to	   curtail	   buying	   power	   of	   large	   retail	   chains,	   buyer	   liability	   is	   likely	   to	   arise	   only	   in	   one	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
807	  See	  :	  E.Gellhorn	  &	  W.E.Kovacic,	  Antitrust	  Law	  and	  Economics	  (1994),	  at	  444-­‐448	  and	  D.J.Gifford,	  Farewell	  to	  
the	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act?	  The	  Antitrust	  Modernization	  Commission’s	  report	  and	  recommendation,	  53	  The	  
Antitrust	  Bulletin	  481,	  at	  500-­‐502	  (2008).	  
808	  See	  for	  examples:	  Automatic	  Canteen	  Co.	  of	  America	  v.	  FTC,	  346	  U.	  S.	  61	  (1953)	  and	  Great	  Atlantic	  &	  Pacific	  
Tea	  Co.,	  Inc.	  v	  FTC,	  440	  U.S.	  69	  (1979).	  An	  exception	  to	  that	  rule	  was	  accepted	  in	  case	  of	  “lying	  buyer”.	  	  When	  a	  
buyer	  gives	  false	  price	  information	  to	  its	  supplier	  concerning	  a	  rival’s	  competing	  bid	  and	  induces	  consequently	  
the	  former	  to	  meet	  the	  low	  price	  allegedly	  offered	  in	  that	  bid,	  the	  transaction	  may	  be	  held	  illegal	  as	  regards	  the	  
buyer	  for	  inducing	  a	  discriminatory	  price	  in	  violation	  of	  Section	  2	  (f)	  but	  justified	  as	  regards	  the	  supplier	  on	  
basis	  of	  the	  meeting	  competition	  defense.	  See:	  Kroger	  Co.	  v.	  FTC,	  438	  F.	  2d	  1372	  (6th	  cir.)	  404,	  U.S.	  871	  (1971).	  
The	  doctrine	  however	  does	  not	  encompass	  misrepresentation	  by	  silence.	  See:	  Great	  A	  &	  P	  Tea	  Co.	  v.	  FTC,	  440	  
U.S.	  69	  (1979).	  See	  on	  the	  distinction	  between	  those	  two	  cases:	  D.E.Ray,	  Buyer	  liability	  under	  Section	  2	  (f)	  of	  the	  
Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act,	  15	  University	  of	  Richmond	  Law	  Review	  547	  (1981).	  
809	  On	  details	  concerning	  the	  conditions	  to	  be	  met	  to	  prove	  such	  knowledge,	  see	  :	  B.Rosner,	  Buyer	  Liability,	  53	  
Antitrust	  Law	  Journal	  999	  (1984-­‐1985).	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situation,	  namely	  inducement	  of	  price	  discrimination.	  Section	  2	  (f)	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  inducements	  of	  
discriminatory	   services	   or	   allowances.	   However,	   it	   was	   held	   in	   some	   cases	   that	   such	   conduct	  
constitutes	   an	   unfair	  method	   of	   competition	   and	   as	   such	   is	   governed	   under	   Section	   5	   of	   the	   FTC	  
Act.810	   As	   a	   result,	   both	   the	   buyer	   and	   the	   seller	   could	   be	   prosecuted	   in	   case	   of	   inducement	   of	  
discriminatory	  allowances	  or	  services,	  the	  former	  under	  Section	  5	  of	  the	  FTC	  Act	  and	  the	  latter	  under	  
Section	   2	   (d)	   or	   (e)	   of	   the	   Clayton	   Act.	   Some	   courts	   have,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   given	   a	   very	   broad	  
interpretation	   to	  Section	  2	   (a)	  of	   the	  Act	  and	   treated	  a	  promotional	  allowance	  as	  an	   indirect	  price	  
discrimination	  the	  inducement	  of	  which	  entails	  the	  buyer	  liability	  under	  Section	  2	  (f).811	  Nevertheless,	  
it	  remains	  that	  actions	  against	  sellers	  are	  generally	  given	  a	  preference	  because	  no	  proof	  is	  required	  
as	  to	  the	  buyer’s	  knowledge	  of	  the	  discrimination.812	  
Where	   the	   Robinson-­‐Patman	   Act	   is	   an	   antitrust	   statute	   in	   name,	   some	   argue	   that	   the	   legislative	  
history	  underlying	  the	  enactment	  of	  that	   legislation	  shows	  that	   it	  was	  designed	  neither	  to	  enhance	  
consumer	  welfare	  nor	  to	  encourage	  allocative	  efficiency.	  Instead,	  the	  only	  purpose	  of	  the	  Act	  was	  to	  
protect	   smaller	   retailers.813	   Even	   though,	   in	   the	   text,	   proof	   of	   competition	   injury	   is	   required	   to	  
establish	  illegal	  price	  discrimination,	   it	  turns	  out	  that	  the	  meaning	  attributed	  to	  that	  concept	  by	  US	  
courts	   is	   completely	   different	   from	   its	   commonly-­‐understood	   meaning	   under	   the	   other	   antitrust	  
rules.	   Indeed,	  as	   it	  will	  be	  developed	  below,	  courts	  have	  stuck	  to	  the	  protectionist	  objective	  of	  the	  
Act	  and,	  as	  far	  as	  secondary	  line	  price	  discrimination	  is	  concerned,	  have	  given	  priority	  to	  the	  welfare	  
of	   individual	   competitors	   over	   the	   protection	   of	   competition.	   However,	   according	   to	   Professor	  
Hovenkamp,	  Congress’s	  intent	  was	  not	  to	  preclude	  any	  rebate	  or	  other	  price	  concession	  awarded	  by	  
a	   manufacturer	   to	   some	   customers	   but	   rather	   to	   tackle	   price	   discrimination	   induced	   by	   a	   large	  
retailer	  and	  injuring	  both	  rival	  buyers	  and	  the	  seller	  forced	  to	  grand	  such	  concession.814	  It	  appears	  yet	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
810	  See	  for	  examples	  :	  Giant	  Foods	  Inc.,	  v.	  FTC,	  907	  F.	  2d	  184	  (D.C.Cir.	  1962)	  and	  Grand	  Union	  Co.	  v.	  FTC,	  3000	  F.	  
2d	  92	  (2d	  Cir.	  1962).	  Section	  5	  of	  the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  Act	  prohibits	  unfair	  or	  deceptive	  practices	  
affecting	  commerce.	  Enforcement	  actions	  against	  those	  practices	  are	  taken	  exclusively	  by	  the	  FTC	  since	  the	  Act	  
does	  not	  provide	  for	  a	  private	  cause	  of	  action.	  
811	  See	  for	  example	  :	  Intimate	  Bookshop	  Inc.	  v	  Barnes	  and	  Noble,	  Inc.,	  88	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  133	  (S.D.N.Y.	  2000).	  
812	  Although	  the	  term	  “knowingly”	  also	  appear	  in	  Article	  2(a)	  of	  the	  Act	  which	  prohibits	  discriminations	  that	  
“injure,	  destroy,	  or	  prevent	  competition	  with	  any	  person	  who	  either	  grants	  or	  knowingly	  receives	  the	  benefit	  of	  
such	  discrimination,	  or	  with	  customers	  of	  either	  of	  them”,	  the	  courts	  have	  ignored	  such	  knowledge	  
requirement	  when	  applying	  the	  provision	  against	  sellers.	  See:	  H.Hovenkamp,	  The	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act	  and	  
Competition:	  Unfinished	  business,	  68	  Antitrust	  Law	  Journal	  125,	  141-­‐142	  (2000)	  
813	  T.Calvani	  &	  G.Breidenbach,	  op.cit.,	  at	  770.	  
814	  H.Hovenkamp,	  The	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act	  …,	  op.cit.,	  at	  138.	  According	  to	  the	  author,	  the	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  
Act	  pursues	  a	  similar	  objective	  as	  the	  Sherman	  Act,	  namely	  protection	  of	  competition.	  “The	  legislative	  history	  
indicates	  that	  Congress’s	  concern	  was	  not	  with	  injury	  to	  competitors	  for	  its	  own	  sake.	  Rather,	  Congress	  
believed	  that	  an	  injury	  to	  individual	  competitors	  was	  an	  essential	  prerequisite	  to	  injury	  to	  competition	  
conditions	  generally.”	  He	  points	  out	  that	  manufacturers	  should	  remain	  free	  to	  reward	  dealer	  effectiveness	  
through	  rebates	  or	  other	  price	  concessions	  and	  maintains	  that	  the	  concerns	  of	  the	  Congress	  that	  passed	  the	  
Statute	  focused	  only	  on	  the	  practices	  of	  large	  retailers	  which	  use	  their	  buyer	  power	  to	  extract	  non-­‐cost-­‐related	  
rebates	  and	  concessions	  from	  their	  suppliers.	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that	   the	   case	   law	   has	   ignored	   the	   principal	   concern	   of	   the	   Act,	   namely	   the	   coercive	   use	   of	   buyer	  
power.	  	  
c) Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  Act	  (FTC	  Act)	  
The	  FTC	  Act,	  enacted	   in	  1914,	  prohibits	   inter	  alia	   “unfair	  methods	  of	   competition”	   (Section	  5(a)	  of	  
the	  Act).	  The	  U.S.	  courts	  have	  ruled	  that	  such	  ban	  includes	  Sherman	  Act	  and	  Clayton	  Act	  offenses815	  
but	  that	  other	  practices,	  not	  addressed	  under	  those	  Statutes,	  may	  also	  be	  caught	  by	  the	  FTC	  Act.	  As	  
such,	  the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission,	  which	  is	  exclusively	  competent	  to	  enforce	  the	  Act,	  may	  use	  its	  
power	   to	   bolster	   the	   other	   antitrust	   laws	   by,	   for	   example,	   stopping	   in	   their	   incipiency	   practices	  
which,	  when	  full	  blown,	  would	  violate	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  or	  the	  Clayton	  Act.816	  However,	  no	  criminal	  
sanctions	  await	  violators	  of	  the	  FTC	  Act.	  The	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  may	  only	  impose	  a	  cease	  and	  
desist	  order	  to	  halt	  the	  illegal	  practice	  in	  question.	  In	  comparison	  with	  the	  other	  antitrust	  laws,	  the	  
penalties	   are	   therefore	   lighter-­‐handed.	   In	   addition,	   no	   private	   remedy	   is	   available	   for	   individuals,	  
reducing	  even	  more	  the	  deterrent	  effect	  of	  the	  FTC	  Act.817	  
The	   letter	   of	   the	   Act	   may	   be	   read	   expansively	   and	   give	   the	   Federal	   Trade	   Commission	   the	  
competence	   to	   examine	   most	   business	   practices.818	   In	   order	   to	   safeguard	   an	   open,	   free	   market	  
economy,	  all	  conduct	  that	  threatens	  to	  undermine	  that	  general	  goal	  should	  be	  condemned	  under	  the	  
FTC	   Act,	   even	   if	   no	   other	   antitrust	   law	   has	   been	   violated.819	   For	   examples,	   the	   Act	   could	   be	   used	  
against	   new	   forms	   of	   anticompetitive	   practices	   that	   have	   never	   been	   dealt	   with	   under	   the	   other	  
antitrust	   laws.	   It	   could	   also	   be	   applied	   to	   harmful	   conduct	   that	   fails	   to	   satisfy	   one	   of	   the	   legal	  
requirements	  of	  Section	  2	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act.	  820	  In	  the	  area	  of	  buyer	  power,	  the	  Act	  could	  therefore	  
encompass	  practices	  carried	  out	  by	  powerful	  buyers	  which	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  affect	  competition	  but	  
which	   have	   a	   market	   share	   below	   that	   required	   under	   Section	   2	   of	   the	   Sherman	   Act	   for	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
815	  See	  for	  examples:	  Fashion	  Originators’	  Guild	  v.	  FTC,	  312	  U.S.	  457	  (1941)	  and	  FTC	  v.	  Cement	  Institute,	  333	  
U.S.	  383	  (1948).	  The	  FTC	  is	  less	  likely	  to	  use	  the	  FTC	  Act	  to	  pursue	  practices	  violating	  the	  Clayton	  Act	  because	  it	  
is	  authorized	  to	  enforce	  that	  Act	  directly.	  However,	  as	  regards	  violations	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act,	  the	  FTC	  is	  not	  
competent	  to	  take	  action	  against	  them.	  Due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  any	  conduct	  illegal	  under	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  is	  also	  
prohibited	  under	  the	  FTC	  Act,	  the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  may	  nevertheless	  use	  its	  competence	  under	  the	  
FTC	  Act	  to	  enforce	  indirectly	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act.	  
816	  See	  for	  examples:	  FTC	  v.	  Motion	  Picture	  Advertising	  Svc.	  Co.,	  Inc.,	  344	  U.S.	  392	  (1953)	  and	  FTC	  v.	  Brown	  Shoe	  
Co.,	  348	  U.S.	  316	  (1966)	  
817	  See:	  P.C.Ward,	  Restitution	  for	  consumers	  under	  the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  Act:	  Good	  intentions	  or	  
Congressional	  intentions?,	  41	  The	  American	  University	  Law	  Review	  1139	  (1992)	  
818	  N.W.Averitt,	  The	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  Act	  –	  An	  Introduction,	  19	  J.	  Reprints	  Antitrust	  L.	  &	  Econ.	  5	  (1989)	  
819	  Ibid.,	  	  at	  6.	  	  
820	  The	  first	  situation	  would	  be	  a	  “frontier”	  case,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  “one	  that	  meets	  all	  of	  the	  legal	  requirements	  for	  
a	  Sherman	  Act	  claim,	  but	  involves	  new	  forms	  of	  anticompetitive	  conduct	  that	  fall	  outside	  traditional	  categories	  
of	  antitrust	  analysis”.	  The	  second	  example	  would	  be	  a	  “gap-­‐filling”	  case.	  See:	  S.A.Creighton	  &	  
T.G.Krattenmaker,	  Some	  Thoughts	  About	  the	  Scope	  of	  Section	  5,	  FTC	  Workshop	  on	  Section	  5	  of	  the	  FTC	  Act,	  
October	  2008,	  at	  2.	  
Final	  version	  -­‐	  Mai	  2014	   	  
246	  
	  
monopolistic	   seller.821	   However,	   the	   Statute	   remains	   an	   antitrust	   Act	   and	   as	   such	   is	   designed	   to	  
protect	   competition,	   not	   competitors.	   Only	   conduct	   which	   is	   proved	   to	   entail	   probable	  
anticompetitive	  effects	  may	  therefore	  be	  condemned	  under	  the	  FTC	  Act.822	  We	  will	  see	  below	  how	  
broadly	   the	  Act	  may	  be	   interpreted	   as	   regards	   buyer	   power	   conduct	   and	  how	   it	   could	   be	  used	   to	  
tackle	  buyer	  practices	  which	  so	  far	  have	  escaped	  from	  the	  ambit	  of	  the	  antitrust	  laws.	  
2. Specific	  rules	  in	  the	  agricultural	  sector	  
The	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  within	  the	  food	  supply	  chain	  affects	  particularly	  producers	  who	  are	   in	  
most	  cases	  at	  the	  mercy	  of	  their	  buyers,	  be	  it	  retailers,	  processors	  or	  packers.	  Various	  measures	  have	  
been	   taken	   in	   order	   to	   strengthen	   farmers’	   bargaining	   power	   and	   to	   give	   them	   an	   effective	  
protection	  against	  unscrupulous	  customers.	  We	  will	  focus	  in	  this	  section	  on	  a	  brief	  description	  of	  the	  
Capper-­‐Volstead	  Ac	  and	  on	  a	  more	  detailed	  presentation	  of	  the	  Packers	  and	  Stockyards	  Act.	  
a) Capper-­‐Volstead	  Act823	  
Where	   Section	   6	   of	   the	   1914	   Clayton	   Act	   already	   provided	   an	   exception	   to	   the	   antitrust	   laws	   by	  
allowing	   producers	   to	   act	   collectively	   through	   agricultural	   organizations,	   the	   Statute	   proved	   to	  
constitute	   a	   too	  narrow	  and	   vague	  exemption.824	   In	   1922,	   the	  Congress	   filled	   the	   gap	   through	   the	  
enactment	  of	  the	  Capper-­‐Volstead	  Act	  and	  expanded	  the	  authorization	  to	  capital-­‐stock	  and	  for-­‐profit	  
cooperatives.825	   Producers	   are	   therefore	   allowed	   to	   create	   countervailing	   power	   to	   bargain	   more	  
effectively	   with	   large	   buyers.	   However,	   the	   immunity	   granted	   to	   farmers	   is	   not	   unrestricted.	  
Limitations	   are	   indeed	   provided	   for	   in	   order	   to	   prevent	   that	   countervailing	   power	   turn	   into	  
supervailing	  power	  and	  lead	  to	  other	  adverse	  effects	  on	  the	  markets.826	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
821	  See:	  A.A.Foer,	  Section	  5	  as	  a	  bridge	  toward	  convergence,	  Amercian	  antitrust	  Institue	  for	  the	  FTC	  Workshop	  
on	  Section	  5	  of	  the	  FTC	  Act,	  October	  17,	  2008,	  at	  8.	  	  Such	  expansion	  of	  Section	  5	  of	  the	  FTC	  Act	  is	  however	  
controversial.	  For	  example,	  according	  to	  Judge	  Richard	  Posner,	  “the	  Sherman	  and	  Clayton	  Acts	  have	  been	  
interpreted	  so	  broadly	  that	  they	  no	  longer	  contain	  gaps	  that	  a	  broad	  interpretation	  of	  Section	  5	  of	  the	  FTC	  Act	  
might	  be	  needed	  to	  fill”.	  He	  underlines	  the	  risk	  of	  false	  positives	  and	  the	  risk	  of	  deterring	  procompetitive	  
conduct.	  See:	  R.A.Posner,	  The	  Federal	  trade	  Commission:	  A	  Retrospective,	  72	  Antitrust	  Law	  Journal	  761,	  at	  766	  
(2005).	  
822	  S.A.Creighton	  &	  T.G.Krattenmaker,	  Some	  Thoughts	  About	  the	  Scope	  of	  Section	  5,	  FTC	  Workshop	  on	  Section	  5	  
of	  the	  FTC	  Act,	  October	  2008.	  
823	  Capper-­‐Volstead	  Act,	  7	  U.S.C.	  §§	  291-­‐292.	  
824	  Section	  6	  of	  the	  Clayton	  Act	  does	  not	  shelter	  for-­‐profit	  and	  capital-­‐stock	  cooperatives.	  It	  also	  provides	  that	  
individual	  members	  of	  a	  cooperative	  may	  carry	  out	  the	  “legitimate	  objects”	  of	  the	  organization	  without	  giving	  
any	  guidelines	  on	  what	  activities	  are	  covered	  by	  those	  terms.	  
825	  C.A.Varney,	  The	  Capper-­‐Volstead	  Act,	  Agricultural	  Cooperatives,	  and	  Antitrust	  Immunity,	  The	  Antitrust	  
Source,	  at	  2,	  December	  2010.	  Other	  exemptions	  were	  enacted	  following	  the	  Capper-­‐Volstead	  Act	  such	  as	  the	  
Cooperative	  Marketing	  Act	  of	  1926,	  7	  U.S.C.	  §	  455,	  the	  Agricultural	  Marketing	  Agreement	  Act	  of	  1937,	  7	  U.S.C.	  
§608b	  and	  the	  Agricultural	  Fair	  Practices	  Act	  of	  1967,	  7	  U.S.C.	  §§	  2301-­‐2306.	  
826	  D.L.Baumer,	  R.T.Masson,	  &	  R.A.Masson,	  Curdling	  the	  Competition:	  an	  Economic	  and	  Legal	  Analysis	  of	  the	  
Antitrust	  Exemption	  for	  Agriculture,	  31	  Villanova	  Law	  Review	  183,	  at	  194	  (1986).	  On	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  immunity	  
and	  on	  the	  conditions	  to	  be	  fulfilled,	  see:	  D.A.	  Frederick,	  Antitrust	  statute	  of	  farmer	  cooperatives:	  The	  story	  of	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b) Packers	  and	  Stockyards	  Act827	  
	  Enacted	   in	  1921,	   the	  Packers	   and	  Stockyards	  Act	   (PSA)	  was	   intended	   to	   curb	   the	  meat	  processing	  
industry’s	  excessive	  power.	  Different	  reports	  issued	  by	  the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  revealed	  that	  
the	   “Big	   Five”	   packing	   houses,	   which	   dominated	   meat-­‐packing	   markets,	   had	   engaged	   in	  
anticompetitive	   practices.828	   Considering	   that	   the	   Sherman	  Act	   and	   the	   Federal	   Trade	   Commission	  
Act	   were	   unable	   to	   tackle	   those	   practices	   and	   that	   the	   livestock	   industry	   needed	   specialized	  
regulation,	   the	  Congress	   enacted	   the	  PSA	   in	  order	   to	   regulate	  more	   strictly	   trade	  practices	   in	   that	  
sector.829	  Unlawful	  practices	  are	  enumerated	  as	  follows:	  
“It	  shall	  be	  unlawful	  for	  any	  packer	  or	  swine	  contractor	  with	  respect	  to	  livestock,	  meats,	  
meat	   food	   products,	   or	   livestock	   products	   in	   unmanufactured	   form,	   or	   for	   any	   live	  
poultry	  dealer	  with	  respect	  to	  live	  poultry,	  to:	  
(a)	  Engage	  in	  or	  use	  any	  unfair,	  unjustly	  discriminatory,	  or	  deceptive	  practice	  or	  device;	  
or	  
(b)	  Make	  or	  give	  any	  undue	  or	  unreasonable	  preference	  or	  advantage	  to	  any	  particular	  
person	   or	   locality	   in	   any	   respect,	   or	   subject	   any	   particular	   person	   or	   locality	   to	   any	  
undue	  or	  unreasonable	  prejudice	  or	  disadvantage	  in	  any	  respect;	  or	  
(c)	   Sell	   or	   otherwise	   transfer	   to	   or	   for	   any	   other	   packer,	   swine	   contractor,	   or	   any	   live	  
poultry	   dealer,	   or	   buy	   or	   otherwise	   receive	   from	   or	   for	   any	   other	   packer,	   swine	  
contractor,	  or	  any	   live	  poultry	  dealer,	  any	  article	   for	   the	  purpose	  or	  with	   the	  effect	  of	  
apportioning	   the	   supply	   between	   any	   such	   persons,	   if	   such	   apportionment	   has	   the	  
tendency	  or	  effect	  of	  restraining	  commerce	  or	  of	  creating	  a	  monopoly;	  or	  
(d)	   Sell	   or	   otherwise	   transfer	   to	   or	   for	   any	   other	   person,	   or	   buy	   or	   otherwise	   receive	  
from	   or	   for	   any	   other	   person,	   any	   article	   for	   the	   purpose	   or	   with	   the	   effect	   of	  
manipulating	   or	   controlling	   prices,	   or	   of	   creating	   a	   monopoly	   in	   the	   acquisition	   of,	  
buying,	  selling,	  or	  dealing	  in,	  any	  article,	  or	  of	  restraining	  commerce;	  or	  
(e)	  Engage	  in	  any	  course	  of	  business	  or	  do	  any	  act	  for	  the	  purpose	  or	  with	  the	  effect	  of	  
manipulating	   or	   controlling	   prices,	   or	   of	   creating	   a	   monopoly	   in	   the	   acquisition	   of,	  
buying,	  selling,	  or	  dealing	  in,	  any	  article,	  or	  of	  restraining	  commerce;	  or	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the	  Capper-­‐Volstead	  Act,	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  Agriculture	  ,	  Rural	  Business-­‐cooperative	  service,	  
Cooperative	  Information	  Report	  59	  (2002)	  
827	  Packers	  and	  Stockyards	  Act	  of	  1921,	  7	  U.S.C.	  §§	  181-­‐229b.	  
828	  FTC,	  Report	  of	  the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  on	  the	  Meat	  Packing	  Industry	  392	  (1919).	  The	  five	  largest	  
packers	  were	  Swift,	  Armour,	  Morris,	  Cudahy	  and	  Wilson.	  They	  were	  criticized	  for	  manipulating	  live-­‐stock	  
markets,	  for	  controlling	  the	  prices	  and	  defrauding	  producer	  and	  consumers.	  
829	  C.R.Kelley,	  An	  Overview	  of	  the	  Packers	  and	  Stockyards	  Act,	  An	  Agricultural	  Law	  Research	  Article,	  Arkansas	  
Law	  Notes,	  at	  35	  (2003)	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(f)	  Conspire,	  combine,	  agree,	  or	  arrange	  with	  any	  other	  person	  (1)	  to	  apportion	  territory	  
for	  carrying	  on	  business,	  or	   (2)	   to	  apportion	  purchases	  or	  sales	  of	  any	  article,	  or	   (3)	   to	  
manipulate	  or	  control	  prices;	  or	  
(g)	  Conspire,	  combine,	  agree	  or	  arrange	  with	  any	  other	  person	  to	  do,	  or	  aid	  or	  abet	  the	  
doing	  of,	  any	  act	  made	  unlawful	  by	  subdivisions	  (a),	  (b),	  (c),	  (d),	  or	  (e)	  of	  this	  section.	  (7	  
U.S.C.	  192)”	  830	  
	  
In	  fact,	  the	  Statute	  prohibits,	  in	  particular,	  meatpackers	  from	  engaging	  in	  or	  using	  any	  unfair,	  unjustly	  
discriminatory,	   or	   deceptive	   practice,	   from	  manipulating	   or	   controlling	   prices	   and	   from	   creating	   a	  
monopoly	  in	  the	  acquisition	  of,	  buying,	  selling,	  or	  dealing	  in,	  any	  article.	  The	  enforcement	  of	  the	  Act	  
comes	   within	   the	   competence	   of	   the	   U.S.	   Department	   of	   Agriculture	   which	   has	   delegated	   the	  
authority	  to	  control	  the	  livestock	  industry	  and	  halt	  unfair	  and	  anticompetitive	  practices	  to	  the	  Grain	  
Inspection,	  Packers	  and	  Stockyards	  Administration	  (GIPSA).831	  
More	   than	   90	   years	   after	   the	   enactment	   of	   the	   PSA,	   it	   turns	   out	   that	   the	  meat	   packing	   industry,	  
following	  a	  series	  of	  mergers	   in	   the	  nineties,	   is	  now	  more	  concentrated	   than	   it	  was	   in	  1921.832	  For	  
example,	  in	  2011,	  the	  four-­‐firm	  concentration	  ratio	  for	  hog	  and	  cattle	  slaughterers	  rose	  respectively	  
to	  65%	  and	  85%.833	  Therefore,	  the	  necessity	  to	  regulate	  the	  behavior	  of	  large	  processors	  and	  to	  limit	  
the	  negative	  consequences	  that	  such	  a	  concentrated	  industry	  might	  cause	  to	  the	  markets	  is	  probably	  
even	  more	   blatant	   today	   than	   it	  was	   in	   the	   early	   1900’s.	   However,	   criticisms	   have	   been	   raised	   as	  
regards	  the	  deficient	  enforcement	  of	  the	  PSA.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  GIPSA	  is	  found	  to	  take	  no	  sufficient	  
action	   to	   protect	   effectively	   competition	   in	   the	   livestock	   industry834	   and,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   U.S.	  
courts	  conclude	  to	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  Act	  only	  under	  strict	  conditions.	  	  
Concerning	  the	   latter	   issue,	  a	  controversy	  has	  arisen	  on	  whether	  a	  violation	  of	   the	  PSA	   implies	   the	  
proof	  of	  overall	  market	  harm	  resulting	  from	  the	  packers’	  conduct	  or	  whether	  harm	  to	  an	  individual	  
market	   participant	   is	   sufficient.835	   Under	   the	   terms	   of	   the	   Act,	   Section	   202(c)	   prohibits	  
apportionment	   of	   territory	   only	   “where	   such	   practice	   has	   the	   tendency	   or	   effect	   of	   restraining	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
830	  Capper-­‐Volstead	  Act,	  7	  U.S.C.	  §	  202.	  
831	  C.R.Kelley,	  op.cit.,	  at	  36.	  
832	  Ibid.,	  at	  37.	  
833	  See:	  2011	  P&SP	  Annual	  Report	  –	  Packers	  and	  Stockyards	  Program,	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  Agriculture,	  
Grain	  Inspection,	  Packers	  and	  Stockyards	  Administration,	  March	  2012,	  available	  at:	  
http://www.gipsa.usda.gov/Publications/psp/ar/2011_psp_annual_report.pdf	  	  
834	  See:	  GAO	  Report	  to	  Congressional	  Committees,	  Packers	  and	  Stockyards	  Programs	  –	  Actions	  needed	  to	  
improve	  investigations	  of	  competitive	  practices,	  Unites	  States	  General	  Accounting	  Office,	  September	  2000,	  
available	  at:	  http://www.gao.gov/new.items/rc00242.pdf	  	  
835	  R.L.Dettmann,	  You’re	  not	  the	  boss	  of	  me:	  an	  analysis	  of	  GIPSA’s	  authority	  to	  regulate	  private	  contracting	  in	  
the	  beef	  industry,	  16	  Drake	  Journal	  of	  Agricultural	  Law	  321,	  at	  325	  (2011)	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commerce	  or	  of	  creating	  monopoly”.	  However,	  no	  similar	  condition	  was	  included	  by	  the	  Congress	  in	  
the	  other	  provisions.	   Section	  202(a),	   for	  example,	   simply	   states	   that	  unfair,	  unjustly	  discriminatory	  
and	   deceptive	   practices	   are	   unlawful	   while	   the	   provisions	   related	   to	   market-­‐price	   manipulation	  
provide	  that	  a	  packer	  cannot	  engage	  “in	  any	  course	  of	  business	  or	  do	  any	  act	  for	  the	  purpose	  or	  with	  
the	   effect	   of	   manipulating	   or	   controlling	   prices,	   (…)	   or	   of	   restraining	   commerce.”836	   Plaintiffs	   and	  
GIPSA	  itself	  argue	  therefore	  that	  proof	  of	  competitive	  injury	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  satisfy	  the	  statutory	  
language.837	   They	   contend	   that	   the	   reach	   of	   the	   PSA	   was	   intended	   to	   be	   broader	   than	   the	   other	  
antitrust	  laws	  since	  the	  very	  purpose	  of	  the	  Act	  was	  to	  tackle	  practices	  that	  could	  not	  be	  condemned	  
under	  the	  Sherman	  or	  the	  FTC	  Act.	  The	  position	  that	  the	  PSA	  extends	  farther	  than	  those	  traditional	  
antitrust	   rules	   “is	   consistent	   with	   the	   language	   and	   structure	   of	   the	   PSA,	   as	   well	   as	   its	   legislative	  
history	   and	   purposes.”838	   However,	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   U.S.	   courts	   does	   not	   agree	   with	   that	  
interpretation	   and	   refuse	   to	   restrict	   market	   participants’	   conduct	   unless	   some	   adverse	   effect	   on	  
competition	  is	  established.	  
C. ENFORCEMENT	  OF	  ANTITRUST	  LAWS	  AGAINST	  BUYER	  PRACTICES	  
The	   DOJ	   and	   the	   FTC	   share	   responsibility	   for	   enforcing	   the	   US	   antitrust	   laws.839	   Individual	   and	  
business	   firms	  may	   also	   participate	   in	   the	   enforcement	   of	   the	   Sherman	   Act	   and	   the	   Clayton	   Act.	  
Through	  private	  litigation	  they	  may	  indeed	  reinforce	  the	  deterrent	  effect	  of	  the	  Statutes	  by	  seeking	  
to	   recover	   three	   times	   the	   amount	   of	   actual	   damages	   sustained	   as	   a	   result	   of	   anticompetitive	  
conduct.840	   Actions	   under	   the	   Sherman	   Act	   and	   the	   Clayton	   Act,	   be	   it	   civil	   or	   criminal	   suits,	   are	  
brought	   to	   a	   federal	   district	   court	  which	  will	   examine	   the	   legality	   of	   a	   firm’s	   behavior	   and	   decide	  
appropriate	   remedies	   in	   case	   of	   violation	   of	   antitrust	   laws.841	   The	   case	   law	   of	   the	  US	   courts	   plays	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
836	  Emphasis	  added.	  
837	  R.L.Dettmann,	  op.cit.,	  at	  327-­‐328.	  
838	  GIPSA,	  Implementation	  of	  Regulations	  Required	  Under	  Title	  XI	  of	  the	  Food,	  Conservation	  and	  Energy	  Act	  of	  
2008,	  Conduct	  in	  Violation	  of	  the	  Act,	  Proposed	  Rules,	  75	  Fed.	  Reg.	  at	  35340,-­‐35341,	  June	  22,	  2010,	  available	  
at:	  http://archive.gipsa.usda.gov/rulemaking/fr10/06-­‐22-­‐10.pdf.	  	  
839	  The	  DOJ	  is	  an	  executive	  branch	  of	  government	  while	  the	  FTC	  is	  an	  independent	  administrative	  agency.	  The	  
latter	  was	  created	  to	  reduce	  the	  influence	  of	  presidential	  policies	  on	  the	  federal	  antitrust	  enforcement	  system.	  
Criminal	  prosecutions	  under	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  can	  only	  be	  undertaken	  by	  the	  DOJ.	  The	  Clayton	  Act	  is	  enforced	  
by	  both	  agencies	  which	  may	  bring	  civil	  suits	  to	  courts’	  attention.	  As	  regards	  the	  FTC	  Act,	  its	  enforcement	  falls	  
under	  the	  FTC’s	  purview	  which	  can,	  however,	  only	  seek	  cease	  and	  desist	  order.	  	  
840	  Private	  litigation	  is	  an	  important	  antitrust	  enforcement	  tool	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Private	  fillings	  largely	  
outnumber	  government	  fillings	  by	  roughly	  a	  ratio	  of	  10	  to	  1.	  See:	  E.D.Cavanagh,	  The	  private	  antitrust	  remedy:	  
Lessons	  from	  the	  American	  experience,	  41	  Loyala	  University	  Chicago	  Law	  Journal	  629	  (2010)	  
841	  In	  addition	  to	  proceeding	  before	  courts,	  the	  FTC	  has	  the	  power	  to	  enforce	  antitrust	  laws	  through	  an	  
administrative	  proceeding	  which	  begins	  with	  issuing	  a	  complaint	  against	  an	  alleged	  violator	  and	  is	  followed	  by	  
hearings	  before	  an	  Administrative	  Law	  Judge	  (ALJ).	  The	  resulting	  decision	  may	  then	  be	  appealed	  to	  the	  
Commission.	  Courts	  play	  nevertheless	  still	  a	  role	  in	  that	  procedure	  since	  the	  final	  Commission	  determination	  
may	  be	  appealed	  to	  a	  regional	  Circuit	  Court	  of	  Appeals.	  See:	  OECD,	  Institutional	  and	  procedural	  aspects	  of	  the	  
relationship	  between	  competition	  authorities	  and	  courts,	  an	  update	  on	  developments	  in	  procedural	  fairness	  and	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therefore	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  the	  antitrust	  system	  and	  provides	  answers	  about	  how	  the	  statutory	  terms	  
are	  interpreted	  and	  enforced.842	  However,	  as	  regards	  the	  potential	  harm	  that	  may	  be	  caused	  by	  the	  
exercise	   of	   buyer	   power,	  US	   courts	   have	   sometimes	   diverging	   opinions.	   Buyers’	   conduct	   has	   been	  
mostly	   addressed	   under	   Section	   1	   of	   the	   Sherman	   Act.	   Where	   restrictive	   agreements	   among	  
purchasers	  are	  nearly	  unanimously	  condemned,	  unilateral	  conduct	  seems	  to	  have	  gone	  unpunished	  
so	  far.	  
1. Section	  1	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  applied	  to	  buyer	  agreements	  
Many	  courts	  have	  not	  been	  reluctant	  to	  enforce	  Section	  1	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  against	  buyer	  cartels.	  
Those	   practices	   are	   generally	   condemned	   as	   per	   se	   illegal	   because	   they	   constitute	   unjustified	  
restraints	  of	  trade.	  However,	  some	  courts	  have	  analyzed	  buy-­‐side	  conduct	  under	  the	  rule	  of	  reason,	  
considering	  that	  it	  may	  benefit	  consumers	  and,	  as	  such,	  be	  procompetitive.	  	  
a) Illegal	  buyer	  cartels	  
A	  long	  time	  has	  already	  passed	  since	  the	  potential	  harm	  caused	  by	  buyer	  agreements	  was	  recognized	  
in	   the	  US	   case	   law.	  Different	   decisions	   attest	   that	   courts	   and	   enforcers	   are	  willing	   to	   treat	   buying	  
conduct	  just	  as	  strictly	  as	  conduct	  on	  the	  selling	  side	  of	  the	  market,	  even	  though	  no	  direct	  threat	  to	  
consumers	   is	   established.843	   Most	   cases	   concern	   price-­‐fixing	   arrangements	   in	   various	   sectors	   or	  
group	  boycotts	  involving	  a	  restriction	  to	  deal	  with	  a	  particular	  market	  participant.	  
i. Price-­‐fixing	  
Per	  se	  prohibition	  of	  price	  fixing	  agreements	  among	  buyers	  date	  back	  to	  the	  forties	  where	  the	  U.S.	  
Supreme	  Court	  held	  that:	  	  	  
“Under	  the	  Sherman	  Act,	  a	  combination	  formed	  for	  the	  purpose	  and	  with	  the	  effect	  of	  
raising,	  depressing,	  fixing,	  pegging,	  or	  stabilizing	  the	  price	  of	  a	  commodity	   in	   interstate	  
or	  foreign	  commerce	  is	  illegal	  per	  se.”844	  
In	  Mandeville,	  three	  refiners	  were	  condemned	  for	  entering	  into	  an	  agreement	  to	  pay	  uniform	  prices	  
for	  sugar	  beets.	  According	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  such	  conduct	  is	  prohibited	  even	  though	  the	  price	  is	  
fixed	  by	  purchasers	  and	  the	  persons	  specially	   injured	  are	  sellers,	  not	  customers	  or	  consumers.845	   It	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
transparency,	  Directorate	  for	  financial	  and	  enterprise	  affairs	  –	  Competition	  Committee,	  Working	  Party	  No.3	  on	  
Co-­‐operation	  and	  enforcement,	  DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2011)98,	  11	  October	  2011.	  
842	  On	  the	  enforcement	  system	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  see:	  E.Gellhorn	  &	  W.E.Kovacic,	  Antitrust	  Law	  and	  Economics,	  at	  449-­‐
472	  (1994)	  and	  D.F.Broder,	  A	  Guide	  to	  US	  Antitrust	  Law,	  at	  166-­‐192	  (2005)	  
843	  N.Rosenfelt,	  The	  verdict	  on	  monopsony,	  20	  Loyola	  Consumer	  Law	  Review	  402,	  at	  412	  (2007-­‐2008).	  	  
844	  United	  States	  v.	  Socony-­‐Vacuum	  Oil	  Co.,	  Inc.,	  310	  U.S.	  150,	  223,	  (1940).	  Emphasis	  added.	  
845	  Mandeville	  Island	  Farms	  v.	  American	  Crystal	  Sugar	  Co.,	  334	  U.S.	  219,	  236	  (1948).	  See	  also:	  Swift	  &	  Co.	  v.	  
United	  States,	  196	  U.S.	  375	  (1905);	  National	  Macaroni	  Manufacturers	  Association	  v.	  F.T.C.,	  345	  F.2d	  421	  (1965)	  
and	  Bellevue	  Drug	  Co.	  v.	  Advance	  PCS,	  333	  F.Supp.2d	  318	  (E.D.Pa.2004).	  In	  the	  first	  case,	  dealers	  of	  meat	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was	  asserted	  that	  the	  act	  does	  not	  confine	  its	  protection	  to	  consumers,	  or	  to	  purchasers,	  but	  instead	  
protect	  all	  who	  are	  made	  victims	  of	  restraints	  of	  trade.846	  Even	  though	  the	  Court	  also	  found	  a	  harmful	  
effect	  flowing	  from	  the	  monopsony	  conspiracy	  in	  the	  downstream	  output	  market,	  it	  did	  not	  hold	  that	  
such	  effect	  was	  a	  necessary	  condition	  to	  make	  a	  buying	  practice	  forbidden.847	  One	  can	  therefore	  read	  
this	  case	  as	  attesting	  that	  a	  practice	  could	  offend	  the	  antitrust	   laws	  even	   if	   it	  only	  harms	  sellers.848	  
Price-­‐fixing	  agreements	  are	  prohibited	  because	  of	  their	  very	  nature	  whoever	  are	  the	  price	  fixers	  or	  
the	  immediate	  victims.849	  	  
Various	   arguments	   have	   been	   invoked	   by	   conspiring	   buyers	   to	   justify	   their	   conduct.	   In	   Socony-­‐
Vacuum	   Oil	   for	   example,	   oil	   companies	   claimed	   that	   the	   agreement	   led	   to	   fairer	   and	   more	  
reasonable	  prices	  on	  the	  markets.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  yet	  rejected	  that	  argument	  and	  stated	  that	  the	  
reasonableness	  of	  prices	  is	  not	  an	  issue	  in	  price-­‐fixing	  cases.	  What	  matters	  is	  that,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  
agreement,	   one	   form	   of	   competition	   is	   eliminated.	   Such	   conduct	   must	   therefore	   be	   prohibited	  
otherwise	  the	  Sherman	  Act,	  which	  protects	  a	  system	  of	  free	  competition,	  would	  be	  emasculated.850	  
In	  Knevelbaard	  Dairies,	  a	  United	  States	  Courts	  of	  Appeals	   refused	   to	  associate	  antitrust	   injury	  with	  
harm	  to	  consumers.851	  In	  that	  case,	  cheese	  makers	  conspired	  to	  depress	  the	  prices	  they	  paid	  to	  milk	  
producers.	   	   They	  argued	   that	   the	  agreement	  was	  not	   anticompetitive	   since	   it	   entailed	  benefits	   for	  
consumers.	   The	   reduced	  milk	  acquisition	   costs	   indeed	  enabled	   them	   to	   lower	  manufacturing	   costs	  
and,	   as	   a	   result,	   to	   offer	   lower	   prices	   for	   cheese	   products	   to	   consumers.	   Although	   the	   argument	  
seems	  appealing,	  the	  Court	  refused	  to	  make	  consumer	  injury	  a	  necessary	  condition	  to	  find	  a	  violation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
agreed	  not	  to	  bid	  against	  one	  another	  in	  order	  to	  regulate	  prices.	  The	  second	  case	  concerned	  a	  buying	  cartel	  of	  
macaroni	  manufacturers	  which	  attempted	  to	  control	  the	  price	  of	  durum	  wheat	  by	  reducing	  the	  quantity	  
purchased.	  The	  third	  case	  involved	  a	  class	  action	  brought	  on	  behalf	  of	  retail	  pharmacies	  against	  an	  alleged	  
anticompetitive	  agreement	  between	  plan	  sponsors.	  The	  participants	  agreed	  not	  to	  bid	  up	  the	  price	  or	  bid	  
against	  each	  other,	  thereby	  reducing	  the	  market	  price	  for	  prescription	  drugs	  and	  dispensing	  services	  provided	  
by	  retail	  pharmacies.	  It	  was	  maintained	  that	  injury	  to	  sellers	  inflicted	  through	  a	  horizontal	  price-­‐fixing	  
conspiracy	  of	  buyers	  constitutes	  an	  antitrust	  injury	  which	  is	  actionable	  by	  the	  seller.	  
846	  Mandeville	  Island	  Farms,	  op.cit.,	  at	  237.	  	  
847	  M.C.Naughton,	  Buyer	  power	  under	  attack:	  recent	  trends	  in	  monopsony	  cases,	  18	  Antitrust	  81,	  at	  83	  (2003-­‐
2004)	  
848	  R.D.Blair	  &	  J.E.Lopatka,	  Predatory	  buying	  and	  the	  antitrust	  laws,	  2008	  Utah	  Law	  Review	  415,	  at	  444	  (2008)	  
849	  Commissioner	  J.	  Thomas	  Rosch	  does	  not	  agree	  with	  such	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Mandeville	  case.	  According	  to	  
him,	  that	  case	  arose	  long	  before	  consumer	  welfare	  became	  the	  standard	  of	  US	  antitrust	  policy.	  It	  can	  therefore	  
not	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  proof	  that	  sellers	  and	  consumers	  are	  equally	  protected	  by	  the	  antitrust	  laws.	  He	  is	  in	  
the	  opinion	  that	  the	  latter	  care	  about	  the	  welfare	  of	  consumers	  which	  is	  only	  likely	  to	  be	  impaired	  by	  the	  
exercise	  of	  seller	  market	  power	  in	  the	  output	  market.	  Under	  that	  interpretation,	  the	  exercise	  of	  monopsony	  
power	  is	  not	  anticompetitive	  unless	  it	  is	  used	  to	  create	  or	  maintain	  market	  power	  in	  the	  output	  market.	  See:	  
J.T.Rosch,	  Monopsony	  and	  the	  meaning	  of	  “consumer	  welfare”:	  A	  closer	  look	  at	  Weyerhaeuser,	  2007	  Columbia	  
Business	  Law	  Review	  353,	  at	  359-­‐361	  (2007)	  
850	  United	  States	  v.	  Socony-­‐Vacuum	  Oil	  Co.,	  Inc.,	  310	  U.S.	  150,	  221-­‐223	  (1940)	  
851	  Knevelbaard	  Dairies	  v.	  Kraft	  Foods,	  Inc.,	  232	  F.3d	  979	  (9th	  Circ.	  2000)	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of	  the	  antitrust	  laws	  or	  to	  consider	  consumer	  benefits	  as	  justifying	  a	  restraint	  of	  trade.852	  It	  restated	  
that	  the	  central	  purpose	  of	  the	  antitrust	   laws	   is	  to	  preserve	  competition	  and	  protect	  the	  economic	  
freedom	  of	  participants	  in	  the	  relevant	  market.	  Conspiracy	  among	  buyers	  to	  pay	  suppliers	  less	  than	  
the	  prices	  that	  would	  otherwise	  prevail	  was	  held	  to	  injure	  milk	  producers	  and	  competition.	  The	  Court	  
strongly	   opposed	   the	   interpretation	   given	   by	   other	   courts	   to	   the	   notion	   of	   antitrust	   injury	   by	  
affirming	  that:	  	  
“Clearly	   mistaken	   is	   the	   occasional	   court	   that	   considers	   low	   buying	   prices	   pro-­‐
competitive	   or	   that	   thinks	   sellers	   receiving	   illegally	   low	   prices	   do	   not	   suffer	   antitrust	  
injury.	  To	  hold	  otherwise	  would	  be	  contrary	  to	  long-­‐established	  antitrust	  law.”853	  	  
Price-­‐fixing	  agreements	  between	  buyers	  are	  not	  only	  prohibited	  on	  the	  commodities	  markets	  but	  are	  
also	  likely	  to	  be	  condemned	  as	  per	  se	  unlawful	  arrangements	  in	  markets	  for	  services	  or	  in	  the	  labor	  
market.	  As	  regards	  the	   latter,	  US	  courts	  held	  that	  arrangements	  between	  employers	  to	  set	  salaries	  
violate	   Section	   1	   of	   the	   Sherman	   Act	   since	   such	   agreements	   reduce	   their	   incentive	   to	   bid	   up	  
payments	  in	  order	  to	  attract	  or	  to	  retain	  employees.854	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  latter	  receive	  a	  salary	  lower	  
than	  what	  they	  would	  have	  received	  but	  for	  their	  employers’	  conspiracy.	  	  
Even	  nonprofit	  associations	  are	  not	  beyond	   the	   reach	  of	   the	  antitrust	   laws.	   In	  Law	  v.	  NCAA855,	   the	  
court	   held	   that,	   by	   limiting	   the	   salaries	   of	   some	  assistant	   coaches,	   the	  National	   Collegiate	  Athletic	  
Association	   (NCAA)856	   entered	   into	   an	   anticompetitive	   agreement.857	   The	   argument	   that	   the	   rule	  
would	  reduce	  the	  schools’	  costs	  and	  preserved	  employment	  opportunities	  was	  rejected	  as	  not	  valid.	  
The	  court	  indeed	  maintained	  that:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
852	  See	  also:	  Nate	  Pease,	  et	  al.	  v.	  Jasper	  Wyman	  &	  Son,	  Inc.,	  et	  al.,	  Civil	  Action	  No.	  00-­‐015,	  Knox	  County,	  State	  of	  
Maine	  (2004).	  This	  case	  involves	  a	  conspiracy	  among	  processors	  to	  fix	  prices	  paid	  for	  wild	  blueberries.	  There	  
was	  no	  proof	  that	  the	  defendants	  had	  the	  power	  to	  increase	  prices	  in	  the	  downstream	  markets	  but	  it	  was	  held	  
that	  blueberry	  growers	  were	  injured	  since	  prices	  had	  been	  depressed	  significantly.	  
853	  Knevelbaard	  Dairies,	  op.cit.,	  at	  47.	  
854	  See	  for	  example:	  Todd	  v.	  Exxon	  Corporation,	  275	  F.3d	  191	  (2nd	  Cir.	  2001).	  Even	  though	  the	  case	  involved	  an	  
exchange	  of	  price	  information,	  which	  is	  not	  itself	  a	  per	  se	  violation	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act,	  the	  courts	  considered	  
that	  sharing	  current	  price	  information	  has	  the	  greatest	  potential	  for	  generating	  anticompetitive	  effects	  and	  has	  
consistently	  been	  held	  to	  violate	  the	  Sherman	  Act.	  
855	  Law	  v.	  NCAA,	  134	  F.3d	  1010	  (10th	  Cir.	  1998)	  
856	  Members	  of	  the	  NCAA	  are	  colleges	  and	  universities.	  The	  association	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  organizing	  the	  athletic	  
programs	  of	  its	  members.	  
857	  Although	  price-­‐fixing	  agreement	  is	  usually	  illegal	  per	  se,	  the	  court	  decided	  to	  apply	  the	  rule	  of	  reason	  in	  this	  
case.	  It	  followed	  a	  decision	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  which	  it	  was	  considered	  that	  the	  NCAA	  regulated	  an	  
industry	  in	  which	  horizontal	  restraints	  on	  competition	  are	  essential	  if	  the	  product	  is	  to	  be	  available	  to	  all.	  See:	  
NCAA	  v.	  Board	  of	  Regents,	  468	  U.S.	  85	  (1984).	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  had	  first	  developed	  the	  theory	  in	  Broadcast	  
Music,	  Inc.,	  v.	  Columbia	  Broadcasting	  System,	  Inc.,	  441	  U.S.	  1	  (1979).	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  
ASCAP	  (The	  American	  Society	  of	  Composers,	  Authors	  and	  Publishers)	  blanket	  music	  license	  could	  not	  exist	  
absent	  an	  agreement	  among	  artist	  to	  sell	  their	  rights	  at	  uniform	  prices.	  It	  was	  hence	  decided	  to	  apply	  a	  rule	  of	  
reason	  analysis	  to	  examine	  the	  restraint.	  (at	  24)	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“Lower	  prices	  cannot	  justify	  a	  cartel’s	  control	  of	  prices	  charged	  by	  suppliers,	  because	  the	  
cartel	   ultimately	   robs	   the	   suppliers	   of	   the	   normal	   fruits	   of	   their	   enterprises.	   Further,	  
setting	   maximum	   prices	   reduces	   the	   incentive	   among	   suppliers	   to	   improve	   their	  
products.	   Likewise,	   in	   our	   case,	   coaches	   have	   less	   incentive	   to	   improve	   their	  
performance	  if	  their	  salaries	  are	  capped.”858	  
	  It	  was	  clearly	  asserted	  that	  free	  competition	  is	  protected	  not	  only	  because	  it	  produces	  lower	  prices	  
but	   also	   because	   it	   incites	   traders	   to	   offer	   better	   goods	   and	   services.	   Therefore,	   even	   though	   the	  
exercise	  of	  market	  power	  by	  a	  group	  of	  buyers	  results	   in	   lower	  costs	  to	  the	  buyers	  and	  may	  be,	  as	  
result,	  beneficial	   to	  consumers,	   it	   is	  not	  sufficient	   to	  constitute	  a	  defense	  under	   the	  antitrust	   laws.	  
The	  court	  added	  that:	  	  
“If	  holding	  down	  costs	  by	  the	  exercise	  of	  market	  power	  over	  suppliers,	  rather	  than	  just	  
by	  increased	  efficiency,	  is	  a	  procompetitive	  effect	  justifying	  joint	  conduct,	  then	  Section	  1	  
can	  never	  apply	  to	  input	  market	  or	  buyer	  cartels.	  That	  is	  not	  and	  cannot	  be	  the	  law.”859	  	  
Two	  lessons	  might	  be	  drawn	  from	  this	  decision.	  Firstly,	  the	  court	  refused	  to	  take	  into	  consideration	  
the	  possible	  benefits	  that	  a	  buyer	  agreement	  may	  yield	  on	  the	  selling	  side	  and	  that	  buyers	  invoke	  to	  
justify	  their	  practices.	  Cost	  savings	  or	  end-­‐user	  positive	  effects	  are	  hence	  irrelevant	  to	  determine	  the	  
legality	   of	   concerted	   conduct	   by	   buyers.860	   The	   underlying	   reasoning	   is	   that	   buyer	   cartels	   do	   not	  
create	  efficiencies	  so	  that	  the	  lower	  prices	  obtained	  and	  passed	  on	  in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market	  
only	   result	   from	   the	   exercise	   of	   combined	  market	   power.	   If	   such	   anticompetitive	   behavior	   in	   the	  
upstream	  buyer	  market	  could	  be	  justified	  by	  (short-­‐term)	  benefits	  in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market,	  
buyer	   cartels	   could	   hardly	   be	   condemned.	   One	  may	   nevertheless	   assume	   that	   those	   benefits	   are	  
fleeting	  and	  that	  the	  resulting	  reinforcement	  of	  market	  power	  in	  the	  up-­‐	  and	  downstream	  markets	  is	  
likely	   to	   adversely	   affect	   consumers	   in	   the	   longer-­‐term.	   Anticompetitive	   conduct	   in	   the	   upstream	  
buyer	  market	  can	  therefore	  not	  be	   justified	  by	  any	  positive	  effect	   in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market	  
unless	   the	  benefits	   invoked	  have	  been	   created	   through	  higher	   efficiency.	   The	  second	   lesson	   to	  be	  
underlined	   refers	   to	   the	   objectives	   of	   competition	   law	   pointed	   out	   by	   the	   Court.	   Where	   lower	  
costs/prices	  are	  particularly	  important	  in	  a	  bargain,	  other	  elements	  come	  also	  into	  the	  picture	  such	  
as	  quality,	   service,	   safety,	  and	  durability.	  Even	  though	  buyer	  agreements	  may	   lead	  to	   lower	  prices,	  
restriction	   on	   free	   competition	   and	   on	   the	   free	   opportunity	   to	   select	   among	   alternative	   offers	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
858	  Law	  v.	  NCAA,	  134	  F.3d	  1010	  (10th	  Cir.	  1998),	  at	  1022	  
859	  Ibid.,	  at	  1023	  
860	  G.J.Werden,	  Monopsony	  and	  the	  Sherman	  Act:	  Consumer	  Welfare	  in	  a	  New	  Light,	  74	  Antitrust	  Law	  Journal	  
707,	  at	  720	  (2008)	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nevertheless	   likely	   to	   go	   against	   the	   achievement	   of	   the	   competition	   goals	   by	   negatively	   affecting	  
other	  but	  equally	  important	  aspects	  included	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  consumer	  welfare.	  
ii. Non-­‐price	  concessions	  imposed	  on	  sellers	  
In	  addition	   to	   restraints	  of	   trade	  commonly	  considered	  as	  per	  se	  unlawful	  under	   the	  antitrust	   laws	  
such	   as	   price	   fixing,	   market	   sharing	   or	   output/input	   restriction,	   the	   courts	   have	   also	   condemned	  
other	  types	  of	  agreements	  involving	  induced	  refusal	  to	  deal	  orchestrated	  by	  buyers.	  The	  per	  se	  rule	  
was	   for	   example	   applied	   in	   Klor’s	  where	   an	   appliance	   store	   conspired	   with	   household	   appliance	  
manufacturers	  and	  their	  distributors	  either	  not	  to	  sell	  to	  Klor’s,	  a	  competitor,	  or	  to	  sell	  to	  it	  only	  at	  
discriminatory	   prices	   and	   highly	   unfavorable	   terms.861	   The	   Supreme	   Court	   maintained	   that	   group	  
boycotts	   fall	   in	   the	   forbidden	   category,	   even	   though	   they	   operate	   to	   lower	   prices	   or	   temporarily	  
stimulate	  competition,	  because	  	  
“Such	   agreements,	   no	   less	   than	   those	   to	   fix	   minimum	   prices,	   cripple	   the	   freedom	   of	  
traders	   and	   thereby	   restrain	   their	   ability	   to	   sell	   in	   accordance	   with	   their	   own	  
judgment”.862	  	  
The	  Court	  distinguished	  this	  case	  from	  those	  involving	  a	  single	  trader	  refusing	  to	  deal	  with	  another	  or	  
a	   manufacturer	   and	   a	   dealer	   agreeing	   to	   an	   exclusive	   distributorship.	   The	   complaint	   at	   hand	  
concerned	   a	   conspiracy	   between	   manufacturers,	   distributors	   and	   a	   retailer	   which	   seriously	  
handicapped	  a	  rival’s	  ability	  to	  compete	  and	  deprived	  suppliers	  of	  their	  freedom	  to	  sell	  to	  Klor’s.	  The	  
Court	  added	  that	  no	  matters	  whether	  the	  victim	   is	   just	  one	  small	  merchant	  whose	  exclusion	   is	  not	  
likely	   to	   make	   a	   difference	   in	   the	   economy.863	   It	   is	   worth	   noting	   that	   in	   this	   case,	   the	   buyer’s	  
orchestration	  was	  deemed	   to	  have	  a	  monopolistic	   tendency,	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   to	  be	   likely	   to	  create	  a	  
monopoly	  in	  the	  downstream	  markets.	  	  
A	  similar	  case,	  dealt	  with	  by	  a	  Court	  of	  Appeals,	  concerned	  a	  large	  retailer	  of	  toys,	  Toys	  ‘R’	  Us,	  which	  
orchestrated	   an	   agreement	   among	   toy	   manufacturers	   not	   to	   sell	   to	   low-­‐price	   rival	   stores.864	   The	  
arrangement	   took	   the	   form	   of	   a	   network	   of	   vertical	   agreements	   between	   Toys	   ‘R’	   Us	   and	   the	  
individual	  manufacturers	   in	  which	   the	   former	   acted	   as	   a	  middleman,	   conveying	   assurance	   to	   each	  
supplier	   that	   their	   competitors	   would	   abide	   by	   the	   same	   restriction.	   It	   was	   indeed	   not	   in	   the	  
manufacturers’	   interests	   to	   deprive	   themselves	   of	   a	   profitable	   sales	   outlet	   but,	   because	   of	   the	  
insurance	  that	  their	  competitors	  would	  do	  the	  same	  and	  under	  the	  pressure	  of	  the	  retailer’s	  buyer	  
power,	  they	  agreed	  to	  join	  in	  the	  boycott.	  Instead	  of	  acting	  against	  the	  buyer’s	  conduct	  at	  the	  root	  of	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  Klor’s	  v.	  Broadway-­‐Hale	  Stores,	  359	  U.S.	  207	  (1959)	  
862	  Ibid.,	  213.	  
863	  Ibid.,	  214.	  
864	  Toys	  “R”	  Us,	  Inc.	  v.	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission,	  221	  F.3d	  928,	  (7th	  Cir.2000)	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the	  anticompetitive	  agreement,	  the	  court	  decided	  to	  condemn	  the	  horizontal	  conspiracy	  as	  violating	  
Section	  5	  of	   the	  FTC	  Act.	  This	  case	  nevertheless	  attests	   that	  a	  buyer	  may	  be	   in	  a	  position	  to	  affect	  
competition	  despite	  its	  relatively	  low	  market	  share.	  Although	  Toys	  ‘R’	  Us	  accounted	  for	  only	  20%	  of	  
the	   national	  wholesale	  market,	   it	   had	   nevertheless	   sufficient	   buyer	   power	   to	   achieve	   its	   intended	  
anticompetitive	  goal,	  namely	  eliminating	  the	  competitive	  threat	  posed	  by	  new	  discounters.865	  	  
Restriction	  on	  sellers’	   freedom	  imposed	  by	  buyers	  was	  also	  held	  unlawful	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court	   in	  
Crescent866	  and	  Griffith867.	  In	  those	  cases,	  movie	  exhibitors	  were	  found	  to	  have	  combined	  their	  buyer	  
power	  to	  eliminate	  their	  competitors.	  To	  achieve	  that	  aim,	  they	  agreed	  to	  buy	  films	  from	  distributors	  
in	   cities	   where	   they	   had	   no	   competition,	   on	   condition	   that	   distributors	   give	   them	   monopoly	  
exhibition	  rights	  in	  towns	  where	  the	  theaters	  faced	  competition.	  In	  the	  first	  case,	  the	  common	  end	  of	  
film	  exhibitors	  was	   to	   acquire	  monopoly	  power	   in	   all	  market	   areas	   and	  was	   therefore	   condemned	  
under	  Section	  1	  and	  2	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act.868	  However,	   in	  the	  second	  case,	  the	  Court	  held	  that	  it	   is	  
not	  always	  necessary	  to	  find	  a	  specific	  intent	  to	  restrain	  trade	  or	  to	  build	  a	  monopoly	  in	  order	  to	  find	  
that	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  has	  been	  violated.	  It	   is	  sufficient	  that	  a	  restraint	  of	  trade	  or	  monopoly	  in	  fact	  
results	  from	  the	  buyers’	  conduct.869	  
b) 	  Agreements	  likely	  to	  be	  held	  reasonable	  
In	  some	  cases,	  courts	  have	  not	  condemned	  agreements	  on	  the	  buying	  side	  as	  strictly	  as	  they	  would	  
have	  been	  on	  the	  selling	  side.	  In	  contradiction	  with	  what	  was	  held	  in	  the	  decisions	  analysed	  above,	  
those	  courts	  have	  put	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  potential	  benefits	   that	  buyer	  conduct	  may	  entail	   in	  the	  
output	  markets.	  For	  example,	   in	  Balmoral,	  the	  court	  refused	  to	  hold	  as	  per	  se	   illegal	  an	  agreement	  
between	   competing	   film	   exhibitors	   not	   to	   engage	   in	   competitive	   bidding	   for	   films	   offered	   by	  
distributors.870	   The	   practice	   was	   deemed	   to	   be	   likely	   to	   serve	   rather	   than	   undermine	   consumer	  
welfare	  since	   it	  would	  result	   in	   lower	  prices	  to	  moviegoers	  at	  the	  box	  office.	   In	  contrast,	   the	   lower	  
prices	  paid	  to	  distributors	  were	  considered	  of	  little	  importance	  in	  this	  case	  due,	  in	  particular,	  to	  the	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  M.E.Stucke,	  Buyer	  power:	  Should	  the	  seller	  beware?,	  Paper	  presented	  at	  the	  Conference	  on	  Buyer	  Power	  in	  
Competition	  Law,	  Centre	  for	  Competition	  Law	  and	  Policy,	  Oxford,	  15	  May	  2012,	  at	  23.	  
866	  United	  States	  v.	  Crescent	  Amusement	  Co.,	  323	  U.S.	  173	  (1944)	  
867	  United	  States	  v.	  Griffith,	  334	  U.S.	  100	  (1948).	  See	  also:	  FTC	  v.	  Motion	  Picture	  Advertising	  Svc.	  Co.,	  Inc.,	  344	  
U.S.	  392	  (1953)	  
868	  The	  practices	  were	  condemned	  under	  Section	  1	  and	  Section	  2	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  because	  exhibitors	  have	  
combined	  with	  each	  other	  and	  with	  the	  distributors	  to	  obtain	  the	  monopoly	  rights.	  However,	  the	  same	  practice	  
enforced	  by	  a	  single	  buyer	  would	  be	  enough	  to	  violate	  Section	  2	  of	  the	  Sherman	  act	  since	  the	  result	  would	  be	  
the	  same.	  The	  consequences	  of	  such	  use	  of	  pooled	  or	  single	  buying	  power	  is	  that	  films	  are	  licensed	  on	  a	  
noncompetitive	  basis	  
869	  United	  States	  v.	  Griffith,	  op.cit.,	  at	  105.	  In	  that	  case,	  exhibitors	  made	  no	  threat	  to	  withhold	  the	  business	  of	  
their	  closed	  or	  monopoly	  towns	  unless	  the	  distributors	  gave	  them	  the	  exclusive	  film	  rights	  in	  the	  towns	  where	  
they	  had	  competitors.	  However,	  the	  Court	  found	  that	  the	  effect	  was	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  same.	  
870	  Balmoral	  Cinema,	  Inc.,	  v.	  Allied	  Artists	  Pictures	  Corp.,	  855	  F.2d	  3313	  (6th	  Cir.	  1989)	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great	  market	  power	  wielded	  by	   them	  over	   film	  products.	  The	  Court	   suggested	   that	   the	  agreement	  
would	  not	   create	  monopsony	  but	  would	   represent	  a	   shift	   from	  a	  monopoly	   situation	   to	  a	  bilateral	  
monopoly	  situation.871	  	  
A	  similar	  argument	  was	  held	   in	  North	  Jackson	  Pharmacy.872	  An	  alleged	  anticompetitive	  drug	  buying	  
cartel	  between	  insurance	  companies	  to	  drive	  down	  the	  prices	  paid	  to	  pharmacies	  escaped	  from	  the	  
per	   se	   standard	   because	   such	   agreement	   might	   benefit	   consumers,	   at	   least	   in	   the	   short	   term,	  
through	   lower	  drug	  prices.	  Again	   in	   that	  case,	   the	  court	   seemed	  to	  consider	   that	  prescription	  drug	  
sellers	  held	  market	  power	  and	  that	  the	  arrangement	  constituted	  a	  mean	  to	  lower	  prices	  closer	  to	  the	  
competitive	  level.873	  	  	  
However,	   such	  argument	   seems	  hardly	   justifiable.	  Even	   though	  buyer	  may	  be	   in	  a	  weaker	  position	  
when	   dealing	   with	   large	   sellers,	   the	   mere	   fact	   to	   hold	   market	   power	   is	   not	   unlawful	   under	   the	  
Sherman	  Act.	  Authorizing	   restrictive	  buyer	  cartels	   to	  counterbalance	   the	  exercise	  of	  market	  power	  
on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  market	  restricts	  free	  competition	  and	  does	  not,	  in	  any	  way,	  restore	  effective	  
competition.	  Furthermore,	  the	  reasoning	  of	  the	  court	  is	  likely	  to	  entail	  uncertainties	  on	  the	  markets.	  
When	   do	   sellers	   hold	   sufficient	   market	   power	   to	   allow	   their	   customers	   to	   conspire?	   This	   case	  
concerned	   an	   arrangement	   between	   buyers	   not	   to	   bid	   against	   each	   other	   but	   may	   price-­‐fixing	  
agreements	  also	   fall	   into	   the	   reasoning	  of	   the	  court?	  Where	  buyer	  power	  may	  constitute,	   in	   some	  
circumstances,	  a	  positive	  countervailing	  strength	  when	  buyers	   face	  a	  concentrated	  upstream	  seller	  
market,	   the	  countervailing	  power	  argument	   is	  more	  arguable	   in	  cases	  of	  buyer	  cartels.	   Indeed,	   the	  
exercise	   of	   market	   power	   is	   not	   unlawful	   unless	   it	   results	   in	   competition	   distortions	   while	  
agreements	   among	  market	   participants	   limit	   de	   facto	   competition	   on	   the	  market	   and	   can	   only	   be	  
justified	  on	  efficiency	  grounds.	  
US	  courts	  have	  also	  been	  more	  lenient	  towards	  boycotts	  orchestrated	  by	  a	  buyer	  when	  no	  horizontal	  
agreement	  has	  been	  established.	  Where	  a	  single	  retailer	  induced	  one	  of	  his	  suppliers	  to	  stop	  selling	  
to	   a	   rival	   distributor,	   courts	   consider	   that	   the	   “group	   boycott”	   doctrine	   upheld	   in	   Klor’s	   is	   not	  
applicable.874	   As	   confirmed	   by	   the	   Supreme	   Court,	   the	   per	   se	   rule	   is	   limited	   to	   cases	   involving	  
horizontal	   agreements	   among	   direct	   competitors,	   either	   between	   buyers	   or	   between	   sellers,	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
871	  L.Alexander,	  Monopsony	  and	  the	  Consumer	  Harm	  Standard,	  95	  The	  Georgetown	  Law	  Journal	  1611,	  at	  1625	  
(2007)	  
872	  North	  Jackson	  Pharmacy,	  Inc.	  v.	  Caremark	  RX,	  Inc.,	  385	  F.Supp.2d	  740	  (N.D.	  III.	  2005).	  See	  also:	  Addamax	  
Corporation	  v.	  Open	  Software	  Foundation,	  Inc.,	  888.	  F.Supp.	  274	  (D.Mass.	  1995).	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  court	  
considered	  that	  lower	  prices	  benefit	  consumers.	  Antitrust	  injury	  is	  only	  likely	  to	  occur	  when	  the	  colluding	  
buyers	  also	  possess	  market	  power	  in	  the	  output	  market.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  they	  would	  be	  able	  to	  harm	  consumer	  
by	  raising	  prices	  and	  thereby	  cause	  competition	  injury.	  
873	  L.Alexander,	  op.cit.,	  at	  1625.	  
874	  Oreck	  Corporation	  v.	  Whirlpool	  Corporation,	  563	  F.	  69	  (1979).	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may	  have	  been	  orchestrated	  by	  a	  powerful	  buyer.875	  The	  main	  reason	  of	  such	  differential	  treatment	  
is	   the	   willingness	   to	   preserve	   the	   ability	   of	   a	   manufacturer	   to	   award	   and	   cancel	   an	   exclusive	  
distributorship.	  	  
However,	  the	  real	  evil	  in	  all	  those	  cases	  is	  not	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  conspiracy	  among	  manufacturers	  or	  
among	  buyers	  but	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  to	  exclude	  competitors.	  When	   it	   is	  established	  that	  
the	  decision	  to	  cease	  to	  do	  business	  with	  a	  customer	  does	  not	  result	  from	  the	  supplier’s	  free	  choice	  
but	  from	  coercive	  pressure	  exerted	  on	  that	  supplier	  by	  a	  competing	  buyer,	  the	  restrictive	  effect	  on	  
competition	  is	  the	  same,	  whatever	  the	  number	  of	  conspirators	  at	  each	  level	  of	  the	  supply	  chain.876	  A	  
similar	   treatment	   should	   therefore	   be	   applied	  when	   a	   buyer	   is	   at	   the	   root	   of	   the	   anticompetitive	  
practice.	  	  According	  to	  the	  US	  case	  law,	  though,	  a	  boycott	  involving	  horizontal	  agreements	  is	  per	  se	  
unlawful,	  while	  a	  single	  buyer’s	  inducement	  will	  be	  examined	  under	  the	  rule	  of	  reason.	  In	  the	  latter	  
case,	  it	  will	  be	  required	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  exclusion	  of	  the	  targeted	  retailer	  entails	  a	  significant	  
restriction	   on	   competition	   in	   the	   relevant	  market.	   If,	   in	   addition,	   the	   court	   dealing	   with	   the	   case	  
bases	   its	   assessment	   only	   on	   the	   direct	   impact	   of	   the	   conduct	   on	   the	   downstream	   seller	  market,	  
boycotts	   induced	   by	   large	   buyers	   are	   unlikely	   to	   be	   considered	   as	   violating	   the	   competition	   rules.	  
Consequently,	   although	   the	   two	   examples	   of	   boycott	   lead	   to	   similar	   effects,	   namely	   market	  
foreclosure,	  the	  result	  of	  the	  competition	  assessment	  may	  be	  radically	  different.877	  	  
Even	  though	  the	  assessment	  approach	  may	  vary	   from	  one	  court	   to	  another,	  buyer	  agreements	  are	  
nevertheless	   a	   target	   in	   US	   antitrust	   enforcement.	   Buyer	   power	   cases	   involving	   Section	   2	   of	   the	  
Sherman	  Act,	  however,	  seem	  to	  raise	  fewer	  competition	  concerns.	  
2. Section	  2	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  
Section	   2	   of	   the	   Sherman	   Act	   applies	   to	   unilateral	   conduct	   aiming	   at	   monopolizing	   a	   particular	  
market.	  We	  cannot	  but	  notice	  that	  the	  provision	  has	  hardly	  been	  successfully	  used	  to	  tackle	  alleged	  
anticompetitive	  practices	  used	  by	  a	  single	  buyer.	  The	  focus	  on	  the	  lower	  prices	  that	  the	  exercise	  of	  
buyer	   power	   may	   bring	   to	   consumers	   and	   the	   application	   of	   standards	   ill-­‐adapted	   to	   buy	   side	  
conduct	  are	  probably	  the	  main	  reasons	  of	  that	  under	  enforcement.	  	  
a) Lower	  prices	  and	  refusal	  to	  deal	  
As	  imposing	  low	  prices	  in	  the	  input	  market	  is	  likely	  to	  benefit	  consumers,	  US	  courts	  are	  not	  willing	  to	  
condemn	   such	   conduct	   even	   though	   prices	   are	   pushed	   down	   below	   the	   competitive	   level.	   To	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
875	  See:	  Business	  Electronics	  Corp.	  v.	  Sharp	  Electronics	  Corp.,	  458	  U.S.	  717	  (1988)	  and	  Nynex	  Corp.	  v.	  Discon,	  Inc.,	  
525	  U.S.	  128	  (1998)	  
876	  T.A.Piraino,	  A	  proposed	  antitrust	  approach	  to	  buyers’	  competitive	  conduct,	  56	  Hastings	  Law	  Journal	  1121,	  at	  
1134	  (2005)	  
877	  T.A.Piraino,	  op.cit.,	  at	  1135.	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consider	   that	   low	   consumer	   prices	   are,	   in	   any	   case,	   procompetitive	   constituted	   the	   reasoning	  
followed	  by	  the	  Court	  in	  Kartell.878	  The	  case	  involved	  a	  health	  insurance	  company,	  Blue	  Shield,	  which	  
decided	  to	  cap	  the	  prices	  that	  doctors	  could	  charge	  to	  its	  subscribers.	  That	  ban	  against	  balance	  billing	  
prevented	  hence	  physicians	  to	  set	  higher	  prices	  for	  more	  expensive	  services.	  In	  order	  to	  implement	  
its	  policy,	  Blue	  Shield	   simply	   refused	   to	  deal	  with	  doctors	  who	  did	  not	  agree	  with	   the	  program.	   In	  
view	  of	  the	  large	  number	  of	  privately	  insured	  residents	  covered	  by	  Blue	  Shield,	  doctors	  felt	  coerced	  
to	   adhere	   to	   the	   maximum	   fee	   schedule	   and	   alleged	   that	   the	   insurance	   company	   violated	   the	  
Sherman	  Act.879	  	  
While	   the	  district	   court	   concluded	   that	   the	  payment	   system	   imposed	  heavy	  economic	  pressure	  on	  
physicians	   and	   set	   unjustifiably	   low	   prices880,	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeals,	   however,	   did	   not	   find	   any	  
unlawful	  restraint.	  It	  considered	  that,	  as	  a	  buyer	  of	  the	  doctors’	  services,	  Blue	  Shield	  was	  entitled	  to	  
determine	   the	   price	   of	   the	   product	   that	   will	   be	   sold.	   	   The	   company	   was	   even	   free	   to	   exploit	   its	  
monopsony	   power	   and	   to	   set	   uncompetitive	   prices,	   namely	   prices	   below	   the	   level	   that	   a	   freely	  
competitive	   market	   would	   otherwise	   set.	   It	   is	   only	   in	   special	   circumstances,	   such	   as	   in	   case	   of	  
predatory	  pricing,	  that	  the	  antitrust	  laws	  may	  interfere	  in	  the	  price	  bargain	  between	  buyer	  and	  seller.	  
Furthermore,	  the	  Court	  emphasized	  that	  when	  enacting	  the	  Sherman	  Act,	  the	  Congress	  intended	  to	  
protect	   consumers	  against	  prices	   that	  were	   too	  high,	  not	   too	   low.	  Since	   the	  prices	  at	   issue	   in	   that	  
case	  were	  low	  prices,	  the	  Court	  concluded	  that	  the	  payment	  program	  was	  likely	  to	  bring	  benefits	  to	  
consumers	  in	  the	  form	  of	  lower	  insurance	  premiums.881	  Finally,	   it	  was	  maintained	  that,	  as	  the	  price	  
system	   in	   the	  health	   care	   sector	   is	  one	   supervised	  by	   state	   regulators,	   strict	   antitrust	   scrutiny	  was	  
less	  likely	  to	  be	  necessary.882	  	  
Turning	   to	   the	   issue	   on	  whether	   Blue	   Shield’s	   refusal	   to	   deal	  with	   recalcitrant	   doctors	  was	   or	   not	  
unlawful,	   the	  Court	  held	  that,	  as	   long	  as	  there	   is	  no	  horizontal	  conspiracy,	  a	  firm	  is	   free	  to	  deal,	  or	  
refuse	  to	  deal,	  with	  whomever	  it	  likes.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
878	  Kartell	  v.	  Blue	  Shield	  of	  Massachusetts,	  Inc.,	  749	  F.2d	  922	  (5th	  Cir.	  1984).	  See	  also:	  Westchester	  Radiological	  
Associates	  P.C.	  v.	  Empire	  Blue	  Cross	  and	  Blue	  Shield,	  884	  F.2d	  707	  (2nd	  Cir.	  1989)	  
879	  Blue	  Shield	  covered	  nearly	  74%	  of	  all	  privately	  insured	  Massachusetts	  residents.	  Physicians	  who	  did	  not	  
agree	  with	  the	  program	  were	  therefore	  likely	  to	  be	  cut	  off	  from	  a	  substantial	  number	  of	  possible	  patients.	  
Indeed,	  the	  latter	  were	  dissuaded	  from	  choosing	  a	  non-­‐participant	  doctor	  as	  they	  would	  consequently	  lose	  
their	  Blue	  Shield	  benefits	  and	  would	  have	  to	  pay	  personally,	  not	  only	  for	  the	  additional	  charge,	  but	  for	  the	  
entire	  bill.	  
880	  According	  to	  the	  district	  court,	  the	  system	  interfered	  with	  the	  doctors’	  freedom	  to	  set	  higher	  prices	  for	  more	  
expensive	  services.	  Such	  restriction	  was	  likely	  to	  discourage	  them	  from	  developing	  better	  but	  more	  expensive	  
services.	  
881	  S.C.Salop,	  Question:	  What	  is	  the	  Real	  and	  Proper	  Antitrust	  Welfare	  Standard?	  Answer:	  The	  True	  Consumer	  
Welfare	  Standard,	  Georgetown	  University	  Law	  Center,	  November	  4,	  2005,	  at	  7-­‐8.	  
882	  That	  argument	  has	  been	  maintained	  in	  other	  regulated	  sectors,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  electric	  power	  industry.	  See	  
for	  example:	  Kamine/Besicorp	  Allegany	  v.	  Rochester	  Gas	  &	  Elec.,	  908	  F.Supp.	  1194	  (W.D.N.Y.	  1995)	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“It	   runs	   squarely	   into	   basic	   antitrust	   law	   that	   a	   firm	   generally	   has	   a	   right	   to	   deal,	   or	  
refuse	   to	   deal,	   with	   whomever	   it	   likes,	   as	   long	   as	   it	   does	   so	   independently.	   There	   is	  
nothing	  special	  here	  to	  take	  this	  case	  outside	  the	  general	  rule.	  There	  is	  neither	  evidence	  
of	   a	   horizontal	   conspiracy	   nor	   any	   charge	   that	   Blue	   Shield	   agreed	   with	   one	   of	   its	  
competitors	   not	   to	   deal	   with	   nonparticipating	   doctors.	   (…)Blue	   Shield's	   independent	  
determination	  of	  the	  terms	  on	  which	  it	  will	  deal,	  of	  the	  customers	  to	  whom	  it	  will	  sell,	  
and	  of	   the	   suppliers	   from	  whom	   it	  will	  purchase	   is	  a	  manifestation	  of	   the	  competitive	  
process,	  not	  an	  effort	  to	  suppress	  or	  to	  destroy	  that	  process.”	  	  
We	  can	  note	  that,	  even	  though	  Blue	  Shield,	  due	  to	  its	  very	  large	  market	  share	  in	  the	  health	  insurance	  
market,	  might	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  avoidable	  trading	  partner	  or	  “gatekeeper”	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  physicians,	  
that	   issue	   was	   not	   raised	   by	   the	   Court.	   As	   long	   as	   the	   practice	   is	   likely	   to	   bring	   lower	   prices	   to	  
consumers,	   it	  will	  be	  held	  procompetitive.	  No	  matter	   the	  degree	  of	  coercion	   imposed	  on	  suppliers	  
which	  are	  deprived	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  a	  competitive	  buying	  market.	  
However,	  courts	  may	  be	  stricter	  when	  threats	  of	  refusal	  to	  deal	  are	  used	  as	  a	  means,	  not	  to	  set	  low	  
prices,	   but	   to	   drive	   rivals	   out	   of	   the	  market.	   In	  Reazin883,	   the	   largest	   private	   health	   care	   financing	  
organization	  in	  Kansas	  (Blue	  Cross)	  threatened	  hospitals	  to	  terminate	  their	  contracting	  agreement	  if	  
they	  were	  doing	  business	  with	  competing	   insurance	  companies.	  The	  reason	  of	  that	  new	  policy	  was	  
the	  perceived	  competitive	   threat	  posed	  by	  growing	   rivals	   in	   the	  market.	  Although	  all	  hospitals	  and	  
90%	  of	  all	  physicians	  were	  affiliated	  to	  Blue	  Cross	  as	  providers	  of	  medical	  services	  to	  its	  subscribers,	  
the	  company	  was	  seeking	  a	  mean	  to	  maintain	  its	  monopoly	  power.	  The	  court	  judged	  in	  that	  case	  that	  
Blue	  Cross’s	  conduct	  violated	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  because	  it	  prevented	  providers	  from	  contracting	  with	  
rival	  buyers	  and	  thereby	  injected	  a	  market	  distortion.	  	  
b) Predatory	  bidding	  
Predatory	  practices	  have	  been	  addressed	  by	  US	  courts	   in	  different	  decisions.	  Where	  most	  of	   them	  
concerned	   sellers	   engaged	   in	   predatory	   pricing,	   similar	   practices	   involving	   buyers	   have	   also	   been	  
subject	  to	  courts’	  scrutiny.	  Predatory	  bidding	  on	  the	  buying	  side	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  mirror	  image	  of	  
predatory	   pricing	   on	   the	   selling	   side	   of	   the	   market.	   The	   latter	   involves	   the	   practice	   of	   selling	   a	  
product	  or	  service	  at	  a	  very	  low	  price	  in	  order	  to	  drive	  competitors	  out	  of	  the	  market.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  
former	  occurs	  when	  a	  buyer	  bids	  up	   the	  market	  price	  of	  an	   input	   to	  a	   level	  unsustainable	   for	   rival	  
buyers	   which	   are	   consequently	   ousted	   from	   the	   market.	   To	   that	   period	   of	   aggressive	   price	  
competition	  succeeds	  a	  period	  where	  the	  seller	  is	  able	  to	  exercise	  monopoly	  power	  and	  to	  increase	  
prices	  to	  consumers.	  Similarly,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  predatory	  bidding,	  the	  buyer	  acquires	  (or	  maintains	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
883	  Reazin	  v.	  Blue	  Cross	  and	  Blue	  Shield	  of	  Kansas,	  Inc.,	  899	  F.2d	  951	  (10th	  Cir.	  1990)	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increases	  its)	  monopsony	  power	  as	  a	  result	  of	  its	  predatory	  conduct	  and	  is	  therefore	  in	  a	  position	  to	  
lower	   the	   input	   prices	   below	   the	   competitive	   level.884	   The	   question	   of	   whether	   those	   two	   similar	  
practices	  are	  to	  be	  treated	  under	  the	  same	  standard	  has	  been	  answered	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  the	  
Weyerhaeuser	  case.885	  
In	  that	  case,	  Weyerhaeuser,	  a	  saw	  mill,	  was	  accused	  by	  a	  competitor	  (Ross-­‐Simmons)	  of	  buying	  more	  
raw	  materials	  that	  it	  needed.	  The	  objective	  of	  such	  strategy	  was	  to	  push	  up	  prices	  of	  sawlogs	  in	  the	  
upstream	  buyer	  market	  so	  as	  to	  force	  rivals	  out	  of	  that	  market	  and	  acquire	  monopsony	  power.886	  The	  
intention	  of	  the	  firm	  was	  clearly	  to	  recoup	  the	  costs	  manifold	  once	  competition	  would	  be	  sufficiently	  
restricted.887	  Before	  the	  District	  Court,	  Weyerhaeuser	  argued	  that	  the	  Brooke	  Group	  test	  under	  which	  
predatory	  pricing	  is	  assessed	  should	  also	  apply	  to	  claims	  of	  predatory	  bidding.888	  On	  the	  selling	  side,	  
that	  test	  requires	  the	  plaintiff	  to	  show	  that	  the	  prices	  he	  complained	  about	  are	  below	  an	  appropriate	  
measure	   of	   the	   predator’s	   costs	   and	   that	   the	   latter	   has	   a	   dangerous	   probability	   of	   recouping	   its	  
investment	  in	  below-­‐cost	  prices.889	  The	  District	  Court	  and	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeals,	  however,	  disagreed	  
and	   considered	   that	   predatory	   pricing	   and	   predatory	   bidding	   constituted	   practices	   materially	  
different.890	  According	  to	  those	  courts,	  to	  prove	  a	  predatory	  bidding	  claim,	  it	  is	  sufficient	  to	  show	  that	  
a	   buyer	   purchased	  more	   inputs	   than	   it	   needed,	   or	   paid	   a	   higher	   price	   than	   necessary	   in	   order	   to	  
prevent	  competitors	  from	  obtaining	  the	  input	  they	  needed	  at	  a	  fair	  price.	  Under	  that	  interpretation,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
884	  J.B.Kirkwood,	  Buyer	  power	  and	  exclusionary	  conduct	  :	  Should	  Brooke	  Group	  set	  the	  standards	  for	  buyer-­‐
induced	  price	  discrimination	  and	  predatory	  bidding	  ?,	  72	  Antitrust	  Law	  Journal	  625,	  at	  652-­‐653	  (2005).	  
Predatory	  bidding,	  which	  aims	  at	  acquiring	  monopsony	  power	  in	  the	  input	  market,	  must	  be	  distinguished	  from	  
raising	  rivals’	  costs.	  In	  the	  latter	  case,	  a	  buyer	  raises	  its	  rivals’	  costs	  by	  overbuying	  inputs	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  
market	  power	  in	  the	  downstream	  market.	  The	  objective	  of	  such	  practices	  is	  not	  so	  much	  to	  exclude	  
competitors	  as	  to	  make	  them	  sell	  at	  a	  higher	  price	  in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market	  due	  to	  their	  higher	  
purchasing	  costs.	  This	  enables	  then	  the	  overbuying	  firm	  to	  also	  charge	  higher	  prices	  in	  the	  output	  market	  and	  
to	  increase	  its	  margins,	  reducing	  as	  a	  result	  consumer	  welfare.	  On	  the	  distinction	  between	  predatory	  
overbuying	  and	  raising	  rivals’	  costs	  overbuying	  and	  the	  treatment	  that	  should	  apply	  to	  those	  practices,	  see:	  
S.C.Salop,	  Anticompetitive	  overbuying	  by	  buyer	  power,	  Georgetown	  University	  Law	  Center,	  Research	  paper	  No.	  
614513	  (2004).	  
885	  Weyerhaeuser	  Co.	  v.	  Ross-­‐Simmons	  Hardwood	  Lumber	  Co.,	  549	  U.S.	  312	  (2007)	  
886	  Pushing	  up	  input	  costs	  was	  part	  of	  Weyerhaeuser’s	  consolidation	  strategy.	  Other	  bidding	  practices	  were	  
implemented	  to	  increase	  input	  costs	  for	  competitors.	  It	  also	  used	  strategic	  acquisitions	  and	  entered	  into	  
various	  exclusive	  arrangements	  to	  lock	  up	  the	  sawlog	  market.	  See:	  M.E.Haglund,	  Weyerhaeuser’s	  aftermath:	  
increased	  vulnerability	  of	  resource-­‐based	  input	  markets	  to	  monopsony,	  53	  The	  Antitrust	  Bulletin	  411,	  at	  422-­‐
428	  (2008)	  
887	  M.E.Haglund,	  op.cit.,	  at	  432-­‐433.	  
888	  Brooke	  Group	  Ltd.	  V.	  Brown	  &	  Williamson	  Tobacco	  Corp.,	  509	  U.S.	  209	  (1993).	  
889	  Ibid.,	  at	  221-­‐222.	  
890	  Confederated	  Tribes	  of	  Siletz	  Indians	  of	  Ore.	  V.	  Weyerhaeuser	  Co.,	  411	  F.3d	  1030	  (9th	  Cir.	  2005)	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predatory	  bidding	  should	  hence	  be	  addressed	  following	  a	  loose	  profit-­‐sacrifice	  test	  rather	  than	  a	  cost	  
test.891	  
The	   Supreme	   Court	   reversed	   that	   decision	   and	   ruled	   that,	   since	   predatory	   pricing	   and	   predatory	  
bidding	  claims	  are	  analytically	  similar,	  the	  same	  legal	  standards	  should	  apply,	  namely	  the	  two-­‐prong	  
Brooke	  Group	  test.	  On	  the	  buying	  side,	  the	  test	  requires,	  first,	  that	  the	  alleged	  predatory	  bidding	  led	  
to	  below-­‐cost	  pricing	  of	  the	  predator’s	  outputs	  in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market.	  That	  is,	  the	  cost	  of	  
the	  relevant	  outputs	  must	  be	  above	  the	  revenues	  generated	  in	  the	  sale	  of	  those	  outputs	  due	  to	  the	  
high	   prices	   paid	   for	   inputs	   in	   the	   upstream	   buyer	   market.	   Second,	   a	   dangerous	   probability	   of	  
recouping	  the	  losses	  through	  the	  exercise	  of	  monopsony	  power	  must	  be	  established.	  	  
Despite	   the	   similarities	   noted	   by	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   between	   predatory	   pricing	   and	   predatory	  
bidding,	  it	  nevertheless	  maintained	  that	  the	  consequences	  of	  those	  practices	  on	  consumers	  may	  be	  
different.	   In	  predatory	  pricing	  cases,	  consumers	  are	  directly	  affected	  during	  the	  recoupment	  period	  
due	  to	  the	  higher	  prices	  imposed	  by	  the	  new	  monopolist.	  Without	  successful	  recoupment,	  however,	  
consumers	  fully	  benefit	  from	  the	  intense	  price	  competition	  period	  initiated	  by	  the	  predator.892	  This	  is	  
not	   always	  accurate	   in	   case	  of	  predatory	  bidding.	   Indeed,	   the	  Court	   asserted	   that	   failed	  predatory	  
bidding	   schemes	   can	   also,	   but	   will	   not	   necessarily,	   benefit	   consumers.	   The	   reason	   is	   that	   the	  
predator’s	  high	  bidding	  does	  not	  necessarily	  result	  in	  the	  manufacture	  of	  more	  outputs	  and	  thereby	  
lower	   prices	   for	   consumers.893	   In	   addition,	   the	   Court	   noted	   that	   successful	   predatory	   bidding	  may	  
occur	   without	   any	   effect	   on	   consumer	   prices.	   The	   predator	   may	   in	   fact	   only	   use	   its	   monopsony	  
power	   to	   recoup	   its	   losses,	   by	   forcing	   down	   input	   prices,	  without	   decreasing	   prices	   in	   the	   output	  
market.	  It	  was	  therefore	  recognized	  that	  buyer’s	  conduct	  may	  be	  held	  anticompetitive	  even	  though	  it	  
leads	  to	  no	  consumer	  harm.894	  
The	  restrictive	   liability	  standard	  of	   the	  Brooke	  Group	  test	  was	  established	   in	  order	   to	  prevent	   false	  
positives.	   With	   only	   vague	   requirements,	   aggressive	   price	   competition	   could	   indeed	   easily	   be	  
mistaken	  with	  predatory	  pricing	  schemes.	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  risk	  of	  deterring	  such	  procompetitive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
891	  Under	  a	  profit-­‐sacrifice	  test,	  a	  plaintiff	  can	  prevail	  by	  demonstrating	  that	  the	  buyer	  made	  a	  profit	  sacrifice.	  
Instead,	  under	  a	  cost	  test	  the	  plaintiff	  is	  required	  to	  establish	  that	  the	  product	  was	  sold	  at	  a	  loss	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
the	  predatory	  practice.	  See:	  S.C.Salop,	  op.cit.,	  at	  39-­‐47.	  
892	  That	  is	  why	  the	  Court	  held	  in	  Brooke	  Group	  that,	  short	  of	  successful	  recoupment,	  predatory	  pricing	  is	  not	  
prohibited	  even	  though	  the	  practice	  causes	  allocative	  inefficiency.	  Injury	  to	  competition	  was	  clearly	  equated	  to	  
consumer	  harm	  in	  that	  case.	  See:	  R.D.Blair	  &	  J.E.Lopatka,	  op.cit.,	  at	  420.	  
893	  The	  predator	  may	  indeed	  decide	  not	  to	  use	  the	  excess	  inputs	  or	  to	  destroy	  them.	  An	  increase	  in	  outputs	  
may	  also	  be	  offset	  by	  a	  decrease	  in	  outputs	  by	  market	  competitors.	  See:	  S.C.Salop,	  op.cit.,	  at	  14.	  
894	  Comments	  during	  oral	  argument	  made	  reference	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  protects	  suppliers	  against	  
anticompetitive	  conduct	  such	  as	  it	  protects	  consumers.	  However,	  the	  Court	  did	  not	  explicitly	  mentioned	  in	  its	  
decision	  that	  efficiency	  in	  input	  market	  is	  part	  of	  the	  competition	  goals.	  See:	  Transcript	  of	  Oral	  Argument,	  
Weyerhaeuser	  Co.	  v.	  Ross-­‐Simmons	  Hardwood	  Lumber	  Co.,	  549	  U.S.	  312	  (2007)	  (No.	  05-­‐381)	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price	  cutting	  which	  benefits	  consumers,	   the	  Court	   therefore	  decided	   to	   impose	  strict	  conditions	   to	  
prevail	   on	   a	   predatory	   pricing	   claim.	   The	   same	   argument	   was	   held	   in	   Weyerhaeuser.	   It	   was	  
maintained	  that:	  	  
“Given	   the	  multitude	   of	   procompetitive	   ends	   served	   by	   higher	   bidding	   for	   inputs,	   the	  
risk	  of	  chilling	  procompetitive	  behavior	  with	  too	  lax	  a	  liability	  standard	  is	  as	  serious	  here	  
as	   it	   was	   in	  Brooke	   Group.	  Consequently,	   only	   higher	   bidding	   that	   lead	   to	   below-­‐cost	  
pricing	   in	   the	   relevant	   output	  market	   will	   suffice	   as	   a	   basis	   for	   liability	   for	   predatory	  
bidding.”895	  	  
A	  lot	  of	  ink	  has	  been	  spilled	  over	  this	  decision.	  Some	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  was	  wrong	  
when	  applying	  the	  Brooke	  Group	  test	  to	  predatory	  bidding	  with	  little	  adaptation.896	  Professor	  John	  B.	  
Kirkwood	  considers	  that	  the	  claim	  should	  have	  been	  analyzed	  under	  a	  full	  rule	  of	  reason	  in	  order	  to	  
determine	  whether	  the	  practice	  was	  likely	  or	  not	  to	  reduce	  consumer	  welfare.897	  According	  to	  him,	  
the	  application	  of	  the	  test	  to	  predatory	  bidding	  conduct	  does	  not	  constitute	  a	  good	  proxy	  to	  evaluate	  
consumer	  injury.898	  Defending	  a	  consumer	  welfare	  standard,	  he	  maintains	  that	  buyer	  liability	  should	  
be	  in	  any	  case	  precluded	  when	  monopsony	  power	  is	  exercised	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  consumers	  through	  
lower	  prices,	  even	  though	  suppliers	  are	  hurt	  by	  the	  practice	  in	  question.899	  In	  contrast	  with	  Professor	  
Steven	  Salop’s	  developments	  on	  that	  issue,	  John	  B.	  Kirkwood	  considers	  that	  consumer	  injury	  may	  not	  
necessarily	  be	  significant	  to	  find	  anticompetitive	  buying	  conduct.900	  He	  seems	  to	  admit	  that	  suppliers	  
deserve	   protection	   under	   antitrust	   laws,	   unless	   buyers’	   conduct	   is	   likely	   to	   increase	   consumer	  
welfare.	  He	  maintains	  that:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
895	  Weyerhaeuser	  Co.	  v.	  Ross-­‐Simmons	  Hardwood	  Lumber	  Co.,	  549	  U.S.	  312	  (2007),	  pp.6-­‐7.	  
896	  See	  for	  examples:	  M.E.Haglund,	  op.cit.	  and	  J.B.Kirkwood,	  op.cit.	  
897	  “The	  plaintiff	  should	  establish	  four	  elements:	  First,	  that	  the	  defendant	  raised	  the	  price	  that	  its	  rivals	  had	  to	  
pay	  for	  a	  critical	  input;	  second,	  that	  this	  price	  increase	  impeded	  the	  rivals’	  ability	  to	  compete	  and	  made	  it	  likely	  
that	  the	  defendant	  would	  exercise	  monopsony	  power	  in	  the	  future;	  third,	  that	  the	  exercise	  of	  this	  power	  was	  
not	  likely	  to	  be	  undermined	  by	  new	  entrants;	  and	  finally,	  that	  this	  power	  was	  likely	  to	  cause	  adverse	  effects	  on	  
consumers	  that	  would	  outweigh	  any	  benefits	  attributable	  to	  the	  defendant’s	  behavior.”	  See:	  J.B.Kirkwood,	  
op.cit.,	  at	  661.	  Mr.	  Michael	  E.	  Haglund,	  who	  appears	  on	  behalf	  of	  Ross-­‐Simmon	  in	  the	  Weyerhaeuser	  case,	  is	  
also	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  the	  rule	  of	  reason	  balancing	  test	  would	  be	  more	  appropriate,	  especially	  when	  the	  input	  
market	  is	  inelastic,	  such	  as	  the	  sawlog	  market.	  In	  that	  situation,	  however	  much	  buyers	  pay,	  the	  same	  amount	  
of	  inputs	  are	  supplied	  and	  hence	  processed.	  Higher	  prices	  offered	  to	  suppliers	  are	  therefore	  not	  likely	  to	  lead	  
to	  higher	  outputs	  and	  lower	  prices	  for	  consumers.	  See:	  M.E.Haglund,	  op.cit.,	  at	  422.	  
898	  He	  considers	  that,	  unlike	  in	  predatory	  pricing	  cases,	  there	  is	  no	  direct	  correspondence	  between	  a	  buyer	  
profits	  and	  consumer	  losses.	  Indeed,	  higher	  prices	  for	  inputs	  do	  not	  automatically	  lead	  to	  extra	  dollars	  gained	  
by	  consumers.	  Similarly,	  during	  the	  recoupment	  period,	  lower	  prices	  may	  be	  set	  in	  the	  buying	  market	  without	  
causing	  any	  consumer	  injury.	  
899	  J.B.Kirkwood,	  op.cit.,	  at	  662.	  
900	  Steven	  Salop	  considers	  that	  both	  the	  Brooke	  Group	  test	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  reason	  should	  apply	  to	  predatory	  
bidding.	  As	  regards	  the	  latter,	  he	  rejects	  to	  apply	  only	  a	  “minimal”	  consumer	  harm	  standard.	  Because	  
consumers	  may	  benefit	  during	  the	  predatory	  period,	  a	  non-­‐insignificant	  harm	  must	  be	  established	  to	  condemn	  
a	  buyer’s	  conduct.	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“When	  an	  upstream	  monopsonist	  has	  no	  significant	  power	  in	  the	  downstream	  product	  
market,	   its	   acquisition	   of	   monopsony	   power	   through	   predatory	   bidding	  may	   have	   no	  
significant	   effects	   on	   downstream	   consumers.	   That	   however	   should	   not	   absolve	   the	  
defendant.”901	  	  
Commissioner	  J.	  Thomas	  Rosch	  is,	  however,	  not	  of	  that	  opinion.	  He	  also	  rejects	  the	  application	  of	  the	  
Brooke	  Group	   test	  but,	   in	  addition,	   considers	   that	  where	   the	  defendant	   lacks	  market	  power	   in	   the	  
output	  market,	  such	  as	  in	  Weyerhaeuser,	  predatory	  bidding	  claims	  should	  automatically	  be	  rejected	  
since,	  in	  such	  circumstances,	  the	  exercise	  of	  monopsony	  is	  unlikely	  to	  harm	  consumers.902	  According	  
to	   him,	   unlike	   predatory	   conduct	   on	   the	   selling	   side,	   predatory	   bidding	   is	   not	   detrimental	   to	  
consumers	   and	  may	   in	   fact	   benefit	   them,	  be	   it	   during	   the	  predation	  period	  or	   the	  harvest	   period.	  
Competition	  in	  the	  output	  market	  indeed	  dissuades	  the	  firm	  from	  increasing	  output	  prices	  during	  the	  
first	  period	  and,	  once	  monopsony	  is	  acquired,	  induces	  it	  to	  pass	  on	  the	  lower	  prices	  	  obtained	  in	  the	  
input	   market	   to	   consumers.903	   Considering	   that	   antitrust	   law	   is	   confined	   to	   the	   protection	   of	  
consumers	  confronted	  by	  the	  exercise	  of	  seller	  market	  power,	  he	  holds	  that	  exclusionary	  conduct	  in	  
the	  input	  market	  is	  only	  likely	  to	  raise	  anticompetitive	  concerns	  when	  it	  is	  used	  to	  create	  or	  maintain	  
market	  power	  in	  the	  output	  market.904	  
Other	   criticisms	   have	   been	   put	   forward	   concerning	   the	   first	   prong	   of	   the	  Brooke	   Group	   standard,	  
namely	   the	   price-­‐cost	   test	   which	   requires	   that	   the	   predatory	   bidding	   scheme	   leads	   to	   below-­‐cost	  
pricing	  in	  the	  output	  market.	  In	  fact,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  drew	  on	  the	  price-­‐cost	  test	  from	  that	  applied	  
to	   predatory	   pricing	  without	   any	   adaptation.	   However,	   the	   comparison	   between	   the	   cost	   and	   the	  
output	   price	   is	  much	   less	   evident	   in	   a	   situation	   of	   predatory	   bidding.	   Indeed,	   as	   Professors	   Roger	  
D.Blair	  and	  John	  E.	  Lopatka	  rightly	  highlighted,	  	  
“In	   a	   predatory	   pricing	   case,	   the	   relevant	   comparison	   is	   between	   the	   allegedly	  
exclusionary	   price	   charged	   for	   a	   good	   and	   the	   cost	   of	   that	   good.	   By	   contrast,	   in	   a	  
predatory	   bidding	   case,	   the	   comparison	   is	   between	   the	   price	   charged	   for	   some	   good	  
other	  than	  the	  one	  whose	  price	  is	  allegedly	  exclusionary	  and	  its	  costs.”905	  	  
There	   is	   therefore	   a	   lack	   of	   symmetry	  which	  would	   require	   a	   different	  metric	   to	   assess	   predatory	  
bidding.	  It	  results	  yet	  from	  the	  Weyerhaeuser’s	  rule	  that	  buyers	  have	  more	  leeway	  than	  sellers	  have	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
901	  J.B.Kirkwood,	  op.cit.	  at	  664.	  
902	  See:	  J.T.Rosch,	  Monopsony	  and	  the	  meaning	  of	  “consumer	  welfare”:	  A	  closer	  look	  at	  Weyerhaeuser,	  2007	  
Columbia	  Business	  Law	  Review	  353	  (2007)	  
903	  Ibid.,	  at	  366.	  
904	  J.T.Rosch,	  op.cit.,	  at	  368-­‐369.	  
905	  R.D.Blair	  &	  J.E.Lopatka,	  op.cit.,	  at	  416.	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in	   the	  downstream	  market	   to	   increase	   their	  market	  power	   in	   the	  upstream	  buyer	  market	   through	  
their	  pricing	  policy.	  They	  can	  indeed	  acquire	  monopsony	  power	  without	  necessarily	  selling	  at	  a	  loss	  in	  
the	  downstream	   seller	  market.906	   For	   example,	   the	  buyer	   could	  decide	  not	   to	  use	   all	   the	   inputs	   in	  
order	  to	  limit	  the	  amount	  of	  outputs	  and	  keep	  prices	  high	  in	  the	  downstream	  market.	  Such	  conduct	  
would	  enable	  the	  predator	  to	  harm	  rival	  buyers	   in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market	  by	  bidding	  up	   input	  
prices	  but	  would	  nevertheless	  not	  prevent	  it	  from	  selling	  the	  end	  product	  for	  a	  profit.	  The	  first	  prong	  
of	  the	  test	  would,	  as	  a	  result,	  not	  be	  fulfilled	  and	  the	  practice	  not	  condemned	  by	  the	  courts.907	  One	  
can	  also	  mention	  the	  case	  of	  a	  partially	  vertically	  integrated	  buyer	  which	  only	  buys	  a	  small	  amount	  of	  
its	   needed	   inputs	   on	   the	  markets.	   In	   that	   situation,	   bidding	   up	   the	   prices	  would	   not	   push	   up	   the	  
predator’s	  costs	  to	  the	  same	  extent	  as	  its	  competitors’	  costs.	  Applying	  another	  standard	  in	  predatory	  
bidding	   cases	  might	   therefore	  be	  more	   suitable	  not	   to	   leave	   intended	  exclusionary	   conduct	   in	   the	  
input	  market	  unpunished.908	  
Where	  the	  Brooke	  Group	  test	  probably	  constitutes	  a	  too	  extensive	  safe	  harbor	  rule	  to	  tackle	  buyers’	  
predatory	  conduct,	  it	  remains	  that	  the	  Weyerhaeuser	  case	  contains	  important	  statements	  as	  regards	  
the	  treatment	  of	  buyer	  power.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  Court	  recognized	  that	  practices	  on	  the	  buying	  
side	   may	   lead	   to	   anticompetitive	   outcomes	   and	   must	   therefore	   be	   treated	   as	   strictly	   as	   selling	  
practices.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  by	  stating	  that	  successful	  predatory	  bidding	  does	  not	  necessarily	  harm	  
consumers,	   the	   Court	   considered	   that	   anticompetitive	   injury	   does	   not	   equate	   to	   consumer	   injury.	  
The	  Sherman	  Act	  may	  hence	  be	  enforced	  to	  protect	  competitive	  pricing	   for	   input	  suppliers	  despite	  
no	   consumer	   injury	   being	   established.	   For	   example,	   lacking	   sufficient	  market	   power	   in	   the	   output	  
market,	   a	   buyer	   is	   unlikely	   to	   affect	   directly	   consumers.	   Yet,	   this	   is	   not	   an	   argument	   to	   avoid	   the	  
application	   of	   the	   antitrust	   laws.	   In	   case	   of	   predatory	   bidding,	   and	  more	   generally	   in	   case	   of	   any	  
alleged	  anticompetitive	  buyer’s	  conduct,	  the	  resulting	  distortions	  on	  competition	  should	  raise	  similar	  
antitrust	  concerns	  as	  sellers’	  practices	  do.	  According	  to	  some	  scholars,	  such	  interpretation	  would	  be	  
totally	   consistent	   with	   the	   legislative	   history	   and	   the	   terms	   of	   the	   Sherman	   Act	   which	   aim	   at	  
preventing	  any	  restraint	  of	  trade	  whoever	  are	  the	  perpetrators,	  be	  it	  buyers	  or	  sellers.909	  They	  argue	  
that	  the	  Congress	   intended	  to	  condemn	  trusts	  not	  only	  for	  raising	  prices	  to	  consumers	  but	  also	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
906	  M.E.Haglund,	  op.cit.,	  at	  451-­‐452.	  
907	  R.D.Blair	  &	  J.E.Lopatka,	  op.cit.,	  at	  449.	  
908	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  corroborated	  by	  the	  Weyerhaeuser’s	  conduct	  and	  the	  resulting	  positive	  effects	  on	  the	  
relevant	  markets	  after	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  District	  Court	  confirmed	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeals.	  The	  firm	  indeed	  
abandoned	  its	  bidding	  practices	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  competitive	  situation	  in	  the	  input	  market	  improved	  
significantly.	  The	  antitrust	  litigation	  helped	  restore	  competition	  in	  those	  markets.	  However,	  after	  the	  Supreme	  
Court’s	  decision,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  Weyerhaeuser	  will	  yield	  to	  its	  prior	  practices.	  See:	  M.E.Haglund,	  op.cit.,	  at	  434-­‐
435.	  
909	  See	  for	  examples:	  W.S.Grimes,	  Buyer	  power	  and	  retail	  gatekeeper	  power:	  Protecting	  competition	  and	  the	  
atomistic	  seller,	  72	  Antitrust	  Law	  Journal	  563	  (2005)	  and	  G.J.Werden,	  Monopsony	  and	  the	  Sherman	  Act:	  
Consumer	  Welfare	  in	  a	  New	  Light,	  74	  Antitrust	  Law	  Journal	  707	  (2007)	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reducing	   prices	   paid	   to	   farmers.910	   During	   the	   debates	   on	   the	   Sherman	   Act,	   Senators	   and	  
Congressmen	   underlined	   the	   harmful	   effects	   that	   powerful	   buyers	   were	   causing	   to	   farmers.	   They	  
pointed	  out	  that	  the	  former	  were	  robbing	  producers	  of	  their	  hard-­‐earned	  money	  by	  forcing	  them	  to	  
sell	   at	   an	   enormous	   sacrifice,	   at	   starvation	   prices.911	   Consequently,	   it	   may	   be	   assumed	   that	   the	  
Sherman	   Act	   is	   not	   only	   concerned	   with	   restriction	   in	   the	   downstream	   seller	   market	   but	   rather	  
extends	   its	  protection	   to	  all	  market	  participants	  who	  are	  made	  victims	  of	  anticompetitive	  conduct.	  
Even	   though	   consumer	  welfare	   remains	   the	   ultimate	   aim	   of	   competition	   law,	   the	   achievement	   of	  
that	   objective	   could	   be	   impeded	   by	   a	   broader	   range	   of	   practices,	   not	   limited	   to	   the	   increase	   of	  
consumer	   prices	   or	   the	   reduction	   of	   output	   quantity.	   However,	   US	   courts	   have	   never	   effectively	  
applied	   such	   an	   approach	   in	   antitrust	   cases.	   Focusing	   on	   prices	   and	   quantities	   in	   the	   downstream	  
market,	   they	  generally	  consider	   that	  end-­‐users	  are	  better	  off	  only	   through	   lower	  prices.	  Any	  buyer	  
practice	  restricting	  competition	  in	  the	  upstream	  market	  but	  resulting	  in	  (short-­‐term)	  lower	  prices	  in	  
the	  retail	  market	  is	  therefore	  very	  likely	  to	  be	  characterized	  as	  procompetitive.	  	  
Besides	   Section	   1	   and	   Section	   2	   of	   the	   Sherman	   Act,	   the	   enforcement	   of	   two	   other	   pieces	   of	  
legislation	  mentioned	  above	   is	  worth	   looking	  at,	  namely	  the	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act	  and	  the	  Packers	  
and	  Stockyards	  Act.	  
3. Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act	  (Section	  2	  of	  the	  Clayton	  Act)	  
Section	  2	  of	  the	  Clayton	  Act	  requires	  that	  suppliers	  sell	  to	  everyone	  at	  the	  same	  price	  and	  prevents	  
buyers	  from	  inducing	  lower	  prices	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  rivals.	  Enacted	  to	  establish	  a	  competitive	  level	  
playing	   field	   for	   the	   purchase	   of	   commodities,	   the	   Robinson-­‐Patman	   Act	   have	   entailed	   adverse	  
consequences	   on	   the	  markets	   and	   failed	   to	   reach	   the	   intended	   targets,	   namely	   large	   retail	   chains	  
holding	  significant	  buyer	  power.	  One	  of	  the	  reasons	  of	  that	  failure	  is	  the	  particular	  meaning	  given	  by	  
the	  U.S.	  courts	   to	  the	  notion	  of	  competition	   injury	   in	  cases	   involving	  secondary	   line	  discrimination.	  
Departing	   from	   the	   tradition	   meaning	   given	   to	   that	   notion,	   competition	   enforcers	   have,	   in	   some	  
cases,	   favored	   protection	   of	   smaller	   buyers	   over	   protection	   of	   competition	   and,	   consequently,	  
deprived	  consumers	  of	  the	  benefits	  resulting	  from	  supply	  chain	  efficiencies	  gained	  by	  large	  retailers.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
910	  G.J.Werden,	  Monopsony	  and	  the	  Sherman	  Act…,	  op.cit.,	  at	  713-­‐714.	  
911	  See:	  Statement	  of	  Rep.	  John	  T.	  Heard	  and	  Statement	  of	  Sen.	  William	  M.	  Stewart,	  21	  Cong.	  Rec.	  2461	  (1890).	  
See	  also	  statement	  of	  Sen.	  John	  Sherman,	  21	  Cong.	  Rec.	  2461	  (1890):	  “These	  trusts	  combinations	  are	  great	  
wrongs	  to	  the	  people.	  They	  have	  invaded	  many	  of	  the	  most	  important	  branches	  of	  business.	  They	  operate	  as	  a	  
double-­‐edged	  sword.	  They	  increase	  beyond	  reason	  the	  cost	  of	  necessaries	  of	  life	  and	  business,	  and	  they	  
decrease	  the	  cost	  of	  raw	  material,	  the	  farm	  products	  of	  the	  country.	  They	  regulate	  at	  will,	  depress	  the	  price	  of	  
what	  they	  buy	  and	  increase	  the	  price	  of	  what	  they	  sell.”	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a) Primary	  line	  discrimination	  
Primary	  line	  discrimination	  arises	  when	  a	  seller	  decides	  to	  lower	  its	  prices	  in	  a	  particular	  area	  in	  order	  
to	   attract	   more	   business	   and	   exclude	   competitors	   from	   that	   market.	   Such	   discriminatory	   pricing	  
policy	   is	   likely	   to	   cause	   injury	   to	   competition	   between	   the	   discriminating	   seller	   and	   its	   rivals.	   For	  
three	  decades	  following	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act,	   injury	  to	  competition	   in	  those	  
cases	  was	   equated	   to	   harm	   to	   competitors.912	   	   Because	   selling	   at	   lower	   prices	  was	   likely	   to	   injure	  
competitors	  by	  taking	  business	  away	  from	  them,	  the	  U.S.	  courts	  considered	  that	  the	  mere	  proof	  of	  a	  
difference	   in	   prices	   was	   sufficient	   to	   raise	   a	   presumption	   of	   violation	   of	   the	   Act.	   To	   antitrust	  
observers,	   that	   interpretation	   limited	   to	   a	   great	   extent	   competitive	   activities	   which	   include,	   by	  
definition,	   attempts	   to	   take	   business	   away	   from	   rivals	   by	   offering	   lower	   prices	   or	   higher	   quality	  
products.913	  Condemning	  price	  competition	  was	  hence	  totally	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  type	  of	  behavior	  
the	   Sherman	  Act	   seeks	   to	   foster,	   especially	  when	   price	   reductions	   resulting	   from	   scale	   economies	  
were	  found	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act.914	  
It	   is	   only	   since	   1993	   that	   a	   new	   interpretation	   has	   been	   put	   forward	   by	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   in	   its	  
Brooke-­‐Group	   decision.915	   That	   change	   in	   the	   construction	   of	   the	   Act	   reflected	   a	   new	   general	  
understanding	  of	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  antitrust	  laws	  which	  emerged	  in	  the	  1970s.	  The	  focus	  was	  no	  
longer	  upon	  fairness	  or	  rivalry	  for	  its	  own	  sake	  but	  rather	  upon	  efficiency.916	  Thereby,	  the	  Court	  ruled	  
that	   primary-­‐line	   injury	   requires	   proof	   of	   predatory	   pricing.917	   This	   hence	   implies	   that	   the	   plaintiff	  
must	  prove	  that	   (1)	   the	  seller’s	  prices	  were	  below	  an	  appropriate	  measure	  of	   its	  costs	  and	  that	   (2)	  
the	  seller	  has	  a	  reasonable	  prospect	  of	  recouping	  its	   investment	  in	  below-­‐cost	  prices.918	  Under	  that	  
new	   interpretation,	   the	  diversion	  of	   business	   from	   rival	   sellers	   is	   no	   longer	   equivalent	   to	   injury	   to	  
competition.	   Instead,	   it	  must	  be	  established	  that	  price	  discrimination	   is	  profitable	   in	  the	  sense	  that	  
the	  subsequent	  monopoly	  profits	  extracted	  by	  the	  seller	  are	  likely	  to	  exceed	  the	  costs	  of	  driving	  rivals	  
out	  of	  business.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
912	  See	  for	  examples	  :	  Samuel	  H.	  Moss,	  Inc.,	  v.	  FTC,	  148	  F.2d	  378	  (2d	  Cir.),	  cert.	  denied,	  326	  U.S.	  736	  (1945);	  FTC	  
v.	  Anheuser-­‐Busch,	  Inc.,	  363	  U.S.	  536	  (1960),	  Utah	  Pie	  Co.	  v.	  Continental	  Baking	  Co.,	  386	  U.S.	  685	  (1967);	  Baking	  
Corp.	  v.	  Old	  Homestead	  Bread	  Co.,	  476	  F.2d	  97	  (10th	  Cir.)	  (1973).	  
913	  D.J.Gifford	  &	  R.T.Kudrle,	  op.cit.,	  at	  23.	  See	  also:	  D.Gifford,	  Farewell	  to	  the	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act?	  The	  
Antitrust	  Modernization	  Commission’s	  report	  and	  recommendation,	  53	  The	  Antitrust	  Bulletin	  481,	  at	  510	  
(2008).	  
914	  See	  :	  Utah	  Pie	  Co.	  v.	  Continental	  Baking	  Co.,	  386	  U.S.	  685	  (1967).	  
915	  Brooke	  Group	  Ltd.	  v.	  Brown	  &	  Williamson	  Tobacco	  Corp.,	  509	  U.S.	  209	  (1993).	  
916	  That	  new	  antitrust	  economic	  theory	  is	  called	  the	  «	  Chicago	  School	  »	  and	  was	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  shortcomings	  
of	  another	  antitrust	  doctrine,	  namely	  the	  “Harvard	  School”	  which	  was	  deemed	  to	  overprotect	  individual	  
competitors	  against	  market	  power	  of	  large	  firms.	  See	  on	  that	  matter:	  T.A.Piraino,	  Reconciling	  the	  Harvard	  and	  
Chicago	  Schools:	  A	  New	  Antitrust	  Approach	  for	  the	  21st	  Century,	  82	  Indiana	  law	  Journal	  345	  (2007).	  
917	  In	  cases	  of	  predatory	  pricing,	  the	  seller	  imposes	  uniform	  price	  cuts.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  predatory	  price	  
discrimination	  consists	  in	  selective	  price	  cuts	  resulting	  in	  different	  prices	  for	  the	  same	  product	  in	  separate	  
areas.	  
918	  Brooke	  Group	  Ltd.,	  op.cit.,	  at	  222-­‐224	  (1993).	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This	   new	  approach	   to	   the	   interpretation	  of	   the	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act	   seems	  better	   constructed	   to	  
avoid	   anticompetitive	   outcomes	   and	   ensure	   a	   consistent	   enforcement	   of	   the	   antitrust	   rules.	   It	  
remains	  yet	  that	  the	  meaning	  given	  to	  competition	  injury	  in	  second-­‐line	  discrimination	  cases	  is	  still	  in	  
contradiction	  with	  the	  need	  to	  ensure	  an	  effective	  competitive	  environment.	  
b) Secondary	  line	  discrimination	  
Secondary	   line	   injury	   considers	   the	   effect	   of	   a	   discriminatory	   price	   given	   by	   a	   seller	   to	   a	   favored	  
customer	   on	   the	   latter’s	   competitors.	   Early	   in	   the	   history	   of	   the	   Act	   and	   since	   then,	   courts	   have	  
inferred	   harm	   to	   competition	   within	   the	   meaning	   of	   the	   Act	   from	   price	   differentials	   among	  
competing	  customers.919	  Such	  presumption	   is	  however	  rebuttable.	  The	  defendant	  may	  for	  example	  
break	   the	   causal	   connection	   between	   the	   discriminatory	   price	   and	   the	   loss	   of	   sales	   or	   profits	   by	  
proving	  that	  the	  disfavored	  competitors	  have	  in	  fact	  increased	  their	  profits920	  or	  that	  the	  differential	  
price	  constituted	  a	  “new	  customer	  discount”.921	  
The	  unwillingness	  of	  U.S.	  courts	  to	  shift	  to	  the	  commonly-­‐used	  ‘injury	  to	  competition’	  standard	  -­‐	  as	  
the	   Supreme	   Court	   did	   as	   regards	   primary	   line	   discrimination	   -­‐,	   is	   probably	   due	   to	   the	   underlying	  
purpose	   of	   the	   Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act	  which	  was	   to	   protect	   buyer-­‐level	   competition.	  However,	   the	  
presumption	  of	  unlawfulness	  deriving	  from	  a	  price	  differential	  seems	  to	  go	  far	  beyond	  the	  objective	  
of	  protecting	  small	  buyers	  against	  large	  chain	  stores’	  buying	  power.	  Courts	  indeed	  consider	  that	  the	  
Act	   is	   of	   general	   applicability	   and	   hence	   prohibits	   any	   discrimination,	   regardless	   of	   whether	   the	  
discount	   has	   been	   granted	   to	   or	   extracted	   by	   a	   powerful	   buyer.922	   Already	   incompatible	  with	   the	  
consumer-­‐welfare	  and	  efficiency	  objectives	  of	   the	  antitrust	   legislation,	   the	  enforcement	  of	   the	  Act	  
seems,	   as	   a	   result,	   also	   to	  miss	   the	   goals	   of	   fairness	   intended	  by	   the	  Congress	   by	   immunizing	   any	  
market	  participant,	  big	  or	  small,	  from	  the	  vagaries	  of	  price	  competition.	  
c) Unsatisfactory	  result	  
Although	  the	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act	  was	  meant	  to	  address	  an	  important	  competitive	  concern,	  namely	  
the	  exercise	  of	  significant	  buyer	  power	  and	  its	  effects	  within	  the	  supply	  chain,	  it	  does	  not	  constitute	  
an	  adequate	  tool	  to	  effectively	  achieve	  that	  objective.	  Different	  elements	  reveal	  that	  the	  Act	  fails	  to	  
curb	   retail	   chains’	   market	   power	   and,	   in	   addition,	   entails	   anticompetitive	   effects	   by	   harming	  
consumers.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
919	  See:	  FTC	  v.	  Morton	  Salt	  Co.,	  334	  U.S.	  37	  (1948)	  and	  Texaco	  Inc.	  v.	  Hasbrouck,	  496	  U.S.	  543	  (1990).	  In	  order	  to	  
establish	  the	  prima	  face	  case,	  the	  plaintiff	  has	  merely	  to	  prove	  either	  lost	  sales	  or	  profits	  or	  a	  substantial	  price	  
differential	  over	  time.	  	  
920	  Boise	  Cascade	  Corp.	  v.	  FTC,	  837	  F.2d	  1127	  (D.C.Cir.	  1988)	  
921	  Motive	  Parts	  Warehouse	  v.	  Facet	  Enters,	  774	  F.2d	  380	  (10th	  Cir.	  1985).	  
922	  Falls	  City	  Industries,	  Inc.	  V.	  Vanco	  Beverage,	  Inc.,	  460	  U.S.	  428	  (1983).	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Firstly,	   the	   Act	   has	   been	   criticized	   for	   discouraging	   sellers	   from	   granting	   non-­‐cost	   but	   also	   cost-­‐
justified	  concessions	  to	  large	  buyers.	   Indeed,	  the	  difficulty	   in	   invoking	  the	  justifications	  provided	  by	  
the	  Act	   leads	   suppliers	   to	   imposing	   a	   uniform	  price	   to	   all	   their	   customers.	   As	   a	   result,	   such	   price-­‐
rigidifying	  effect	  deprives	  consumers	  of	  the	  benefits	  generated	  by	  a	  higher	  efficiency	  of	   large	  chain	  
stores.	   By	   integrating	   the	   wholesaling	   and	   retail	   functions	   and	   by	   purchasing	   directly	   from	  
manufacturers	   without	   resorting	   to	   brokerage	   services,	   those	   large	   customers	   are	   indeed	   able	   to	  
save	  some	  expenses	  which	  may	  be	  passed	  on	  to	  consumers	  through	  lower	  prices.923	  If	  a	  preferential	  
price	   that	   is	  not	   cost-­‐justified	  may	   in	   some	  cases	  pose	  a	   threat	   to	  consumer	  welfare,	   cost-­‐justified	  
discounts	  are	  more	   likely	   to	  benefit	  consumers.924	  The	   inference	  of	  competition	  harm	  from	  a	  mere	  
price	  differential	  results	  in	  fact	  in	  confiscating	  the	  benefits	  offered	  by	  the	  development	  of	  large	  retail	  
chains	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  consumers.	  
Secondly,	   the	   protection	   of	   small	   business	   firms	   for	   its	   own	   sake	   is	   at	   odds	   with	   the	   currently	  
prevailing	  goals	  of	  competition	  law.	  Even	  though	  the	  precise	  determination	  of	  those	  objectives	  is	  still	  
subject	  to	  controversy	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  protection	  of	  weaker	  players	  on	  the	  markets	  is	  not	  a	  
source	   of	   concern	   either	   under	   the	   efficiency	   theory	   or	   under	   the	   consumer	  welfare	   doctrine.	   By	  
preventing	   pricing	   flexibility,	   courts	   impede	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   competitive	   process.925	   The	   focus	  
upon	  the	  welfare	  of	  individual	  rivals	  is	  hence	  likely	  to	  reduce	  the	  intensity	  of	  competition.	  Instead	  of	  
protecting	   competition	   as	   the	   other	   antitrust	   rules	   do,	   the	   Robinson-­‐Patman	   Act	   rather	   insulates	  
competitors	   from	   the	   rigor	   and	   beneficial	   fierceness	   of	   competition.926	   In	   addition,	   the	   different	  
meaning	   given	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   competition	   injury	   under	   the	   Act	   is	   likely	   to	   give	   rise	   to	  
inconsistencies	  in	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  antitrust	  rules.	  Indeed,	  proof	  of	  a	  price	  differential	  or	  other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
923	  D.Gifford,	  op.cit.,	  at	  495.	  
924	  J.B.Kirkwood,	  op.cit.,	  at	  646-­‐651.	  According	  to	  M.Kirkwood,	  the	  impact	  on	  consumers	  resulting	  from	  non-­‐
cost-­‐justified	  discrimination	  may	  be	  either	  positive	  or	  negative.	  It	  would	  be	  positive	  if	  a	  buyer	  induces	  a	  
discriminatory	  price	  from	  oligopolistic	  sellers	  and	  that	  the	  concession	  spreads	  to	  other	  buyers	  causing	  the	  
oligopolistic	  structure	  to	  collapse.	  Even	  if	  the	  price	  discount	  is	  not	  granted	  to	  smaller	  buyers,	  the	  impact	  on	  
consumers	  may	  still	  be	  positive	  if	  the	  concessions	  are	  passed	  on	  to	  them	  due	  to	  competition	  forces	  in	  the	  retail	  
market	  forcing	  retailers	  to	  keep	  low	  prices.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  non-­‐cost-­‐justified	  discrimination	  may	  have	  
negative	  effects	  in	  at	  least	  five	  situations.	  Frist,	  favored	  buyers	  may	  be	  able	  to	  take	  business	  from	  their	  
competitors	  and	  thereby	  reduce	  the	  number	  of	  players	  on	  the	  market	  leaving	  consumers	  with	  a	  restricted	  
array	  of	  options.	  Second,	  a	  favored	  buyer	  may	  use	  that	  competitive	  advantage	  to	  gain	  market	  power	  as	  a	  seller.	  
The	  strong	  position	  acquired	  in	  the	  selling	  market	  would	  then	  allow	  him	  to	  raise	  prices	  to	  consumers.	  Third,	  a	  
buyer	  may	  use	  its	  power	  not	  to	  lower	  its	  own	  purchasing	  prices	  but	  to	  induce	  sellers	  to	  discriminate	  by	  raising	  
prices	  to	  competitors.	  By	  raising	  its	  rivals’	  costs,	  the	  buyer	  will	  be	  able	  to	  increase	  its	  prices	  in	  the	  downstream	  
markets.	  Fourth,	  since	  favored	  buyers	  are	  conferred	  a	  competitive	  advantage	  through	  the	  price	  concession,	  
they	  may	  become	  less	  efficient	  and	  less	  innovative	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  “use	  concessions	  to	  cushion	  their	  own	  
sluggishness”.	  Fifth,	  unjustified	  discrimination	  may	  reduce	  the	  supplier’s	  profit	  margin	  and	  thereby	  reduce	  its	  
incentive	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  industry.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  product	  diversity	  or	  quality	  offered	  to	  consumers	  may	  be	  
affected.	  
925	  D.Gifford,	  op.cit.,	  at	  491.	  
926	  Ibid.,	  at	  499.	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concession	  obtained	  by	  a	  buyer	  is	  sufficient	  to	  infer	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  unlawful	  discrimination	  under	  
the	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act.	  In	  contrast,	  if	  a	  sufficiently	  powerful	  buyer	  uses	  its	  bargaining	  strength,	  for	  
example,	  to	  forbid	  a	  manufacturer	  to	  sell	  to	  rivals	  with	  the	  intent	  to	  drive	  the	  latter	  out	  of	  business,	  
the	   plaintiff	   will	   have	   the	   difficult	   task	   to	   prove	   that	   such	   conduct	   is	   likely	   to	   harm	   competition.	  
Where	  the	  second	  practice	  seems	  more	  reprehensible,	  in	  practice,	  it	  is	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  condemned.	  
Thirdly,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act	  was	  dominated	  by	  concerns	  
about	  the	  power	  of	  large	  buyers	  who	  were	  able	  to	  exacted	  discriminatory	  concessions,	  the	  resulting	  
statute	  is	  primarily	  directed	  at	  sellers.927	   Indeed,	  even	  though	  discrimination	  is	  often	  the	  result	  of	  a	  
buyer	  exploiting	   its	  market	  power,	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Act	  focus	  on	  the	  price	  discriminator	  rather	  
than	  on	  the	  firm	  benefiting	  from	  the	  price	  differential.	  This	  is	  nonsensical	  since,	  besides	  harming	  rival	  
buyers,	  price	  discrimination	  may	  also	   cause	   injury	   to	   suppliers	   forced	   to	   submit	   to	   the	  pressure	  of	  
powerful	  customers	  and	  to	  forego	  sometimes	  essential	  profits	  to	  the	  development	  or	  survival	  of	  their	  
business.	   Direct	   victims	   of	   the	   use	   of	   buyer	   power	   in	  most	   cases,	   sellers	   remain	   nevertheless	   the	  
main	  and	  easier	  target	  of	  the	  Act	  and	  can	  even	  not	  invoke	  the	  buyer’s	  inducement	  as	  a	  defense	  for	  
discriminatory	  prices.	  The	  derivative	  nature	  of	  the	  buyer	  liability	  would	  indeed	  imply	  condemning	  the	  
seller	  as	  well.	  	  
Probably	  because	  of	  those	  adverse	  effects,	   the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  Act	  by	  the	  federal	  agencies	  has	  
declined	   substantially	   for	   a	   couple	  of	  decades.	  Consequently,	  price	  discrimination	  has	  been	  mainly	  
subject	   to	   private	   treble	   damage	   action	   in	   the	   recent	   years.928	   Leaving	   the	   enforcement	   of	   the	  
Statute	   to	   private	   suits	   is	   however	   likely	   to	   intensify	   pressure	   against	   the	   wrong	   target,	   namely	  
sellers.	   It	   is	   indeed	   much	   easier	   to	   establish	   the	   seller	   liability,	   inferred	   itself	   form	   the	   price	  
differential,	   than	   to	   prove	   the	   buyer’s	   knowledge	   of	   the	   illegal	   price.	   Furthermore,	   as	   regards	   the	  
other	   types	   of	   discrimination	   related	   to	   services,	   allowances	   or	   other	   compensation,	   the	   buyer	  
liability	   is	   likely	  to	  be	  examined	  under	  Section	  5	  of	  the	  FTC	  Act	  which	  cannot	   lead	  to	  private	  treble	  
damage	   remedy.	   Without	   the	   intervention	   of	   the	   federal	   enforcement	   authorities,	   buyers	   are	  
therefore	  allowed	  to	  use	  their	  buying	  power	   in	  order	  to	  extract	  various	  advantages,	  with	  complete	  
impunity	  under	  the	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act.929	  	  
Despite	  the	  criticisms,	  the	  Statute	  has	  not	  been	  repealed.	  The	  adverse	  effects	  mentioned	  above	  are	  
therefore	  likely	  to	  be	  continuing	  and	  the	  use	  of	  buyer	  power	  to	  remain	  not	  properly	  addressed.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
927	  D.E.Ray,	  Buyer	  liability	  under	  Section	  2	  (f)	  of	  the	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act,	  15	  University	  of	  Richmond	  Law	  
Review	  547,	  at	  555	  (1981).	  
928	  E.Gellhorn	  &	  W.E.Kovacic,	  op.cit.,	  at	  434.	  
929	  Action	  might	  be	  brought	  under	  Section	  2	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  but,	  in	  practice,	  the	  stricter	  conditions	  required	  
to	  prove	  monopolization	  or	  attempt	  to	  monopolize	  make	  the	  enforcement	  of	  that	  provision	  difficult	  against	  the	  
exercise	  of	  buyer	  power.	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4. Packers	  and	  Stockyards	  Act	  (PSA)	  
Like	  the	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act,	  the	  specialized	  rules	  enacted	  to	  address	  anticompetitive	  concerns	  in	  
the	   agricultural	   sector	   have	   resulted	   in	   unsatisfactory	   enforcement.	   Most	   practices	   the	   Congress	  
intended	   to	   tackle	  when	  enacting	   the	  PSA	  have	   indeed	   remained	  unpunished	  due,	   in	  particular,	   to	  
the	   interpretation	   given	   by	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   U.S.	   Courts	   to	   the	   Act.	   While	   the	   United	   States	  
Department	   of	  Agriculture	   is	   of	   the	  opinion	   that	   the	   PSA	  encompasses	  more	   than	   anticompetitive	  
conduct,	   judicial	  authorities	  do	  not	  generally	  defer	  to	  that	   interpretation	  of	  the	  Statute	  but	   instead	  
subject	   any	   violation	   to	   the	   proof	   of	   competition	   injury.	   All	   federal	   appellate	   courts	   that	   have	  
addressed	   that	   issue	   have	   indeed	   held	   that	   the	   PSA	   is	   essentially	   an	   antitrust	   statute	   and	   as	   such	  
requires	  the	  plaintiff	  to	  establish	  an	  adverse	  effect	  on	  competition	  to	  sustain	  a	  cause	  of	  action.930	  The	  
two	  following	  cases	  illustrate	  the	  Circuit	  Courts’	  position	  and	  show	  how	  strict	   is	  the	  requirement	  of	  
competition	  injury.	  
The	   first	   case	   concerns	   an	   alleged	   unlawful	   market-­‐price	   manipulation	   carried	   out	   by	   Tyson,	   the	  
largest	  meatpacking	  company	   in	  the	  United	  States.931	  Picket,	   the	  owner	  of	  a	  cattle-­‐producing	  farm,	  
contended	  that	  the	  processor	  in	  question	  had	  used	  marketing	  agreements	  to	  deflate	  the	  price	  of	  fed	  
cattle	   on	   the	   cash	  market	   and	   that	   the	   use	   of	   such	   a	   strategy	   to	   obtain	   lower	   prices	   constituted	  
unfair	  practice	  and	  price	  manipulation	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  PSA.	  The	  district	  court	  sustained	  the	  claim	  
and	  found	  that	  Tyson’s	  use	  of	  marketing	  agreements	  had	  an	  adverse	  effect	  on	  competition	  and	  that	  
no	  legitimate	  business	  reason	  had	  been	  established	  to	  justify	  the	  use	  of	  such	  agreements.	  The	  verdict	  
was	  however	  set	  aside	  by	  the	  Circuit	  Court	  which	  considered,	  in	  contrast,	  that	  Tyson	  had	  competitive	  
justification	   for	  using	  marketing	   agreements.	   It	  was	   restated	   that	  unfairness	  or	  price	  manipulation	  
claim	   requires	   a	   plaintiff	   to	   show	   harm	   to	   competition.	   Although	   the	   Court	   recognized	   that	   the	  
agreements	   had	   resulted	   in	   lower	   prices	   for	   cattle	   both	   on	   the	   cash	  market	   and	   the	  market	   as	   a	  
whole,	   it	  nevertheless	  maintained	  that	  the	  PSA	  had	  not	  been	  violated	  as	  at	   least	  three	  competitive	  
justifications	  could	  be	  upheld.932	  First,	  marketing	  agreements	  provides	   the	  company	  with	  a	   reliable	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
930	  See	  :	  Terry	  v.	  Tyson	  Farms	  Inc,	  604	  F.3d	  272	  (6th	  Cir.	  2010);	  Wheeler	  v.	  Pilgrim	  Pride	  Corp,	  591	  F.3d	  355	  (5th	  
Cir.	  2009);	  Been	  v.	  O.K.Indus.,	  Inc.,	  495	  F.3d	  1217	  (10th	  Cir.	  2007);	  Pickett	  v.	  Tyson	  Fresh	  Meats	  Inc.,	  420	  F.3d	  
1272	  (11th	  Cir.	  2005);	  London	  v.	  Fieldale	  Farms	  Corp.,	  410	  F.3d	  974	  (11th	  Cir.	  2005);	  JBP,	  Inc.	  v.	  Glickman,	  187	  
F.3d	  974	  (8th	  Cir.	  1999);	  Philson	  v.	  Goldsboro	  Milling	  Co.,	  Nos.,	  164	  F.3d	  625	  (4th	  Cir.	  1998);	  Farrow	  v.	  United	  
States	  Dep’t	  of	  Agric.,	  760	  F.2d	  211	  (8th	  Cir.	  1985);	  DeJong	  Packing	  Co.	  v.	  United	  States	  Dep’t	  of	  Agric.,	  618	  F.2d	  
1329	  (9th	  Cir.	  1980);	  Pac.	  Trading	  Co.	  v.	  Wilson	  &	  Co.,	  547	  F.2d	  367	  (7th	  Cir.	  1976).	  The	  position	  of	  the	  USDA	  has	  
only	  been	  embraced	  by	  some	  district	  courts.	  See	  for	  examples:	  Schumacher	  v.	  Tyson	  Fresh	  Meats,	  Inc.,	  434	  
F.Supp.2d	  748	  (D.S.D.	  2006);	  Kinkaid	  v.	  John	  Morell	  &	  Co.,	  321	  F.Supp.2d	  1090	  (N.D.Iowa	  2004)	  and	  Gerace	  v.	  
Utica	  Veal	  Co.,	  Inc.,	  580	  F.Supp.	  1465	  (N.D.N.Y.	  1984).	  	  
931	  Pickett	  v.	  Tyson	  Fresh	  Meats	  Inc.,	  420	  F.3d	  1272	  (11th	  Cir.	  2005)	  
932	  A	  fourth	  justification	  was	  presented	  namely	  the	  meeting	  competition	  defense.	  Tyson	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  
necessary	  to	  use	  marketing	  agreements	  in	  order	  to	  have	  access	  to	  the	  cattle	  since	  otherwise	  it	  would	  lose	  all	  of	  
that	  supply	  to	  its	  competitors	  who	  did	  use	  the	  agreements.	  The	  Court	  highlighted	  that	  the	  meeting	  competition	  
defense	  constituted	  a	  defense	  under	  the	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act	  but	  that	  such	  justification	  had	  not	  been	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and	  stably	  supply	  of	  cattle	  which	   is	  needed	  to	  keep	   its	  processing	  plants	  operating	  at	   full	   capacity.	  
Second,	   those	   arrangements	   reduce	   transaction	   costs,	   and	   finally,	   as	   the	   company	  was	   allowed	   to	  
pay	  for	  each	  head	  of	  cattle	  based	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  meat,	  incentive	  was	  created	  for	  the	  producers	  
to	  grow	  better	  cattle.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  Court	  concluded	  that:	  	  
“While	   Picket	   presented	   evidence	   at	   trial	   that	   Tyson’s	   marketing	   agreements	   have	  
decreased	  the	  price	  of	  cattle	  on	  the	  cash	  market	  and	  on	  the	  market	  as	  whole,	  he	  did	  not	  
present	   any	   evidence	   from	  which	   a	   reasonable	   jury	   could	   conclude	   that	   Tyson	   lacked	  
pro-­‐competitive	  justifications	  for	  using	  the	  agreements.”	  	  
The	  second	  case	  involved	  a	  chicken	  grower	  who	  claimed	  that	  its	  customer,	  a	  monopsonist	  processor,	  
was	  charging	  uncompetitive	  low	  prices.933	  The	  Court	  acknowledged	  that	  a	  monopsony	  can	  threaten	  
competition	  but	  gave	  a	  narrow-­‐scope	  interpretation	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  competition	  injury	  by	  equating	  
the	   latter	   with	   harm	   in	   the	   output	   market.	   Accordingly,	   to	   establish	   that	   the	   practices	   of	   a	  
monopsonist	  have	  injured	  or	  are	  likely	  to	  injure	  competition,	  	  
“The	  plaintiff	  must	  show	  that	   the	  monopsonist’s	  practices	  have	  caused	  or	  are	   likely	   to	  
cause	   the	   anticompetitive	   effect	   associated	   with	   monopsonies,	   namely	   the	   arbitrary	  
manipulation	   of	   market	   prices	   by	   unilaterally	   depressing	   seller	   prices	   on	   the	   input	  
market	  with	  the	  effect	  of	  increasing	  prices	  on	  the	  output	  market.”	  	  
Those	  two	  cases	  call	  for	  some	  remarks	  as,	  besides	  the	  controversy	  on	  whether	  the	  PSA	  does	  or	  not	  
require	  the	  proof	  of	  competition	  injury,	  they	  appear	  to	  strongly	  limit	  the	  potential	  scope	  of	  the	  Act	  
and	   to	   make	   the	   plaintiff	   bear	   a	   heavier	   burden	   of	   proof.	   In	   Pickett	   v.	   Tyson,	   the	   Circuit	   Court	  
departed	  from	  the	  standard	  application	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  reason	  in	  two	  ways.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  did	  not	  
settle	  for	  the	  proof	  of	  market	  manipulation	  but	  required	  in	  addition	  the	  plaintiff	  to	  present	  evidence	  
that	   the	   defendant	   lacked	   procompetitive	   justifications	   for	   using	   marketing	   agreements.	   Such	  
reasoning	   in	   fact	   shifts	   the	   issue	  of	   justification	   from	   the	  defendant	   to	   the	  plaintiff.	   In	   the	   case	   at	  
hand,	   the	   Court	   should	   instead	   have	   concluded	   that	   the	   mere	   fact	   to	   manipulate	   market	   prices	  
constituted	   a	   violation	   of	   Section	   202(e)	   of	   the	   PSA.	   Although	   prices	   in	   the	   cash	   market	   are	  
determined	  by	   the	   forces	  of	   supply	  and	  demand,	   this	  does	  not	  mean	   that	   the	  price	   resulting	   from	  
that	   interaction	   is	   necessarily	   competitive.934	   Particularly	   in	   the	   context	   of	   market-­‐price	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
included	  into	  the	  PSA.	  As	  other	  justifications	  were	  offered	  in	  that	  case,	  the	  Court	  refrained	  from	  deciding	  
whether	  the	  meeting	  competition	  defense	  could	  or	  not	  be	  used	  to	  justify	  a	  market-­‐price	  manipulation	  under	  
the	  PSA.	  
933	  Been	  v.	  O.K.Indus.,	  Inc.,	  495	  F.3d	  1217	  (10th	  Cir.	  2007)	  
934	  C.R.Taylor,	  Buyer	  power	  litigation	  in	  agriculture:	  Pickett	  v.	  Tyson	  Fresh	  Meat,	  Inc.,	  53	  The	  Antitrust	  Bulletin	  
455,	  at	  469	  (2008)	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manipulation,	   such	   as	   in	   Pickett	   v.	   Tyson,	   the	   price	   determination	   by	   supply	   and	   demand	   is	  
meaningless.	   Any	   practice	   carried	   out	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   manipulating	   prices	   is	   likely	   to	   create	  
market	   distortions	   and	   yield	   anticompetitive	   or	   unfair	   prices.	  As	   such,	   price	  manipulation	  must	   be	  
considered	   to	   distort	   competition	   and	   to	   violate	   the	   PSA.	   It	   remains	   then	   with	   the	   defendant	   to	  
present	   legitimate	   business	   reasons	   in	   order	   to	   justify	   its	   conduct.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   Court	  
failed	   to	   strike	   a	   balance	   between	   competition	   harm	   and	   procompetitive	   benefit	   derived	   from	  
Tyson’s	   conduct.	   In	   fact,	   the	   Court	   limited	   itself	   to	   finding	   the	   existence	   of	   procompetitive	  
justifications	  without	  weighing	  those	  positive	  effects	  against	  injury	  to	  the	  market.935	  	  
According	  to	  C.	  Robert	  Taylor,	  the	  rule	  of	  reason	  three	  parts	  test	  applied	  to	  a	  restriction	  in	  the	  input	  
market	  would	  be	  the	  following:	  	   	  
	   (1)	  A	  business	  practice	   fails	  a	   rule	  of	   reason	  test	   if	   it	   is	  not	  essential	   to	   the	  conduct	  of	  
business	   and	   if	   an	   alternative	   conduct	   that	   is	   less	   likely	   to	   affect	   welfare	   adversely	   is	   available.	  
Passing	  this	  test	  is	  mandatory.	  
	   (2)	  A	  business	  practice	  fails	  a	  rule	  of	  reason	  test	  if	  its	  likely	  result	  is	  a	  lower	  price	  to	  the	  
seller;	  that	  is,	  if	  it	  is	  exclusionary	  and	  denies	  seller	  acceptable	  and	  competitive	  higher-­‐price	  options.	  
Passing	  this	  test,	  too,	  is	  mandatory.	  
	   (3)	  A	  business	  practice	  also	  fails	  the	  rule	  of	  reason	  test	  if	  its	  lacks	  clear	  transaction	  cost	  
benefits	   that	  make	   the	   enterprise	  more	   efficient	   than	   any	   one	   of	   its	   competitors	   or	   if	   it	   lacks	   the	  
potential	   to	   enhance	   welfare	   in	   some	   other	   way.	   Passing	   this	   test	   is	   not	   mandatory	   because	   the	  
restraint’s	  effects	  might	  be	  neutral.936	  
Such	   test	   would	   imply	   that	   competitive	   injury	   also	   includes	   harm	   caused	   to	   the	   upstream	   buyer	  
market,	  provided	  that	  such	  harm	  is	  not	  outweighed	  by	  procompetitive	  benefits.	  However,	  the	  second	  
case	  analyzed	   in	  this	  section	  seems	  to	  contradict	  such	  an	   interpretation.	  According	  to	  some	  courts,	  
buyer	   power	   raises	   competitive	   concerns	   only	   where	   it	   is	   likely	   to	   entail	   negative	   effects	   in	   the	  
output	  market	  and	  thus	  to	  harm	  directly	  consumers.	  Such	  competition	  injury	  would	  occur	  in	  case	  of	  
pure	  monopsony,	  namely	  when	  a	  reduction	  in	  input	  purchases	  leads	  to	  a	  lower	  level	  of	  output	  and	  
thus	  to	  higher	  prices	  for	  consumers.	  Any	  violation	  of	  the	  PSA	  would	  hence	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  proof	  of	  
a	  direct	  negative	  impact	  on	  end-­‐users	  through	  higher	  prices.	  	  
That	  interpretation	  seems	  however	  too	  narrow	  to	  encompass	  all	  potential	  harmful	  effects	  that	  buyer	  
power	  may	  cause	  on	  the	  markets.	  Without	  settling	  the	  issue	  on	  whether	  the	  PSA	  is	  or	  not	  broader	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
935	  Ibid.,	  at	  465-­‐467.	  
936	  Ibid.,	  at	  466.	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scope	   than	   the	   traditional	   antitrust	   instruments,	   we	   do	   think	   that,	   even	   if	   competition	   harm	   is	  
required,	  the	  Act	  could	  be	  enforced	  against	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  practices.	  Buyer’s	  conduct	  is	   indeed	  
likely	  to	  distort	  competition	  even	  though	  it	  does	  not	  directly	  affect	  the	  output	  market.	  As	  we	  noted	  
in	  cases	  involving	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  or	  the	  FTC	  Act	  and	  despite	  the	  controversy	  on	  whether	  suppliers	  
are	   protected	   by	   those	   traditional	   antitrust	   laws,	   some	   U.S.	   courts	   are	   willing	   to	   adhere	   to	   that	  
broader	   conception	   of	   competition	   injury.	   As	   the	   PSA	   has	   been	   enacted	   specifically	   to	   protect	  
competition	   in	   the	   input	  markets,	   it	  would	  be	  contrary	   to	   the	   legislative	   intent	  of	   the	  Act	   to	   focus	  
only	  on	  the	  output	  markets	  to	  assess	  the	  potential	  anticompetitive	  effects	  of	  buyers’	  practices.	  	  
D. CONCLUSIVE	  REMARKS	  
The	   issue	   of	   buyer	   power	   is	   not	   a	   new	   concern	   in	   the	   United	   States.	   Antitrust	   rules	   have	   been	  
enacted,	   adapted	   or	   complemented	   in	   order	   to	   prevent,	   or	   at	   least	   limit,	   the	   negative	   effects	  
resulting	   from	  a	   consolidated	  buying	   side.	   The	  necessity	   to	   target	   the	   real	   evil,	   namely	  excessively	  
powerful	  buyers,	  and	  to	  enforce	  the	  antitrust	  laws	  thoroughly	  is	  all	  the	  more	  urgent	  today	  that	  the	  
degree	  of	  concentration	  has	  been	  increasing	  in	  various	  sectors,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  agri-­‐food	  industry.	  The	  
Robinson-­‐Patman	   Act	   failed	   in	   every	   respect	   to	   properly	   address	   the	   issue	   of	   buyer	   power	   in	   the	  
retail	   sector.	   Directed	   to	   sellers	   and	   protecting	   competing	   retailers,	   be	   it	   small	   or	   big,	   from	   fierce	  
price	  competition,	  the	  Act	  has	  not	  curbed	  the	  exercise	  of	  market	  power	  in	  the	  procurement	  market	  
but	  has	  entailed	  harmful	  effects	  on	  competition,	  especially	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  consumers.	  	  
Section	  1	  and	  Section	  2	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act,	  mainly	  enforced	  against	  sellers’	  practices,	  have	  yet	  been	  
also	  used	  to	  condemn	  conduct	  affecting	  suppliers	   in	  the	  upstream	  market.	  The	  enforcement	  of	  the	  
Act	  against	  buyer	  cartels	  shows	  that	  enforcers	  and	  courts	  treat,	  in	  most	  cases,	  those	  practices	  just	  as	  
strictly	   as	   seller	   cartels.	   Even	   though	   consumer	  welfare	   is	   part	   of	   the	   goals	   of	   the	   antitrust	   policy,	  
direct	  effects	  on	  end-­‐users	  do	  not	  constitute	  the	  ultimate	  test	  used	  by	  US	  courts,	  at	   least	  as	   far	  as	  
Section	  1	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  is	  concerned.	  As	  such,	  consumer	  harm	  is	  not	  required	  to	  find	  a	  violation	  
of	   the	   antitrust	   rules	   and	   the	   proof	   of	   consumer	   benefits	   through	   lower	   prices	   is	   not	   sufficient	   to	  
reject	  an	  antitrust	  claim.	  It	  was	  recognized	  that	  effective	  competition	  does	  not	  only	  yield	  lower	  prices	  
but	   also	  more	   choices,	   higher	   quality	   and	   innovative	   product.	   In	   order	   to	   guarantee	   those	   various	  
benefits,	   courts	   seem	  willing	   to	   protect	   the	   competition	   process	   by	   considering	   the	   interest	   of	   all	  
market	  participants.937	  
Where	  buyer	  cartels	  may	  be	  condemned	  as	  such	  because	  of	  their	  very	  restrictive	  nature,	  unilateral	  
conduct	  is	  often	  treated	  more	  leniently	  as	  monopoly	  power	  is	  not	  prohibited	  by	  itself.	  	  A	  single	  buyer	  
may	  however	  be	  powerful	   enough	   to	   restrict	   competition.	   The	  U.S.	   Supreme	  Court	   seems	   to	  have	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  N.Rosenfelt,	  The	  verdict	  on	  monopsony,	  20	  Loyola	  Consumer	  Law	  Review	  402	  (2007-­‐2008)	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admitted	   the	   potential	   harmful	   effect	   of	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power,	   at	   least	   with	   regard	   to	  
predatory	  conduct.	  By	  treating	  predatory	  bidding	  as	  strictly	  as	  predatory	  pricing,	  the	  Court	  refused	  to	  
equate	   competition	   injury	   with	   consumer	   harm.	   Even	   though	   a	   buy-­‐side	   conduct	   is	   not	   used	   to	  
enhance	   market	   power	   in	   the	   output	   market,	   it	   may	   nevertheless	   lead	   to	   anticompetitive	  
outcomes.938	  However,	  would	   the	  Court	   condemn	  unilateral	   conduct	  which	  distorts	   competition	   in	  
the	   input	   markets	   but	   benefits	   consumers?	   If	   the	   antitrust	   laws	   really	   aimed	   at	   protecting	  
undistorted	  competition	  for	  all	  market	  participants,	  a	  balancing	  test	  should	  be	  carried	  out	  between	  
the	  positive	  and	  the	  negative	  effects,	  both	  in	  the	  input	  and	  output	  markets.	  Yet,	  it	  appears	  that,	  even	  
in	  cases	  involving	  an	  Act	  which	  expressly	  aims	  at	  protecting	  suppliers,	  such	  as	  the	  PSA,	  a	  showing	  of	  a	  















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
938	  Such	  an	  interpretation	  was	  confirmed	  in	  a	  note	  submitted	  by	  the	  United	  States	  to	  the	  OECD,	  stating	  that	  
buyer	  cartels	  are	  unlawful	  if	  they	  create	  market	  power	  on	  the	  buying	  side	  of	  the	  market.	  Single	  conduct	  is	  also	  
unlawful	  if	  it	  maintains,	  creates	  or	  threatens	  to	  create	  high	  degree	  of	  market	  power	  on	  the	  buying	  side	  of	  the	  
market.	  See:	  Monopsony	  and	  Buyer	  Power,	  OECD	  –	  Policy	  Roundtables,	  note	  submitted	  by	  the	  United	  States,	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CONCLUSION	  PART	  II	  
The	  notion	  of	  buyer	  power	  appears	   in	  various	  EU	   legal	   instruments	  and	  non-­‐regulatory	  documents	  
such	  as	  notices	  and	  guidelines	  of	  the	  Commission.	  	  The	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  is	  treated	  either	  as	  a	  
positive	  competitive	  constraint	  or,	  more	  rarely,	  as	  a	  source	  of	  competitive	  concern.	  In	  the	  texts,	  but	  
also	   in	   practice,	   the	   Commission	   adopts	   a	   cautious	   approach	   on	   that	   matter	   and	   seems	   rather	  
reluctant	   to	   take	   action	   against	   powerful	   buyers’	   practices	   in	   upstream	  markets.	   Even	   though	   the	  
Treaty	  competition	  rules	  are	  designed	  to	  apply	  to	  both	  seller	  and	  buyer	  practices,	  the	  enforcement	  of	  
Article	  101	  and	  102	  TFEU	  against	  powerful	  buyers	  remains	  weak	  if	  not	  inexistent	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  
latter	  provision.	  The	   specificities	  of	  buyer	  power	  pointed	  out	   in	  Part	   I	   are	   in	   fact	  hardly	   taken	   into	  
consideration	  by	  EU	  competition	  authorities	  when	  enforcing	  the	  competition	  law	  Treaty	  provisions.	  
The	  Commission	  has	  nevertheless	  addressed	  more	  deeply	   the	   issue	  of	  buyer	  power	  and	   its	  effects	  
when	  enforcing	  the	  merger	  Regulation.	  The	  increase	  of	  the	  merging	  parties’	  buyer	  power	  was	  indeed	  
considered	   in	   some	   cases	   to	   be	   likely	   to	   impair	   effective	   competition	   following	   the	   merger.	   The	  
Commission	  had	  therefore	  the	  opportunity	  to	  examine	  thoroughly	  the	  different	  factors	  giving	  rise	  to	  
market	  power	  in	  upstream	  buyer	  markets	  as	  well	  as	  the	  positive	  and	  negative	  effects	  that	  may	  result	  
from	   the	   (mis)use	  of	   such	  power.	   The	   competition	  assessment	  made	   in	   those	  merger	   cases	   shows	  
that	  buyer	  power	  probably	  needs	  to	  be	  addressed	  differently	  than	  seller	  power.	  	  
At	   national	   level,	   various	   initiatives	   have	   been	   undertaken	   to	   tackle	   the	   issue	   of	   buyer	   power,	  
especially	   in	   the	   grocery	   sector.	   French	   authorities	   have	   for	   example	   enlarged	   the	   scope	   of	   the	  
prohibition	  on	  abusive	  conduct	  to	  cover	  no	  only	  abuses	  of	  dominance	  but	  also	  abuses	  of	  economic	  
dependency.	   On	   paper,	   this	   seemed	   promising	   because	   the	   concept	   of	   economic	   dependency,	   as	  
defined	  by	  the	  French	  Competition	  Authority,	  covers	  the	  specificities	  of	  buyer	  power.	  Large	  buyers’	  
practices	  were	  hence	  allegedly	  more	   likely	   to	  be	   scrutinized	  by	   competition	  authorities	  under	   that	  
concept.	  However,	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  prohibition	  on	  abuse	  of	  economic	  dependency	  turned	  out	  
to	  be	  ineffective	  and	  never	  concerned	  large	  retail	  chains.	  	  
The	  French	  legislator	  has	  also	  enacted	  contractual	  laws	  to	  regulate	  retailer-­‐supplier	  relationships	  and	  
to	   prevent	   unfair	   practices	   in	   business-­‐to-­‐business	   relationships.	   Although	   the	   objective	   was	   to	  
restrain	   the	  exploitation	  of	  buyer	  power	   so	  as	   to	   restore	   fair	   relations	  between	   large	   retailers	  and	  
their	  suppliers,	  the	  prohibition	  per	  se	  of	  some	  practices	  used	  by	  those	  large	  retailers	  did	  in	  fact	  not	  
bring	  about	  the	  expected	  positive	  change	  in	  the	  grocery	  sector,	  on	  the	  contrary.	  	  
In	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	   the	   issue	   of	   buyer	   power	   has	   been	   addressed	   more	   gently	   through	   the	  
adoption	  of	  a	  Code	  of	  conduct	  applicable	  to	  the	  largest	  grocery	  retailers.	  Two	  elements	  are	  yet	  likely	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to	  make	   such	   an	   instrument	   ineffective:	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   fear	   of	   suppliers	   to	   denounce	   non-­‐
complying	   retailers	   and,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   lack	   of	   deterrent	   sanctions	   applied	   in	   case	   of	  
violation	  of	  the	  Code.	  	  
It	   is	   essential	   to	   adopt	   instruments	   suited	   to	   tackle	   effectively	   buyer	   power	   concerns	   without	  
affecting	   competition.	   This	   involves	   targeting	   buyers	   for	   misuse	   of	   their	   power	   instead	   of	   sellers	  
subject	   to	   that	   power	   and	   to	   assess	   the	   competition	   impact	   of	   those	   buyers’	   practices.	   The	  
enforcement	   of	   the	   Robinson-­‐Patman	   Act	   in	   the	   United	   States	   provides	   an	   example	   not	   to	   be	  
followed	  on	  that	  matter.	  	  
The	  national	  rules	  examined	  in	  this	  Part	  show	  that	  buyer	  power	  may	  be	  addressed	  within	  or	  outside	  
the	   scope	  of	   competition	   law.	  One	  may	  hence	  wonder	  under	  which	  policy	  buyer	  power	   should	  be	  
dealt	   with.	   To	   answer	   that	   question,	   it	   is	   needed	   to	   take	   a	   closer	   look	   into	   the	   objectives	   of	   EU	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PART	  III	  -­‐	  BUYER	  POWER:	  AN	  ISSUE	  TO	  BE	  ADDRESSED	  IN	  EU	  LAW	  
EU	   and	   national	   competition	   rules	   have	   rarely	   been	   used	   to	   address	   buyer	   power	   concerns.	   The	  
reason	  may	  be	  either	  that	  buyer	  practices	  are	  unlikely	  to	  affect	  competition	  on	  the	  markets	  or	  that	  
the	  competition	  rules	  are	   ill-­‐suited	  to	  prevent	  harmful	  exploitation	  of	  buyer	  power.	  To	  answer	  that	  
question,	  it	  is	  needed	  to	  look	  into	  the	  objectives	  of	  EU	  competition	  law	  so	  as	  to	  determine	  whether	  
the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	   is	   likely	  to	   impede	  their	  achievement.	   If	  so,	  one	  could	  hence	  conclude	  
that	  the	  second	  hypothesis	  prevails.	  
Chapter	  1	  is	  meant	  to	  describe	  the	  objectives	  pursued	  in	  EU	  competition	  law	  and	  to	  highlight,	  in	  view	  
of	   those	  objectives,	  practices	  used	  by	   large	   retail	   chains	   in	   the	  grocery	  procurement	  market	  which	  
might	   be	   considered	   anticompetitive.	   The	   potential	   harmful	   effects	   caused	   by	   those	   practices	   to	  
competition	  raise	  the	  question	  of	  the	  responsibility	  of	  competition	  authorities	  to	  address	  effectively	  
the	  issue	  of	  buyer	  power,	  in	  particular	  in	  the	  grocery	  retail	  sector.	  
In	  Chapter	  2,	   it	   is	  argued	  that	  a	  common	  action	  should	  be	  taken	  at	  EU	  level	  under	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  
competition	  policy	  so	  as	  to	  control	  buyers’	  market	  power.	  Large	  supermarket	  chains	  are	  not	  the	  only	  
buyers	  having	  the	  ability	  to	  exert	  buyer	  power	  over	  their	  suppliers.	  However,	  concerns	  about	  buyer	  
power	  have	  especially	  been	  raised	  in	  the	  grocery	  retail	  sector	  so	  that	  one	  may	  wonder	  whether	  EU	  
action	  should	  not	  be	   limited	  to	  that	  sector.	   It	  must	  hence	  be	  examined	  whether	  the	  specificities	  of	  
the	  grocery	  retail	  sector	  incite	  buyers	  to	  exploit	  their	  buyer	  power	  to	  a	  greater	  extent	  than	  in	  other	  
industries	  and	  thereby	  increase	  the	  risk	  of	  anticompetitive	  effects	  on	  the	  markets.	  	  	  
Action	   at	   EU	   level	   may	   take	   various	   forms.	   One	   of	   them	   involves	   the	   harmonization	   of	   national	  
competition	   rules	   on	   buyer	   power	   so	   as	   to	   subject	   large	   buyers	   to	   the	   national	   competition	  
authorities’	   supervision.	   In	   such	   a	   case,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   justify	   EU	   authorities’	   intervention,	   to	  
determine	   the	   type	   of	   EU	   instrument	   to	   be	   used	   as	   well	   as	   the	   degree	   of	   harmonization.	   The	  
objective	  would	  be	  to	  make	  sure	  supermarket	  chains	  which	  are	  able	  to	  affect	  competition	  through	  
their	  conduct	  due	  to	  their	  large	  degree	  of	  buyer	  power	  can	  be	  pursued	  and	  sanctioned	  if	  they	  abuse	  
their	  power.	  This	  would	  hence	  require	  introducing	  new	  criteria,	  common	  to	  the	  Member	  States,	  with	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CHAPTER	  1	  –	  BUYER	  POWER:	  A	  POSSIBLE	   IMPEDIMENT	  TO	  THE	  OBJECTIVES	  OF	  EU	  COMPETITION	  
LAW	  
Whether	   buyer	   power	   should	   be	   addressed	   under	   EU	   competition	   law	   in	   fact	   depends	   on	   the	  
objectives	  pursed	  by	  the	  treaty	  rules	  on	  competition.	  We	  have	  already	  provided	  an	  insight	  into	  those	  
objectives	   in	   Part	   I	   when	   raising	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   potential	   detrimental	   effects	   of	   buyer	   power	   on	  
competition	  in	  the	  European	  Union.	  Section	  1	  of	  this	  chapter	  aims	  at	  exploring	  more	  deeply,	  though	  
not	  exhaustively,	  the	  various	  goals	  the	  authorities	  may	  pursue	  when	  enforcing	  the	  competition	  rules	  
and	   to	   define	   those	  which	   prevail	   in	   EU	   law.	   Although	   the	   impact	   of	   firms’	   conduct	   on	   consumer	  
prices	  may	  provide	  some	  indication	  of	  the	  (un)lawfulness	  of	  such	  conduct,	  other	  aspects	  than	  price	  
are	   to	   be	   taken	   into	   consideration	   in	   the	   competition	   assessment	  which	  may	   require	   competition	  
authorities	  not	  to	  focus	  only	  on	  the	  direct	  and	  immediate	  effects	  on	  consumers.	  	  
In	   view	   of	   the	   so-­‐defined	   EU	   competition	   goals,	   we	   will	   then	   examine,	   in	   Section	   2,	   some	   of	   the	  
practices	  used	  by	  large	  buyers	  in	  the	  grocery	  sector	  which	  might	  seriously	  restrict	  competition	  on	  the	  
markets	  and	  impede	  the	  achievement	  of	  the	  competition	  law	  objectives.	  	  
SECTION	  I	  –	  THE	  OBJECTIVES	  OF	  EU	  COMPTITION	  LAW	  
The	  debate	  surrounding	  the	  objectives	  of	  competition	  law	  has	  already	  been	  spilled	  over	  by	  much	  ink.	  
The	  purpose	  of	  this	  section	   is	  not	  to	  provide	  an	  extensive	  examination	  of	  each	  position	  concerning	  
that	  debate	  but	  rather	  to	  determine	  what	  are	  the	  prevailing	  goals	  pursued	  under	  the	  EU	  competition	  
policy	   and	   whether	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   is	   likely	   to	   jeopardize	   the	   achievement	   of	   those	  
goals.	   The	   issue	   of	   the	   objectives	   of	   competition	   law	   is	   of	   significant	   importance	   for	   the	  
development,	  drafting	  and	  enforcement	  of	  the	  competition	  rules.	  As	  rightly	  maintained	  by	  Professor	  
Bork,	  one	  of	  the	  founders	  of	  the	  Chicago	  School,	  	  
“Antitrust	  policy	  cannot	  be	  made	  rational	  until	  we	  are	  able	  to	  give	  a	  firm	  answer	  to	  one	  
question:	  What	  is	  the	  point	  of	  the	  law	  –	  what	  are	  its	  goals?	  Everything	  else	  follows	  from	  
the	  answer	  we	  give”.939	  	  
Even	  though	  the	  answer	  he	  gave	  to	  that	  question,	   in	   its	  real	  meaning,	   is	  not	  the	  one	  supported	  by	  
the	   EU	   authorities,	   at	   least	   Professor	   Bork	   highlighted	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   objectives	   of	  
competition	  law	  and	  fuelled	  the	  debate	  with	  new	  thoughts.	  	  	  
These	  last	  decades,	  among	  the	  various	  objectives	  underlying	  the	  competition	  rules	  in	  most	  countries,	  
the	   European	   Commission	   has	   put	   the	   emphasis	   on	   the	   protection	   of	   consumer	  welfare.	  Without	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
939	  R.H.Bork,	  The	  Antitrust	  Paradox	  –	  A	  policy	  at	  war	  with	  itself	  (1978),	  at	  50.	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denying	  the	  relevance	  of	  other	  elements	  such	  as	  the	  integration	  of	  the	  single	  market	  or	  the	  role	  of	  
economic	   efficiency,	   bringing	   consumers	   the	   benefits	   resulting	   from	   competitive	  markets	   is	   at	   the	  
heart	  of	  the	  EU	  competition	  policy.	  It	  seems,	  however,	  that	  direct	  consumer	  harm/benefit	  does	  not	  
constitute	  a	  benchmark	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  business	  practices.	  The	  EU	  authorities,	  and	  in	  particular	  
the	   European	   Courts,	   instead	   focus	   on	   the	   effects	   on	   the	   competitive	   process	   to	   decide	   whether	  
firms’	   conduct	   violates	   or	   not	  Article	   101	  or	  Article	   102	   TFEU.	   The	  protection	  of	   that	   process	   as	   a	  
means	  to	  enhance	  consumer	  welfare,	  envisaged	  in	  a	  broad	  and	  long-­‐term	  perspective,	  derives	  from	  
the	   terms	   of	   the	   Treaty	   and	   was	   given	   concrete	   expression	   in	   the	   EU	   case	   law.	   On	   basis	   of	   that	  
objective,	   which	   in	   fact	   guarantees	   the	   achievement	   of	  many	   others,	   the	   issue	   of	   buyer	   power	   is	  
likely	  to	  take	  on	  another	  dimension	  in	  EU	  competition	  law.	  	  
A. VARIOUS	  OBJECTIVES	  OF	  COMPETITION	  LAW	  
Following	   a	   report	   prepared	   by	   the	   International	   Competition	   Network	   (ICN),	   it	   emerges	   that	  
competition	   laws,	   regulations	   and	   policies	   aim	   in	   most	   countries	   and	   primarily	   at	   ensuring	   an	  
effective	   competitive	  process	   as	   an	  objective	   in	   itself	   or	   as	   a	   tool	   to	   achieve	  other	  desirable	   goals	  
such	   as	   economic	   freedom,	   economic	   efficiency	   or	   consumer	   welfare.940	   In	   this	   section	   we	   will	  
develop	  those	  last	  three	  objectives	  as	  they	  all	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  elaboration	  and	  enforcement	  of	  the	  
EU	   competition	   policy.	   In	   addition,	   we	   cannot	   but	  mention	   the	   central	   objective	   of	   the	   European	  
Union,	   that	   is,	   the	   single	  market	   goal	   which	   continues	   to	   influence	   the	   action	   of	   the	   competition	  
authorities.	  
1. Market	  integration	  	  
The	   goal	   of	   political	   and	   economic	   integration	   constitutes	   the	   cornerstone	   of	   EU	   law.	   From	   its	  
beginning,	   the	  EU	  competition	  policy,	  as	  a	   complement	   to	   the	  other	  EU	  policies	  and	  specifically	   to	  
the	  free	  movement	  rules,	  has	  been	  designed	  and	  enforced	  to	  achieve	  the	  single	  market	  objective.941	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
940	  See	  :	  ICN	  –	  Report	  on	  the	  Objectives	  of	  Unilateral	  Conduct	  Laws,	  Assessment	  of	  Dominance/Substantial	  
Market	  Power,	  and	  State-­‐created	  Monopolies,	  prepared	  by	  the	  Unilateral	  Conduct	  Working	  Group,	  Presented	  
at	  the	  6th	  Annual	  Conference	  of	  the	  ICN,	  Moscow,	  May	  2007.	  The	  other	  objectives	  mentioned	  in	  that	  report	  but	  
less	  cited	  by	  the	  authorities	  questioned	  include:	  ensuring	  a	  level	  playing	  field	  for	  small	  and	  medium	  size	  
enterprises;	  promoting	  fairness	  and	  equality;	  promoting	  consumer	  choice;	  achieving	  market	  integration;	  
facilitating	  privatization	  and	  market	  liberalization;	  and	  promoting	  competitiveness	  in	  international	  markets.	  On	  
the	  objectives	  of	  EU	  competition	  law,	  see	  also:	  I.Lianos,	  Some	  Reflections	  on	  the	  Question	  of	  the	  Goals	  of	  EU	  
Competition	  Law,	  Centre	  for	  Law,	  Economics	  and	  Society	  Working	  Paper	  Series	  3/2013,	  January	  2013,	  available	  
at:	  http://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/research-­‐paper-­‐series/research-­‐papers/cles-­‐3-­‐2013	  	  
941	  Article	  2	  of	  the	  former	  EC	  Treaty	  enumerated	  the	  various	  tasks	  of	  the	  Community	  which	  were	  to	  be	  carried	  
out	  by	  establishing	  in	  particular	  a	  common	  market.	  Among	  the	  different	  common	  policies	  which	  were	  to	  be	  
implemented	  in	  order	  to	  realize	  the	  potential	  of	  that	  common	  market,	  Article	  3	  (1)	  (g)	  referred	  to	  a	  system	  
ensuring	  that	  competition	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  is	  not	  distorted.	  Following	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty,	  that	  last	  
provision	  was	  repealed	  and	  moved	  to	  a	  Protocol	  annexed	  to	  the	  Treaties.	  Those	  provisions	  will	  be	  further	  
examined	  below	  in	  section	  2,	  3.	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Such	   as	   state	   measures,	   arrangements	   between	   private	   undertakings	   or	   abusive	   conduct	   by	  
dominant	   firms	   can	   similarly	   create	   barriers	   to	   trade	   between	   Member	   States	   impeding	   the	  
realization	   of	   the	   integration	   of	   the	   markets	   within	   the	   Union.	   The	   competition	   rules	   contribute	  
hence	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   common	   market	   which	   is	   supposed	   to	   bring	   in	   turn	   economic	  
efficiencies	   and	   benefits	   to	   consumers.	  Market	   integration	   in	   fact	   enlarges	   the	   size	   of	   the	  market	  
available	  to	  firms	  and	  thus	  enables	  the	  latter	  to	  produce	  more	  efficiently	  through	  the	  realization	  of	  
economies	  of	  scale.	  In	  addition,	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  (potential)	  competitors	  reinforces	  
the	   competitive	   pressure	   on	   firms	   thereby	   contributing	   to	   allocative	   efficiency	   and	   stimulating	  
innovation.942	  As	  a	  result	  of	  such	  cost	  reduction	  and	  greater	  competition	  in	  prices	  but	  also	  in	  research	  
and	   development	   (R&D),	   significant	   benefits	   are	   brought	   to	   consumers	  who	   have	   access	   to	  wider	  
choices,	   better	   quality	   and	   lower	   prices.943	   Generally,	   there	   is	   therefore	   no	   conflict	   between	   the	  
objective	  of	  market	  integration	  and	  the	  other	  competition	  goals	  that	  will	  be	  examined	  below.	  
The	  relative	  importance	  of	  the	  single	  market	  objective	  in	  EU	  competition	  law	  is	  likely	  to	  diminish	  as	  
the	  process	  of	   integration	   is	  moving	   forward.	  However,	   that	  objective	   remains	  an	  ongoing	  process	  
which	  will	   consequently	  never	  be	  marginalized	  by	   the	   competition	  authorities.944	  As	  underlined	  by	  
the	  Commissioner	  for	  Competition,	  Joaquin	  Almunia,	  	  
“Establishing	   the	   Single	   market	   is	   among	   Europe’s	   highest	   achievement,	   but	   in	   many	  
respects,	   it	   is	   still	  work	   in	  progress.	  Competition	  enforcement	  must	  help	   to	  accelerate	  
the	  completion	  of	  this	  crucial	  element	  of	  our	  integration	  process.”945	  	  
Various	  recent	  cases	  also	  show	  that	  market	  integration	  is	  still	  very	  much	  present	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  
firms’	   conduct.	   The	   Court	   of	   Justice	   has	   in	   particular	   reaffirmed	   in	   Syfait	   II946	   and	   in	  
Glaxosmithkline947	  that	  prohibiting	  or	  limiting	  parallel	  trade	  constitutes	  restriction	  of	  competition	  by	  
object	   since	   such	   conduct	   aims	   at	   partitioning	   the	   national	   markets	   and	   hence	   neutralizes	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
942	  D.Geradin,	  Efficiency	  claims	  in	  EC	  competition	  law	  and	  sector-­‐specific	  regulation,	  in	  The	  evolution	  of	  
European	  Competition	  law	  –Whose	  regulation,	  which	  competition?,	  Hanns	  Ullrich	  (ed.)	  (2006),	  at	  318.	  
943	  W.-­‐H.Roth,	  Strategic	  competition	  plicy	  :	  a	  comment	  on	  EU	  competition	  policy,	  in	  The	  evolution	  of	  European	  
Competition	  law	  –Whose	  regulation,	  which	  competition?,	  Hanns	  Ullrich	  (ed.)	  (2006),	  at	  42.	  
944	  E.Buttigieg,	  Competition	  law	  :	  Safeguarding	  the	  consumer	  interest	  –	  A	  comparative	  analysis	  of	  US	  antitrust	  
law	  and	  EC	  competition	  law	  (2009),	  at	  78.	  
945	  J.Almunia,	  Competition	  as	  a	  pan-­‐European	  effort,	  Speech	  given	  by	  the	  Vice	  President	  of	  the	  European	  
Commission	  responsible	  for	  Competition	  policy,	  Speech/12/672,	  European	  Competition	  Day,	  Nicosia,	  2	  October	  
2012,	  available	  at:	  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-­‐release_SPEECH-­‐12-­‐672_en.htm	  	  
946	  Joined	  cases	  C-­‐468/06	  to	  C-­‐478/06,	  Sot	  Lee	  los	  kai	  Sia	  EE	  and	  Others	  v.	  Glaxosmithkline	  AEVE	  Farma	  keftikon	  
Proïonton	  (Syfait	  II)	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐7139.	  
947	  Joined	  cases	  C-­‐501/06P,	  C-­‐513/06P,	  C-­‐515/06P	  and	  C-­‐519/06P,	  Glaxosmithkline	  Services	  Unlimited	  and	  
Ohters	  v.	  Commission	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐9291.	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benefits	  of	  effective	  competition.948	  The	  Court	  stated	  that,	  by	  restoring	  the	  national	  divisions	  in	  trade	  
between	  Member	  States,	  private	  firms	  frustrate	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  Treaty	  to	  achieve	  the	  integration	  
of	   national	  markets	   through	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   single	  market.	   The	   importance	   of	   the	  market	  
integration	  objective	  was	   further	  highlighted	  by	   the	  Court	  which	  held	   that	  an	  agreement	  aimed	  at	  
limiting	   parallel	   trade	   constitutes	   a	   restriction	   of	   competition	   by	   object,	   even	   though	   it	   is	   not	  
established	  that	  final	  consumers	  are	  deprived	  of	  the	  advantages	  of	  effective	  competition.949	  The	  goal	  
of	   market	   integration	   is	   thus	   still	   given	   particular	   protection	   in	   EU	   competition	   law	   even	   though,	  
nowadays,	  greater	  attention	  is	  devoted	  to	  consumer	  welfare.	  	  
2. Economic	  freedom	  	  
The	  protection	  of	  economic	   freedom	  as	  an	  objective	  of	   competition	   law	   involves	   the	  protection	  of	  
economic	  actors’	  opportunities	  to	  enter	  the	  market	  and	  compete	  within	  that	  market	  without	  being	  
restricted	  by	  any	  other	   firm.950	  Protecting	  economic	   freedom	   is	   the	  keystone	  of	   the	  ordoliberalism	  
theory	  which	  has	  been	  developed	  by	  German	  economists	  and	  legal	  scholars	  from	  the	  Freiburg	  School	  
and	  influenced	  German	  and	  EU	  competition	  law.951	  The	  ordoliberal	  thought	  arose	  in	  response	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
948	  In	  Syfait	  II,	  Glaxosmithkline	  (GSK),	  a	  dominant	  pharmaceutical	  company,	  refused	  to	  meet	  fully	  the	  orders	  
sent	  to	  it	  by	  pharmaceutical	  wholesalers	  in	  order	  to	  limit	  the	  export	  activity	  of	  the	  latter.	  Referring	  to	  other	  
cases	  (see	  for	  examples:	  Case	  26/75,	  General	  Motors	  Continental	  v.	  Commission	  [1975]	  ECR	  1367,	  para.12	  and	  
Case	  226/84,	  British	  Leyland	  v.	  Commission	  [1986]	  ECR	  3263,	  para.	  24),	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  restated	  that	  
restriction	  of	  parallel	  trade	  constitutes	  abuse	  of	  a	  dominant	  position.	  Examining	  the	  objective	  considerations	  
put	  forward	  by	  GSK	  to	  justify	  its	  conduct,	  the	  Court	  considered	  that	  neither	  the	  omnipresent	  regulation	  of	  
prices	  in	  the	  pharmaceuticals	  sector	  nor	  the	  minimal	  benefit	  that	  parallel	  trade	  would	  bring	  to	  final	  consumers	  
could	  exempted	  the	  refusal	  to	  supply	  from	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  However,	  it	  was	  recognized	  that	  
a	  firm	  holding	  a	  dominant	  position	  can	  take	  steps	  that	  are	  reasonable	  to	  protect	  its	  own	  commercial	  interests	  if	  
it	  is	  confronted	  with	  orders	  that	  are	  out	  of	  the	  ordinary	  in	  terms	  of	  quantity.	  The	  Glaxosmithkline	  case	  
concerned	  an	  agreement	  between	  GSK	  and	  Spanish	  wholesalers	  operating	  a	  distinction	  between	  prices	  charged	  
for	  domestic	  resale	  and	  higher	  prices	  charged	  in	  the	  case	  of	  exports	  of	  medicines	  to	  any	  other	  Member	  State.	  	  
949	  Joined	  cases	  C-­‐501/06P,	  C-­‐513/06P,	  C-­‐515/06P	  and	  C-­‐519/06P,	  Glaxosmithkline	  Services	  Unlimited	  and	  
Ohters	  v.	  Commission	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐9291,	  at	  62-­‐64.	  The	  Court	  of	  Justice	  overturned	  the	  General	  Court’s	  
reasoning	  which	  maintained	  that	  such	  an	  agreement	  constitutes	  a	  restriction	  by	  object	  only	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  may	  
be	  presumed	  that	  consumers	  are	  deprived	  of	  certain	  advantages	  of	  effective	  competition	  in	  terms	  of	  supply	  or	  
price.	  According	  to	  that	  reasoning,	  parallel	  trade	  must	  be	  given	  a	  certain	  protection	  only	  if	  it	  gives	  final	  
consumers	  certain	  advantages.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  General	  Court	  considered	  that,	  as	  the	  prices	  of	  medicines	  are	  
to	  large	  extent	  shielded	  from	  the	  free	  play	  of	  supply	  and	  demand	  owing	  to	  the	  applicable	  regulations,	  it	  cannot	  
be	  taken	  for	  granted	  that	  parallel	  trade	  tends	  to	  reduce	  price	  and	  thus	  to	  increase	  the	  welfare	  of	  final	  
consumers	  (See:	  T-­‐168/01,	  GlaxoSmithKline	  Services	  v	  Commission	  [2006]	  ECR	  II-­‐2969,	  at	  121-­‐122).	  	  
950	  L.Lovdahl	  Gormsen,	  The	  conflict	  between	  economic	  freedom	  and	  consumer	  welfare	  in	  the	  modernization	  of	  
Article	  82	  EC,	  3	  European	  Competition	  Journal	  329	  (2007).	  
951	  When	  the	  Rome	  Treaty	  was	  being	  drawn	  up,	  Germany	  was	  about	  to	  enact	  its	  national	  competition	  law.	  The	  
German	  debate	  on	  the	  competition	  rules	  was	  influenced	  by	  the	  ordoliberalist	  ideas	  defended	  by	  a	  group	  of	  
economists	  and	  political	  thinkers	  from	  the	  Freiburg	  School.	  Such	  simultaneity	  of	  the	  national	  and	  European	  
negotiations	  led	  to	  a	  significant	  influence	  of	  German	  thinking	  on	  the	  EU	  competition	  policy.	  See:	  D.J.Gerber,	  
Constitutionalizing	  the	  Economy:	  German	  Neo-­‐liberalism,	  Competition	  Law	  and	  the	  "New"	  Europe,	  42	  American	  
Journal	  of	  Comparative	  Law	  25	  (1994)	  and	  A.Weitbrecht,	  From	  Freiburg	  to	  Chicago	  and	  beyond	  –	  The	  first	  50	  
years	  of	  European	  competition	  law,	  2008	  European	  Competition	  Law	  Review	  81.	  On	  the	  Freiburg	  School,	  see:	  
V.J.Vanberg,	  The	  Freiburg	  School:	  Walter	  Eucken	  and	  Ordoliberalism,	  Freiburg	  Discussionpapers	  on	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Nazi	  Germany	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  where	  private	  economic	  power	  was	  turned	  into	  political	  
power	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   democratic	   principles.952	   In	   order	   to	   prevent	   a	   repetition	   of	   history,	  
ordoliberalists	  argue	   that	  an	  appropriate	   legal	   framework	  has	   to	  be	  established	   in	  order	   to	  control	  
private	  economic	  power	  and	  protect	  individual	  economic	  freedom.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  State	  is	  therefore	  
to	  take	  active	  measures	  to	  foster	  competition	  and	  to	  prevent	  accumulation	  of	  power	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  
private	  companies	  so	  that	  they	  cannot	  destroy	  or	  restrict	  freedom	  of	  others.953	  They	  indeed	  consider	  
that	  individual	  economic	  freedom	  is	  to	  be	  protected	  not	  only	  from	  the	  power	  of	  government	  but	  also	  
from	   the	   economic	   power	   of	   private	   undertakings.	   In	   the	   dispersion	   of	   such	   power,	   they	   seek	   to	  
safeguard	   the	   economic	   order	   and	   ultimately	   the	   benefits	   of	   democracy.954	   Under	   the	   ordoliberal	  
thinking,	   the	   protection	   of	   individual	   economic	   freedom	   is	   hence	   the	   primary	   objective	   of	  
competition	   policy	   which	   is	   designed	   to	   prohibit	   any	   form	   of	   conduct	   restraining	   autonomous	  
economic	  behavior	  or	  rivalry	  between	  competitors.	  
3. Economic	  efficiency	  	  
Another	   objective	   assigned	   to	   competition	   law	   is	   to	   promote	   economic	   efficiency.	   That	   economic	  
antitrust	  theory	  has	  been	  particularly	  influenced	  in	  the	  late	  60’s	  by	  the	  “Chicago	  School”,	  a	  group	  of	  
economic	   and	   legal	   scholars	   from	   the	   University	   of	   Chicago	   in	   the	   United	   States.955	   Chicagoans	  
strongly	   criticized	   US	   authorities	   for	   acting	   against	   practices	   which	   were	   in	   fact	   procompetitive	  
because	  justified	  on	  efficiency	  grounds.	  They	  objected	  to	  the	  Harvard	  School	  structuralist	  approach	  
which	  often	  guided	  antitrust	  action	  at	  the	  time.956	  According	  to	  Harvard	  scholars,	  when	  the	  structure	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952	  L.Lovdahl	  Gormsen,	  op.cit.,	  at	  332.	  
953	  G.Ghidini,	  Comment	  :	  A	  short	  note	  on	  the	  generation	  of	  efficiencies	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  «	  constitutional	  »	  
principles	  of	  European	  competition	  law,	  in	  The	  evolution	  of	  European	  competition	  law	  –	  Whose	  regulation,	  
which	  competition?,	  Hanns	  Ullrich	  (ed.)	  (2006),	  at	  361.	  
954	  F.Maier-­‐Rigaud,	  On	  the	  normative	  foundations	  of	  competition	  law	  –	  efficiency,	  political	  freedom	  and	  the	  
freedom	  to	  compete,	  in	  The	  goals	  of	  competition	  law,	  Daniel	  Zimmer	  (ed.)	  (2012),	  at	  142.	  
955	  The	  Chicago	  School	  scholars	  included	  Robert	  Bork,	  Richard	  Posner	  and	  Frank	  Easterbrook.	  See,	  in	  particular:	  
R.H.Bork,	  The	  antitrust	  paradox	  –	  A	  policy	  at	  war	  with	  itself	  (1978)	  and	  R.A.Posner,	  Antitrust	  law:	  an	  economic	  
perspective	  (1976).	  Much	  has	  been	  written	  on	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  Chicago	  School	  on	  competition	  policy.	  See,	  
for	  examples:	  H.Hovenkamp,	  Antitrust	  Policy	  After	  Chicago,	  84	  Michigan	  Law	  Review	  213	  (1985);	  E.W.Kitch,	  The	  
fire	  of	  truth:	  Remembrance	  of	  law	  and	  economics	  at	  Chicago,	  1932-­‐1970,	  1963	  Journal	  of	  Lac	  and	  Economics	  
163;	  M.S.Jacobs,	  An	  Essay	  on	  the	  Normative	  Foundations	  of	  Antitrust	  Economics,	  74	  North	  Carolina	  Law	  Review	  
219	  (1995);	  W.H.Page,	  The	  Chicago	  School	  and	  the	  evolution	  of	  Antitrust	  Characterization,	  Antitrust	  Injury,	  and	  
Evidentiary	  Sufficiency,	  75	  Virgina	  Law	  Review	  1221	  (1989).	  
956	  See	  for	  examples:	  Unites	  States	  v.	  Aluminum	  Co.	  of	  America,	  148	  F.2d	  	  416	  (2nd	  Cir.	  1945).	  In	  that	  case,	  Judge	  
Learned	  Hand	  clearly	  expressed	  an	  aversion	  to	  concentration	  by	  stating	  that:	  “(…)	  great	  industrial	  
consolidations	  are	  inherently	  undesirable,	  regardless	  of	  their	  economic	  results	  (…)Throughout	  the	  history	  of	  
these	  statutes,	  it	  has	  been	  constantly	  assumed	  that	  one	  of	  their	  purposes	  was	  to	  perpetuate	  and	  preserve,	  for	  
its	  own	  sake,	  in	  spite	  of	  possible	  cost,	  an	  organization	  of	  industry	  in	  small	  units	  which	  can	  effectively	  compete	  
with	  each	  other.”	  (at	  428-­‐429)	  See	  also:	  Northern	  Pacific	  Railway	  Co.	  v.	  Unites	  States,	  356	  U.S.	  1	  (1958)	  and	  
Brown	  Shoe	  Co.,	  Inc.	  v.	  United	  States,	  370	  U.S.	  294	  (1962)	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of	  the	  market	  is	  concentrated,	  firms	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  adopt	  anticompetitive	  practices.957	  Following	  
that	   approach,	  which	   is	   opposed	   to	  market	   concentration	   regardless	   of	   the	  positive	   effects	   it	  may	  
have	  on	  the	  markets,	  the	  US	  courts	  condemned	  practices	  which	  in	  fact	  led	  to	  higher	  efficiencies	  and	  
benefitted	   consumers.	   Influenced	   by	   criteria	   of	   fairness	   and	   aimed	   at	   protecting	   small	   businesses,	  
such	  a	  policy	  ended	  up	  shielding	  inefficient	  competitors	  from	  competition.958	  
The	  Chicago	  School	  pointed	  out	  that	  economic	  efficiencies,	  even	  though	  they	  could	  reinforce	  a	  firm’s	  
market	   power,	   lead	   to	   benefits	   for	   consumers	   and	   should	   thus	   not	   be	  negatively	   appraised	   in	   the	  
assessment	  of	  firms’	  business	  conduct.	  To	  the	  question	  of	  the	  goal	  of	  competition	  law,	  the	  Chicagoan	  
Robert	  Bork	  answered	  that	  consumer	  welfare	  was	  the	  only	  objective	  pursued	  by	  the	  Congress	  when	  
enacting	   the	   Sherman	   Act.959	   However,	   it	   appears	   that	   the	   terms	   used	   by	   Professor	   Bork	   are	  
confusing	   since	   behind	   the	   expression	   “consumer	  welfare”	   hides	   in	   fact	   the	   economic	   concept	   of	  
economic	   efficiency.	   That	   concept	   includes	   three	   basic	   components,	   namely	   allocative	   efficiency,	  
productive	  efficiency	  and	   innovation	  efficiency.	  Allocative	  efficiency	   is	  achieved	  when	  products	  are	  
allocated	  to	  those	  buyers	  who	  value	  them	  most,	  in	  terms	  of	  willingness	  to	  pay.	  Productive	  efficiency	  
is	   attained	   when	   goods	   are	   produced	   using	   the	   optimal	   combination	   of	   inputs	   available	   under	  
existing	   technology	   to	   produce	   maximum	   output	   for	   the	   minimum	   costs.	   Innovation	   efficiency	  
involves	   the	   development,	   invention	   and	   diffusion	   of	   new	   products	   and	   production	   processes.960	  	  
That	  last	  component	  promotes	  dynamic	  efficiency	  as	  it	   leads	  to	  longer	  term	  investment	  resulting	  in	  
innovation	   and	   improving	   efficiency	   over	   time	   unlike	   static	   efficiency	  which	   is	   concerned	  with	   the	  
most	  efficient	  combination	  of	  resources	  at	  a	  given	  point	  in	  time.961	  	  
In	  his	  definition	  of	   consumer	  welfare,	  Bork	   referred	   to	  allocative	  efficiency,	   considering	   that	   those	  
concepts	  were	  align.	  He	  wrote	  that	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
957	  H.J.Hovenkamp,	  The	  rationalization	  of	  antitrust,	  116	  Harvard	  Law	  Review	  117,	  at	  920	  (2003).	  See	  also:	  
H.J.Hovenkamp,	  The	  Neal	  Report	  and	  the	  Crisis	  in	  Antitrust,	  U	  Iowa	  Legal	  Studies	  Research	  Paper	  No	  09-­‐09	  
(2009),	  available	  at:	  SSRN:	  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1348707.	  Among	  the	  Harvard	  economists	  we	  can	  mention:	  
E.Chamberlain,	  The	  theory	  of	  monopolistic	  competition	  (1933);	  E.S.Mason,	  Economic	  concentration	  and	  the	  
oligopoly	  problem	  (1964)	  and	  J.S.Bain,	  Industrial	  Organization,	  2nd	  ed.	  (1959).	  Those	  economists	  influenced	  
Harvard	  antitrust.	  See	  for	  examples:	  D.F.Turner,	  The	  Definition	  of	  Agreement	  Under	  the	  Sherman	  Act:	  Conscious	  
Parallelism	  and	  Refusals	  to	  Deal,	  75	  Harvard	  Law	  Review	  655,	  (1962);	  T.J.DiLorenzo,	  The	  Origins	  of	  Antitrust:	  An	  
Interest-­‐Group	  Perspective,	  5	  International	  Review	  of	  Law	  and	  Economics	  73	  (1985)	  
958	  A.Pera,	  Changing	  views	  of	  competition,	  economic	  analysis	  and	  EC	  antitrust	  law,	  4	  European	  Competition	  
journal	  127,	  at	  141	  (2008).	  
959	  R.H.Bork,	  op.cit.,	  at	  50-­‐71.	  
960	  J.F.Brodley,	  The	  Economic	  goal	  of	  Antitrust:	  Efficiency,	  Consumer	  welfare,	  and	  Technological	  progress,	  62	  
New	  York	  University	  Law	  Review	  1020,	  at	  1025	  (1987)	  
961	  R.J.Gilbert	  &	  S.Sunshine,	  Incorporating	  dynamic	  efficiency	  concerns	  in	  merger	  analysis:	  The	  use	  of	  innovation	  
markets,	  28	  Journal	  of	  Reprints	  for	  Antitrust	  Law	  and	  Economics	  447	  (1998)	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“Consumer	  welfare	   is	   the	  greatest	  when	  society’s	  economic	  resources	  are	  allocated	  so	  
that	   consumers	   are	   able	   to	   satisfy	   their	   wants	   as	   fully	   as	   technological	   constraints	  
permit.”962	  	  
Rejecting	   distributive	   issues	   as	   a	   source	   of	   competition	   concern,	   the	   Chicagoan	   consumer	  welfare	  
model	  focuses	  in	  fact	  on	  aggregate	  welfare	  (or	  total	  surplus)	  to	  determine	  the	  legality	  of	  an	  activity	  
instead	  of	  valuing	  consumers	  surplus,	   that	   is	   the	  difference	  between	  the	  buyer’s	  willingness	  to	  pay	  
for	   a	   good	   and	   the	   price	   he	   actually	   pays	   for	   it.963	   As	   for	   total	   welfare	   standard,	   it	   refers	   to	   the	  
welfare	  of	  buyers	  and	  sellers964	   in	  a	  particular	  market	  and	  does	  not	   take	   into	  consideration	  wealth	  
transfers	  which	  might	  occur	  from	  one	  side	  of	  the	  market	  to	  the	  other.965	  Focusing	  only	  on	  allocative	  
efficiency,	  Bork	  distinguishes	  two	  types	  of	  conduct:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  firms’	  activities	  which	  restrict	  
output	   in	   order	   to	   gain	   monopoly	   power	   (detrimental)	   and,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   practices	   which	  
increase	   a	   firm’s	   profits	   by	   achieving	   new	   efficiency	   (beneficial).966	   He	   makes	   clear	   that	   only	   the	  
former	  is	  to	  be	  prohibited	  by	  antitrust	  law	  because	  if	  a	  practice	  is	  not	  used	  to	  restrict	  output,	  it	  must	  
necessarily	   be	   designed	   to	   increase	   the	   firm’s	   efficiency.	   As	   regards	   exclusionary	   behavior,	   he	  
considers	   that	   exclusion	   or	   foreclosure	   is	   part	   of	   competition	   as	   all	   business	   activity	   excludes.	   In	  
order	   to	   separate	   normal	   and	   efficient	   conduct	   from	   improper	   exclusion,	   he	   suggests	   a	   theory	   of	  
predation	   according	   to	   which,	   unless	   some	   indication	   of	   a	   firm’s	   wrongful	   intent	   is	   established,	  
exclusion	  of	  rivals	   is	  deemed	  to	  result	   from	  superior	  efficiency.967	  Consequently,	  very	   few	  practices	  
would	   require	   authorities’	   intervention.968	   The	   Chicago	   School	   indeed	   believes	   that	   markets	   are	  
efficient	  and	  self-­‐correcting	  so	  that	  governments	  do	  not	  need	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  economy	  at	  the	  risk	  
of	   condemning	  efficient	  practices	  and	  creating	  over-­‐deterrence.	  Excessive	   intervention	  would	  wipe	  
out	  the	  benefits	  resulting	  from	  efficiency	  gains	  whereas	  wrongly	  tolerated	  practices	  will	   in	  any	  case	  
disappear	  under	   the	  onslaught	  of	   competition.	  False	  negatives	  are	   thus	   less	  detrimental	   than	   false	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
962	  R.H.Bork,	  op.cit.,	  at	  90.	  “The	  evil	  of	  monopoly,	  then,	  is	  not	  higher	  prices	  or	  smaller	  production	  (though	  these	  
are	  its	  concomitants)	  but	  misallocated	  resources,	  or	  allocation	  inefficiency.”	  Following	  a	  restriction	  in	  output,	  
“the	  unneeded	  resources	  must	  either	  lie	  idle,	  an	  obvious	  social	  waste,	  or	  migrate	  to	  other	  industries	  where	  the	  
value	  of	  their	  marginal	  product	  will	  be	  less	  than	  it	  would	  be	  in	  the	  monopolized	  widget	  industry.”	  (at	  101)	  
963	  B.Y.Orbach,	  The	  antitrust	  consumer	  welfare	  paradox,	  7	  Journal	  of	  Competition	  Law	  &	  Economics	  133,	  at	  139	  
(2011)	  
964	  Producer	  surplus	  represents	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  price	  a	  seller	  received	  for	  a	  good	  and	  the	  seller’s	  
cost	  of	  producing	  it.	  
965	  E.Buttigieg,	  op.cit.,	  at	  12.	  According	  to	  Bork,	  the	  distribution	  of	  wealth	  or	  the	  accomplishment	  of	  
noneconomic	  goals	  should	  be	  the	  subjects	  of	  other	  laws.	  Trade-­‐off	  decisions	  between	  different	  values	  such	  as	  
between	  manufacturers	  and	  consumers’	  interests	  should	  be	  made	  by	  the	  legislature	  rather	  than	  by	  the	  
judiciary.	  See:	  R.H.Bork,	  op.cit.,	  79-­‐89.	  
966	  R.H.Bork,	  op.cit.,	  at	  122.	  He	  also	  makes	  reference	  to	  neutral	  conduct,	  that	  is	  practices	  which	  increase	  a	  
firm’s	  profits	  by	  some	  device	  not	  related	  to	  either	  productive	  or	  allocative	  efficiency.	  
967	  R.H.Bork,	  op.cit.,	  at	  137.	  	  	  
968	  The	  law	  should	  only	  strikes	  non-­‐ancillary	  horizontal	  agreements	  between	  rivals	  to	  fix	  prices	  or	  divide	  
markets,	  horizontal	  mergers	  creating	  very	  large	  market	  shares	  and	  deliberate	  predation	  engaged	  in	  to	  drive	  
rivals	  from	  a	  market.	  Antitrust	  should	  however	  have	  no	  concern	  with	  vertical	  agreements	  or	  mergers.	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positives.	  In	  the	  latter	  case	  the	  damage	  is	  irreparable	  while	  if	  bad	  practices	  are	  allowed,	  the	  market	  
will	  self-­‐correct	  and	  eradicate	  them.969	  	  
Such	   blindly	   trust	   in	   the	   markets	   as	   well	   as	   the	   concept	   of	   consumer	   welfare	   defended	   by	   the	  
Chicagoans	   raise	   yet	   some	   criticisms.970	   First	   of	   all,	   allocative	   efficiency	   does	   not	   always	   enhance	  
consumer	  well-­‐being.	  For	  example,	   in	  case	  of	  discriminatory	  pricing,	  producers	   increase	  output	  and	  
thereby	  allocative	  efficiency.	  However,	  imposing	  different	  prices	  depending	  on	  the	  willingness	  to	  pay	  
of	  consumers	   leads	  to	  a	   transfer	  of	  wealth	   from	  buyers	   to	  sellers	   reducing	  consequently	  consumer	  
surplus.971	  Another	  contradiction	  between	  consumer	  welfare	  and	  economic	  efficiency	  may	  be	  found	  
in	   merger	   or	   collaboration	   cases	   which	   enable	   the	   participants	   to	   lower	   their	   production	   costs	  
because	  of	   improved	  efficiency	  but	   also	   to	   raise	  prices	   due	   to	   their	   stronger	  market	   power.	   If	   the	  
savings	   in	   costs	   are	   higher	   than	   the	   consumer	   welfare	   loss,	   the	   operation	   would	   increase	   total	  
welfare	  and	  consequently	  be	  considered	  as	  efficient	  under	  the	  Chicago	  School	  approach,	  regardless	  
of	   the	   harm	   caused	   to	   consumers.972	   Those	   examples	   show	   clearly	   that	   the	   economic	   efficiency	  
standard	   does	   not	   necessarily	   translate	   into	   consumer	   benefit	   s	   so	   that	   considering	   efficiency	  
tantamount	  to	  consumer	  welfare	  may	  be	  misleading.	  	  
Secondly,	  Professor	  Eleanor	  Fox	  points	  out	  that	  the	  Chicago	  School	  has	  given	  rise	  to	  a	  new	  paradox,	  
namely	   the	  efficiency	  paradox.	  She	  argues	   that,	   in	   the	  name	  of	  efficiency,	  Chicagoans,	   like	  Bork,	   in	  
fact	  protect	  inefficient	  conduct	  by	  dominant	  firms.	  By	  condemning	  as	  inefficient	  only	  conduct	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
969	  F.H.Easterbrook,	  The	  limits	  of	  antitrust,	  63	  Texas	  Law	  Review	  1,	  at	  15	  (1984).	  See	  also:	  D.S.Evans	  &	  
A.J.Padilla,	  Designing	  antitrust	  rules	  for	  assessing	  unilateral	  practices:	  a	  Neo-­‐Chicago	  approach,	  72	  University	  of	  
Chicago	  Law	  Review	  73	  (2005).	  The	  authors	  assume	  that	  most	  cases	  involve	  practices	  that	  are	  not	  harmful	  and	  
that	  the	  cost	  of	  false	  “conviction”	  is	  higher	  than	  the	  cost	  of	  false	  “acquittals”.	  In	  order	  to	  minimize	  the	  error	  
costs,	  they	  recommends	  therefore	  that,	  when	  assessing	  unilateral	  practices,	  competition	  authorities	  use	  a	  strict	  
legal	  standard	  that	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  result	  in	  false	  acquittals	  than	  false	  convictions.	  
970	  Criticisms	  have	  in	  particular	  been	  raised	  by	  the	  Post-­‐Chicago	  School.	  Post-­‐Chicago	  economists	  produced	  a	  
series	  of	  models	  based	  on	  theoretic-­‐game	  concepts	  which	  demonstrate	  that	  some	  practices	  considered	  by	  
Chicagoans	  as	  efficient	  could	  in	  fact	  be	  anticompetitive.	  Those	  models	  highlight	  indeed	  that	  it	  may	  be	  
profitable	  for	  firms	  to	  engage	  in	  coordinated	  action	  and	  exclusionary	  conduct.	  They	  show	  that	  market	  failures	  
are	  not	  always	  self-­‐correcting	  and	  that	  firms	  can	  take	  advantage	  of	  imperfections	  and	  make	  money	  while	  
producing	  inefficiency.	  See:	  R.	  Lande,	  Wealth	  Transfers	  as	  the	  Original	  and	  Primary	  Concern	  of	  Antitrust:	  the	  
Efficiency	  Interpretation	  Challenged,	  34	  Hastings	  Law	  Journal	  65	  (1982);	  L.Kaplow,	  Extension	  of	  Monopoly	  
Power	  Through	  Leverage,	  85	  Columbia	  Law	  Review	  515	  (1985);	  T.G.Krattenmaker	  &	  S.C.Salop,	  Anticompetitive	  
Exclusion:	  Raising	  Rivals’	  Costs	  to	  Achieve	  Power	  Over	  Price,	  96	  Yale	  Law	  Journal	  209	  (1986);	  J.	  Baker,	  Recent	  
Developments	  in	  Economics	  that	  Challenge	  the	  Chicago	  School	  Views,	  58	  Antitrust	  Law	  Journal	  645	  (1989);	  
M.D.Whinston,	  Tying,	  Foreclosure,	  and	  Exclusion,	  80	  American	  Economic	  Review	  837	  (1990);	  L.A.	  Sullivan,	  Post-­‐
Chicago	  Economics:	  Economists,	  Lawyers,	  Judges,	  and	  Enforcement	  in	  a	  Less	  Determinate	  
Theoretical	  World,	  63	  Antitrust	  Law	  Journal	  669	  (1995);	  B.Baker,	  A	  preface	  to	  Post-­‐Chicago	  antitrust,	  in	  Post-­‐
Chicago	  developments	  in	  Antitrust	  Law,	  Antonio	  Cucinotta	  et	  al.	  (eds.)	  (2000),	  at	  60.	  
971	  J.F.Brodley,	  op.cit.,	  at	  1033.	  
972	  Ibid.,	  at	  1034.	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leads	   to	   a	  particular	  outcome,	  namely	  output	   reduction,	   they	   indeed	   fail	   to	   tackle	   anticompetitive	  
conduct	  which	  creates	  other	  types	  of	  inefficiency.973	  	  
Thirdly,	  the	  Borkean	  theory	  is	  a	  static	  approach	  focusing	  on	  market	  prices	  and	  on	  the	  maximization	  
of	   social	   wealth	   at	   a	   fixed	   point	   in	   time.974	   It	   is,	   however,	   commonly	   recognized	   that	   dynamic	  
efficiency	  provides	  the	  greatest	  enhancement	  of	  social	  wealth	  over	  time.975	  Innovation	  leads	  not	  only	  
to	  cost	  reduction	  but	  also	  to	  higher	  product	  quality	  and	  diversity.	  Those	  elements	  enlarge	  consumer	  
choices	   and	   thereby	   contribute	   to	   consumer	  welfare	   to	   the	   same	   extent	   as	   low	   prices.	   As	   Robert	  
Lande	   argues,	   consumer	  welfare	   does	   not	   only	   refer	   to	   consumer	   surplus	   but	   also	   include	   various	  
non-­‐price	  product	  variables	  which	  are	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration	  by	  competition	  authorities.976	  In	  
addition	  to	  ignoring	  the	  wealth	  transfer	  issue	  between	  producers	  and	  consumers,	  the	  Chicago	  School	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
973	  E.M.Fox,	  The	  efficiency	  paradox,	  in	  How	  the	  Chicago	  School	  overshot	  the	  mark	  –	  The	  effect	  of	  conservative	  
economic	  analysis	  on	  U.S.	  antitrust,	  Robert	  Pitofsky	  (ed.)	  (2008),	  at	  77-­‐88.	  Practices	  which	  do	  not	  lead	  to	  
output	  reduction	  but	  affect	  the	  openness	  of	  the	  markets	  or	  restrict	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  rivalry	  among	  firms	  are	  
also	  likely	  to	  affect	  adversely	  market	  efficiency,	  especially	  dynamic	  efficiency.	  	  
974	  O.E.Williamson,	  Economies	  as	  an	  Antitrust	  Defense	  :	  The	  Welfare	  Tradeoffs,	  58	  American	  Economic	  Review	  
18,	  at	  29-­‐31	  (1968)	  
975	  See	  :	  J.F.Brodley,	  op.cit..	  According	  to	  Brodley,	  the	  promotion	  of	  innovation	  efficiency	  should	  be	  the	  first	  
economic	  goal	  of	  antitrust	  policy.	  In	  fact,	  Schumpeter	  was	  the	  first	  to	  emphasize	  the	  central	  role	  of	  innovation	  
in	  firms’	  productivity	  growth.	  See:	  J.Schumpeter,	  Capitalism,	  socialism	  and	  democracy	  (1942).	  According	  to	  
him,	  the	  harm	  caused	  to	  the	  economy	  by	  restraints	  on	  innovation	  can	  be	  much	  greater	  than	  the	  social	  costs	  
resulting	  from	  static	  resource	  misallocation.	  Different	  authors	  have	  agreed	  with	  that	  theory.	  See	  for	  examples:	  
R.M.Solow,	  Technical	  Change	  and	  the	  Aggregate	  Production	  Function,	  39	  Revue	  of	  Economics	  and	  Statistics	  312	  
(1957);	  P.Aghion	  &	  P.Howitt,	  Capital,	  Innovation,	  and	  Growth	  Accounting,	  23	  Oxford	  Revue	  of	  Economic	  Policy	  
79	  (2007).	  Schumpeter	  also	  considered	  that	  large	  firms	  with	  market	  power	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  enhance	  
innovation	  as	  they	  are	  better	  able	  to	  pursue	  successfully	  research	  and	  development	  projects.	  In	  addition,	  the	  
fewer	  the	  rivals,	  the	  grower	  the	  incentive	  the	  dominant	  firm	  will	  have	  to	  engage	  in	  innovative	  activities	  as	  the	  
returns	  on	  innovation	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  higher.	  On	  that	  matter,	  see	  also:	  P.Gayle,	  Market	  concentration	  and	  
innovation:	  new	  empirical	  evidence	  on	  the	  Schumpeterian	  hypothesis,	  Center	  for	  Economic	  Analysis	  Working	  
Papers,	  No	  01-­‐14,	  University	  of	  Colorado	  (2004),	  available	  at:	  
http://www.colorado.edu/econ/papers/paper01/wp01-­‐14.pdf	  	  The	  assumption	  that	  monopoly	  rather	  than	  
competition	  promotes	  innovation	  was	  contested	  in	  particular	  by	  Kenneth	  Arrow	  who	  maintained	  that	  the	  
monopolist	  has	  less	  incentive	  for	  innovation	  because	  a	  loss	  of	  self-­‐substitution	  exists.	  Competitors	  have	  indeed	  
nothing	  to	  lose	  from	  innovation	  while	  the	  monopolist	  takes	  into	  account	  that	  innovation	  will	  replace	  part	  of	  its	  
existing	  technology.	  See:	  K.J.Arrow,	  Economic	  welfare	  and	  allocation	  of	  resources	  for	  innovation,	  in	  The	  rate	  
and	  direction	  of	  economic	  activities:	  Economic	  and	  social	  factors,	  Richard	  Nelson	  ed.	  (1962),	  at	  609.	  The	  
dominant	  answer	  to	  the	  issue	  concerning	  the	  relationship	  between	  market	  structure	  and	  the	  rate	  of	  innovation	  
seems	  to	  be	  that	  the	  innovation	  curve	  is	  an	  inverted	  “U”	  with	  innovation	  occurring	  at	  the	  fastest	  pace	  in	  
moderately	  concentrated	  markets.	  See:	  P.Aghion,	  N.Bloom,	  R.Blundell,	  R.Griffith	  and	  P.Howitt.	  Competition	  
And	  Innovation:	  An	  Inverted-­‐U	  Relationship,	  120	  Quarterly	  Journal	  of	  Economics	  701	  (2005)	  
976	  According	  to	  Robert	  Lande,	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  antitrust	  law	  is	  “consumer	  choice”.	  That	  objective	  is	  
attained	  when	  the	  consumer	  “has	  the	  power	  to	  define	  his	  or	  her	  own	  wants	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  satisfy	  these	  
wants	  at	  competitive	  prices”.	  See	  on	  that	  matter:	  N.W.Averitt	  &	  R.H.Lande,	  Consumer	  Sovereignty:	  A	  Unified	  
Theory	  of	  Antitrust	  and	  consumer	  Protection	  Law,	  65	  Antitrust	  Law	  Journal	  713	  (1997);	  N.W.Averitt	  &	  
R.H.Lande,	  Using	  the	  “Consumer	  Choice”	  Approach	  to	  Antitrust	  Law,	  74	  Antitrust	  Law	  Journal	  175	  (2007);	  
Kirkwood	  &	  Lande,	  The	  fundamental	  goal	  of	  antitrust:	  Protecting	  consumers,	  not	  increasing	  efficiency,	  84	  Notre	  
Dame	  Law	  Review	  191	  (2008);	  R.H.Lande,	  Wealth	  transfers	  as	  the	  original	  and	  primary	  concern	  of	  antitrust:	  The	  
efficiency	  interpretation	  challenged,	  34	  Hastings	  Law	  Journal	  65	  (1982);	  R.H.Lande,	  Consumer	  Choice	  as	  the	  
Ultimate	  Goal	  of	  Antitrust,	  62	  University	  of	  Pittsburgh	  Law	  Review	  506	  (2001).	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antitrust	   theory	   disregards	   the	   long-­‐term	  benefits	   of	   the	   latter,	  moving	   even	   further	   away	   from	   a	  
true	  consumer	  welfare	  objective.	  	  
Finally,	  competition	  policy	  cannot	  be	  limited	  to	  economics	  as	  conceived	  by	  Chicagoans	  who	  use	  law	  
as	   an	   instrumental	   tool	   to	   achieve	   an	   economic	   model.977	   Conversely,	   economics	   should	   serve	  
competition	  law	  by	  helping	  authorities	  to	  promote	  values	  which	  go	  beyond	  allocative	  efficiency.978	  
Where	  economics	   is	  playing	  a	  growing	   role	   in	   the	  enforcement	  of	   the	  competition	   rules	  and	  helps	  
authorities	  to	  assess	  more	  accurately	  the	  effects	  of	  business	  practices	  on	  the	  markets,	  it	  remains	  that	  
the	  ultimate	  objective	  of	  competition	  law	  is	  rarely	  efficiency	  as	  such	  but	  rather	  consumer	  welfare	  in	  
its	  literal	  sense	  of	  consumer	  well-­‐being.	  
4. Consumer	  welfare	  	  
Contrary	   to	   the	   standard	  put	   forward	  by	   the	  Chicago	   School,	   a	   true	   consumer	  welfare	   standard	   is	  
sensitive	   to	   the	   distribution	   consequences	   that	   firms’	   conduct	   may	   entail.	   Under	   that	   approach,	  
efficiencies	  generated	  by	  a	  single	  or	  collective	  practice	  will	  be	  positively	  appraised	  only	   in	  so	  far	  as	  
they	   translate	   into	   consumer	   benefits.	   Accordingly,	   the	   right	   balance	   is	   to	   be	   struck	   between	   the	  
positive	  and	  negative	  effects	  of	  business	  conduct	  on	  consumers.	  Only	  those	  practices	  which	  generate	  
sufficient	   benefits	   for	   consumers	   so	   as	   to	   outweigh	   any	  harmful	   effect	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   allowed	  by	  
competition	   enforcers.	   As	   a	   result,	   practices	   which	   enhance	   aggregate	   welfare	   but	   also	   cause	   an	  
unfair	  transfer	  of	  wealth	  from	  consumers	  to	  producers	  are	  to	  be	  held	  illegal,	  unless	  consumer	  harm	  is	  
fully	  compensated	  by	  other	  benefits.979	  Under	  that	  approach,	  antitrust	  authorities	  are	  concerned,	  not	  
about	  allocative	   inefficiency,	  but	   rather	  about	   the	   transfer	  of	   surplus	   from	  consumers	   to	  cartels	  or	  
monopolists980	   and	   about	   the	   negative	   impact	   firms’	   conduct	   may	   have	   on	   the	   other	   aspects	   of	  
consumer	  welfare	  such	  as	  choice,	  quality	  and	  diversity.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
977	  L.Boy,	  Abuse	  of	  market	  power	  :	  controlling	  dominance	  or	  protecting	  competition	  ?,	  in	  The	  evolution	  of	  
European	  competition	  saw	  –	  Whose	  regulation,	  which	  competition?,	  Hanns	  Ullrich	  (ed.)	  (2006),	  at	  223.	  
978	  E.Buttigieg,	  op.cit.,	  at	  30.	  
979	  J.B.Kirkwook	  &	  R.H.Lande,	  The	  fundamental	  goal	  of	  antitrust:	  Protecting	  consumers,	  not	  increasing	  
efficiency,	  84	  Notre	  Dame	  law	  Review	  191,	  at	  201	  (2008).	  The	  authors	  assimilate	  such	  transfer	  of	  wealth	  to	  a	  
robbery	  which	  is	  to	  be	  condemned	  not	  because	  stealing	  is	  inefficient	  but	  because	  it	  is	  a	  taking	  of	  property	  
without	  consent	  and	  without	  compensation.	  
980	  J.B.Kirkwood	  &	  R.H.Lande,	  The	  Chicago	  School’s	  foundation	  is	  flawed:	  antitrust	  protect	  consumers,	  not	  
efficiency,	  in	  How	  the	  Chicago	  School	  overshot	  the	  mark	  –	  The	  effect	  of	  conservative	  economic	  analysis	  on	  U.S.	  
antitrust,	  Robert	  Pitofsky	  (ed.)	  (2008),	  at	  92.	  According	  to	  the	  authors,	  when	  enacting	  the	  Sherman	  Act,	  the	  
U.S.	  Congress	  did	  not	  intent	  to	  promote	  allocative	  efficiency,	  as	  argued	  by	  Bork,	  but	  “to	  prevent	  conduct	  that	  
deprives	  consumers	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  competition	  and	  transfers	  their	  wealth	  to	  firms	  with	  market	  power”.	  (at	  
93)	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We	  will	  see	   in	  the	  next	  section	  that	  such	  balancing	  test	  constitutes	  the	  main	  approach	  followed	  by	  
the	  Commission	  and	  the	  European	  Courts	  in	  their	  assessment	  under	  Article	  101	  and	  102	  TFEU	  as	  well	  
as	  in	  merger	  cases.	  	  
B. ARTICULATION	   OF	   COMPETITION	   OBJECTIVES	   IN	   EU	   LAW:	   ECONOMIC	   EFFICIENCY,	  
CONSUMER	  WELFARE	  AND	  PROTECTION	  OF	  THE	  COMPETITION	  PROCESS	  	  
In	  European	  law,	  competition	  policy	  is	  supposed	  to	  protect	  competition	  as	  a	  process,	  the	  outcome	  of	  
which	  must	  be	  efficiency	  and	  welfare,	  consumer	  welfare	  being	  the	  primary	  objective.	  As	  maintained	  
by	  the	  former	  competition	  commissioner	  Neelie	  Kroes:	  	  
“Consumer	   welfare	   is	   now	   well	   established	   as	   the	   standard	   the	   Commission	   applies	  
when	   assessing	   mergers	   and	   infringements	   of	   the	   Treaty	   rules	   on	   cartels	   and	  
monopolies.	   Our	   aim	   is	   simple:	   to	   protect	   competition	   in	   the	   market	   as	   a	   means	   of	  
enhancing	   consumer	   welfare	   and	   ensuring	   an	   efficient	   allocation	   of	   resources.	   An	  
effects-­‐based	   approach,	   grounded	   in	   solid	   economics,	   ensures	   that	   citizens	   enjoy	   the	  
benefits	  of	  a	  competitive,	  dynamic	  market	  economy.”981	  	  
Consumer	  welfare	  is	  hence	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  competition	  policy	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  competition	  
process	  is	  deemed	  to	  be	  the	  best	  instrument	  to	  achieve	  that	  objective.	  However,	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  
that	   competition	   gives	   consumers	   long-­‐term	   benefits,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	   proof	   of	   direct	   and	  
immediate	   consumer	   harm	   or	   benefit	   is	   not	   necessarily	   conclusive	   that	   a	   practice	   is	   anti-­‐	   or	  
procompetitive	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  European	  authorities	  which	  focus	  rather	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  
competition	  process.	  
1. Focus	  on	  consumer	  welfare	  but…	  
It	  emerges	  clearly	  from	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  from	  the	  texts	  implementing	  the	  competition	  rules	  
as	  well	  as	   from	  the	  various	  guidelines	  and	  declarations	  of	  the	  Commission	  that	  the	  objective	  of	  EU	  
competition	  law	  is	  to	  protect	  consumer	  well-­‐being	  in	  its	  literal	  sense.	  However,	  economic	  efficiency	  
arguments	   are	   not	   set	   aside	   for	   all	   that.	   To	   the	   opposite,	   those	   last	   years,	   stronger	   emphasis	   has	  
been	   placed	   on	   economics	   in	   the	   enforcement	   of	   the	   competition	   rules.	   Shifting	   from	   a	   legalistic	  
approach	   to	  an	  effects-­‐based	  approach,	  EU	  authorities	   rely	   indeed	  greatly	  on	  economic	  analysis	   in	  
the	   assessment	   of	   business	   conduct	   in	   order	   to	  measure	   the	   likely	   effects	   of	   such	   conduct	   on	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
981	  N.Kroes,	  Delivering	  better	  markets	  and	  better	  choices,	  Speech/05/512,	  European	  Consumer	  and	  
Competition	  Day,	  London,	  15	  September	  2005,	  available	  at:	  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-­‐release_SPEECH-­‐05-­‐
512_en.htm.	  See	  also:	  P.Lowe,	  Consumer	  welfare	  and	  efficiency	  –	  new	  guiding	  principles	  of	  competition	  policy?,	  
Speech	  given	  at	  the	  13th	  International	  Conference	  on	  Competition	  and	  14th	  European	  Competition	  Day,	  Munich,	  
27	  March	  2007,	  available	  at:	  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2007_02_en.pdf	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market.982	   It	   appears	   clearly	   from	   the	   various	   guidelines	   adopted	   for	   the	   application	   of	   the	  
competition	  rules	  that	  economic	  criteria	  such	  as	  the	  market	  power	  of	  firms	  and	  other	  factors	  relating	  
to	  the	  market	  structure	  constitute	  key	  elements	  of	  the	  assessment	  under	  the	  Treaty	  provisions	  and	  
the	  Merger	  Regulation.983	   	  Except	  for	  hardcore	  restrictions,	  the	  economics-­‐based	  approach	  requires	  
therefore	  that	  the	  Commission	  examines	  carefully	  the	  actual	  or	  potential	  effects	  of	  a	  firm’s	  conduct	  
on	  competition	  by	  taking	  into	  account	  all	  the	  circumstances	  specific	  to	  the	  case	  at	  hand,	   instead	  of	  
condemning	  as	  such	  some	  practices	  because	  of	  their	  supposed	  anticompetitive	  effects.	  	  
In	  the	  overall	  assessment	  of	  the	  foreseeable	  impact	  on	  the	  market,	  the	  negative	  effects	  but	  also	  the	  
efficiency	  gains	  generated	  by	  the	  practice	  are	  taken	  into	  account	  and	  balanced	  against	  each	  other.	  It	  
is	  indeed	  recognized	  that	  agreements,	  mergers	  or	  single-­‐firm	  conduct	  that	  restrict	  competition	  may	  
at	  the	  same	  time	  entail	  pro-­‐competitive	  effects.	  Such	  behavior	  may	  lead	  to	  efficiencies	  by	  lowering	  
cost	   of	   producing	   output,	   improving	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   product	   or	   helping	   firms	   to	   create	   new	  
products.984	  However,	   the	   focus	   is	  not	  on	  aggregate	  welfare	  but	  on	  consumer	  well-­‐being	   so	   that	  a	  
restrictive	   practice	   will	   be	   deemed	   on	   balance	   pro-­‐competitive	   only	   if	   the	   resulting	   benefits	   	   are	  
passed	   on	   to	   consumers	   and	   at	   least	   compensate	   them	   for	   any	   negative	   impact	   caused	   by	   the	  
restriction.	  Such	  consumer	  pass-­‐on	  requirement	  is	  one	  of	  the	  four	  conditions	  to	  be	  met,	  according	  to	  
Article	  101(3)	  TFEU,	  to	  exempt	  an	  anticompetitive	  agreement	  from	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  101(1)	  
TFEU.985	  The	  overall	  benchmark	  in	  assessing	  efficiency	  claims,	  which	  also	  applies	  in	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  
and	  in	  merger	  cases986,	  is	  that	  consumers	  are	  not	  worse	  off	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  practice	  in	  question.	  In	  
addition,	  the	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU	  make	  clear	  that	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
982	  See:	  D.Hildebrand,	  The	  role	  of	  economic	  analysis	  in	  the	  EC	  competition	  rules,	  3rd	  ed.	  (2009);	  D.Geradin,	  EU	  
competition	  law	  and	  economics	  (2012).	  
983	  See,	  in	  particular:	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  81(3)	  of	  the	  Treaty	  (Text	  with	  EEA	  relevance),	  O.J.	  
C	  101	  of	  27/04/2004;	  Commission	  notice	  -­‐	  Guidelines	  on	  vertical	  restraints,	  SEC(2010)411,	  O.J.	  C	  130	  of	  
19/05/2010;	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  applicability	  of	  Article	  101	  of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  the	  Functioning	  of	  the	  European	  
Union	  to	  horizontal	  co-­‐operation	  agreements,	  O.J.	  C	  11/1	  of	  04/01/2011;	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission	  
–	  Guidance	  on	  the	  Commission’s	  enforcement	  priorities	  in	  applying	  Article	  102	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty	  to	  abusive	  
exclusionary	  conduct	  bye	  dominant	  undertakings	  (Text	  with	  EEA	  relevance),	  O.J.	  C	  45/7	  of	  24/02/2009;	  
Guidelines	  on	  the	  assessment	  of	  horizontal	  mergers	  under	  the	  Council	  Regulation	  on	  the	  control	  of	  
concentrations	  between	  undertakings,	  O.J.	  C	  31	  of	  05/02/2004;	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  assessment	  of	  non-­‐
horizontal	  mergers	  under	  the	  Council	  Regulation	  on	  the	  control	  of	  concentrations	  between	  undertakings,	  O.J.	  C	  
265	  of	  18/10/2008.	  
984	  See	  :	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  81(3)	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  at	  33.	  
985	  For	  more	  details,	  see	  :	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  81(3)	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  at	  83-­‐105.	  The	  
other	  three	  conditions	  are	  the	  following:	  (1)	  the	  agreement	  must	  contribute	  to	  improving	  the	  production	  or	  
distribution	  of	  goods	  or	  contribute	  to	  promoting	  technical	  or	  economic	  progress;	  (2)	  the	  restriction	  must	  be	  
indispensable	  to	  the	  attainment	  of	  these	  objectives;	  and	  (3)	  the	  agreement	  must	  not	  afford	  the	  parties	  the	  
possibility	  of	  eliminating	  competition	  in	  respect	  of	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  the	  products	  in	  question.	  That	  last	  
condition	  will	  be	  further	  examined	  below.	  
986	  See	  :	  Guidance	  on	  the	  Commission’s	  enforcement	  priorities	  in	  applying	  Article	  102	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  
at	  28-­‐31;	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  assessment	  of	  horizontal	  mergers,	  op.cit.,	  at	  76-­‐89.	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“cost	  savings	  and	  other	  gains	  to	  the	  parties	  that	  arise	  from	  the	  mere	  exercise	  of	  market	  
power	  do	  not	  give	  rise	  to	  objective	  benefits	  and	  cannot	  be	  taken	  into	  account.”987	  	  
The	   firms’	   increased	   profit	   resulting	   not	   from	   efficiencies	   but	   from	   an	   unfair	   transfer	   of	  wealth	   is	  
therefore	  in	  no	  way	  positively	  appraised	  by	  the	  Commission.	  
Economic	   efficiencies	   play	   thus	   an	   important	   role	   in	   the	   assessment	   of	   business	   conduct.	   If	   they	  
outweigh	  the	  negative	  effects	  and	  are	  sufficient	  to	  guarantee	  that	  no	  net	  harm	  to	  consumers	  is	  likely	  
to	  arise,	  they	  may	  indeed	  turn	  an	  anticompetitive	  practice	  into	  a	  procompetitive	  one.	  The	  economic	  
analysis	   is	   in	   fact	  used	  as	  an	   instrument	  to	  assess	  the	  overall	   impact	  on	  competition	  and	  to	  ensure	  
that	  consumer	  welfare	  is	  protected.	  Any	  efficiency	  claim	  is	  subject	  to	  that	  more	  global	  objective.	  	  
2. …	  consumer	  harm/benefit	  is	  not	  a	  benchmark	  
Even	   though	  consumer	  welfare	   is	   the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  EU	  competition	   law,	   the	  direct	  effect	   that	  a	  
practice	  may	  have	  on	  consumers	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  metric	  used	  to	  assess	  whether	  such	  a	  practice	  
is	  pro-­‐	  or	  anticompetitive.	  Accordingly,	  the	  absence	  of	  consumer	  harm	  or	  the	  proof	  of	   (short-­‐term)	  
consumer	  benefits	  does	  not	  necessarily	  preclude	  the	  finding	  of	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  competition	  rules.	  
In	  some	  cases,	  short-­‐term	  consumer	  harm	  can	  even	  be	  tolerated	  if	  the	  practice	  causing	  such	  harm	  is	  
likely	  to	  give	  rise	  to	  sufficient	  benefits	  in	  the	  future.	  
a) No	  proof	  of	  consumer	  harm	  required	  	  
In	  different	  cases,	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  pointed	  out	  that	  a	  practice	  can	  be	  held	  contrary	  to	  the	  Treaty	  
provisions,	   even	   though	   no	   consumer	   harm	   has	   been	   established.	   The	   Glaxosmithkline	   case,	  
mentioned	  above	  when	  examining	  the	  market	  integration	  goal,	  is	  one	  of	  those.	  The	  Court	  overturned	  
the	  reasoning	  of	  the	  General	  Court	  and	  maintained	  that	  any	  conduct	   limiting	  or	  prohibiting	  parallel	  
trade	  constitutes	  restriction	  of	  competition,	  no	  matter	  the	  absence	  of	  consumer	  harm	  resulting	  from	  
such	  restriction.	  Referring	  to	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  Treaty	  provisions	  and	  to	  the	  European	  case-­‐law,	  the	  
Court	  asserted:	  	  
“First	  of	  all,	  there	  is	  nothing	  in	  [article	  101(1)]	  to	  indicate	  that	  only	  those	  agreements	  
which	  deprive	  consumers	  of	  certain	  advantages	  may	  have	  an	  anti-­‐competitive	  object.	  
Secondly,	  it	  must	  be	  borne	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  Court	  has	  held	  that,	  like	  other	  competition	  
rules	  laid	  down	  in	  the	  Treaty,	  [Article	  101	  TFEU]	  aims	  to	  protect	  not	  only	  the	  interests	  
of	  competitors	  or	  of	  consumers,	  but	  also	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  market	  and,	  in	  so	  doing,	  
competition	   as	   such.	   Consequently,	   for	   a	   finding	   that	   an	   agreement	   has	   an	   anti-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
987	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  81(3)	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  at	  49.	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competitive	   object,	   it	   is	   not	   necessary	   that	   final	   consumers	   be	   deprived	   of	   the	  
advantages	  of	  effective	  competition	  in	  terms	  of	  supply	  or	  price.”988	  	  
If	   such	   statement	   is	  evident	   concerning	  agreements	   restricting	   competition	  by	  object	   -­‐	   since	   those	  
are	  prohibited	  whatever	  their	  effects	  on	  the	  market	  -­‐,	  the	  same	  reasoning	  yet	  applies	  to	  all	  types	  of	  
collusive	  arrangements	  as	  well	  as	  to	  abusive	  conduct.	  Already	  in	  Continental	  Can	  and	  in	  Hoffman-­‐La	  
Roche,	   the	  Court	   refused	   to	  base	   its	  assessment	  on	   the	  direct	  harm	  a	  practice	   is	   likely	   to	  cause	   to	  
consumers.	  Maintaining	  that	  the	  Treaty	  provisions	  on	  competition	  must	  be	  interpreted	  and	  applied	  
in	  the	   light	  of	   the	  former	  Article	  3(1)(g)	  of	   the	  EC	  Treaty	   -­‐	  which	  provided	  that	  the	  activities	  of	   the	  
Community	   shall	   include	   the	   “institution	   of	   a	   system	   ensuring	   that	   competition	   in	   the	   common	  
market	  is	  not	  distorted”	  -­‐,	  the	  Court	  considered	  that	  those	  provisions	  cover	  not	  only	  practices	  which	  
may	   directly	   prejudice	   consumers	   but	   also	   those	   which	   are	   indirectly	   detrimental	   to	   them	   by	  
impairing	  the	  effective	  competitive	  structure	  as	  envisaged	  by	  Article	  3(1)(g)	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty.989	  	  
One	  may	   think	   that,	  as	   those	   last	  years	   the	  European	   institutions	  have	  put	   to	  a	  greater	  extent	   the	  
focus	  on	  consumer	  welfare	  and	  on	  an	  effects-­‐based	  analysis,	  the	  current	  approach	  followed	  by	  the	  
Commission	   would	   require	   proof	   of	   direct	   harm	   to	   consumers	   before	   condemning	   a	   practice	   as	  
anticompetitive.	   It	   appears,	   however,	   from	   recent	   cases	   that	  nothing	  has	   changed	  on	   that	  matter.	  
The	   primary	   concern	   still	   remains	   on	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   competitive	   process	   while	   the	   direct	  
actual	  or	  potential	  impact	  of	  the	  firm’s	  conduct	  on	  consumers	  is	  generally	  not	  considered.990	  This	  is	  in	  
particular	  illustrated	  in	  the	  British	  Airways	  case	  where	  the	  Court	  of	  First	  Instance	  reaffirmed	  that	  	  
“[The	  Treaty]	  does	  not	  require	  it	  to	  be	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  conduct	   in	  question	  had	  
any	  actual	  or	  direct	  effect	  on	  consumers.	  Competition	  law	  concentrates	  upon	  protecting	  
the	  market	  structure	  from	  artificial	  distortions	  because	  by	  doing	  so	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  
consumer	  in	  the	  medium	  to	  long	  term	  are	  best	  protected.”991	  	  
The	   case	   was	   upheld	   on	   appeal	   by	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   ruling	   according	   to	   the	   opinion	   of	   the	  
Advocate	  General	  Kokott	  who	  maintained	  that:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
988	  Joined	  cases	  C-­‐501/06P,	  C-­‐513/06P,	  C-­‐515/06P	  and	  C-­‐519/06P,	  Glaxosmithkline	  Services	  Unlimited	  and	  
Ohters	  v.	  Commission	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐9291,	  at	  63.	  See	  also:	  C-­‐8/08,	  T-­‐Mobile	  Netherlands	  BV	  and	  Others	  v.	  Raad	  
van	  bestuur	  van	  de	  Nederlandse	  Mededingingsautoriteit	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐4529,	  at	  38-­‐39.	  
989	  Case	  6/72,	  Europemballage	  Corporation	  and	  Continental	  Can	  Company	  Inc.	  v.	  Commission	  [1973]	  ECR	  215,	  at	  
26	  and	  Case	  85/76,	  Hoffman-­‐La	  Roche	  v	  Commission	  [1979]	  ECR	  461,	  at	  125.	  See	  also:	  T-­‐228/97,	  Irish	  Sugar	  
[1999]	  ECR	  II-­‐2963,	  at	  232.	  
990	  See	  :	  P.Marsden	  &	  P.Whelan,	  “Consumer	  detriment”	  and	  its	  application	  in	  EC	  and	  UK	  competition	  law,	  27	  
European	  Competition	  Law	  Review	  569	  (2006).	  
991	  T-­‐219/99,	  British	  Airways	  v	  Commission	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐5917,	  at	  264.	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“The	   starting-­‐point	   here	   must	   be	   the	   protective	   purpose	   of	   Article	   [102	   TFEU].	   The	  
provision	   forms	   part	   of	   a	   system	   designed	   to	   protect	   competition	   within	   the	   internal	  
market	   from	   distortions	   (Article	   3(1)(g)	   EC).	   Accordingly,	   Article	   [102	   TFEU],	   like	   the	  
other	   competition	   rules	  of	   the	  Treaty,	   is	  not	  designed	  only	  or	  primarily	   to	  protect	   the	  
immediate	  interests	  of	  individual	  competitors	  or	  consumers,	  but	  to	  protect	  the	  structure	  
of	  the	  market	  and	  thus	  competition	  as	  such	  (as	  an	  institution),	  which	  has	  already	  been	  
weakened	   by	   the	   presence	   of	   the	   dominant	   undertaking	   on	   the	  market.	   In	   this	   way,	  
consumers	   are	   also	   indirectly	   protected.	   Because	   where	   competition	   as	   such	   is	  
damaged,	  disadvantages	  for	  consumers	  are	  also	  to	  be	  feared.”992	  	  
The	  proof	  of	  harm	  to	  the	  competitive	  process	  is	  therefore	  sufficient	  for	  the	  finding	  of	  a	  violation	  of	  
the	  competition	  rules	  as	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  such	  harm	  is	  detrimental	  to	  consumers	  as	  well.	  	  
b) Consumer	  benefits	  do	  not	  preclude	  the	  finding	  of	  anticompetitive	  conduct	  	  
Different	   types	  of	  practices	   are	   likely	   to	  be	  prohibited	  under	   the	  Treaty	  provisions	  on	   competition	  
although	  they	  appear	  beneficial	  to	  consumers	  in	  the	  short-­‐term.	  This	  is	  in	  particular	  the	  case	  where	  
the	  benefits	  offered	  to	  end-­‐users	  are	  not	  due	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  efficiencies	  but	  result	  merely	  from	  
the	   exercise	   of	   market	   power	   or	   aim	   at	   excluding	   competitors.	   It	   is	   recognized	   that	   the	   long-­‐run	  
interest	  of	   consumers	  may	  differ	   from	   the	   short-­‐run	  benefits,	   such	  as	   lower	  prices,	   a	   firm	  gives	   to	  
them	  in	  view	  of	  strengthening	   its	  position	  on	  the	  market.993	  Three	  examples	  can	  be	  pointed	  out	  to	  
illustrate	  such	  long-­‐term	  perspective	  followed	  by	  the	  Commission	  in	  its	  competition	  assessment.	  	  
First,	  buyer	  agreements	  to	  fix	  lower	  prices,	  quantities	  or	  to	  allocate	  sources	  of	  supply	  are	  prohibited	  
as	  hardcore	  restrictions	  even	  though	  they	  may	  lead	  to	  lower	  consumer	  prices.994	  Such	  arrangements	  
are	   indeed	   considered	   to	   eliminate	   the	   participants’	   autonomy	   in	   strategic	   decision-­‐making	   and	  
thereby	  to	  distort	  competition	  on	  the	  markets.	  	  
Secondly,	   fidelity	   rebates	   are	   generally	   condemned	   under	   Article	   102	   TFEU.	   The	   Commission	  
considers	  that	  those	  types	  of	  discounts	  may	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  harmful	  to	  consumers	  in	  the	  long-­‐run.995	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
992	  Opinion	  Advocate	  General	  Kokott,	  delivered	  on	  23	  February	  2006,	  C-­‐95/04P,	  British	  Airways	  plc	  v	  
Commission	  [2007]	  ECR	  I-­‐2331,	  at	  68.	  
993	  E.Buttigieg,	  op.cit.,at	  160.	  
994	  See	  :	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  I,	  Point	  B,	  1,	  a).	  
995	  See	  for	  examples:	  T-­‐219/99,	  British	  Airways	  v	  Commission	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐5917;	  T-­‐203/01,	  Manufacture	  
française	  des	  pneumatiques	  Michelin	  v	  Commission	  (Michelin	  II)	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐4071.	  Volume-­‐related	  discounts	  
schemes	  are	  in	  principle	  lawful	  provided	  they	  reflect	  costs	  savings/economies	  of	  scale.	  On	  the	  various	  types	  of	  
rebates	  and	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  European	  Courts	  on	  that	  matter,	  see	  :	  R.O’DONOGHUE	  &	  J.PADILLA,	  The	  law	  
and	  economics	  of	  Article	  82	  EC,	  2006,	  at	  374-­‐406.	  See	  also:	  OECD,	  Loyalty	  and	  Fidelity	  Discounts	  and	  Rebate,	  
Report,	  DAFFE/COMP(2002)21,	  2003;	  W.Tom,	  D.Balto	  &	  N.Averrit,	  Anticompetitive	  aspects	  of	  market-­‐share	  
discounts	  and	  other	  incentives	  to	  exclusive	  dealing,	  67	  Antitrust	  Law	  Journal	  615	  (2000);	  D.Spector,	  Loyalty	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The	  lower	  prices	  obtained	  by	  the	  latter	  are	  indeed	  conditional	  on	  their	  loyalty	  to	  a	  particular	  firm.	  As	  
a	  result,	  by	  inducing	  buyers	  to	  forego	  other	  sources	  of	  supply,	  the	  firm	  in	  question	  impedes	  access	  to	  
the	  market	  for	  competitors	  and	  thereby	  strengthens	  its	  position	  and	  the	  level	  of	  concentration	  in	  the	  
market,	   leading	   to	   a	   likely	   reduction	   in	   consumer	   choice	   in	   the	   longer-­‐term.996	   Lower	   consumer	  
prices	   can	   therefore	   not	   be	   taken	   as	   a	   benchmark	   to	   assess	   the	   overall	   impact	   of	   the	   practice	   on	  
competition.	  	  
Thirdly,	   the	   approach	   followed	   by	   the	   Commission	   and	   the	   European	   Courts	   in	   case	   of	   predatory	  
pricing	  also	   reveals	   that	   lower	  consumer	  prices	  do	  not	  constitute	  a	  conclusive	  argument.	  The	   legal	  
test	   used	   in	   predation	   cases	   includes	   two	   rules:	   (1)	   Price	   below	   average	   variable	   cost	   (AVC)	   is	  
presumed	  to	  be	  predatory;	  (2)	  price	  below	  average	  total	  cost	  (ATC)	  but	  above	  AVC	  is	  considered	  as	  
abusive	  if	  it	  is	  part	  of	  a	  plan	  for	  eliminating	  a	  competitor.997	  However,	  unlike	  in	  U.S.	  antitrust	  law998,	  
no	   recoupment	   condition	   is	   required	   in	   EU	   law	   so	   that,	   provided	   that	   one	   of	   the	   conditions	  
mentioned	  above	  is	  fulfilled,	  it	  is	  concluded	  to	  a	  pricing	  abuse	  even	  though	  the	  firm	  has	  no	  realistic	  
chance	  of	  recouping	  it	  losses.999	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  asserted	  in	  Tetra	  Pak	  II	  that	  	  
«	  it	   must	   be	   possible	   to	   penalize	   predatory	   pricing	   whenever	   there	   is	   a	   risk	   that	  
competitors	  will	  be	  eliminated.	   (…)	  The	  aim	  pursued,	  which	   is	   to	  maintain	  undistorted	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
rebates:	  an	  assessment	  of	  competition	  concerns	  and	  a	  proposed	  structured	  rule	  of	  reason,	  1	  Competition	  Policy	  
International	  89	  (2005);	  C.Ahlborn	  &	  D.Bailey,	  Discounts,	  rebates	  and	  selective	  pricing	  by	  dominant	  firms:	  A	  
trans-­‐Atlantic	  comparison,	  2	  European	  Competition	  Journal	  101	  (2006).	  
996	  E.Buttigieg,	  op.cit.,	  at	  218-­‐219.	  
997	  See	  for	  examples	  :	  C-­‐62/86,	  AKZO	  Chemie	  BV	  v	  Commission	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐3359,	  at	  70	  et	  seq.;	  T-­‐83/91,	  Tetra	  
Pak	  International	  SA	  v	  Commission	  [1994]	  ECR	  II-­‐755,	  at	  150,	  on	  appeal	  Case	  C-­‐333/94	  P,	  Tetra	  Pak	  
International	  SA	  c	  Commission	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐5951;	  Joined	  cases	  T-­‐24/93,	  T-­‐25/93,	  T-­‐26/93,	  and	  T-­‐28/93,	  
Colmpagnie	  Maritime	  Belge	  Transports	  SA	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  [1996]	  ECR	  II-­‐1201,	  at	  139-­‐141,	  on	  appeal	  
Joined	  cases	  C-­‐395/96	  P	  and	  C-­‐396/96	  P,	  Compangie	  Maritime	  Belge	  Transports	  SA,	  Compagnie	  Maritime	  Belge	  
SA	  and	  Dafra-­‐Line	  A/S	  v	  Commission	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐1365;	  Case	  COMP/38.233,	  Wanadoo	  Interactive,	  Commission	  
Decision	  of	  16	  July	  2003.	  See	  also:	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission	  –	  Guidance	  on	  the	  Commission’s	  
enforcement	  priorities	  in	  applying	  Article	  102	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty	  to	  abusive	  exclusionary	  conduct	  bye	  dominant	  
undertakings	  (Text	  with	  EEA	  relevance),	  O.J.	  C	  45/7	  of	  24/02/2009,	  at	  63-­‐74.	  
998	  See	  :	  Brooke	  Group	  Ltd	  v	  Brown	  &	  Williamson	  Tobacco	  Corp,	  509	  US	  209,	  225	  (1993).	  The	  greater	  reluctance	  
of	  US	  courts	  to	  consider	  pricing	  conduct	  as	  predatory	  may	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  Chicago	  School	  
which	  alleges	  that	  predatory	  pricing	  schemes	  are	  rarely	  tried	  as	  they	  are	  too	  speculative	  and	  rarely	  successful	  
so	  that	  they	  do	  not	  constitute	  a	  rational	  strategy.	  See:	  H.Schweitzer,	  The	  history,	  interpretation	  and	  underlying	  
principles	  of	  Section	  2	  Sherman	  Act	  and	  Article	  82	  EC,	  EUI	  Working	  Paper	  (2007),	  published	  in	  Claus-­‐Dieter	  
Ehlermann	  and	  Mel	  Marquis	  (eds.),	  European	  Competition	  Law	  Annual	  2007:	  A	  reformed	  approach	  of	  Article	  82	  
EC,	  pp.119-­‐164,	  available	  at:	  http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2007(pdf)/200709-­‐COMPed-­‐
Schweitzer.pdf,	  at	  31.	  
999	  On	  the	  concept	  of	  predation	  in	  EU	  competition	  law,	  see	  for	  examples	  :	  J.Glöckner,	  Predatory	  pricing	  and	  
recoupment	  under	  EU	  competition	  law:	  per	  se	  rules,	  underlying	  assumptions	  and	  the	  reality:	  results	  of	  an	  
experimental	  study,	  31	  European	  Competition	  Law	  Review	  423	  (2010);	  A.Mateus,	  Predatory	  pricing:	  a	  proposed	  
structured	  rule	  of	  reason,	  7	  European	  Competition	  Journal	  243	  (2011).	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competition,	   rules	   out	  waiting	   until	   such	   a	   strategy	   leads	   to	   the	   actual	   elimination	   of	  
competitors.	  »1000	  	  
It	  is	  hence	  sufficient	  to	  prove	  an	  intention	  to	  eliminate	  competitors	  –	  which	  is	  presumed	  if	  prices	  are	  
below	  AVC1001	  –	  to	  prove	  the	  abusive	  character	  of	  a	  pricing	  policy,	  regardless	  whether	  that	  result	   is	  
achieved	  or	  not.	  
All	   those	   examples	   show	   that	   business	   conduct	   leading	   to	   lower	   consumer	   prices	   does	   not	  
necessarily	  fall	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  Treaty	  rules	  on	  competition.	  The	  conflict	  between	  the	  short-­‐
term	  and	   long-­‐term	   interests	  of	   consumers	   is	   resolved	   in	   favor	  of	   the	   latter.	  This	   requires	   in	   some	  
cases	   to	   rule	   out	   practices	   which	   are	   likely	   to	   eliminate	   competitors	   and	   affect	   the	   competitive	  
structure	  of	  the	  market,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  may	  be	  beneficial	  to	  consumers	  in	  the	  short-­‐run.	  
Low	  prices	  are	  indeed	  not	  the	  only	  parameter	  included	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  consumer	  welfare.	  Other	  sort	  
of	  damage	  has	  also	  to	  be	  considered,	  such	  as	  a	  reduction	   in	  consumer	  choice	  or	   innovation,	  which	  
may	   result	   from	   the	   eviction	   of	   competitors.1002	   Consequently,	   when	   the	   Commission	   and	   the	  
European	  Courts	  condemned	  practices	  in	  cases	  where	  no	  consumer	  harm	  had	  been	  proved	  or	  where	  
consumers	  were	  guaranteed	  to	  benefit	   from	  lower	  prices	  as	  a	  result	  of	   those	  practices,	   they	  did	   in	  
fact	  consider	  that	  consumer	  welfare	  was	  endangered	  but	  in	  a	  less	  visible	  way,	  that	  is	  in	  a	  longer-­‐term	  
perspective	  or	  through	  a	  reduction	  in	  choice,	  quality,	  diversity	  or	  innovation.	  
c) Consumer	  harm	  is	  not	  necessarily	  equivalent	  to	  competition	  harm	  	  
Where	  direct	  benefits	  to	  consumers	  are	  not	  sufficient	  to	  characterize	  a	  practice	  as	  pro-­‐competitive,	  
conversely,	   it	   is	  not	  excluded	  that	  a	  practice	   leading	  to	  consumer	  harm	  will	  be	  exempted	  from	  the	  
prohibitions	   contained	   in	   the	   EU	   competition	   rules.	   Again,	   the	   main	   concerns	   are	   the	   long-­‐term	  
interests	  of	  consumers.	  Competition	  authorities	  may	  sometimes	  refrain	  themselves	  from	  blocking	  or	  
condemning	  some	  initiatives	  that	  cause	   immediate	  harmful	  effects	  to	  consumers	  when	   it	   turns	  out	  
that	   the	   same	  practices	  are	   likely	   to	  entail	   long-­‐term	  deferred	  positive	  effects,	   in	  particular	  due	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1000	  C-­‐333/94	  P,	  Tetra	  Pak	  International	  SA	  c	  Commission	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐5951,	  at	  44.	  	  
1001	  In	  such	  as	  case,	  it	  is	  considered	  that	  there	  is	  no	  conceivable	  economic	  purpose	  other	  than	  the	  elimination	  
of	  a	  competitor.	  	  
1002	  See:	  P.Nihoul,	  Freedom	  of	  choice:	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  powerful	  concept	  in	  European	  competition	  law	  
(2012),	  available	  at:	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2077694	  	  In	  different	  cases,	  the	  
limitation	  of	  the	  choices	  available	  to	  consumers	  was	  considered	  as	  outweighing	  the	  reduction	  in	  consumer	  
prices.	  See	  for	  example:	  Wanadoo	  Interactive,	  Case	  COMP/38.233,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  16	  July	  2003.	  
Decision	  upheld	  on	  appeal	  by	  the	  General	  Court	  and	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice:	  T-­‐340/03,	  France	  Télécom	  SA	  v	  
Commission	  [2007]	  ECR	  II-­‐107	  and	  C-­‐202/07	  P,	  France	  Télécom	  SA	  v	  Commission	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐2369.	  The	  issue	  of	  
consumer	  choice	  was	  also	  highlighted	  in	  other	  cases.	  See	  for	  examples:	  Microsoft,	  Case	  COMP/C-­‐3/37792,	  
Commission	  Decision	  of	  24	  March	  2004	  (On	  appeal,	  see:	  T-­‐201/04,	  Microsoft	  Corp.	  v	  Commission	  [2007]	  ECR	  II-­‐
3601);	  Intel,	  Case	  COMP/C-­‐3/37.990,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  13	  March	  2009.	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the	   substantial	   productive	   and	   innovative	   efficiencies	   they	   generate.1003	   In	   its	   Guidelines	   on	   the	  
application	   of	   Article	   101(3)	   TFEU,	   the	   Commission	   refers	   to	   those	   possible	   deferred	   beneficial	  
effects	   and	   recognizes	   that,	   in	   some	   cases,	   a	   certain	   period	   of	   time	   may	   be	   required	   before	   the	  
efficiencies	  materialize.	   The	   fact	   that	   an	   agreement	   has	   only	   negative	   effects	   in	   the	   short-­‐run	   and	  
that	   pass-­‐on	   to	   consumers	   occurs	  with	   a	   certain	   time	   lag	   does,	   however,	   not	   in	   itself	   prevent	   the	  
participants	  from	  benefiting	  of	  an	  individual	  exemption	  under	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU.1004	  Provided	  that	  
the	  efficiencies	  generated	  by	  the	  firms	  are	  sufficient	  to	  compensate	  in	  the	  long-­‐term	  consumers	  for	  
the	  negative	  impact	  caused	  to	  them	  by	  the	  restriction	  of	  competition,	  the	  Commission	  may	  consider	  
that	  the	  pass-­‐on	  condition	  of	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU	  is	  fulfilled.	  
The	   reason	  why	   EU	   authorities	   give	   lesser	   consideration	   to	   the	   short-­‐run	   harmful	   impact	   of	   firms’	  
conduct	   is	   that	   practices	   likely	   to	   increase	   innovative	   efficiency,	   which	   is	   the	   main	   source	   of	  
economic	   growth,	   sometimes	   involve	   an	   immediate	   adverse	   effect	   on	   consumers	   through,	   for	  
example,	  higher	  prices.	  Yet,	  in	  view	  of	  the	  benefits	  that	  innovation	  may	  generate	  in	  the	  economy,	  it	  
may	  be	  considered	  in	  certain	  circumstances	  that	  the	  limited	  harm	  caused	  today	  to	  consumers	  will	  be	  
outweighed	  tomorrow	  by	  the	  positive	  effects	  resulting	  from	  innovative	  efficiencies.	  	  
	  
3. Protection	  of	  the	  competitive	  process	  as	  a	  means	  to	  protect	  long-­‐term	  consumer	  interests.	  
There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  EU	  competition	  law	  is	  to	  protect	  and	  enhance	  consumer	  
welfare.	   However,	   that	   concept	   includes	   a	   large	   variety	   of	   elements	   whose	   protection	   cannot	   be	  
properly	  guaranteed	  by	  a	  mere	  assessment	  of	  the	  direct	  and	  immediate	  effects	  of	  business	  conduct	  
on	   final	  consumers.	  Those	  effects	   reflect	   indeed	  only	  a	  static	  perspective	  of	  consumer	  welfare	  and	  
are	  therefore	  not	  a	  good	  metric	  to	  evaluate	  dynamic/innovative	  efficiency	  or	  the	  potential	  harm	  that	  
is	   likely	  to	  affect	  consumers	  in	  the	  long-­‐run.	  As	  shown	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  the	  Commission	  and	  
the	  European	  Courts	  focus	  rather	  on	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  competitive	  process	  which	  is	  considered	  
as	  the	  best	  way	  to	  achieve	  the	  long-­‐term	  interests	  of	  consumers.	  
a) Consumer	  welfare,	  a	  broad	  concept…	  
When	  referring	  to	  consumer	  welfare,	  the	  European	  authorities	  make	  it	  clear	  that	  such	  concept	  is	  not	  
limited	  to	  low	  prices	  that	  competition	  is	  expected	  to	  provide	  for	  consumers.	  Instead,	  the	  emphasis	  is	  
put,	  among	  other	  things,	  on	  product	  variety,	  diversity,	  quality,	   innovation	  and	  on	  consumer	  choice.	  
Expressing	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  Commission,	  Neelie	  Kroes	  affirmed	  that	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1003	  E.Buttigieg,	  op.cit.,	  at	  46.	  
1004	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  81(3)	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,,	  at	  87.	  “However,	  the	  greater	  the	  time	  
lag,	  the	  greater	  must	  be	  the	  efficiencies	  to	  compensate	  also	  for	  the	  loss	  to	  consumers	  during	  the	  period	  
preceding	  the	  pass-­‐on.”	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“Competition	   policy	   is	   about	  more	   than	   lowering	   prices	   for	   consumers.	   Our	   effect	   on	  
choice	  and	  quality	   is	   just	  as	   important.	  We	  also	  consider	  the	  benefits	  of	  more	  dynamic	  
efficiencies	  associated	  with	  innovation	  and	  increased	  productivity.”1005	  	  
Consequently,	   even	   though	   the	   direct	   effect	   a	   particular	   practice	   has	   on	   consumer	   prices	   may	  
constitute	  a	  handy	  standard	   to	  assess	   the	   legality	  of	   that	  practice,	   such	  an	  approach	  would	  not	  be	  
effective	   in	   protecting	   all	   the	   aspects	   included	   in	   the	   concept	   of	   consumer	  welfare.	  However,	   one	  
must	   admit	   that	   the	   potential	   impact	   firms’	   conduct	   is	   likely	   to	   have	   on	   those	   other	   consumer	  
interests,	   such	   as	   quality,	   innovation	   or	   choice,	   is	   definitely	   not	   easy	   to	   assess	   immediately.	   It	   is	  
indeed	  only	  in	  the	  longer-­‐term	  that	  the	  positive/negative	  effects	  of	  some	  practices	  will	  appear	  on	  the	  
markets.	  By	  the	  time	  consumer	  harm	  manifests	  itself,	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  market	  and	  the	  position	  of	  
the	   remaining	   market	   participants	   may	   hence	   be	   much	   different	   and	   the	   enforcement	   of	   the	  
competition	  rules	  less	  likely	  to	  ensure	  sufficient	  corrective	  effects.	  This	  is	  why	  the	  standard	  governing	  
the	  assessment	  of	  anticompetitive	  conduct	   is	  generally	  not	  the	   immediate	   impact	  on	  consumers	  as	  
such	   but	   rather	   the	   consequences	   the	   practice	   engenders	   on	   the	   competitive	   process.	   The	  
Commission’s	  work	  on	  competition	  law	  is	  in	  fact	  not	  to	  deliver	  directly	  the	  benefits	  mentioned	  above	  
to	  consumers	  –	  that	  should	  be	  the	  job	  of	  companies	  –	  but	  to	  enable	  a	  functioning	  market.1006	  Philppe	  
Lowe,	  the	  former	  Director	  General	  of	  Competition,	  clearly	  expressed	  this	  approach	  by	  stating	  that	  	  
“The	  concept	  of	  consumer	  welfare	  should	  be	  interpreted	  dynamically	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  
effects	  of	  any	  structure	  or	  conduct	  on	  price,	  choice,	  quality	  and	  innovation	  in	  the	  short	  
and	   long	   terms.	   Sometimes	   those	   effects	   are	   immediate	   and	   measurable.	   However,	  
often	  the	  effects	  are	  difficult	  to	  quantify	  and	  the	  only	  way	  to	  protect	  consumer	  welfare	  
in	   the	   longer	   term	   is	   by	   safeguarding	   the	   process	   or	   dynamic	   of	   competition	   on	   the	  
markets.”1007	  
b) …To	  be	  protected	  through	  an	  effective	  competitive	  process	  
The	  primary	  concern	  is	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  competitive	  process	  as	  a	  means	  to	  maximize	  consumer	  
welfare	   in	  all	   its	  aspects.	  To	  focus	  on	  such	  process,	   instead	  of	  on	  a	  particular	  market	  outcome	  at	  a	  
given	  point	  of	  time,	  constitutes	  the	  best	  approach	  to	  safeguard	  long-­‐term	  consumer	  interests	  and	  is	  
consistent	   with	   the	   wording	   of	   the	   Treaty.	   The	   effects	   of	   business	   conduct	   on	   consumers	   keep	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1005	  N.Kroes,	  Consumer	  welfare	  :	  more	  than	  a	  slogan,	  Competition	  and	  Consumers	  in	  the	  21st	  Century,	  
Speech/09/486,	  Brussels,	  21	  October	  2009,	  available	  at:	  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-­‐release_SPEECH-­‐09-­‐
486_en.htm?locale=en	  	  
1006	  Ibidem.	  
1007	  P.Lowe,	  The	  design	  of	  competition	  policy	  institutions	  for	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century:	  The	  experience	  of	  the	  
European	  Commission	  and	  the	  Directorate-­‐General	  for	  Competition	  in	  Competition	  policy	  in	  the	  EU	  –	  Fifty	  years	  
on	  from	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Rome,	  Xavier	  Vives	  (ed.)	  (2009),	  at	  32.	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nevertheless	   a	   significant	   role	   in	   the	   competition	   assessment	   since	   most	   restrictions	   on	   the	  
competitive	   process	   may	   be	   justified	   if	   sufficient	   consumer	   benefits	   are	   likely	   to	   derive	   from	   the	  
restrictive	  practice.	  
i. The	  protection	  of	  the	  competitive	  process	  in	  the	  Treaty	  
The	  importance	  of	  the	  competitive	  process	  was	  enshrined	  in	  ex-­‐Article	  3(1)(g)	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty.	  That	  
provision	  provided	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  objectives	  mentioned	  in	  Article	  2	  EC,	  the	  activities	  of	  
the	   then	   European	   Community	   shall	   include	   “a	   system	   ensuring	   that	   competition	   in	   the	   internal	  
market	  is	  not	  distorted”.	  In	  different	  cases,	  the	  Court	  referred	  to	  that	  provision	  to	  underline	  that	  the	  
competition	  rules	  do	  not	  only	  cover	  practices	  which	  may	  directly	  prejudice	  consumers	  but	  also	  those	  
which	   are	   indirectly	   detrimental	   to	   them	   by	   impairing	   an	   effective	   competitive	   structure.1008	   Even	  
though	   the	   provision	   in	   question	   has	   been	   repealed	   by	   the	   Lisbon	   Treaty,	   it	   is	   nevertheless	   still	  
relevant	   today	   and	   keeps	   the	   same	   value	   as	   it	   has	   been	   moved	   to	   a	   Protocol	   annexed	   to	   the	  
Treaties.1009	   Furthermore,	   the	   interpretative	   status	   of	   the	   former	   Treaty	   provision	   is	   not	   affected	  
either	  in	  view	  of	  recent	  judgments	  rendered	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  The	  substantive	  content	  of	  the	  
Protocol	   is	   indeed	   read	   in	   conjunction	   with	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	   Union	   and	   the	   requirement	   of	  
undistorted	   competition	   considered	   as	   part	   of	   the	   fundamental	   principles	   of	   the	   economic	  
constitutional	  law	  of	  the	  EU.1010	  	  
The	  prevalence	  of	  the	  competition	  process	   is	  also	  embedded	   in	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU	  which	  contains	  
the	  four	  conditions	  to	  be	  met	  for	  an	  exemption	  from	  the	  prohibition	  on	  anticompetitive	  agreements.	  
According	   to	   that	   provision,	   such	   prohibition	   may	   be	   declared	   inapplicable	   if	   the	   arrangement	  
“contributes	   to	   improving	   the	   production	   or	   distribution	   of	   goods	   or	   to	   promoting	   technical	   or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1008	  	  Case	  6/72,	  Europemballage	  Corporation	  and	  Continental	  Can	  Company	  Inc.	  v.	  Commission	  [1973]	  ECR	  215,	  
at	  26	  and	  Case	  85/76,	  Hoffman-­‐La	  Roche	  v	  Commission	  [1979]	  ECR	  461,	  at	  125.	  See	  also:	  T-­‐228/97,	  Irish	  Sugar	  
[1999]	  ECR	  II-­‐2963,	  at	  232.	  
1009	  Protocol	  (No	  27)	  on	  the	  internal	  market	  and	  competition,	  OJ	  C	  115,	  9/05/2008.	  According	  to	  Article	  51	  TEU,	  
protocols	  form	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  Treaties.	  The	  former	  commissioner	  responsible	  for	  competition	  Neelie	  
Kroes	  also	  insisted	  that	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  does	  not	  affect	  the	  protection	  of	  competition	  in	  the	  Union	  by	  stating	  
that	  “The	  Internal	  Market	  and	  Competition	  Protocol	  is	  a	  legally	  binding	  confirmation	  that	  a	  system	  of	  ensuring	  
undistorted	  competition	  is	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  Internal	  Market.	  The	  Protocol	  paraphrases	  the	  current	  Treaty	  
provisions:	  competition	  is	  no	  an	  end	  in	  itself	  –	  but	  it	  is	  the	  best	  means	  anyone	  has	  found	  to	  create	  the	  
conditions	  for	  growth	  and	  jobs.	  Integrating	  competition	  into	  the	  very	  concepts	  of	  the	  “Internal	  Market”	  clarifies	  
that	  the	  one	  simply	  cannot	  exist	  without	  the	  other	  –	  which	  is	  a	  fact.”	  See:	  N.Kroes,	  “Competition	  policy;	  
Achievements	  in	  2006;	  Work	  program	  in	  2007;	  Priorities	  for	  2008”,	  European	  Parliament	  Economic	  and	  
Monetary	  Affairs	  Committee,	  Speech/07/425,	  26	  June	  2007,	  available	  at:	  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-­‐
release_SPEECH-­‐07-­‐425_en.htm	  	  
1010	  See	  :	  C-­‐52/9,	  Konkurrensverket	  v	  TeliaSonera	  Sverige	  AB	  [2001]	  ECR	  I-­‐527;	  C-­‐496/09,	  European	  Commission	  
v	  Italian	  Republic	  [2001]	  not	  yet	  reported.	  Those	  cases	  concerned	  illegal	  state	  aids.	  See	  also:	  B.Van	  Rompuy,	  
“Thanks	  Nicolas	  Sarkozy,	  but	  no	  thanks.”	  CJEU	  rules	  on	  status	  of	  Protocol	  on	  Internal	  Market	  and	  Competition	  
(2011),	  available	  at:	  http://kluwercompetitionlawblog.com/2011/11/25/%E2%80%9Cthanks-­‐nicolas-­‐sarkozy-­‐
but-­‐no-­‐thanks-­‐%E2%80%9D-­‐cjeu-­‐rules-­‐on-­‐status-­‐of-­‐protocol-­‐on-­‐internal-­‐market-­‐and-­‐competition/	  and	  J.Drexl,	  
La	  constitution	  économique	  européenne	  –	  L’actualité	  du	  modèle	  ordolibéral,	  2011/4,	  t.XXV,	  p.447.	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economic	  progress,	  while	  allowing	  consumers	  a	   fair	   share	  of	   the	   resulting	  benefit,	  and	  which	  does	  
not:	   (a)	   impose	   on	   the	   undertakings	   concerned	   restrictions	   which	   are	   not	   indispensable	   to	   the	  
attainment	   of	   these	   objectives;	   (b)	   afford	   such	   undertakings	   the	   possibility	   of	   eliminating	  
competition	   in	  respect	  of	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  the	  products	   in	  question.”	  The	  last	  condition	  reveals	  
the	  important	  role	  accorded	  to	  the	  intensity	  of	  residual	  competition	  and	  the	  necessity	  to	  safeguard	  
an	   effective	   competition	   structure.1011	   The	   Guidelines	   on	   the	   application	   of	   Article	   101(3)	   TFEU	  
further	   highlight	   the	  predominance	  of	   the	   competitive	  process	   over	   any	  other	   value.	   In	   Paragraph	  
105	  of	  those	  Guidelines,	  it	  is	  stated	  that:	  	  
“Ultimately	   the	  protection	  of	   rivalry	  and	   the	  competitive	  process	   is	  given	  priority	  over	  
potentially	   pro-­‐competitive	   efficiency	   gains	   which	   could	   result	   from	   restrictive	  
agreements.	   The	   last	   condition	   of	   Article	   [101(3)]	   recognises	   the	   fact	   that	   rivalry	  
between	  undertakings	   is	   an	   essential	   driver	   of	   economic	   efficiency,	   including	   dynamic	  
efficiencies	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  innovation.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  ultimate	  aim	  of	  [Article	  101]	  
is	   to	  protect	  the	  competitive	  process.	  When	  competition	   is	  eliminated	  the	  competitive	  
process	  is	  brought	  to	  an	  end	  and	  short-­‐term	  efficiency	  gains	  are	  outweighed	  by	  longer-­‐
term	   losses	   stemming	   inter	   alia	   from	   expenditures	   incurred	   by	   the	   incumbent	   to	  
maintain	  its	  position	  (rent	  seeking),	  misallocation	  of	  resources,	  reduced	  innovation	  and	  
higher	  prices.”1012	  	  
Consequently,	  even	  if	  a	  practice	  provides	  efficiencies	  which	  are	  passed	  on	  to	  consumers,	  this	  will	  not	  
be	  sufficient	  to	  justify	  elimination	  of	  competition	  as	  it	  is	  presumed	  that	  such	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  
competitive	   process	   will	   harm	   consumers	   in	   the	   future.	   The	   emphasis	   of	   the	   Commission’s	  
enforcement	   activity	   on	   safeguarding	   the	   competitive	   process	   also	   applies	   in	   abuse	   of	   dominance	  
cases	  as	  explained	  in	  the	  Guidance	  paper	  on	  Article	  102	  TFEU.1013	  
ii. The	  competitive	  process	  and	  competition	  on	  the	  merits	  
Protection	  of	  the	  competitive	  process	  implies	  preservation	  of	  a	  competitive	  business	  environment	  in	  
which	   companies	   are	   incited	   to	   compete	   and	   innovate.	   This	   in	   turn	   requires	   that	   competition	  
authorities	  maintain	  a	   level	  playing	   field	   for	  consumers	  and	  businesses	  and	  make	  sure	  smaller,	  but	  
efficient,	   players	   are	   not	   driven	   out	   of	   the	   market	   by	   large	   competitor	   strategies	   not	   based	   on	  
“competition	  on	  the	  merits”.	  Even	  though	  there	  is	  no	  general	  agreement	  on	  what	  these	  term	  means,	  
the	  Commission	  and	  the	  European	  Courts	  have	  been	  using	  “competition	  on	  the	  merits”	  for	  years	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1011	  H.Schweitzer,	  Efficiency,	  political	  freedom	  and	  the	  freedom	  to	  compete	  –	  comment	  on	  Maier-­‐Rigaud,	  in	  The	  
goals	  of	  competition	  law,	  Daniel	  Zimmer	  (ed.)	  (2012)	  
1012	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  81(3)	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  at	  105.	  
1013	  Guidance	  on	  the	  Commission’s	  enforcement	  priorities	  in	  applying	  Article	  102	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty,	  op.cit.	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single-­‐firm	  conduct	  cases	  to	  determine	  whether	  a	  certain	  practice	  was	  abusive	  or	  not.1014	  That	  notion	  
implies	   that	   firms	   in	   a	   dominant	   position	   cannot	   have	   recourse	   to	   methods	   different	   from	   those	  
which	   conditions	   normal	   competition	   if	   these	   have	   the	   effect	   of	   hindering	   the	   maintenance	   of	  
effective	  competition.1015	  Where	  it	  is	  admitted	  that	  powerful	  firms	  have	  the	  right	  to	  take	  reasonable	  
steps	  to	  protect	  their	  interests	  and	  are	  not	  under	  an	  obligation	  to	  refrain	  from	  competing	  vigorously,	  
their	  conduct	  must	  nevertheless	  be	  proportionate	  and	  cannot	  be	  allowed	  if	  it	  is	  used	  to	  strengthen	  a	  
dominant	   position.1016	   A	   firm’s	   success	  must	   in	   fact	   be	   based	   only	   on	   its	   superior	   performance	   in	  
terms	   of	   price,	   quality	   or	   innovation.	   If	   a	   practice	   improves	   a	   firm’s	   performance	   leading	   to	   the	  
elimination	  of	  rivals	  not	  able	  to	  match	  such	  improvement,	  the	  conduct	  in	  question	  will	  generally	  be	  
included	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  normal	  competition,	  despite	  its	  exclusionary	  effect.	  This	  occurs	  for	  example	  
when	  a	  firm	  increases	  its	  market	  power	  by	  offering	  higher	  quality	  or	  more	  attractive	  products	  so	  that	  
consumers	  prefer	  to	  turn	  to	  that	  firm	  to	  satisfy	  their	  needs.	  	  
However,	  if	  the	  practice	  only	  results	  in	  elimination	  of	  competitors	  without	  generating	  efficiencies,	  it	  
is	  much	  less	   likely	  to	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  competition	  on	  the	  merits.1017	   In	  some	  cases,	  a	  firm	  is	  
indeed	   able	   to	   influence	   consumers’	   buying	   conduct	   -­‐	   and	   thereby	   its	   position	   and	   the	   degree	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1014	  OECD,	  Competition	  on	  the	  merits,	  Directorate	  for	  Financial	  and	  Enterprise	  Affairs	  –	  Competition	  Committee,	  
2006,	  DAF/COMP(2005)27,	  available	  at:	  
http://www.oecd.org/competition/abuseofdominanceandmonopolisation/35911017.pdf	  Different	  tests	  have	  
been	  suggested	  to	  evaluate	  the	  legality	  of	  dominant	  firm	  conduct:	  The	  profit	  sacrifice	  test	  (or	  “but	  for”	  test);	  
the	  No	  economic	  sense	  test;	  the	  Equally	  efficient	  firm	  test;	  the	  Consumer	  welfare	  test;	  the	  Elhauge	  test.	  See	  at	  
25-­‐37.	  For	  the	  assessment	  of	  specific	  cases	  of	  exclusionary	  abuses,	  especially	  pricing	  abuses,	  the	  Commission	  
uses	  the	  “as-­‐efficient	  competitor	  test”.	  The	  Guidance	  paper	  on	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  gives	  some	  
substance	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  “competition	  on	  the	  merits”	  by	  defining	  criteria	  based	  on	  economic	  analysis	  for	  
each	  kind	  of	  practices.	  See:	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission	  –	  Guidance	  on	  the	  Commission’s	  
enforcement	  priorities	  in	  applying	  Article	  102	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty	  to	  abusive	  exclusionary	  conduct	  by	  dominant	  
undertakings	  (Text	  with	  EEA	  relevance),	  O.J.	  C	  45/7	  of	  24/02/2009.	  
1015	  See:	  Case	  85/76,	  Hoffmann-­‐La	  Roche	  v.	  Commission	  [1979]	  ECR	  461,	  at	  6;	  ECS/AKZO,	  Case	  IV/30.698,	  
Commission	  Decision	  of	  14	  December	  1985,	  at	  81,	  upheld	  on	  appeal	  in	  Case	  C-­‐62/86,	  AKZO	  Chemie	  BV	  v	  
Commission	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐3359;	  T-­‐203/01,	  Manufacture	  française	  des	  pneumatiques	  Michelin	  v	  Commission	  
[2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐4071,	  at	  107-­‐110.	  The	  Court	  defined	  abuse	  as	  “an	  objective	  concept	  relating	  to	  the	  behavior	  of	  an	  
undertaking	  in	  a	  dominant	  position	  which	  is	  such	  as	  to	  influence	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  market	  where,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
the	  very	  presence	  of	  the	  undertaking	  in	  question,	  the	  degree	  of	  competition	  is	  weakened	  and	  which,	  through	  
recourse	  to	  methods	  different	  from	  those	  which	  condition	  normal	  competition	  in	  products	  or	  services	  on	  basis	  
of	  the	  transaction	  of	  commercial	  operators,	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  hindering	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  degree	  of	  
competition	  still	  existing	  in	  the	  market	  or	  the	  growth	  of	  that	  competition.”	  In	  practice,	  it	  is	  sometimes	  difficult	  
to	  distinguish	  legitimate	  competition	  from	  abusive	  exclusionary	  conduct.	  A	  practice	  may	  be	  considered	  as	  
“normal”	  if	  it	  is	  carried	  out	  by	  a	  non-­‐dominant	  firm	  but	  be	  prohibited	  if	  it	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  dominant	  firms’	  
action	  as	  the	  impact	  on	  competition	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  different.	  On	  the	  uncertainty	  surrounding	  the	  definition	  of	  
abusive	  conduct,	  see:	  R.O’DONOGHUE	  &	  J.PADILLA,	  The	  law	  and	  economics	  of	  Article	  82	  EC	  (2006),	  at	  176-­‐178.	  
1016	  See:	  Case	  27/76,	  United	  Brands	  Company	  and	  United	  Brands	  Continental	  v	  Commission	  [1978]	  ECR	  207;	  C-­‐
62/86,	  Akzo	  Chemie	  BV	  v	  Commission	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐3359;	  T-­‐203/01,	  Manufacture	  française	  des	  pneumatiques	  
Michelin	  v	  Commission	  (Michelin	  II)	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐4071.	  The	  European	  institutions	  also	  use	  the	  phrase	  “special	  
responsibility”	  to	  define	  abusive	  conduct	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  a	  firm	  in	  a	  dominant	  position	  “has	  a	  special	  
responsibility	  not	  to	  allow	  its	  conduct	  to	  impair	  genuine	  undistorted	  competition	  on	  the	  common	  market.”	  See:	  
Case	  322/81,	  Nederlandsche	  Banden	  Industrie	  Michelin	  (Michelin	  I)	  	  v	  Commission	  [1983]	  ECR	  3461,	  at	  10.	  
1017	  J.Faull	  &	  A.Nikpay,	  The	  EC	  law	  of	  competition	  (2007),	  at	  148.	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competition	   on	   the	   market	   -­‐	   by	   excluding	   competitors	   or	   making	   them	   less	   attractive	   through	  
practices	   which	   in	   no	   way	   enhance	   productive	   or	   innovative	   efficiency	   and	   do	   not	   contribute	   to	  
improving	   products/services	   offered	   to	   consumers.	   Similarly,	   a	   firm	  may	   be	   in	   a	   position	   to	   raise	  
artificial	   barriers	   to	   entry	   or	   expansion	   not	   related	   to	   any	   superior	   economic	   performance	   or	  
efficiency.	   In	   such	   cases,	   exclusion	   of	   rivals	   will	   generally	   be	   considered	   anticompetitive.	  When	   a	  
dominant	  firm	  excludes	  competitors	  through	  its	  behavior,	  one	  should	  therefore	  wonder	  whether	  the	  
resulting	  enhancement	  or	  maintenance	  of	  dominance	  is	  due	  to	  the	  firm’s	  efficiency	  improvement	  or	  
to	  the	  impairment	  of	  competitors’	  efficiency.1018	  
This	  distinction	  between	  efficiency	  exclusion	  and	  exclusion	   resulting	   from	   the	  mere	  exploitation	  of	  
market	  power	  is	  essential	  and	  attests	  that	  protection	  of	  the	  competitive	  process	  does	  not	  in	  any	  way	  
mean	  protection	  of	  competitors	  against	  competition.	  Injury	  inflicted	  to	  weaker	  rivals	  does	  indeed	  not	  
necessarily	   lead	   to	   competition	   harm.	   It	   is	   obvious	   that	   all	   business	   activity	   excludes	   in	   fact	  
competitors	   from	  some	  share	  of	   the	  market	  but	   such	  exclusion	  may	   result	   from	  efficiencies	  which	  
enhance	  competition	  on	  the	  markets	  and	  constitute	  the	  very	  essence	  of	  the	  competitive	  process.1019	  
The	  objective	  is	  therefore	  not	  to	  keep	  markets	  de-­‐concentrated	  at	  all	  costs	  -­‐	  as	  is	  recognized	  that,	  in	  
some	  cases,	  a	  large	  number	  of	  players	  do	  not	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  an	  optimal	  economic	  outcome	  and	  
that	  strong	  power	  may	  help	  achieve	  efficiencies	  and	  raise	   incentives	   to	  compete	  –	  but	   to	  maintain	  
markets	   with	   sufficient	   competitive	   pressure	   on	   large	   firms.	   By	   protecting	   rivalry	   between	  
competitors	   and	   openness	   of	   markets,	   EU	   competition	   policy	   ensures	   a	   dynamic	   and	   innovative	  
economy	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  all	  market	  participants	  and	  especially	  consumers.	  
iii. The	  competitive	  process	  and	  consumer	  welfare	  
Protection	  of	  the	  competitive	  process	   is	  not	  an	  end	  in	   itself	  but	  an	   instrument	  to	  ensure	  consumer	  
welfare.	   The	  objective	  of	   the	  Commission	   is	   thus	   to	  make	  market	  work	  better,	  not	   for	   an	  abstract	  
notion	  of	   free	   competition	  but	  because	  better	   functioning	  markets	  provide	   consumers	  with	  better	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1018	  This	  is	  more	  or	  less	  the	  reasoning	  developed	  by	  Professor	  Elhauge	  in	  his	  efficiency	  test	  which	  lies	  “in	  
distinguishing	  whether	  the	  alleged	  exclusionary	  conduct	  succeeds	  in	  furthering	  monopoly	  power	  (1)	  only	  if	  the	  
monopolist	  has	  improved	  its	  own	  efficiency	  or	  (2)	  by	  impairing	  rival	  efficiency	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  enhances	  
monopolist	  efficiency.	  In	  the	  first	  category	  of	  cases,	  the	  greater	  efficiency	  of	  the	  monopolist	  may	  cause	  it	  to	  
expand,	  which	  in	  turn	  makes	  rivals	  lose	  sales	  and	  become	  less	  efficient.	  But	  the	  root	  cause	  is	  the	  increased	  
efficiency	  of	  the	  monopolist	  because	  this	  conduct	  cannot	  expand	  or	  maintain	  its	  monopoly	  share	  unless	  the	  
monopolist	  has	  improved	  its	  efficiency.	  In	  the	  second	  category	  of	  cases,	  the	  decreased	  rival	  efficiency	  procured	  
by	  the	  exclusionary	  conduct	  causes	  the	  monopolist	  to	  gain	  or	  maintain	  its	  monopoly	  share	  even	  if	  the	  conduct	  
does	  not	  improve	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  monopolist	  at	  all.”	  	  (…)	  “The	  key	  factor	  that	  distinguishes	  the	  sort	  of	  
exclusionary	  conduct	  that	  merits	  condemnation	  is	  that	  it	  can	  successfully	  increase	  or	  maintain	  the	  monopolist’s	  
market	  power	  even	  if	  the	  monopolist	  has	  not	  increased	  its	  efficiency	  in	  any	  way.”	  See:	  E.Elhauge,	  Defining	  
better	  monopolization	  standards,	  56	  Stanford	  Law	  Review	  523	  (2003),	  at	  315	  and	  323.	  
1019	  OECD,	  Roundtable	  on	  competition	  on	  the	  merits	  –	  Note	  by	  the	  European	  Commission,	  Directorate	  for	  
Financial	  and	  Enterprise	  Affairs	  –	  Competition	  Committee,	  2005,	  DAF/COMP/WD(2005)31,	  at	  7.	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goods/services.1020	   When	   focusing	   on	   the	   competitive	   process,	   competition	   authorities	   keep	  
nevertheless	  in	  mind	  that	  ultimate	  objective.	  	  
In	  practice,	  in	  most	  cases,	  restriction	  affecting	  the	  competitive	  process	  also	  harms	  consumers	  so	  that	  
it	  may	  rapidly	  be	  concluded	  to	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  competition	  rules.	  This	  occurs	  in	  particular	  when	  the	  
restriction	   in	   question	   entails	   direct	   effects	   on	   quantity	   or	   consumer	   prices.	   However,	   when	   such	  
direct	  effects	  are	  not	  visible	  immediately,	  the	  apparent	  absence	  of	  consumer	  harm	  cannot	  exclude	  a	  
finding	   of	   anticompetitive	   conduct	   at	   the	   risk	   of	   committing	   a	   “straight	   line	   fallacy”.1021	   One	   has	  
instead	   to	   go	   beyond	   the	   short-­‐term	   view,	   namely	   the	   view	   based	   on	   lower	   prices,	   and	   take	   into	  
consideration	  the	  long-­‐term	  aspects	  of	  consumer	  welfare	  such	  as	  choice,	  quality	  and	  diversity.	  Those	  
parameters	   are	   yet	   very	   difficult	   to	   evaluate	   immediately.	   That	   explains	  why	   the	   approach	   of	   the	  
competition	   authorities	   rather	   takes	   the	   form	   of	   a	   “curved	   line”	   with	   the	   emphasis	   put	   on	   the	  
competitive	  process	  whose	  protection	   is	   assumed	   to	  guarantee	   long-­‐term	  positive	  dynamic	  effects	  
for	  consumers.	  Any	  negative	  impact	  on	  such	  process	  will	  be	  considered	  anticompetitive.	  	  
However,	  the	  issue	  of	  consumer	  interests	  may	  still	  reemerge	  when	  an	  objective	  justification	  is	  raised	  
by	   the	   defendant(s)	   and	   examined	   by	   the	   Commission	   or	   the	   European	   Courts.1022	   Any	  
anticompetitive	  practice	  may	   indeed	  be	   justified	   if	   it	   is	  objectively	  necessary1023	  or	   if	   it	  gives	  rise	  to	  
more	  efficient	  methods	  of	  production	  or	  commercialization	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  consumers.	  	  
In	   the	   assessment	   of	   efficiency	   claims,	   productive	   and	   innovative	   efficiencies	   are	   generally	   more	  
prized	  than	  allocative	  efficiency	  which	  only	  contributes	  to	  a	  static	  perspective	  of	  consumer	  welfare.	  
This	  is	  why,	  in	  case	  of	  predatory	  abuse,	  the	  resulting	  lower	  prices	  on	  the	  market	  are	  not	  considered	  
sufficient	   to	   justify	  a	   restriction	  on	  competition.	   It	  may	  also	  be	  held	   that	  such	  decrease	   in	  prices	   is	  
mostly	  due	  to	  the	  exploitation	  of	  market	  power	  and	  can	  therefore	  not	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1020	  N.Kroes,	  Competition	  Policy	  and	  Consumers,	  General	  Assembly	  of	  Bureau	  Européen	  des	  Unions	  de	  
Consommateurs	  (BEUC),	  Speech/06/691,	  Brussels,	  16	  November	  2006,	  available	  at:	  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-­‐release_SPEECH-­‐06-­‐691_en.htm?locale=en	  	  
1021	  See	  :	  B.Heitzer,	  What	  kind	  of	  benefits	  ?	  Consumer	  welfare	  as	  a	  standard	  of	  competition	  policy,	  presented	  at	  
the	  European	  competition	  day,	  Paris,	  18-­‐19	  November	  2008,	  at	  23.	  According	  to	  Heitzer,	  the	  former	  president	  
of	  the	  Bundeskartellamt,	  “competition	  is	  a	  complex	  process.	  Its	  results	  cannot	  be	  known	  in	  advance,	  but	  we	  
can	  assume	  that	  it	  will	  create	  beneficial	  outcomes.	  (…)	  To	  try	  to	  directly	  manipulate	  one	  of	  the	  potential	  results	  
of	  the	  process,	  namely	  consumer	  welfare	  –	  is	  an	  endeavor	  fraught	  with	  numerous	  uncertainties.	  It	  may	  turn	  
out	  that	  what	  looks	  like	  a	  straight	  line	  is	  in	  fact	  more	  complicated,	  and	  that	  trying	  to	  force	  the	  process	  into	  a	  
direct,	  straight	  line	  may	  cause	  more	  harm	  than	  good	  to	  the	  system.”	  
1022	  Guidance	  on	  the	  Commission’s	  enforcement	  priorities	  in	  applying	  Article	  102	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  at	  28-­‐
31.	  
1023	  Concerns	  about	  quality,	  security	  or	  safety	  might	  for	  example	  justify	  a	  refusal	  to	  deal.	  European	  competition	  
authorities	  however	  scrutinize	  very	  carefully	  such	  kind	  of	  defenses	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  whether	  those	  legitimate	  
objectives	  constitute	  the	  real	  purpose	  of	  the	  restriction	  on	  competition.	  See	  for	  examples:	  FAG-­‐Flughafen	  
Frankfurt/Main	  AG,	  Case	  IV.34.801,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  14	  January	  1998	  and	  Eurofix-­‐Bauco	  v	  Hilti,	  Case	  
IV/30.787,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  22	  December	  1987,	  upheld	  on	  appeal	  T-­‐30/89,	  Hilti	  AG	  v	  Commission	  [1991]	  
ECR	  II-­‐1439.	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the	   Commission	   in	   its	   balancing	   test.	   Output	   and	   price	   effects	   on	   consumers	  must	   in	   fact	   not	   be	  
overvalued	  or,	  to	  put	  it	  another	  way,	  effects	  on	  quality,	  innovation	  and	  consumer	  choice	  must	  not	  be	  
underestimated.	  One	   should	   in	   addition	   remember	   that,	  where	   restriction	  on	   competition	  may	  be	  
justified	   on	   efficiency	   grounds,	   there	   is	   still	   the	   safeguard	   condition	   providing	   that	   competition	  
cannot	   be	   eliminated.	   Competition	   authorities	   have	   therefore	   to	   make	   sure	   that,	   despite	   the	  
restriction,	  market	   access	   is	   not	   foreclosed	   and	   competitive	   constraints,	   coming	   in	   particular	   from	  
actual	   or	   potential	   competition	   but	   also	   from	   customers	   due	   to	   their	   ability	   to	   switch	   to	   other	  
business	  partners,	  remain	  sufficient	  on	  the	  market.	  
In	  conclusion,	  the	  competitive	  process	  approach	  constitutes	  an	  economic	  and	  effects-­‐based	  analysis	  
but	   focused	   on	   the	   process	   of	   competition	   instead	   of	   on	   the	   direct	   effects	   on	   consumers.	   The	  
absence	   of	   consumer	   harm	   is	   hence	   not	   relevant	   in	   the	   assessment.	   However,	   the	   focus	  may	   be	  
redirected	  toward	  consumers	  if	   it	   is	  established	  that	  the	  latter	  benefit	  from	  the	  efficiencies	  created	  
by	  the	  restriction.	  The	  final	  stage	  of	  the	  assessment	  is	  turned	  back	  again	  on	  the	  competitive	  process	  
in	  order	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  competitive	  game	  is	  not	  completely	  truncated	  or	  distorted	  and	  that	  
other	  (new)	  players	  have	  still	  the	  opportunity	  to	  participate	  in	  that	  process.	  
C. 	  BUYER	  POWER	  AND	  COMPETITION	  LAW	  OBJECTIVES	  
In	   view	   of	   the	   enforcement	   priorities	   in	   EU	   competition	   law	   and	   of	   the	   potential	   effects	   of	   buyer	  
power	  described	  above	  in	  the	  previous	  sections,	  the	  question	  now	  arises	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  exercise	  
of	  market	  power	  over	  suppliers	  is	  likely	  to	  hinder	  the	  achievement	  of	  the	  competition	  law	  objectives.	  	  
With	  an	  eye	  on	  end	  consumers,	  whose	  welfare	  constitutes	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  competition	  policy,	  
the	  European	  authorities	   seem	   to	  be	  more	   lenient	  with	   regard	   to	   restrictive	  practices	   in	  upstream	  
buyer	  markets	  since	  the	  detrimental	  effects	  caused	  to	  suppliers	  or	  competitors	  in	  those	  markets	  do	  
not	  necessarily	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  consumer	  harm,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  short-­‐run.1024	  	  
However,	  we	  have	  extensively	  examined	  and	  shown	  that	  the	  texts	  (Treaty,	  guidelines,…)	  and	  the	  EU	  
case	   law	   look	   beyond	   the	   direct	   effects	   on	   consumers	   and	   take	   mostly	   into	   consideration	   the	  
effectiveness	   of	   the	   competitive	   process	   to	   assess	   the	   legality	   of	   business	   conduct.	   That	   approach	  
should	   therefore	   also	   prevail	   in	   case	   of	   buyer	   power	   alleged	   abuses.	  Whether	   the	   practice	   takes	  
place	   in	   the	   buyer	   or	   in	   the	   seller	   market,	   the	   focus	   should	   remain	   on	   the	   protection	   of	   the	  
competitive	   process	   so	   that	   all	  market	   participants	   have	   the	   opportunity	   to	   play	   in	   a	   competitive	  
environment.	  Such	  a	  broad	  understanding	  of	  the	  process	  to	  be	  protected	  runs	  in	  no	  way	  counter	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1024	  Buyer	  power	  in	  Competition	  law	  –	  Status	  and	  perspectives,	  BundesKartellamt,	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Working	  
Group	  on	  Competition	  Law	  on	  18	  September	  2008,	  available	  at:	  
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/download/pdf/2008_ProfTagung_E.pdf	  ,	  at	  18.	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the	  consumer	  welfare	  objective,	  quite	  the	  contrary.	  Different	  situations	  will	  be	  examined	  to	  illustrate	  
how	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   could	   be	   integrated	   in	   the	   assessment	   of	   the	   competition	  
authorities	  in	  view	  of	  contributing	  to	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  competition	  policy	  objectives.	  	  
1. Protection	  of	  competition	  in	  all	  directions	  
Various	  compelling	  reasons	  can	  be	  put	  forward	  to	   justify	  protection	  not	  only	  of	  supply	  competition	  
but	  also	  of	  demand	  competition.	  First	  of	  all,	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  Treaty	  attests	  that	  all	  practices	  used	  
by	  a	  dominant	  firm,	  either	   in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market	  or	   in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market,	  may	  
fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  article	  101	  and	  102	  TFEU.	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  first	  provision,	  any	  agreement,	  
including	   conspiracy	   between	   buyers,	   is	   prohibited	   when	   it	   has	   the	   object	   of	   effect	   to	   restrict	  
competition.	  Among	   the	  arrangements	  deemed	   incompatible	  with	   the	   internal	  market,	  Article	  101	  
TFEU	  refers	  to	  agreements	  which	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  fix	  purchase	  prices	  or	  share	  sources	  of	  supply.	  
As	   for	   the	   other	   examples	   of	   restriction	   included	   in	   that	   provision,	   one	   can	   note	   that	   they	  might	  
apply	  similarly	  to	  buyers	  or	  sellers.	  Concerted	  practices	  creating	  discrimination	  among	  trading	  parties	  
or	   imposing	   unjustified	   supplementary	   obligations	   to	   the	   other	   parties	   are	   indeed	   prohibited	  
whoever	   they	   are	   aimed	   at.	   If	   only	   customers	   were	   protected	   against	   those	   anticompetitive	  
conditions,	  the	  drafters	  of	  the	  Treaty	  would	  have	  explicitly	  mentioned	  that	  category	  of	  participants	  
instead	  of	  using	  the	  general	  term	  “other	  parties”.	  Similar	  examples	  are	  provided	  in	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  
so	  that	  abusive	  conduct	  may	  be	  condemned,	  even	  though	  it	  has	  been	  taking	  place	  in	  the	  upstream	  
buyer	  market.	  One	  may	  hence	   assume	   that	   the	   EU	   competition	   rules	   aim	   at	   protecting	   all	  market	  
participants	  from	  exploitation	  of	  market	  power.	  
Secondly,	  anticompetitive	  exclusion	  of	  rivals	  may	  be	  the	  result	  of	  practices	  used	  in	  the	  downstream	  
seller	  market	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market.	  Take	  for	  example	  exclusive	  supply	  obligations	  
imposed	  on	  suppliers	  by	  a	  powerful	  buyer	  in	  order,	  not	  to	  pursue	  a	  legitimate	  aim,	  such	  as	  avoiding	  a	  
free	   riding	   problem,	   but	   to	   eliminate	   competitors	   offering	   lower	   prices	   in	   the	   retail	  market.	   Such	  
exclusionary	  conduct	   is	  not	  part	  of	   competition	  on	   the	  merits	  as	   the	  elimination	  of	   rivals	  does	  not	  
result	  of	  the	  firm’s	  better	  performance	  on	  the	  market.	  The	  restrictive	  effect	  in	  the	  upstream	  market	  
will	  therefore	  contribute	  to	  strengthening	  the	  firm’s	  position	  in	  the	  retail	  market	  without	  generating	  
any	  benefit	  for	  consumers.	  Other	  types	  of	  practices	  may	  also	  cause	  the	  exclusion	  of	  competitors	  such	  
as	  those	  that	  raise	  rivals’	  costs	  or	  involve	  predatory	  bidding.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  such	  exclusion,	  the	  firm’s	  
market	   power	  will	   be	   reinforced	   in	   the	   upstream	  buyer	  market	   but	   also	   in	   the	   downstream	   seller	  
market	  if	  the	  excluded	  buyers	  were	  also	  competitors	  in	  that	  market.	  In	  order	  to	  maintain	  competitive	  
constraints	  on	  powerful	   firms	  and	  to	  preserve	  the	  openness	  of	  the	  markets,	   it	  may	  hence	  be	  more	  
effective	  to	  act	  upstream	  of	  the	  supply	  chain	  against	  abusive	  conduct	  of	  powerful	  buyers	  rather	  than	  
waiting	  for	  the	  emergence	  or	  reinforcement	  of	  a	  dominant	  position	  in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market.	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Again,	  the	  objective	  is	  not	  to	  protect	  weaker	  or	  inefficient	  players	  but	  to	  make	  sure	  competitors	  are	  
not	  excluded	  from	  the	  market	  by	  improper	  means.	  	  
Thirdly,	   the	   necessity	   to	   protect	   the	   competitive	   process	   and	   to	   maintain	   fair	   and	   undistorted	  
competition	   referred	   to	  by	   the	  EU	  authorities	   cannot	  be	   restricted	   to	  one	   side	  of	   the	  market.	   The	  
protection	  of	  such	  a	  process	  implies	  indeed	  that	  all	  market	  participants	  are	  protected	  against	  abusive	  
practices	  and	  coercion.	  Agreements	  among	  buyers	  or	  abuses	  by	  a	  large	  buyer	  which	  affect	  suppliers	  
by	  imposing	  on	  them	  unjustified	  obligations	  or	  by	  restricting	  their	  freedom	  of	  action	  or	  choice	  should	  
therefore	   be	   considered	   to	   restrict	   the	   competitive	   process	   and	   as	   such	   be	   condemned	   as	  
anticompetitive.	  Even	  if	  abuses	  committed	  in	  the	  upstream	  market	  by	  a	  powerful	  buyer	  do	  not	  lead	  
directly	  to	  reinforcing	  the	  market	  position	  of	  the	   latter	   in	  the	  seller	  market,	  we	  will	  see	  below	  that	  
those	  abuses	  may	  nevertheless	  affect	  the	  dynamics	  of	  competition.	  Such	  potential	  negative	   impact	  
on	  dynamic	  efficiency	  justifies	  thus	  also	  protection	  of	  competition	  in	  all	  directions.	  
Professor	   Zimmer,	   in	   particular,	   defends	   that	   approach	   by	   arguing	   that	   competition	   must	   be	  
protected,	  not	  only	  among	  sellers	  but	  also	  among	  buyers.	  According	   to	  him,	  what	  competition	   law	  
seeks	  to	  achieve	  is	  to	  protect	  the	  opposite	  side	  of	  the	  market.1025	  Consequently,	  any	  conduct	  which	  
harms	   the	   other	   side	   of	   the	   market	   should	   be	   deemed	   anticompetitive.	   For	   example,	   transfer	   of	  
wealth	   resulting	   from	   the	   exploitation	   of	  market	   power,	   either	   from	   consumers	   to	   sellers	   or	   from	  
suppliers	   to	   buyers,	   should	   be	   prohibited.	   As	   regards	   exclusionary	   conduct,	   he	   underlines	   that	  
competitors	  are	  not	  protected	  as	  such	  by	  competition	   law	  against	  exclusion	  but	  conduct	   leading	  to	  
the	  elimination	  of	  rivals	  would	  be	  condemned	  if	   it	  had	  a	  detrimental	  effect	  on	  the	  opposite	  side	  of	  
the	   market.1026	   Professor	   Zimmer’s	   approach	   could	   be	   followed	   to	   ensure	   the	   protection	   of	   the	  
competitive	  process	  in	  EU	  markets.	  However,	  one	  must	  not	  forget	  that	  the	  objective	  of	  competition	  
law	   is	   to	   protect	   the	   competitive	   process	   not	   for	   its	   own	   sake	   but	   because	   it	   is	   the	   best	   tool	   to	  
promote	  consumer	  welfare.	  Among	  the	  different	  sides	  of	  the	  different	  markets	  involved,	  the	  side	  of	  
end	   consumers	   should	   hence	   take	   precedence.	   That	   is	   why	   competition	   authorities	   should	   in	   any	  
case	  keep	  an	  eye	  on	  consumers	  and	  take	  into	  consideration	  any	  objective	  justification	  which	  includes	  
benefits	  for	  consumers.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1025	  D.Zimmer,	  The	  basic	  goal	  of	  competition	  law	  :	  to	  protect	  the	  opposite	  side	  of	  the	  market,	  in	  The	  goals	  of	  
competition	  law,	  Daniel	  Zimmer	  (ed.)	  (2012),	  at	  496.	  See	  also:	  M.Schwartz,	  Should	  Antitrust	  Assess	  Buyer	  
Market	  Power	  Differently	  than	  Seller	  Market	  Power?,	  Comments	  presented	  at	  DOF-­‐FTC	  Workshop	  on	  Merger	  
Enforcement,	  Washington	  DC,	  February	  17,	  2004.	  Professor	  Schwartz	  argues	  that	  the	  term	  consumers	  is	  a	  
metaphor	  for	  trading	  partners.	  As	  a	  result,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  competition	  rules	  in	  merger	  
cases,	  he	  maintains	  that	  “a	  merger	  that	  increases	  market	  power	  and	  enables	  the	  merged	  firm	  to	  impose	  worse	  
terms	  on	  its	  trading	  partners	  is	  equally	  objectionable	  if	  the	  trading	  partners	  in	  question	  are	  suppliers	  to	  or	  
buyers	  from	  that	  firm.”	  	  
1026	  D.Zimmer,	  The	  basic	  goal	  of	  competition	  law…,op.cit.	  at	  497-­‐499.	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2. Buyer	  power	  and	  protection	  of	  consumer	  welfare	  
The	  protection	  of	  competition	  in	  all	  directions	  may	  raise	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  such	  an	  approach	  is	  
truly	   to	   the	   benefit	   of	   consumers	   as	   the	   latter	  may	   not	   be	   affected	   by	   the	   exploitation	   of	  market	  
power	  over	  suppliers	  or	  may	  even	  benefit	  from	  lower	  prices	  due	  to	  some	  buyer	  practices.	  However,	  
the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  may	  be	  as	  harmful	   to	  consumers	  as	  seller	  power	  or	   lead	  to	  consumer	  
benefits	  which	  in	  fact	  derive	  from	  practices	  reprehensible	  under	  the	  competition	  rules.	  In	  case	  buyer	  
power	  yields	  some	  positive	  effects	  in	  the	  downstreamseller	  	  market,	  any	  restriction	  on	  competition	  
in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market	  should	  be	  balanced	  against	  those	  beneficial	  effects	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  
the	   legality	   of	   the	   practice	   in	   question.	   Attention	   should	   in	   particular	   be	   drawn	   on	   the	   other	  
parameters	  contributing	  to	  consumer	  welfare	  such	  as	  choice,	  quality	  and	  diversity.	  
a) Buyer	  power	  increasing	  seller	  power	  
The	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  does	  not	  necessarily	  leads	  to	  consumer	  benefits	  because,	  in	  most	  cases,	  
it	  goes	  along	  with	  a	  reinforcement	  of	  market	  power	  in	  the	  downstream	  market	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  
consumers.	  In	  such	  cases,	  firms	  are	  not	  incited	  to	  pass	  on	  the	  better	  conditions	  obtained	  from	  their	  
suppliers	  to	  their	  own	  customers	  and	  may	  gain	  a	  position	  which	  is	  likely	  to	  restrict	  competition	  in	  the	  
downstream	  seller	  markets	  as	  well.	  This	  is	  described	  as	  the	  “spiral	  effect”	  which	  led	  the	  Commission	  
to	   block	  mergers	   among	   retailers	   such	   as	   in	  Rewe/Meinl	  or	  Carrefour/Promodes.1027	  Where	   buyer	  
power	   goes	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   or	   contributes	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   seller	   power,	   competition	  
authorities	  should	  be	  more	   inclined	  to	  condemn	  restriction	  of	  competition	   in	  the	  upstream	  market	  
since	  such	  restriction	  is	  unlikely	  to	  benefit	  consumers.	  
b) Buyer	  power	  and	  lower	  prices	  
Even	  if	  buyer	  practices	  may	  lead	  to	  benefits	  for	  consumers,	  such	  as	  lower	  prices,	  this	  should	  not	  be	  
taken	  into	  consideration	  if	  those	  benefits	  result	  only	  from	  abusive	  exploitation	  of	  market	  power.	  The	  
Guidelines	  on	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU	  provide	  indeed	  that	  	  
“Cost	  savings	  that	  arise	  from	  the	  mere	  exercise	  of	  market	  power	  by	  the	  parties	  cannot	  
be	   taken	   into	   account.	   (…)The	   cost	   reductions	   in	   question	   do	   not	   produce	   any	   pro-­‐
competitive	   effects	   on	   the	   market.	   In	   particular,	   they	   do	   not	   lead	   to	   the	   creation	   of	  
value	  through	  an	  integration	  of	  assets	  and	  activities.	  They	  merely	  allow	  the	  undertakings	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1027	  Rewe/Meinl,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1221,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  3	  February	  1999	  and	  Carrefour/Promodes,	  Case	  
No	  COMP/M.1684,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  25	  January	  2000.	  See	  also:	  Kesko/Tuko,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.784,	  
Commission	  Decision	  of	  20	  November	  1996.	  On	  those	  merger	  cases,	  see	  above	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  II,	  
Point	  B,	  2.	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concerned	  to	  increase	  their	  profits	  and	  are	  therefore	  irrelevant	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  
[Article	  101(3)].”	  	  
Profits	  gained	  through	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  and	  thus	  not	  resulting	  from	  efficiency	  or	  greater	  
performance	  achieved	  by	  the	  buyer	   in	  question	  should	  therefore	  not	  be	  positively	  appraised	   in	  the	  
assessment	   of	   restrictive	   conduct.	   The	   fact	   that	   some	   of	   those	   profits	   may	   be	   passed	   on	   to	  
consumers	   does	   not	   necessarily	   change	   what	   is	   at	   stake.	   Indeed,	   if	   abuses	   committed	   in	   the	  
upstream	  buyer	  market	  enable	  buyers	  to	  offer	  lower	  prices	  to	  its	  customers,	  such	  pricing	  policy	  could	  
also	   be	   used	   to	   exlude	   competitors	   in	   the	   downstream	   seller	   market.	   A	   comparison	   can	   here	   be	  
made	  with	  anticompetitive	  practices	  such	  as	  tying	  or	  predatory	  pricing.	  Even	  though	  those	  practices	  
lead	  to	  lower	  consumer	  prices,	  the	  (potential)	  exclusion	  of	  rivals	  is	  deemed	  sufficient	  to	  enforce	  the	  
competition	  rules	  because	  such	  exclusion	  would	  be	  the	  result	  of	  action	  which	  cannot	  be	  described	  as	  
competition	  on	  the	  merits.	  The	  same	  reasoning	  could	  therefore	  be	  held	  with	  regard	  to	  buyer	  power	  
abuses	  which	   allow	   the	   dominant	   buyer	   to	   offer	   lower	   prices	   to	   its	   customers	   but	   are	   unlikely	   to	  
benefit	   them	   in	   the	   longer-­‐term	  as	   they	   strengthen	   the	   firm’s	  market	   position	  without	   generating	  
additional	  efficiencies.	  	  
However,	   it	   must	   be	   made	   clear	   that	   lower	   prices	   obtained	   from	   suppliers	   and	   passed	   on	   to	  
consumers	   are	   in	   principle	   procompetitive	   and	   should	   hence	   be	   encouraged,	   especially	   when	  
upstream	  sellers	  have	  market	  power.	  Fierce	  competition	  in	  buyer	  markets	  leads	  indeed	  suppliers	  to	  
offer	  better	  prices	  and	  better	  quality	  products/services	  to	  their	  customers	  who	  in	  turn	  are	  incited	  to	  
pass	  on	  those	  benefits	  to	  consumers	  if	  sufficient	  competitive	  pressure	  is	  present	  in	  the	  downstream	  
seller	  market.	  The	  exercise	  of	   countervailing	  power	  when	  buyers	   face	  powerful	   sellers	  enables	   the	  
former	   to	   lower	   prices	   closer	   to	   the	   competitive	   level	   for	   the	   benefit	   of	   consumers.	   Competition	  
implies	   that	  all	  parties	  bargain,	  even	  aggressively,	   to	   take	  a	  bigger	  share	  of	   the	  pie.	  Concerns	  arise	  
when	   a	   market	   participant	   acquires	   sufficient	   market	   power	   so	   as	   to	   be	   able	   to	   behave	  
independently	  and	  influence	  the	  market	  conditions.	  	  
This	  is	  why	  it	  is	  important	  to	  examine	  first	  the	  degree	  of	  market	  power	  of	  each	  market	  participant	  in	  
order	  to	  evaluate	  whether	  a	  buyer	  could	  distort	  or	  restrict	  competition	  through	  its	  conduct.	  In	  such	  a	  
case,	   abuses	   committed	   in	   the	   upstream	   market,	   such	   as	   imposing	   sub-­‐competitive	   prices	   to	  
suppliers,	  are	  unlikely	  to	  promote	  effective	  competition	  and	  thus	  unlikely	  to	  contribute	  to	  consumer	  
welfare.	   For	   example,	   Professors	   Lande	   and	   Kirkwood	   argue	   that	   buyers	   as	   well	   as	   sellers	   should	  
obtain	   the	  benefits	  of	   competition	  and	   that,	   consequently,	  both	   supra-­‐	  and	  sub-­‐competitive	  prices	  
should	  be	  condemned.	  They	  maintain	  that	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“the	   rival	   sellers	   should	   not	   have	   to	   face	   prices	   set	   artificially	   below	   the	   competitive	  
level,	   just	   as	   consumers	   should	   not	   have	   to	   face	   prices	   set	   artificially	   above	   the	  
competitive	   level.	   This	   conduct	   has	   no	   redeeming	   value	   and	   should	   be	   condemned.	  
While	   consumers	   benefited	   in	   the	   short	   term	   from	   the	   below-­‐cost	   prices,	   these	   low	  
prices	  should	  not	  count	  as	  an	  ‘antitrust	  benefit’	  because	  they	  were	  not	  the	  types	  of	  low	  
prices	  the	  antitrust	  laws	  were	  designed	  to	  achieve.	  The	  main	  point	  of	  the	  antitrust	  laws	  
is	  to	  prevent	  consumers	  from	  paying	  supra-­‐competitive	  prices,	  not	  to	  provide	  them	  with	  
artificially	  low	  prices.”1028	  	  
Other	  potential	  abusive	  practices	  such	  as	  excessive	   transfer	  of	  cost	  or	  unjustified	  obligations	  
imposed	  on	  suppliers	  may	  also	  enable	  a	  firm	  to	  lower	  prices	  in	  the	  downstream	  market.	  Those	  
benefits,	  however,	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  precarious	  as	  they	  do	  not	  rely	  on	  any	  efficiency	  gain	  or	  they	  
are	  acquired	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  other	  aspects	   included	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  consumer	  welfare,	  
namely	  innovation,	  product	  quality	  and	  consumer	  choice.	  
c) Buyer	  power	  and	  investment:	  impact	  on	  innovation	  and	  quality	  
	  Where	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  might	  harm	  consumers	  in	  the	  longer-­‐term	  because	  of	  the	  likely	  
consolidation	   of	   downstream	   seller	   markets,	   it	   might	   also	   affect	   consumer	   interests	   due	   to	   the	  
impact	  some	  practices	  have	  on	  dynamic	  efficiency	  competition.	  Suppliers	  may	  indeed	  not	  be	  incited	  
to	   invest	   in	  new	  or	   improved	  products	   as	   the	  difference	   in	  profit	   that	   they	   can	  earn	   through	   such	  
investment	  compared	  to	  what	  they	  would	  earn	  if	  they	  do	  not	  invest	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  very	  slim.1029	  In	  the	  
grocery	  industry	  for	  example,	  retailers	  are	  able	  to	  use	  similar	  coercive	  strategies	  against	  most	  of	  their	  
suppliers,	  no	  matter	  the	  brand,	  the	  type	  or	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  products	  the	  latter	  put	  on	  the	  markets.	  
As	  a	  result,	  receiving	  always	  less	  for	  what	  they	  produce	  and	  knowing	  that	  there	  is	  little	  chance	  they	  
will	  obtain	  better	  conditions	  whatever	  product	  they	  offer,	  some	  producers	  may	  not	  find	  profitable	  or	  
simply	  do	  not	  get	  sufficient	  resources	  to	  invest	  in	  better	  quality	  or	  new	  products.	  Quite	  the	  opposite,	  
they	   are	  more	   likely	   to	   reduce	   expenses	   as	  much	   as	   possible	   by	   limiting	   investment	   and	   lowering	  
costs	  of	  production.	  	  
Achievement	   of	   cost	   reduction	   is	   obviously	   beneficial	   for	   competition	   as	   it	   leads	   firms	   to	   produce	  
more	  efficiently.	  However,	  when	  productive	  efficiency	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  improved	  through	  technical	  
advances	  or	  innovative	  methods	  of	  production,	  cost	  reduction	  will	  be	  realized	  by	  using	  lower	  quality	  
products	  or	  by	  reducing	  the	  pack	  size	  of	  their	  products	  without,	   in	  so	  doing,	  decreasing	  prices.	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1028	  J.B.Kirkwook	  &	  R.H.Lande,	  The	  fundamental	  goal	  of	  antitrust…,	  op.cit.,	  at	  210.	  
1029	  R.Gilbert,	  Looking	  for	  Mr.Schumpeter:	  Where	  are	  we	  in	  the	  competition-­‐innovation	  debate?,	  6	  Innovation	  
Policy	  and	  the	  Economy	  159	  (2006)	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exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  may	  hence	  affect	  consumer	  welfare,	  imperceptibly	  in	  the	  short-­‐run,	  through	  
a	  lower	  product	  quality	  level	  and	  a	  lessening	  in	  product	  innovation.	  
d) Buyer	  power	  and	  consumer	  choice	  
Conduct	   of	   powerful	   buyers,	   such	   as	   retailers,	   who	   have	   the	   ability	   to	   dictate	   the	   rules	   in	   buyer	  
markets,	  may	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  consumer	  choice	  as	  well.	  First	  of	  all,	  in	  the	  retail	  industry,	  consumer	  
choice	   is	  being	   reduced	  due	   to	   the	   increasing	  presence	  of	  private	   label	   lines	  which	   limit	   to	  a	  great	  
extent	  space	  available	  for	  branded	  products.	  Secondly,	  suppliers	  may	  decide	  to	  remove	  some	  of	  their	  
products	   from	   the	  market	  or	   to	   limit	   the	  number	  of	   retailers	   they	  will	   deal	  with	  because	   they	  are	  
unable	  to	  satisfy	  all	  buyers’	  demands	  for	  all	  their	  product	  lines.	  Few	  products	  will	  hence	  be	  available	  
to	  consumers	  or	  at	  a	  higher	  cost	  as	  the	  latter	  will	  have	  to	  shop	  from	  one	  place	  to	  another	  to	  find	  the	  
products	   they	   need.	   Finally,	   the	   presence	   and	   success	   of	   products	   on	   the	   markets	   may	   not	  
necessarily	  be	  based	  on	  choices	  made	  by	  consumers	  but	  may	  in	  fact	  rely	  only	  on	  retailers’	  discretion.	  
Due	  to	  their	  significant	  buyer	  power,	   large	  retail	  chains	  can	   indeed	  exercise	  discretionary	  power	  to	  
decide	  which	  products	  will	   be	   displayed	  on	   their	   store	   shelves.	   To	  make	   such	  decisions,	   they	   take	  
consumer	  preferences	  into	  consideration	  as	  their	  sales	  and	  profits	  depend	  on	  consumer	  purchases.	  
However,	   if	   suppliers	   do	   not	   agree	   or	   cannot	   cope	   with	   the	   low	   prices,	   additional	   payments	   and	  
other	   obligations	   imposed	   by	   retailers,	   the	   latter	   are	   likely	   to	   simply	   delist	   products	   of	   those	  
suppliers	   regardless	   of	   consumer	   demand.	   In	   fact,	   retailers’	   decisions	   do	   not	   rely	   so	   much	   on	  
consumer	  preferences	  as	  on	  suppliers’	  ability	  to	  yield	  to	  their	  demands.	  	  	  
The	   number	   and	   type	   of	   products	   available	   on	   the	   markets	   should	   be	   subject	   to	   consumers’	  
judgment	   revealed	   through	   their	   own	   purchasing	   choices	   based	   on	   their	   needs	   and	   preferences.	  
Excessive	   market	   power	   in	   the	   hand	   of	   buyers	   may	   in	   some	   cases	   remove	   from	   consumers	   such	  
ability	  to	  decide	  which	  product	  best	  corresponds	  to	  their	  needs.	  	  
As	   consumer	   choice	   is	   as	   important	   as	   low	   price	   or	   quality,	   practices	   affecting	   that	   aspect	   of	  
consumer	   welfare	   should	   be	   tackled	   by	   competition	   authorities.	   This	   requires	   in	   some	   cases	   a	  
balancing	   test	  which	   takes	   into	   account	   all	   the	   effects	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   entails	   on	   the	  
markets.	  
3. Effects-­‐based	  analysis	  of	  buyer	  power	  cases	  
Various	  situations	   involving	  the	  exercise	  or	  the	  creation	  of	  buyer	  power	  may	  be	  envisaged.	   In	  each	  
situation,	   the	   enforcement	   of	   the	   competition	   rules	   must	   be	   based	   on	   the	   effects	   buyers’	   action	  
entails	   on	   the	  markets.	   Those	   effects	  may	   be	   restrictive	   but	   also	   pro-­‐competitive,	   in	  which	   case	   a	  
balancing	  test	  must	  be	  applied	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  legality	  of	  the	  practice	  in	  question.	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The	   first	   situation	   concerns	   a	   case	   of	   pure	   monopsony.	   As	   pointed	   out	   in	   the	   first	   chapter,	   such	  
situation	  leads	  to	  both	  producer	  and	  consumer	  harm	  and	  causes	  in	  addition	  a	  reduction	  of	  aggregate	  
welfare.	  By	  limiting	  the	  volume	  of	  purchases	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  lower	  prices,	  the	  buyer	  is	  indeed	  likely	  
to	  reduce	  outputs	   in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market	  and	  consequently	  brings	  about	  higher	  prices	   in	  
that	  market.	  Such	  conduct	  is	  therefore	  considered	  anticompetitive.	  	  	  
The	  second	  situation	  where	  the	  effects	  of	  buyer	  power	  must	  be	  addressed	   involves	  a	  restriction	  of	  
competition	   in	   the	   upstream	  market	  which	   is	   likely	   to	   generate	   efficiencies.	   Take	   for	   example	   the	  
creation	  of	  buying	  alliances	  between	  some	  retailers.	  Such	  arrangement	  restricts	  competition	   in	  the	  
upstream	   market	   as	   the	   members	   do	   no	   longer	   compete	   against	   each	   other	   in	   their	   purchasing	  
activities.	  However,	  common	  purchase	  agreements	  may	  give	  rise	  to	  efficiency	  gains	  such	  as	  reduced	  
transaction,	  transportation	  and	  storage	  costs	  or	  enable	  the	  participants	  to	  exercise	  more	  effectively	  
countervailing	  power	  against	  powerful	  sellers.	  The	  legality	  of	  those	  agreements	  will	  then	  depends	  on	  
whether	   and	   to	   what	   extent	   those	   benefits	   are	   passed	   on	   to	   consumers.	   As	   provided	   in	   the	  
Guidelines	  on	  the	  applicability	  of	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  to	  horizontal	  co-­‐operation	  agreements,	  	  
“[the	  efficiency	  gains]	  must	  be	  passed	  on	  to	  consumers	  to	  an	  extent	  that	  outweighs	  the	  
restrictive	   effects	   of	   competition	   caused	   by	   the	   joint	   purchasing	   arrangement.	   Hence,	  
cost	   savings	   or	   other	   efficiencies	   that	   only	   benefit	   the	   parties	   to	   the	   joint	   purchasing	  
arrangement	  will	  not	  suffice.”1030	  	  
This	   balancing	   test	   shows	   that	   restriction	   on	   competition,	   whichever	   market	   is	   involved,	   is	  
considered	   tantamount	   to	   consumer	   harm.	   The	   general	   efficiency	   test	   provided	   in	   Article	  
101(3)	   TFEU	   requires	   that,	   to	   be	   exempted	   from	   the	   application	   of	   the	   competition	   rules,	  
restrictive	   practices	   create	   benefits	   for	   consumers	  which	   at	   least	   compensate	   them	   for	   any	  
actual	   or	   likely	   negative	   impact	   caused	   by	   the	   restriction	   on	   competition.1031	   When	   the	  
restrictive	   practice	   takes	   place	   in	   the	   upstream	   market,	   such	   as	   in	   case	   of	   purchasing	  
agreements,	  the	  balance	  is	  stricken	  between	  the	  negative	  effects	  in	  that	  upstream	  market	  and	  
the	  benefits	  passed-­‐on	  to	  consumers	  in	  the	  downstream	  market.	  It	  can	  thus	  be	  concluded	  that	  
the	  European	  Commission	  equates	  restriction	  of	  competition	  in	  buyer	  markets	  with	  prejudice	  
to	   consumers.	   This	   is	   moreover	   consistent	   with	   the	   approach	   followed	   by	   the	   European	  
institutions	   which	   put	   forward	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   competitive	   process	   as	   a	   means	   to	  
promote	  consumer	  welfare	  so	  that	  any	  restriction	  affecting	  that	  process	  is	  deemed	  to	  conflict	  
with	   consumer	   interests.	   If	   the	   efficiency	   gains	   are	   effectively	   passed	   on	   to	   consumers,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1030	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  applicability	  of	  Article	  101	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  at	  219.	  
1031	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  81(3)	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  at	  85.	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competition	   authorities	   have	   then	   to	   examine	   whether	   competition	   is	   not	   eliminated	   in	  
respect	  of	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  the	  products	  concerned	  in	  order	  to	  make	  sure	  rivalry	  remains	  
on	  the	  relevant	  market.	  
The	   last	   situation	   refers	   to	   practices	  which	   increase	   buyers’	   profits	   but	   do	   not	   enhance	   efficiency	  
whatsoever.	  That	  situation	  has	  already	  been	  addressed	  above	  and	  it	  has	  been	  concluded	  that,	  even	  if	  
the	   firm	  passed	   on	   some	  of	   its	   profits	   to	   consumers,	   such	   lower	   prices	   should	   not	   be	   the	   type	   of	  
benefit	  protected	  under	  competition	  law.	  	  
4. Protection	  of	  the	  competitive	  process	  but	  not	  more	  
The	   protection	   of	   the	   competitive	   process	   may	   sometimes	   lead	   to	   the	   protection	   of	   (potential)	  
competitors	   if	   the	   latter	   are	   eliminated	   or	   are	   prevented	   from	   expanding	   or	   entering	   the	  market	  
because	  of	  a	  dominant	  firm’s	  anticompetitive	  conduct.	  Effective	  competition	  implies	  the	  presence	  of	  
competitors	   or	   at	   least	   the	   possibility	   of	   new	   rivals	   entering	   the	   market.	   Competitive	   pressure	  
coming	  from	  those	  (potential)	  competitors	  is	  indeed	  a	  key	  element	  to	  bring	  consumers	  the	  benefits	  
of	   competition.	   Rivalry	   among	   competing	   firms	   leads	   the	   latter	   to	   create	   efficiencies	   and	   achieve	  
greater	  performance	  in	  order	  to	  attract	  consumers	  through	  the	  offer	  of	   lower	  prices,	  better	  quality	  
or	  new	  products.	   It	   is	  therefore	  necessary	  to	  maintain	  such	  rivalry	  as	  much	  as	  possible.	  However,	  a	  
firm	   cannot	   be	   condemned	   because	   it	   has	   achieved	   what	   competition	   law	   is	   aimed	   at,	   that	   is	  
increasing	   efficiencies	   for	   the	   benefits	   of	   consumers,	   even	   though	   this	   results	   in	   excluding	  
competitors.	  The	  protection	  of	  rivals	  against	  exclusion	  does	  therefore	  not	   include	  the	  protection	  of	  
weaker	  or	  smaller	  competitors	  which	  are	  unable	  to	  compete	  as	  efficiently	  as	  larger	  firms.	  	  
The	   same	   is	   relevant	   with	   regard	   to	   suppliers	   in	   buyer	   power	   cases.	   The	   enforcement	   of	   the	  
competition	   rules	  might,	   in	   some	   cases,	   lead	   to	   protecting	   suppliers.	   However,	   practices	   affecting	  
some	  producers	  by	  lowering	  their	  profits	  or	  by	  limiting	  their	  access	  to	  consumers	  are	  not	  necessarily	  
anticompetitive.	  Take	   for	  example	  small	  producers	  who	  are	  unable	   to	  meet	   large	  orders	  placed	  by	  
retailers.	   The	   latter’s	   refusal	   to	   deal	   with	   those	   producers	   cannot	   be	   considered	   an	   abuse	   even	  
though	   such	  decision	  will	   exclude	   the	  producers	   in	  question	   from	  a	   very	   large	  part	   of	   the	  market.	  
Provided	  that	  buyers’	  conduct	  does	  not	  distort	  or	  restrict	  competition	  either	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  
market	  or	   in	   the	  downstream	  seller	  market,	   the	   resulting	  negative	  effects	  on	  suppliers	  are	  not	   the	  
type	   of	   harm	   protected	   by	   the	   competition	   rules.	   Competition	   law	  must	   in	   fact	   be	   limited	   to	   the	  
protection	  of	  the	  competitive	  process	  in	  view	  of	  promoting	  consumer	  welfare.	  	  
Some	  argue	  that	  other	  values,	  such	  as	  the	  right	  for	  producers	  to	  earn	  a	  minimum	  level	  of	  income	  in	  
order	   to	   protect	   their	   right	   to	   food	   for	   example,	   should	   be	   included	   in	   the	   scope	   of	   competition	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policy.1032	  Under	  such	  a	  view,	  the	  rules	  of	  competition	  law	  should	  be	  interpreted	  in	  conformity	  with	  
the	   right	   to	   food	  which	   is	   recognized	   in	   various	   international	   instruments.1033	   	   The	  protection	  of	   a	  
minimum	   level	   of	   producer	  welfare	   that	   is	   demanded	  by	   the	   right	   to	   food	   should	   even	  be	   itself	   a	  
proper	   task	   of	   competition	   law.1034	  One	   of	   the	   proponents	   of	   this	   approach,	  M.Ganesh,	  maintains	  
that	  	  
“there	   is	  nothing	  special	  about	  consumers	   that	  gives	   them	  a	  moral	   right	   to	   the	   lowest	  
prices	   possible,	   even	   at	   the	   cost	   of	   producers’	   ability	   to	   earn	   an	   income	   sufficient	   to	  
enable	  them	  to	  function	  as	  equal	  members	  of	  society.”1035	  	  
Such	   assertion	   is	   completely	   right	   from	   a	   fairness	   and	   humanity	   point	   of	   view.	   However,	   from	   a	  
competition	  law	  perspective,	  harm	  caused	  to	  smaller	  market	  participants	  cannot	  by	  itself	  trigger	  an	  
intervention	  of	   competition	   authorities.	   Indeed,	  where	  prices	   set	   artificially	   below	   the	   competitive	  
level,	  such	  as	  in	  case	  of	  price	  manipulation,	  may	  be	  considered	  anticompetitive,	  all	  practices	  leading	  
to	   lower	   prices	   or	   to	   the	   transfer	   of	   additional	   obligations	   on	   suppliers	   are	   not	   to	   be	   condemned	  
under	   the	   competition	   rules	   unless	   they	   distort	   or	   restrict	   competition	   and	   so,	   even	   if	   they	  might	  
impair	  the	  viability	  of	  some	  producers.	  	  
However,	  where	  human	  rights	  protection	  cannot	  be	  as	  such	  an	  objective	  of	  EU	  competition	  policy,	  
unfair	  exploitation	  of	  market	  power	  over	  producers	  may	  nevertheless	  be	  condemned	  by	  competition	  
authorities	  if	  such	  exploitation	  is	  also	  likely	  to	  restrict	  effective	  competition.	  The	  enforcement	  of	  the	  
competition	   rules	   against	  buyers’	   anticompetitive	   conduct	   could	  hence	  de	   facto	   lead	   to	  protecting	  
producers,	  such	  as	  small	  farmers.	  	  
In	   addition,	   if	   European	   politicians	   consider	   it	   necessary	   to	   grant	   greater	   protection	   to	   smaller	  
producers	   regardless	   of	   the	   impact	   on	   competition,	   action	   should	   be	   taken	   through	   other	   specific	  
policies.	   The	   same	   applies	   in	   downstream	   seller	   markets.	   When	   sellers’	   practices	   do	   not	   distort	  
competition	  but	  are	  nevertheless	   likely	   to	  affect	  consumers,	  other	  provisions	   than	  the	  competition	  
rules	  can	  be	  applied,	  namely	  provisions	  contained	  in	  consumer	  protection	  laws	  and	  regulations.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1032	  See:	  A.R.Ganesh,	  The	  Right	  to	  Food	  and	  Buyer	  Power,	  11	  German	  Law	  Journal	  1190	  (2010)	  and	  A.R.Ganesh	  
&	  N.Harsdorf	  Enderndorf,	  Monopsony	  in	  European	  food	  markets,	  Revue	  Européenne	  de	  droit	  de	  la	  
consommation	  93	  (1/2012).	  
1033	  For	  examples	  Article	  25	  of	  the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  adopted	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  
General	  Assembly	  on	  12	  December	  1948	  provides	  that	  “(everyone)	  has	  the	  right	  to	  a	  standard	  of	  living	  
adequate	  for	  the	  health	  and	  well-­‐being	  of	  himself	  and	  his	  family,	  including	  food…”	  and	  Article	  11	  of	  the	  
International	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  adopted	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  General	  
assembly	  on	  16	  December	  1966	  that	  recognized	  the	  right	  to	  adequate	  food	  and	  the	  right	  to	  be	  free	  from	  
hunger.	  	  
1034	  A.R.Ganesh,	  op.cit.,	  at	  1230.	  
1035	  Ibid.,	  at	  1224.	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D. CONCLUSIVE	  REMARKS	  
There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  ultimate	  objective	  of	  EU	  competition	  law	  is	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  consumers.	  
The	  concept	  of	  consumer	  welfare	  in	  its	  literal	  sense	  is	  yet	  not	  static	  but	  dynamic	  and	  includes	  various	  
equally	  important	  aspects	  among	  those	  we	  can	  mention	  low	  prices,	  diversity,	  quality,	  innovation	  and	  
choice.	  Any	   agreement	  between	  market	   participants	   or	   any	   conduct	   of	   dominant	   firms	   that	  might	  
adversely	  affect	  one	  of	  those	  parameters	  must	  therefore	  be	  condemned	  under	  the	  EU	  competition	  
rules.	   However,	   in	   a	   large	   number	   of	   cases,	   harmful	   effects	   on	   consumers	   are	   not	   immediate	   or	  
directly	  measurable.	  The	  EU	  authorities	  consider	  therefore	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  safeguard	  the	  long-­‐
term	  interests	  of	  consumers	  is	  to	  protect	  the	  competitive	  process.	  As	  a	  result,	  any	  practice	  distorting	  
that	  process	  must	  be	  prohibited,	  despite	  the	  absence	  of	  direct	  consumer	  harm.	  	  
	  
SECTION	  II	  –	  FOCUS	  ON	  ANTICOMPETITIVE	  PRACTICES	  IN	  BUYER	  MARKETS	  
One	   cannot	   deny	   that	   significant	   buyer	   power	   stands	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   large	   supermarket	   chains	   as	  
well	  as	   in	   those	  of	   large	  buyers	   in	  other	  sectors.	  Some	  doubts	  have	  yet	  been	  raised	  as	  regards	  the	  
effects	  of	  such	  power	  on	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  markets.	  Pro-­‐competitive	  benefits	  resulting	  from	  
the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   have	   indeed	  been	  underlined,	   in	   particular	   in	   respect	   to	   lower	   prices	  
that	  may	  be	  passed	  on	   to	  consumers.	  This	  explains	  probably	   the	   lack	  of	   (effective)	  action	   taken	  at	  
national	  and	  EU	  level	  to	  tackle	  the	  issue	  of	  buyer	  power	  in	  the	  retail	  and	  other	  sectors.	  	  
However,	   in	  view	  of	  the	  objectives	  of	  EU	  competition	   law	  developed	   in	  Section	  1,	  we	  can	  affirm	  at	  
this	   point	   that	   the	   exercise	   of	   market	   power	   in	   buyer	   markets	   is	   likely	   to	   adversely	   affect	   the	  
competitive	  process	  and	  harm	  consumers.	  In	  order	  to	  illustrate	  how	  buyer	  power	  affects	  or	  is	  likely	  
to	   affect	   the	   achievement	   of	   the	   competition	   objectives,	   we	   will	   refer	   to	   concrete	   situations	  
occurring	  in	  buyer	  markets	  of	  the	  grocery	  sector.	  Most	  of	  the	  practices	  described	  below	  have	  already	  
been	  mentioned	   in	  Parts	   I	  and	   II.	  This	  section	  highlights,	   in	  particular,	   their	  negative	   impact	  on	  the	  
competition	  process	  as	  well	  as	  on	  consumers	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  that	  further	  action	  against	  buyer	  
power	  is	  needed.	  
Among	   the	  different	   potential	   harmful	   practices	   that	   are	  used	  by	   large	   retail	   chains,	  we	  will	   point	  
out,	   first,	   practices	   that	   are	   likely	   to	   exclude	   competitors,	   be	   it	   competing	   retailers	   or	   competing	  
producers	   -­‐	   as	   supermarket	   chains	   also	  play	  a	   role,	   to	  a	   certain	  extent,	   at	   the	  manufacturing	   level	  
through	  their	  private	  label	  lines	  -­‐,	  secondly,	  practices	  that	  in	  fact	  raise	  consumer	  prices	  in	  the	  retail	  
market	  and,	  finally,	  practices	  that	  affect	  other	  aspects	  included	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  consumer	  welfare	  
such	  as	  quality	  and	  choice.	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A. PRACTICES	  EXCLUDING	  COMPETITORS	  
Various	   practices	   may,	   in	   some	   circumstances,	   lead	   to	   excluding	   smaller	   market	   participants.	   A	  
distinction	  has	   to	  be	  drawn	  between	  pro-­‐	   and	  anti-­‐competitive	  exclusion.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	   fierce	  
competition	  based	  on	  price	  or	  quality	  for	  example,	  or	  competitive	  advantages	  enjoyed	  by	  large	  firms,	  
such	   as	   economies	  of	   scale/scope,	   are	   likely	   to	  drive	   some	  market	   participants	   out	   of	   the	  market.	  
However,	   such	   exclusion	   is	   part	   of	   the	   competitive	   process	   and	   is	   hence	   not	   a	   concern	   from	   a	  
competition	  law	  perspective.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  some	  firms	  are	  able	  to	  exclude	  competitors	  by	  using	  
practices	  which	  depart	  from	  competition	  on	  the	  merits.	  These	  firms	  generally	  hold	  significant	  market	  
power	  they	  can	  use	  to	  weaken	  the	  market	  position	  of	  rivals	  and	  strengthen	  their	  own	  position	  on	  the	  
market.	   That	   latter	   type	   of	   exclusion,	   when	   resulting	   from	   a	   dominant	   firm’s	   conduct,	   calls	   for	  
intervention	  of	  competition	  authorities.	  
As	  it	  was	  already	  pointed	  out	  in	  the	  Section	  on	  the	  retail	  sector,	  supermarket	  chains	  are	  customers	  of	  
brand	  manufacturers	  but	  they	  are	  also	  competitors	  of	  those	  manufacturers.	  They	  indeed	  put	  on	  the	  
market,	   through	   backward	   integration,	   their	   own	   products,	   called	   private	   labels	   or	   own-­‐brand	  
products,	   which	   compete	   with	   branded	   products	   on	   the	   shelves.1036	  Market	   power	   of	   large	   retail	  
chains	  could	  therefore	  be	  used,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  to	  exclude	  competing	  retailers	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  
hand,	  to	  exclude	  competing	  producers	  by	  favoring	  their	  own-­‐brands.	  	  
1. Exclusion	  of	  competing	  retailers	  
The	  most	  blatant	  exclusionary	  practice	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  an	  exclusive	  supply	  agreement	  imposed	  by	  
large	  retail	  chains	  on	  their	  suppliers.	  Such	  an	  agreement	  leads	  indeed	  to	  input	  foreclosure,	  restricting	  
access	  of	  competing	  retailers	  to	  a	  particular	  input	  and	  thus	  preventing	  them	  from	  competing	  in	  the	  
downstream	  seller	  market.	  	  
However,	   one	   can	   consider	   that,	   given	   the	   oligopolistic	   structure	   of	   the	   retail	   market	   in	   most	  
Member	  states,	  exclusive	  supply	  agreements	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  effectively	  enforced	  except	  for	  a	  few	  
products.1037	  Most	  brands	  are	  indeed	  available	  in	  all	  the	  largest	  grocery	  stores	  so	  that	  it	  is	  assumed	  
that	   a	   single	   retail	   chain	   cannot	   restrict	   to	   such	   an	  extent	  producers’	   freedom.	   Large	   supermarket	  
chains	  impose	  thus	  less	  drastic,	  but	  just	  as	  much	  anticompetitive,	  restrictions	  on	  their	  suppliers.	  For	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1036	  Supermarkets	  do	  not	  produce	  private	  label	  products	  but	  own	  the	  private	  label	  brands	  and	  source	  their	  
products	  sold	  under	  those	  own-­‐brands	  from	  third-­‐party	  suppliers.	  
1037	  Take	  for	  example	  regional	  products	  sold	  by	  a	  supermarket	  in	  a	  particular	  geographic	  area.	  The	  supermarket	  
in	  question	  can	  use	  its	  buyer	  power	  to	  prohibit	  the	  local	  producer	  from	  selling	  its	  products	  to	  competing	  
retailers	  located	  in	  the	  same	  area.	  Such	  a	  restriction	  excludes	  competition	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  products	  in	  
question	  but	  also	  prevents	  producers	  from	  expanding	  and	  gaining	  more	  leverage	  in	  the	  negotiations	  with	  their	  
large	  customer.	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examples,	   they	   can	   prevent	   the	   latter	   from	   selling	   to	   an	   incoming	   retailer	   under	   the	   threat	   of	  
delisting	  some	  products.	  In	  view	  of	  the	  large	  percentage	  that	  incumbent	  retailers	  account	  for	  in	  their	  
turnover,	   product	   manufacturers	   generally	   give	   in	   to	   their	   large	   customers’	   pressure.	   Supply	  
restrictions	  may	   also	   be	   aimed	   at	   existing	   discounters	   which	   are	   known	   as	   willing	   to	   start	   selling	  
branded	   products	   in	   addition	   to	   their	   own-­‐brands.	   As	   a	   result	   of	   such	   restrictive	   conduct	   in	   the	  
upstream	   buyer	  market,	   smaller	   retailers	   cannot	   constrain	   the	   exercise	   of	   market	   power	   of	   large	  
supermarkets,	   either	   in	   the	   upstream	   buyer	   market	   or	   in	   the	   downstream	   seller	   market,	   and	  
potential	  competing	  retailers	  are	  strongly	  dissuaded	  from	  entering	  a	  market	  where	  a	  few	  players	  are	  
able	   to	   dictate	   the	   rules	   to	   their	   detriment.	   Furthermore,	   suppliers	   are	   kept	   in	   a	   position	   of	  
dependence	   with	   regard	   to	   large	   supermarkets	   as	   they	   are	   prevented	   from	   diversifying	   their	  
customer	  base.	  	  	  
Restrictive	  supply	  agreements	  may	  also	  be	  used	  by	  large	  retailers	  in	  order	  to	  orchestrate	  a	  collective	  
boycott	   of	   rival	   distributors.	   A	   situation	   involving	   such	   a	   hub	   and	   spoke	   conspiracy1038	   was	   for	  
example	  dealt	  with	  by	  US	  antitrust	  authorities.1039	   In	   the	  Toys	   “R”	  Us	   case,	  a	   leading	  discounter	  of	  
toys	   concluded	   a	   series	   of	   agreements	   with	   toy	   manufacturers	   in	   order	   to	   prevent	   them	   from	  
offering	   some	   products	   to	   a	   new	   competing	   distributor.	   To	   make	   sure	   that	   restriction	   would	   be	  
abided	   by,	   the	   retailer	   conveyed	   the	   information	   among	   its	   suppliers	   that	   each	   of	   them	   was	  
committing	   not	   to	   supply	   the	   incoming	   distributor.	   As	   a	   result	   of	   this	   tacit	   agreement	   among	  
suppliers,	  incited	  by	  one	  of	  their	  customer,	  the	  new	  distributor	  was	  excluded	  from	  the	  procurement	  
market	   and	   therefore	   prevented	   from	   competing	   in	   the	   retail	   market	   with	   regard	   to	   all	   products	  
concerned	  by	  the	  agreement.1040	  	  
There	  is	  hardly	  any	  doubt	  that	  practices	  restricting	  access	  of	  competitors	  to	  products	  from	  upstream	  
markets	  constitute	  anticompetitive	  restrictions.	  Such	  vertical	  agreements,	  generally	   imposed	  tacitly	  
on	   suppliers,	   cannot	   be	   justified	   by	   any	   economic	   reason.	   Indeed,	   in	   the	   grocery	   retail	   sector,	  
supermarket	  chains	  do	  not	  bear	  the	  cost	  and	  risk	  of	  launching	  or	  promoting	  a	  particular	  product.	  All	  
investments	  are	  in	  fact	  made	  by	  the	  product	  manufacturer	  at	  its	  own	  risk	  through	  various	  payments	  
required	  by	  the	  retailers.	  No	  economic	  efficiency	  gains	  are	  therefore	  generated	  from	  restrictions	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1038	  On	  the	  notion	  and	  implication	  of	  hub	  &	  spoke	  conspiracies,	  see	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  I,	  A,	  1,	  c)	  and	  
below	  Point	  C	  of	  this	  Section	  and	  Chapter	  II,	  Section	  II,	  Point	  B,	  4,	  b).	  
1039	  Toys	  “R”	  Us,	  Inc.	  v.	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission,	  221	  F.3d	  928	  (7th	  Cir.2000).	  See	  also:	  Klor’s	  v.	  Broadway-­‐Hale	  
Stores,	  359	  U.S.	  207	  (1959).	  On	  these	  two	  US	  cases,	  See	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  2,	  Section	  III,	  Point	  C,	  1,	  a),	  ii.	  
1040	  Even	  though	  the	  suppliers’	  conduct	  was	  strongly	  incited	  by	  the	  retailer,	  US	  competition	  authorities	  focused	  
only	  on	  the	  result	  of	  the	  pressure	  exerted	  by	  the	  latter,	  namely	  the	  anticompetitive	  agreement	  between	  the	  
producers	  to	  restrict	  sales	  to	  a	  particular	  buyer.	  The	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  found	  that	  a	  horizontal	  
agreement,	  provoked	  by	  the	  distributor,	  had	  been	  concluded	  between	  the	  different	  manufacturers	  involved	  
since	  each	  of	  them	  accepted	  the	  limitations	  on	  sales	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  their	  competitors	  comply	  with	  that	  
restriction	  as	  well.	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producers’	  freedom	  to	  supply	  competitors.	  As	  pointed	  out	  in	  Part	  II,	  Section	  I,	  Point	  A.1,	  exclusive	  or	  
other	  restrictive	  supply	  agreements	  may	  be	  justified	  if	  they	  incite	  buyers	  to	  invest	  so	  as	  to	  improve	  
the	   production	   or	   distribution	   of	   goods	   to	   the	   benefit	   of	   consumers.	   The	   objective	   is	   to	   promote	  
higher	  quality	  of	  products	  and	  services	  and	  avoid	  the	  free-­‐ride	  problem.	  However,	  unlike	  luxurious	  or	  
technological	  products,	  mass	  consumer	  goods	  do	  not	  require	  substantial	  investment	  in	  staff	  training	  
or	   other	   services.	   Economic	   and	   consumer	   benefits	   which	   may,	   in	   some	   cases,	   justify	   vertical	  
restrictions,	  are	  therefore	  very	  unlikely	  to	  emerge	  from	  exclusive	  supply	  agreements	  or	  other	  supply	  
restrictions	  in	  the	  grocery	  sector.	  	  
2. Exclusion	  of	  “competing”	  producers	  
The	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  over	  suppliers	  is	  likely	  to	  drive	  many	  of	  them	  out	  of	  the	  market	  due	  to	  
the	   increased	  costs	  and	  risks	  they	  have	  to	  bear	  to	  get	  access	  to	  and	  remain	  on	   large	  supermarkets	  
shelves.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   commercial	   costs,	   such	   as	   promotional	   and	   marketing	   costs,	   store	  
equipment	   costs,	   distribution	   and	   the	  management	   of	   individual	   stores,	   are	   transferred	   from	   the	  
buyer	  to	  the	  supplier	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  payments	  imposed	  by	  retailers	  on	  product	  manufacturers.	  
The	  use	  of	  payments	  not	  related	  to	  discounts	  on	  rate	  price	  or	  volume	  of	  sales	  has	  indeed	  significantly	  
increased	  those	  last	  years.	  Those	  payments	  take	  the	  form	  of	  shelf-­‐access	  fees,	  slotting	  fees,	  pay-­‐to-­‐
stay	  fees,	  wedding	  gifts	  or	  other	  commercial	  payments	  made	  for	  services	  either	  overtly	  overcharged	  
or	  purely	  fictitious	  as	  noting	   is	  provided	   in	  return	  by	  the	  retailers.	   	  The	  amount	  of	  those	  costs	  may	  
reach	  up	   to	  50%	  or	  even	  70%	  of	  producers’	   revenues,	  affecting	  especially	   small	  and	  medium	  sized	  
enterprises.1041	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  supermarket	  chains	  use	  to	  pass	  on	  the	  cost	  of	  their	  business	  risk	  
to	   their	   suppliers.	   This	   is	   achieved	   thanks	   to	   various	   unfair	   terms	   and	   conditions	   imposed	   on	  
suppliers	   including,	   for	   example,	   return	   of	   unsold	   goods,	   extra	   discounts,	   after-­‐sale	   rebates	   or	  
retrospective	   change	   to	   agreed	   terms	   based	   on	   how	   well	   the	   product	   in	   question	   was	   sold	   to	  
consumers.1042	  	  The	  benefits	  so	  obtained	  are	  not	  justified	  by	  economic	  reasons,	  such	  as	  economies	  of	  
scale	   that	   could	  be	   created	  by	   a	   larger	   volume	  of	   purchases	   for	   example,	   but	   from	  pressure	   large	  
retailers	  are	  able	  to	  exert	  on	  suppliers.	  
There	   is	   no	   consensus	   on	  whether	   the	   various	   payments	   extracted	   by	   big	   supermarket	   chains	   are	  
anticompetitive	   or	   not.	   If	   one	   considers	   that	   effective	   competition	   should	   be	   protected	   in	   all	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1041	  C.Nicholson	  &	  B.Young,	  The	  relationship	  between	  supermarkets	  and	  suppliers:	  What	  are	  the	  implications	  for	  
consumers?,	  Report	  by	  Consumer	  International	  (2012),	  at	  6,	  available	  at:	  
http://www.consumersinternational.org/media/1035301/consumer%20detriment%20briefing%20paper%20se
pt2012.pdf,	  	  
1042	  See:	  Opinion	  of	  the	  European	  and	  Social	  Committee	  on	  “The	  current	  state	  of	  commercial	  relations	  between	  
food	  suppliers	  and	  the	  large	  retail	  sector”	  (own	  initiative	  opinion),	  Rapporteur:	  Mr	  Sarmir,	  JO	  C	  133,	  p.16,	  	  9	  
May	  2013,	  at	  18,	  point	  2.3.2.	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directions,	   that	   is	   customers	  as	  well	   as	   suppliers	   should	  protected	  against	  abuse	  of	  market	  power,	  
those	   unjustified	   payments	   would	   constitute	   exploitative	   abuses	   when	   imposed	   by	   a	   dominant	  
buyer.	  
A	   larger	   consensus	  would	   probably	   arise	   over	   the	   abusive	   character	   of	   some	  payments	   if	   retailers	  
were	  not	  seen	  as	  customers	  but	  as	  competitors	  of	  brands	  manufacturers.	  	  Through	  their	  private	  label	  
brands,	   supermarket	   chains	   indeed	   compete	   with	   brands	   producers.	   Private	   labels	   represent	   a	  
significant	  market	  share,	  amounting	  to	  more	  than	  40%	  of	  the	  market	  in	  some	  product	  categories	  and	  
in	  some	  Member	  states.1043	  	  













	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1043	  Own-­‐brands	  penetration	  varies	  considerably	  from	  one	  product	  category	  to	  another.	  Among	  the	  top	  product	  
categories,	  we	  can	  mention	  aluminum	  foil,	  milk,	  frozen	  food,	  vegetables,	  delicatessen,	  garbage/refuse	  bags	  and	  
kitchen	  paper/towel.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  shampoo,	  insect	  control,	  alcoholic	  beverages,	  baby	  formula,	  chewing	  
gum	  and	  toothpaste	  are	  in	  the	  bottom	  categories	  where	  own-­‐brands	  penetration	  is	  low.	  See:	  The	  economic	  
benefits	  of	  retailer	  own-­‐brands,	  Report	  prepared	  for	  the	  European	  Retail	  Round	  Table,	  Oxera,	  September	  2010,	  
available	  at:	  
http://www.errt.org/uploads/Oxera%20report%20on%20the%20economic%20benefits%20of%20retailer%20o
wn-­‐brands.pdf,	  at	  7	  and	  The	  impact	  of	  private	  labels	  on	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  European	  food	  supply	  chain,	  
LEI	  Study	  commissioned	  by	  the	  European	  Commission,	  DG	  for	  Enterprise	  and	  Industry,	  The	  Hague,	  January	  
2011,	  available	  at:	  http://edz.bib.uni-­‐mannheim.de/daten/edz-­‐h/gdb/11/study_privlab04042011_en.pdf,	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Retailers	   are	   therefore	   becoming	   the	   main	   competitors	   of	   their	   brands	   suppliers.	   Under	   that	  
perspective,	   one	   cannot	   but	   note	   that	   supermarket	   chains	   are	   able	   to	   influence	   and	   restrict	  
competition	   in	  the	  retail	  market	  by	  exploiting	  their	  buyer	  power	  over	  suppliers	   in	  the	  procurement	  
market	   and	   unfairly	   favouring	   their	   own	   products	   in	   the	   retail	   market.	   They	   can	   indeed	   gain	  
significant	  competitive	  advantages	  in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market	  and	  exclude	  competitors	  in	  that	  
market	  by	  affecting	  brands	  manufacturers	  through	  different	  practices	  they	  can	  use	  when	  buying	  and	  
reselling	  branded	  products.	  
Firstly,	  the	  increase	  of	  commercial	  payments	  mentioned	  above	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  raising	  significantly	  
brands	  producers’	  costs	  and	  thereby	  squeezing	  their	  margins.	  Unjustified	  fees	  levied	  by	  supermarket	  
chains	   may,	   consequently,	   lead	   those	   producers	   to	   revise	   upwards	   the	   transfer	   prices	   of	   their	  
products	   in	  order	   to	   finance	  the	  additional	  costs	   imposed	  on	  them	  by	  their	  customers.	  As	  a	   result,	  
branded	  products	  may	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  put	  at	  a	  competitive	  disadvantage	  in	  the	  retail	  market	  in	  
comparison	   with	   private	   labels.	   The	   commercialization	   and	   marketing	   of	   the	   latter	   products	   are	  
indeed	   not	   subject	   to	   similar	   costs.	   Some	   brands	  manufacturers	  may	   even	   be	   forced	   to	   leave	   the	  
market	  due	   to	  such	  an	   imbalance	  between	  branded	  products	  and	  private	   label	  products.	  Retailers’	  
financial	  and	  other	  requirements	  may,	  to	  some	  extent,	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  technique	  for	  raising	  rivals’	  
costs	   and	   facilitating	   the	   growth	   of	   private	   label	   lines.1044	   The	   growing	   presence	   of	   own-­‐brand	  
products	  on	  the	  shelves	  gives	  in	  turn	  retailers	  greater	  leverage	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market	  to	  seek	  
better	   commercial	   payments	   from	   brands	   manufacturers,	   leading	   to	   a	   spiral	   which	   reinforces	  
supermarket	  chains’	  market	  power	  both	  in	  the	  retail	  and	  procurement	  markets.	  	  
Secondly,	  supermarket	  chains	  can	  deliberatively	  set	  the	  prices	  of	  private	  labels	  and	  branded	  articles	  
so	  as	  to	  make	  the	  former	  more	  attractive	  for	  consumers.	  As	  such,	  brands	  producers	  are	  sometimes	  
surprised	   to	   find	   out	   that	   the	   prices	   of	   their	   products	   have	   been	   artificially	   increased	   in	   order	   to	  
make	   private	   label	   competing	   products	   appear	   considerably	   low-­‐priced.1045	   Those	   pricing	   practices	  
affect	  particularly	  branded	  goods	  with	  weaker	  market	  shares	  but	  also	  stronger	  brands	  which	  finally	  
disappear	  from	  the	  shelves.	  	  
Thirdly,	   the	   fact	   that	   retailers	  have	   the	   last	  word	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  presence	  and	   the	  place	  on	   the	  
shelves	  of	  branded	  products	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  promotion	  of	  those	  products	  in	  their	  stores	  also	  leads	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1044	  See:	  Distribution	  of	  daily	  consumer	  goods:	  competition,	  oligopoly	  and	  tacit	  collusion,	  Report	  of	  the	  Basque	  
Competition	  Court	  (2009),	  at	  180,	  available	  at:	  https://www.euskadi.net/r51-­‐
14000/es/contenidos/informacion/imformes_mercados/es_infomerc/adjuntos/090519%20ESTUDIO%20DISTRI
BUCION%20COMERCIAL%20ENGLISH%20VERSION.pdf	  	  
1045	  O.Rainer	  &	  C.-­‐C.Buhr,	  Who	  benefits	  from	  the	  prohibition	  of	  resale	  price	  maintenance	  in	  European	  
competition	  law?	  –	  the	  case	  of	  food	  retailing,	  26	  European	  Competition	  Law	  Review	  705,	  at	  707	  (2005)	  
Different	  suppliers	  questioned	  on	  that	  matter	  confirmed	  such	  pricing	  policy	  tactics.	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to	   unjustified	   exclusion	   of	   competing	   producers.	   Supermarket	   chains	   hold	   indeed	   all	   the	   cards	  
necessary	   to	  promote	   their	  own-­‐brands	  and	  expand	   their	  penetration	  by	  delisting	  or	  putting	  other	  
brands	  at	  a	  disadvantage.	  The	   threat	  of	  delisting	   is	   commonly	  used	  by	   retailers	   in	  upstream	  buyer	  
markets	  in	  order	  to	  extract	  further	  concessions	  from	  brands	  suppliers	  and	  consequently	  reinforce	  the	  
market	  position	  of	  private	  labels	  in	  the	  retail	  market.	  	  
Fourthly,	   the	  specific	  position	   in	  which	   retailers	   find	   themselves	  by	  virtue	  of	   the	   fact	   that	   they	  are	  
both	   customers	   and	   competitors	   of	   brands	  manufacturers	   also	   gives	   them	   the	   ability	   to	   reinforce	  
their	   competitive	   position	   in	   the	   retail	   market	   due	   to	   detailed	   knowledge	   of	   their	   competitors’	  
commercial	   terms	   and	  plans	   they	   can	  obtain	  when	   acting	   as	   buyers	   in	   the	  upstream	  procurement	  
market.1046	  Retailers	  require	  indeed	  unjustifiably	  access	  to	  sensitive	  information	  from	  their	  suppliers	  
such	  as	   information	  on	  their	  price	  structures,	  on	  their	  strategic	  plans	  or	  research	  and	  development	  
plans,	  on	  product	   innovations	  or	  new	  product	   launches	  and	  so	  on.	   Information	  so	  obtained	  in	  their	  
capacity	   as	   customers	   is	   clearly	   used	   by	   retailers	   when	   acting	   as	   competitors	   in	   the	   downstream	  
seller	  market	   in	  order	   to	  adjust	  private	   label	  offers	  accordingly	  and	  consequently	   strengthen	  again	  
their	  market	  position.	  	  
The	  mutual	  consolidation	  of	  big	  supermarkets’	  market	  power	  in	  the	  retail	  and	  procurement	  markets	  
is	   therefore	   not	   only	   associated	   with	   the	   exclusion	   of	   competing	   distributors	   but	   also	   with	   the	  
appearance	   of	   private	   labels	   which	   gives	   those	   supermarkets	   much	   more	   leverage	   on	   brands	  
suppliers.1047	  The	  latter	  can	  indeed	  be	  excluded	  at	  any	  time	  and	  their	  products	  be	  replaced	  by	  own-­‐
brand	   products.	   Restraints	   imposed	   on	   those	   manufacturers	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   encouraging	  
consumers	   to	   switch	   to	   private	   label	   products	   distort	   competition	   but	   are	   yet	   not	   addressed	   by	  
competition	  authorities	  due,	  in	  particular,	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  dominance	  in	  either	  market.	  
However,	  the	  revision	  of	  the	  criteria	  used	  to	  assess	  dominance	  in	  upstream	  buyer	  markets	  could	  set	  
up	  a	  new	  deal.	   Indeed,	   if	  under	  new	  criteria	   it	  could	  be	  concluded	  that	  some	   large	  retailers	  hold	  a	  
dominant	  position	  in	  a	  particular	  relevant	  procurement	  market,	  any	  practices	  used	  by	  those	  retailers	  
to	  strengthen	  their	  position	  as	  buyers	  in	  the	  market	  in	  question	  but	  also	  those	  used	  to	  leverage	  the	  
position	  of	  private	  labels	  in	  the	  retail	  market	  would	  hence	  constitute	  an	  abuse	  prohibited	  by	  Article	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  A.Ezrachi,	  Unchallenged	  market	  power?	  The	  tale	  of	  supermarkets,	  private	  labels	  and	  competition	  law,	  33	  
World	  competition	  257,	  at	  267	  (2010).	  See	  also:	  A.Gorrie,	  Competition	  between	  branded	  and	  private	  label	  
goods.	  Do	  competition	  concerns	  arise	  when	  a	  customer	  is	  also	  a	  competitor?,	  27	  European	  Competition	  Law	  
Review	  217,	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  (2006)	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  Distribution	  of	  daily	  consumer	  goods:	  competition,	  oligopoly	  and	  tacit	  collusion,	  Report	  of	  the	  Basque	  
Competition	  Court	  (2009),	  at	  180,	  available	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  https://www.euskadi.net/r51-­‐
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102	   TFEU.	   The	   issue	   of	   dominance	   and	   abusive	   conduct	   in	   buyer	   markets	   is	   examined	   below	   in	  
Chapter	  2,	  Section	  II,	  Point	  B.	  	  
Even	  though	  competing	  retailers	  and	  suppliers	  are	  presented	  as	  direct	  victims	  of	  large	  retail	  chains’	  
unfair	  and	  abusive	  conduct,	  consumers	  are	  not	  either	   left	  unharmed	  from	  the	  superpower	  of	   large	  
grocery	  chains.	  	  
B. PRACTICES	  HARMING	  CONSUMERS	  
Buyer	   power	   is	   generally	   not	   addressed	   by	   competition	   authorities	   due	   to	   the	   assumption	   that	  
pressure	   exerted	   on	   suppliers	   entails	   benefits	   for	   consumers,	   especially	   in	   terms	   of	   lower	   prices.	  
However,	   that	   assumption	   turns	   out	   to	   be	   not	   necessarily	   true.	   Some	   buyer	   practices	   do	   indeed	  
cause	  harmful	  effects	  in	  downstream	  seller	  markets	  and	  consequently	  affect	  the	  primary	  objective	  of	  
EU	  competition	  law,	  namely	  consumer	  welfare.	  	  
1. Practices	  raising	  consumer	  prices	  
Exclusionary	  practices	  used	  by	  large	  supermarket	  chains	  are	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  higher	  consumer	  prices	  
in	   the	  mid	  or	   longer	   term	  due	  to	  a	   reinforcement	  of	   their	  position	   in	   the	  retail	  market.	   It	  appears,	  
though,	   that	   such	   harmful	   effects	   already	   arise	   and	   might	   get	   worse	   in	   the	   short-­‐term	   as	   well.	  
According	   to	   suppliers,	   the	   exercise	  of	   buyer	   power	  does	   indeed	  not	   turn	   into	   lower	  prices	   at	   the	  
retail	  level	  but,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  causes	  an	  increase	  in	  consumer	  prices	  in	  some	  circumstances.	  
As	  mentioned	  above,	   the	   countless	   commercial	  payments	   required	  by	   large	  distributors	  may	   force	  
brands	   producers	   to	   raise	   the	   transfer	   prices	   of	   their	   products.	   Although	   buyers	   keep	   exerting	  
pressure	   on	   their	   suppliers	   to	   prevent	   such	   an	   increase	   of	   the	   purchasing	   prices,	   the	   core	   of	   the	  
negotiation	  between	   the	   two	  parties	  appears	   to	  be	  often	   redirected	   towards	  other	   issues	   that	  are	  
unlikely	  to	  benefit	  consumers.	  In	  fact,	  supermarket	  chains	  tend	  to	  exploit	  their	  buyer	  power	  mostly	  
to	   extract	   other	   types	   of	   concessions	   than	   lower	   prices	   from	   their	   suppliers.	   As	   such,	   through	   the	  
sales	  of	  expensive	   (factious)	   services	   to	  producers	   (promotional	   activities	   in	   the	   stores,	   advertising	  
leaflets,	  and	  so	  on)	  and	  through	  different	  payments	  and	  retroactive	  discounts	  imposed	  on	  the	  latter,	  
retailers	   are	   in	   the	   end	   able	   to	   far	   overcompensate	   a	   possible	   increase	   in	   the	   transfer	   prices	   of	  
branded	  products.	   In	   those	   circumstances,	   the	  exercise	  of	  market	  power	   in	   the	  procurement	  does	  
not	  yield	  the	  benefits	  expected	  for	  consumers.	  Distributors	  are	  indeed	  unlikely	  to	  pass	  on	  off-­‐invoice	  
payments	  and	  discounts	  obtained	  from	  suppliers	  to	  consumers	  through	  lower	  prices,	  and	  definitely	  
not	  in	  Member	  states	  where	  resale-­‐below-­‐cost	  offers	  are	  prohibited.	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In	  addition,	  to	  protect	  their	  market	  position	  in	  the	  retail	  market,	  large	  distributors	  may	  use	  different	  
techniques	   so	   as	   to	  make	   sure	   rivals	   are	   subject	   to	   and	   apply	   the	   same	   increase	   in	   prices	   in	   their	  
stores.	   For	   example,	   most-­‐favored-­‐customer	   clauses	   aim	   at	   ensuring	   that	   suppliers	   do	   not	   offer	  
better	  conditions	  to	  competitors.	  Under	  such	  a	  clause,	  a	  producer	  commits	  not	  to	  offer	  worse	  terms	  
to	   a	   particular	   retailer	   than	   are	   offered	   to	   its	   other	   customers.1048	   As	   a	   result,	   producers	   are	  
dissuaded	   from	   lowering	   the	   prices	   charged	   to	   one	   distributor	   as	   this	   would	   compel	   them	   to	  
decrease	  prices	  charged	  to	  their	  larger	  customers.	  In	  case	  of	  complaint	  from	  those	  customers	  about	  
competing	   retailers’	   lower	   prices,	   suppliers	   are	   hence	   more	   likely	   to	   level	   prices	   upwards	   than	  
downwards.	  
Buyer	  power	  can	  also	  be	  used	  to	  orchestrate	   the	   implementation	  of	  a	  common	  trade	  policy	  at	   the	  
retail	   level,	   such	  as	   retail	   price	   realignment,	   by	  using	   common	   suppliers	   to	   share	   information	  with	  
competing	  retailers.	  This	  would	  constitute	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  hub	  and	  spoke	  conspiracies	   initiated	  
by	  (a)	  buyer(s)	  leading	  to	  higher	  prices	  for	  consumers	  as	  it	  is	  developed	  below	  in	  Point	  C.	  
In	   terms	   of	   consumer	   prices,	   buyer	   power	   benefits	   consumers	   where	   it	   is	   used	   to	   lower	  
supracompetitive	  prices	  imposed	  by	  powerful	  producers.	  However,	  when	  such	  power	  is	  exploited	  by	  
retailers	  to	  extract	  unjustified	  concessions	  from	  suppliers	  and/or	   incite	  them	  to	  engage	   in	  unlawful	  
conduct,	   consumers	   can	   in	   fact	   not	   expect	   any	   benefits	   in	   terms	   of	   lower	   prices	   in	   their	  
supermarkets.	   In	   view	   of	   the	   current	   trends	   in	   the	   retail	   sector	  which	   lead	   supermarket	   chains	   to	  
exercise	  pressure	  on	  other	  aspects	  of	  the	  negotiation,	  which	  may	  be	  more	  profitable	  for	  them	  than	  
lower	  purchasing	  prices,	  skepticism	  gains	  ground	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  positive	  effects	  of	  buyer	  power.	  	  
2. Practices	  affecting	  quality	  	  
Facing	  downward	  pressure	  on	  prices	  and	  increasing	  costs,	  producers	  may	  be	  left	  with	  little	  choice	  but	  
to	   undermine	   the	   quality	   of	   their	   products.	   Quality	   erosion	   may	   indeed	   constitute	   an	   attractive	  
avenue	   to	   alleviate	   the	   financial	   burden	   resulting	   from	   supermarket	   chains’	   buyer	   power.1049	   Such	  
quality	  depression	  may	   consist	   in	  using	   lower-­‐quality	   ingredients,	   reducing	   the	  nutritional	   value	  of	  
the	   products	   or	  modifying	   the	   recipe	   and	  may	   even	   lead	   producers	   to	   depart	   from	   the	   values	   or	  
ingredients	  indicated	  on	  the	  products.	  
Producers	  of	  private	  labels	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  more	  prone	  to	  engage	  in	  quality	  erosion	  because	  they	  
do	   not	   own	   the	   brands	   of	   their	   products.	   High	   concentration	   among	   buyers	   in	   the	   procurement	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  J.P.	  van	  der	  Veer,	  Antitrust	  scrutiny	  of	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  clauses:	  an	  economic	  analysis,	  4	  Journal	  of	  
European	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  &	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  (2013)	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market	   and	   the	   resulting	   competitive	   pressure	   on	   suppliers	  may	   lead	   some	  of	   them	   to	   take	   some	  
risks	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   quality	   of	   their	   production.	   Producers	   of	   private	   labels	   are	   indeed	   played	  
against	  each	  other	   in	   tenders	   issued	  by	   large	  retailers	  and	  pressured	  to	  bid	  very	   low	  prices	  so	  that	  
the	  only	  way	  to	  retain	  profitability	  may	  be	  to	  reduce	  quality.	  Such	  quality	  erosion	  may	  in	  fact	  remain	  
undetected	  as	  supermarket	  chains,	  which	  own	  the	  private	  label	  brand,	  do	  not	  necessarily	  possess	  the	  
technology	  or	  incentive	  to	  screen	  each	  of	  their	  product	  lines.1050	  	  
Brands	  owners	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  undermine	  the	  quality	  of	  their	  products	  because	  such	  conduct	  might	  
seriously	   damage	   the	   brands	   name	   and	   image.	   However,	   quality	   depression	   is	   not	   excluded	   in	  
branded	   products	   either,	   in	   particular	   if	   consumers	   do	   not	   have	   the	   capacity	   to	   spot	   it	   when	  
consuming	  the	  product	  in	  question	  and/or	  are	  misled	  by	  false	  information.	  	  
Stories	   illustrating	  possible	  quality	  erosion	  are	  sometimes	  reported	  and	  concern	  both	  private	  labels	  
and	   branded	   products.	   For	   example,	   in	   2011,	   in	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	   pangasius	   fish,	   sold	   under	  
private	   labels	   as	  well	   as	   some	  producers’	   brands,	  was	  withdrawn	   from	   the	   shelves	  of	   three	  of	   the	  
UK’s	  largest	  retailers	  after	  it	  was	  found	  that	  the	  fish	  in	  question	  was	  adulterated	  by	  significant	  levels	  
of	   additives	   used	   to	   retain	   water	   in	   the	   fish	   and	   thereby	   increase	   the	   latter’s	   weight.1051	   More	  
recently,	   in	   January	   2013,	   beef	   lasagna	   and	   other	   beef	   product	   sold	   in	  most	  Member	   states	  were	  
discovered	  to	  be	  made	  of	  horse	  meat.	  Such	  adulteration	  enabled	  processors	  to	  reduce	  their	  costs	  as	  
horse	  meat	  may	  be	  much	  cheaper	  than	  beef.	  Even	  though	  in	  that	  case	  no	  evidence	  of	  health	  risk	  was	  
proved,	   it	   comes	   that	   consumers	   were	   deceived	   by	   disguised	   inferior	   products	   bought	   at	   a	   price	  
above	   their	  market	   value.	  As	   rightly	  pointed	  out	  by	  M.Ezrachi,	   in	   those	   cases,	   the	  possible	  benefit	  
resulting	  from	  price	  decreases	  is	  cancelled	  out	  by	  quality	  erosion	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  consumers.1052	  
Could	   those	  practices	  have	  been	  avoided	   if	   large	   retailers	  were	  not	  allowed	   to	  abuse	   their	  market	  
power	  in	  the	  procurement	  market?	  This	  is	  an	  open	  question	  but	  that	  is	  worth	  being	  asked.	  One	  can	  
indeed	   legitimately	   think	   that	   ever	   present	   pressure	   from	   retailers	   is	   likely	   to	   push	   producers	   to	  
engage	  in	  practices	  that	  they	  would	  not	  have	  envisaged	  otherwise.	  	  To	  remain	  profitable,	  producers	  
may	  hence	  be	   led	   to	   impair	   the	  quality	  of	   their	   products	  or	   relocate	   their	   production	   to	   countries	  
with	   cheap	   labour	   and	   inputs,	   thereby	   making	   quality	   control	   much	   more	   difficult.	   Even	   though	  
supermarket	  chains	  cannot	  be	  blamed	  for	  all	  dysfunctions	  occurring	  along	  the	  supply	  chain,	  sanctions	  
for	  abusive	  practices	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market	  could	  alleviate	  the	  burden	  imposed	  on	  suppliers	  
and	  make	  them	  less	   likely	  to	  take	  risks	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  their	  products	  so	  as	  to	  reduce	  
their	  costs.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1050	  Ibid.,	  at	  259-­‐260.	  
1051	  “Three	  UK	  Retailers	  Nix	  Pangasius”	  in	  Seafood	  International,	  September	  2011,	  p.19.	  
1052	  A.Ezrachi	  &	  K.De	  Jong,	  op.cit.,	  at	  261.	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3. Practices	  affecting	  choice	  
In	   a	   competitive	  market,	   retailers	   select	   products	   in	   the	   procurement	  market	  which	   are	   the	  most	  
likely	  to	  meet	  the	  needs	  and	  preferences	  of	  consumers	  according	  to	  their	  type,	  price	  and	  quality.1053	  
However,	   exploitation	   of	   producers	   by	   large	   retailers	   and	   some	   strategies	   used	   by	   the	   latter	   to	  
increase	  their	  market	  power	  may	  in	  fact	  affect	  that	  selection	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  consumers.	  	  
Hopes	   of	   profits	   and	  higher	  margins	   constitute	   the	  main	   considerations	   that	   influence	  distributors	  
when	   making	   their	   selection	   in	   the	   upstream	   buyer	   market.	   Accordingly,	   they	   are	   very	   likely	   to	  
choose	  their	  suppliers	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  criteria	  unrelated	  to	  consumer	  welfare	  such	  as	  the	  capacity	  and	  
consent	   of	   those	   suppliers	   to	   pay	   the	   required	   number	   of	   fees	   and	   to	   comply	  with	   any	   additional	  
demand	   that	   could	   be	   imposed	   on	   them.1054	   Retailers	   can	   in	   fact	   strongly	   influence	   and	   even	  
prescribe	  the	  demand	  of	  consumers	  so	  as	  to	  serve	  their	  own	  best	  interests.	  The	  convenience	  of	  one-­‐
stop-­‐shopping	   provided	   by	   large	   supermarket	   chains	  makes	   indeed	   consumers	  more	   likely	   to	   buy	  
another	  brand	  or	  a	  private	   label	  product	  should	  their	   favorite	  brand	  be	  no	   longer	  available	   in	  their	  
store	   rather	   than	   go	   to	   a	   competing	   retail	   store	   to	   find	   the	   desired	   product.	   The	   high	   loyalty	   of	  
consumers	  to	  their	  supermarket	  gives	  distributors	  much	  more	  leeway	  and	  leverage	  in	  selecting	  their	  
suppliers.	   Being	   the	   final	   decision-­‐makers,	   distributors	   can	   as	   such	   dictate	   consumer	   choice.	  
However,	   given	   the	   high	   discrepancy	   that	   may	   exist	   between	   retailers’	   and	   consumers’	   interests,	  
especially	   due	   to	   the	   large	   number	   of	   payments	   the	   former	   can	   extract	   from	   some	   suppliers,	   the	  
exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  may	  not	  necessarily	  benefit	  consumers.	  Consumer	  choice,	  that	  is	  the	  ability	  
of	  consumers	  to	  choose	  the	  products	  that	  best	  satisfy	  their	  needs	  and	  preferences,	  is	  hence	  likely	  to	  
shrink	  away	  to	  nothing.	  	  	  
Consumers	   cannot	   but	   settle	   for	   products	   selected	   by	   their	   supermarket	   in	   the	   upstream	   buyer	  
markets	   and	   may	   sometimes	   suffer	   the	   consequences	   of	   some	   decisions	   such	   as	   the	   delisting	   of	  
some	  branded	  goods.	  Where	  the	  removal	  of	  products	  from	  a	  distributor’s	  shelves	  is	  not	  the	  result	  of	  
a	   reduced	   consumer	   demand	   but	   of	   dissensions	   between	   the	   distributor	   and	   the	   product	  
manufacturer	   in	  question,	   consumers	  end	  up	   facing	  products	  assortments	   that	  do	  not	   reflect	   their	  
choice.	  	  
For	   example,	   in	   2008,	   one	   of	   the	   largest	   Belgian	   retailers,	   Delhaize,	   delisted	   some	   300	   Unilever	  
products	  including	  very	  popular	  brands	  such	  as	  Dove,	  Knorr	  or	  Lipton	  after	  the	  two	  parties	  failed	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1053	  H.Köhler,	  Buyer	  power	  and	  the	  control	  of	  abusive	  and	  discriminatory	  trade	  practices	  in	  West	  Germany,	  136	  
Journal	  of	  Institutional	  and	  Theoretical	  Economics	  533,	  at	  540	  (1980)	  
1054	  M.Lehmann,	  Legal	  control	  of	  buying	  power	  on	  the	  distribution	  level	  in	  Germany,	  9	  International	  Review	  of	  
Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Competition	  Law	  340,	  at	  349	  (1978)	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conclude	  negotiation.1055	  The	  decision	  was	  thus	  made	  regardless	  of	  consumer	  high	  demand	  for	  those	  
products.	   Where	   delisting	   such	   well-­‐known	   brands	   was	   unthinkable	   some	   time	   ago	   because	   of	  
retailers’	  fear	  of	  losing	  customers,	  this	  case	  proves	  that	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  producers	  and	  
supermarkets	  has	  shifted	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  a	  latter.	  Such	  power	  may	  lead	  to	  lower	  prices	  for	  consumers	  
but	   it	   can	   also	   affect	   their	   choice.	  With	   regard	   to	   the	  dispute	  between	  Unilever	   and	  Delhaize,	   the	  
delisting	  decision	  in	  fact	  deprived	  consumers	  of	  their	  ability	  to	  make	  their	  own	  choice	  for	  a	  very	  large	  
variety	  of	  products.	  Even	  if	  Unilever	  requirements	  had	  led	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  price	  for	  some	  products,	  
consumers	  could	  have	  made	  the	  decision	  to	  continue	  buying	  those	  products	  or	   rather	   to	  switch	  to	  
another	   brand	   or	   private	   label	   line.	   But	   Delhaize	   decided	   in	   place	   of	   consumers	   and	   the	   result,	  
unavailability	   of	   300	   products	   in	   more	   than	   800	   retail	   stores,	   can	   hardly	   be	   considered	   to	   serve	  
consumer	  interests.	  	  
In	   addition,	   the	   growing	   presence	   of	   private	   labels	   promoted	   by	   the	   distributors	   leads	   to	   the	  
exclusion	   of	   some	   brands	   to	   the	   benefit	   of	   these	   distributors	   but	   not	   necessarily	   of	   consumers.	  
Retailers	  have	  indeed	  an	  interest	  in	  increasing	  space	  available	  for	  their	  own-­‐brands	  because,	  on	  the	  
one	   hand,	   those	   products	   generate	   more	   benefits	   and,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   unlike	   with	   regard	   to	  
branded	  products,	   there	   is	  no	   intra-­‐brand	   competition	   since	  private	   labels	   are	  only	   represented	   in	  
one	   retailer’s	   outlets.1056	   However,	   practices	   used	   by	   distributors	   to	   increase	   the	  market	   share	   of	  
private	   labels	   may	   harm	   consumer	   welfare	   through	   a	   reduction	   in	   product	   variety.	   The	   boom	   in	  
private	  label	  lines	  lead	  to	  a	  scarcity	  of	  shelf-­‐space	  for	  branded	  products	  which,	  consequently,	  makes	  
placement	   on	   the	   shelves	   prohibitively	   expensive	   for	   brands	   producers.	   Delisting	   practices	   and	  
unfordable	   payments	   required	   by	   distributors	   are	   therefore	   likely	   to	   adversely	   affect	   product	  
diversity	  and	  consumer	  choice.	  
C. HUB	  &SPOKE	  CONSPIRACIES	  INITIATED	  BY	  RETAILERS	  
As	   explained	   in	   Part	   II,	   hub	   and	   spoke	   collusion	  may	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   combination	   of	   horizontal	   and	  
vertical	   agreements	   involving	   competing	   suppliers	   and	   their	   common	   customer(s)	   or	   retail	  
competitors	   and	   their	   common	   supplier(s).1057	   When	   such	   trilateral	   agreements	   are	   initiated	   by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1055	  The	  spat	  between	  Delhaize	  and	  Unilever	  arises	  after	  the	  latter	  asked	  for	  better	  promotion	  and	  higher	  prices	  
in	  order	  to	  reflect	  the	  higher	  raw	  material	  costs.	  Following	  Delhaize’s	  decision,	  most	  consumers	  replaced	  
Unilever	  products	  with	  those	  of	  competitors	  or	  Delhaize’s	  private	  label	  lines.	  Some	  reports	  revealed	  that	  30%	  
of	  consumers	  shopped	  elsewhere	  to	  find	  the	  delisted	  products.	  However,	  Delhaize	  denied	  that	  the	  row	  had	  
dented	  its	  sales.	  The	  dispute	  was	  settled	  one	  month	  later.	  See:	  http://www.just-­‐food.com/news/delhaize-­‐pulls-­‐
unilever-­‐brands-­‐in-­‐price-­‐row_id105390.aspx	  	  
1056	  R.Olbrich	  &	  C.-­‐C.Buhr,	  The	  impact	  of	  private	  labels	  on	  welfare	  and	  competition,	  Research	  paper	  No.1,	  
Department	  of	  Business	  Administration	  and	  Economics,	  FernUniversität	  in	  Hagen	  (2004),	  at	  19,	  available	  at:	  
http://www.fernuni-­‐hagen.de/marketing/download/no1-­‐web.pdf	  	  
1057	  See	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  I,	  Point	  A,	  1,	  c).	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buyers,	   it	  may	   be	   assumed	   that	   the	   latter	   detain	   significant	  market	   power	   in	   the	   upstream	   buyer	  
market	  so	  as	  to	  be	  able	  to	  convince	  or	  force	  suppliers	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  collusive	  practice	  which	  may	  not	  
necessarily	  be	  in	  the	  latter’s	  interest.	  	  
There	  is	  no	  European	  case	  law	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  hub	  and	  spoke	  conspiracy.	  However,	  on	  the	  basis,	   in	  
particular,	   on	   national	   cases,	   different	   examples	   of	   unlawful	   A-­‐B-­‐C	   arrangements	   induced	   by	   a	  
powerful	  buyer	  can	  be	  pointed	  out.	  
Firstly,	  as	  already	  mentioned	  above	  with	   regard	   to	  practices	   leading	   to	   the	  exclusion	  of	  competing	  
retailers,	  a	  hub	  and	  spoke	  conspiracy	  may	  consist	   in	  a	   retailer	   coercing	  or	   convincing	  a	   supplier	   to	  
abide	   by	   an	   exclusive	   or	   restrictive	   supply	   obligation	   by	   assuring	   that	   supplier	   that	   the	   same	  
restriction	  will	  be	  enforced	  by	  the	  other	  suppliers	  as	  well.1058	  Knowing	  the	  terms	  of	  his	  rival’s	  future	  
supply	  policy,	   the	   supplier	  decides	   then	   to	  align	  his	  own	  decision	  by	  accepting	   the	   restrictive	  deal.	  
That	   would	   result	   in	   a	   kind	   of	   tacit	   agreement	   among	   suppliers	   boycotting	   other	   retailers	   and	  
possibly	  leading	  to	  input	  foreclosure.1059	  	  
Secondly,	   a	   powerful	   retailer	   (A)	  may	   complain	   to	  his	   supplier	   (B)	   about	   the	  market	   activities	  of	   a	  
rival	  (C)	  which	  benefits	  from	  lower	  prices	  or	  simply	  offers	  lower	  prices	  to	  consumers.	  In	  response	  of	  
A’s	  complaint	  and	  possibly	  due	  to	  pressure	  the	  latter	  puts	  on	  it,	  the	  supplier	  then	  may	  act	  in	  a	  way	  
which	   limits	  the	  competitive	  activity	  of	  retailer	  C	   in	  the	  downstream	  retail	  market	  by	   increasing	  his	  
sale	  prices	  to	  the	  same	  level	  as	  that	  offered	  to	  A	  or	  by	  persuading	  retailer	  C	  to	  realign	  its	  retail	  prices	  
to	  a	  higher	  level.	  In	  fact,	  the	  retailer’s	  complaint	  is	  only	  meant	  to	  convince	  the	  supplier	  in	  question	  to	  
take	   action	   against	   a	   competing	   retailer	   and	   thereby	   to	   make	   that	   rival	   raise	   its	   prices	   or	   stop	  
discounting.1060	   Such	   a	   trilateral	   arrangement	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   regarded	   as	   minimum	   resale	   price	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1058	  The	  hub-­‐and-­‐spoke	  conspiracy	  may	  concern	  restrictions	  on	  supply	  but	  also	  pricing	  conditions	  or	  other	  
anticompetitive	  cooperation	  such	  as	  sharing	  of	  geographic	  markets.	  Without	  the	  assurance	  that	  its	  competing	  
suppliers	  are	  also	  bound	  by	  the	  same	  restriction,	  the	  supplier	  would	  be	  even	  more	  reluctant	  to	  accept	  the	  
buyer’s	  exclusive	  conditions.	  If	  a	  supplier	  is	  the	  only	  one	  foregoing	  sales	  to	  other	  buyers,	  it	  would	  indeed	  be	  put	  
at	  a	  significant	  competitive	  disadvantage	  in	  comparison	  with	  its	  rivals.	  
1059	  A	  good	  example	  of	  such	  an	  hybrid	  arrangement	  is	  the	  case	  Toys	  “R”	  Us,	  Inc.	  v.	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission,	  
221	  F.3d	  928,	  (7th	  Cir.2000)	  in	  the	  United	  States	  where	  a	  leading	  discounter	  of	  toys	  concluded	  a	  series	  of	  
agreements	  with	  toy	  manufacturers	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  them	  from	  offering	  some	  products	  to	  a	  new	  competing	  
distributor.	  See	  above	  in	  this	  Section	  Point	  A,	  1.	  
1060	  Complaints	  from	  retailers	  to	  suppliers	  may	  yet	  also	  be	  legitimate,	  especially	  when	  they	  are	  directed	  at	  
getting	  better	  terms	  and	  conditions	  from	  suppliers.	  Provided	  that	  discussions	  about	  a	  competitor’s	  pricing	  
policy	  remain	  on	  a	  vertical	  basis	  and	  do	  not	  lead	  to	  include	  a	  horizontal	  element	  in	  the	  relationship,	  no	  
horizontal	  concerted	  practice	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  found.	  See:	  UK	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	  Argos	  Limited	  and	  Littlewoods	  
Limited	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  and	  JJB	  Sports	  Plc	  v	  	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading,	  Case	  Nos	  2005/1071,	  1074	  and	  1623	  	  
[2006]	  EWCA	  Civ	  1318,	  at	  106.	  See	  also:	  P.Whelan,	  Trading	  negotiations	  between	  retailers	  and	  suppliers:	  a	  
fertile	  ground	  for	  anti-­‐competitive	  horizontal	  information	  exchange?,	  5	  European	  Competition	  Journal	  823,	  at	  
838	  (2009)	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maintenance	  imposed	  de	  facto	  by	  the	  retailer.1061	  In	  addition,	  as	  the	  A-­‐B-­‐C	  arrangement	  leads	  to	  an	  
alignment	  of	  selling	  prices	  in	  the	  downstream	  market,	  it	  might	  hence	  be	  concluded	  that	  competitors	  
A	  and	  C	  have	  been	  involved	  in	  an	  anticompetitive	  concerted	  practice	  fixing	  prices,	  at	  least	  if	  both	  of	  
them	  were	  aware	  that	  the	  supplier	  was	  acting	  as	  a	  “hub”.	  	  
Illegal	  indirect	  share	  of	  information	  induced	  by	  a	  complaining	  retailer	  has	  already	  been	  sanctioned	  by	  
UK	  competition	  authorities	  in	  the	  sector	  of	  sportswear	  and	  sport	  equipment.	  In	  the	  Replica	  football	  
kit	  case,	  a	  retailer,	   JJB	  Sports,	   initiated	  a	  trilateral	  agreement	  by	  complaining	  to	  one	  of	   its	  supplier,	  
Umbro,	   that	   a	   competing	   retailer,	   Sport	   Soccer,	  was	  discounting	   replica	   football	   shirts.	   In	  order	   to	  
keep	   its	   higher	  prices	  without	   losing	   customers,	   JJB	   Sports	   incited	   the	   supplier	   in	  question	   to	   take	  
measures	   so	   as	   to	   prevent	   discounts	   by	   competitors	   at	   the	   retail	   level.	   Following	   discussions	  with	  
Umbro,	  Sport	  Soccer	  agreed	  reluctantly	  to	  raise	  its	  prices	  on	  the	  understanding	  that	  other	  retailers,	  
in	   particular	   JJB	   Sports,	   would	   not	   discount.	   Despite	   the	   absence	   of	   direct	   contact	   between	   the	  
competing	   retailers,	   UK	   competition	   authorities	   found	   that	   they	   were	   part	   of	   an	   anticompetitive	  
horizontal	  agreement.1062	  
A	   third	   example	   where	   a	   hub-­‐and-­‐spoke	   conspiracy	   may	   amount	   to	   a	   horizontal	   anticompetitive	  
arrangement	   induced	  by	  a	  powerful	  buyer,	   involves	  a	  retailer	  willing	  to	   increase	  the	  retail	  prices	  of	  
some	  products,	  possibly	  after	  a	  rise	  in	  the	  wholesale	  prices	  of	  these	  products.	  However,	  in	  order	  to	  
remain	   competitive	   at	   the	   retail	   level,	   the	   retailer	   will	   first	   get	   assurances	   from	   its	   supplier	   that	  
competing	  retailers	  will	  also	  raise	  prices	  in	  the	  downstream	  retail	  market.1063	  If	  discussions	  between	  
the	  supplier	  and	  its	  different	  customers	  lead	  in	  fact	  to	  an	  indirect	  horizontal	  exchange	  of	  information	  
about	  prices	  between	  competitors	  who	  have	  knowledge	  of	  the	  role	  being	  played	  by	  the	  supplier	   in	  
question,	  competition	  authorities	  could	  consider	  that	  the	  hub-­‐and-­‐spoke	  arrangement	  amounts	  to	  a	  
horizontal	  agreement	  restricting	  competition	  by	  object.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1061	  Resale	  price	  maintenance	  is	  considered	  as	  a	  vertical	  hardcore	  restriction	  and	  is	  therefore	  not	  covered	  by	  
the	  Block	  Exemption	  Regulation.	  See	  Commission	  Regulation	  (EU)	  No	  330/2010	  of	  20	  April	  2010	  on	  the	  
application	  of	  Article	  101(3)	  of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  the	  Functioning	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  to	  categories	  of	  vertical	  
agreements	  and	  concerted	  practices	  (Text	  with	  EEA	  relevance),	  O.J.	  L	  102/1	  of	  23/04/2010.	  Article	  4	  provides	  
that	  the	  exemption	  for	  vertical	  agreements	  will	  not	  apply	  to	  agreements	  “which,	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  in	  
isolation	  or	  in	  combination	  with	  other	  factors	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  parties,	  have	  as	  their	  object:	  	  
(a)	  the	  restriction	  of	  the	  buyer's	  ability	  to	  determine	  its	  sale	  price,	  without	  prejudice	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  
supplier	  to	  impose	  a	  maximum	  sale	  price	  or	  recommend	  a	  sale	  price,	  provided	  that	  they	  do	  not	  amount	  to	  a	  
fixed	  or	  minimum	  sale	  price	  as	  a	  result	  of	  pressure	  from,	  or	  incentives	  offered	  by,	  any	  of	  the	  parties	  (…)”	  
1062	  See:	  OFT	  Decision,	  Price-­‐Fixing	  of	  Replica	  Football	  Kit,	  Case	  CP/0871/01,	  1	  August	  2003.	  On	  appeal	  before	  
the	  Competition	  Appeal	  Tribunal,	  see:	  Competition	  Appeal	  Tribunal,	  JJB	  Sports	  Plc	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading;	  
Allsports	  Limited	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading,	  Case	  1022/1/1/03	  [2004]	  CAT	  17.	  On	  appeal	  before	  the	  Court	  of	  
Appeal:	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	  Argos	  Limited	  and	  Littlewoods	  Limited	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  and	  JJP	  Sports	  Plc	  v	  
Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading,	  Case	  No	  2005/1071,	  1074	  and	  1623,	  [2006]	  EWCA	  Civ	  1318.	  
1063	  P.Whelan,	  Trading	  negotiations	  between	  retailers	  and	  suppliers…,	  op.cit.,	  at	  839.	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Such	  an	  arrangement	  to	  increase	  retail	  prices	  was	  for	  example	  sanctioned	  by	  the	  French	  competition	  
authority	   in	   2007.1064	   The	   case	   occurred	   in	   the	   sector	   of	   toys	   and	   involved	   toys	   producers,	  
supermarket	   chains	   and	   specialist	   toys	   distributors.	   In	   order	   to	   cease	   price	   competition	   and	   to	  
establish	   a	   unique	   retail	   price	   for	   some	   products	   in	   competing	   stores,	   the	   distributors	   concerned	  
largely	  participated	  in	  an	  arrangement	  with	  their	  suppliers	  and	  competitors.	  Price	  monitoring	  policies	  
were	  also	  organized	  so	  as	   to	   track	  down	  “deviant”	  distributors	  and	  achieve	  a	  quick	   realignment	  of	  
prices.	   For	   example,	   the	   supermarket	   chain	   Carrefour	   launched	   a	   commercial	   operation	   called	  
“Carrefour	   repays	   ten	   times	   the	  difference”,	   inciting	   thereby	   consumers	   to	   report	   any	  decrease	   in	  
prices	  in	  competing	  retail	  stores.	  Using	  the	  information	  obtained	  thanks	  to	  the	  claims	  of	  repayment	  
brought	  by	  consumers,	  Carrefour	  systematically	  intervened	  with	  the	  concerned	  suppliers	  in	  order	  to	  
“fix	   the	   problem”	   –	   thas	   is,	   they	   demanded	   suppliers	   to	   obtain	   that	   their	   competitors	   increase	  
prices.1065	  	  
Even	   though,	   in	   this	   case,	   the	  price	   alignment	   seems	   to	  have	  been	   initiated	  by	   toys	   producers,1066	  
large	   supermarket	   chains	   have,	   without	   any	   doubt,	   sufficient	   market	   power	   to	   orchestrate	   such	  
collusion,	  especially	  in	  product	  markets	  where	  their	  buyer	  power	  is	  greater	  than	  in	  the	  toys	  market.	  
Toys	  manufacturers	  have	  indeed	  alternative	  customers	  and	  sell	  in	  fact	  most	  of	  their	  products	  to	  toys	  
distributors.	  They	  are	  therefore	  unlikely	  to	  be	  dependent	  of	  supermarket	  chains,	  limiting	  the	  latter’s	  
bargaining	   power.	   The	   situation	   is	   however	   radically	   different	   with	   regard	   to	   food	   product	   or	  
detergent	  manufacturers	   for	   example	  who	   can	   hardly	   reach	   final	   consumers	  without	   supermarket	  
chains	  buying	  their	  products.	  Given	  the	  economic	  dependence	  of	  those	  producers	  on	   large	  grocery	  
stores,	   the	   latter	   can	   therefore	   easily	   exploit	   their	   buyer	   power	   and	   incite	   their	   suppliers	   to	  
participate	  in	  anticompetitive	  practices.	  
For	  example,	  in	  the	  UK,	  competition	  authorities	  fined	  four	  retailers	  for	  indirectly	  sharing	  confidential	  
future	   retail	   pricing	   information	   in	   2002	   and	  2003	   via	   common	  dairy	   processor	   suppliers	   acting	   as	  
intermediaries.1067	   In	   fact,	   milk	   processing	   companies	   sought	   to	   increase	   wholesale	   cheese	   prices	  
charged	   to	   retailers.	   The	   latter	   wished	   to	   pass	   on	   the	   cost	   price	   increase	   to	   consumers	   but	   were	  
concerned	   that	   they	   would	   be	   undercut	   by	   rivals	   at	   the	   retail	   level.	   To	   prevent	   any	   competitive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1064	  See:	  Décision	  07-­‐D-­‐50	  du	  20	  décembre	  2007	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  dans	  le	  secteur	  de	  la	  
distribution	  des	  jouets.	  	  
1065	  See:	  Press	  releases	  of	  the	  French	  competition	  authority	  on	  decision	  07-­‐D-­‐50,	  available	  at:	  
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/standard.php?id_rub=211&id_article=881	  	  
1066	  Manufacturers	  colluded	  to	  set	  toy	  resale	  prices	  while	  distributors	  participated	  in	  keeping	  an	  eye	  on	  pricing	  
of	  competitors.	  	  
1067	  OFT	  Decision,	  Dairy	  retail	  price	  initiatives,	  Case	  No	  CA/98/03/2011,	  26	  July	  2011.	  Each	  of	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  
infringement	  has	  admitted	  its	  involvement	  except	  for	  Tesco	  which	  lodged	  an	  appeal	  before	  the	  Competition	  
Appeal	  Tribunal.	  See:	  Competition	  Appeal	  Tribunal,	  Tesco	  Stores	  Ltd	  Tesco	  Holdings	  Ltd	  Tesco	  Plc	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  
Trading,	  Cases	  1188/1/1/11	  	  [2012]	  CAT	  31.	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disadvantage,	   some	   of	   them	   passed	   on	   their	   future	   retail	   pricing	   intention	   to	   common	   suppliers,	  
foreseeing	  that	  the	  latter	  would,	  in	  turn,	  pass	  that	  information	  to	  retailer	  competitors	  who	  would	  use	  
it	   to	  define	   their	  own	  pricing	   strategy	  on	   the	  market.	  On	  basis	  of	   the	  EU	  case	   law	  on	  exchange	  of	  
information	  and	  on	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  UK	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  in	  Replica	  Football	  Kit,	  it	  was	  held	  that	  the	  
retailers	  and	  suppliers	  involved	  infringed	  the	  Competition	  Act	  1998	  by	  coordinating	  increases	  in	  the	  
prices	  consumers	  paid	  for	  certain	  dairy	  products.	  
A	  firm	  may	  therefore	  be	  used	  as	  a	  conduit	  through	  which	  information	  is	  knowingly	  passed	  between	  
competitors.	  Even	  though	  the	  proof	  of	  unlawful	  indirect	  exchanges	  of	  information	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  
establish,	  the	  examples	  developed	  above	  nevertheless	  show	  that	  the	  use	  of	  buyer	  power	  may	  lead	  to	  
vertical	  as	  well	  as	  horizontal	  restrictions	  involving	  suppliers	  and	  competing	  retailers.	  	  
	  The	  risk	  of	  retailers	   inducing	  suppliers	  to	  participate	   in	  an	  unlawful	  exchange	  of	   information	  arises	  
when	   these	   buyers	   have	   the	   ability	   and	   incentive	   to	   exploit	   market	   power	   in	   the	   upstream	  
procurement	  market	  so	  as	  to	  exclude	  competitors	  or	  raise	  prices	  at	  the	  retail	  level.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  in	  
the	  grocery	  retail	  sector	  where	  a	  few	  retailers	  compete	  against	  each	  other	  both	  in	  the	  downstream	  
retail	   market	   and	   in	   the	   upstream	   buyer	   market.	   These	   competing	   supermarkets	   have	   therefore	  
common	   suppliers	   over	  whom	   they	   can	   exert	   significant	   buyer	   power	   due	   to	   the	   latter	   economic	  
dependency.	  As	   illustrated	  above,	   large	   retailers’	  buyer	  power	  give	   them	   the	  ability	   to	  orchestrate	  
retail	   price	   realignments	   by	   asking	   their	   suppliers,	   possibly	   under	   the	   threat	   of	   delisting	   their	  
products,	   to	  persuade	   competing	  distributors	   to	   raise	  prices.1068	   The	  high	   level	   of	   concentration	   in	  
the	  grocery	  retail	  sector	  in	  most	  Member	  states	  makes	  it	  easier	  to	  implement	  and	  monitor	  such	  A-­‐B-­‐
C	  arrangement	  as	  deviation	  can	  quickly	  be	  detected	  and	  punished.	  	  
In	   addition,	   grocery	   chains	   are	   incited	   to	   use	   their	   market	   power	   to	   force	   suppliers	   to	   police	  
collusion,	   such	   as	   sale	   price	  maintenance,	   at	   the	   retail	   level.	   Provided	   that	   competitors	   align	   their	  
pricing	   policy	   according	   to	   the	   information	   obtained	   from	   (a)	   common	   supplier(s),	   retailers	   can	  
indeed	  benefit	  from	  an	  increase	  in	  prices	  of	  branded	  products	  as	  this	  would	  create	  a	  price	  gap	  with	  
their	  own-­‐brands	  and,	  as	  a	   result,	  makes	   the	   latter	  more	  attractive	   for	   consumers.	   It	   is	  also	  worth	  
noting	  that	  the	  benefits	  of	  retailers	  are	  unlikely	  to	  fall	  even	   if	  the	  arrangement	  to	  coordinate	  retail	  
prices	   is	  accompanied	  or	  results	   from	  an	   increase	   in	  prices	  at	  the	  wholesale	   level.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  
any	  increase	  in	  prices	  charged	  to	  retailers	  will	  be	  (over)compensated	  by	  other	  concessions	  extracted	  
by	  the	  latter	  from	  their	  suppliers,	  such	  as	  additional	  payments	  for	  promotional	  services.	  Conversely,	  
in	  some	  cases,	  suppliers	  have	  no	  incentive	  to	  police	  indirect	  exchange	  of	  information,	  except	  for	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1068	  V.Bonfitto,	  Buyer	  power	  in	  anti-­‐trust	  investigations:	  a	  review,	  32	  European	  Competition	  Law	  Review	  414,	  at	  
424	  (2011)	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fear	  of	  being	  delisted	  by	   large	  retailers	  which	  force	  them	  to	  play	  the	  role	  consigned	  to	  them	  in	  the	  
hub-­‐and-­‐spoke	  distribution	  strategy.	  
Indirect	  exchange	  of	  information	  between	  competitors	  induced	  by	  large	  buyers	  is	  likely	  to	  generate	  
harmful	   effects	   on	   competition	   as	   it	  may	   remove	   uncertainty	   concerning	   the	   intended	   conduct	   of	  
rivals	  and,	  as	  such,	  amount	  to	  an	  anticompetitive	  horizontal	  arrangement.1069	  We	  will	  see	  in	  the	  next	  
Chapter	  how	  hub-­‐and-­‐spoke	  conspiracies	  could	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  prohibition	  on	  restrictive	  
agreements	  provided	  by	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  and	  possibly	  under	  the	  scope	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  on	  abuses	  
of	  dominance.	  
D. CONCLUSIVE	  REMARKS	  
The	  protection	  of	  the	  process	  of	  competition	  should	  prevail	  in	  seller	  power	  cases	  as	  well	  as	  in	  buyer	  
power	   cases.	   Even	   though	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	  may	   appear	   beneficial	   for	   consumers	   as	   it	  
may	   lead	   to	   lower	   prices	   in	   the	   retail	  markets,	   exclusion	   of	   competitors	   or	   exploitation	   of	  market	  
power	  over	  suppliers	  in	  upstream	  markets	  are	  nevertheless	  likely	  to	  cause	  longer-­‐term	  harm	  to	  end-­‐
users.	  Powerful	  buyers	  are	  indeed	  able	  to	  reinforce	  their	  position,	  not	  only	  as	  a	  buyer	  but	  also	  as	  a	  
seller	   in	   downstream	   seller	   markets,	   through	   practices	   which	   do	   not	   generate	   any	   benefit	   for	  
consumers.	  In	  particular,	  where	  extracting	  other	  concessions	  than	  lower	  prices	  is	  more	  profitable	  for	  
retailers,	  this	  may	  result	  in	  an	  increase	  in	  consumer	  prices	  at	  the	  retail	  level.	  	  
In	   addition,	   excessive	   pressure	   exerted	   on	   producers	   may,	   in	   some	   cases,	   undermine	   the	   latter’s	  
incentives	   to	   invest	   in	   higher	   quality	   or	   new	   product	   thereby	   affecting	   dynamic	   efficiency	   on	   the	  
markets.	  The	  common	  interest	  of	  powerful	  buyers	  in	  exploiting	  suppliers	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  dictate	  
the	  rules	  to	  their	  advantage	  in	  the	  upstream	  markets	  may	  also	  result	  in	  restricting	  consumer	  choice.	  
The	  range	  of	  products	  available	  on	  the	  markets	  relies	   indeed	  on	  buyers’	  decisions	  which	  should,	   in	  
principle,	  reflect	  consumers’	  preferences.	  However,	  it	  turns	  out	  that,	  when	  a	  firm	  acquires	  significant	  
market	  power	  in	  the	  buyer	  market,	  such	  decisions	  may	  sometimes	  be	  taken	  independently	  from	  the	  
other	   market	   participants	   and	   from	   consumers,	   impairing,	   as	   a	   result,	   the	   latter’s	   ability	   to	   buy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1069	  MM.	  Sahuguet	  and	  Walckiers	  	  present	  a	  model	  describing	  the	  working	  of	  hub-­‐and-­‐spoke	  collusion	  and	  
showing	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  such	  collusion	  on	  consumer’s	  welfare	  depends	  on	  the	  bargaining	  power	  in	  the	  
relationship.	  If	  the	  supplier	  has	  the	  bargaining	  power,	  the	  agreement,	  comparable	  to	  a	  vertical	  restraint,	  can	  be	  
welfare	  improving	  in	  reducing	  double	  marginalization.	  However,	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  buyer	  power,	  such	  collusion	  
leads	  to	  a	  loss	  of	  welfare	  since	  it	  helps	  retailers	  to	  improve	  their	  collusive	  scheme.	  See:	  N.Sahuguet	  &	  
A.Walckiers,	  Selling	  to	  a	  cartel	  of	  retailers:	  a	  model	  of	  hub-­‐and-­‐spoke	  collusion,	  CEPR	  Discussion	  paper	  No	  
DP9385	  (2013),	  available	  at:	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2231876	  See	  also:	  P.Dobson	  
&	  M.Waterson,	  The	  competition	  effects	  of	  industry-­‐wide	  vertical	  price	  fixing	  in	  bilateral	  oligopoly,	  25	  
International	  Journal	  of	  Industrial	  Organization	  935	  (2007).	  The	  authors	  also	  maintain	  that	  where	  retailer	  
power	  is	  strong,	  the	  welfare	  effects	  of	  resale	  price	  maintenance	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  adverse,	  since	  the	  practice	  can	  
assist	  in	  coordinating	  price	  levels.	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products	  best	  corresponding	  to	  their	  needs	  and	  preferences.	  As	  consumer	  welfare	  includes	  product	  
quality,	   diversity,	   innovation	   and	   choice,	   an	   improper	   use	   of	   buyer	   power	   over	   suppliers	   may	  
therefore	  hinder	  the	  achievement	  of	  the	  competition	  policy	  objective.	  
In	  EU	  competition	  law,	  the	  prohibition	  on	  abusive	  conduct	  is	  only	  applicable	  to	  firms	  in	  a	  dominant	  
position	  as	   it	   is	  assumed	  that,	  without	   such	  a	  position,	   firms	  are	  unable	   to	  distort	   the	  competition	  
process.	   The	   ability	   of	   some	   buyers,	   with	   significant	   buyer	   power	   but	   considered	   non-­‐dominant	  
under	   the	  criteria	  currently	  used	  by	   the	  Commission,	   to	   restrict	  competition	   through	  their	  conduct	  
raises	  therefore	  the	  question	  of	  the	  need	  to	  define	  new	  criteria	  to	  address	  buyer	  practices.	  One	  can	  
indeed	  consider	  that	  the	  competition	  rules	  should	  be	  applicable	  to	  any	  buyer	  which	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	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CHAPTER	  2	  –	  ACTION	  AT	  EU	  LEVEL	  NEEDED	  
The	  analysis	  of	  the	  EU	  competition	  objectives	  and	  of	  buyer	  practices	  used	  in	  the	  grocery	  retail	  sector	  
sheds	   some	   light	   on	   the	   potential	   anticompetitive	   impact	   of	   large	   retail	   chains’	   buyer	   power.	   The	  
next	   issue	   to	   address	   is	   what	   type	   of	   action	   would	   be	   best	   to	   sanction	   and	   prevent	   the	   harmful	  
exercise	  of	  buyer	  power.	  This	  requires	  determining	  at	  which	  level	  -­‐	  national	  or	  supranational	  -­‐,	  under	  
which	  policy	  and	  in	  which	  sector	  action	  is	  to	  be	  taken	  as	  well	  as	  specifying	  the	  type	  of	  instrument	  to	  
be	  used	  and	  defining	  the	  rules	  to	  be	  included	  in	  that	  instrument.	  
In	  Section	  1	  of	   this	  Chapter,	  we	  will	  address	   the	   first	   three	  questions.	  Firstly,	   it	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  
common	   action	   should	   be	   envisaged	   at	   EU	   level	   to	   remedy	   the	   negative	   effects	   arising	   from	  
discrepancies	  in	  national	  laws.	  Secondly,	  different	  arguments	  call	  for	  addressing	  buyer	  power	  under	  
the	  competition	  rules.	  Thirdly,	  given	  the	  specificities	  of	   the	  grocery	  retail	   sector	  and	  the	   increasing	  
concerns	  related	  to	  large	  retail	  chains’	  buyer	  power,	  EU	  intervention	  should	  be	  limited	  to	  that	  sector.	  
How	  to	  address	  grocery	  retailers’	  buyer	  power	  in	  concrete	  terms	  under	  EU	  competition	  rules	  will	  be	  
dealt	   with	   in	   Section	   2.	   We	   suggest	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	   Directive	   which	   would	   empower	   national	  
competition	  authorities	  to	  control	  large	  retail	  chains’	  conduct	  in	  the	  procurement	  market.	  To	  do	  so,	  
new	   criteria	   are	   suggested	   to	   assess	   the	   degree	   of	   buyer	   power	   and	   buyers’	   ability	   to	   restrict	  
competition.	   A	   particular	   attention	  will	   also	   be	   drawn	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   hub-­‐and-­‐spoke	   conspiracies	  
when	  initiated	  by	  large	  buyers.	  	  
SECTION	  1	  –	  NEED	  FOR	  COMMON	  ACTION	  WITHIN	  THE	  SCOPE	  OF	  COMPETITION	  LAW	  
Voices	   are	   being	   raised	   against	   abuses	   of	   buyer	   power	   in	   different	  Member	   states	   but	   also	   at	   EU	  
level.	   Various	   actions	   have	   been	   taken	   by	   national	   authorities	   in	   order	   to	   address	   some	   buyer	  
practices	  used,	  in	  particular,	  in	  the	  retail	  grocery	  industry	  but	  so	  far	  none	  of	  them	  has	  succeeded	  in	  
containing	  supermarkets’	  buyer	  power.	  
Within	  the	  European	  institutions,	  concerns	  have	  been	  emerging	  for	  some	  time	  about	  unfair	  trading	  
practices,	   including	   and	   especially,	   about	   unfair	   use	   of	   buyer	   power	   in	   business-­‐to-­‐business	  
relationships	   in	   the	   supply	   chain.	   However,	   the	   potential	   anticompetitive	   effects	   of	   buyer	   power	  
have	   been	   only	   prudently	   mentioned.	   The	   first	   part	   of	   this	   section	   provides	   an	   overview	   of	   the	  
different	  investigations	  carried	  out	  at	  EU	  level	  on	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  supply	  chain	  and	  on	  the	  
different	  initiatives	  that	  have	  followed	  to	  further	  investigate	  on	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  intervening	  in	  
trade	  relationships	  through	  a	  European	  common	  set	  of	  principles.	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The	  current	  debate	  on	  unfair	  trading	  practices	  within	  the	  European	  institutions	  attests	  of	  the	  latter’s	  
growing	   interest	   in	  buyer	  power	  and	   its	  consequences.	  Most	  of	   the	  practices	  pointed	  out	  as	  unfair	  
concern	  indeed	  practices	  used	  by	  large	  retailers	  in	  the	  procurement	  market.	  Even	  though	  highlighting	  
unfair	   buyer	   practices	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   laudable	   step,	   it	   remains	   that	   the	   possible	  
anticompetitiveness	  of	   some	  of	   those	  practices	  has	  not	  been	   formerly	   recognized	  so	   that,	   if	  action	  
should	   be	   taken,	   it	  would	   probably	   be	   outside	   the	   scope	   of	   competition	   law.	   	   It	   has	   though	   been	  
established	  in	  the	  first	  Chapter	  above	  that	  large	  buyers,	  such	  as	  supermarket	  chains,	  have	  the	  ability	  
to	   restrict	   competition	   and	   harm	   consumers	   through	   their	   conduct.	   It	   is	   therefore	   argued	   in	   the	  
second	   part	   of	   this	   Section	   that,	   given	   the	   actual	   or	   potential	   harmful	   effect	   of	   buyer	   power	   on	  
competition	   within	   the	   common	   market,	   this	   issue	   should	   be	   dealt	   with	   uniformly	   and	   through	  
effective	  measures	  within	  the	  European	  Union	  under	  the	  competition	  rules.	  Such	  an	  action	  against	  
buyer	  practices	  would	  indeed	  present	  different	  advantages	  and	  be	  best	  suited	  to	  protect	  undistorted	  
competition.	  In	  addition,	  the	  specificity	  of	  buyer	  power	  in	  the	  grocery	  retail	  industry	  should	  call	  for	  a	  
particular	   focus	   on	   that	   sector	   where	   supermarket	   chains’	   conduct	   is	   more	   likely	   to	   affect	  
competition.	   In	   order	   to	   avoid	   excessive	   intervention	   in	   business-­‐to-­‐business	   relationships,	   action	  
should	  therefore	  be	  limited	  to	  defining	  new	  rules	  so	  as	  to	  give	  competition	  authorities	  the	  power	  to	  
tackle	  anticompetitive	  buyer	  practices	  in	  the	  grocery	  industry.	  
A. CURRENT	  APPROACH	  OF	  EU	  INSTITUTIONS	  
The	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   by	   large	   companies	   constitutes	   undoubtedly	   a	   concern	   in	   EU	   law,	  
especially	  in	  the	  food	  sectors.	  That	  issue	  has	  indeed	  been	  examined	  by	  the	  EU	  institutions	  in	  different	  
monitoring	   investigations	   related	   to	   the	   functioning	  and	  competitiveness	  of	   the	   food	   supply	   chain.	  
Different	   reports	   resulting	   from	   those	   investigations	  highlight	   some	  potential	   negative	   effects	   that	  
may	   arise	   due	   to	   imbalances	   of	   power	   in	   the	   supply	   chain.	   A	   particular	   attention	   is	   for	   example	  
drawn	  on	  the	  possible	  negative	   impact	  of	  some	  practices	  on	   innovation	  and	  on	  the	  strong	  position	  
acquired	   by	   large	   retailers	   due	   to	   the	   growing	   penetration	   of	   private	   labels	   which	   give	   them	  
significant	   competitive	  advantages.	  However,	   the	  anticompetitive	   impact	  of	  buyer	  power	   seems	   to	  
be	  an	   incidental	   issue	   in	   those	   reports	   leading	   the	  authorities	   to	  envisage	  action	   to	  address	  unfair	  
trading	  practices	  in	  business-­‐to-­‐business	  relationships	  only	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  competition	  law.	  
1. Emphasis	  on	  buyer	  power	  in	  monitoring	  investigations	  
Different	   documents,	   declarations	   and	   reports	   issued	   recently	   by	   the	   EU	   institutions	   show	   a	   new	  
focus	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  buyer	  power,	  especially	  when	  exercised	  within	  the	  food	  supply	  chain.	  In	  fact,	  
the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  by	   large	  companies	  constitutes	  one	  of	   the	   issues	  examined	  by	   the	  EU	  
institutions	   in	  different	  monitoring	   investigations	  related	  to	  the	  functioning	  and	  competitiveness	  of	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the	  food	  supply	  chain.	  The	  recent	  food	  prices	  developments	  have	  led	  the	  Commission	  to	  investigate,	  
among	   other	   things,	   the	   impact	   buyer-­‐supplier	   contractual	   relationships	   may	   have	   on	   the	  
competitiveness	   of	   all	   sectors	   of	   the	   food	   supply	   chain	   in	   the	   European	   Union.	   While	   the	   sharp	  
increase	   in	   agricultural	   commodity	   prices	   in	   the	   second	   half	   of	   2007	   resulted	   in	   higher	   consumer	  
prices,	   the	   following	  drop	   in	  prices	   in	   2008	  has	   yet	   failed	   to	   fully	   translate	   in	   lower	   food	  prices	   at	  
retail	  levels.	  That	  discrepancy	  between	  agricultural	  commodity	  prices	  and	  consumer	  prices	  has	  raised	  
concerns	  among	  the	  EU	  institutions	  as	  regards	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  European	  food	  supply	  chain	  and	  
triggered	  the	  need	  to	  better	  monitor	  potential	  competition	  issues.	  
The	   Commission	   has	   identified	   significant	   imbalances	   in	   bargaining	   power	   between	   contracting	  
parties	  in	  the	  food	  supply	  chain	  which	  lead	  very	  often	  to	  unfair	  trading	  practices.1070	  It	  is	  considered	  
that	   the	  proliferation	  of	  such	  unfair	  practices	   is	   likely	   to	  undermine	  the	   food	   industry’s	   investment	  
and	   innovation.	  Contractual	   imbalances	  associated	  with	  unequal	  bargaining	  power	   indeed	   limit	   the	  
ability	   and	   incentives	   of	   smaller	   but	   efficient	   actors	   to	   invest	   in	   improved	   product	   quality	   and	  
innovation	  of	  production	  processes	  as	  they	  may	  be	  obliged	  to	  operate	  under	  reduced	  profitability.	  	  
This	  issue	  was,	  in	  particular,	  underlined	  in	  the	  Report	  drawn	  up	  in	  2009	  by	  the	  High	  Level	  Group	  on	  
the	  Competitiveness	  of	  the	  Agro-­‐Food	  Industry.1071	  It	  was	  pointed	  out	  in	  that	  report	  that	  the	  level	  of	  
investment	   in	   R&D	   in	   the	   European	   food	   industry	   is	   too	   low,	   especially	   because	   SMEs,	   which	  
represent	   approximately	   99%	   of	   all	   the	   enterprises	   active	   in	   the	   supply	   chain,	   have	   very	   little	  
capability	   to	  deal	  with	   the	  uncertainties	  and	   risks	   inferred	   in	   research	  and	   innovation	  projects	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1070	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission	  to	  the	  European	  Parliament,	  the	  Council,	  the	  European	  Economic	  
and	  Social	  Committee	  and	  the	  Committee	  of	  the	  Regions,	  A	  better	  functioning	  food	  supply	  chain	  in	  Europe,	  
SEC(2009)	  591	  final,	  Brussels,	  28/10/2009.	  The	  technical	  analysis	  on	  which	  this	  Communication	  is	  based	  is	  
published	  in	  a	  series	  of	  six	  accompanying	  staff	  working	  documents.	  See:	  Staff	  working	  document,	  The	  evolution	  
of	  value-­‐added	  repartition	  along	  the	  European	  food	  supply	  chain,	  SEC(2009)1445,	  28/10/2009;	  Staff	  working	  
document,	  Improving	  price	  transparency	  along	  the	  food	  supply	  chain	  for	  consumers	  and	  policy	  makers,	  SEC	  
(2009)1446,	  28/10/2009;	  Staff	  working	  document,	  Agricultural	  commodity	  derivative	  markets:	  the	  way	  ahead,	  
SEC(2009)1447,	  28/10/2009,	  Staff	  working	  document,	  Outcomes	  of	  the	  High-­‐Level	  Group	  on	  the	  
Competitiveness	  of	  the	  Agro-­‐Food	  Industry	  –	  Proposals	  to	  increase	  efficiency	  and	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  
European	  food	  supply	  chain,	  SEC(2009)1448,	  28/10/2009;	  Staff	  working	  document,	  Competition	  in	  the	  food	  
supply	  chain,	  SEC(2009)1449,	  28/10/2009;	  Staff	  working	  document,	  Analysis	  of	  price	  transmission	  along	  the	  
food	  supply	  chain	  in	  the	  European	  Union,	  SEC(2009)1450,	  28/10/2009.	  See	  also:	  Communication	  from	  the	  
Commission	  to	  the	  European	  Parliament,	  the	  Council,	  the	  European	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Committee	  and	  the	  
Committee	  of	  the	  Regions,	  Food	  prices	  in	  Europe,	  SEC(2008)	  821	  final,	  09/12/2008;	  
1071	  The	  High	  Level	  Group	  was	  set	  up	  in	  2008	  in	  order	  to	  analyse	  the	  factors	  influencing	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  
the	  European	  food	  industry.	  The	  Group	  was	  composed	  of	  representatives	  of	  selected	  Member	  States,	  of	  the	  
European	  agro-­‐food	  industry,	  of	  professional	  associations	  and	  of	  civil	  society.	  In	  its	  Report,	  the	  Group	  put	  
forward	  30	  recommendations	  and	  a	  roadmap	  of	  key	  initiatives	  to	  boost	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  sector.	  In	  
2010,	  the	  Commission	  put	  an	  end	  to	  the	  mandate	  of	  the	  High	  Level	  Group	  and	  established	  the	  High	  Level	  
Forum	  for	  a	  Better	  Functioning	  Food	  Supply	  Chain	  to	  follow	  the	  implementation	  of	  its	  recommendations.	  See:	  
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/food/competitiveness/high-­‐level-­‐group/index_en.htm	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lack	   sufficient	   resources	   to	   invest	   in	   such	   projects.1072	   Producers’	   inability	   to	   invest	   in	   R&D	   and	  
product	   innovation	  may	   be	   considered	   to	   be	   a	   direct	   consequence	   of	   tensions	   and	   imbalances	   of	  
power	   in	   contractual	   relations	   between	   companies.	   Various	   unfair	   practices	   in	   fact	   curb	   suppliers’	  
ability	  to	  make	  sufficient	  margins	  to	  make	  their	  businesses	  viable	  and	  to	  make	  new	  investments.1073	  	  
The	  attention	  of	  the	  High	  Level	  Group	  was	  also	  drawn	  on	  the	  increased	  use	  of	  private	  label	  products	  
by	  retailers.	  Some	  Member	  States	  have	  indeed	  noted	  that,	  due	  to	  the	  growing	  presence	  of	  their	  own-­‐
brands,	  	  
“[retailers]	  have	  become	  direct	  competitors	   to	   the	  agro-­‐food	  processing	   industry,	  with	  
detailed	   insights	   into	   production	   trends,	   innovation	   activity,	   cost-­‐structures	   and	  
marketing	   strategy.	   This	   situation	   provides	   them	   with	   a	   clear	   advantage	   over	   their	  
suppliers	  and	  raises	  serious	  questions	  of	  competition,	  namely,	   the	  possible	  foreclosure	  
of	  existing	  and	  potential	  competing	  suppliers.”1074	  	  
Private	   labels	  give	   indeed	  retailers	  “artificial”	  competitive	  advantages	  over	  brands	  producers	  which	  
can	  be	  used	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  the	  latter.	  
2. Declaration	  and	  Resolutions	  of	  the	  EU	  Parliament	  
The	   European	   Parliament	   has	   also	   raised	   concerns	   about	   unbalanced	   buyer-­‐supplier	   relationships	  
and	   unfair	   practices	   occurring	   along	   the	   food	   supply	   chain.	   The	   first	   declaration	   warning	   against	  
excessive	  buyer	  power	  dates	  from	  2008.1075	  The	  European	  Parliament	  requested	  the	  Commission	  to	  
propose	  appropriate	  measures	  to	  remedy	  the	  abuse	  of	  power	  by	  large	  supermarkets.	  It	  pointed	  out	  
that	   abuses	   committed	  by	  big	   supermarkets	   affected	   farmers	   and	  other	   suppliers	  by	   forcing	  down	  
prices	  paid	  to	  them	  to	  unsustainable	  levels	  and	  by	  imposing	  unfair	  conditions.	  It	  also	  underlined	  that	  
such	   squeezes	   on	   suppliers	   may	   also	   have	   negative	   knock-­‐on	   effects,	   in	   particular	   on	   consumers	  
through	   a	   reduction	   in	   quality	   as	   well	   as	   a	   loss	   in	   diversity	   of	   products	   and	   retail	   outlets.	   Those	  
concerns	  were	   repeated	   in	   a	   resolution	  adopted	  by	   the	  European	  Parliament	   in	  which	   it	   drew	   the	  
attention	  on	   increasing	  concentration	  not	  only	   in	   the	  retail	   sector	  but	  along	  the	  whole	  of	   the	   food	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1072	  High	  Level	  Group	  on	  the	  Competitiveness	  of	  the	  Agro-­‐Food	  Industry,	  Report	  on	  the	  Competitiveness	  of	  the	  
European	  Agro-­‐Food	  industry,	  17	  March	  2009,	  at	  42,	  available	  at:	  
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/food/files/high_level_group_2008/documents_hlg/final_report_hlg_1
7_03_09_en.pdf	  	  
1073	  Report	  from	  the	  Commission	  to	  the	  European	  Parliament,	  the	  Council,	  the	  European	  Economic	  and	  Social	  
Committee	  and	  the	  Committee	  of	  the	  Regions,	  Retail	  market	  monitoring	  report	  “Towards	  more	  efficient	  and	  
fairer	  retail	  services	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  for	  2020”,	  COM(2010)355	  final,	  05/07/2010,	  at	  7,	  available	  at:	  
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/retail/docs/monitoring_report_en.pdf	  	  
1074	  Report	  of	  the	  High	  Level	  Group	  on	  the	  Competitiveness	  of	  the	  Agro-­‐Food	  Industry,	  op.cit.,	  at	  50.	  
1075	  Written	  declaration	  on	  investigating	  and	  remedying	  the	  abuse	  of	  power	  by	  large	  supermarkets	  operating	  in	  
the	  European	  Union,	  0088/2007,	  24	  January	  2008.	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supply	   chain.1076	   It	   was	   considered	   that	   some	   practices	   used	   by	   large	   companies,	   including	  
manufacturers,	  wholesalers	  and	  retailers,	  constitute	  one	  of	  the	  factors	  influencing	  the	  gap	  between	  
producer	  and	  consumer	  price.1077	  Even	  though	  the	  effects	  of	  market	  concentration	  can	  lead	  to	  lower	  
price	  levels	  for	  food,	  the	  European	  Parliament	  nevertheless	  underlined	  that,	  in	  the	  medium	  and	  long	  
term,	  this	  may	  damage	  free	  competition,	  drive	  small	  producers	  out	  of	  the	  market	  and	  limit	  consumer	  
choice.1078	  	  
In	  2010,	  in	  a	  resolution	  on	  fair	  revenues	  for	  farmers,	  the	  European	  Parliament	  called	  on	  national	  and	  
European	  competition	  authorities	  to	  take	  action	  against	  abusive	  buyer	  practices	  of	  all	  actors	  which	  
put	  farmers	  in	  a	  very	  unequal	  bargaining	  position.1079	  It	  urged	  the	  Commission	  to	  revise	  the	  criteria	  
currently	  used	  to	  assess	  anticompetitive	  behavior	  as	  those	  were	  deemed	  to	  be	  unsuitable	  to	  get	  the	  
true	  measure	  of	  anticompetitive	  practices.1080	   It	  also	  emphasized	  the	  necessity	  to	  expand	  European	  
competition	   law	  beyond	   its	   current	  narrow	   focus	  on	   consumer	  welfare	   and	   concerns	   for	   low	   food	  
price.1081	   With	   regard	   to	   unfair	   commercial	   practices,	   Members	   of	   the	   European	   Parliament	  
considered	  that	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  coordination	  and	  harmonization	  of	  national	  measures	  are	  needed	  
at	  EU	  level.1082	  They	  encouraged	  Member	  states	  to	  draft	  codes	  of	  good	  commercial	  practices	  for	  the	  
food	  chain,	  including	  complaint	  mechanisms	  and	  penalties	  for	  unfair	  practices,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  establish	  
ombudsmen	   for	   the	   food	   retail	   sector	   and	   other	   arbitration	   mechanisms	   aimed	   at	   guaranteeing	  
compliance	  with	  those	  codes	  and	  contractual	  agreements.1083	  Such	  a	  call	   for	  effective	  enforcement	  
mechanisms	   was	   reiterated	   in	   a	   2011	   resolution	   where	   the	   European	   Parliament	   suggested	   the	  
establishment	  of	  an	  EU	  Ombudsman.1084	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1076	  European	  Parliament	  resolution	  of	  26	  March	  2009	  on	  food	  prices	  in	  Europe,	  (2008/2175(INI)).	  
1077	  Among	  the	  other	  factors,	  it	  underlined	  the	  share	  of	  non-­‐agricultural	  costs	  such	  as	  energy	  and	  labour,	  
legislative	  and	  regulatory	  frameworks,	  the	  perishable	  nature	  of	  the	  product,	  the	  degree	  of	  product	  processing	  
as	  well	  as	  speculation	  with	  agricultural	  commodities.	  	  
1078	  European	  Parliament	  resolution	  of	  26	  March	  2009,	  op.cit.	  	  at	  19-­‐20.	  
1079	  European	  Parliament	  resolution	  of	  7	  September	  2010	  on	  fair	  revenues	  for	  farmers	  :	  A	  better	  functioning	  
food	  supply	  chain	  in	  Europe	  (2009/2337(INI)),	  para.15.	  	  
1080	  Ibid.,	  para.22.	  
1081	  Ibid.,	  para.30.	  
1082	  Ibid.,	  para.25.	  
1083	  Ibid.,	  para.45.	  
1084	  European	  Parliament	  resolution	  of	  5	  July	  2011	  on	  a	  more	  efficient	  and	  fairer	  retail	  market	  (2010/2109(INI)).	  
In	  this	  resolution,	  the	  European	  Parliament	  put	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  role	  of	  SMEs.	  It	  stressed	  that	  SMEs	  
“constitute	  the	  backbone	  of	  the	  European	  economy	  and	  have	  a	  unique	  role	  to	  play	  in	  creating	  jobs,	  particularly	  
in	  rural	  areas,	  as	  well	  as	  fostering	  innovation	  and	  growth	  in	  the	  retail	  sector	  in	  local	  communities	  across	  the	  
EU”.	  (at	  17)	  In	  order	  to	  ensure	  fair	  competition	  in	  both	  vertical	  and	  horizontal	  B2B	  relations,	  thereby	  paving	  the	  
way	  for	  a	  genuine	  level	  playing	  field	  for	  businesses,	  the	  European	  Parliament	  considered	  that	  new	  measures	  
should	  be	  adopted.	  Those	  would	  enable	  companies,	  especially	  SMEs,	  to	  uphold	  their	  rights	  and	  to	  restore	  
confidence.	  (at	  19)	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More	   recently,	   the	   European	   Parliament	   resolution	   of	   19	   January	   2012	   on	   imbalances	   in	   the	   food	  
supply	   chain	  highlighted	   the	  effect	  of	   the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  on	   farmers	   and	   called	  again	  on	  
national	   and	   European	   competition	   authorities	   to	   address	   abusive	   buyer	   practices	   on	   the	   part	   of	  
dominant	   wholesalers	   and	   retailers	   which	   systematically	   put	   farmers	   in	   an	   extremely	   unequal	  
bargaining	  position.1085	  In	  this	  resolution,	  the	  Parliament	  stressed	  that	  the	  problem	  of	  imbalances	  in	  
the	   food	   supply	   chain	   clearly	   has	   a	   European	   dimension	   requiring	   a	   specific	   European	   solution.	   It	  
called	   therefore	   upon	   the	   Commission	   to	   propose	   robust	   EU	   legislation	   to	   ensure	   fair	   relations	  
amongst	   producers,	   suppliers	   and	   distributors	   of	   food	   products;	   to	   define	   unfair	   and	   abusive	  
practices	  as	  well	  as	  to	  create	  an	  independent	  Food	  Trading	  Ombudsman	  to	  control	  them.1086	  
3. Towards	  fairer	  trading	  relationships	  
One	  can	  note	  that	  buyers’	  conduct	  in	  the	  retail	  grocery	  sector	  does	  not	  leave	  indifferent	  within	  the	  
European	   institutions.	   Following	   the	   different	   market	   investigations	   and	   the	   call	   of	   the	   EU	  
Parliament,	  various	  measures	  have	  been	  taken	  at	  EU	  level	  to	  investigate	  more	  deeply	  imbalances	  of	  
power	  in	  the	  supply	  chain	  and	  to	  assess	  whether	  a	  common	  action	  is	  needed	  to	  address	  unfairness	  in	  
business-­‐to-­‐business	   relationships	  which	   results	   from	  such	   imbalances.	  However,	  given	   the	  current	  
status	  of	  that	   initiative,	   it	   is	  very	  unlikely	  that	  the	  European	  Union	  will	  prescribe	  Member	  states	  to	  
act	  within	  the	  ambit	  of	  the	  competition	  rules.	  
a) Unfairness	  in	  business-­‐to-­‐business	  relationships	  
The	   use	   of	   unfair	   trading	   practices	   and	   its	   effects	   on	   the	   markets	   constitute	   a	   recurrent	   issue	  
highlighted	   by	   the	   EU	   institutions	   on	   several	   occasions.	   	   Different	   measures	   have	   therefore	   been	  
taken	   by	   the	   European	   Commission	   to	   further	   investigate	   the	   impact	   of	   such	   practices	   on	   the	  
business-­‐to-­‐business	   (B2B)	   food	   but	   also	   non-­‐food	   supply	   chain.	   It	   is	   indeed	   argued	   that	   unfair	  
trading	  practices	   (UTPs)	  may	  occur	  not	  only	   in	   the	   food	   sector	  but	   in	  other	   sectors	   as	  well	   due	   to	  
different	  factors.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  retail	  sectors	  have	  evolved	  towards	  a	  “mixed”	  format	  where	  
the	   vast	   majority	   of	   retailers	   supply	   range	   of	   food	   as	   well	   as	   non-­‐food	   products	   under	   the	   same	  
management	   and	   under	   the	   same	   terms	   and	   conditions.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   some	   large	  
manufacturers	  produce	  food	  goods	  but	  also	  detergents,	  cosmetics,	  hygiene	  products,	  etc.	  so	  that	  the	  
issue	  of	  UTPs	  is	  likely	  to	  arise	  in	  different	  types	  of	  sectors.	  The	  Commission	  has	  therefore	  recognized	  
the	   need	   to	   go	   beyond	   the	   agro-­‐food	   industry	   and	   to	   launch	   new	   initiatives	   to	   combat	   UTPs	   in	  
business	  relations.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1085	  European	  Parliament	  resolution	  of	  19	  January	  2012	  on	  the	  imbalances	  in	  the	  food	  supply	  chain,	  
2011/2114(INI),	  para.8.	  
1086	  Ibid.,	  para.4-­‐17.	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As	   mentioned	   above,	   UTPs	   are	   typically	   imposed	   in	   a	   situation	   of	   imbalance	   of	   power	   where	   a	  
stronger	  party	  has	   the	  ability	   to	   impose	  contractual	  arrangements	   to	   its	  advantage,	  either	   through	  
better	  prices	  or	   through	   improved	   terms	  and	  conditions.	  UTPs	  are	   in	   fact	  practices	  and	   terms	   that	  
grossly	  deviate	  from	  good	  commercial	  conduct	  and	  which	  are	  contrary	  to	  good	  faith	  and	  fair	  dealing	  
in	  business-­‐to-­‐business	  (B2B)	  relationships.1087	  The	  weaker	  party	  is	  often	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  switch	  
to	   another	   business	   partner	   and	   fear	   to	   lose	   its	   contract	   in	   the	   event	   of	   a	   complaint	   on	   its	   part.	  
Agricultural	  producers	  are	   for	  example	  particularly	  vulnerable	  to	  UTPs.	  They	  have	   limited	  choice	  of	  
business	  partners	  for	  the	  take-­‐up	  of	  their	  production	  and	  the	  intrinsic	  characteristics	  of	  many	  goods	  
make	   them	  unable	   to	   store	   production	   for	   a	   long	   period	   of	   time	   in	   order	   to	   obtain	   better	   buying	  
conditions.1088	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  asymmetry	  in	  bargaining	  power	  in	  B2B	  relationships	  is	  likely	  to	  affect	  
companies’,	  especially	  SMEs’,	  capacity	  to	  invest	  and	  innovate	  and	  may	  ultimately	  restrict	  consumer	  
choice.	   Such	   practices	   may	   occur	   at	   every	   link	   of	   the	   supply	   chain	   and	   can	   be	   employed	   when	  
negotiating	  a	  contract,	  can	  be	  part	  of	   the	  contract	   itself	  or	  can	  be	   imposed	   in	   the	  post-­‐contractual	  
phase	  as	  revealed	  by	  the	  responses	  received	  to	  the	  Commission’s	  consultation	  on	  unfair	  business	  to	  
business	  commercial	  practices.1089	  
b) Expert	  Platform	  on	  B2B	  contractual	  practices	  
In	   2010,	   the	   Commission	   created	   an	   Expert	   Platform	   within	   the	   High	   Level	   Forum	   for	   a	   Better	  
functioning	  Food	  Supply	  Chain	  to	  consider	  the	  issue	  of	  UTPs	  and	  put	  forward	  recommendations.1090	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1087	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission	  to	  the	  European	  Parliament,	  the	  Council,	  the	  European	  Economic	  
and	  Social	  Committee	  and	  the	  Committee	  of	  the	  Regions,	  Setting	  up	  a	  European	  retail	  action	  plan,	  
COM(2013)36	  final,	  Brussels,	  31/01/2013,	  at	  11.	  
1088	  Green	  Paper	  on	  unfair	  trading	  practices	  in	  the	  business-­‐to-­‐business	  food	  and	  non-­‐food	  supply	  chain	  in	  
Europe,	  COM(2013)37	  final,	  Brussels,	  31/01/2013,	  at	  6.	  
1089	  See:	  Summary	  Report	  	  of	  the	  responses	  received	  to	  the	  Commission’s	  consultation	  on	  unfair	  business-­‐to-­‐
business	  commercial	  practices	  –	  Directorate-­‐General	  for	  the	  Internal	  market	  and	  services,	  12	  February	  2012,	  
available	  at:	  http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/ebtp/consultations/2011/unfair_business/report_en.pdf	  Among	  
unfair	  practices	  during	  pre-­‐contractual	  negotiations,	  the	  Report	  refers	  for	  examples	  to:	  abuse	  of	  bargaining	  
power	  (pressure	  on	  weaker	  companies	  during	  the	  negotiations)	  or	  no	  willingness/room	  whatsoever	  to	  
negotiate;	  sale	  targets	  which	  were	  unrealistic	  and	  unilaterally	  set;	  unilateral	  (and	  repeated)	  changing	  contract	  
terms;	  unilateral	  imposition	  of	  standards	  or	  requirements;	  discriminatory	  terms	  relative	  to	  competitors;	  
unilateral	  reduction	  of	  margins;	  unfair	  pricing	  or	  very	  lengthy	  payment	  terms;	  imposition	  of	  unacceptable	  
warranty/guarantee	  handling	  requirements;	  stipulation	  of	  disproportionate/excessive	  contractual	  penalties.	  
Unfair	  practices	  in	  the	  contract	  may	  consist	  for	  examples	  in	  disadvantageous	  conditions	  that	  were	  non	  
negotiable	  and	  non	  challengeable,	  clauses	  allowing	  the	  company	  positioned	  as	  a	  customer	  in	  the	  business	  
relationship	  to	  unilaterally	  withdraw	  from	  the	  contract,	  imposition	  or	  change	  of	  standards	  and	  requirements	  to	  
undergo	  compulsory	  training.	  As	  regards	  unfair	  practices	  after	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  contract,	  the	  report	  refers	  
to	  non-­‐compliance	  with	  contract	  terms,	  refusal	  to	  pay,	  unilateral	  and	  repeated	  amendments	  to	  the	  contract,	  
unilateral	  imposition	  of	  higher	  standards,	  termination	  of	  the	  contract	  without	  reason,	  prior	  notice	  or	  
compensation.	  	  
1090	  The	  High	  Level	  Forum	  has	  set	  up	  three	  working	  groups	  in	  order	  to	  focus	  on	  flagship	  issues	  requiring	  a	  
specific	  expertise.	  Those	  Expert	  Platforms	  are	  dedicated	  to:	  (1)	  Business-­‐to-­‐Business	  contractual	  practices	  in	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The	  mandate	  of	  the	  Expert	  Platform	  on	  B2B	  contractual	  practices	   in	  the	  food	  supply	  chain	   includes	  
three	   objectives:	   	   (1)	   To	   agree	   on	   a	   list	   of	   practices	   which	   can	   be	   deemed	   unfair;	   (2)	   To	   identify	  
relevant	  best	  practices	  in	  commercial	  relations;	  (3)	  To	  propose	  actions	  when	  necessary	  (regulatory	  or	  
non-­‐regulatory	  instruments).1091	  	  
A	  major	  step	  was	  taken	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  first	  two	  objectives	  in	  2011	  when	  the	  business	  
organisations	  composing	  the	  core	  group	  of	  the	  Expert	  Platform	  worked	  together	  towards	  a	  common	  
understanding	   of	   fairness	   in	   B2B	   relations.	   The	   resulting	   document	   enumerates	   a	   set	   of	   general	  
principles	   such	   as	   taking	   consumer	   interests	   into	   account,	   freedom	  of	   contract	   and	   fair	   dealing	   as	  
well	  as	  a	  set	  of	  specific	  principles	  of	  good	  practices	  including	  the	  importance	  of	  written	  agreements,	  
predictability,	   compliance,	   information,	   confidentiality,	   responsibility	   for	   risk	   and	   the	   need	   for	  
requests	   to	   be	   justifiable.	   In	   addition,	   concrete	   examples	   of	   good	   and	   bad	   practices	   in	   the	   supply	  
chain	  were	  provided	  to	  illustrate	  those	  principles.1092	  The	  High-­‐Level	  Forum	  welcomed	  the	  document	  
and	   invited	   the	   core	   group	   to	   agree	   on	   an	   implementation	   and	   enforcement	   framework.1093	   In	  
January	  2013,	  a	  framework	  was	  established,	  consisting	  in	  a	  registration	  system	  whereby	  companies	  
voluntarily	   commit	   to	   implement	   the	   principles	   and	   accept	   different	   options	   for	   the	   resolution	   of	  
disputes.1094	   The	   success	   of	   such	   a	   voluntarily	   framework	   depends	   therefore	   upong	   the	   willing	  
participation	  of	  companies.	  	  
Even	  though	  the	  initiative	  to	  implement	  voluntarily	  principles	  of	  good	  practices	  is	  laudable,	  such	  an	  
announcement	   is,	   though,	   very	   unlikely	   to	   be	   effectively	   followed	   by	   the	   members	   of	   those	  
organizations	  if	  no	  enforcement	  mechanism	  is	  put	  in	  place	  to	  ensure	  compliance.	  It	  appears	  indeed	  
that	  most	  practices	  considered	  unfair	  by	  the	  members	  of	  the	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  dialogue	  are	  in	  fact	  
commonly	  used,	   in	  particular	  by	   large	   retail	   chains.	  We	  can	  mention	   for	  examples	  non-­‐contractual	  
retroactive	  unilateral	   changes,	   transfer	  of	  unjustified	  or	  disproportionate	   risk,	   imposing	   listing	   fees	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the	  food	  supply	  chain;	  (2)	  Competitiveness	  in	  the	  agro-­‐food	  industry	  and;	  (3)	  The	  European	  Food	  Prices	  
Monitoring	  Tool.	  
1091	  Report	  of	  the	  High	  Level	  Forum	  for	  a	  Better	  Functioning	  Food	  Supply	  Chain,	  5	  December	  2012,	  at	  8,	  
available	  at:	  http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/food/files/hlf-­‐third-­‐meeting-­‐final-­‐report-­‐cover_en.pdf	  	  
1092	  See	  :	  Vertical	  relationships	  in	  the	  Food	  Supply	  Chain:	  Principles	  of	  Good	  Practices	  proposed	  by	  the	  following	  
core	  members	  of	  the	  B2B	  Platform:	  AIM,	  CEJA,	  CELCAA,	  CLITRAVI,	  Copa	  Cogeca,	  ERRT,	  EuroCommerce,	  Euro	  
Coop,	  FoodDringEurope,	  UEAPME,	  UGAL,	  29	  November	  2011,	  available	  at:	  
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/food/files/competitiveness/good_practices_en.pdf	  	  
1093	  The	  EU	  Parliament	  also	  welcomed	  the	  principles	  of	  good	  practice	  and	  the	  list	  of	  examples	  of	  fair	  and	  unfair	  
practices	  in	  vertical	  trading	  relationships	  in	  the	  food	  supply	  chain,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  framework	  for	  the	  
implementation	  and	  enforcement	  of	  these	  principles.	  See:	  Motion	  for	  a	  European	  Parliament	  Resolution	  on	  the	  
European	  Retail	  Action	  Plan	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  all	  actors,	  2013/2093(INI),	  available	  at:	  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-­‐2013-­‐
0374&language=EN&mode=XML	  	  
1094	  See	  the	  framework	  on	  the	  Supply	  Chain	  Initiative	  website	  at:	  
http://www.supplychaininitiative.eu/sites/default/files/b2b_voluntary_initiative_-­‐framework.pdf	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that	   are	   disproportionate	   to	   the	   risk	   incurred	   in	   stocking	   a	   new	   product,	   threatening	   business	  
disruption	  or	  the	  termination	  of	  the	  business	  relationship	  to	  obtain	  an	  advantage	  without	  objective	  
justification	   or	   demanding	   payments	   for	   services	   not	   rendered,	   to	   name	   but	   a	   few.	   Without	   a	  
common	   framework	   applied	   to	   all	  market	   participants	   and	   including	   sufficient	   incentives	   to	  make	  
them	  abide	  by	   the	  principles	  of	  good	  practice,	   it	   is	  hence	  doubtful	   that	   the	   initiative	  will	  achieve	  a	  
real	  culture	  change	  in	  business-­‐to-­‐business	  relationships.	  
c) Action	  Plan	  and	  Green	  Paper	  on	  unfair	  trading	  practices	  
In	   January	  2013,	   the	  Commission	  published	  a	  Communication	  setting	  up	  a	  European	  action	  plan	   in	  
which	   it	   identifies	   five	  key	  priorities	   to	  achieve	  more	   competitive	  and	   sustainable	   retail	   services	   in	  
the	   food	   but	   also	   non-­‐food	   supply	   chain.1095	   The	   third	   key	   driver	   consists	   in	   developing	   fairer	   and	  
more	   sustainable	   trading	   relationships	   along	   the	   retail	   supply	   chain.	   The	   Commission	   indeed	  
considers	   that	   by	   tackling	   unfairness,	   upstream	   and	   downstream	   players	   would	   enjoy	   more	  
sustainable	   relationships	   and	   be	   encouraged	   to	   increase	   both	   innovation	   and	   investment.1096	   As	   a	  
part	  of	  this	  action	  plan,	  the	  Commission	  has	  also	  adopted	  a	  Green	  Paper	  on	  unfair	  trading	  practices	  
in	   the	   business-­‐to-­‐business	   food	   and	   non-­‐food	   supply	   chain	   which	   opens	   a	   consultation	   on	   this	  
topic.1097	  
The	  Green	  Paper	  adopted	  in	  parallel	  of	  the	  European	  retail	  action	  plan	  is	  aimed	  at	  opening	  a	  public	  
debate	  on	  the	   impact	  of	  UTPs	  on	  businesses	  affected,	  on	  national	   legislation	  that	  seeks	   to	  address	  
this	  problem	  and	  on	  possible	  avenues	  of	  actions	  at	  EU	  level.	  	  	  
“The	  three-­‐month	   long	  consultation	  will	  help	  the	  Commission	  to	  assess	  the	  magnitude	  
of	  unfair	  trading	  practices	  and	  gather	  evidence	  on	  their	  effect	  on	  the	  economy	  and	  on	  
cross-­‐border	  activity.	   It	  will	  examine	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  self-­‐regulatory	  and	   legislative	  
frameworks	  put	   in	  place	   to	  address	   those	  practices	  at	  national	   level	  and	  will	   look	   into	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1095	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission,	  Setting	  up	  a	  European	  retail	  action	  plan,	  op.cit.	  The	  five	  key	  
priorities	  are:	  (1)	  Consumer	  empowerment	  –	  through,	  inter	  alia,	  more	  transparent,	  more	  reliable	  and	  more	  
directly	  comparable	  information	  on	  the	  price	  and	  quality	  of	  products;	  (2)	  Improved	  access	  to	  more	  sustainable	  
and	  competitive	  retail	  services	  –	  both	  “bricks	  and	  mortar”	  and	  e-­‐commerce	  retail	  could	  benefit	  from	  improved	  
market	  access,	  in	  particular	  through	  clearer	  and	  more	  transparent	  establishment	  rules;	  (3)	  Fairer	  and	  more	  
sustainable	  trading	  relationships	  along	  the	  retail	  supply	  chain	  –	  stakeholders	  could	  benefit	  from	  a	  framework	  
effectively	  tackling	  unfair	  trading	  practices;	  (4)	  More	  innovative	  solutions	  –	  stakeholders	  would	  benefit	  if	  
research	  results	  were	  brought	  more	  rapidly	  to	  market;	  (5)	  Better	  working	  environment	  –	  both	  employees	  and	  
employers	  will	  benefit	  from	  creating	  better	  working	  conditions	  and	  addressing	  mismatches	  between	  skills	  
required	  and	  those	  available.	  
1096	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission	  Setting	  up	  a	  European	  retail	  action	  plan,	  op.cit.,	  at	  11.	  
1097	  Green	  Paper	  on	  unfair	  trading	  practices,	  op.cit.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  consultation	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  available	  
by	  late	  spring	  2013.	  Based	  on	  the	  results	  of	  the	  consultation,	  the	  Commission	  will	  consider	  appropriate	  next	  
steps	  in	  2013.	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the	  question	  of	  whether	  these	  divergent	  approaches	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  fragmentation	  of	  the	  
Single	  Market.”1098	  	  
As	   pointed	   out	   in	   the	  Green	   Paper	   on	   unfair	   trading	   practices,	   it	  may	   be	   necessary	   to	   ensure	   the	  
existence	   in	   all	   Member	   States	   of	   a	   common	   set	   of	   enforcement	   principles.1099	   Due	   to	   the	   legal	  
fragmentation	   between	  Member	   States	   concerning	   the	   treatment	   of	   UTPs,	   companies	   confronted	  
with	   such	   practices	   are	   indeed	   unable	   to	   benefit	   from	   consistent	   protection	   across	   the	   European	  
Union.	  In	  addition,	  both	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  High-­‐Level	  Forum	  underlined	  that	  such	  a	  common	  
set	  of	  enforcement	  principles	  should	  include	  a	  proper	  remedy	  to	  the	  “fear	  factor”,	  that	  is	  to	  weaker	  
parties’	  fear	  of	  complaining	  about	  UTPs	  because	  of	  possible	  retaliatory	  measures.1100	   	  This	  could	  be	  
done	  for	  example	  by	  granting	  powers	  to	  the	  competent	  authorities	  to	  accept	  anonymous	  complaints,	  
to	  impose	  deterrent	  sanctions,	  to	  launch	  ex	  officio	  action	  and	  to	  report	  publicly	  on	  their	  findings.1101	  	  
d) A	  likely	  action	  outside	  the	  competition	  rules	  
While	   the	   EU	   institutions	   are	   considering	   adopting	   a	   common	   set	   of	   principles	   to	   tackle	   UTPs,	   it	  
seems	  that	  such	  action	   is	  very	   likely	  to	  be	   implemented	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  competition	   law.	  The	  
Commission	  considers	  indeed	  that	  unequal	  bargaining	  power	  cannot	  be	  automatically	  assimilated	  to	  
a	  buyer	  power	  problem	  involving	  competition	  issues.	  	  
i. Unequal	  bargaining	  power	  v.	  buyer	  power	  	  
The	  Commission	  draws	  a	  distinction	  between,	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	  anticompetitive	  business	  practices	  
which	   distorts	   competition	   and,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   unfair	   practices	   resulting	   from	   contractual	  
imbalances	  but	  which	  do	  not	  fall	  under	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  EU	  competition	  rules	  because	  they	  do	  not	  
entail	   any	   anticompetitive	   effect	   on	   the	  markets.1102	  With	   regard	   to	   the	   issue	  of	  UTPs	   imposed	  by	  
powerful	   buyers,	   it	   is	   considered	   that,	   in	   most	   cases,	   unequal	   bargaining	   power	   leading	   to	   such	  
practices	   does	  not	   necessarily	   imply	   a	   competition	   infringement	   and	  must	   therefore	  be	   addressed	  
through	  other	  policy	  tools.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1098	  Press	  release,	  Commission	  adopts	  a	  European	  Retail	  Action	  Plan	  and	  consults	  on	  unfair	  trading	  practices,	  
Brussels,	  31/01/2013,	  available	  at:	  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-­‐release_IP-­‐13-­‐78_en.htm	  	  
1099	  Green	  Paper	  on	  unfair	  trading	  practices,	  op.cit.,	  at	  17.	  
1100	  See:	  Report	  of	  the	  High	  Level	  Forum	  for	  a	  Better	  Functioning	  Food	  Supply	  Chain,	  op.cit.,	  at	  13	  and	  Green	  
Paper	  on	  unfair	  trading	  practices,	  op.cit.,	  at	  17.	  
1101	  Green	  Paper	  on	  unfair	  trading	  practices,	  op.cit.,	  at	  17.	  
1102	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission,	  A	  better	  functioning	  food	  supply	  chain	  in	  Europe,	  op.cit.,	  at	  5.	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On	  the	  buy-­‐side,	  unequal	  bargaining	  power	  exists	  whenever	  the	  buyer	  can	  impose	  upon	  seller	  terms	  
and	  conditions	   that	  are	  deemed	  unfavourable	  by	   that	  other	  party.1103	  Unequal	  bargaining	  power	   is	  
unlikely	   to	   raise	   competitive	   concerns	   unless	   it	   amounts	   to	   buyer	   power.	   The	   exercise	   of	   buyer	  
power	  may	   indeed	   cause	   harmful	   effects	   to	   competition	   in	   the	  market.	   Such	   power	   is	   deemed	   to	  
exist	  	  
“if	  a	  market	  is	  concentrated	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  a	  particular	  buyer	  has	  not	  only	  power	  
over	  a	  particular	  supplier	  but	  over	  suppliers	  in	  general”.1104	  	  
The	   ability	   to	   exert	   buyer	   power,	   that	   is	   to	   extract	   unilateral	   concessions	   from	   suppliers	   in	  
general,	  is	  therefore	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  potential	  source	  of	  anticompetitive	  conduct.	  
ii. Focus	  on	  unequal	  bargaining	  power	  at	  EU	  level	  
In	   the	   different	   documents	   mentioned	   above,	   it	   is	   mostly	   referred	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   unequal	  
bargaining	  power.	  The	  issue	  of	  the	  potential	  negative	  impact	  of	  some	  buyer	  practices	  on	  competition	  
seems	  in	  fact	  to	  be	  disregarded	  or	  at	  least	  underestimated.	  However,	  in	  some	  sectors,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  
grocery	  retail	  industry,	  a	  small	  number	  of	  large	  buyers	  are	  able	  to	  exert	  significant	  market	  power,	  not	  
only	   over	   one	   particular	   contracting	   party,	   but	   over	   suppliers	   in	   general,	   including	   over	   some	   big	  
processing	  companies.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  according	  to	  the	  distinction	  mentioned	  above,	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  
matter	  of	  unequal	  bargaining	  power	  but	  rather	  of	  buyer	  power	  which	  may	  be	  used	  anticompetitively.	  	  
Consequently,	  particular	  attention	  should	  be	  paid	  by	  EU	  institutions	  on	  unfair	  trading	  practices	  that	  
result	  from	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  because,	  when	  used	  by	  powerful	  buyers,	  those	  practices	  are	  
likely	   to	  affect	  competition	  by	  strengthening	   incumbents	  and	  hindering	  new	  entrants.	  Even	  though	  
EU	  competition	  law	  is	  not	  per	  se	  concerned	  with	  fairness	  in	  individual	  business	  relations,	  it	  is	  hence	  
not	   excluded	   that	   UTPs	   impede	   the	   achievement	   of	   the	   competition	   objectives	   and	   require	   the	  
intervention	  of	  competition	  authorities.	  
B. NEED	  FOR	  ACTION	  UNDER	  EU	  COMPETITION	  LAW	  IN	  THE	  GROCERY	  RETAIL	  SECTOR	  
The	  growing	  interest	  of	  the	  EU	  institutions	  in	  tackling	  unfair	  trading	  practices	  suggest	  that	  a	  common	  
framework	   is	   likely	   to	  be	  defined	  at	   EU	   level.	   The	   issue	  about	   the	  necessity	   to	  act	   against	  UTPs	   in	  
order	   to	  protect	  weaker	  players	   in	   the	  supply	  chain	  will	  not	  be	  addressed	  here.	  That	  question	   falls	  
indeed	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  competition	  law	  which	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  unfairness	  as	  such	  but	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1103	  European	  Competition	  network,	  ECN	  activities	  in	  the	  food	  sector	  –	  Report	  on	  competition	  law	  enforcement	  
and	  market	  monitoring	  activities	  by	  European	  competition	  authorities	  in	  the	  food	  sector,	  May	  2012,	  at	  41,	  
available	  at:	  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/food_report_en.pdf	  	  
1104	  Report	  of	  the	  European	  Competition	  network,	  ECN	  activities	  in	  the	  food	  sector,	  op.cit.,	  at	  41.	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practices	   that	   (are	   likely	   to)	   restrict	   or	   distort	   competition.	   Unfair	   conduct	   harming	   smaller	   firms	  
without	  affecting	  competition	  should	  therefore	  be	  dealt	  with	  under	  other	  policies	  than	  competition.	  	  
However,	  some	  of	  the	  reasons	  invoked	  to	  justify	  action	  at	  EU	  level	  against	  UTPs	  are	  also	  relevant	  to	  
support	  the	  establishment	  of	  common	  measures	  against	  anticompetitive	  buyer	  practices.	  The	   likely	  
cross-­‐border	   effects	   of	   those	   practices	   and	   the	   impediment	   to	   the	   integration	   process	   that	   may	  
result	   from	   the	   disparities	   among	   national	   laws	   on	   that	   matter	   call	   indeed	   for	   a	   uniform	   answer	  
within	   the	   European	   Union.	   Such	   common	   action	   is	   all	   the	   more	   justified	   with	   regard	   to	  
anticompetitive	  practices	  given	  the	  exclusive	  competence	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  in	  competition	  law.	  	  
Whenever	   buyers’	   conduct	   affects	   competition,	   suitable	   competition	   rules	   should	   be	   available	   in	  
order	   to	   sanction	   companies	   involved	   in	   such	   conduct	   and	   restore	   effective	   competition	   in	   the	  
relevant	   market.	   Anticompetitive	   practices	   should	   indeed	   not	   escape	   the	   application	   of	   the	  
competition	  law	  regime.	  In	  addition,	  the	  latter	  presents	  different	  advantages	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  make	  
the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  rules	  against	  powerful	  buyers	  more	  effective	  and	  to	  increase	  deterrence.	  	  
Buyer	   power	   presents	   yet	   some	   specificity	   compared	   to	   seller	   power	   that	   should	   be	   taken	   into	  
consideration	  when	  enforcing	  the	  competition	  rules.	  Those	  specificities	  can	  especially	  be	  observed	  in	  
the	   grocery	   retail	   sector	   where	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   different	   product	  markets	   gives	   supermarket	  
chains	  significant	  buyer	  power	  and	  incites	  them	  to	  exploit	  it.	  Given	  the	  particular	  harmful	  effects	  of	  
large	   grocery	   chains’	   buyer	   power	   established	   in	   Chapter	   1,	   Section	   2	   above,	   we	   argue	   that	   EU	  
authorities	  should	  focus	  their	  action	  on	  that	  sector.	  
1. Need	  for	  a	  common	  action	  	  
In	   the	   current	   debate	   about	   UTPs,	   some	   call	   for	   a	   common	   action	   at	   EU	   level	   to	   harmonize	   the	  
treatment	  of	  those	  practices	  in	  the	  different	  Member	  States.	  The	  geographic	  expansion	  of	  large	  retail	  
chains	   and	   processing	   companies	   lead	   indeed	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   EU-­‐wide	   business-­‐to-­‐business	  
relationships	   in	   the	   food	  and	  non-­‐food	  supply	  chain.	  Buyer	  practices	  occurring	   in	   that	  supply	  chain	  
may	   therefore	   have	   repercussions	   in	   different	   Member	   States	   and	   affect	   trade	   and	   competition	  
within	   the	  European	  Union.	  The	  EU-­‐wide	  dimension	  of	   trade	  relationships	  would	   justify	  a	  common	  
action	  at	  EU	  level.	  	  	  
Furthermore,	   regulatory	   fragmentation	   across	   Member	   states,	   different	   levels	   of	   enforcement	  
against	   buyer	   practices	   and	   the	   lack	   of	   co-­‐operation	   between	   national	   authorities	   may	   also	   be	  
invoked	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  harmonization	   in	  the	  European	  Union.	  National	   laws	  adopted	  to	  address	  the	  
issue	  of	  buyer	  power	  have	  indeed	  distinctive	  features	  and	  vary	  from	  one	  Member	  State	  to	  another	  in	  
terms	   of	   the	   level,	   nature,	   and	   legal	   form	   of	   protection	   provided	   against	   buyer	   practices.	   Some	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frameworks	   are	   statutory	   while	   others	   are	   self-­‐regulatory.	   There	   are	   also	   substantial	   differences	  
related	  to	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  national	   instruments	  as,	   in	  some	  Member	  States,	  they	  apply	  only	  in	  the	  
retail	   supply	   chain	   or	   in	   a	   given	   retail	   sector	   -­‐	   such	   as	   in	   the	   United	   Kingdom	  where	   the	   code	   of	  
conduct	  concerns	  the	  grocery	  supply	  chain	  -­‐,	  while	  in	  others	  the	  rules	  apply	  across	  the	  board.1105	  	  
The	  lack	  of	  an	  EU	  regulatory	  framework	  on	  that	   issue	  and	  the	  resulting	  divergent	  national	   laws	  can	  
lead	   to	   barriers	   fragmenting	   the	   internal	   market,	   distorting	   competition	   or	   increasing	   the	   risk	   of	  
circumvention.1106	   Companies,	   especially	   when	   they	   are	   SMEs,	   may	   indeed	   be	   discouraged	   from	  
taking	  up	  activities	  outside	  their	  Member	  State	  of	  origin	  as	  national	  legal	  frameworks	  are	  subject	  to	  
frequent	   changes,	   making	   it	   difficult	   and	   costly	   to	   keep	   track	   on	   the	   legal	   rights	   available	   in	   the	  
different	  Member	  States.1107	  Varied	  rules	  have	  indeed	  been	  implemented	  by	  national	  authorities	  to	  
sanction	  some	  harmful	  practices	  used	  in	  procurement	  markets.	  In	  most	  Member	  states,	  those	  rules	  
are	   in	   fact	   included	   in	   the	   national	   regulation	   against	   unfair	   trading	   practices	   as	   the	   possible	  
anticompetitive	  effect	  of	  buyer	  power	  is	  hardly	  explicitly	  recognized.	  	  	  
In	  addition,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  market	  participants	  do	  not	  feel	  that	  they	  are	  sufficiently	  protected	  
by	   the	   enforcement	   instruments	   available	   in	   their	   Member	   State	   of	   operation.	   The	   lack	   of	   rules	  
governing	  buyer	  practices	  or	   their	  poor	  application	   is	   likely	   to	  hamper	  business	  activities	   in	  a	  wide	  
range	  of	   sectors	   throughout	   the	  European	  economy.1108	   Furthermore,	   it	   is	  worth	  noting	   that,	  even	  
where	   enforcement	   mechanisms	   are	   available,	   companies	   may	   be	   very	   reluctant	   to	   make	   use	   of	  
them	   due	   especially	   to	   fear	   of	   retaliation	   or	   of	   contract	   being	   revoked.	   Such	   fear,	   which	   strongly	  
dissuades	   firms	   from	   turning	   to	   national	   authorities	   in	   order	   to	   seek	   protection	   against	   the	   buyer	  
practices	  they	  have	  experienced,	  makes	   in	  fact	  the	   legal	   instruments	   implemented	  at	  national	   level	  
ineffective.1109	  
The	  diversity	  or	   the	   lack	  of	   sanctions	  provided	   for	  by	   the	  Member	   states	   to	  prevent	  unfair	   trading	  
practices,	   including	  the	  harmful	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power,	  may	  dissuade	  companies	   from	  expanding	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1105	  Green	  Paper	  on	  unfair	  trading	  practices,	  op.cit.,	  at	  11.	  	  
1106	  Report	  from	  the	  Commission,	  Retail	  market	  monitoring	  report	  “towards	  more	  efficient	  and	  fairer	  retail	  
services	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  for	  2020”,	  op.cit.,	  at	  7.	  
1107	  Green	  Paper	  on	  unfair	  trading	  practices,	  op.cit.,	  at	  12.	  
1108	  Report	  from	  the	  Commission,	  Retail	  market	  monitoring	  report	  “towards	  more	  efficient	  and	  fairer	  retail	  
services	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  for	  2020”,	  op.cit.,	  at	  10.	  
1109	  The	  main	  reasons	  for	  reluctance	  to	  make	  use	  of	  enforcement	  mechanisms	  are	  fear	  of	  retaliation,	  fear	  of	  
contracting	  being	  revoked	  and	  costs	  too	  high.	  Among	  the	  other	  reasons,	  respondents	  to	  the	  Commission’s	  
consultation	  on	  unfair	  business-­‐to-­‐business	  commercial	  practices	  mention:	  length	  and	  complexity	  of	  
proceedings,	  legal	  issues	  (different	  legal	  system)	  and	  language	  barriers	  in	  cross-­‐border	  relations,	  fear	  that	  the	  
courts	  would	  have	  a	  national	  bias	  and	  doubts	  as	  to	  whether	  such	  mechanisms	  would	  help	  (unpredictable	  
outcome,	  no	  suitable	  remedies).	  See:	  Summary	  Report	  of	  the	  responses	  received	  to	  the	  Commission’s	  
consultation	  on	  unfair	  business-­‐to-­‐business	  commercial	  practices	  –	  Directorate-­‐General	  for	  the	  Internal	  market	  
and	  services,	  12	  February	  2012,	  at	  37-­‐38.	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their	  activities	  in	  countries	  where	  they	  could	  be	  subject	  to	  abusive	  conduct	  but	  is	  also	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  
“law	   shopping”	   by	   powerful	   buyers.	   French	   authorities	   have	   for	   example	   pointed	   out	   that	   some	  
supermarket	  chains	  impose	  on	  their	  suppliers	  to	  negotiate	  at	  multinational	  level	  via	  buying	  agencies	  
outside	  France,	  where	  the	  legislation	  is	  more	  lenient	  with	  regard	  to	  buyer	  practices.1110	  The	  possible	  
negative	  outcome	  that	  results	  from	  the	  disparity	  in	  national	  laws	  and	  from	  the	  relative	  inefficiency	  of	  
the	   existing	   national	   rules,	   such	   as	   competition	   distortion	   or	   barriers	   fragmenting	   the	   Common	  
market,	  would	  hence	  justify	  a	  common	  action	  at	  EU	  level	  to	  address	  buyers’	  conduct.	  	  
Furthermore,	  the	  restrictive	  impact	  on	  competition	  and	  on	  the	  freedom	  of	  movement	  is	  even	  greater	  
where	  unfair	  buyer	  practices	  amount	  to	  anticompetitive	  practices.	  The	  latter	  practices,	  by	  definition,	  
restrict	  or	  distort	   competition	  by	  exploiting	  or	  excluding	  other	  market	  participants.	   In	   such	  a	   case,	  
potential	  competitors	  are	  not	  only	  dissuaded	  from	  entering	  a	  particular	  market	  due	  to	  unfavorable	  
legislative	  environment	  but	  may	  in	  fact	  be	  prevented	  from	  doing	  so	  due	  to	  powerful	  buyers’	  conduct.	  
For	  example,	   restrictive	  supply	  agreements	   imposed	  by	   incumbent	   retailers	  on	   their	   suppliers	   limit	  
access	   to	   input	  markets	   and	   thereby	   the	  entry	   in	   the	   retail	  market	  of	   competitors	   that	  may	   come	  
from	  another	  Member	   state.	   It	   is	   therefore	   not	   only	   the	   differences	   between	   national	   regulations	  
that	   are	   likely	   to	   hinder	   cross-­‐border	   trade	   but	   some	   buyer	   practices	   themselves.	   The	   possible	  
restrictive	  impact	  on	  competition	  of	  those	  practices	  and	  their	  cross-­‐border	  effects	  call	  therefore	  for	  a	  
common	   action	   at	   EU	   level	   under	   the	   competition	   rules	   to	   harmonize	   the	   treatment	   of	  
anticompetitive	  buyer	  practices.	  
Although	   Member	   States	   constitute	   a	   kind	   of	   laboratory	   where	   various	   national	   legislative	  
experiments	  on	  buyer	  power	  can	  be	  observed,	  assessed	  and	  by	  which	  EU	  institutions	  may	  be	  inspired	  
before	   possibly	   taking	   an	   EU	   initiative,	   it	   appears	   that	   national	   authorities	   remain	   relatively	   timid	  
when	   it	  comes	  to	  adopt	  measures	  against	  anticompetitive	  buyer	  practices	  or	   to	  enforce	  effectively	  
those	   measures.	   An	   EU	   impetus	   can	   thus	   be	   considered	   necessary	   for	   addressing	   harmful	   use	   of	  
buyer	  power	  within	  the	  Union.	  
2. Need	  for	  action	  under	  the	  competition	  rules	  
Once	  the	  possible	  anticompetitive	  character	  of	  buyer	  practices	  has	  been	  recognized	  and	  given	  their	  
potential	   restrictive	   effect	   on	   trade	  between	  Member	   states,	   it	   is	   self-­‐evident	   that	   those	  practices	  
have	   to	   be	   supervised	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   the	   EU	   competition	   rules.	   Action	   within	   the	   ambit	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1110	  French	  authorities	  response	  to	  the	  Green	  Paper	  on	  unfair	  trading	  practices	  in	  the	  business	  to	  business	  food	  
and	  non-­‐food	  supply	  chain	  COM	  (2013)37,	  at	  13,	  available	  at	  :	  
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/unfair-­‐trading-­‐practices/docs/contributions/public-­‐
authorities/france_fr.pdf	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competition	   law	   would	   be	   limited	   to	   sanctioning	   competition	   restrictions	   resulting	   from	   the	  
exploitation	  of	  buyer	  power.	  
a) Anticompetitive	  buyer	  practices	  require	  action	  under	  competition	  law	  
On	  the	  buy	  side,	  UTPs	  may	  amount	  to	  anticompetitive	  practices	  when	  they	  do	  not	  result	  from	  a	  mere	  
unequal	   bargaining	   power	   between	   two	   parties	   but	   from	   the	   exploitation	   of	   buyer	   power	   which	  
implies	   the	   ability	   of	   a	   buyer	   to	   exert	   its	  market	   power	   over	   suppliers	   in	   general.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	  
(positive	   or	   negative)	   effects	   of	   buyer	   power	   are	   likely	   to	   concern	   not	   only	   weaker	   market	  
participants	  or	  the	  buyer’s	  direct	  trading	  partners	  but	  a	  whole	  market.	  Powerful	  buyers	  have	  in	  fact	  
the	  ability	   to	  adversely	  affect	  competition	  through	  their	  conduct	   if	   they	  use	  their	  power	  to	  restrict	  
the	  freedom	  of	  suppliers	  or	  to	  exclude	  competitors.	  	  
For	  example,	   in	   the	  grocery	  retail	   sector,	   it	  has	  been	  pointed	  out	  by	   the	  Commission	  and	  by	  a	   few	  
National	  competition	  authorities	  (NCAs)	  that	  the	  imbalances	  of	  bargaining	  power	  between	  retailers	  
and	  suppliers	  may	  result	   in	   the	  transfer	  of	  excessive	  costs	  or	   risks	  and	  to	  the	   imposition	  of	   trading	  
practices	  which	  may	  lead,	  in	  the	  medium	  and	  long-­‐term,	  to	  a	  decrease	  in	  investment	  and	  innovation	  
as	  well	   as	   to	  a	   reduction	   in	   consumer	  choice.1111	  As	   the	  concept	  of	   consumer	  welfare	   includes	  not	  
only	   lower	   prices	   but	   also	   quality,	   diversity,	   innovation	   and	   choice,	   we	   cannot	   but	   conclude	   that	  
UTPs,	  especially	  when	  imposed	  by	  large	  buyers,	  are	  likely	  to	  adversely	  affect	  consumers	  and	  thereby	  
impede	  the	  achievement	  of	  the	  primary	  objective	  of	  EU	  competition	  policy.	  Although	  EU	  authorities	  
recognize	   that	   the	   competition	   assessment	   of	   business	   practices	   must	   be	   based	   on	   a	   long-­‐term	  
perspective	  and	  not	  be	  limited	  to	  the	  immediate	  effects	  of	  those	  practices,	  when	  dealing	  with	  UTPs	  
they	  seem	  to	  reduce	  the	  scope	  of	  competition	  law	  only	  to	  practices	  which	  cause	  a	  direct	  increase	  in	  
consumer	  prices.	  While	  has	  been	  underlined	  in	  several	  occasions	  that	  UTPs	  prevent	  investment	  and	  
innovation	  in	  new	  and	  quality	  products,	  links	  are	  rarely	  made	  between	  those	  adverse	  effects	  and	  the	  
objectives	  of	  EU	  competition	  law.	  	  
In	   addition,	  we	  have	   established	   that	   a	   large	  number	   of	   practices	   used	  by	   big	   supermarket	   chains	  
(are	   likely	   to)	   exclude	   competitors	   and	   thereby	   substantially	   restrict	   competition.	   As	   developed	  
above	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  I,	  larger	  distributors	  can	  exclude	  competing	  retailers	  but	  also	  competing	  
producers.	  Restrictive	  agreements	  but	   also,	   and	  especially,	   the	  use	  of	   various	   technics	   to	  promote	  
private	   labels	  give	   indeed	  large	  retailers	  significant	  competitive	  advantages	  acquired	  only	  thanks	  to	  
their	  huge	  market	  power.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1111	  Report	  of	  the	  European	  Competition	  network,	  ECN	  activities	  in	  the	  food	  sector,	  op.cit.,	  at	  116-­‐117.	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The	  negative	   impact	  that	  some	  buyer	  practices	  may	  have	  on	  suppliers	   in	  general	  but	  also	  on	  other	  
market	  participants,	  such	  as	  competitors,	  yet	  attests	  that	  large	  buyers’	  bargaining	  power	  is	  likely	  to	  
amount	  to	  buyer	  power	  more	  often	  than	  suggested	  by	  the	  Commission.	  Without	  significant	  market	  
power	   in	   the	   upstream	   buyer	   market,	   large	   buyers	   would	   indeed	   be	   unable	   to	   dictate	   the	   rules	  
without	  generating	  any	  reaction	  from	  their	  suppliers.	  Given	  the	  negative	  effects	  that	  the	  exercise	  of	  
buyer	  power	  may	  cause	  to	  the	  competitive	  process	  and	  ultimately	  on	  consumers,	  an	  important	  tool	  
to	  address	  UTPs	  should	  hence	  be	  the	  application	  of	  the	  provisions	  and	  sanctions	  provided	  for	  in	  case	  
of	  breach	  of	  competition	  law.	  	  
Given	  the	  potential	  restrictive	  impact	  on	  competition	  of	  buyer	  practices	  within	  the	  internal	  market,	  a	  
common	   action	   at	   EU	   level	   is	   all	   the	  more	   justified	   and	   even	   prescribed	   by	   the	   Treaty.	   Article	   3,	  
paragraph	   1,	   a),	   TFUE	   gives	   indeed	   the	   European	   Union	   exclusive	   competence	   to	   establish	   the	  
competition	  rules	  necessary	  for	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  internal	  market.	  As	  conduct	  occurring	  on	  the	  
buy	   side	   adversely	   affects,	   in	   some	   circumstances,	   competition	   and	   that	   the	   current	   competition	  
rules	   defined	   by	   the	   EU	   institutions	   are	   not	   suitable	   to	   address	   that	   issue,	   new	   means	   of	   action	  
should	  be	  given	  to	  the	  Commission	  and/or	  national	  competition	  authorities	  to	  protect	  competition.	  	  
Unlike	   the	   rules	   envisaged	   at	   EU	   level	   to	   protect	   weaker	   firms	   against	   UTPS,	   regardless	   of	   their	  
impact	   on	   competition,	   action	   under	   the	   competition	   rules	   is	   only	   aimed	   at	   restoring	   effective	  
competition.	   Intervention	   of	   authorities	   would	   therefore	   be	   required	   only	   in	   cases	   where	   buyer	  
practices	  affect	  the	  competition	  process	  or	  harm	  consumers.	  Such	   limited	   intervention	   in	  business-­‐
to-­‐business	  relationships	  will	  prevent	  a	  too	  great	   intrusion	  by	  authorities	   in	  those	  relationships	  and	  
the	  negative	  effects	  that	  may	  result	  from	  it	  so	  as	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  public	  interest	  in	  intervening	  
outweighs	  the	  risks	  of	  intervention.1112	  	  
Even	   though	   all	   UTPs	   do	   not	   amount	   to	   anticompetitive	   practices,	   some	   of	   them	   undoubtedly	  
impede	  effective	  competition	  and	  are	  therefore	  to	  be	  dealt	  with	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  EU	  competition	  
law.1113	  Giving	  competition	  authorities	  the	  power	  to	  sanction	  abuses	  of	  buyer	  power,	  by	  defining	  new	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1112	  Excessive	  interventionism	  could	  damage	  market	  dynamics,	  deter	  new	  entry	  and	  raise	  consumer	  prices.	  See:	  
UK	  Government	  response	  to	  the	  Green	  Paper	  on	  unfair	  trading	  practices	  in	  the	  business	  to	  business	  food	  and	  
non-­‐food	  supply	  chain,	  at	  12,	  available	  at:	  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/unfair-­‐
trading-­‐practices/docs/contributions/public-­‐authorities/united-­‐kingdom_en.pdf	  	  
1113	  With	  regard	  to	  UTPs	  that	  do	  not	  distort	  or	  restrict	  competition	  on	  the	  markets,	  European	  and	  national	  
authorities	  can	  resort	  to	  other	  policies	  to	  protect	  firms	  harmed	  by	  such	  conduct.	  On	  that	  matter,	  expected	  
harmonization	  of	  national	  laws	  at	  EU	  level	  outlawing	  some	  of	  those	  practices	  and	  providing	  for	  uniform	  
standards	  of	  enforcement	  could	  constitute	  complementing	  measures	  to	  ensure	  fairness	  along	  the	  supply	  chain.	  
However,	  competent	  authorities	  should	  make	  sure	  such	  an	  intrusion	  in	  business-­‐to-­‐business	  relationships	  does	  
not	  entail	  adverse	  effects	  on	  competition.	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criteria	  on	   that	  matter1114,	  would,	   in	  addition,	   imply	  other	  advantages	   related,	   in	  particular,	   to	   the	  
effective	  enforcement	  and	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  rules	  prohibiting	  anticompetitive	  conduct.	  
b) Advantages	  of	  dealing	  with	  buyer	  power	  under	  the	  competition	  rules	  
Applying	  the	  competition	  rules	  to	  buyer	  practices	  would	  not	  be	  an	  easy	  task,	  even	  if	  new	  criteria	  of	  
dominance	  were	  defined	  as	  suggested	  below.	  The	  proof	  of	  a	  restrictive	  impact	  on	  competition	  may	  
indeed	   turn	   out	   to	   be	   hard	   to	   establish,	   such	   as	   in	   seller	   power	   cases.	   Dealing	  with	   buyer	   power	  
under	  the	  scope	  of	  competition	  law	  would	  yet	  offer	  some	  advantages.	  Any	  anticompetitive	  conduct	  
is	  likely	  to	  be	  caught	  by	  the	  rules	  on	  competition	  whereas	  the	  latter	  provide	  for	  strict	  requirements	  in	  
order	  to	  prevent	  the	  drawbacks	  of	  excessive	  interventionism	  in	  trade	  relationships.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  
enforcement	  of	  the	  rules	  by	  independent	  authorities	  and	  the	  level	  of	  the	  sanctions	  imposed	  in	  case	  
of	  infringement	  might	  be	  a	  good	  means	  to	  ensure	  the	  effective	  application	  of	  those	  rules	  and	  create	  
strong	  incentives	  to	  abide	  by	  them.	  
i. Open	  list	  of	  anticompetitive	  conduct	  
The	   prohibition	   of	   anticompetitive	   agreements	   and	   abuses	   in	   competition	   law	   may	   be	   enforced	  
against	  any	  conduct	  that	  restricts	  or	  distorts	  competition,	  provided	  that	  it	  is	  committed	  by	  a	  firm	  in	  a	  
dominant	  position	  with	   regard	   to	  abusive	   conduct.	  Although	  Articles	  101	  and	  102	  TFEU	  give	   some	  
examples	   of	   anticompetitive	   practices,	   the	   latter	   do	  not	   constitute	   a	   closed	   list.1115	   Firms’	   conduct	  
must	   in	   fact	   be	   assessed	   on	   a	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   basis	   so	   as	   to	   determine	   its	   (potential)	   impact	   on	  
competition.	   This	  means,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   that	   there	   is	   no	  per	   se	   prohibition	   as	   the	   effects	   of	   a	  
particular	  practice	  on	  competition	  depend	  on	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  case,	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
that	   any	   behavior	   restricting	   competition	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   sanctioned	   even	   if	   such	   conduct	   is	   not	  
expressly	  prohibited	  and	  has	  never	  been	  dealt	  with	  by	  competition	  authorities.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1114	  On	  the	  new	  criteria	  to	  be	  defined	  in	  order	  to	  give	  competition	  authorities	  the	  ability	  to	  effectively	  take	  
action	  against	  anticompetitive	  practices,	  see	  below	  Section	  II,	  Point	  B.	  
1115	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  provides	  that	  agreements	  restricting	  or	  distorting	  competition	  are	  prohibited,	  and	  in	  
particular	  those	  which	  :	  (a)	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  fix	  purchase	  or	  selling	  prices	  or	  any	  other	  trading	  conditions;	  
(b)	  limit	  or	  control	  production,	  markets,	  technical	  development	  or	  investment;	  (c)	  share	  markets	  or	  sources	  of	  
supply;	  (d)	  apply	  dissimilar	  conditions	  to	  equivalent	  transactions	  with	  other	  trading	  parties,	  thereby	  placing	  
them	  at	  a	  competitive	  disadvantage;	  (e)	  make	  the	  conclusion	  of	  contracts	  subject	  to	  acceptance	  by	  the	  other	  
parties	  of	  supplementary	  obligations	  which,	  by	  their	  nature	  or	  according	  to	  commercial	  usage,	  have	  no	  
connection	  with	  the	  subject	  of	  such	  contracts.	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  prohibits	  abusive	  conduct	  which	  may,	  in	  
particular,	  consist	  in:	  (a)	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  imposing	  unfair	  purchase	  or	  selling	  prices	  or	  other	  unfair	  trading	  
conditions;	  (b)	  limiting	  production,	  markets	  or	  technical	  developments	  to	  the	  prejudice	  of	  consumers;	  (c)	  
applying	  dissimilar	  conditions	  to	  equivalent	  transactions	  with	  other	  trading	  parties,	  thereby	  placing	  them	  at	  a	  
competitive	  disadvantage;	  (d)	  making	  	  the	  conclusion	  of	  contracts	  subject	  to	  acceptance	  by	  the	  other	  parties	  of	  
supplementary	  obligations	  which,	  by	  their	  nature	  or	  according	  to	  commercial	  usage,	  have	  no	  connection	  with	  
the	  subject	  of	  such	  contracts.	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Circumstantial	   assessment	   of	   firms’	   conduct	   aims	   at	   preventing	   excessive	   intervention	   in	   business	  
relationships	  that	  could	  deter	  procompetitive	  behavior	  or	  lead	  to	  sanctioning	  practices	  that	  have	  no	  
impact	   on	   competition.	   Such	   drawbacks	   may	   happen	   when	   practices	   are	   prohibited	   as	   such,	  
regardless	  of	  their	  effects	  on	  competition	  such	  as	  in	  some	  national	  contractual	  laws.	  For	  example,	  in	  
France,	   the	  Loi	  Galland	   introduced	  a	  prohibition	  on	  price	  discrimination	   in	  order	  to	  protect	  smaller	  
retailers	   and	   suppliers.	   However,	   by	   outlawing	   some	   practices	   irrespective	   of	   their	   impact	   on	   the	  
market,	  that	  legislation	  led	  in	  fact	  to	  competition	  restriction	  and	  harm	  to	  final	  consumers.1116	  
In	  addition,	  anticompetitive	  practices	  are	  evolving	  and	  vary	  from	  one	  market	  to	  another.	  Prohibiting	  
one	   practice	   assumed	   to	   be	   anticompetitive	   at	   a	   given	   time	   is	   therefore	   likely	   to	   lead	   firms	   to	  
circumvent	   the	   rules	   by	   using	   practices	   that	   are	   not	   forbidden	   but	   which	   in	   fact	   similarly	   harm	  
competition.	   The	   use	   of	   a	   general	   standard,	   such	   as	   the	   one	   related	   to	   an	   appreciable	   impact	   on	  
competition,	   gives	   therefore	   authorities	   a	   wider	   discretion	   when	   enforcing	   the	   law	   so	   as	   to	  
appreciate	  at	  best	  the	  opportuneness	  of	  intervening.	  	  
ii. Independent	  authority	  to	  enforce	  the	  rules	  
Measures	  taken	  by	  national	  authorities	  to	  tackle	  buyer	  power	  have	  often	  remained	  ineffective	  due,	  
in	  particular,	   to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	   initiative	  to	  enforce	  those	  measures	   is	   left	   to	  suppliers,	  victims	  of	  
large	  buyers’	  practices.	  As	   the	   latter	   fear	   to	   lose	   their	   largest	   customers,	   they	  often	  choose	  not	   to	  
complain	   about	   unlawful	   buyer	   conduct.	   This	   “fear	   factor”	   is	   a	   reality,	   in	   particular	   in	   the	   grocery	  
retail	   sector	   where	   suppliers	   are	   strongly	   dependent	   on	   large	   supermarket	   chains.	   The	   likely	  
retaliation	  from	  retailers	  therefore	  dissuades	  producers	  to	  report	  breaches	  of	  the	  law.	  	  
For	  example,	   in	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  the	  first	  code	  of	  conduct	   implemented	   in	  2002	   in	  the	  grocery	  
retail	   sector	   failed	   to	   provide	   the	   expected	   benefits.1117	   It	   appeared	   indeed	   during	   the	   second	  
investigation	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  grocery	  sector	  some	  years	  later	  by	  the	  Competition	  Commission	  that	  
nothing	   had	   changed	   in	   retailer-­‐supplier	   relationships	   and	   that	   matters	   had	   even	   worsened.	   The	  
reason	  was	  that	  nothing	  had	  been	  provided	  for	  to	  address	  the	  “fear	  factor”	  so	  that	  abuses	  prohibited	  
under	   the	   code	  were	   kept	   quiet	   by	   suppliers.	   In	   2013,	   a	   supermarket	   ombudsman	  was	   named	   in	  
order	  to	  police	  the	  new	  code	  of	  practice	  instituted	  in	  2010	  and	  to	  prevent	  the	  largest	  supermarkets	  
in	   the	   UK	   from	   abusing	   their	   market	   power	   over	   suppliers.	   The	   supermarket	   adjudicator	   has	   the	  
power	  to	   investigate	  anonymous	  tip-­‐offs	  from	  suppliers	  and	  to	  take	  enforcement	  action	  by,	  among	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1116	  On	  the	  French	  legislation,	  See	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  2,	  Section	  I.	  
1117	  On	  the	  measures	  taken	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  to	  address	  supermarkets’	  buyer	  power,	  see	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  
2,	  Section	  II.	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other	   things,	   imposing	   financial	   penalties	   on	   retailers.1118	   It	   remains	   yet	   to	   be	   seen	   whether	   the	  
amount	  of	  the	  penalty	  will	  be	  high	  enough	  to	  deter	  unlawful	  conduct.	  
The	  establishment	  of	   an	   independent	   authority	   to	   take	  enforcement	  action	  against	   large	  buyers	   is	  
crucial	   as	   it	   may	   incite	   suppliers	   to	   speak	   out	   against	   abusive	   practices.	   Naming	   a	   supermarket	  
ombudsman	  may	  be	  decided	   to	  address	  more	  effectively	   some	  unfair	   trading	  practices	   in	   the	   food	  
and	   non-­‐food	   supply	   chain,	   as	   suggested	   within	   the	   context	   of	   the	   European	   Retail	   Action	   Plan.	  
However,	  with	   regard	   to	   anticompetitive	  practices	  occurring	   in	   the	   very	   same	   supply	   chain,	   action	  
has	  to	  be	  taken	  by	  other	  independent	  authorities,	  namely	  competition	  authorities	  which	  can	  enforce	  
the	  competition	   rules	  on	   their	  own	   initiatives.	   In	  addition,	   sanctions	   that	  can	  be	   imposed	  by	   those	  
authorities	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  deter	  firms	  from	  engaging	  in	  the	  most	  harmful	  unfair	  trading	  practices,	  
that	  is	  anticompetitive	  practices.	  	  
iii. Deterrent	  sanctions	  	  
Financial	   penalties	   provided	   for	   in	   competition	   law	   are	   meant,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   to	   sanction	   the	  
infringing	  undertaking(s)	   and	  prevent	   recidivism	   (“specific	  deterrence”)	   and,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   to	  
deter	  ex	   ante	   other	   firms	   from	   engaging	   in	   anticompetitive	   conduct	   (“general	   deterrence”).1119	   To	  
create	  those	  deterrent	  effects,	  the	  Commission	  and	  national	  competition	  authorities	  are	  entitled	  to	  
impose	   fines	   amounting	   up	   to	   10%	   of	   the	   total	   turnover	   of	   the	   firm(s)	   participating	   in	   the	  
infringement.1120	  High	   levels	  of	   fines	  play	   in	   fact	   a	   key	   role	   in	   the	  enforcement	  of	   the	   competition	  
rules	  and	   raise	  awareness	  of	   firms	  and	  citizens	  of	   the	  adverse	  effects	  of	  anticompetitive	  practices.	  
The	  higher	  the	  fine,	  the	  stronger	  is	  the	  incentive	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  rules.	  In	  addition,	  firms	  subject	  
to	   a	   severe	   sanction	   for	   infringing	   the	   competition	   rules	   may	   face	   a	   loss	   in	   popularity	   among	  
consumers.1121	   Enforcing	   the	   competition	   rules	   and	   sanctions	   against	   restrictive	   buyer	   practices	  
would	  therefore	  send	  a	  strong	  signal	  to	  large	  buyers	  that	  their	  conduct	  in	  the	  procurement	  market	  is	  
not	  immune	  from	  competition	  law	  scrutiny	  and	  enforcement.	  
In	   some	   Member	   states,	   independent	   authorities	   (other	   than	   competition	   authorities)	   have	   the	  
power	   to	   impose	   financial	   sanctions	   on	   buyers	   engaged	   in	   unlawful	   conduct.	   For	   example,	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1118	  Groceries	  Code	  Adjudicator	  Act	  2013,	  available	  at	  :	  
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/19/pdfs/ukpga_20130019_en.pdf	  	  
1119	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  method	  of	  setting	  fines	  imposed	  pursuant	  to	  Article	  23(2)(a)	  of	  Regulation	  No	  1/2003,	  OJ	  
C	  210,	  p.2,	  01/09/2006,	  at	  4.	  
1120	  Ibid.,	  at	  32	  and	  Regulation	  Council	  Regulation	  (EC)	  No	  1/2003	  of	  16	  December	  2002	  on	  the	  implementation	  
of	  the	  rules	  on	  competition	  laid	  down	  in	  Article	  81	  and	  82	  of	  the	  Treaty(Text	  with	  EEA	  relevance),	  O.J.	  L	  1/1	  of	  
04/01/2003,	  Article	  25(2).	  
1121	  OECD,	  Promoting	  Compliance	  with	  Competition	  Law,	  Policy	  Roundtables,	  DAF/COMP(2011)20,	  30	  August	  
2012,	  at	  201,	  available	  at:	  
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Promotingcompliancewithcompetitionlaw2011.pdf	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United	   Kingdom,	   the	   new	   Groceries	   Code	   Adjudicator	   Act	   provides	   that	   supermarkets	   dealing	  
unfairly	  with	  their	  suppliers	  could,	   in	  the	  most	  extreme	  cases,	  be	  fined	  by	  the	  adjudicator.	  One	  can	  
yet	  wonder	  whether	  the	  maximum	  fines	  that	  the	  latter	  will	  be	  allowed	  to	  impose	  on	  firms	  breaching	  
the	  code	  will	  reach	  a	  level	  of	  sufficient	  deterrence.	  In	  France,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  economy	  can	  bring	  to	  
courts	  cases	  involving	  competitive	  restrictive	  practices	  and	  requests	  sanctions	  such	  as	  a	  civil	  fine	  up	  
to	  €	  2	  million.	  However,	   that	   amount	   is	   very	  unlikely	   to	   incite	   firms	   to	  abide	  by	   the	   law	  given	   the	  
huge	  benefits	  they	  can	  gain	  from	  exploiting	  their	  market	  power.	  	  
As	  already	  mentioned	  above,	  unfair	  trading	  practices	  do	  not	  necessarily	  amount	  to	  anticompetitive	  
practices.	   Where	   unfairness	   in	   the	   supply	   chain	   does	   not	   lead	   to	   an	   adverse	   impact	   on	   the	  
competitiveness	   of	   the	   market,	   sanctions	   imposed	   under	   other	   rules	   than	   those	   provided	   for	   in	  
competition	   law	  may	  be	   suitable	   to	  protect	  weaker	  players.	  However,	  all	  practices	  which	  have	   the	  
object	   or	   effect	   of	   excluding	   competitors,	   raising	   consumer	   prices,	   reducing	   product	   quality	   or	  
limiting	   consumer	   choice	  must	   be	   sanctioned	   severely	   and	   prevented	   as	   far	   as	   possible	   given	   the	  
damage	   they	  cause	   to	   the	  society	  at	   large.	  Sanctions	  provided	   for	  under	   the	  competition	   rules	  are	  
more	  likely	  to	  achieve	  that	  objective	  and	  deter	  large	  buyers	  from	  exploiting	  anti-­‐competitively	  their	  
market	  power.	  
3. Need	  for	  a	  specific	  answer	  to	  buyer	  power	  in	  the	  grocery	  retail	  sector	  
Anticompetitive	  buyer	  conduct	  should	  be	  addressed	  under	  common	  competition	  law	  rules	  within	  the	  
European	  Union.	  We	  argue	  though	  that	  specific	  criteria	  should	  be	  defined	  in	  order	  to	  sanction	  buyers	  
engaged	  in	  such	  harmful	  conduct.	  The	  current	  competition	  rules	  and	  the	  different	  guidelines	  of	  the	  
European	  Commission	  are	   indeed	  primarily	  designed	   to	  prevent	  sellers	   from	  misusing	   their	  market	  
power	   when	   acting	   in	   the	   downstream	   seller	   market.	   Buyer	   power	   presents	   though	   particular	  
features	  which	  are	  not	  caught	  by	  competition	  law	  instruments	  in	  their	  present	  form.	  	  
Specificity	  of	  buyer	  power,	  compared	  to	  seller	  power,	  can	  especially	  be	  observed	  in	  the	  grocery	  retail	  
industry	  where	   supermarket	   chains	   are	  able	   to	  exert	   significant	  market	  power	  over	   their	   suppliers	  
and	  to	  affect	  competition	  through	  their	  behavior	  despite	  their	  relatively	  low	  market	  share.	  Given	  the	  
potential	   anticompetitive	   outcome	  of	   some	   supermarket	   chains’	   practices,	   competition	   authorities	  
should	  focus	  their	  action	  on	  the	  grocery	  retail	  sector.	  
1) Specificity	  of	  buyer	  power	  
Market	  power	  arises,	  among	  other	  things,	  from	  concentration	  among	  sellers	  or	  buyers.	  On	  the	  buy-­‐
side,	   concentrated	   buyers	   are	   indeed	   likely	   to	   acquire	   significant	   market	   power	   when	   facing	   an	  
atomistic	  upstream	  seller	  market,	  especially	  when	  there	  is	  no	  scarcity	  in	  supply	  and	  that	  buyers	  can	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easily	   switch	   from	   one	   producer	   to	   another.	   However,	   we	   have	   already	   referred	   in	   Part	   I	   to	   the	  
specificities	  of	  buyer	  power	  whose	  degree	  mostly	  depends	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  vertical	  relationships	  
between	  buyers	   and	   suppliers.	   	   In	   addition,	   incentives	   to	   exert	  market	   power	   or	   to	   compete	  with	  
rivals	  may	  be	  very	  different	  from	  one	  side	  of	  the	  market	  to	  another.	  1122	  
Unlike	  in	  seller	  markets	  where	  competition	  may	  be	  fierce	  between	  sellers	  who	  are	  willing	  to	  attract	  
as	  many	  customers	  as	  possible	  by	  offering	  them	  better	  conditions	  (lower	  prices,	  higher	  quality,	  more	  
choice	  of	  products,…)1123,	  buyers	  are	   less	   incited	  to	  compete	  against	  each	  other	  by	  raising	  prices	   in	  
order	  to	  appeal	  to	  suppliers.	  Provided	  that	  unlimited	  inputs	  are	  available	  in	  the	  procurement	  market,	  
they	   are	   indeed	   unlikely	   to	   gain	   benefits	   from	   such	   conduct,	   especially	   with	   regard	   to	  
undifferentiated	  products.	  
Where	   a	   buyer	   could	   attract	   more	   suppliers	   by	   bidding	   up	   input	   prices	   and	   thereby	   enlarge	   his	  
volume	  of	   production,	   this	  would	   also	   raise	  his	   costs	   of	   productions.	   The	  buyer	   in	   question	  would	  
hence	  be	  put	  at	  a	  competitive	  disadvantage	   in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market	  so	  that	  his	  chance	  of	  
making	   profits	   through	   his	   additional	   sales	   would	   be	   quite	   slim.1124	   The	   incentive	   to	   compete	   is	  
therefore	  unlikely	  to	  be	  present	  in	  the	  procurement	  market,	  at	  least	  when	  firms	  cannot	  differentiate	  
to	  some	  extent	  their	  production	  or	  when	  their	  activity	  merely	  consist	  in	  reselling	  goods	  in	  the	  retail	  
market.1125	  
In	   addition,	   in	   terms	   of	   supply,	   buyers’	   needs	   are	   met	   with	   a	   limited	   number	   of	   suppliers.	   The	  
objective	  is	  therefore	  not	  to	  become	  customers	  of	  all	  producers	  but	  to	  select	  some	  of	  them	  and	  play	  
them	  against	  each	  other	  so	  as	  to	  obtain	  the	  most	  favorable	  conditions.	  Unlike	  in	  retail	  markets	  where	  
firms’	  profits	  depends	  mainly	  on	  the	  width	  of	  their	  customer	  base	  –	  inciting	  them	  to	  decrease	  prices-­‐,	  
in	  buyer	  markets,	  a	  larger	  supplier-­‐base	  does	  not	  necessarily	  means	  higher	  profits.	  Although,	  in	  retail	  
markets,	   a	   large	   product	   choice	   certainly	   helps	   attract	   more	   consumers,	   retailers	   can	   only	   sell	   a	  
limited	  range	  of	  products	  due	  to	  space	  scarcity	  in	  retail	  stores.	  Facing	  a	  large	  number	  of	  suppliers	  in	  
each	  product	  category	  who	  offer	  similar	  goods,	  retailers	  are	  not	  concerned	  about	  appealing	  to	  all	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1122	  See	  Part	  I,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  I,	  Point	  C.	  
1123	  The	  loss	  of	  one	  customer	  will	  necessarily	  benefit	  one	  of	  the	  competing	  sellers.	  As,	  by	  definition,	  competing	  
firms	  sell	  similar	  or	  interchangeable	  products,	  customers	  can	  select	  one	  of	  them	  to	  satisfy	  their	  needs.	  Sellers	  
are	  therefore	  incited	  to	  lower	  prices,	  improve	  quality	  of	  their	  products	  or	  increase	  services	  provided	  to	  
customers	  in	  order	  to	  be	  the	  lucky	  one.	  
1124	  P.C.Carstensen,	  Buyer	  power	  and	  the	  horizontal	  merger	  guidelines	  :	  minor	  progress	  on	  an	  important	  issue,	  
14	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Journal	  of	  Business	  Law	  775,	  at	  790	  (2012).	  
1125	  The	  situation	  may	  be	  different	  if	  buyers	  could	  get	  higher	  quality	  products	  by	  offering	  better	  conditions	  to	  
their	  suppliers	  and	  thereby	  produce	  and	  sell	  differentiated	  products	  in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market.	  In	  such	  
case,	  higher	  prices	  paid	  in	  the	  procurement	  market	  would	  not	  necessarily	  be	  a	  competitive	  disadvantage	  as	  the	  
firm	  could	  stand	  out	  from	  competitors	  through	  other	  aspects	  than	  its	  products	  price.	  New	  technology	  or	  higher	  
quality	  may	  indeed	  be	  as	  appealing	  to	  consumers	  as	  lower	  prices.	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them	  but	   instead	  of	  getting	  the	  most	  of	  a	  few	  of	  them	  so	  as	  to	  gain	  competitive	  advantages	   in	  the	  
downstream	  seller	  market.	  
The	  ability	  and	  incentive	  to	  exert	  buyer	  power	  is	  all	  the	  more	  present	  when	  a	  few	  buyers	  act	  in	  fact	  
as	  gatekeepers.	  In	  such	  circumstances,	  suppliers	  cannot	  but	  deal	  with	  all	  incumbent	  buyers	  in	  order	  
to	   access	   consumers.	  As	   a	   result,	   unlike	   in	   seller	  markets	  where	   customers	   can	   satisfy	   their	   needs	  
with	  regard	  to	  a	  particular	  product	  by	  selecting	  one	  firm	  and	  switch	  to	  another	  one	  if	  they	  can	  get	  a	  
better	   deal,	   suppliers	  may	   literally	   be	   stuck	   to	   all	   large	   buyers	   if	   no	   alternative	   sales	   avenues	   are	  
available.	  Aware	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  unavoidable	  trading	  partners	  for	  most	  suppliers,	  buyers	  can	  
therefore	   freely	   exert	   their	  market	   power	   in	   the	   procurement	  market.	   Suppliers	   are	   very	   likely	   to	  
resign	  themselves	  to	  agreeing	  with	  the	  terms	  and	  conditions	  imposed	  by	  their	  large	  customers.	  They	  
know	   indeed	  that,	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	   losing	  one	  of	   these	  customers	  would	   threaten	  their	  economic	  
viability	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  switching	  to	  one	  of	  the	  other	  incumbents	  would	  not	  result	  in	  better	  
deals	  since,	  as	  mentioned	  above,	  none	  of	  them	  are	  incited	  to	  improve	  suppliers’	  conditions,	  on	  the	  
contrary.	  
When	   rival	   buyers	   also	   compete	   in	   the	   downstream	   seller	   market,	   it	   would	   also	   be	   in	   their	   best	  
interest	   to	   exploit	   as	  much	  as	  possible	   their	   power	   in	   the	  procurement	  market	   at	   risk	  of	   suffering	  
from	   serious	   competitive	   disadvantages	   in	   the	   downstream	   seller	   market.	   This	   makes	   even	  more	  
sense	   where	   the	   firms	   in	   question	   are	   not	   involved	   in	   activities	   which	   consist	   in	   adding	   value	   to	  
inputs	  but	  rather	   in	  selling	  products	  bought	  from	  producers	  to	  consumers.	  As	  competitors	  buy	  and	  
sell	  the	  same	  or	  similar	  products,	  none	  of	  them	  are	  incited	  to	  pay	  higher	  prices	  in	  the	  procurement	  in	  
order,	   for	   example,	   to	   encourage	   suppliers	   to	   invest	   in	   product	   quality	   or	   innovation	   since	   any	  
product	   improvement	  would	   also	   benefit	   competitors.	   The	   latter	  will	   not,	   though,	   have	   borne	   the	  
costs	   of	   such	   improvement	   so	   that	   they	   will	   gain	   significant	   competitive	   advantages	   in	   the	  
downstream	  seller	  market	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  the	  firm	  which	  induced	  product	  improvement.	  By	  so	  
reasoning,	  each	  buyer	  is	  strongly	  incited	  to	  exert	  its	  market	  power	  over	  suppliers,	  expecting	  the	  same	  
conduct	  from	  competitors.	  	  
Unlike	  in	  seller	  markets,	  firms	  do	  not	  have,	   in	  most	  cases,	  any	  interest	   in	  doing	  their	  best	  to	  satisfy	  
their	  trading	  partners	  when	  acting	  as	  buyers	  in	  the	  procurement	  market.	  Large	  buyers	  use	  practices	  
that	  serve	  their	  best	  interests	  in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market	  and	  exert	  therefore	  significant	  buyer	  
power	   over	   their	   suppliers	   in	   order	   to	   strengthen	   their	   position	   as	   sellers	   in	   that	  market.	  Nothing	  
seems	   to	   dissuade	   a	   buyer	   from	   so	   acting,	   not	   even	   competing	   buyers	   due	   to	   the	   absence	   of	  
incentives	  to	  act	  the	  other	  way	  round.	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2) Specificity	  of	  retail	  grocery	  industry	  
Large	   supermarket	   chains	   hold	   considerable	   market	   power.	   The	   grocery	   procurement	   and	   retail	  
markets	   are	   indeed	   structured	   as	   such	   as	   to	   give	   rise	   to	   significant	   buyer	   power	   in	   the	   hands	   of	  
retailers.	   In	  addition,	  different	   factors	   contribute	   to	   the	   reinforcement	  of	  buyers’	  market	  power	   in	  
the	  grocery	  retail	  industry	  and	  increase	  the	  incentives	  to	  exploit	  that	  power.	  
i. Buyer	  power	  in	  the	  retail	  grocery	  industry	  
Large	  retailers’	  buyer	  power	  has	  already	  been	  extensively	  described	  and	  illustrated	  above.	  All	  factors	  
giving	  rise	  to	  buyer	  power	  are	  in	  fact	  present	  in	  the	  grocery	  retail	  sector.	  
Firstly,	  in	  many	  products	  categories,	  the	  buy-­‐side	  of	  the	  market	  is	  much	  more	  concentrated	  than	  the	  
sell-­‐side	   so	   that	   concentrated	  buyers	  are	   facing	  atomistic	   suppliers.	  Retailers’	  market	  power	   in	   the	  
procurement	  market	   is	   therefore	  more	   likely	   to	   amount	   to	   buyer	   power	   instead	   of	   countervailing	  
power,	  excluding	  thereby	  the	  likely	  positive	  effects	  generally	  associated	  with	  the	  latter	  power.1126	  	  
Secondly,	   grocery	   retailers	   can	   easily	   switch	   from	   one	   supplier	   to	   another	   as	   the	   demand	   rarely	  
exceeds	  the	  supply.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  many	  product	  manufacturers	  are	  waiting	  at	  the	  doors	  of	  large	  
supermarket	  chains	  since	  getting	  space	  on	  the	  shelves	  of	  each	  incumbent	  retailer	  is	  the	  only	  key	  to	  
have	   sufficient	   access	   to	   consumers.	   Few	   shelf-­‐spaces	   are	   though	   available.	   The	   large	   choice	   of	  
suppliers	   therefore	  gives	   retailers	   the	  ability	   to	  play	   the	   latter	  against	  one	  another.	  By	   threatening	  
them	  to	  change	  their	  source	  of	  supply	  and	  remove	  some	  products	  from	  the	  shelves,	  retailers	  can	  in	  
fact	  extract	  concessions	  that	  they	  would	  never	  have	  got	  otherwise.1127	  	  
Thirdly,	   suppliers	   are	  highly	  dependent	  on	   large	   supermarket	   chains	  due,	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	   to	   the	  
high	  proportion	  the	  latter	  represent	  in	  their	  turnover	  (high	  risk	  rate)	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  to	  the	  
lack	   of	   equivalent	   alternatives	   available	   to	   reach	   consumers.	   In	  most	  Member	   States,	   each	   of	   the	  
largest	  grocery	  retailers	  may	  account	  for	  more	  than	  20%	  of	  a	  supplier’s	  total	  sales.	  The	  loss	  of	  one	  of	  
those	   customers	   is	   therefore	   likely	   to	   mark	   the	   decline	   of	   a	   producer’s	   business	   activities.	   The	  
grocery	  retail	  channel	  is	  indeed	  the	  main	  sales	  avenue	  for	  producers	  and	  is	  in	  the	  hand	  of	  a	  very	  few	  
retail	  chains.	  The	  large	  volume	  of	  sales	  made	  through	  the	  stores	  of	  one	  of	  those	  supermarket	  chains	  
can	  hardly	  be	  sold	  off	  via	  other	  customers	  such	  as	  smaller	  self-­‐service	  or	  drugstore	  chains.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1126	  On	  the	  different	  forms	  of	  buyer	  power	  and,	  in	  particular,	  on	  the	  distinction	  between	  buyer	  power	  and	  
countervailing	  buyer	  power,	  see	  Part	  I,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  I,	  Point	  B.	  
1127	  Retailers	  can	  push	  suppliers	  off	  their	  supply	  curve	  onto	  their	  all-­‐or-­‐non	  supply	  curve.	  See,	  Part	  I,	  Chapter	  1,	  
Section	  I,	  Point	  B,	  1,	  c),	  ii.	  As	  a	  result,	  they	  can	  obtain	  lower	  prices	  but	  also	  and	  especially	  other	  concessions	  
such	  as	  supply	  restrictions	  aimed	  at	  competitors,	  invoicing	  of	  expensive	  services	  or	  other	  payments.	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In	  addition,	   the	  possibility	  of	   finding	  new	  customers	  by	  turning	  to	  an	  alternative	   line	  of	  production	  
probably	   constitutes	   an	   illusory	   solution.	   All	   grocery	   products	   have	   indeed	   to	   pass	   through	   the	  
gateway	  guarded	  by	  large	  supermarket	  chains	  so	  that	  the	  production	  of	  another	  product	  is	  unlikely	  
to	  lead	  to	  the	  opening	  of	  new	  horizons	  in	  terms	  of	  sales,	  not	  to	  mention	  the	  high	  costs	  that	  such	  a	  
change	  may	  involve.	  	  The	  inability	  of	  suppliers	  to	  find	  alternative	  buyers	  results	  in	  fact	  in	  a	  very	  low	  
elasticity	   of	   supply	   and	   thereby	   reinforces	   retailers’	   buyer	   power.	   The	   latter	   indeed	   know	   that,	  
whatever	  the	  price	  and	  purchase	  conditions	  imposed	  on	  suppliers,	  the	  quantity	  supplied	  will	  not	  be	  
affected.	  	  
Some	  processing	   companies,	   such	   as	  Unilever,	  Nestlé	   or	   Kraft	   Foods,	   are	   yet	   better	   equipped	   and	  
positioned	  to	  counter	  the	  pressure	  exerted	  by	   large	  grocery	  chains	  due,	   in	  particular,	   to	  their	   large	  
market	  share,	  their	  reputation	  and	  their	  brand	  strength.	  Although	  retailers’	  buyer	  power	  may	  have	  
constituted	   at	   another	   time	   a	   countervailing	   means	   for	   mitigating	   those	   large	   suppliers’	   market	  
power	   and	   preventing	   them	   from	   imposing	   supra-­‐competitive	   prices,	   it	   appears,	   at	   this	   time,	   that	  
large	  retail	  chains	  are	  getting	  the	  upper	  hand	  in	  their	  business	  relationships,	  even	  over	  their	  largest	  
suppliers.	  Countervailing	  buyer	  power,	  and	  its	  recognized	  positive	  effect,	  has	  therefore	  given	  way	  to	  
buyer	  power	  and	  its	  possible	  harmful	  effects	  on	  competition.	  	  
Among	   the	   various	   types	   of	   buyer	   power	   described	   in	   the	   first	   part,	   retailers	   are	   unlikely	   to	   exert	  
monopsony	   power	   that	   is	   to	   reduce	   the	   volume	   of	   purchases	   in	   order	   to	   lower	   prices.1128	  
Supermarket	   chains	   use	   instead	   all-­‐or-­‐nothing	   contracts	   in	   order	   to	   impose	   their	   terms	   and	  
conditions	   on	   suppliers.	   Those	   are	   related	   to	   lower	   purchase	   prices	   but	   also	   to	   other	   concessions	  
which	  may	   result	   in	   excluding	   competitors	   or	   significantly	   strengthening	   large	   retailers’	   position	   in	  
the	  upstream	  buyer	  market	  but	  also	  in	  the	  downstream	  retail	  market.	  	  
ii. Specific	  features	  of	  the	  retail	  grocery	  industry	  
In	  Part	  I,	  we	  mentioned	  various	  sectors	  where	  the	  Commission	  considered	  that	  buyers	  held	  a	  strong	  
position.1129	  It	  may	  yet	  be	  argued	  that	  different	  features	  distinguish	  the	  retail	  grocery	  industry	  from	  
those	  other	  sectors	  and	  make	  powerful	  supermarket	  chains	  potentially	  more	  harmful	  for	  competition	  
than	  other	  buyers.	  These	  different	  features	  specific	  to	  the	  retail	  grocery	  industry	  make	  indeed	  large	  
grocery	   chains’	  market	   power	   particularly	   strong	   and	   therefore	   increase	   the	   probability	   that	   such	  
power	  leads	  to	  competition	  harm.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1128	  On	  the	  model	  of	  monopsony	  power,	  see	  Part	  I,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  I,	  Point	  B,	  1,	  c),	  i.	  
1129	  See	  Part	  I,	  Chapter	  2,	  Section	  I.	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Firstly,	  the	  nature	  of	  buyer-­‐supplier	  relationships	  in	  the	  grocery	  retail	  sector	  attests	  to	  the	  presence	  
of	  significant	  buyer	  power	  and	  not	  only	  unequal	  bargaining	  power.	  In	  various	  sectors,	  the	  balance	  of	  
power	  between	  a	  supplier	  and	  its	  customer	  may	  tilt	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  latter	  and	  result	  in	  unfair	  terms	  
and	  conditions	  imposed	  on	  the	  former.	  Contractual	  imbalances	  are,	  though,	  not	  as	  such	  as	  to	  affect	  
competition,	  especially	  when	  they	  are	  limited	  to	  one	  or	  a	  few	  trading	  relationships.	  According	  to	  the	  
Commission,	  competition	  concerns	  may	  nevertheless	  arise	  when	  unequal	  bargaining	  power	  amounts	  
in	  fact	  to	  buyer	  power	  that	   is	  when	  a	  buyer	  has	  not	  only	  power	  over	  a	  particular	  supplier	  but	  over	  
suppliers	   in	   general.1130	   One	   cannot	   but	   note	   that	   supermarket	   chains’	   bargaining	   power	   in	   the	  
procurement	  market	  has	  reached	  that	  level	  of	  power.	  Those	  buyers	  enjoy	  indeed	  market	  power	  over	  
all	  their	  suppliers,	  large	  and	  small,	  so	  that	  unfair	  trading	  practices	  are	  systemic.1131	  The	  ability	  of	  large	  
retail	   chains	   to	   dictate	   the	   rules	   in	   the	   procurement	   market	   is	   therefore	   more	   likely	   to	   lead	   to	  
competition	  harm	  in	  that	  market	  but	  also	  in	  the	  downstream	  retail	  market.	  
Secondly,	  supermarket	  chains’	  market	  power	  in	  the	  upstream	  purchasing	  market	  is	  amplified	  due	  to	  
their	  “gatekeeper”	  role	  and	  vice	  versa.	  As	  illustrated	  above,	  supermarket	  chains	  can	  use	  their	  buyer	  
power	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  competitive	  advantages	  and	  reinforce	  their	  position	  in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  
market.	  This	  in	  turn	  strengthens	  their	  role	  of	  gatekeepers.	  The	  larger	  a	  retailer’s	  market	  share	  in	  the	  
downstream	  retail	  market,	  the	  stronger	  is	  its	  position	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market	  as	  it	  becomes	  an	  
unavoidable	  trading	  partner	  to	  reach	  consumers.	  The	  bottleneck	  represented	  by	  large	  grocery	  chains	  
is	   in	   fact	   unique.	   Only	   a	   few	   companies	   are	   indeed	   active	   in	   the	   grocery	   retail	   sector	   and	   no	  
equivalent	   alternatives	   are	   available	   for	   suppliers	   to	   sell	   their	   products.	   Such	   considerable	  
“gatekeeper	  effect”	  seems	  to	  be	  present	  in	  no	  other	  sector.	  	  
The	  reason	  of	  that	  uniqueness	  probably	   lies,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  on	  the	  absence	  of	  other	  avenues	  to	  
sell	   grocery	   products	   and,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   on	   the	   loyalty	   of	   consumers	   to	   their	   supermarket.	  
Unlike	   in	   other	   sectors	  where	   the	  market	   structure	  may	   appear	   close	   to	   that	   in	   the	   grocery	   retail	  
sector,	  the	  bottleneck	  characterizing	  the	  latter	  sector	  is	  hardly	  expansible.	  For	  example,	  a	  ready-­‐to-­‐
eat	   salads	   producer	   is	   unlikely	   to	   get	   by	   without	   its	   largest	   grocery	   retail	   customers	   which	   may	  
represent	   more	   than	   80%	   of	   its	   sales.	   Smaller	   retailers	   are	   indeed	   unable	   to	   store	   and	   sell	   large	  
volume	   of	   production	   and	   only	   a	   relatively	   limited	   number	   of	   consumers	   can	   be	   reached	   through	  
those	  retailers.	  While	  forward	  integration	  may	  constitute	  an	  outside	  option	  in	  some	  sectors,	  creating	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1130	  See:	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission,	  A	  better	  functioning	  food	  supply	  chain	  in	  Europe,	  op.cit.,	  at	  5	  
and	  Report	  of	  the	  European	  Competition	  network,	  ECN	  activities	  in	  the	  food	  sector,	  op.cit.,	  	  at	  41.	  
1131	  Submission	  of	  Promarca	  (Spain)	  to	  the	  European	  Commission’s	  Green	  Paper	  on	  unfair	  trading	  practices	  in	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a	   new	  distribution	   channel	   is	   unthinkable	   for	   grocery	  products	  manufacturers	   because	  of	   the	  high	  
costs	  such	  an	  option	  would	  imply	  and	  of	  consumers’	  preferences	  for	  one-­‐stop	  shopping.	  	  
In	  other	  sectors	  where	  a	  few	  retailers	  face	  numerous	  suppliers,	  the	  gatekeeper	  effect	  does	  not	  seem	  
to	   be	   as	   strong	   as	   in	   the	   retail	   grocery	   industry.	   For	   example,	   in	   the	   hardware	   retail	   market,	   the	  
French	  authorities	  pointed	  out	  the	  high	  concentration	  at	  the	  retail	   level	  and	  the	  atomistic	  structure	  
of	  the	  supply	  market.	  Incidentally,	  unfair	  trading	  practices	  imposed	  by	  some	  large	  retail	  chains	  have	  
been	   sanctioned	  by	   French	   courts	  under	   the	   legislation	  on	  anticompetitive	   restrictive	  practices.1132	  
However,	  no	  competition	  concerns	  have	  been	  raised	  so	   far	   in	   that	   sector.	  The	   reason	  may	  be	   that	  
suppliers	  may	   find	  or	  develop	  more	  easily	   alternatives	   to	   sell	   their	  production.	  Hardware	  products	  
can	   indeed	  be	  sold	  through	  hypermarket	  stores,	  smaller	  specialized	  retailers	  or	  via	  the	   internet	   for	  
examples.	   Many	   sales	   avenues	   are	   indeed	   available	   on	   the	   internet	   and	   can	   be	   used	   by	   product	  
manufacturers	   to	   circumvent	   the	   predominance	   of	   large	   hardware	   retail	   chains.	   Producers	   can	  
develop	  their	  own	  online	  sales	  channel	  or	  use	  existing	  online	  sales	  platforms	  to	  put	  their	  products	  on	  
the	  market.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  grocery	  retail	  market	  remains	  insulated	  from	  the	  development	  of	  online	  
sales.	   Consumers	   keep	   indeed	   going	   to	   their	   supermarket	   store	   to	   get	   fresh	   foods	   and	   take	  
advantage	  of	  the	  opportunity	  to	  buy	  all	  other	  products	  available	  that	  they	  need.	  Moreover,	  current	  
online	  grocery	  shopping	  platforms	  that	  offer	  a	  sufficiently	  large	  number	  of	  product	  lines	  are	  in	  fact	  in	  
the	  hands	  of	  the	  incumbent	  grocery	  retail	  companies.	  	  
Consumers’	   loyalty	   to	   their	   favorite	   supermarket	   and	   their	   preferences	   for	   one-­‐stop	   shopping	  
contribute	   to	   making	   large	   retail	   chains	   indispensable.	   Even	   though	   consumers	   may	   prefer	   a	  
particular	   brand,	   they	   are	  more	   likely	   to	  be	   loyal	   to	   their	   supermarket	   store	   than	   to	   their	   favorite	  
brand.	   The	   convenience	   of	   one-­‐stop	   shopping	   leads	   indeed	   consumers	   to	   switch	   more	   easily	   to	  
another	   brand	   or	   to	   private	   label	   products	   rather	   than	   go	   to	   another	   store	   to	   find	   their	   favorite	  
brand.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  removal	  of	  a	  product	  from	  the	  shelves	  of	  a	  supermarket	  turns	  for	  the	  supplier	  
into	   the	   loss	   of	   a	   large	   majority	   of	   consumers	   who	   used	   to	   buy	   the	   product	   in	   question	   in	   that	  
supermarket.	   The	   loss	   of	   a	   grocery	   retail	   customer	   causes	   serious	   financial	   consequences	   on	  
suppliers	   who	   may	   end	   up	   more	   affected	   than	   in	   other	   sectors	   as,	   even	   with	   the	   best	   will	   and	  
capacity	  in	  the	  world,	  they	  can	  hardly	  make	  up	  for	  the	  resulting	  shortfall.	  
Thirdly,	   nothing	   seems	   to	   dissuade	   supermarket	   chains	   from	   exploiting	   their	   market	   power	   over	  
suppliers.	  With	  regard	  to	  branded	  products,	  all	  big	  retail	  chain	  companies	  sell	   to	  a	   large	  extent	  the	  
same	  products	   for	  which	  they	  are	  not	  responsible,	  be	   it	   in	  respect	  of	  the	  composition	  or	  quality	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1132	  Réponse	  des	  autorités	  françaises	  au	  livre	  vert	  sur	  les	  pratiques	  commerciales	  déloyales	  dans	  la	  chaîne	  
d’approvisionnement	  alimentaire	  et	  non-­‐alimentaire	  interentreprises	  en	  Europe	  COM(2013)37,	  at	  10.	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those	  products.	  In	  fact,	  supermarkets	  do	  not	  use	  and	  transform	  inputs	  to	  produce	  new	  outputs	  but	  
merely	   resell	   finished	   products	   in	   the	   retail	  market.	  Unlike	   buyers	   in	   other	   sectors,	   such	   as	   car	   or	  
aircraft	   manufacturers,	   grocery	   chains	   are	   therefore	   not	   incited	   to	   pay	   more	   or	   offer	   better	  
conditions	  to	  producers	  so	  as	  to	  improve	  some	  products.	  In	  the	  first	  Part,	  we	  have	  indeed	  mentioned	  
that	  car	  manufacturers	  may	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  taking	  care	  of	  the	  situation	  of	  firms	  producing	  some	  
car	  components	  in	  order	  to	  get	  higher	  quality	  product.	  As	  they	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  final	  products	  
that	  they	  can	  differentiate	  through	  a	  good	  manufacturing	  process	  but	  also	  through	  a	  higher	  quality	  of	  
each	   component,	   car	   producers	   are	   in	   fact	   more	   likely	   establish	   close	   and	   mutually	   beneficial	  
relationships	   with	   their	   suppliers.	   In	   contrast,	   grocery	   retailers	   have	   no	   direct	   interest	   in	   giving	  
brands	   suppliers	   the	   ability	   to	   improve	   their	   products	   through	   higher	   purchase	   prices	   or	   better	  
purchase	   conditions	   since	   they	   know	   that	   any	   improvement	   of	   those	   brands	   would	   also	   benefit	  
competing	  retailers.	  They	  are	  rather	   incited	  to	  exploit	  their	  market	  power	  so	  as	  to	  get	   lower	  prices	  
and	   other	   concessions	   which	   will	   constitute	   competitive	   advantages	   in	   the	   downstream	   seller	  
market.	  
Fourthly,	  supermarkets	  can	  generally	  find	  easily	  alternatives	   in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market	  and	  are	  
not	   required	   to	   keep	   buying	   one	   particular	   product	   to	   carry	   out	   their	   activity	   in	   the	   downstream	  
retail	  market.	  Their	  product	  assortments	  can	  indeed	  change	  and	  the	  loss	  of	  one	  product	  is	  not	  likely	  
to	  seriously	  affect	  their	  results.	  This	  distinguished	  grocery	  retailers	  from	  product	  manufacturers	  who	  
need	  a	  complete	  assortment	  of	  inputs,	  each	  one	  being	  indispensable	  to	  produce	  a	  particular	  output.	  
Although	   product	  manufacturers	   can	   use	  multi-­‐sourcing	   strategies	   to	   avoid	   any	   rupture	   in	   supply,	  
they	   are	   nevertheless	   more	   dependent	   on	   their	   suppliers	   than	   grocery	   retailers	   due	   to	   the	  
consequences	  such	  a	  rupture	  would	  have	  on	  their	  business	  activity.	  	  
In	  addition,	   in	  other	   sectors,	  buyers	  may	  have	  a	   strong	   interest	   in	  keeping	  good	   relationships	  with	  
their	  suppliers.	  For	  example,	  public	  bodies	  buying	  facilities	  to	  provide	  public	  services,	  such	  as	  public	  
transport,	   are	   better	   off	   keeping	   stable	   commercial	   relations	  with	   their	   suppliers	   so	   as	   to	   benefit	  
from	   their	   know-­‐how	   in	   maintaining	   or	   repairing	   those	   facilities.	   In	   these	   circumstances,	   the	  
incentive	  to	  exercise	  buyer	  power	  and	  to	  use	  the	  threat	  to	  switch	  to	  other	  suppliers	   is	  much	  lower	  
than	  in	  the	  grocery	  retail	  sector.	  	  	  	  
Fifthly,	   the	   strong	  and	   increasing	  presence	  of	  private	   labels	   in	   the	  grocery	   sector	   further	  amplifies	  
the	  incitement	  for	  retailers	  to	  (ab)use	  buyer	  power	  in	  the	  procurement	  market.	  Supermarket	  chains	  
are	   indeed	   incited	   to	   exert	   their	  market	   power	   over	   brands	   suppliers	   as	   this	  may	   in	   fact	   result	   in	  
improving	  the	  market	  position	  of	  their	  own-­‐brand	  products.	  Different	  practices	  used	  by	  retailers	  with	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regard,	   for	   example,	   to	   the	   acquisition	   or	   placement	   of	   branded	   products	   may	   weaken	   or	   even	  
eliminate	  some	  brands	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  private	  label	  lines.1133	  	  	  
The	   ability	   and	  particular	   incitement	   to	   exert	  market	  power	   in	   the	   grocery	  procurement	  market	   is	  
likely	  to	  cause	  adverse	  effects	  on	  competition.	  As	  developed	  above	  in	  Chapter	  1	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  
likely	  anticompetitive	  impact	  of	  some	  practices	  used	  in	  the	  grocery	  retail	  sector,	  supermarket	  chains	  
tend	   to	  extend	   their	   field	  of	  action	  by	  using	   their	  buyer	  power	  not	  only	   to	  obtain	   lower	  prices	  but	  
also	   and	   especially	   to	   extract	   other	   concessions	   from	   suppliers.	   Negotiation	   on	   restrictive	   supply	  
arrangements,	  on	   listing,	   slotting	  or	  promotional	   fees	  or	  on	  charged	  services	   imposed	  on	  suppliers	  
are	  much	  less	  likely	  to	  benefit	  consumers	  in	  the	  short	  and	  longer-­‐term.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  such	  use	  of	  
buyer	   power	  may	   lead,	   among	  other	   things,	   to	   the	   exclusion	  of	   competitors	   and	  higher	   consumer	  
prices.	  
As	   the	   specificities	   of	   the	   retail	   grocery	   industry	  may	   lead	   to	   anticompetitive	   use	   of	   buyer	   power,	  
suitable	  competition	  rules	  should	  be	  designed	  to	  effectively	  address	  harmful	  practices	  in	  that	  sector.	  
Those	  rules	  should	  apply	  to	  large	  supermarket	  chains	  that	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  exert	  buyer	  power	  over	  
suppliers	  in	  general	  and	  restrict	  or	  distort	  competition	  through	  their	  conduct.	  Suppliers	  may	  be	  food	  
but	  also	  non-­‐food	  items	  producers.	  For	  many	  household	  and	  personal	  care	  products	  manufacturers	  
for	  example,	  the	  grocery	  retail	  sector	  constitutes	  indeed	  the	  main	  and	  indispensable	  avenue	  to	  reach	  
consumers.	   The	   strength	   of	   supermarkets’	   buyer	   power	   and	   the	   potential	   harmful	   impact	   of	   such	  
power	  on	  competition	  in	  those	  non-­‐food	  markets	  are	  therefore	  similar	  to	  those	  observed	  in	  the	  food	  
procurement	  and	  retail	  markets	  so	  that	  similar	  rules	  should	  be	  applied.	  
The	  specificity	  of	  buyer	  power	  and,	   in	  particular,	  of	  buyer	  power	   in	  the	  grocery	  retail	   industry	  calls	  
for	   a	   specific	   assessment	   of	   supermarket	   chains’	   buyer	   practices	   under	   the	   competition	   rules.	   A	  
common	  and	  specific	  approach	  to	  address	  buyer	  power	  in	  that	  sector	  would	  help	  authorities	  prevent	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  On	  the	  different	  practices	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  by	  large	  retail	  chains	  in	  order	  to	  promote	  their	  own-­‐brands,	  see	  above,	  
Chapter	  1,	  Section	  II,	  Point	  A,	  2.	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SECTION	  2	  –	  NEW	  CRITERIA	  TO	  BE	  DEFINED	  IN	  EU	  COMPETITION	  LAW	  
While	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   buyers’	   practices	   may	   adversely	   affect	   competition	   in	   the	   grocery	   sector,	   it	  
remains	   to	   be	   seen	   whether	   the	   EU	   competition	   rules	   can	   sanction	   and	   prevent	   anticompetitive	  
conduct	  committed	  by	   large	  supermarket	  chains.	  On	  that	  matter,	   it	   turns	  out	  that	  Articles	  101	  and	  
102	   TFEU	   are	   very	   unlikely	   to	   be	   effectively	   enforced	   against	   anticompetitive	   practices	   in	   the	  
upstream	  procurement	  market,	   in	  particular,	  because	  the	  current	  criteria	  used	  in	  the	  application	  of	  
these	   provisions	   are	   ill-­‐suited	   to	   address	   the	   specificities	   of	   buyer	   power.	   In	   fact,	   competition	  
authorities	   focus	   mainly	   on	   the	   firms’	   market	   shares	   to	   assess	   the	   latter’s	   ability	   to	   distort	  
competition	  and	  thereby	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  competition	  rules	  apply	  to	  them.	  However,	  the	  
ability	  of	  large	  retail	  chains	  to	  affect	  competition	  relies	  mostly	  on	  other	  factors	  than	  the	  level	  of	  their	  
market	   shares	   in	   the	  procurement	  market.	   Except	   in	   a	   few	  merger	   cases,	   those	   factors	  have	  been	  
largely	  underestimated	  by	  competition	  authorities,	  leaving,	  as	  a	  result,	  uncontrolled	  possible	  harmful	  
buyer	  practices.	  
In	  order	  to	  protect	  effective	  competition,	  large	  retail	  chains	  that	  have	  sufficient	  market	  power	  so	  as	  
to	  limit	  or	  distort	  competition	  should	  be	  subject	  to	  competition	  authorities’	  supervision.	  This	  would	  
therefore	   call	   for	   defining	   new	   criteria	   of	   dominance	   applicable	   to	   buyer	   retailers	   in	   the	   grocery	  
sector.	   The	   specific	   approach	   to	   be	   adopted	   in	   buyer	   power	   cases	   should	   in	   fact	   be	   part	   of	   the	  
common	   action	   needed	   at	   EU	   level	   and	   could	   be	   implemented	   in	   the	   Member	   States’	   national	  
legislation	  via	  an	  EU	  instrument	  which	  presents	  some	  degree	  of	  flexibility,	  such	  as	  a	  Directive.	  
The	  objective	  would	  be	  to	  harmonize	  national	  laws	  on	  buyer	  power	  by	  defining	  common	  criteria	  to	  
be	  used	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  buyer	  power.	  This	  would	   in	  fact	  give	  national	  competition	  authorities	  
the	   power	   to	   enforce	   the	   prohibition	   on	   restrictive	   agreements	   and	   abusive	   conduct	   in	   a	   larger	  
number	  of	  cases.	  The	  new	  criteria	  would	   indeed	   integrate	  the	  specificities	  of	  buyer	  power	  so	  as	  to	  
ensure	   that	   buyer	   retailers	   which	   are	   in	   a	   position	   to	   limit	   competition	   and	   adversely	   affect	  
consumers	  through	  their	  conduct	  do	  not	  escape	  from	  the	  competition	  rules.	  
A. CURRENT	  COMPETITION	  RULES	  UNSUITABLE	  TO	  ADDRESS	  BUYER	  CONDUCT	  
Theoretically,	   anticompetitive	   buyer	   practices	   could	   be	   caught	   under	   EU	   competition	   law.	   The	  
prohibition	   on	   anticompetitive	   agreements	   and	   abusive	   conduct,	   provided	   respectively	   by	   Articles	  
101	  and	  102	  TFEU,	  are	  indeed	  meant	  to	  apply	  to	  both	  the	  sell-­‐	  and	  the	  buy-­‐side	  of	  the	  market.1134	  In	  
the	  enforcement	  of	  those	  provisions,	  the	  focus	  has	  though	  mainly	  been	  put	  on	  sellers’	  market	  power	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1134	  See	  :	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  I.	  
Final	  version	  -­‐	  Mai	  2014	   	  
359	  
	  
and	  practices.	  As	  the	  result,	  the	  current	  criteria	  used	  to	  assess	  business	  practices	  are	  defined	  on	  the	  
basis	  of	  the	  characteristics	  of	  seller	  markets	  and	  appear	  unsuitable	  to	  address	  buyers’	  conduct.	  
The	  EU	  Commission	  has	  yet	  drawn	  greater	  attention	  on	  the	  potential	  harmful	  effects	  of	  buyer	  power	  
in	   a	   few	  merger	   cases.	   Although	   those	   cases	   remain	   relatively	   isolated	   in	   the	   enforcement	   of	   the	  
Merger	  Regulation,	   the	  criteria	  used	  and	   the	  arguments	  developed	   therein	  are	  nevertheless	  worth	  
being	  taken	  into	  account	  as	  they	  may	  help	  shape	  a	  new	  approach,	  specific	  to	  buyer	  power	  cases.	  
1. Article	  101	  TFEU	  
Horizontal	   agreements	   between	   competing	   producers	   or	   between	   competing	   retailers	   but	   also	  
vertical	  agreements	  between	   retailers	  and	   their	   suppliers	  are	  prohibited	   if	   they	  have	   the	  object	  or	  
effect	   to	   restrict	   competition.	   The	   different	   (potential)	   anticompetitive	   practices	   involving	   large	  
supermarket	  chains	  described	  above	  are	  though	  unlikely	  to	  be	  sanctioned	  under	  Article	  101	  TFEU.	  
a) Horizontal	  agreements	  
Hardcore	   restrictions	   between	   competing	   buyers,	   such	   as	   agreements	   fixing	   purchase	   prices	   or	  
sharing	   sources	   of	   supply,	   are	   clearly	   prohibited	   by	   Article	   101	   TFEU.1135	   	   In	   a	   few	   cases,	   the	  
Commission	  has	  enforced	  this	  provision	  against	  buyer	  cartels,	  confirming	  the	  harmful	  effect	  of	  such	  
arrangements	  on	  competition	  even	  though	  they	  do	  not	  lead	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  consumer	  prices.1136	  	  
With	   regard	   to	   buyer	   agreements	   that	  may	   have	   the	   effect	   of	   restricting	   competition,	   a	   balancing	  
approach	  is	  used,	  weighing	  the	  benefits	  against	  the	  harm	  caused	  by	  the	  agreement	  in	  question	  both	  
in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market	  and	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market.	  Such	  an	  effect-­‐based	  approach	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1135	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  reads	  as	  follows	  :	  “The	  following	  shall	  be	  prohibited	  as	  incompatible	  with	  the	  internal	  
market	  all	  agreements	  between	  undertakings,	  decisions	  by	  associations	  of	  undertakings	  and	  concerted	  
practices	  which	  may	  affect	  trade	  between	  Member	  States	  and	  which	  have	  as	  their	  object	  or	  effect	  the	  
prevention,	  restriction	  or	  distortion	  of	  competition	  within	  the	  internal	  market,	  and	  in	  particular	  those	  which:	  
	   (a)	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  fix	  purchase	  or	  selling	  prices	  or	  any	  other	  trading	  conditions;	  
	   (b)	  limit	  or	  control	  production,	  markets,	  technical	  development,	  or	  investment;	  
	   (c)	  share	  markets	  or	  sources	  of	  supply;	  
	   (d)	  apply	  dissimilar	  conditions	  to	  equivalent	  transactions	  with	  other	  trading	  parties,	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  thereby	  	  placing	  them	  at	  a	  competitive	  disadvantage;	  
	   (e)	  make	  the	  conclusion	  of	  contracts	  subject	  to	  acceptance	  by	  the	  other	  parties	  of	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  supplementary	  obligations	  which,	  by	  their	  nature	  or	  according	  to	  commercial	  usage,	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  have	  	  no	  connection	  with	  the	  subject	  of	  such	  contracts.”	  
1136	  See	  for	  examples	  :	  Spanish	  Raw	  Tobacco,	  Case	  No	  COMP/C.38.238/B.2,	  Commission	  decision	  of	  20	  October	  
2004	  ;	  Italian	  Raw	  Tobacco,	  Case	  No	  COMP/C.38.281/B.2,	  Commission	  decision	  of	  20	  October	  2005;	  Aluminium	  
Imports	  from	  Eastern	  Europe,	  Case	  IV/26.870,	  Commission	  decision	  of	  19	  December	  1984	  ;	  French	  beef,	  Case	  
COMP/C.38.279/F3,	  Commission	  decision	  of	  2	  April	  2003;	  C-­‐8/08,	  T-­‐Mobile	  Netherlands	  BV	  and	  others	  v	  Raad	  
van	  bestuur	  van	  de	  Nederlandse	  Mededingingsautoriteit	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐4529.	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for	  example	  applied	  to	  assess	  the	  lawfulness	  of	  buying	  agreements	  between	  parties	  with	  a	  combined	  
market	  share	  exceeding	  15%.1137	  	  
Although	  Article	  101	  TFEU	   is	  applicable	   to	  buyer	  alliances,	   this	  provision	  may	   turn	   to	  be	  useless	   to	  
prevent	   anticompetitive	   practices	   in	   the	   grocery	   retail	   sector.	   Agreements	   between	   retailers	   to	  
coordinate	  their	  conduct	   in	  the	  upstream	  procurement	  market	  are	   indeed	  unlikely	  to	  be	  concluded	  
due,	  in	  particular,	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  each	  single	  big	  supermarket	  chain	  is	  able	  to	  dictate	  the	  rules	  to	  its	  
suppliers	   without	   conspiring	   with	   competing	   buyers.	   As	   all	   large	   grocery	   chains	   constitute	  
unavoidable	  trading	  partners	  to	  reach	  consumers,	  each	  of	  them	  can	  indeed	  exert	  their	  market	  power	  
in	   the	   upstream	  buyer	  market	  without	   fearing	   to	   lose	   suppliers	  which	   are	   dependent	   on	   them.	   In	  
addition,	   since	   those	   buyers	   have	   no	   interest	   in	   increasing	   purchase	   prices	   or	   in	   offering	   better	  
purchase	  conditions	  to	  producers,	  none	  of	  them	  is	  likely	  to	  give	  up	  exploiting	  their	  buyer	  power.	  On	  
the	   contrary,	   knowing	   that	   producers	   will	   not	   be	   offered	   better	   terms	   and	   conditions	   from	  
competitors,	  retailers	  are	  incited	  to	  exploit	  their	  buyer	  power	  in	  the	  upstream	  procurement	  market	  
so	   as	   to	   maximize	   their	   profits	   and	   do	   not	   feel	   it	   necessary	   to	   enter	   into	   an	   agreement	   with	  
competitors	  to	  do	  so.	  	  
As	   for	   competition	   concerns	   related	   to	   the	   share	   of	   information	   between	   competitors	  which	  may	  
result	   from	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  by	  some	  retailers,	   they	  have	   little	  chance	  to	  be	  addressed	  
under	  Article	  101	  TFEU.	  For	  example,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  current	  practices	  in	  relation	  to	  private	  labels,	  
it	   was	   developed	   above	   that	   retailers	   can	   exploit	   their	   buyer	   power	   in	   order	   to	   get	   sensitive	  
information	  from	  suppliers	  about	  branded	  products.	  Such	  a	  share	  of	  information	  may	  be	  regarded	  as	  
occurring	   in	   fact	   between	   competitors	   since	   retailers	   compete	  with	   brands	   producers	   in	   the	   retail	  
market	  through	  their	  own-­‐brands.	  However,	  the	  double-­‐agent	  function	  of	  grocery	  retailers	  blurs	  the	  
picture.	   One	   may	   indeed	   consider	   that	   information	   exchange	   is	   part	   of	   the	   vertical	   relationship	  
between	  the	  supermarkets	  and	   their	   suppliers	   so	   that	   it	   cannot	  be	   regarded	  as	  an	   infringement	  of	  
the	   competition	   rules.1138	   Among	   the	   indispensable	   flow	   of	   information	   between	   retailers	   and	  
producers,	  it	  is	  therefore	  uneasy	  to	  distinguish	  the	  part	  which	  is	  needed	  for	  a	  better	  marketing	  of	  the	  
products	   from	  the	  part	  which	   is	   likely	   to	  be	  used	   in	  an	  anticompetitive	  manner,	  especially	  because	  
those	  two	  parts	  may	  in	  fact	  be	  confused.	  	  
Retailers	   may	   also	   use	   their	   buyer	   power	   to	   orchestrate	   a	   trilateral	   arrangement	   leading	   to	   an	  
indirect	   share	   of	   information	   between	   competitors,	   a	   so-­‐called	   “hub-­‐and-­‐spoke”	   conspiracy.	   The	  
convey	  of	  information	  between	  competing	  firms	  through	  a	  common	  agency	  is	  an	  issue	  that	  has	  been	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1137	  On	  the	  rules	  applicable	  to	  buying	  agreements	  and	  the	  case	  law	  on	  that	  matter,	  see	  :	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  1,	  
Section	  I,	  Point	  A,	  1	  and	  B,	  1.	  
1138	  S.Erzene,	  Buyer	  power	  in	  the	  Context	  of	  Private	  Label	  in	  the	  EU,	  Global	  Antitrust	  Review	  106	  (2012),	  at	  118.	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recognized	   by	   the	   Commission.1139	  We	   have	   already	  mentioned	   that	   an	   A-­‐B-­‐C	   collusion	   is	   likely	   to	  
constitute	  a	  horizontal	  agreement.	  However,	  no	  criteria	  have	  been	  defined	  at	  EU	  level	  to	  determine	  
when	  indirect	  exchange	  of	  information	  must	  be	  regarded	  as	  an	  anticompetitive	  arrangement	  in	  the	  
sense	  of	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  as	  no	  case	  involving	  that	  matter	  has	  been	  dealt	  with	  by	  the	  Commission	  so	  
far.1140	  Given	  the	  difficulty	   in	  proving	  such	  type	  of	  collusion,	  retailers	  exploiting	  their	  market	  power	  
over	  suppliers	  so	  as	  to	  use	  them	  to	  convey	  information	  to	  competitors	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  sanctioned	  
under	  Article	   101	   TFEU.	   In	   addition,	  when	   some	   suppliers,	   under	   the	   pressure	   of	   a	   large	   retailer’s	  
power,	  are	  forced,	  for	  example,	  to	  abide	  by	  a	  policy	  of	  boycotting	  smaller	  retailers	  and	  consequently	  
end	  up	  being	  engaged	  in	  an	  unlawful	  horizontal	  arrangement	  at	  the	  supply	  level,	  the	  application	  of	  
Article	   101	   TFEU	   to	   those	   suppliers	   will	   not	   sanction	   or	   deter	   the	   conduct	   which	   is	   behind	   the	  
anticompetitive	  boycott,	  namely	  the	  anticompetitive	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  by	  a	  retailer.	  	  
b) Vertical	  agreements	  
Terms	   and	   conditions	   imposed	   by	   a	   retailer	   on	   its	   suppliers	   may	   constitute	   a	   vertical	   agreement	  
when	  a	  concurrence	  of	  will	   is	  established.	  According	  to	  the	  EU	  case	   law	  on	  this	  matter,	  apparently	  
unilateral	  conduct	  may	  indeed	  be	  part	  of	  an	  agreement	  between	  two	  parties	  where	  clear	  evidence	  is	  
established	  that	  one	  of	  those	  parties	  has	  agreed	  or	  acquiesced,	  explicitly	  or	  tacitly,	  in	  any	  unilateral	  
policy	  declared	  by	   the	  other	  party.1141	  For	   there	   to	  be	  an	  agreement	  within	   the	  meaning	  of	  Article	  
101	  TFEU	  it	   is	  sufficient	  that	  the	  parties	  have	  expressed	  their	   joint	   intention	  to	  conduct	  themselves	  
on	  the	  market	  in	  a	  specific	  way,	  no	  matter	  the	  form	  in	  which	  the	  intention	  is	  expressed.1142	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1139	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  applicability	  of	  Article	  101	  of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  the	  Functioning	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  to	  
horizontal	  co-­‐operation	  agreements,	  O.J.	  C11/1	  of	  04/01/2011,	  at	  55.	  
1140	  The	  issue	  of	  indirect	  exchange	  of	  information	  between	  competitors	  has	  been	  dealt	  with	  by	  some	  national	  
authorities.	  See	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  UK:	  Case	  CP/0871/01	  Price-­‐Fixing	  of	  Replica	  Football	  Kit	  [2003]	  1	  August	  
and	  Case	  CP/0480-­‐01	  Agreements	  between	  Hasbro	  UK	  Ltd,	  Argos	  Ltd	  and	  Littlewood	  Ltd	  Fixing	  the	  Price	  of	  
Hasbro	  Toys	  and	  Games	  [2003]	  21	  November.	  On	  appeal	  before	  the	  Competition	  Appeal	  Tribunal:	  Case	  
1021/1/1/03	  and	  1022/1/1/03	  JJB	  Sports	  Plc	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading;	  Allsports	  Limited	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  
[2004]	  CAT	  17.	  On	  appeal	  before	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal:	  Case	  Nos	  2005/1071,	  1074	  and	  1623	  Argos	  Limited	  and	  
Littlewoods	  Limited	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  and	  JJB	  Sports	  Plc	  v	  	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  [2006]	  EWCA	  Civ	  1318.	  
1141	  See	  for	  examples	  :	  Case	  107/82,	  AEG-­‐Telefunken	  v	  Commission	  [1983]	  ECR	  3151;	  Joint	  cases	  25	  &	  26/84,	  
Ford	  Werke	  &	  Ford	  of	  Europe	  Inc.	  v	  Commission	  [1985]	  ECR	  2725;	  C-­‐277/87,	  Sandoz	  prodoti	  farmaceutici	  SpA	  v	  
Commission	  [1990]ECR	  I-­‐45;	  T-­‐62/98,	  Volkswagen	  AG	  v	  Commission	  [2000]	  ECR	  II-­‐2707;	  T-­‐368/00,	  General	  
Motor	  Nederland	  BV,	  Opel	  Nederland	  BV	  v	  Commission	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐4491.	  See	  also:	  However,	  the	  European	  
Courts	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  if	  no	  concurrence	  of	  will	  has	  been	  established,	  the	  decision	  to	  restrict	  competition	  
must	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  genuinely	  unilateral	  conduct	  which	  escapes	  the	  prohibition	  in	  Article	  101	  TFEU.	  See:	  T-­‐
41/96,	  Bayer	  v	  Commission	  [2000]	  ECR	  II-­‐3383,	  upheld	  on	  appeal	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  C-­‐2	  &	  3/01P,	  BAI	  and	  
Commission	  v	  Bayer	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐23.	  See	  on	  that	  matter:	  A.Jones	  &	  B.Sufrin,	  EU	  competition	  law:	  Text,	  cases	  
and	  materials	  (2011),	  at	  147-­‐158.	  
1142	  Guidelines	  on	  vertical	  restraints,	  op.cit.,	  at	  25.	  In	  case	  there	  is	  no	  explicit	  agreement	  expressing	  the	  
concurrence	  of	  wills,	  there	  are	  two	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  Commission	  can	  prove	  that	  the	  unilateral	  policy	  of	  one	  
party	  receives	  the	  acquiescence	  of	  the	  other	  party.	  First,	  the	  acquiescence	  can	  be	  deduced	  from	  the	  powers	  
conferred	  upon	  the	  parties	  in	  a	  general	  agreement	  drawn	  up	  in	  advance.	  If	  the	  clauses	  of	  the	  agreement	  drawn	  up	  in	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In	   the	   context	   of	   buyer	   power	   in	   the	   grocery	   retail	   sector,	   if	   a	   supermarket	   chain	   requires	   some	  
suppliers	  to	  adopt	  specific	  conduct	  and	  that	  the	  latter	  abide	  by	  such	  a	  requirement,	  the	  supermarket	  
chain’s	  decision	  is	  deemed	  to	  be	  part	  of	  an	  agreement	  falling	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  Article	  101	  TFEU.	  
Take	  for	  example,	  a	  supply	  restriction	  imposed	  by	  a	  grocery	  retailer	  on	  a	  food	  manufacturer	  in	  order	  
to	  prevent	  the	  latter	  from	  selling	  its	  products	  to	  a	  new	  competing	  retailer.	  If	  the	  supplier	  in	  question	  
acquiesces	   in	   its	   customer’s	   restrictive	   supply	   policy,	   such	   restriction	   will	   be	   regarded	   as	   the	  
expression	  of	  the	  concurrence	  of	  wills	  between	  those	  two	  parties	  even	  though	  it	  did	  not	  operate	  to	  
the	  supplier’s	  advantage.	  Tacit	  acquiescence	  may	   in	   fact	  be	  deduced	   from	  coercion	  exerted	  by	   the	  
retailer	   to	   impose	   its	  unilateral	  policy	  on	   the	  supplier.	  As	  such,	  a	   system	  of	  penalties,	   including	   for	  
example	  the	  delisting	  of	  items	  produced	  by	  the	  supplier	  in	  question,	  set	  up	  by	  the	  retailer	  to	  penalize	  
non-­‐compliance	  with	  its	  unilateral	  policy,	  points	  to	  tacit	  acquiescence.1143	  	  
The	   fact	   that	   the	   supplier	   was	   unwilling	   to	   accept	   those	   terms	   is	   irrelevant	   for	   the	   finding	   of	   an	  
anticompetitive	   agreement.1144	   Provided	   that	   the	   retailer’s	   aims	   could	   not	   have	   been	   achieved	  
without	   the	   supplier’s	   participation,	   the	   two	   parties	   are	   considered	   to	   be	   involved	   in	   the	   same	  
infringement	  of	  Article	  101	  TFEU.	  The	  Commission	  could	   though	  decline	   to	   fine	  a	  supplier	   that	  has	  
acted	  under	  duress	  against	  its	  own	  economic	  interest.1145	  That	  supplier	  will	  nevertheless	  be	  declared	  
a	  party	  to	  the	  unlawful	  agreement	  and	  could,	  as	  a	  result,	  become	  liable	  for	  damages	  to	  anyone	  who	  
has	  suffered	  a	  loss	  caused	  by	  the	  infringement.1146	  	  
The	  payment	  of	  listing	  or	  slotting	  fees	  may	  also	  be	  regarded	  as	  part	  of	  a	  vertical	  agreement	  between	  
a	   retailer	   and	   a	   producer.	   In	   the	  Guidelines	   on	   vertical	   restraints,	   the	   Commission	   points	   out	   that	  
those	   payments	  may	   sometimes	   result	   in	   anticompetitive	   foreclosure	   of	   other	   distributors	   if	   they	  
induce	   the	   supplier	   to	   channel	   its	   products	   through	   only	   one	   or	   a	   limited	   number	   of	   distributors.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
advance	  provide	  for	  or	  authorise	  a	  party	  to	  adopt	  subsequently	  a	  specific	  unilateral	  policy	  which	  will	  be	  binding	  on	  
the	  other	  party,	  the	  acquiescence	  of	  that	  policy	  by	  the	  other	  party	  can	  be	  established	  on	  the	  basis	  thereof	  .	  Secondly,	  
in	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  an	  explicit	  acquiescence,	  the	  Commission	  can	  show	  the	  existence	  of	  tacit	  acquiescence.	  For	  
that	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  show	  first	  that	  one	  party	  requires	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly	  the	  cooperation	  of	  the	  other	  party	  for	  
the	  implementation	  of	  its	  unilateral	  policy	  and	  second	  that	  the	  other	  party	  complied	  with	  that	  requirement	  by	  
implementing	  that	  unilateral	  policy	  in	  practice	  .	  
1143	  See,	  by	  analogy:	  Guidelines	  on	  vertical	  restraints,	  op.cit.,	  at	  25.	  	  
1144	  A.Jones	  &	  B.Sufrin,	  op.cit.,	  at	  148.	  
1145	  See	  for	  example	  :	  VW,	  Case	  IV/35.733,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  28	  January	  1998.	  In	  that	  case,	  The	  European	  
Commission	  fined	  Volkswagen	  ECU	  102	  million	  for	  systematically	  forcing	  its	  authorised	  dealers	  in	  Italy	  to	  refuse	  
to	  sell	  Volkswagen	  and	  Audi	  cars	  to	  foreign	  buyers,	  mainly	  from	  Germany	  and	  Austria.	  Authorised	  dealers	  were	  
in	  fact	  threatened	  that	  their	  dealership	  contracts	  would	  be	  terminated	  if	  they	  sold	  to	  foreign	  customers,	  and	  
some	  of	  them	  were	  actually	  terminated.	  The	  Commission	  therefore	  considered	  that	  those	  dealers	  were	  victims	  
of	  the	  restrictive	  policy	  introduced	  by	  Volkswagen	  as	  were	  forced	  to	  consent	  to	  such	  a	  policy	  under	  pressure.	  It	  
was	  therefore	  decided	  not	  to	  impose	  a	  fine	  on	  them	  (at	  208).	  
1146	  A.Jones	  &	  B.Sufrin,	  op.cit.,	  at	  149.	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They	   may	   indeed	   have	   the	   same	   downstream	   foreclosure	   effect	   as	   an	   exclusive	   supply	   type	   of	  
obligation.1147	  
Restrictive	  supply	  agreements	  in	  the	  grocery	  sector	  are,	  however,	  very	  likely	  to	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  
of	   the	  Block	   Exemption	  Regulation	  on	   vertical	   restraints.1148	   That	   Regulation	  provides	   indeed	   for	   a	  
safe	  harbor,	  according	  to	  which	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU	  will	  not	  apply	  to	  vertical	  agreements	  where	  the	  
market	  share	  held	  by	  the	  supplier	  does	  not	  exceed	  30%	  of	  the	  relevant	  market	  on	  which	  it	  sells	  the	  
contract	   goods	   or	   services	   and	   the	   market	   share	   held	   by	   the	   buyer	   does	   not	   exceed	   30%	   of	   the	  
relevant	  market	  on	  which	   it	   purchases	   the	   contract	   goods	  or	   services.1149	  With	   regard	   to	  exclusive	  
supply	  agreements,	  the	  Commission	  points	  out	   in	   its	  Guidelines	  on	  vertical	  restraints	  that	  the	  main	  
competition	  risk	  is	  competitive	  foreclosure	  of	  other	  buyers.	  Although	  the	  market	  share	  of	  the	  buyer	  
in	   the	   upstream	   procurement	  market	   is	   important	   to	   assess	   its	   ability	   to	   impose	   exclusive	   supply	  
obligations,	   particular	   attention	   is	   also	   drawn	   on	   the	   position	   of	   the	   buyer	   in	   the	   downstream	  
market.	   The	  Commission	   indeed	   considers	   that	   no	   appreciable	  negative	   effects	   can	  be	  expected	   if	  
the	  buyer	  has	  no	  market	  power	  downstream.	  Accordingly,	  a	  competition	  problem	  is	  unlikely	  to	  arise	  
when	   the	   market	   share	   of	   the	   buyer	   does	   not	   exceed	   30%	   either	   in	   the	   upstream	   procurement	  
market	  or	  in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market.1150	  	  
Among	  the	  other	  factors	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  assess	  the	  lawfulness	  of	  exclusive	  supply	  agreements,	  
we	   can	   mention	   the	   market	   position	   of	   the	   competing	   buyers	   in	   the	   upstream	   market.	  
Anticompetitive	   foreclosure	   is	   indeed	  more	   likely	   to	   arise	  when	   competing	  buyers	   are	   significantly	  
smaller	  than	  the	  foreclosing	  buyer.	  Countervailing	  power	  of	  suppliers	  is	  also	  of	  particular	  importance	  
as	   powerful	   suppliers	   will	   not	   easily	   allow	   themselves	   to	   be	   cut	   off	   from	   alternative	   buyers.	  
Foreclosure	  is	  mainly	  a	  risk	  in	  the	  case	  of	  weak	  suppliers	  and	  strong	  buyers.1151	  Although	  the	  grocery	  
retail	  sector	  is	  characterized	  by	  those	  features	  -­‐	  as	  a	  few	  big	  retail	  chains	  are	  facing	  a	  large	  number	  of	  
smaller	  suppliers	  who	  can	  be	  coerced	  at	  will	  -­‐,	  the	  safe	  harbor	  set	  in	  the	  Block	  Exemption	  Regulation	  
creates	   in	   fact	   a	   presumption	   of	   legality	   for	  most	   vertical	   agreements	   imposed	   by	   those	   big	   retail	  
chains.	  The	  market	  shares	  of	  large	  grocery	  chains	  will	  indeed	  fall	  below	  the	  threshold	  of	  30%	  in	  most	  
Member	  States.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1147	  Guidelines	  on	  vertical	  restraints,	  op.cit.,	  at	  204.	  
1148	  Commission	  Regulation	  (EU)	  No	  330/2010	  of	  20	  April	  2010	  on	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  101(3)	  of	  the	  Treaty	  
on	  the	  Functioning	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  to	  categories	  of	  vertical	  agreements	  and	  concerted	  practices	  (Text	  
with	  EEA	  relevance),	  O.J.	  L	  102/1	  of	  23/04/2010.	  
1149	  Ibid.,	  Article	  3(1)	  
1150	  Guidelines	  on	  vertical	  restraints,	  op.cit.,	  at	  194.	  	  
1151	  Ibid.,	  at	  196	  and	  198.	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With	   regard	   to	   the	   application	   of	   such	   an	   exemption	   to	   the	   consumer	   goods	   retail	   sector,	   some	  
comments	  are	   though	  worth	  being	  made.	  Where	  vertical	   restraints	  are	  generally	   less	  harmful	   than	  
horizontal	  restraints	  and	  are	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  efficiencies,	  the	  reasons	  underlying	  the	  exemptions	  of	  
most	   of	   those	   agreements	   hardly	   apply	   to	   supermarkets.	   Indeed,	   according	   to	   the	   Guidelines	   on	  
vertical	  restraints,	  the	  positive	  effects	  of	  exclusive	  agreements	  are	  likely	  to	  outweigh	  any	  competition	  
restriction	  when,	  for	  example,	  substantial	  investments	  have	  to	  be	  made	  by	  the	  distributor	  to	  launch	  
a	   particular	   product.	   In	   such	   a	   case,	   a	   particular	   protection	   in	   the	   form	   of	   exclusivity	  may	   in	   fact	  
promote	  the	  entry	  of	  new	  products	  or	  improve	  quality	  of	  services	  offered	  to	  consumers.1152	  Among	  
the	   other	   positive	   effects	   of	   exclusive	   agreements,	   the	   Commission	   underlines	   that	   they	   may	  
constitute	   a	   mean	   to	   solve	   a	   “free-­‐rider”	   problem.	   Such	   problem	   arises	   for	   instance	   when	   one	  
distributor	  free-­‐ride	  on	  the	  promotion	  efforts	  of	  another	  distributor.	  However,	  it	  is	  made	  clear	  in	  the	  
Guidelines	   that	   the	   product	   subject	   to	   the	   exclusivity	   will	   usually	   need	   to	   be	   relatively	   new	   or	  
technically	  complex	  and	  must	  be	  of	  a	  reasonably	  high	  value.1153	  
	  In	   view	  of	   those	  elements,	   one	  may	  wonder	   to	  what	   extent	   the	  exemptions	  of	   vertical	   restraints,	  
such	   as	   exclusive	   supply	   agreements,	   are	   justified	   when	   they	   are	   imposed	   by	   large	   supermarket	  
chains.	   Indeed,	   we	   have	   seen	   that	   all	   investments	   necessary	   to	   launch	   or	   promote	   a	   product	   are	  
made	  by	  the	  supplier	  in	  question	  so	  that	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  grant	  retailers	  a	  certain	  protection	  to	  
recoup	  inexistent	  costs.	  Concerning	  the	  free-­‐rider	  problem,	  one	  cannot	  but	  note	  that	  supermarkets	  
do	   not	   generally	   sell	   high-­‐value	   and	   complex	   items	   but	   rather	   daily	   consumer	   goods	   for	   which	  
consumers	   do	   not	   need	   specific	   information	   to	   make	   a	   decision.	   No	   extra-­‐services	   requiring	  
substantial	   investment	   in	   staff	   training	   or	   new	   infrastructure	   for	   examples	   are	   hence	   provided	   by	  
those	  retail	  chains	  which	  would	  justify	  a	  restriction	  on	  competition.	  	  
In	  conclusion,	  two	  arguments	  may	  justify	  a	  stricter	  approach	  when	  a	  vertical	  restriction	  is	  induced	  by	  
a	   buyer.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   a	   firm	  may	   have	   significant	   buyer	   power	   below	   the	   threshold	   of	   30%	  
market	   share	  established	   in	   the	  block	  exemption	   regulation.	  On	  basis	  of	  other	   factors,	   such	  as	   the	  
economic	   dependency	   of	   suppliers	   or	   a	   gatekeeper	   effect,	   a	   buyer	  may	   in	   fact	   be	   in	   a	   position	   to	  
influence	   the	  market	   conditions	   in	   order	   to	   increase	   its	   profits	   at	   the	   expense	  of	   its	   suppliers	   and	  
competitors.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  as	  far	  as	  supermarket	  chains	  are	  concerned,	  economic	  efficiencies	  
which	  are	  likely	  to	  arise	  from	  the	  conclusion	  of	  vertical	  agreements,	  and	  which	  justify	  the	  existence	  
of	  the	  block	  exemption,	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  emerge	  from	  vertical	  practices	  used	  by	  large	  retail	  chains.	  If	  
some	  restrictions	  imposed	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  specific	  products,	  such	  as	  luxurious	  or	  technological	  
products,	  may	   lead	   to	   improvement	   in	  production	  or	  distribution	  and	  benefit	   consumers,	   they	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1152	  Ibid.,	  at	  61.	  
1153	  Ibid.,	  at	  107.	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more	  hardly	  justified	  with	  regard	  to	  mass	  consumer	  goods.	  The	  ability	  of	  retail	  chains	  to	  impose	  an	  
anticompetitive	   policy	   on	   their	   suppliers	   so	   as	   to	   strengthen	   their	   market	   power	   both	   in	   the	  
upstream	   procurement	  market	   and	   in	   the	   downstream	   seller	  market	   is	   therefore	   likely	   to	   remain	  
unsupervised	  by	  competition	  authorities.	  
The	  grant	  of	  individual	  or	  block	  exemption	  cannot	  be	  such	  as	  to	  render	  inapplicable	  the	  prohibition	  
set	   out	   in	   Article	   102	   TFEU.1154	   Derogation,	   through	   a	   declaration	   of	   inapplicability,	   from	   the	  
prohibition	  on	  anticompetitive	  conduct	  applies	  indeed	  only	  to	  agreements,	  decisions,	  and	  concerted	  
practices	   provided	   by	   Article	   101(1)	   TFEU.	   Such	   derogation	   can	   therefore	   not	   preclude	   the	  
application	   of	   Article	   102	   TFEU.1155	   Although	   both	   provisions	   pursue	   the	   same	   aim	   of	   monitoring	  
effective	  competition	  on	   the	  market,	   they	  are	  nevertheless	  designed	   to	   regulate	  distinct	   situations	  
and	  are	  as	  such	  independent	  and	  complementary.	  	  
Such	  a	  complementary	  approach	  between	  the	  Treaty	  rules	  on	  competition	  presents	  two	  advantages	  
for	   tackling	   buyer	   power	   used	   by	   large	   grocery	   retailers	   to	   impose	   their	   restrictive	   policy	   on	  
suppliers.	   Firstly,	   agreements	   exempted	   under	   the	   block	   exemption	   regulation	   may	   still	   be	  
scrutinized	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  and	  sanctioned	  if	  it	  is	  established	  that	  the	  retailer’s	  policy	  in	  which	  
a	  producer	  has	  explicitly	  or	  tacitly	  acquiesced,	  be	  it	  willingly	  or	  unwillingly,	  constitutes	  an	  abuse	  of	  a	  
dominant	  position.	  Secondly,	  even	  though	  a	  restrictive	  agreement	  between	  a	  large	  retail	  chain	  and	  a	  
grocery	   producer	   is	   not	   exempted	   and	   hence	   falls	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   Article	   101(1)	   TFEU,	   the	  
possibility	  to	  apply	  both	  the	  latter	  provision	  and	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  may	  be	  used,	  in	  some	  cases,	  to	  put	  
the	  real	  wrongdoer	   in	  the	  spotlight.1156	   Indeed,	   if	  a	   retailer	   in	  a	  dominant	  position	   in	  the	  upstream	  
procurement	  market	  has	  succeeded,	  by	  exploiting	   its	  buyer	  power,	   in	   imposing	   its	  restrictive	  policy	  
on	  a	   supplier	  who	  has,	  as	  a	   result,	  been	  unwillingly	   involved	   in	  an	  anticompetitive	  agreement,	   the	  
application	   of	   Article	   102	   TFEU	   could	   contribute	   to	   putting	   the	   emphasis	   on	   the	   initiator	   of	   the	  
anticompetitive	  practice.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1154	  See:	  Joint	  cases	  C-­‐395/96	  P	  and	  C-­‐396/96	  P,	  Compagnie	  Maritime	  Belge	  Transports	  and	  Others	  v	  
Commission	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐1365,	  at	  130;	  T-­‐51/89,	  Tetra	  Pak	  v	  Commission	  [1990]	  ECR	  II-­‐309,	  at	  25.	  See	  also:	  
Guidelines	  on	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  81(3)	  of	  the	  Treaty	  (Text	  with	  EEA	  relevance),	  O.J.	  C	  101	  of	  27/04/2004,	  
at	  106.	  
1155	  In	  Tetra	  Pak,	  the	  General	  Court	  argued	  that,	  “if	  the	  Commission	  were	  required	  in	  every	  case	  to	  take	  a	  
decision	  withdrawing	  exemption	  before	  applying	  Article	  [102],	  this	  would	  be	  tantamount,	  in	  view	  of	  the	  non-­‐
retroactive	  nature	  of	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  exemption,	  to	  accepting	  that	  an	  exemption	  under	  Article	  [101(3)]	  
operates	  in	  reality	  as	  a	  concurrent	  exemption	  from	  the	  prohibition	  of	  abuse	  of	  a	  dominant	  position.	  (…)	  That	  
would	  not	  be	  consistent	  with	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  the	  infringement	  prohibited	  by	  Article	  [102].	  Moreover,	  in	  view	  
of	  the	  principles	  governing	  the	  hierarchical	  relationship	  of	  legal	  rules,	  grant	  of	  exemption	  under	  secondary	  
legislation	  could	  not,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  enabling	  provision	  in	  the	  Treaty,	  derogate	  from	  a	  provision	  of	  the	  
Treaty,	  in	  this	  case	  Article	  [102].”	  (at	  25)	  
1156	  The	  possibility	  to	  apply	  that	  Articles	  101	  and	  102	  TFEU	  may	  both	  be	  applicable	  can	  indeed	  not	  be	  ruled	  out.	  
See	  for	  example:	  Case	  66/86,	  Ahmed	  Saeed	  Flugreisen	  and	  Silver	  Line	  Reisebüro	  GmbH	  v	  Zentrale	  zur	  
Bekämpfung	  unlauteren	  Wettbewerbs	  e.V	  [1989]	  ECR	  803,	  at	  37.	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However,	   applying	   Article	   102	   TFEU	   to	   powerful	   grocery	   retailers	   so	   as	   to	   punish	   and	   deter	  
anticompetitive	   practices	   used	   in	   the	   procurement	   market,	   such	   as	   the	   imposition	   of	   restrictive	  
policy	  on	  their	  suppliers,	  may	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  difficult	  under	  the	  current	  criteria	  applied	  to	  assess	  the	  
existence	  of	  a	  dominant	  position.	  Those	  difficulties	   in	  enforcing	  the	  Treaty	  provision	  on	  dominance	  
against	  powerful	  retailers	   involved	  in	  an	  anticompetitive	  agreement	  with	  some	  suppliers	  are	  in	  fact	  
the	  same	  as	  those	  encountered	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  tackling	  truly	  unilateral	  conduct.	  
2. Article	  102	  TFEU	  
Many	   practices	   used	   by	   large	   retail	   chains	   in	   the	   grocery	   procurement	  market	   are	   not	   part	   of	   an	  
agreement	   with	   suppliers	   but	   constitute	   the	   expression	   of	   unilateral	   conduct	   adopted	   by	   those	  
chains.	   Big	   supermarkets	   can	   indeed	   use	   their	   buyer	   power	   to	   achieve	   their	   aims	   without	  
participation	  of	  producers.	   In	  such	  a	  case,	  the	  retailer’s	  policy	  does	  not	  fall	  under	  Article	  101	  TFEU,	  
since	  no	  agreement	  can	  be	  established,	  but	  could	  nevertheless	  be	  caught	  up	  by	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  The	  
prohibition	   on	   abusive	   conduct	   applies	   indeed	   both	   in	   the	   downstream	   seller	   market	   and	   in	   the	  
upstream	  buyer	  market,	  provided	  that	  such	  conduct	   is	  adopted	  by	  a	  firm	  in	  a	  dominant	  position	   in	  
the	  relevant	  market.	  
In	   the	  context	  of	  possible	  abusive	  buyer	  practices	  used	  by	   large	   retail	   chains	   in	   the	  grocery	  sector,	  
the	   first	   step	   in	   the	  enforcement	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  consists	   therefore	   in	  assessing	   the	  degree	  of	  
buyer	   power	   held	   by	   those	   firms	   in	   the	   relevant	   upstream	   procurement	   market.	   However,	   the	  
criteria	   used	   to	   do	   so	   appear	   unsuitable	   to	   effectively	   address	   restrictive	   practices	   in	   that	   sector.	  
Despite	   their	   significant	   power	   and	   their	   ability	   to	   behave	   independently	   of	   competitors	   and	  
suppliers	   in	   the	   upstream	  buyer	  market,	   grocery	   chains	   are	   indeed	   very	   unlikely	   to	   be	   considered	  
dominant.	  
In	  addition,	  although	  the	  grocery	  procurement	  market	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  an	  oligopsoly	  where	  a	  few	  
supermarket	   chains	   detain	   significant	   buyer	   power,	   the	   concept	   of	   collective	   dominance	   seems	  
hardly	  to	  be	  applicable	  to	  that	  market.	  	  
a) Single	  dominance	  
Grocery	   chains	   are	   able	   to	   impose	   their	   own	   policy	   without	   necessarily	   getting	   the	   agreement	   of	  
suppliers.	   Take	   for	   example	   practices	   used	   by	   supermarkets	   which	   consist	   in	   delisting	   branded	  
products	  or	  in	  using	  confidential	  information	  obtained	  from	  some	  producers	  so	  as	  to	  promote	  or	  to	  
launch	   new	  private	   label	   lines.	   Those	   practices	   escape	   the	   prohibition	   of	   Article	   101	   TFEU	   as	   they	  
constitute	  genuinely	  unilateral	  practices.	  They	  could	  though	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  
as	   the	   latter	   forbids	   abuses	   of	   dominance	   committed	   by	   a	   firm	   when	   acting	   as	   a	   seller	   in	   the	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downstream	  market	  but	  also	  when	  buying	  inputs	  in	  the	  upstream	  market.	  Abusive	  conduct	  may	  for	  
example	  consist	   in	   imposing	  unfair	  purchase	  price	  or	  making	  the	  conclusion	  of	  contracts	  subject	  to	  
acceptance	  by	  suppliers	  of	  supplementary	  obligations	  which	  have	  no	  connection	  with	  the	  subject	  of	  
such	  contracts.	  
However,	   as	   developed	   in	   Part	   I,	   among	   the	   different	   elements	   taken	   into	   consideration	   by	   the	  
Commission	   to	   measure	   the	   degree	   of	   market	   power,	   the	   market	   share	   held	   by	   the	   firm	   under	  
examination	   is	   not	   conclusive	   but	   plays	   nevertheless	   a	   key	   role.1157	   Below	   40%,	   the	   finding	   of	   a	  
dominant	  position	  is	  very	  unlikely,	  excluding	  therefore	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.1158	  Even	  if	  
competition	  enforcers	  were	  more	  willing	  to	  enforce	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  against	  alleged	  abuses	  of	  buyer	  
power	   in	   the	  grocery	  sector,	   such	   task	  could	   therefore	   turn	  out	   to	  be	  hard	  since,	   in	  most	  Member	  
States,	  even	  the	  largest	  supermarket	  chain	  does	  not	  account	  for	  such	  a	  market	  share.	  
The	  criteria	  defining	  the	  notion	  of	  dominance	  have	  in	  fact	  been	  determined	  in	  seller	  power	  cases	  but	  
it	  seems	  that	  buyer	  power	  presents	  different	  characteristics	  which	  would	  require	  the	  application	  of	  a	  
specific	  test.	  	  No	  consensus	  exists	  among	  scholars	  and	  officials	  about	  the	  key	  elements	  giving	  rise	  to	  
substantial	  market	  power	   in	   the	  hands	  of	   a	  buyer,	   especially	  with	   regard	   to	   the	  use	  of	   a	  different	  
market	  share	  threshold.1159	  It	  is	  yet	  argued	  that	  a	  buyer	  will	  get	  a	  position	  of	  economic	  strength	  vis-­‐à-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1157	  See	  :	  Part	  I,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  I,	  Point	  A,	  1.	  
1158	  According	  to	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  an	  undertaking	  with	  a	  market	  share	  of	  50%	  or	  more	  will	  
be	  presumed	  dominant	  while	  a	  market	  share	  below	  40%	  is	  unlikely	  to	  give	  a	  firm	  such	  a	  position.	  Between	  
those	  two	  thresholds,	  other	  additional	  factors	  will	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  
existence/nonexistence	  of	  dominance.	  See:	  Case	  85/76,	  Hoffman-­‐La	  Roche	  v	  Commission	  [1979]	  ECR	  461	  and	  
C-­‐62/86,	  Akzo	  Chemie	  BV	  v	  Commission	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐3359	  and	  22/79,	  United	  Brands	  v	  Commission	  [1978]	  ECR	  
207.	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  excluded	  that	  the	  Commission	  find	  a	  dominant	  position	  where	  the	  firm	  has	  a	  market	  
share	  below	  40%	  if	  other	  factors	  reinforce	  the	  economic	  strength	  of	  that	  firm	  and	  give	  it	  the	  ability	  to	  behave	  
independently	  on	  the	  markets.	  See,	  for	  example,	  the	  British	  Airways	  case	  examined	  above	  where	  BA	  was	  
qualified	  as	  dominant	  with	  a	  market	  share	  of	  39.7%.	  See	  also:	  Wanadoo	  Interactive,	  Case	  No	  COMP/38.233,	  
Commission	  Decision	  of	  16	  July	  2003.	  In	  that	  case,	  it	  was	  concluded	  that	  Wanadoo	  did	  hold	  a	  dominant	  
position,	  albeit	  it	  only	  had	  a	  market	  share	  of	  39%	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  market	  was	  very	  
fragmented.	  Among	  the	  additional	  factors	  taken	  into	  consideration	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  dominance,	  we	  can	  
mention	  economies	  of	  scale	  and	  scope	  enjoyed	  by	  the	  firm,	  privileged	  access	  to	  essential	  inputs	  or	  natural	  
resources,	  highly	  developed	  distribution	  and	  sales	  network	  or	  important	  technologies.	  See:	  Communication	  
from	  the	  Commission	  –	  Guidance	  on	  the	  Commission’s	  enforcement	  priorities	  in	  applying	  Article	  102	  of	  the	  EC	  
Treaty	  to	  abusive	  exclusionary	  conduct	  bye	  dominant	  undertakings	  (Text	  with	  EEA	  relevance),	  O.J.	  C	  45/7	  of	  
24/02/2009,	  at	  17.	  
1159	  Some	  suggestions	  have	  already	  been	  made	  on	  that	  matter,	  in	  particular	  by	  the	  UK	  Competition	  Commission	  
which	  considers	  in	  its	  reports	  on	  the	  supply	  groceries	  that	  a	  market	  share	  of	  8%	  enables	  retailers	  to	  exercise	  
buyer	  power	  while	  the	  OECD	  mentions	  a	  threshold	  of	  15%.	  See:	  UK	  Competition	  Commission,	  Supermarkets:	  A	  
Report	  on	  the	  Supply	  Groceries	  from	  Multiple	  Stores	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  (2000)	  and	  Buyer	  Power	  of	  
Multiproduct	  Retailers,	  OECD	  –	  Policy	  Roundtables,	  1998,	  DAFFE/CLP(99)21.	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vis	   its	   suppliers	  with	  a	   smaller	  market	   share	   than	   that	  generally	   associated	  with	   significant	  market	  
power	  on	  the	  selling	  side.1160	  
Article	  102	  TFEU	  applies	  only	  to	  firms	   in	  a	  dominant	  position	  as	   it	   is	  assumed	  that	  only	  those	  firms	  
are	  able	   to	   substantially	  affect	   competition	   through	   their	   conduct.	  However,	   it	   appears	   that	   in	   the	  
grocery	  sector,	  large	  retail	  chains	  hardly	  have	  a	  market	  share	  of	  40%	  in	  the	  procurement	  market	  but	  
are	   nevertheless	   in	   a	   position	   to	   harm	   competition	   by	   exploiting	   their	   buyer	   power.	   A	   certain	  
inadequacy	   of	   the	   current	   criteria	   of	   dominance	   therefore	   appears	   for	   effectively	   tackling	  
anticompetitive	  conduct	  in	  buyer	  power	  cases.	  	  	  
We	  have	  already	  noted	  that	  other	  factors	  are	  more	  relevant	  to	  assess	  the	  degree	  of	  buyer	  power	  and	  
to	  determine	  whether	  a	  firm	  is	  able	  to	  restrict	  or	  distort	  competition	  on	  a	  particular	  market.	  These	  
factors	   may	   be,	   for	   examples,	   the	   role	   of	   gatekeeper	   of	   the	   buyer	   in	   question	   or	   the	   state	   of	  
dependency	  of	  its	  suppliers.	  It	  is	  worth	  though	  noting	  on	  that	  matter	  that	  economic	  dependency	  may	  
arise	  when	  buyers	  have	  a	   relatively	   low	  market	   share	   in	   the	  procurement	  market,	  especially	  when	  
those	  buyers	  are	  in	  fact	  gatekeepers,	  such	  as	  retail	  chains	  in	  the	  grocery	  sector.	  	  
It	  is	  striking	  to	  see	  that	  the	  only	  cases	  where	  the	  Commission	  highlights	  the	  state	  of	  dependency	  of	  
trading	  partners,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  firm	  under	  assessment	  having	  a	  market	  share	  below	  40%,	  concerned	  
buyer	  power	  cases.	  In	  the	  British	  Airways	  case	  analyzed	  above1161,	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  European	  
Courts	  considered	  that	  British	  Airways	  was	  a	  dominant	  buyer	  in	  the	  market	  for	  the	  purchase	  of	  travel	  
agency	  services	  while	  that	  firm	  had	  a	  market	  share	  slightly	  below	  40%.	  In	  fact,	  in	  that	  case,	  besides	  
the	   market	   share	   held	   by	   British	   Airways,	   another	   factor	   was	   of	   particular	   importance	   in	   the	  
dominance	   assessment,	   namely	   the	   travel	   agents’	   economic	   dependence	   on	   British	   Airways.	  
Although	   the	   configuration	  of	   the	  markets	   of	   ailrines	   services	   differs	   to	   a	   great	   extent	   from	   those	  
where	   grocery	   chains	   are	   acting1162,	   the	   British	   Airways	   shows	   that	   other	   factors	   than	   the	   firm’s	  
market	   share	   might	   be	   given	   a	   prime	   position	   in	   the	   assessment	   of	   a	   firm’s	   market	   power.	   A	  
departure	   from	   the	  market	   share	   thresholds	   defined	   in	   seller	   power	   cases	  would	   be	   all	   the	  more	  
relevant	   in	   the	   grocery	   sector	  where	   different	   elements,	   such	   as	   the	   growing	   presence	   of	   private	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1160	  P.C.Carstensen,	  Buyer	  Power,	  Competition	  Policy,	  and	  Antitrust:	  the	  Competitive	  Effects	  of	  discrimination	  
among	  suppliers,	  53	  Antitrust	  Bulletin	  271,	  at	  296	  (2008)	  
1161	  See,	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  I,	  Point	  B,	  2,	  a),	  iii.	  
1161	  See,	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  I,	  Point	  B,	  2,	  a),	  iii.	  
1162	  In	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  British	  Airways	  case,	  we	  pointed	  out	  that	  airline	  companies	  and	  travel	  agents	  do	  not	  
act	  in	  successive	  markets	  (upstream	  buyer	  market	  and	  downstream	  seller	  market)	  but	  in	  interlocked	  markets.	  
Airline	  companies	  supply	  air	  transport	  services	  but	  also	  purchase	  air	  travel	  agency	  services	  from	  travel	  agents.	  
In	  return,	  travel	  agents	  are	  paid	  through	  commission	  based	  on	  the	  sales	  of	  tickets.	  As	  the	  result,	  the	  market	  
share	  of	  BA	  in	  the	  procurement	  market	  for	  travel	  agency	  services	  corresponded	  to	  its	  market	  share	  in	  the	  seller	  
market	  for	  air	  tickets.	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labels	  or	  the	  strong	  loyalty	  of	  consumers	  to	  their	  supermarket,	  reinforce	  producers’	  dependence	  on	  
large	   retail	   chains	   and	   give	   thereby	   the	   latter	   significant	   buyer	   power	   despite	   their	   relatively	   low	  
market	   share	   in	   the	   upstream	   procurement	  market.	   	   These	   other	   factors	  which	   contribute	   to	   the	  
emergence	  of	  market	  power,	  such	  as	  the	  trading	  partners’	  economic	  dependence,	  should	  therefore	  
be	  paid	  even	  greater	  attention	  in	  the	  grocery	  sector.	  The	  economic	  dependence	  of	  suppliers	  was	  for	  
example	   the	   main	   factor	   which	   led	   the	   Commission	   in	   three	   cases	   related	   to	   mergers	   between	  
supermarket	  chains,	  Kesko/Tuko,	  Rewe/Meinl	  and	  Carrefour/Promodes,	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  merging	  
parties	  in	  question	  had	  a	  dominant	  position	  in	  the	  relevant	  upstream	  buyer	  market,	  even	  though	  the	  
latter	   had	   a	   market	   share	   far	   below	   the	   thresholds	   generally	   used	   to	   assess	   a	   firm’s	   dominant	  
position.1163	  	  
In	  contrast,	  in	  seller	  power	  cases,	  the	  Commission	  concluded	  to	  a	  situation	  of	  dependency	  only	  as	  a	  
consequence	  of	  the	  very	  high	  market	  share	  of	  the	  firm	  in	  question.1164	  It	   is	  nevertheless	  recognized	  
that	  the	  economic	  dependence	  of	  trading	  partners	  is	  characteristic	  of	  a	  situation	  of	  dominance.	  The	  
argument,	   according	   to	   which	   a	   buyer	   with	   a	  market	   share	   below	   40%	  may	   be	   considered	   to	   be	  
dominant	  in	  a	  certain	  market,	  can	  be	  put	  in	  the	  following	  syllogistic	  form:	  the	  state	  of	  dependence	  of	  
trading	  partners	  is	  characteristic	  of	  a	  dominant	  position;	  buyers	  with	  a	  market	  share	  below	  40%	  may	  
be	  unavoidable	  partners	  for	  suppliers	  who	  are	  dependent	  on	  them;	  therefore,	  buyers	  with	  a	  market	  
share	  below	  40%	  may	  be	  in	  a	  dominant	  position.	  	  
Even	   though	   the	   economic	   dependence	   of	   suppliers	   is	   not	   the	   only	   element	   to	   be	   taken	   into	  
consideration,	  it	  is	  nevertheless	  a	  factor	  of	  particular	  importance	  when	  assessing	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  firm	  
to	  behave	   independently.	   It	  would	   therefore	  be	  advisable	   to	  redefine	  the	  conditions	  of	  dominance	  
on	  the	  buying	  side	  in	  order	  to	  put	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  elements	  which	  characterized	  market	  power	  
in	  the	  grocery	  procurement	  market.	  On	  basis	  of	  the	  definition	  given	  to	  that	  concept	  in	  previous	  seller	  
power	   cases,	   this	   would	   consist	   in	   determining	   the	   situations	   where	   a	   buyer	   has	   a	   position	   of	  
economic	  strength	  which	  gives	  it	  the	  power	  to	  behave	  independently	  of	  its	  competitors	  and	  suppliers	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1163	  See:	  Kesko/Tuko,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.784,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  20	  November	  1996;	  Rewe/Meinl,	  Case	  No	  
IV/M.1221,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  3	  February	  1999	  and	  Carrefour/Promodes,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.1684,	  
Commission	  Decision	  of	  25	  January	  2000.	  On	  those	  decisions,	  see	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  II,	  Point	  B,	  2.	  
1164	  See:	  Magill	  TV	  Guide/ITP,	  BBC	  and	  RTE,	  Case	  No	  IV/31.851,	  Commission	  decision	  of	  21	  December	  1988;	  
Soda	  ash-­‐Solvay,	  Case	  No	  COMP/33.133-­‐C,	  Commission	  decision	  of	  13	  December	  2000;	  Soda	  ash-­‐ICI,	  Case	  No	  
COMP/33.133-­‐D,	  Commission	  decision	  of	  13	  December	  2000	  and	  Michelin,	  Case	  No	  COMP/E-­‐2/36.041/PO,	  
Commission	  decision	  of	  20	  June	  2001.	  In	  one	  seller	  power	  case,	  the	  Commission	  considered	  that	  the	  
dependence	  of	  customers	  on	  their	  supplier	  was	  sufficient	  to	  conclude	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  dominant	  position,	  
even	  though	  the	  latter	  had	  a	  market	  share	  of	  only	  26%.	  See:	  ABG/Oil	  companies,	  Case	  No	  IV28.841,	  
Commission	  decision	  of	  19	  April	  1977.	  However,	  that	  case	  was	  justified	  by	  exceptional	  circumstances	  as	  it	  arose	  
during	  the	  oil	  crisis	  in	  the	  seventies.	  See:	  P.Këllezi,	  Abuse	  below	  the	  threshold	  of	  dominance?,	  in	  Abuse	  of	  
dominant	  position:	  new	  interpretation,	  new	  enforcement	  mechanisms?	  (2008),	  at	  77.	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on	  the	  procurement	  market	  and	  which	  enables	  it	  to	  have	  an	  appreciable	  influence	  on	  the	  conditions	  
under	  which	  competition	  will	  develop	  on	  that	  market.1165	  
The	  application	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  in	  the	  grocery	  procurement	  market	  to	  a	  single	  retail	  chain	  seems	  
to	  be	  only	  theoretical	  due	  to	  the	  difficulties	  related	  to	  the	  current	  criteria	  used	  to	  assess	  dominance.	  
It	  remains	  yet	  to	  examine	  whether	  that	  provision	  could	  be	  applied	  through	  the	  concept	  of	  collective	  
dominance.	  	  
b) Collective	  dominance	  
Express	  agreements	  or	  concerted	  practices	  between	  competitors	  which	  have	  as	  their	  object	  of	  effect	  
to	   restrict	   competition	   are	   prohibited	   under	   Article	   101(1)	   TFEU.1166	   However,	   in	   oligopolistic	  
markets,	  rivals	  may	  be	  able	  to	  coordinate	  their	  conduct	  without	  entering	   into	  agreements	  or	  other	  
arrangements	   amounting	   to	   concerted	   practices.	   Such	   a	   situation	   is	   referred	   to	   as	   “collective	  
dominance”	   or	   “tacit	   collusion”	   and	   may,	   in	   some	   circumstances,	   be	   caught	   under	   Article	   102	  
TFEU.1167	  	  
Oligopolistic	   interaction	   does,	   however,	   not	   necessarily	   equate	   to	   collective	   dominance.	   It	   must	  
therefore	  be	  examined	  whether,	  in	  the	  grocery	  sector,	  the	  oligopsolistic	  position	  of	  large	  retail	  chains	  
could	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  collective	  dominant	  position.	  	  
i. The	  concept	  and	  conditions	  of	  collective	  dominance	  
Article	  102	  TFEU	  applies	  to	  dominance	  held	  by	  a	  single	  firm	  but	  also	  to	  collective	  dominance	  that	  is	  
dominance	   enjoyed	   by	   legally	   and	   economically	   separate	   firms.	   The	   Treaty	   prohibits	   indeed	   “any	  
abuse	   by	   one	   or	   more	   undertakings	   of	   a	   dominant	   position	   within	   the	   common	   market”.1168	   The	  
decisional	  practice	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  and	  under	  the	  Merger	  Regulation	  has	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  
the	  concept	  of	  collective	  dominance.1169	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1165	  On	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  dominant	  position,	  see,	  in	  particular	  :	  22/79,	  United	  Brands	  v	  Commission,	  op.cit.,	  at	  
65	  and	  85/76,	  Hoffman-­‐La	  Roche	  v	  Commission,	  op.cit.,	  at	  39.	  
1166	  Concerted	  practices	  is	  defined	  as	  “a	  form	  of	  coordination	  between	  undertakings	  which,	  without	  having	  
reached	  the	  stage	  where	  an	  agreement	  properly	  so-­‐called	  has	  been	  concluded,	  knowingly	  substitutes	  practical	  
cooperation	  between	  them	  for	  the	  risks	  of	  competition”.	  See:	  Case	  48/69,	  ICI	  v	  Commission	  [1972]	  ECR	  619,	  at	  
64.	  In	  Case	  40/73,	  Suiker	  Unie	  v	  Commission	  [1975]	  ECR	  1663,	  the	  Commission	  elaborated	  upon	  this	  definition	  
and	  held	  that	  Article	  [101	  TFEU]	  prohibits	  “any	  direct	  or	  indirect	  contact	  between	  [competing	  firms],	  the	  object	  
of	  effect	  whereof	  is	  either	  to	  influence	  the	  conduct	  on	  the	  market	  of	  an	  actual	  or	  potential	  competitor	  or	  to	  
disclose	  to	  such	  a	  competitor	  the	  course	  of	  conduct	  which	  they	  themselves	  have	  decided	  to	  adopt	  or	  
contemplate	  adopting	  on	  the	  market”	  (at	  174).	  
1167	  R.O’Donoghue	  &	  A.J.Padilla,	  The	  Law	  and	  Economics	  of	  Article	  82	  EC	  (2006),	  at	  137.	  
1168	  Emphasis	  added.	  
1169Mergers	  that	  create	  or	  strengthen	  situations	  of	  collective	  dominance	  can	  indeed	  be	  blocked	  under	  merger	  
control	  laws.	  The	  approach	  followed	  to	  address	  collective	  dominance	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	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In	   Compagnie	   Maritime	   Belge,	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   defined	   collective	   dominance	   as	   a	   dominant	  
position	  held	  by	  	  
“Two	  or	  more	  economic	  entities	   legally	   independent	  of	  each	  other	  provided	  that	   from	  
an	   economic	   point	   of	   view	   they	   present	   themselves	   or	   act	   together	   on	   a	   particular	  
market	  as	  a	  collective	  entity”.1170	  
Even	   if	   there	  are	  no	   structural	  or	  other	   links	   in	   law	  between	   the	   firms	   concerned,	   the	   latter	  
could	  be	  held	  to	  be	  collectively	  dominant.	  The	  oligopolistic	  nature	  of	  the	  market	  may	  indeed	  
be	  such	  that	  competing	  firms	  become	  aware	  of	  common	  interests	  and	  decide,	  independently,	  
to	  align	  their	  conduct	  in	  the	  market,	  thereby	  appearing	  to	  that	  market	  as	  a	  collective	  entity.1171	  
The	   finding	   of	   a	   collective	   dominant	   position	   may	   therefore	   be	   based	   on	   other	   connecting	  
factors	  than	  structural	  or	  contractual	  links	  between	  firms	  and	  in	  fact	  depend,	  in	  particular,	  on	  
an	  assessment	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  market	  in	  question.1172	  
According	  to	  the	  case	   law	  of	  the	  European	  courts,	  three	  cumulative	  conditions	  are	  necessary	  
for	  a	  finding	  of	  collective	  dominance:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
one	  followed	  under	  the	  Merger	  Regulation.	  With	  regard	  to	  cases	  dealt	  with	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  see	  for	  
examples:	  Joined	  cases	  T-­‐68,	  77	  and	  78/89,	  Societa	  Italiana	  Vietro	  (“Flat	  Glass”)	  [1992]	  ECR	  II-­‐1403;	  C-­‐393/92,	  
Almelo	  v	  NV	  Energiebedrijkf	  Ijsselmij	  [1994]	  ECR	  I-­‐1477;	  Joined	  cases	  C-­‐395	  and	  396/96	  P,	  Compagnie	  Maritime	  
Belge	  Transports	  SA	  and	  others	  v	  Commission	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐1365;	  With	  regard	  to	  cases	  dealt	  with	  under	  the	  
Merger	  Regulation,	  see	  for	  examples:	  C-­‐68/94	  and	  30/95,	  France	  v	  Commission	  (Kali	  und	  Salz)	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐
1375;	  T-­‐102/96,	  Gencor	  v	  Commission	  [1999]	  ECR	  II-­‐753;	  T-­‐342/99,	  Airtours	  v	  Commission	  [2002]	  ECR	  II-­‐2585,	  
annulling	  the	  Commission’s	  prohibition	  decision	  in	  Airtours/First	  Choice,	  Case	  IV/M.1524,	  Commission	  Decision	  
of	  22	  September	  1999.	  
1170	  Joined	  cases	  C-­‐395	  and	  396/96	  P,	  Compagnie	  Maritime	  Belge	  Transports	  SA	  and	  others	  v	  Commission	  
[2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐1365,	  at	  36.	  This	  case	  was	  an	  appeal	  from	  the	  General	  Court’s	  judgment	  upholding	  the	  
Commission’s	  decision.	  See:	  Joined	  Cases	  T-­‐24/93	  to	  T-­‐26/93	  and	  T-­‐28/93	  Compagnie	  Maritime	  Belge	  
Transports	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  [1996]	  ECR	  II-­‐1201	  and	  Cewal,	  Case	  IV/32.448	  and	  IV/32.450,	  Commission	  
Decision	  of	  23	  December	  1992.	  	  
1171	  R.Wish,	  Competition	  Law,	  6th	  ed.	  (2009),	  at	  564.	  See	  also:	  T-­‐102/96,	  Gencor	  v	  Commission	  [1999]	  ECR	  II-­‐
753.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  General	  Court	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  cases	  exhibiting	  tacit	  coordination	  but	  not	  involving	  
structural	  links	  between	  the	  firms	  concerned	  were	  covered	  by	  the	  definition	  of	  collective	  dominance.	  “There	  is	  
no	  reason	  whatsoever	  in	  legal	  or	  economic	  terms	  to	  exclude	  from	  the	  notion	  of	  economic	  links	  the	  relationship	  
of	  interdependence	  existing	  between	  the	  parties	  to	  a	  tight	  oligopoly	  within	  which,	  in	  a	  market	  with	  the	  
appropriate	  characteristics,	  in	  particular	  in	  terms	  of	  market	  concentrations,	  transparency	  and	  product	  
homogeneity,	  those	  parties	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  anticipate	  one	  another’s	  behavior	  and	  are	  therefore	  strongly	  
encouraged	  to	  align	  their	  conduct	  in	  the	  market	  (…).	  In	  such	  a	  context,	  each	  trader	  is	  aware	  that	  highly	  
competitive	  action	  on	  its	  part	  designed	  to	  increase	  its	  market	  share	  (for	  example	  a	  price	  cut)	  would	  provoke	  
identical	  action	  by	  the	  others,	  so	  that	  it	  would	  derive	  no	  benefit	  from	  its	  initiative.	  All	  the	  traders	  would	  thus	  be	  
affected	  by	  the	  reduction	  in	  price	  levels	  (…).	  Each	  undertaking	  may	  become	  aware	  of	  common	  interests	  and,	  in	  
particular,	  cause	  prices	  to	  increase	  without	  having	  an	  agreement	  or	  resort	  concerted	  practice”	  (276-­‐277).	  
1172	  Joined	  cases	  C-­‐395	  and	  396/96	  P,	  Compagnie	  Maritime	  Belge	  Transports	  SA	  and	  others	  v	  Commission	  
[2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐1365,	  at	  45.	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-­‐	   Each	   member	   of	   the	   dominant	   oligopoly	   must	   have	   the	   ability	   to	   know	   how	   the	   other	  
members	   are	   behaving	   in	   order	   to	  monitor	  whether	   or	   not	   they	   are	   adopting	   the	   common	  
policy	  (transparency);	  
-­‐	  The	  situation	  of	  tacit	  coordination	  must	  be	  sustainable	  over	  time,	  meaning	  that	  there	  must	  
be	  an	  incentive	  not	  to	  depart	  from	  the	  common	  policy	  on	  the	  market	  (possibility	  of	  retaliation)	  
and;	  
-­‐	  The	   foreseeable	   reaction	  of	   current	  and	   future	  competitors,	  as	  well	  as	  of	   consumers,	  must	  
not	   jeopardise	   the	   results	   expected	   from	   the	   common	   policy	   (absence	   of	   competitive	  
constraints).1173	  
Where	  those	  market	  characteristics	  are	  present,	  it	  may	  be	  assumed	  that	  the	  members	  of	  the	  
oligopoly	   are	   able	   and	   incited	   to	   reach	   terms	   of	   coordination	   and	   to	   detect	   and	   punish	   any	  
deviation	  from	  those	  terms.1174	  As	  a	  result,	  they	  may	  be	  regarded	  as	  collectively	  dominant	   in	  
the	  relevant	  market	  and	  be	  subject	  to	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  if	  they	  engage	  into	  abusive	  conduct.	  	  
ii. Collective	  dominance	  in	  the	  grocery	  procurement	  market?	  
Determining	  whether	   large	   retail	   chains	   could	   be	   regarded	   as	   holding	   a	   collective	   dominant	  
position	  in	  the	  upstream	  grocery	  procurement	  market	  could	  be	  the	  subject	  of	  another	  entire	  
thesis	   as	   the	   concept	   of	   collective	   dominance	   is	   already	   in	   itself	   a	   very	   complex	   and	  
controversial	   issue	   in	   competition	   law.1175	   Our	   objective	   is	   therefore	   only	   to	   render	   some	  
possible	   positions	   in	   this	   respect	   and	   to	   show	   that,	   in	   any	   case,	   an	   abuse	   of	   collective	  
dominance	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market	  by	  grocery	  retailers	  is	  very	  unlikely	  to	  be	  found.	  	  
The	   Commission	   analysed	   the	   possible	   existence	   of	   a	   collective	   dominant	   position	   between	  
large	   retail	   chains	   in	   the	   upstream	   buyer	   market	   when	   assessing	   the	   merger	   case	  
Carrefour/Promodes.	  Where	  one	   could	   have	   raised	  doubts	   about	   the	  possibility	   to	   include	   a	  
collective	  buying	  dominant	  position	  into	  the	  concept	  of	  collective	  dominance,	  this	  case	  has	  the	  
virtue	   of	   confirming	   the	   ability	   of	   competition	   authorities	   to	   control	   the	   creation	   or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1173	  See:	  T-­‐342/99,	  Airtours	  v	  Commission,	  op.cit.	  and	  T-­‐193/02,	  Laurent	  Piau	  v	  Commission	  [2005]	  ECR	  II-­‐209,	  at	  
111.	  Note	  that	  those	  conditions	  were	  reaffirmed	  in	  the	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  assessment	  of	  horizontal	  mergers	  
under	  the	  Council	  Regulation	  on	  the	  control	  of	  concentrations	  between	  undertakings,	  OJ	  C	  31	  of	  05.02.2004,	  at	  
39-­‐57.	  
1174	  R.O’Donoghue	  &	  A.J.Padilla,	  op.cit.,	  at	  150.	  
1175	  An	  enormous	  body	  of	  literature	  has	  indeed	  developed	  on	  that	  matter.	  See	  for	  examples:	  R.Wish	  and	  
B.Sufrin,	  Oligopolistic	  Markets	  and	  EC	  Competition	  Law,	  12	  Oxford	  Yearbook	  of	  European	  Law	  59	  (1992);	  
B.J.Rodger,	  Oligopolistic	  Market	  Failure:	  Collective	  Dominance	  versus	  Complex	  Monopoly,	  16	  European	  
Competition	  law	  Review	  21	  (1995);	  T.Soames,	  An	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Principles	  of	  Concerted	  Practice	  and	  Collective	  
Dominance:	  a	  Distinction	  without	  a	  Difference,	  17	  European	  Competition	  law	  Review	  24	  (1996);	  G.Monti,	  The	  
Scope	  of	  Collective	  dominance	  under	  Article	  82,	  38	  Common	  Market	  law	  Review	  131	  (2001);	  N.Petit,	  The	  
“Oligopoly	  Problem”	  in	  EU	  Competition	  Law,	  in	  Research	  Handbook	  in	  European	  Competition	  Law,	  I.	  Liannos	  
and	  D.	  Geradin	  (eds.)	  (2013),	  available	  at	  SSRN:	  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1999829	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strengthening,	  through	  a	  merger,	  of	  such	  a	  position,	  either	  in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market	  or	  
in	   the	   upstream	  buyer	  market.	   As	   the	   basic	   principles	   for	   defining	   collective	   dominance	   are	  
essentially	   the	   same	   under	   Article	   102	   TFEU	   and	   under	   the	   Merger	   Regulation1176,	   this	  
therefore	   means	   that	   conduct	   of	   collectively	   dominant	   buyers	   may	   also	   be	   examined	   and	  
sanctioned	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  
In	  Carrefour/Promodes,	   the	  Commission	  pointed	  out	   that,	   following	   the	  merger,	   the	   level	   of	  
concentration	   would	   be	   particularly	   high	   in	   the	   French	   and	   Spanish	   grocery	   procurement	  
market	  since	  the	  three	   leading	  entities	  would	  represent	  respectively	   in	  those	  countries	  more	  
than	   60-­‐70%	  and	   55-­‐65%	  of	   the	   demand.1177	  However,	   the	  Commission	  maintained	   that	   the	  
necessary	  conditions	  for	  the	  finding	  of	  a	  collective	  dominant	  position	  mentioned	  above	  were	  
not	   met	   in	   that	   case	   because	   the	   structure	   and	   operation	   of	   the	   three	   leading	   purchasing	  
centers	   were	   different;	   there	  were	   not	   structural	   ties	   between	   the	   distributors;	   the	  market	  
positions	   held	   by	   the	   different	   actors	   had	   not	   been	   stable	   in	   the	   previous	   years;	   the	  
procurement	  market	  was	  not	  stagnating;	  the	  products	  concerned	  were	  not	  homogeneous	  and;	  
the	   procurement	   market	   was	   not	   transparent,	   in	   particular	   with	   regard	   to	   commercial	  
payments	  and	  conditions.1178	  	  
In	   contrast,	   the	   Basque	   competition	   court	   concluded	   in	   a	   report	   on	   distribution	   of	   daily	  
consumer	   goods	   that	   the	   Spanish	   grocery	   market	   is	   characterized	   by	   the	   existence	   of	   a	  
collective	   dominant	   position,	   both	   in	   the	   downstream	   retail	   market	   and	   in	   the	   upstream	  
procurement	  market.1179	  	  The	  report	  analyzes	  the	  different	  conditions	  that	  make	  an	  oligopoly	  -­‐	  
in	  this	  case	  an	  oligopsoly	  -­‐,	  equivalent	  to	  a	  collective	  dominant	  position.	  
Firstly,	  the	  report	  points	  out	  the	  high	  level	  of	  concentration	  in	  the	  procurement	  market	  which	  
is	   further	   increased	   by	   the	   presence	   of	   purchasing	   centres.	   Each	   of	   the	   three	   leading	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1176	  It	  is	  indeed	  referred	  in	  dominance	  cases	  to	  the	  conditions	  established	  in	  merger	  cases.	  See	  for	  example:	  T-­‐
193/02,	  Laurent	  Piau	  v	  Commission,	  op.cit.	  In	  that	  case	  the	  General	  Court	  cited	  the	  Airtours	  conditions	  with	  full	  
approval.	  	  
1177	  Carrefour/Promodes,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.1684,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  25	  January	  2000,	  at	  98	  and	  131-­‐132.	  
1178	  Ibid.,	  at	  99.	  The	  Commission	  did	  however	  not	  rule	  out	  that,	  in	  the	  future,	  a	  situation	  of	  collective	  
dominance	  could	  arise	  since,	  the	  market	  becoming	  more	  concentrated,	  transparency	  in	  negotiation	  conditions	  
between	  suppliers	  and	  large	  retailers	  is	  likely	  to	  increase.	  (at	  104)	  
1179	  Basque	  Competition	  Court,	  Distribution	  of	  daily	  consumer	  goods:	  competition,	  oligopoly	  and	  tacit	  collusion,	  
April	  2009,	  available	  at:	  http://www.ogasun.ejgv.euskadi.net/r51-­‐
14000/es/contenidos/informacion/imformes_mercados/es_infomerc/adjuntos/090519%20ESTUDIO%20DISTRI
BUCION%20COMERCIAL%20ENGLISH%20VERSION.pdf	  On	  the	  downstream	  retail	  side,	  the	  report	  points	  out	  
that	  all	  of	  the	  necessary	  conditions	  to	  facilitate	  collusive	  oligopoly	  are	  fulfilled:	  market	  concentration	  of	  large	  
grocery	  retail	  outlets,	  product	  identity	  and	  homogeneity	  of	  services	  offered;	  price	  transparency	  and	  
commercial	  discounts;	  ease	  to	  adapt	  prices	  to	  those	  of	  the	  competition;	  enormous	  barriers	  to	  entry;	  and	  
inelasticity	  of	  aggregate	  demand.	  According	  to	  the	  Basque	  competition	  court,	  this	  results	  in	  price	  parallelism	  in	  
supracompetitive	  levels.	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companies	   (almost)	   account	   for	   20%	   of	   the	   suppliers’	   sales.1180	   Secondly,	   the	   procurement	  
market	   is	   considered	   to	  be	  particularly	   transparent.	  All	   grocery	   chains	   stock	   indeed	   identical	  
daily	   consumer	   goods	   (absolute	   homogeneity)	   and	   significant	   homogeneity	   exists	   also	   with	  
regard	  to	  private	  label	  products.1181	  Unlike	  the	  European	  Commission,	  the	  Basque	  competition	  
court	   considers	   that	   the	   existence	   of	   commercial	   payments	   attests	   of	   the	   oligopolistic	  
structure	   in	   the	   retail	   and	   procurement	   markets	   as	   it	   shows	   that	   competition	   in	   the	  
negotiation	  of	  prices	  has	  been	  significantly	  reduced.	  Large	  retail	  chains	  are	  in	  fact	  aware	  of	  the	  
advantages	  associated	  with	   less	  price	  competition	  and	  have	  therefore	  transferred	  the	  center	  
of	  negotiations	  to	  commercial	  conditions.	  In	  addition,	  it	  is	  affirmed	  in	  the	  report	  that	  reduced	  
price	  competition	  with	  suppliers	  and	  exclusion	  of	  brands	  producers	  to	  benefit	  private	  labels	  is	  
feasible	   even	   if	   there	   is	   no	   absolute	   transparency	   in	   commercial	   payments.1182	  Thirdly,	  with	  
regard	   to	   the	  possibility	  of	   retaliation,	   the	  Basque	  competition	   court	  highlights	   the	  ability	  of	  
grocery	   retailers	   to	  engage	   into	   intense	  price	   competition	   through	  a	   series	  of	  price	   lowering	  
negotiations	  with	  suppliers	  which	  would	  be	  reflected	  in	  lower	  prices	  in	  the	  downstream	  retail	  
market.1183	  Retaliation	  would	   therefore	  have	   consequences	  both	   in	   the	  procurement	  market	  
and	   in	  the	  retail	  market	  where	   large	  retail	  chains	  are	  also	  considered	  to	  hold	  an	  oligopolistic	  
position.	   Fourthly,	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   Spanish	   procurement	   market	   shows	   that	   competing	  
retailers,	  suppliers	  or	  consumers	  are	  unable	  to	  counteract	  the	  collusive	  conduct	  of	  large	  retail	  
chains.1184	  
As	   a	   result,	   it	   is	   concluded	   to	   the	   existence	  of	   a	   collective	  dominant	   position	   in	   the	   Spanish	  
procurement	  market.	  Recognizing	  that	  such	  a	  position	  does	  not	  constitute	  an	  infringement	  of	  
the	  competition	  rules,	  the	  Basque	  competition	  court	  pursues	  its	  analysis	  by	  showing	  that	  tacit	  
collusion	   between	   large	   retail	   chains	   restricts	   competition	   and	   damage	   the	   welfare	   of	  
consumers	   through,	   in	   particular,	   a	   reduction	   of	   competition	   in	   purchase	   prices	   and	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1180	  Ibid.,	  at	  146.	  This	  is	  above	  the	  “threat	  point”	  established	  by	  the	  Commission	  in	  different	  merger	  decisions.	  It	  
is	  considered	  that	  when	  a	  retailer’s	  share	  in	  a	  supplier’s	  turnover	  exceeds	  22%,	  it	  is	  economically	  impossible	  for	  
the	  latter	  to	  replace	  that	  part	  of	  its	  business	  by	  switching	  to	  alternative	  customers.	  See:	  Rewe/Meinl,	  Case	  No	  
IV/M.1221,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  3	  February	  1999	  and	  Carrefour/Promodes,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.1684,	  
Commission	  Decision	  of	  25	  January	  2000.	  See	  also:	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  I,	  Section	  II,	  Point	  B,	  2.	  
1181	  Ibid.,	  at	  149.	  
1182	  Ibid.,	  at	  149-­‐150.	  
1183	  Ibid.,	  at	  150.	  “A	  sales	  price	  war	  may	  influence	  purchase	  prices,	  also	  affecting	  the	  supplier’s	  income.	  If	  a	  
price	  reduction	  is	  negotiated	  with	  the	  company	  and	  this	  reduction	  is	  passed	  on	  to	  its	  retail	  prices,	  an	  automatic	  
alarm	  will	  go	  off	  in	  its	  competitors,	  who	  will	  proceed	  to	  equal	  their	  prices.	  If	  the	  sales	  price	  set	  by	  the	  ‘free	  
rider’	  is	  lower	  than	  the	  purchase	  price	  of	  competitors	  with	  buyer	  power	  in	  the	  supply	  market,	  these	  will	  
automatically	  force	  the	  supplier	  to	  offer	  them	  the	  same	  favourable	  prices	  as	  those	  offered	  to	  the	  ‘free	  rider’.”	  
1184	  Ibid.,	  at	  152.	  Smaller	  retailers	  are	  unable	  to	  engage	  into	  price	  wars	  facing	  large	  competitors.	  Suppliers	  do	  
not	  have	  sufficient	  market	  power	  to	  reject	  commercial	  conditions	  demanded	  by	  large	  retail	  chains.	  Consumers,	  
given	  their	  loyalty	  to	  a	  store,	  prefer	  to	  more	  expensive	  products	  with,	  for	  example,	  the	  retailer’s	  own-­‐brands,	  
instead	  of	  switching	  stores.	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exclusion	  of	  brands	  producers.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	   increase	  of	  commercial	  payments	   leads	  
to	  a	  reduction	  in	  price	  competition	  in	  the	  procurement	  market	  and	  thereby	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  
retail	  prices	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  consumers.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  commercial	  payments	  increase	  
economic	   barriers	   to	   entry,	   excluding	   weaker	   suppliers	   and	   reducing	   competition	   in	   the	  
product	  market.	  In	  addition,	  remaining	  suppliers	  are	  put	  at	  a	  competitive	  disadvantage	  as	  the	  
need	   to	   finance	   these	   commercial	   payments	   with	   higher	   transfer	   prices	   makes	   them	   less	  
competitive	  against	  private	  labels.1185	  	  
Although	   the	   assessment	   of	   a	   possible	   collective	   dominant	   position	   in	   the	   grocery	  
procurement	  market	  is	  worth	  being	  carried	  out	  given	  the	  oligopsolistic	  nature	  of	  that	  market,	  
the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  Basque	  competition	  court	  on	  that	  matter	  cannot	  but	  raise	  questions	  as	  
to	   its	  accuracy	  and	  to	  the	  probability	  to	  effectively	  subject	  such	  alleged	  collective	  dominance	  
to	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  One	  may	  indeed	  consider	  that	  concluding	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  dominant	  
collective	   position	   between	   retail	   chains	   constitutes	   too	   a	   hasty	   conclusion	   and	   that	   the	  
enforcement	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  through	  that	  concept	  is	  unrealistic.	  	  	  
Proving	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  collective	  dominant	  position	  based	  only	  on	  market	  interactions	  may	  
turn	   out	   to	   be	   a	   difficult	   task.	   It	   is	   indeed	   much	   easier	   to	   prove	   tacit	   collusion	   where	  
agreements	   lead	   the	   firms	   to	   behave	   as	   a	   collective	   entity.	   To	   date,	   collective	   dominance	  
under	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  has	   in	  fact	  only	  been	  successfully	  established	  in	  cases	  where	  conduct	  
alignment	   resulted	   from	   agreements	   between	   competitors.	   The	   Treaty	   provision	   on	  
dominance	  has	  thus	  not	  yet	  been	  enforced	  against	  mere	  tacit	  collusion.1186	  In	  addition,	  whilst	  
ex	   ante	   and	   ex	   post	   approaches	   to	   collective	   dominance	   are	   based	   on	   similar	   substantive	  
grounds,	  the	  standard	  of	  proof	  in	  merger	  control	  is	  different	  from	  that	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  
In	  the	  first	  case,	  the	  Commission	  is	  required	  to	  produce	  convincing	  evidence	  that	  the	  merger	  
would	   change	   the	  market	   structure	   in	   such	   a	  way	   that	   tacit	   collusion	   is	   likely	   to	   occur.	   This	  
involves	  a	  forward-­‐looking	  assessment	  so	  that	  the	  object	  of	  proof	  is	  the	  likelihood	  of	  collusion.	  
In	   the	   second	   case,	   the	   standard	   of	   proof	   should	   be	   higher	   and	   involve	   evidence	   of	   actual	  
coordination	  of	  conduct.1187	  	  
Such	   a	   high	   standard	   of	   proof	   is	   arguably	   unlikely	   to	   be	   met	   in	   the	   grocery	   procurement	  
market.	   Where	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   negotiations	   has,	   to	   some	   extent,	   shifted	   from	   prices	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1185	  Ibid.,	  at	  153-­‐154.	  
1186	  R.O’Donoghue	  &	  A.J.Padilla,	  op.cit.,	  at	  151.	  See	  also:	  );	  N.Petit,	  The	  “Oligopoly	  Problem”	  in	  EU	  Competition	  
Law,	  in	  Research	  Handbook	  in	  European	  Competition	  Law,	  I.	  Liannos	  and	  D.	  Geradin	  (eds.)	  (2013),	  at	  48,	  
available	  at	  SSRN:	  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1999829	  	  
1187	  M.Filippelli,	  Collective	  dominance	  and	  collusion:	  Parallelism	  in	  EU	  and	  US	  competition	  law	  (2013),	  at	  113.	  
See	  also:	  R.O’Donoghue	  &	  A.J.Padilla,	  op.cit.,	  at	  152.	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commercial	   payments	   and	   services,	   it	   cannot	   be	   concluded	   that	   retail	   chains	   have	   stopped	  
exerting	  their	  market	  power	  to	  get	  lower	  prices.	  Obtaining	  the	  lowest	  possible	  prices	  remains	  
indeed	  of	  particular	  importance,	  in	  particular	  for	  some	  products	  which,	  if	  priced	  low,	  can	  draw	  
consumers	  into	  the	  retailer’s	  stores	  where	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  buy	  other	  products.	  For	  example,	  
popular	  brands,	  that	  have	  earned	  consumers’	   loyalty,	  can	  be	  used	  by	  the	  later	  to	  benchmark	  
the	  price	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  different	  supermarket	  chains.	  Price	  competition	  with	  regard	  
to	  those	  products	  may	  thus	  be	  relatively	  fierce	  and	  lead	  retailers	  to	  drive	  a	  hard	  bargain	  in	  the	  
procurement	   market	   to	   lower	   purchase	   prices.1188	   The	   core	   of	   the	   negotiation	   is	   therefore	  
likely	  to	  vary	  from	  one	  supplier	  to	  another	  and/or	  from	  one	  product	  to	  another.	  Furthermore,	  
the	  grocery	  procurement	  market	  is	  far	  from	  totally	  transparent.	  Although	  some	  practices	  used	  
by	   large	   retail	   chains	   increase	   transparency	   in	   that	  market,	   such	  as	  most-­‐favoured-­‐customer	  
clauses,	  transactions	  between	  retailers	  and	  producers	  remain	  confidentially	  negotiated	  so	  that	  
one	   can	   assume	   that	  many	   aspects	   of	   the	   retailer-­‐supplier	   negotiations	   remain	   unknown	   to	  
competitors.	  As	  result,	  and	  given	  the	  very	  large	  number	  of	  grocery	  products	  belonging	  to	  the	  
assortment	  bought	  	  by	  supermarket	  chains	  and	  offered	  to	  consumer,	  coordination	  as	  regards	  
the	  purchase	  conditions	  of	  each	  of	  those	  products	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  reached	  or,	  at	  least,	  to	  be	  
proved.	  	  
In	  any	  case,	  given	  the	  difficulties	  and/or	  the	  reluctance	  already	  encountered	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  
application	   of	   Article	   102	   TFEU	   to	   purely	   tacit	   collusion	   between	  market	   players	   emanating	  
from	   an	   oligopolistic	   market	   structure	   (on	   the	   sell-­‐side),	   the	   enforcement	   of	   that	   provision	  
against	   possible	   abusive	   conduct	   resulting	   from	   a	   tacitly	   agreed	   course	   of	   action	   in	   a	  
oligopsolistic	  market	  (on	  the	  buy-­‐side)	  is	  very	  likely	  to	  remain	  a	  purely	  theoretical	  scenario,	  at	  
least	   for	   the	   time	   being.	   One	   can	   therefore	   conclude	   that	   it	   is	   not	   under	   the	   concept	   of	  
collective	  dominance	  that	  competition	  authorities	  will	  be	  able	  to	  effectively	  tackle	  the	  actual	  
or	  potential	  anticompetitive	  use	  of	  buyer	  power	  in	  the	  grocery	  sector.	  	  
3. Merger	  Regulation	  
While	  buyer	  power	  in	  the	  grocery	  sector	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  tackled	  under	  Articles	  101	  or	  102	  TFEU,	  it	  
may	  raise	  competition	  concerns	  and	  be	  addressed	  under	  the	  Merger	  policy.	  As	  developed	  above,	  in	  a	  
few	  merger	  cases,	  the	  Commission	  indeed	  blocked	  a	  merger	  operation	  between	  large	  retail	  chains	  or	  
subjected	   it	   to	   undertakings	   due,	   in	   particular,	   to	   the	   significant	   buyer	   power	   which	   the	  merging	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1188	  Especially	  in	  countries	  where	  below-­‐cost	  pricing	  is	  prohibited	  since	  the	  purchase	  price	  will	  constitute	  the	  
minimum	  retail	  price	  in	  those	  countries.	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parties	   would	   have	   acquired	   following	   the	   transaction.1189	   In	   Kesko/Tuko,	   Rewe/Meinl	   and	  
Carrefour/Promodes,	   different	   arguments	   were	   put	   forward	   to	   establish	   that	   the	   merger	   would	  
create	  or	   strengthen	   the	  parties’	   dominant	   position	   in	   the	  upstream	  procurement	  market,	   namely	  
the	   gatekeeper	   position	   of	   those	   retail	   chains,	   the	   particular	   role	   of	   private	   labels,	   the	   economic	  
dependency	  of	  suppliers	  and	  the	  large	  number	  of	  alternative	  producers.	  	  
One	  can	  point	  out	  that	  the	  ex	  ante	  competition	  assessment	  carried	  out	  in	  merger	  cases	  differs	  from	  
the	   ex	   post	   control	   carried	   out	   under	   the	   Treaty	   provision	   on	   abuse	   of	   dominance.	   As	   the	   name	  
suggests,	  the	  former	  precedes	  any	  possible	  anticompetitive	  conduct	  committed	  by	  the	  merged	  entity	  
and	   does	   therefore	   not	   require	   the	   proof	   of	   an	   abuse.	   In	   addition,	   where	   mergers	   creating	   or	  
strengthening	   a	   dominant	   position	   will	   be	   declared	   incompatible	   with	   the	   common	   market,	   the	  
substantive	  test	  in	  merger	  control	  is	  not	  based	  exclusively	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  dominance.	  Accordingly,	  
a	   merger	   that	   does	   not	   create	   or	   strengthen	   a	   dominant	   position	   in	   the	   relevant	   market	   can	  
nevertheless	   be	   blocked	   by	   competition	   authorities.	   Under	   the	   approach	   endorsed	   in	   the	   2004	  
Merger	  Regulation,	  the	  Commission	  can	  indeed	  stand	  in	  the	  way	  of	  any	  concentration	  which	  is	  likely	  
to	   significantly	   impede	   effective	   competition	   in	   the	   common	   market	   (SIEC	   test).1190	   Although	   the	  
creation	  or	  strengthening	  of	  a	  dominant	  position	  is	  a	  primary	  form	  of	  such	  competitive	  harm	  and	  has	  
been	  the	  most	  common	  basis	  for	  blocking	  a	  merger,	  intervention	  may	  thus	  occur	  in	  a	  larger	  number	  
of	  cases.	  	  
Despite	   that	   latter	   difference,	   it	   remains	   that,	   such	   as	   in	   the	   assessment	   of	   dominance,	   the	  
compatibility	   of	   a	  merger	  with	   the	   common	  market	   is	   primarily	   examined	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  market	  
shares	  and	  concentration	  levels.1191	  On	  that	  matter,	  the	  same	  thresholds	  as	  those	  used	  under	  Article	  
102	  TFEU	  apply	   to	  establish	  the	   (non-­‐)existence	  of	  a	  dominant	  market	  position.	  Accordingly,	   in	   the	  
Guidelines	  of	  the	  assessment	  of	  horizontal	  mergers,	  it	  is	  considered	  that	  very	  large	  market	  shares	  (>	  
50%)	  may	  in	  themselves	  be	  evidence	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  dominance.	  Below	  40%,	  the	  Commission	  is	  
though	   very	   unlikely	   to	   find	   that	   the	   merger	   in	   question	   would	   lead	   to	   the	   creation	   or	   the	  
strengthening	  of	  a	  dominant	  position,	  unless	  the	  strength	  and	  number	  of	  competitors	   is	   low,	  there	  
are	   no	   sufficient	   capacity	   constraints	   and/or	   the	   products	   of	   the	   merging	   parties	   are	   close	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1189	  See	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  II,	  Point	  B.	  
1190	  See	  :	  Council	  Regulation	  (EC)	  No	  139/2004	  of	  20	  January	  2004	  on	  the	  control	  of	  concentrations	  between	  
undertakings	  (the	  EC	  Merger	  Regulation),	  OJ	  L	  24,	  29/01/2004,	  Article	  2.	  Under	  the	  old	  Merger	  Regulation,	  the	  
assessment	  of	  the	  Commission	  was	  based	  on	  the	  “dominance	  test”	  which	  allowed	  the	  Commission	  to	  challenge	  
only	  concentration	  that	  “creates	  or	  strengthens	  a	  dominant	  position	  as	  a	  result	  of	  which	  effective	  competition	  
would	  be	  significantly	  impeded	  in	  the	  common	  market	  or	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  it”.	  (Article	  3(2)	  of	  Council	  
Regulation	  (EEC)	  No	  4064/89	  of	  21	  December	  1989	  on	  the	  control	  of	  concentrations	  between	  undertakings,	  OJ	  
L	  395)	  
1191	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  assessment	  of	  horizontal	  merger,	  op.cit.,	  at	  14.	  
Final	  version	  -­‐	  Mai	  2014	   	  
378	  
	  
substitutes.1192	  With	  regard	  to	  concentrations	  that	  do	  not	  create	  or	  strengthen	  a	  dominant	  position,	  
the	   Commission	   relies	   upon	   another	   threshold	   and	   considers	   that,	   when	   the	  market	   share	   of	   the	  
merging	  firms	  does	  not	  exceed	  25%,	  the	  operation	  is	  not	  liable	  to	  impede	  effective	  competition	  and	  
may	  therefore	  be	  presumed	  to	  be	  compatible	  with	  the	  common	  market.1193	  	  
However,	   in	   the	   three	  merger	   cases	  mentioned	  above	  where	  buyer	  power	  constituted	  a	  particular	  
competition	   concern,	   the	   Commission	   strayed	   to	   some	   extent	   from	   those	   market	   share	  
thresholds.1194	   Instead	   of	   focusing	   on	   the	   merging	   parties	   market	   shares	   in	   the	   upstream	  
procurement	  market,	  the	  Commission	  rather	  highlighted	  the	  strong	  dependency	  of	  most	  suppliers	  to	  
conclude	   that	   the	  merger	  would	  create	  a	  dominant	  position	   in	   the	  upstream	  procurement	  market.	  
For	  example,	   in	  Rewe/Meinl,	   the	  Commission	  concluded	   that	   the	  merger	  would	  create	  a	  dominant	  
position	   in	  the	  procurement	  market	  where	  the	  merging	  parties	  had	  a	  combined	  market	  of	  only	  25-­‐
35%	   in	  most	  product	  markets.1195	   In	  Carrefour/Promodes,	   in	   its	   assessment	  of	   single	  dominance	   in	  
the	   procurement	   market,	   the	   Commission	   considered	   that	   the	   merger	   could	   significantly	   impede	  
effective	   competition	   due	   to	   a	   spiral	   where	   the	   parties’	   market	   power	   in	   the	   upstream	   and	  
downstream	  markets	  would	  mutually	  reinforce	  each	  other.1196	  The	  merged	  entity’s	  market	  share	   in	  
the	  relevant	  procurement	  market	  was	  though	  not	  exceeding	  25%.1197	  In	  fact,	  in	  those	  decisions,	  the	  
Commission	  put	  a	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  the	  suppliers’	  economic	  dependency	  on	  the	  merging	  parties	  
that	  was	  deemed	  to	  exist	  as	   the	   latter	   represented	  more	  than	  22%	  of	   the	  suppliers’	   turnover.	  This	  
was	  indeed	  the	  maximum	  share	  of	  revenues	  which	  a	  producer	  could	  afford	  to	  lose	  in	  those	  cases.1198	  	  
In	   view	   of	   these	   cases,	   it	   turns	   out	   that,	   in	   merger	   transactions	   involving	   large	   retail	   chains,	   the	  
assessment	   of	   buyer	   power	   is	   not	   primarily	   based	   on	   the	   traditional	   market	   share	   thresholds	   of	  
dominance	   but	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   economic	   dependence.	   On	   that	   basis,	   grocery	   retailers	  may	   be	  
regarded	  as	  dominant	  in	  the	  procurement	  market	  even	  though	  their	  market	  shares	  are	  below	  40%.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1192	  Ibid.,	  at	  17.	  
1193	  Ibid.,	  at	  18.	  
1194	  The	  three	  merger	  cases	  have	  been	  dealt	  with	  by	  the	  Commission	  before	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  2004	  Merger	  
Regulation	  which	  introduced	  the	  test	  of	  “significant	  impediment	  to	  effective	  competition”.	  Under	  the	  old	  
Regulation	  on	  merger	  control	  (Regulation	  4064/89),	  the	  test	  to	  appraise	  concentrations	  was	  focused	  on	  the	  
concept	  of	  dominance.	  The	  Commission	  could	  therefore	  only	  block	  mergers	  that	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  or	  
strengthening	  of	  a	  dominant	  position.	  	  
1195	  Rewe/Meinl,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1221,	  op.cit.,	  at	  98-­‐117.	  
1196	  That	  spiral	  effect	  was	  also	  highlighted	  in	  the	  Rewe/Meinl	  case.	  The	  Commission	  pointed	  out	  that,	  because	  
of	  its	  buyer	  power	  in	  the	  procurement	  market,	  the	  merged	  entity	  will	  be	  able	  to	  obtain	  much	  better	  purchase	  
conditions	  than	  competitors.	  This	  will	  enable	  it	  to	  strengthen	  its	  position	  in	  the	  downstream	  retail	  market	  
through	  lower-­‐prices	  or	  other	  strategies.	  This	  in	  turn	  will	  further	  reinforce	  its	  position	  in	  the	  upstream	  
procurement	  market,	  and	  so	  on.	  See	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  II,	  B,	  2,	  c),	  ii.	  
1197	  Carrefour/Promodes,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.1684,	  op.cit.,	  at	  47-­‐89.	  
1198	  On	  the	  «	  threat	  point	  »	  of	  22%,	  see	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  Rewe/Meinl	  decision	  above	  in	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  1,	  
Section	  2,	  Point	  B,	  2,	  c),	  iii.	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Such	  a	  specific	  approach	  is	  meant	  to	  prevent	  the	  emergence	  of	  firms	  that	  could	  affect	  competition	  by	  
misusing	   their	   buyer	   power.	   In	   order	   to	   ensure	   certain	   coherence	   in	   the	   enforcement	   of	   the	  
competition	  rules,	   the	  assessment	  of	  a	  buyer’s	  dominance	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  should,	   to	  some	  
extent,	  be	  inspired	  by	  the	  criteria	  developed	  under	  the	  merger	  policy.	  This	  could	  enable	  competition	  
authorities	   to	   keep	  a	   check	  on	  possible	   anticompetitive	  practices	  used	  by	   retail	   chains	  which	  have	  
gained	  significant	  buyer	  power	  not	  through	  concentrations	  but	  through	  internal	  growth.	  	  
B. SUGGESTION	  OF	  HARMONISED	  CRITERIA	  TO	  ADDRESS	  BUYER	  POWER	  
The	  analysis	  carried	  out	  above	  shows	  that	  the	  treaty	  provisions	  fall	  short	  of	  addressing	  buyer	  power	  
in	   the	   grocery	   industry.	   Only	   the	  merger	   rules	   have	   proved,	   although	   in	   few	   cases,	   to	   be	   able	   to	  
tackle	   buyer	   power	   concerns.	   Despite	   Articles	   101	   and	   102	   TFEU	   being	   drafted	   so	   as	   to	   include	  
anticompetitive	  use	  of	  market	  power,	  either	  on	   the	   sell-­‐side	  or	  on	   the	  buy-­‐side,	   it	   appears	   indeed	  
that	   the	   criteria	   defined	   in	   the	   enforcement	   of	   those	   competition	   rules	   are	   ill-­‐adapted	   to	   the	  
specificities	   of	   buyer	   power.	   Such	   unsuitability	   could	   thus	   be	   resolved	   without	   affecting	   the	  
cornerstone	  of	  EU	  competition	  law,	  namely	  the	  Treaty	  provisions,	  by	  defining	  a	  specific	  approach	  to	  
be	  followed	  by	  competition	  authorities	  when	  dealing	  with	  buyer	  power	  in	  the	  grocery	  sector.	  	  
As	  many	   practices	   used	   by	   large	   retail	   chains	   constitute	   genuinely	   unilateral	   conduct,	   the	   issue	   to	  
focus	  on	  would	  be	  abuses	  of	  buyer	  power.	  In	  order	  to	  prevent	  anticompetitive	  use	  of	  buyer	  power,	  
new	   criteria	   of	   dominance	   should	   be	   defined	   on	   the	   buy-­‐side	   of	   the	  market	   so	   as	   to	   make	   each	  
supermarket	   chain	   that	   has	   sufficient	   buyer	   power	   to	   restrict	   or	   distort	   competition	   through	   its	  
conduct,	   either	   by	   affecting	  prices	   or	   by	   reducing	  product	   quality,	   innovation	  or	   consumer	   choice,	  
subject	   to	   supervision	  of	   competition	  authorities	  and	   to	   the	  competition	   rules.	  This	  would	  prevent	  
that	  conduct	  affecting	  competition	  goes	  unchecked	  because	  the	  buyers	  in	  question	  do	  not	  reach	  the	  
threshold	   of	   40%	   market	   share	   in	   the	   upstream	   buyer	   market.	   Although	   the	   focus	   should	   be	   on	  
abuses	  of	  buyer	  power,	  the	  new	  criteria	  to	  be	  defined	  to	  assess	  dominance	  should	  also	  transpire	  in	  
the	   rules	   applicable	   to	   restrictive	   agreements.	   Some	   buyer	   practices	   may	   indeed	   be	   part	   of	   an	  
arrangement	  with	  suppliers	  and	  lead	  to	  restrictive	  horizontal	  or	  vertical	  agreements	  
1. Harmonization	  of	  national	  legislation	  in	  the	  grocery	  retail	  sector	  
To	  make	  the	  assessment	  of	  abuse	  of	  dominance	  suited	  to	  buyer	  power	  cases,	  we	  would	  suggest	  EU	  
action	  but	  working	  at	  national	  level	  through	  harmonization	  of	  national	  legislation.	  Different	  reasons	  
may	  be	  put	  forward	  to	  support	  such	  a	  rapprochement	  of	  national	  legislation	  through	  the	  adoption	  of	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a	  Directive	  by	  EU	  institutions.	  	  Concerning	  the	  legal	  basis,	  inspiration	  may	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  recent	  
proposal	  for	  a	  Directive	  on	  antitrust	  damages	  actions.1199	  
a) Legal	  basis	  and	  justification	  
As	   pointed	   out	   above	   in	   Section	   I1200,	   the	   difference	   in	   legal	   rules	   on	   buyer	   power	   within	   the	  
European	  Union	  is	  likely	  to	  limit	  cross-­‐border	  trade	  and	  create	  unequal	  market	  conditions	  leading	  to	  
competition	   distortions.	   A	   common	   action	   at	   EU	   level,	   through	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	   harmonizing	  
instrument,	  to	  remove	  barriers	  to	  trade	  and	  restore	  a	  level	  playing	  field	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  would	  
hence	  be	  justified.	  
Such	   a	   harmonizing	   instrument	   aiming	   at	   preventing	   anticompetitive	   use	   of	   buyer	   power	   by	   large	  
retail	  chains	  in	  the	  grocery	  industry	  could	  be	  based	  on	  both	  Article	  103	  and	  114	  TFEU.	  	  
i. Article	  103	  TFEU	  
According	  to	  Article	  103	  TFEU,	  on	  a	  proposal	  from	  the	  Commission	  and	  after	  consulting	  the	  European	  
Parliament,	  the	  Council	  can	   lay	  down	  the	  appropriate	  regulations	  or	  directives	  to	  give	  effect	  to	  the	  
principles	  set	  out	  in	  Articles	  101	  and	  102	  TFEU.1201	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  buyer	  power,	  we	  have	  
highlighted	  that	  supermarket	  chains’	  conduct	  is	  likely	  to	  restrict	  or	  distort	  competition	  in	  the	  grocery	  
sector	  and	  thereby	  to	  impede	  the	  achievement	  of	  the	  objectives	  of	  EU	  competition	  law	  that	  Articles	  
101	  and	  102	  TFEU	  are	  meant	  to	  protect.	  These	  objectives	  would	  be	  put	  at	  risk	  if	  it	  was	  not	  possible	  to	  
effectively	  enforce	   the	  Treaty	  provisions	  against	   abuses	  of	  buyer	  power	   in	   the	  grocery	   industry.	   In	  
seeking	   to	  protect	   the	   competition	  process	  and	   consumer	  welfare	  by	   subjecting	   large	   retail	   chains	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1199	  Proposal	  for	  a	  Directive	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  on	  certain	  rules	  governing	  actions	  
for	  damages	  under	  national	  law	  for	  infringements	  of	  the	  competition	  law	  provisions	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  and	  
of	  the	  European	  Union,	  COM(2013)	  404	  final,	  Strasbourg,	  11/06/2013.	  
1200	  See,	  Section	  I	  of	  this	  Chapter,	  Point	  B,	  1.	  
1201	  Article	  103	  TFEU	  reads	  as	  follows	  :	  	  
	  	  	  	  “1.	  The	  appropriate	  regulations	  or	  directives	  to	  give	  effect	  to	  the	  principles	  set	  out	  in	  Articles	  101	  
and	  102	  shall	  be	  laid	  down	  by	  the	  Council,	  on	  a	  proposal	  from	  the	  Commission	  and	  after	  consulting	  
the	  European	  Parliament.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  2.	  The	  regulations	  or	  directives	  referred	  to	  in	  paragraph	  1	  shall	  be	  designed	  in	  particular:	  
(a)	  to	  ensure	  compliance	  with	  the	  prohibitions	  laid	  down	  in	  Article	  101(1)	  and	  in	  Article	  102	  by	  
making	  provision	  for	  fines	  and	  periodic	  penalty	  payments;	  
(b)	  to	  lay	  down	  detailed	  rules	  for	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  101(3),	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  need	  to	  
ensure	  effective	  supervision	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  to	  simplify	  administration	  to	  the	  greatest	  
possible	  extent	  on	  the	  other;	  
(c)	  to	  define,	  if	  need	  be,	  in	  the	  various	  branches	  of	  the	  economy,	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  
Articles	  101	  and	  102;	  
(d)	  to	  define	  the	  respective	  functions	  of	  the	  Commission	  and	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  European	  
Union	  in	  applying	  the	  provisions	  laid	  down	  in	  this	  paragraph;	  
(e)	  to	  determine	  the	  relationship	  between	  national	  laws	  and	  the	  provisions	  contained	  in	  this	  Section	  
or	  adopted	  pursuant	  to	  this	  Article.”	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with	  substantial	  market	  power	  -­‐	  that	  is	  those	  which	  hold	  sufficient	  market	  power	  to	  adversely	  affect	  
competition	  through	  their	  conduct	   -­‐	   to	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  a	  Directive	  or	  Regulation	  would	  therefore	  
give	   effect	   to	   this	   provision.	   This	   means	   that	   such	   a	   harmonizing	   instrument	   could	   be	   based	   on	  
Article	  103	  TFEU.	  
ii. Article	  114	  TFEU	  
The	  aim	  of	  harmonizing	  national	  rules	  on	  buyer	  power	  in	  the	  grocery	  sector	  could	  be	  considered	  to	  
be	  wider	  than	  giving	  effect	  to	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  We	  have	  indeed	  pointed	  out	  that	  diverging	  legislative	  
developments	   have	   taken	   place	   at	   national	   level	   within	   the	   Union	   resulting	   in	   uncertainties	   as	  
regards	   the	   rules	   applicable	   to	   retailer-­‐supplier	   relationships	   but	   also	   to	   inequalities.	   The	  
discrepancies	   between	   national	   laws	   mean	   indeed	   that	   firms	   are	   exposed	   to	   different	   forms	   of	  
repression	  depending	  on	   the	  Member	   State(s)	   they	   are	   acting	   in.	   This	  may	   result	   in	   a	   competitive	  
advantage	  for	   large	  retail	  chains	  that	  are	  active	   in	  “favourable”	  Member	  States	  where	  no	  rules	  are	  
provided	   for	   to	   address	   abuses	   of	   buyer	   power	   or	   where	   the	   legislation	   on	   that	   matter	   is	   not	  
effectively	   enforced.	   Conversely,	   supermarkets	   carrying	   out	   activities	   in	   Member	   States	   where	  
stricter	   rules	   are	   applicable	   to	  practices	  used	   in	   the	   grocery	  procurement	  market	  may	  be	  put	   at	   a	  
competitive	  disadvantage.	  To	  ensure	  a	  more	  level	  playing	  field	  in	  the	  internal	  market,	  it	  would	  hence	  
be	  appropriate	  to	  increase	  legal	  certainty	  and	  to	  reduce	  the	  differences	  between	  Member	  States	  as	  
to	  the	  national	  rules	  governing	  the	  exercise	  of	  buyer	  power	  by	   large	  supermarket	  chains.	   It	   follows	  
that	   the	   aim	  of	  pursuing	  undistorted	   competition	   in	   the	   internal	  market	   can	  be	   regarded	  as	   going	  
beyond	  giving	  effect	  to	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  so	  that	  the	  Directive	  on	  buyer	  power	  should	  also	  be	  based	  
on	  Article	  114	  TFEU.	  The	  latter	  provision	  gives	  the	  power	  to	  the	  EU	  institutions	  to	  	  
“adopt	   the	   measures	   for	   the	   approximation	   of	   the	   provisions	   laid	   down	   by	   law,	  
regulation	   or	   administrative	   action	   in	   Member	   States	   which	   have	   as	   their	   object	   the	  
establishment	  and	  functioning	  of	  the	  internal	  market.”	  
According	  to	  the	  interpretation	  given	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  in	  the	  Tobacco	  Advertising	  I	  case,	  
a	  measure	  may	  be	  validly	  adopted	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Article	  114	  TFEU	  if	  the	  aim	  is	  to	  prevent	  the	  
emergence	  of	   future	   obstacles	   to	   trade	   resulting	   from	  multifarious	   development	   of	   national	  
laws	   or	   to	   eliminate	   appreciable	   distortions	   of	   competition.1202	   A	  mere	   finding	   of	   disparities	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1202	  C-­‐376/98,	  Germany	  v	  Parliament	  &	  Council	  (Tobacco	  Advertising	  I)	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐8417,	  at	  86	  and	  106.	  On	  
that	  case,	  See	  for	  examples:	  T.Hervey,	  Up	  in	  smoke?	  Community	  (Anti)	  Tobacco	  Law	  and	  Policy,	  26	  European	  
Law	  Review	  101	  (2001);	  	  S.Weatherill,	  Competence	  creep	  and	  competence	  control,	  21	  Year	  Book	  of	  European	  
Law	  1	  (2004);	  M.Kumm,	  Constitutionalising	  subsidiarity	  in	  integrated	  markets:	  the	  case	  of	  Tobacco	  Regulation	  
in	  the	  European	  Union,	  12	  European	  Law	  Journal	  503	  (2006).	  On	  Article	  114	  TFEU	  as	  legal	  basis	  for	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between	  national	   rules	   is	   hence	  not	   sufficient	   to	   recourse	   to	   that	   provision	   as	   a	   legal	   basis.	  
What	  matters	  is	  whether	  the	  measure	  contributes	  to	  removing	  (future)	  obstacles	  to	  interstate	  
trade	  or	  to	  removing	  distortions	  of	  competition.1203	  
With	   regard	   to	   buyer	   power	   in	   the	   European	   Union,	   if	   it	   is	   indeed	   established	   that	  
discrepancies	   in	   national	   rules	   effectively	   raise	   barriers	   in	   the	   internal	   market	   or	   cause	  
distortions	   of	   competition,	   a	   harmonizing	  measure	   could	   be	   adopted	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   Article	  
114	  TFEU	  so	  as	  to	  eliminate	  those	  problems.	  	  
In	  addition,	  a	  Directive	  or	  Regulation	  defining	  specific	  criteria	  to	  address	  buyer	  practices	  may	  
be	  regarded	  as	  giving	  effect	   to	   the	  Treaty	  provisions	  but	  also	  as	   introducing	  stricter	   rules	  on	  
dominance	   at	   national	   level.	   With	   regard	   to	   Article	   102	   TFEU,	   as	   provided	   by	   Regulation	  
1/2003,	   a	   system	   of	   parallel	   competences	   empowers	   the	   EU	   Commission	   but	   also	   national	  
competition	   authorities	   and	   national	   courts	   to	   apply	   Articles	   101	   and	   102	   TFEU.1204	   A	  
harmonizing	  instrument	  establishing	  a	  framework	  for	  the	  treatment	  of	  abuses	  of	  buyer	  power	  
in	  the	  grocery	  sector	  could	  hence	  be	  considered	  as	  an	  instrument	  ensuring	  that	  the	  prohibition	  
under	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  which	  concerns	  both	  abuse	  of	  seller	  power	  and	  abuse	  of	  buyer	  power,	  
is	   effectively	   enforced	   by	   national	   authorities.	   However,	   one	   may	   consider	   that	   the	   new	  
criteria	  so-­‐defined	  would,	  to	  a	  certain	  extent,	  stray	  from	  the	  current	  principles	  defined	   in	  EU	  
guidelines	   and	   case	   law	   and	  would,	   as	   a	   result,	   lead	   to	   the	   introduction	   of	   stricter	   rules	   in	  
national	  laws	  as	  regards	  abuse	  of	  dominance.	  Under	  that	  perspective,	  the	  Directive	  in	  question	  
would	  go	  beyond	  giving	  effect	  to	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  and	  should	  thus	  also	  be	  based	  on	  Article	  114	  
TFEU.	  Such	  a	  stricter	  approach	  introduced	  at	  national	  level	  would	  be	  in	  line	  with	  EU	  law	  since	  
Article	  3(2)	  of	  Regulation	  1/2003	  provides	  that:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
harmonization,	  See	  also:	  S.Weatherill,	  The	  limits	  of	  legislative	  harmonization	  then	  years	  after	  Tobacco	  
Advertising:	  How	  the	  Court’s	  Case	  Law	  has	  become	  “Drafting	  Guide”,	  12	  German	  Law	  Journal	  827	  (2011)	  
1203	  D.Chalmers,	  G.Daviers	  &	  G.Monti,	  European	  Union	  Law,	  2nd	  ed.	  (2010),	  at	  690.	  It	  is	  acceptable	  to	  prevent	  
obstacles	  arising	  rather	  than	  removing	  existing	  barriers	  but	  those	  future	  obstacles	  must	  be	  likely.	  See:	  C-­‐58/08,	  
Vodafone,	  O2	  and	  others	  v.	  Secretary	  of	  State	  [2010]	  ECR	  I-­‐4999,	  at	  32-­‐33.	  
1204	  Council	  Regulation	  (EC)	  No	  1/2003	  of	  16	  December	  2002	  on	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  rules	  on	  
competition	  laid	  down	  in	  Article	  81	  and	  82	  of	  the	  Treaty(Text	  with	  EEA	  relevance),	  O.J.	  L	  1/1	  of	  04/01/2003,	  
Article	  3(1).	  National	  courts	  can	  apply	  Articles	  101	  and	  102	  TFEU	  without	  it	  being	  necessary	  to	  apply	  national	  
competition	  law	  in	  parallel.	  However,	  where	  national	  authorities	  apply	  national	  competition	  law	  to	  
agreements,	  decisions	  or	  practices	  which	  may	  affect	  trade	  between	  EU	  countries	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  Article	  
101(1)	  TFEU	  or	  to	  any	  abuse	  prohibited	  by	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  they	  also	  have	  to	  apply	  EU	  competition	  rules	  to	  
those	  practices.	  Cooperation	  between	  national	  authorities	  and	  the	  Commission	  is	  governed	  by	  the	  Commission	  
Notice	  on	  the	  cooperation	  between	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  courts	  of	  the	  EU	  Member	  States	  in	  the	  application	  
of	  Articles	  81	  and	  82	  EC,	  JO	  C	  101	  of	  27/04/2004	  and	  the	  Commission	  Notice	  on	  cooperation	  within	  the	  
Network	  of	  Competition	  Authorities	  OJ	  C	  101	  of	  27/04/2004.	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“Member	  States	  shall	  not	  under	  this	  Regulation	  be	  precluded	  from	  adopting	  and	  
applying	   on	   their	   territory	   stricter	   national	   laws	   which	   prohibit	   or	   sanction	  
unilateral	  conduct	  engaged	  in	  by	  undertakings”.	  
The	  aim	  and	  the	  content	  of	  the	  suggested	  harmonizing	  instrument	  on	  grocery	  retailers’	  
buyer	   power	   should	   therefore	   lead	   the	   European	   institutions	   to	   base	   the	   adoption	   of	  
that	  instrument	  on	  both	  Articles	  103	  and	  114	  TFEU.	  
iii. Principle	  of	  subsidiarity	  1205	  
Harmonization	   of	   the	   rules	   on	   buyer	   power	   would	   be	   in	   line	   with	   the	   subsidiarity	  
principle	   since	   the	   objective	   to	   eliminate	   obstacles	   and	   to	   prevent	   competition	  
distortions	   in	   the	   internal	   market	   could	   not	   sufficiently	   be	   achieved	   by	   the	   Member	  
States.	   A	   legally	   binding	   act	   at	   EU	   level	  would	   be	   better	   capable	   of	   ensuring	   that	   full	  
effect	   is	   given	   to	   Articles	   101	   and	   102	   TFEU	   and	   that	   a	   more	   level	   playing	   field	   is	  
established	  in	  the	  European	  Union.1206	  	  
Most	  Member	  States	  do	  not	  provide,	  on	  their	  own	   initiative,	   for	  effective	  measures	  to	  
prevent	   anticompetitive	   use	   of	   buyer	   power	   in	   the	   grocery	   sector.	   Incentives	   at	  
European	   level	  are	  therefore	  needed	  to	  tackle	  that	   issue.	   In	  addition,	   the	  cross-­‐border	  
dimension	   of	   the	   competition	   rules	   and	   their	   intrinsic	   link	   to	   the	   functioning	   of	   the	  
internal	  market	  would	  also	  justify	  action	  at	  the	  EU	  level.	  
b) The	  most	  appropriate	  legally	  binding	  instrument:	  Regulation	  versus	  Directive	  
A	   legally	   binding	   instrument	   applicable	   to	   the	   grocery	   sector	   is	   needed	   to	   address	   potential	  
anticompetitive	   practices	   used	   by	   large	   retail	   chains	   in	   that	   sector.	   As	   mentioned	   above,	   most	  
Member	   States	   do	   not	   provide	   for	   an	   effective	   competition	   law	   framework	   to	   address	   abuses	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1205	  The	  principle	  of	  subsidiarity	  is	  set	  out	  in	  Article	  5	  (3)	  TEU:	  “Under	  the	  principle	  of	  subsidiarity,	  in	  areas	  
which	  do	  not	  fall	  within	  its	  exclusive	  competence,	  the	  Union	  shall	  act	  only	  if	  and	  insofar	  as	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  
proposed	  action	  cannot	  be	  sufficiently	  achieved	  by	  the	  Member	  States	  (…)	  but	  can	  rather,	  by	  reason	  of	  the	  
scale	  or	  effects	  of	  the	  proposed	  action,	  be	  better	  achieved	  at	  Union	  level.”	  See	  also:	  Protocol	  No	  2	  on	  the	  
application	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  subsidiarity	  and	  proportionality,	  OJ	  C	  83/06	  of	  30/03/2010.	  On	  that	  principle,	  
see,	  for	  example:	  G.Barett,	  Monti	  II:	  The	  Subsidiarity	  Review	  Process	  Comes	  of	  Age...Or	  Then	  Again	  Maybe	  It	  
Doesn't,	  19	  Maastricht	  Journal	  of	  European	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  595	  (2012);	  J.-­‐P.Jacqué,	  Droit	  institutionnel	  
de	  l’Union	  européenne,	  7th	  ed.	  (2012),	  at	  173-­‐183;	  K.Lenaerts	  &	  P.Van	  Nuffel,	  European	  Union	  Law	  (2011),	  at	  
131-­‐140;	  P.Kiiver,	  The	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon,	  the	  National	  Parliaments	  and	  the	  Principle	  of	  Subsidiarity,	  15	  Maastricht	  
Journal	  of	  European	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  77	  (2008);	  I.Cooper,	  The	  watchdogs	  of	  subsidiarity:	  national	  
parliaments	  and	  the	  logic	  of	  arguing	  in	  the	  EU,	  44	  Journal	  of	  Common	  Market	  Studies	  281	  (2006).	  
1206	  See	  the	  arguments	  put	  forward	  in	  the	  proposal	  for	  a	  Directive	  on	  private	  damages	  for	  justifying	  compliance	  
with	  the	  subsidiarity	  principle:	  Proposal	  for	  a	  Directive	  on	  certain	  rules	  governing	  actions	  for	  damages,	  op.cit.,	  
at	  3.2.	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buyer	  power	  or	  fail	  to	  effectively	  enforce	  it.	  Given	  that	  lack	  of	  self-­‐initiative	  from	  the	  side	  of	  Member	  
States,	   it	   appears	   that	   only	   action	   at	   EU	   level	   can	   create	   a	   common	   legal	   framework	   to	   protect	  
competition	  in	  the	  grocery	  sector.	  	  
Before	   addressing	   the	   issue	   of	   which	   types	   of	   legally	   binding	   instrument	   could	   be	   adopted	   to	  
harmonize	  national	  legislation	  of	  the	  Member	  states,	  a	  few	  words	  can	  be	  said	  about	  two	  other	  ways	  
of	   intiating	   the	  use	  of	  a	   specific	  approach	   to	  handle	  buyer	  power	  cases	   in	  EU	  competition	   law	  and	  
about	  the	  reasons	  we	  do	  not	  give	  preference	  to	  those	  alternatives.	  
Firstly,	   we	   can	   mention	   the	   ruling	   of	   the	   European	   Court	   of	   Justice	   that	   might	   impose	   a	   new	  
interpretation	  to	  be	  given	  to	  the	  concepts	  of	  market	  power	  in	  buyer	  power	  cases	  and	  strengthen	  the	  
assessment	  of	  buyers’	  conduct.	  The	  case	  law	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  is	  indeed	  binding	  and	  
might	   therefore	   lead	   to	   the	   implementation	  of	  a	   common	  approach	  within	   the	  European	  Union	  as	  
regards	  buyer	  power	  cases.	  However,	  should	  a	  case	  involving	  buyer	  power	  issues	  reach	  the	  European	  
Court	   of	   Justice,	  which	  would	   require	   first	   the	   Commission	   to	   investigate	   and	  make	   a	   decision	   on	  
such	  a	  case,	  a	  real	  consideration	  by	  the	  European	  judge	  of	  the	  specificites	  of	  buyer	  power	  as	  needed	  
to	   prevent	   harmful	   buyer	   conduct	   on	   the	  markets	   is	   unlikely	   due,	   in	   particular,	   to	   the	   difficulty	   in	  
changing	  a	  well-­‐established	  case	  law	  on	  market	  power	  as	  the	  one	  defined	  in	  seller	  power	  cases.	  	  	  	  	  
Secondly,	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  a	  “softer”	  way	  of	  redefining	  the	  criteria	  to	  be	  applied	  in	  buyer	  power	  
cases	  would	  be	  to	  introduce	  a	  specific	  definition	  of	  buyer	  power	  in	  the	  Guidelines	  of	  the	  Commission.	  
Although	   adopting	   such	   a	   soft	   law	   instrument	   would	   probably	   be,	   to	   some	   extent,	   easier	   as	   this	  
would	  avoid	  passing	  through	  a	  likely	  delicate	  law-­‐making	  process	  needed	  to	  adopt	  a	   legally	  binding	  
instrument,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  mention	  that	  Guidelines	  are	  not	  binding,	  either	  for	  the	  European	  Court	  
of	  Justice	  or	  for	  national	  authorities.	  There	  would	  therefore	  be	  no	  absolute	  certainty	  about	  how	  the	  
specificites	  of	  buyer	  power	  would	  be	   taken	   into	  consideration	   in	  practice.	   In	  addition,	   it	   is	  unlikely	  
that	   national	   authorities	   apply	   the	   principles	   and	   criteria	   defined	   in	   the	   Commission	   Guidelines	  
before	   that	   a	   case	   was	   dealt	   with	   at	   EU	   level	   according	   to	   those	   new	   principles	   and	   critiera	   and	  
maybe	  even	  confirmed	  by	   the	  European	   judge.	  Given	  what	  was	  mentioned	  above,	   that	   is	   that	  one	  
can	   hardly	   expect	   a	   radical	   change	   in	   the	   case	   law	   of	   the	   European	   Court	   of	   Justice,	   we	   would	  
therefore	  opt	  for	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  binding	  instrument.	  
Common	  rules	  can	  be	  introduced	  through	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  Regulation	  or	  a	  Directive.1207	  The	  former	  
constitutes	   the	  most	   centralizing	   instrument	   and	   ensure	   complete	   uniformity	   across	   the	   European	  
Union	   on	   a	   specific	   issue.	   Regulations	   do	   not	   need	   to	   be	   transposed	   in	   national	   law	   so	   that	   they	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1207	  On	  the	  types	  of	  legislative	  act	  in	  EU	  law,	  See:	  D.Chalmers	  and	  others,	  op.cit.,	  at	  98-­‐99;	  J.-­‐P.Jacqué,	  Droit	  
institutionnel	  de	  l’Union	  européenne,	  7th	  ed.	  (2012),	  at	  546-­‐552.	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automatically	   form	   part	   of	   the	   national	   legal	   order	   of	   each	   Member	   State.	   The	   adoption	   of	   a	  
Regulation	  on	  buyer	  power	  in	  the	  grocery	  retail	  sector	  would	  therefore	  ensure	  all	  market	  participants	  
are	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  rules	  and	  prevent	  Member	  States	  from	  adopting	  implementing	  measures	  as	  
these	  might	  contain	  variations	  which	  would	  affect	  the	  uniform	  application	  of	  the	  Regulation.	  
Directives	  are	  binding	  as	  to	  the	  result	  to	  be	  achieved	  but	  national	  authorities	  are	   left	  the	  choice	  of	  
the	   form	   and	   methods	   to	   be	   used	   to	   implement	   it	   and	   achieve	   the	   prescribed	   result.1208	   When	  
adopting	   measures	   implementing	   a	   Directive	   in	   their	   national	   legislation,	   Member	   States	   are	  
therefore	  given	  some	  discretion	  to	  take	  into	  account	  specific	  national	  circumstances.	  	  
Given	   those	   differences	   between	   Regulations	   and	   Directives,	   we	   consider	   that	   a	   Directive	   would	  
constitute	   the	   most	   appropriate	   legally	   binding	   instrument	   to	   harmonize	   national	   rules	   on	   buyer	  
power	   in	   the	   European	   Union.	   	   The	   choice	   of	   a	   Directive	   instead	   of	   a	   Regulation	   ensures	   indeed	  
certain	  flexibility	  by	  giving	  national	  authorities	  some	  leeway	  to	  implement	  it	  in	  the	  way	  they	  find	  best	  
for	  their	  own	  situation.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  concepts,	  criteria	  and	  rules	  that	  would	  be	  established	  in	  
the	  Directive	  could	  be	  transposed	  by	  taking	  into	  consideration	  the	  specificities	  of	  the	  grocery	  market	  
in	   each	  Member	   State.	  We	  have	   pointed	   out	   that	   supermarkets’	   buyer	   power	  may	   vary	   from	  one	  
Member	   State	   to	   another	   due,	   for	   example,	   to	   a	   different	   level	   of	   concentration	   or	   to	   a	   different	  
degree	   of	   private	   label	   penetration.	   By	   allowing	   Member	   States	   to	   choose	   the	   means,	   within	   a	  
common	  framework,	  for	  preventing	  and	  sanctioning	  abuses	  of	  buyer	  power	  in	  the	  grocery	  industry,	  
those	   differences	   existing	   between	  Member	   States	   could	   hence	   be	   taken	   into	   consideration.	   The	  
criteria	  to	  be	  used	  when	  enforcing	  the	  rules	  could	  be	  adapted	  to	  the	  relevant	  market	  characteristics	  
so	   as	   to	   make	   sure	   that	   only	   firms	   with	   substantial	   market	   power	   and	   in	   a	   position	   to	   restrict	  
competition	  could	  be	  liable	  under	  the	  competition	  rules	  if	  they	  abuse	  their	  position.	  	  
In	   addition,	   the	   choice	   of	   a	   Directive	   could	   be	   considered	   more	   in	   line	   with	   the	   proportionality	  
principle	  set	  out	   in	  Article	  5(4)	  TEU	  which	  requires	  that	  the	  content	  and	  form	  of	  Union	  action	  does	  
not	  exceed	  what	  is	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  Treaties.1209	  	  
c) Minimum	  versus	  full	  harmonization	  
When	  harmonizing	  measures	  are	  taken	  pursuant	  Article	  114	  TFEU	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  completion	  of	  
the	   internal	   market,	   the	   European	   institutions	   are	   free	   to	   choose	   between	   minimum	   and	   full	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1208	  D.Chalmers	  and	  others,	  op.cit.,	  at	  99.	  	  
1209	  On	  the	  proportionality	  principle,	  see,	  for	  example:	  K.Lenaerts	  &	  P.Van	  Nuffel,	  op.cit.,	  at	  141-­‐147;	  
T.Tridimas,	  The	  General	  Principles	  of	  EU	  Law	  (2007),	  Chapters	  3-­‐5;	  T.I.Harbo,	  The	  function	  of	  the	  proportionality	  
principle	  in	  EU	  Law,	  16	  European	  Law	  Journal	  158	  (2010);	  G.de	  Burca,	  The	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  and	  its	  
application	  in	  EC	  law,	  13	  Yearbook	  of	  European	  Law	  105	  (1998).	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harmonisation.1210	   With	   regard	   to	   Article	   103	   TFEU	   as	   a	   legal	   basis,	   nothing	   precludes	   either	   the	  
European	  Union	  from	  opting	  for	  full	  harmonization.1211	  
Minimum	  harmonization	   introduces	   a	  minimum	   standard	  but	   leaves	  Member	   States	   free	   to	   adopt	  
stricter	  rules.	  The	   impact	  of	   legal	  differences	   is	   in	  fact	  not	  eliminated,	  but	  only	  reduced.1212	  Market	  
participants	  might	  hence	  still	  face	  different	  rules	  depending	  on	  the	  Member	  State	  they	  are	  acting	  in.	  
By	   contrast,	   legislative	  measures	   taken	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   full	   harmonization	   prevent	  Member	   States	  
from	  maintaining	   or	   introducing	  more	   or	   less	   stringent	   provisions	   than	   those	   provided	   for	   in	   the	  
harmonizing	   instrument.	   Full	   harmonization	   therefore	   creates	   a	   level	   playing	   field	   for	   all	   market	  
participants	  in	  the	  European	  Union.	  
With	  regard	  to	  a	  Directive	  harmonizing	  the	  rules	  on	  buyer	  power,	  we	  would	  suggest	  to	  follow	  the	  full	  
harmonization	  approach	  as	  this	  would	  be	  the	  only	  mean	  to	  remove	  legal	  uncertainty	  on	  that	  matter	  
and	  eliminate	  competition	  distortions.1213	  Such	  an	  approach	  would	  in	  fact	  create	  an	  exception	  in	  the	  
grocery	  retail	  sector	  to	  the	  principle	  set	  out	  in	  Article	  3(2),	  in	  fine	  of	  Regulation	  1/2003.1214	  	  The	  latter	  
provides	   indeed	   that	   Member	   States	   are	   allowed	   to	   adopt	   and	   apply	   on	   their	   territory	   stricter	  
national	   rules	   which	   prohibit	   or	   sanction	   unilateral	   conduct	   engaged	   in	   by	   undertakings.	   Full	  
harmonization	   of	   national	   laws	   concerning	   the	   use	   of	   buyer	   power	   in	   the	   grocery	   retail	   industry	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1210	  See:	  C-­‐183/00,	  Maria	  Victoria	  Gonzalez	  Sanchez	  v	  Medicina	  Asturiana	  SA	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐3901,	  at	  25.	  See	  also:	  
M.B.M.Loos,	  Full	  harmonization	  as	  a	  regulatory	  concept	  and	  its	  consequences	  for	  the	  national	  legal	  orders.	  The	  
example	  of	  the	  Consumer	  rights	  directive,	  Centre	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  European	  Contract	  Law,	  Working	  Paper	  Series	  
No	  2010/03,	  at	  4,	  available	  at:	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1639436;	  P.Rott,	  
Minimum	  harmonization	  for	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  internal	  market?	  The	  example	  of	  consumer	  sales	  law,	  40	  
Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  1130	  (2003).	  On	  the	  differing	  degree	  of	  harmonization,	  see,	  for	  example:	  
S.R.Weatherill,	  Maximum	  versus	  minimum	  harmonization:	  choosing	  between	  unity	  and	  diversity	  in	  the	  search	  of	  
the	  soul	  of	  the	  internal	  market,	  in	  From	  single	  market	  to	  economic	  Union,	  Nic	  Shuibhne	  &	  Gormley	  (eds)	  (2012),	  
at	  175-­‐201;	  J.Stuyck,	  Harmonisatieniveau,	  84	  Consumentenrecht/Droit	  de	  la	  Consommation	  7	  (2010);	  
S.R.Weatherill,	  Supply	  of	  and	  demand	  for	  internal	  market	  regulation:	  strategies,	  preferences	  and	  interpretation,	  
in	  Regulating	  the	  Internal	  Market,	  Nic	  Shuibhne	  (ed)	  (2006),	  at	  29-­‐60.	  
1211	  In	  some	  policy	  areas,	  measures	  adopted	  by	  the	  European	  Union	  can	  only	  be	  based	  on	  minimum	  
harmonization.	  See	  for	  example:	  Article	  169	  (4)	  TFEU	  concerning	  consumer	  protection.	  This	  explains	  why	  the	  
internal	  market	  dimension	  is	  sometimes	  emphasized	  in	  the	  proposals	  of	  the	  Commission	  so	  as	  to	  use	  Article	  
114	  TFEU	  as	  a	  legal	  basis	  instead	  of	  Article	  169	  TFEU.	  See:	  M.B.M.Loos,	  Full	  harmonization	  as	  a	  regulatory	  
concept…,	  op.cit.,	  at	  4.	  
1212	  D.Chalmers,	  G.Davies	  &	  G.Monti,	  op.cit.,	  at	  701.	  
1213	  See	  Contra,	  M.Faure,	  Towards	  a	  maximum	  harmonization	  of	  consumer	  contract	  law?!?,	  15	  Maastricht	  
Journal	  of	  European	  and	  Competition	  Law	  433	  (2008).	  The	  author	  criticizes	  the	  use	  of	  full	  harmonization,	  in	  
particular	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  consumer	  contract	  law.	  “The	  mere	  fact	  that	  legal	  rules	  differ	  between	  Member	  
States	  is,	  from	  an	  economic	  perspective,	  not	  problematic	  but	  rather	  desirable.	  The	  advantage	  of	  different	  legal	  
rules	  is	  that	  legislators	  can	  provide	  rules	  that	  correspond	  to	  the	  preferences	  of	  citizens	  and	  that	  learning	  
processes	  can	  take	  place.	  In	  some	  cases,	  legislators	  can	  learn	  from	  (in	  some	  cases	  superior)	  alternatives	  abroad	  
to	  improve	  national	  legislation.”	  (at	  437)	  According	  to	  M.Faure,	  the	  costs	  of	  doing	  business	  for	  industry	  result	  
less	  from	  the	  differences	  in	  contractual	  rights	  across	  the	  Union	  than	  from	  the	  differences	  in	  language,	  culture	  
and	  tax	  level.	  (at	  439)	  
1214	  Council	  Regulation	  (EC)	  No	  1/2003,	  op.cit.	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would	  therefore	  preclude	  Member	  States	  from	  enacting	  rules	  different	  from	  those	  prescribed	  in	  the	  
suggested	  Directive.	  
2. Empowering	  national	  competition	  authorities	  to	  address	  buyer	  power	  
A	  harmonizing	  instrument,	  such	  as	  a	  directive,	  would	  force	  Member	  States	  to	  take	  suitable	  measures	  
to	  prevent	  grocery	  retail	  chains	  from	  using	  practices	  that,	  for	  example,	  have	  effects	  on	  competition	  
within	   their	   territory	   or	   are	   implemented	   or	   originate	   from	   their	   territory.	   This	   would	   stress	   the	  
essential	   role	  which	  national	  authorities	  have	  to	  play	   in	   the	  supervision	  of	   retailers’	  conduct	   in	   the	  
grocery	  procurement	  market.	  Member	  States’	  authorities	  may	  indeed	  be	  regarded	  as	  better	  placed	  
to	  gather	  evidence	  and/or	  to	  bring	  an	  infringement	  to	  an	  end	  and/or	  to	  sanction	  it	  adequately.	  
In	   practice,	   the	   Directive	   would	   impose	   on	   Member	   States	   to	   give	   their	   national	   competition	  
authority	  the	  power	  to	  pursue	  and	  sanction	  anticompetitive	  conduct	  committed	  by	  dominant	  buyer	  
retailers	   in	   the	   grocery	   sector	   by	   applying	   specific	   criteria	   suited	   to	   buyer	   power	   cases.	   Once	  
implemented,	  these	  specific	  criteria	  would	  be	  part	  of	  the	  Member	  States’	  national	  competition	  law	  
and	   applied	   by	   competition	   authorities	   or	   national	   courts	   to	   practices	   which	   may	   affect	   trade	  
between	  Member	  States.	  	  
As	  underlined	  above,	   competition	  authorities	  are	  undoubtedly	  better	  placed	   to	  ensure	   compliance	  
with	   the	   rules	   on	   buyer	   power.	   They	   are	   indeed	   independent,	   solving	   to	   some	   extent	   the	   “fear	  
factor”	   problem,	   and	   are	   supposed	   to	   have	   at	   their	   disposal	   effective	   and	   appropriate	   means	   of	  
enforcement	  and	  powers	  to	  impose	  severe	  sanctions	  on	  infringing	  firms.	  	  In	  order	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  
obligations	   resulting	   from	   the	   suggested	   Directive,	   Member	   States	   would	   have	   to	   give	   national	  
competition	  authorities	  the	  power	  and	  the	  means	  to	  scrutinize	  retail	  chains’	  conduct	  so	  as	  to	  prevent	  
anticompetitive	   practices	   in	   the	   grocery	   procurement	   market.	   In	   order	   to	   achieve	   that	   objective,	  
national	  implementing	  measures	  would	  have	  to	  be	  issued	  by	  the	  Member	  States.	  	  
3. Revised	  criteria	  applicable	  to	  abuses	  of	  buyer	  power	  
To	   address	   adequately	   grocery	   retailers’	   buyer	   power,	   specific	   criteria	   should	   be	   defined	   for	   each	  
step	   making	   up	   the	   traditional	   assessment	   of	   dominance.	   Accordingly,	   the	   common	   framework	  
introduced	   in	   the	   Member	   States	   should	   include:	   guiding	   principles	   to	   define	   the	   relevant	  
procurement	  market;	  criteria	  to	  measure	  the	  degree	  of	  buyer	  power	  and	  assess	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  retail	  
chain	  to	  affect	  competition	  and;	  specifications	  about	  abuses	  of	  buyer	  power.	  
a) Relevant	  procurement	  market	  
Final	  version	  -­‐	  Mai	  2014	   	  
388	  
	  
The	  definition	  of	  the	  relevant	  market	   is	  of	  crucial	   importance	  in	  the	  competition	  assessment	  as	  the	  
degree	   of	   a	   firm’s	   market	   power	   depends	   on	   the	   boundaries	   of	   the	   market	   in	   product	   and	  
geographical	  terms.1215	  The	  objective	  of	  defining	  a	  market	   is	  to	   identify	  the	  competitive	  constraints	  
that	   face	   the	   firms	   involved	   so	  as	   to	  make	   it	   possible	   the	  assessment	  of	  dominance	   in	   the	   second	  
step	  of	  the	  competition	  assessment.	  	  
The	   Commission	   Notice	   on	   the	   definition	   of	   the	   relevant	  market	   focuses	   on	   the	   seller’s	   side.	   The	  
relevant	  product	  market	  is	  defined	  as	  one	  that	  	  
“comprises	  all	  those	  products	  and/or	  services	  which	  are	  regarded	  as	  interchangeable	  or	  
substitutable	   by	   the	   consumer,	   by	   reason	   of	   the	   products’	   characteristics,	   their	   prices	  
and	  intended	  use”.1216	  	  	  
With	  regard	  to	  the	  relevant	  geographic	  market,	  the	  Commission	  defines	  it	  as	  	  
“the	  area	  in	  which	  the	  undertakings	  concerned	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  supply	  and	  demand	  
of	   products	   or	   services,	   in	   which	   the	   conditions	   of	   competition	   are	   sufficiently	  
homogeneous	   and	   which	   can	   be	   distinguished	   from	   neighbouring	   areas	   because	   the	  
conditions	  of	  competition	  are	  appreciably	  different	  in	  those	  areas”.1217	  	  
However,	   the	   Notice	   falls	   short	   of	   providing	   guidance	   as	   regards	   the	   process	   of	   market	  
definition	  on	  the	  buyer’s	  side	  of	  the	  market.	  
Some	  indications	  on	  how	  to	  define	  the	  relevant	  upstream	  market	  are	  nevertheless	  given	  in	  the	  three	  
merger	   decisions	   already	   mentioned	   above,	   namely	   Kesko/Tuko,	   Rewe/Meinl	   and	  
Carrefour/Promodes.	   With	   regard	   to	   the	   relevant	   product	   market,	   the	   critical	   factors	   are	   the	  
suppliers’	   flexibility	   in	  producing	  another	  product	  and	  the	  alternative	  sales	  channels	  open	  to	  them.	  
The	  concept	  of	  substitutability	  is	  indeed	  an	  essential	  concept	  for	  defining	  the	  relevant	  market.	  Whilst	  
on	   the	  seller’s	   side	  demand	  substitution	  constitutes	   the	  most	   immediate	  and	  effective	  competitive	  
constraint1218,	  on	  the	  buyer’s	  side	  the	  market	  definition	  process	  concentrates	  on	  supply	  substitution.	  
Accordingly,	   the	   market	   definition	   process	   focuses	   on	   the	   ability	   of	   suppliers	   to	   find	   alternative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1215	  I.Kokkoris,	  Buyer	  Power	  Assessment	  in	  Competition	  Law	  :	  A	  Boon	  or	  a	  Menace	  ?,	  29	  World	  Competition	  139,	  
at	  145	  (2006)	  
1216	  Commission	  notice	  on	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  relevant	  market	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  Community	  competition	  
law,	  O.J.	  C372	  of	  09/12/1997,	  at	  7.	  
1217	  Ibid.,	  at	  8.	  On	  market	  power	  on	  the	  seller’s	  side,	  see:	  I.Kokkoris,	  The	  Concept	  of	  Market	  Definition	  and	  the	  
SSNIP	  test	  in	  the	  Merger	  Appraisal,	  26	  European	  Competition	  law	  Review	  209	  (2005).	  
1218	  The	  assessment	  of	  demand	  substitution	  entails	  a	  determination	  of	  the	  range	  of	  products	  which	  are	  viewed	  
as	  substitutes	  by	  the	  consumer.	  Those	  substitutes	  which	  constrain	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  firm	  to	  raise	  prices	  or	  reduce	  
output	  are	  included	  in	  the	  relevant	  market;	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buyers.	   In	   the	   grocery	   sector,	   this	   depends	   on	  whether	   suppliers	   view	   grocery	   retailers	   and	   other	  
outlets,	   such	  as	  specialized	  shops,	  cash-­‐and-­‐carry	  shops,	  delicatessens	  or	  drugstores,	  as	   reasonably	  
interchangeable	  distribution	  channels	   for	   their	  products.1219	   In	   the	  merger	  cases	  mentioned	  above,	  
the	  Commission	  considered	  that	  the	  retailing	  trade	  was	  by	  far	  the	  most	  important	  sales	  channel	  for	  
most	   grocery	   products	   and	   that	   turning	   to	   other	   supply	   avenues	   would	   require	   considerable	  
investment	   and	   adaptation.1220	   The	   number	   of	   alternatives	   available	   to	   suppliers	   also	   depends	   on	  
their	   ability	   to	   switch	   their	   production	   to	   another	   product.	   Supply	   substitutes	   may	   indeed	   be	  
considered	  an	  effective	  competitive	  constraint	  where	  suppliers	  are	  able	  to	  switch	  their	  production	  to	  
those	  products	  in	  a	  short	  period	  of	  time	  without	  incurring	  significant	  additional	  costs	  or	  risks.1221	  The	  
flexibility	   in	   changing	   the	   type	   of	   products	   manufactured	   is	   though	   very	   limited	   in	   the	   grocery	  
industry.	   Finding	   alternative	   buyers	   would,	   in	   addition,	   require	   a	   radical	   change	   in	   the	   suppliers’	  
production	   since	   producers	   will	   face	   the	   same	   limit	   as	   regards	   the	   availability	   of	   alternative	  
distribution	  channels	  for	  all	  grocery	  products.	  	  
With	   regard	   to	   the	   geographic	   market,	   the	   relevant	   question	   is	   in	   what	   geographic	   areas	  
manufacturers	   can	   supply	   their	   products.	   If	   distant	   outlets	   may	   be	   regarded	   as	   reasonable	  
substitutes,	   they	   should	  be	   regarded	  as	  part	   of	   the	   relevant	   geographic	  market.1222	   Transportation	  
costs	  as	  well	  as	  timing	   issues	  are	  of	  particular	   importance	  when	  defining	  the	  geographic	  market.	   In	  
the	   grocery	   sector,	   due,	   in	   particular,	   to	   consumer	   preferences	   for	   national	   products	   and	   to	   the	  
convenience	   and	   necessity	   for	   suppliers	   to	   have	   a	   production	   on	   the	   national	   territory,	   the	  
Commission	  defined	  the	  relevant	  geographic	  market	  as	  national.1223	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1219	  Professors	  Blair	  and	  Harrison	  refer	  to	  the	  availability	  of	  competing	  uses	  for	  the	  seller’s	  output.	  The	  number	  
of	  possible	  uses	  determines	  the	  ability	  of	  sellers	  to	  switch	  to	  other	  buyers.	  They	  point	  out	  that	  “the	  availability	  
of	  reasonably	  substitutable	  uses	  decreases	  the	  likelihood	  that	  any	  one	  buyer	  can	  force	  prices	  down	  and	  
maintain	  them	  below	  a	  competitive	  market	  level”.	  See:	  R.D.Blair	  &	  J.L.Harrison,	  Monopsony	  in	  Law	  and	  
Economics	  (2010),	  at	  62.	  
1220	  Rewe/Meinl,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1221,	  op.cit.,	  at	  79	  and	  Carrefour/Promodes,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.1984,	  op.cit.,	  at	  
15.	  
1221	  I.Kokkoris,	  Buyer	  Power	  Assessment	  in	  Competition	  Law,	  op.cit.,	  at	  147.	  
1222	  R.D.Blair	  &	  J.L.Harrison,	  op.cit.,	  at	  62.	  
1223	  See:	  Rewe/Meinl,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1221,	  op.cit.,	  at	  83,	  85	  and	  86	  	  and	  Carrefour/Promodes,	  Case	  No	  
COMP/M.1984,	  op.cit.,	  at	  29	  and	  30.	  The	  Commission	  pointed	  out	  that	  consumer	  demand	  for	  national	  products	  
is	  generally	  higher.	  Even	  for	  international	  branded	  goods,	  the	  procurement	  is	  effected	  almost	  exclusively	  
through	  national	  establishments	  because	  the	  content	  of	  the	  products	  in	  question	  often	  vary	  from	  one	  country	  
to	  another	  according	  to	  consumer	  preferences.	  Supplying	  abroad	  may,	  in	  addition,	  be	  difficult	  due	  to	  the	  
perishability	  of	  some	  products	  but	  also	  to	  red	  tape,	  formal	  declaration	  and	  packaging.	  The	  Commission	  also	  
considered	  that	  services	  required	  by	  retailers,	  such	  as	  shelf	  maintenance	  and	  market	  research,	  could	  only	  be	  
provided	  through	  a	  presence	  on	  the	  national	  territory.	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Interchangeability	   or	   substitutability	   can	  be	  measured	  by	  using	   a	   test	   equivalent	   to	   the	   SSNIP	   test	  
(Small	   but	   Significant	   Non-­‐transitory	   Increase	   in	   Price)1224,	   namely	   the	   SSNDP	   test	   (Small	   but	  
Significant	   Non-­‐transitory	   Decrease	   in	   Price).	   Under	   that	   test,	   the	   question	   would	   be	   whether	  
producers	  would	  switch	  to	  readily	  available	  substitutes	  or	  to	  buyers	  located	  elsewhere	  in	  response	  to	  
a	  hypothetical	  small	  (in	  the	  range	  5	  %	  to	  10	  %)	  but	  permanent	  relative	  price	  decrease	  in	  the	  products	  
and	  areas	  being	  considered,	  so	  as	  the	  price	  reduction	  to	  be	  unprofitable	  for	  the	  buyer.	  If	  substitution	  
were	  enough	  to	  make	  the	  price	  decrease	  unprofitable	  because	  of	  the	  resulting	  loss	  of	  supply	  sources,	  
additional	  buyers	  or	  geographic	  areas	  are	  added	  to	  the	  relevant	  market.	  This	  process	  continues	  until	  
a	  set	  of	  buyers	  and	  geographic	  areas	  is	  such	  that	  small,	  permanent	  decreases	  in	  relative	  prices	  would	  
be	  accepted	  by	  the	  suppliers	  and	  thus	  would	  be	  profitable.1225	  	  	  
Defining	   correctly	   the	   relevant	   market	   is	   essential	   in	   competition	   cases.	   The	   level	   of	   the	   market	  
shares	   is	   indeed	   the	   primary	   factor	   to	   be	   taken	   into	   consideration	   when	   assessing	   firms’	   market	  
power	  and,	  in	  particular,	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  dominant	  position.	  Market	  shares	  yet	  depend	  on	  how	  the	  
market	  is	  defined.	  The	  narrower	  the	  market	  definition	  the	  higher	  the	  market	  share(s)	  of	  the	  firm(s)	  
involved	   in	   that	  market	   and	  vice	   versa.1226	  However,	  within	   the	   relevant	  market,	   other	   factors	   are	  
also	   likely	   to	  significantly	   influence	  the	  market	  position	  of	  a	   firm.	  This	   is	  all	   the	  more	  true	   in	  buyer	  
power	   cases	  where	   the	  market	   share	   of	   the	   buyers	   involved	   in	   the	   procurement	  market	   does	   not	  
always	  reflect	  the	  real	  degree	  of	  the	  latter’s	  market	  power	  in	  that	  market.	  
b) Dominance	  
Once	  the	  relevant	  market	  has	  been	  correctly	  defined,	  competition	  authorities	  have	  to	  measure	  the	  
degree	  of	  market	  power	  of	  the	  retail	  chain	  concerned	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  latter	  is	  or	  
not	  in	  a	  dominant	  position.	  Whereas,	  on	  the	  sell-­‐side,	  the	  firm’s	  market	  share	  is	  the	  prime	  indicator	  
of	  market	  power,	   the	  criteria	   to	  be	  used	   in	  buyer	  power	  cases	   should	   rather	   focus	  on	   the	  state	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1224	  The	  SSNIP	  test	  is	  used	  to	  define	  the	  relevant	  market	  in	  seller	  power	  cases.	  The	  test	  is	  explained	  in	  the	  
Commission	  Notice	  on	  the	  relevant	  market	  as	  follows:	  “The	  question	  to	  be	  answered	  is	  whether	  the	  parties'	  
customers	  would	  switch	  to	  readily	  available	  substitutes	  or	  to	  suppliers	  located	  elsewhere	  in	  response	  to	  a	  
hypothetical	  small	  (in	  the	  range	  5	  %	  to	  10	  %)	  but	  permanent	  relative	  price	  increase	  in	  the	  products	  and	  areas	  
being	  considered.	  If	  substitution	  were	  enough	  to	  make	  the	  price	  increase	  unprofitable	  because	  of	  the	  resulting	  
loss	  of	  sales,	  additional	  substitutes	  and	  areas	  are	  included	  in	  the	  relevant	  market.	  This	  would	  be	  done	  until	  the	  
set	  of	  products	  and	  geographical	  areas	  is	  such	  that	  small,	  permanent	  increases	  in	  relative	  prices	  would	  be	  
profitable”.	  (at	  17)	  
1225	  I.Kokkoris,	  Buyer	  Power	  Assessment	  in	  Competition	  Law,	  op.cit.,	  at	  147.	  The	  author	  adds	  that	  “care	  must	  be	  
taken	  in	  applying	  the	  SSNDP	  test	  to	  assess	  the	  buyer	  power	  of	  a	  firm,	  because	  the	  “starting	  price”	  may	  have	  
been	  determined	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  competition	  and	  hence	  may	  be	  below	  the	  competitive	  level	  (Cellophane	  
fallacy)”.	  On	  that	  issue,	  see:	  OFT,	  The	  role	  of	  market	  definition	  in	  monopoly	  and	  dominance	  inquiries,	  Economic	  
Discussion	  Paper	  2,	  A	  Report	  prepared	  for	  the	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  by	  National	  Economic	  Research	  Associates,	  
July	  2001,	  available	  at:	  http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft342.pdf	  	  
1226	  R.D.Blair	  &	  J.L.Harrison,	  op.cit.,	  at	  61.	  As	  a	  result,	  plaintiffs	  typically	  argue	  for	  a	  narrow	  market	  definition	  
while	  defendants	  argue	  for	  a	  broad	  definition.	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dependency	  of	  suppliers	  and	  on	  the	  existence	  and	  degree	  of	  competitive	  constraint	  exerted	  on	  the	  
buyer.	  Extending	  the	  approach	  developed	  in	  seller	  power	  cases	  to	  buyer	  power	  cases	  by	  focusing	  on	  
market	   shares	   as	   a	  measure	   of	   market	   power	   is	   indeed	   likely	   to	   result	   in	   incorrect	   conclusion	   as	  
regards	   the	   ability	   of	   the	   buyer	   to	   prevent	   effective	   competition	   from	   being	   maintained	   on	   the	  
relevant	  market,	  especially	  in	  the	  grocery	  sector.	  
The	  definition	  of	  buyer	  power	   relies	  mainly	  on	   the	  concept	  of	  economic	  dependence.	  The	   issue	  of	  
significant	  market	   power	   or	   dominance	   on	   the	   buy-­‐side	   should	   therefore	   be	   assessed	   under	   that	  
concept.	   In	   this	   respect,	   a	   supplier	   is	   regarded	   as	   dependent	   on	   a	   grocery	   chain	   when	   the	   latter	  
represents	   a	   large	   share	   of	   its	   turnover	   and	   that	   no	   equivalent	   alternative	   is	   available.	   Those	   two	  
aspects	   are	   in	   fact	   interdependent.	   Producers	   are	   less	   likely	   to	   be	   affected	   by	   the	   loss	   of	   a	   large	  
customer	  if	  they	  have	  switching	  possibilities	  so	  as	  to	  make	  up	  for	  the	  loss	  of	  sales	  accounted	  for	  by	  
that	   customer.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   lack	   of	   alternatives	   is	   unlikely	   to	   lead	   to	   a	   situation	   of	  
economic	  dependency	  if	  the	  lost	  customer	  represented	  only	  a	  tiny	  part	  of	  the	  producer’s	  business.	  It	  
is	  obvious	  that	  the	  larger	  the	  share	  accounted	  for	  by	  a	  buyer	  the	  higher	  the	  risk	  no	  to	  find	  equivalent	  
or	  sufficient	  alternatives	  to	  replace	  that	  customer.	  The	  share	  of	  a	  producer’s	  turnover	  accounted	  for	  
by	  a	  retail	  chain	  constitutes	  a	  risk	  rate	  or	  threat	  rate	  if	  above	  that	  share	  the	  viability	  of	  the	  producer	  
would	   be	   threatened	   should	   the	   retail	   chain	   in	   question	   switch	   to	   other	   suppliers.1227	   In	   these	  
circumstances,	   and	  provided	   that	  no	  alternative	  buyers	  are	  available,	   it	   can	  be	   concluded	   that	   the	  
producer	  concerned	  is	  economically	  dependent	  on	  its	  customer.	  1228	  	  
It	  is	  difficult	  to	  determine	  what	  proportion	  of	  turnover	  with	  a	  given	  customer	  could	  not	  be	  switched	  
to	   other	   sales	   channels	  without	   difficulty.	   However,	   this	  may	   be	   estimated	   in	   each	   case	   by	   asking	  
suppliers	  the	  figure	  above	  which	  a	  customer	  can	  be	  replaced	  only	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  very	  heavy	  financial	  
losses,	  if	  at	  all,	  as	  it	  was	  done	  for	  example	  in	  the	  Rewe/Meinl	  merger	  case.1229	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1227	  P.Këllezi,	  Abuse	  below	  the	  Threshold	  of	  Dominance?	  Market	  Power,	  market	  Dominance,	  and	  Abuse	  of	  
Economic	  Dependence,	  in	  Abuse	  of	  Dominant	  position,	  new	  Interpretation,	  New	  Enforcement	  Mechanism?,	  M.-­‐
O.Mackenrodt,	  B.Conde	  Gallego	  &	  S.Enchelmaier	  (eds)	  (2008),	  at	  70.	  
1228The	  ability	  of	  suppliers	  to	  find	  alternatives	  depends	  on	  the	  elasticity	  of	  supply	  and	  the	  demand	  elasticity.	  
The	  former	  refers	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  suppliers	  can	  switch	  production	  facilities	  from	  one	  product	  to	  another	  and	  
the	  latter	  refers	  to	  their	  ability	  to	  find	  new	  customers.	  “The	  ability	  of	  sellers	  to	  vary	  output	  in	  the	  monopsony	  
context	  is	  analogous	  to	  the	  ability	  of	  consumers	  to	  shift	  their	  demand	  in	  the	  monopoly	  context.	  Similarly,	  the	  
capacity	  of	  sellers	  to	  find	  new	  customers	  in	  the	  monopsony	  context	  is	  analogous	  to	  the	  ability	  of	  buyers	  to	  turn	  
to	  new	  sources	  of	  supply	  in	  the	  monopoly	  context”.	  See:	  R.D.Blair	  &	  J.L.Harrison,	  op.cit.,	  at	  64.	  With	  regard	  to	  
manufacturers	  of	  grocery	  products,	  moving	  into	  another	  industry	  would	  be	  difficult	  as	  converting	  their	  plant	  to	  
new	  uses	  would	  entail	  high	  costs	  and	  risks.	  In	  addition,	  besides	  the	  few	  big	  supermarket	  chains	  active	  in	  each	  
Member	  States,	  other	  buyers	  are	  unlikely	  to	  significantly	  increase	  their	  purchases.	  
1229	  In	  that	  case,	  it	  transpired	  that	  a	  producer	  behaving	  in	  a	  economically	  realistic	  manner	  cannot	  withstand	  
turnover	  reductions	  of	  22%.	  See:	  	  Rewe/Meinl,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1221,	  op.cit.,	  at	  101.	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In	  addition,	   the	   state	  of	  dependency	  of	  grocery	   suppliers	   is	  also	   to	  be	  assessed	  with	   regard	   to	   the	  
popularity	   of	   the	   retail	   chain	   and	   the	   importance	   of	   its	   market	   shares	   in	   the	   downstream	   retail	  
market.	   Supermarket	   chains	   accounting	   for	   a	   large	   share	   of	   the	   retail	   market	   and	   arousing	   high	  
consumer	  loyalty	  play	  indeed	  a	  role	  of	  gatekeeper	  so	  that	  they	  become	  unavoidable	  trading	  partners	  
for	  most	  grocery	  suppliers.	  Each	  of	  those	  customers	  is	  indispensable	  to	  reach	  consumers	  on	  a	  large	  
scale.	  	  The	  “gatekeeper	  effect”	  depends	  on	  retailers’	  market	  share	  in	  the	  downstream	  retail	  market	  
but	  may	  arise	  even	   if	  none	  of	   those	   retailers	  detain	  a	  dominant	  position	   in	   that	  market.	   It	  may	  be	  
considered	  that	  a	  part	  of	  20-­‐30%	  of	  the	  market	  is	  sufficient	  to	  create	  such	  an	  effect.	  	  
The	   unavoidable	   character	   of	   large	   supermarket	   chains	   is	   due	   to	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   grocery-­‐
retailing	   trade.	   Although	   producers	   may	   diversify	   their	   distribution	   channels,	   the	   grocery-­‐retailing	  
trade	  is	  indeed	  by	  far	  the	  most	  important	  sales	  avenue	  for	  most	  product	  categories	  and	  is	  hence	  not	  
interchangeable	  with	  any	  other.	  The	  concentration	  of	  the	  sales	  in	  large	  retail	  chains	  is	  therefore	  not	  a	  
deliberate	   choice	   but	   rather	   a	   necessity	   that	   has	   to	   be	   taken	   into	   consideration	   by	   competition	  
authorities.1230	  	  
Where	  the	  concept	  of	  dependency	  should	  be	  the	  primary	  factor	  to	  be	  assessed	  in	  buyer	  power	  cases,	  
the	  traditional	  criteria	  used	  in	  seller	  power	  cases	  cannot	  yet	  be	  disregarded.1231	  They	  can	  in	  practice	  
be	   included	   in	   the	   assessment	   of	   suppliers’	   dependency.	   Firstly,	   the	  market	   position	   of	   the	   retail	  
chain	  concerned	  and	  of	  its	  competitors	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market	  and	  in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  
market	  provide	   information	  on	  the	  number	  of	   (equivalent)	  alternatives	  available	   for	  producers	  and	  
on	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   possible	   gatekeeper	   function	   performed	   by	   those	   market	   participants.	  
Secondly,	   with	   regard	   to	   competitive	   constraints	   exerted	   by	   (potential)	   rival	   retailers,	   particular	  
attention	   should	   be	   drawn	   on	   barriers	   to	   entry	   and	   expansion	   in	   the	   grocery	   sector.	   These	   may	  
indeed	  be	  various	  and	  numerous,	  ranging	  from	  legal	  or	  administrative	  barriers	  to	  economic	  barriers,	  
and	  make	  timely	  entry	  or	  expansion	  of	  a	  sufficient	  magnitude	  in	  that	  industry	  difficult.	  Thirdly,	  on	  the	  
buy-­‐side,	   possible	   competitive	   constraints	   exerted	   by	   suppliers	   have	   to	   be	   examined.1232	   Some	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1230	  The	  reasons	  why	  a	  supplier’s	  sales	  are	  mostly	  concentrated	  in	  a	  particular	  retailer	  are	  also	  taken	  into	  
consideration	  in	  France	  to	  assess	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  state	  of	  economic	  dependency.	  The	  French	  Competition	  
authority	  use	  four	  criteria	  in	  its	  assessment:	  Firstly,	  the	  popularity	  of	  the	  retail	  chain	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  its	  
market	  shares	  in	  the	  downstream	  market;	  Secondly,	  the	  share	  of	  the	  retailer’s	  purchases	  in	  the	  supplier	  
turnover;	  Thirdly,	  the	  reasons	  why	  the	  supplier’s	  sales	  are	  mostly	  concentrated	  in	  the	  retailer,	  namely	  whether	  
it	  is	  a	  deliberate	  choice	  based	  on	  a	  commercial	  strategy	  or	  whether	  the	  supplier	  could	  not	  but	  deal	  mainly	  with	  
that	  customer;	  and	  Fourthly,	  the	  existence	  of	  equivalent	  alternatives	  for	  the	  supplier.	  See:	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  2,	  
Section	  I,	  Point	  C,	  2.	  
1231	  On	  the	  approach	  generally	  followed	  to	  assessed	  the	  degree	  of	  competitive	  constraint	  in	  the	  relevant	  
market,	  see	  :	  Guidance	  on	  its	  enforcement	  priorities	  in	  applying	  Article	  82	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  p.7.	  See	  also:	  
Part	  I,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  I,	  Point	  A,	  1.	  
1232	  On	  the	  sell-­‐side,	  competition	  authorities	  take	  into	  consideration	  competitive	  constraints	  exerted	  by	  the	  
firm’s	  customers.	  Buyers’	  countervailing	  power	  may	  indeed	  be	  used	  to	  stimulate	  competition	  among	  sellers	  
Final	  version	  -­‐	  Mai	  2014	   	  
393	  
	  
producers	   may	   be	   in	   a	   position	   to	   exert	   countervailing	   power	   and	   prevent	   retail	   chains	   from	  
exploiting	  their	  buyer	  power.	  That	  factor	  must	  therefore	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration	  by	  competition	  
authorities.	  The	  lack	  of	  alternatives	  is,	  however,	  likely	  to	  limit	  the	  leeway	  of	  manufacturers,	  even	  of	  
large	   processing	   companies,	   reducing	   thereby	   significantly	   their	   market	   power.	   Furthermore,	  
countervailing	   seller	  power	  may	  not	  be	   found	   to	   sufficiently	  off-­‐set	   retail	   chains’	  buyer	  power	   if	   it	  
only	  ensures	  that	  a	  particular	  or	  limited	  segment	  of	  producers	  is	  shielded	  from	  that	  buyer	  power.1233	  
Where	   the	   competitive	   constraint	   exerted	   by	   some	   producers	   is	   unlikely	   to	   be	   of	   a	   sufficient	  
magnitude	  to	  deter	  large	  retailers	  from	  exploiting	  their	  buyer	  power,	  it	  is	  nonetheless	  an	  element	  to	  
be	  examined	  in	  the	  competition	  assessment.	  	  	  
At	   the	  end	  of	   the	  assessment,	   if	   it	   is	   concluded	   that	  most	   suppliers	   are	  dependent	  on	  a	  particular	  
retail	  chain	  and	  that	  no	  competitive	  constraint	  is	  likely	  to	  deter	  the	  latter	  from	  exploiting	  its	  market	  
power	   in	   the	   procurement	   market,	   it	   should	   be	   considered	   that	   the	   retailer	   in	   question	   holds	   a	  
dominant	  position	  in	  that	  market.	  One	  particularity	  of	  such	  an	  approach	  in	  buyer	  power	  cases	  would	  
be	   that	   suppliers	   could	   be	   dependent	   on	   more	   than	   one	   supermarket	   chain.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	  
prohibition	  on	  abusive	  buyer	  conduct	  in	  the	  grocery	  sector	  would	  be	  applicable	  to	  all	  firms	  that	  are	  
likely	  to	  affect	  competition	  through	  their	  conduct	  in	  a	  given	  market.	  	  
Unlike	  in	  seller	  power	  cases	  where	  customers’	  economic	  dependency	  is	  regarded	  as	  a	  consequence	  
of	   the	  dominant	  position	  of	   the	  selling	   firm	  concerned,	   the	  dependency	  of	  suppliers	  on	   large	  retail	  
chains	  is	  to	  be	  considered	  a	  source	  of	  dominance	  in	  buyer	  power	  cases.	  Such	  a	  state	  of	  dependency	  
is	   therefore	   not	   highlighted	   to	  merely	   confirm	   the	   finding	   of	   a	   dominant	   position	   on	   basis	   of	   the	  
traditional	   analysis	   of	   the	   firm’s	   market	   share	   but,	   rather,	   constitutes	   an	   essential	   factor	   in	   the	  
dominance	   assessment	   that	   can	   lead	   competition	   authorities	   to	   conclude	   to	   the	   existence	   of	   a	  
dominant	  position	  in	  the	  grocery	  procurement	  market	  despite	  the	  relatively	  low	  market	  share	  of	  the	  
buyer’s	   involved.	   As	   a	   result,	   competition	   authorities	   would	   be	   entitled	   to	   effectively	   supervise	  
conduct	  of	  firms	  that	  have	  the	  power	  to	  influence	  the	  market	  conditions	  and	  sanction	  them	  if	  they	  
use	  methods	  different	  from	  competition	  on	  the	  merits.	  The	  ability	  of	  large	  retail	  chains	  to	  influence	  
the	  market	  conditions	  and	  affect	  competition	  depends	   indeed	  more	  on	  the	  state	  of	  dependency	  of	  
their	  suppliers	  than	  on	  the	  level	  of	  their	  market	  shares.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and	  constraint	  a	  selling	  firm’s	  competitive	  behavior.	  See:	  Guidance	  on	  its	  enforcement	  priorities	  in	  applying	  
Article	  82	  of	  the	  Treaty	  to	  abusive	  exclusionary	  conduct	  by	  dominant	  undertakings,	  OJ	  C	  45,	  24/02/2009,	  at	  18.	  
1233	  See,	  by	  analogy	  on	  the	  sell-­‐side	  :	  Guidance	  on	  its	  enforcement	  priorities	  in	  applying	  Article	  82	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  
op.cit.,	  at	  18.	  “If	  countervailing	  power	  is	  of	  a	  sufficient	  magnitude,	  it	  may	  deter	  or	  defeat	  an	  attempt	  by	  the	  
undertaking	  to	  profitably	  increase	  prices.	  Buyer	  power	  may	  not,	  however,	  be	  considered	  a	  sufficiently	  effective	  
constraint	  if	  it	  only	  ensures	  that	  a	  particular	  or	  limited	  segment	  of	  customers	  is	  shielded	  from	  the	  market	  
power	  of	  the	  dominant	  undertaking”.	  





i. General	  definition	  
In	  seller	  power	  cases,	  an	  abuse	  has	  been	  defined	  as	  conduct	  of	  firm	  	  
“which,	   through	   recourse	   to	   methods	   different	   from	   those	   governing	   normal	  
competition	  in	  products	  or	  services	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  transaction	  of	  commercial	  operators,	  
has	  the	  effect	  of	  hindering	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  degree	  of	  competition	  still	  existing	  in	  
the	  market	  or	  the	  growth	  of	  that	  competition”.1234	  	  
Any	   conduct	   which	   restricts	   competition	   and	   cannot	   be	   regarded	   as	   legitimate	   competition	   or	  
competition	  on	  the	  merits	  based	  on	  quality	  and	  price	  must	  hence	  be	  considered	  an	  abuse	  under	  this	  
definition.1235	  It	  has	  also	  been	  suggested	  that	  a	  dominant	  firm	  has	  a	  special	  responsibility	  towards	  the	  
competitive	   process	   “not	   to	   allow	   its	   conduct	   to	   impair	   genuine	   undistorted	   competition	   on	   the	  
common	  market”.1236	  
The	  same	  approach	  should	  be	  followed	  in	  buyer	  power	  cases.	  Any	  conduct	  that	  is	  likely	  to	  distort	  or	  
restrict	  competition	  should	  be	  prohibited,	  provided	   it	   is	   committed	  by	  a	   retail	   chain	   in	  a	  dominant	  
position	   under	   the	   criteria	   defined	   above.	   Some	   examples	   of	   abusive	   practices	   could	   be	   given	   to	  
illustrate	  the	  way	  market	  power	  may	  be	  abused	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market.	  However,	  no	  per	  se	  
prohibition	   should	   be	   established.	   Whereas	   enacting	   a	   list	   of	   abusive	   practices	   offers	   some	  
advantages	   in	  terms	  of	  predictability,	   it	  also	  shows	  drawbacks.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  prohibiting	  per	  se	  
some	   practices	  may	   lead	   to	   a	   false	   positive	   that	   is	   to	   an	   incorrect	   conclusion	   that	   procompetitive	  
behaviour	   is	   abusive.1237	   As	   the	   likely	   positive	   or	   negative	   effects	   of	   buyer	   power	   depend	   on	   the	  
circumstances	  of	   the	   case,	  buyer	   conduct	   should	  be	  addressed	  on	  a	   case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis	   in	  order	   to	  
determine	  its	  actual	  or	  potential	  impact	  on	  competition.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  establishing	  a	  close-­‐list	  
of	  abuses	  in	  the	  grocery	  sector	  would	  exclude	  any	  adaptability	  and	  flexibility	   in	  the	  enforcement	  of	  
the	   rules	   while	   buyer	   practices	   may	   in	   fact	   evolve	   and	   change.	   This	   may	   results	   in	   retailers	  
circumventing	   the	   rules	  by	  using	  practices	   that	   are	  not	   as	   such	  prohibited	  but	  which	   cause	   similar	  
negative	   effects	   on	   competition.	   Therefore,	   it	   would	   be	   recommended	   to	   introduce	   a	   general	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1234	  Case	  85/76,	  Hoffmann-­‐La	  Roche	  &	  Co	  AG	  v	  Commission	  [1979]	  ECR	  461,	  at	  91.	  
1235	  R.O’Donoghue	  &	  A.J.Padilla,	  op.cit.,	  at	  175.	  See	  also:	  ECS/AKZO,	  Case	  IV/30.698,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  14	  
December	  1985,	  upheld	  on	  appeal	  in	  Case	  C-­‐62/86,	  AKZO	  Chemie	  BV	  v	  Commission	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐3359.	  The	  
Commission	  made	  it	  clear	  in	  that	  case	  that	  nothing	  prevents	  a	  dominant	  firm	  from	  competing	  on	  the	  merits.	  	  
1236	  See	  :	  Case	  322/81,	  NV	  Nederlandsche	  Banden	  Industrie	  Michelin	  v	  Commission	  [1983]	  ECR	  3461,	  at	  10.	  
1237	  R.Wish	  &	  D.Bailey,	  Competition	  Law,	  Seventh	  edition	  (2012),	  at	  193.	  Conversely,	  a	  false	  negative	  occurs	  
where	  it	  is	  incorrectly	  concluded	  that	  anticompetitive	  conduct	  is	  not	  illegal.	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prohibition	   on	   abusive	   conduct	   that	   could	   include	   various	   practices	   depending	   on	   their	   effects	   on	  
competition.	  
ii. Exploitative	  /	  exclusionary	  abuse	  
Two	  types	  of	  abuses	  may	  be	  distinguished:	  exploitative	  abuses	  and	  exclusionary	  abuses.	  By	  analogy	  
with	   the	   definition	   given	   in	   seller	   power	   cases,	   exploitative	   abuses	   are	   practices	   which	   consist	   in	  
extracting	  concession	  from	  suppliers	  that	  could	  not	  have	  been	  obtained	  by	  a	  non-­‐dominant	  firm	  or	  to	  
take	  advantage	  of	  suppliers	  in	  some	  other	  way.	  Excessively	  low	  pricing	  is	  an	  obvious	  example	  but	  a	  
large	  number	  of	  abusive	  practices	  may	  fall	   in	  that	  category.1238	  Although	  exploitative	  buyer	  conduct	  
aims	  at	  abusing	  suppliers	  and	  not	  as	  such	  consumers,	  it	  may	  nevertheless	  result	  in	  consumer	  harm.	  
For	   example,	   excessive	   payments	   required	  by	   large	   supermarket	   chains	  may	  discourage	  producers	  
from	   investing	   and	   thereby	   lead	   to	   lower	  quality	   products.	   In	   addition,	   those	  payments	  may	   force	  
producers	   to	   increase	   transfer	   prices	   and	   cause	   a	   price	   rise	   at	   the	   retail	   level	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	  
consumers.	  We	  have	  also	  mentioned	  practices	  used	  to	  weaken	  branded	  products	  and	   increase	   the	  
share	  of	  private	  labels	  which,	  consequently,	  affect	  consumer	  choice.	  	  
Exclusionary	   abuses	   concern	   strategic	   acts	   directed	   against	   competitors	  which	   limit	   their	   ability	   to	  
compete	  on	  an	  equal	  playing	  field.1239	  Exclusion	  of	  rivals	  through	  practices	  which	  are	  not	  related	  to	  
pricing	   or	   quality	   must	   be	   considered	   abusive	   because	   it	   reduces	   competitive	   constraints	   and	  
reinforces	   the	   firm’s	   position	   without	   bringing	   any	   benefit	   to	   consumers.	   Among	   possible	  
exclusionary	   practices	   in	   the	   grocery	   sector,	   we	   can	   for	   example	   mention	   exclusive	   dealing,	  
incitement	   to	   boycott	   new	   retailers	   or	   reprisal	   abuses	   which	   consist	   in	   punishing	   a	   supplier	   for	  
dealing	  with	   or	   offering	   better	   conditions	   to	   a	   rival	   retailer.1240	   Abusive	   conduct	  may	   also	   involve	  
situations	   in	   which	   a	   dominant	   firm	   affects	   the	   ability	   of	   grocery	  manufacturers	   to	   compete	  with	  
private	  label	  products.	  To	  some	  extent,	  retail	  chains	  indeed	  compete	  with	  brands	  producers	  through	  
their	   own-­‐brands.	   They	   can	   therefore	   exert	   their	   buyer	   power	   to	   get	   illegitimate	   competitive	  
advantages	  and	  thereby	  promote	  private	  labels	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  competing	  branded	  products.	  We	  
can	  for	  example	  mention	  the	  use	  of	  sensitive	  confidential	  information	  about	  the	  launch	  or	  promotion	  
of	  (new)	  branded	  products	  so	  as	  to	  adapt	  the	  marketing	  of	  private	  label	  lines	  accordingly	  or	  even	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1238	  On	  exploitative	  abuses	  on	  the	  sell-­‐side,	  see	  :	  R.O’Donoghue	  &	  A.J.Padilla,	  op.cit.,	  at	  174.	  “Exploitative	  
abuses	  are	  pricing	  and	  other	  practices	  that	  result	  in	  a	  direct	  loss	  of	  consumer	  welfare.	  In	  economic	  terms,	  the	  
dominant	  firm	  takes	  advantage	  of	  its	  market	  power	  to	  extract	  ‘rents’	  from	  consumers	  that	  could	  not	  have	  been	  
obtained	  by	  a	  non-­‐dominant	  firm	  or	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  consumers	  in	  some	  other	  way”.	  
1239	  R.O’Donoghue	  &	  A.J.Padilla,	  op.cit.,	  at	  175.	  
1240	  On	  examples	  of	  reprisal	  abuses	  on	  the	  sell-­‐side,	  see	  :	  Chiquita,	  Case	  No	  IV/26699,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  
17	  December	  1975,	  confirmed	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  in	  Case	  27/76,	  United	  Brands	  Company	  and	  United	  
Brands	  Continentaal	  BV	  v	  Commission	  [1978]	  ECR	  207	  and	  BBI/Boosey	  &	  Hawkes	  –	  Interim	  measures,	  
Commission	  Decision	  of	  29	  July	  1987.	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bypass	  the	  introduction	  of	  those	  branded	  products	  by	  giving	  priority	  to	  the	  launch	  of	  similar	  private	  
label	  products	  developed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  information	  obtained.	  Exclusionary	  practices	  may	  thus	  
be	  directed	  against	  rival	  retailers	  but	  also	  against	  brands	  manufacturers.	  	  
iii. Hub-­‐and-­‐spoke	  conspiracy	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  
In	  addition,	  the	  concept	  of	  abuse	  should	  also	  include	  incitement	  to	  collude.	  It	  was	  indeed	  highlighted	  
above	  that	  large	  retail	  chains	  are	  able	  to	  orchestrate	  coordination	  either	  between	  suppliers	  or	  with	  
competing	   retailers	   (hub	   &	   spoke	   conspiracies).1241	   Whilst	   A-­‐B-­‐C	   arrangements	   are	   generally	  
sanctioned	  under	  the	  provisions	  on	  restrictive	  agreements,	  specific	  emphasis	  should	  be	  drawn	  on	  the	  
initiator	   of	   such	   practices	   when	   the	   latter	   holds	   a	   dominant	   position	   in	   the	   relevant	   market	   by	  
enforcing,	  in	  addition,	  the	  rules	  on	  abusive	  conduct.	  
iv. Dominant	  position	  and	  abuse	  in	  different	  markets	  
It	  is	  worth	  mentioning	  that	  the	  dominant	  position	  and	  the	  abusive	  conduct	  must	  not	  necessarily	  exist	  
in	  the	  same	  market.	  It	  has	  indeed	  been	  maintained	  in	  seller	  power	  cases	  that	  	  
“Certain	  conduct	  on	  markets	  other	  than	  the	  dominated	  market	  and	  having	  effects	  either	  
on	   the	   dominated	   markets	   or	   on	   the	   non-­‐dominated	   markets	   themselves	   can	   be	  
categorized	  as	  abusive”.1242	  
In	   fact,	   the	   prohibition	   on	   abusive	   conduct	   occurring	   on	   a	   market	   distinct	   from,	   but	  
nevertheless	  associated	  with,	  the	  dominated	  market	  can	  be	  justified	  by	  special	  circumstances	  
such	   as	  where	   a	   firm	  uses	  means	   other	   than	   reliance	  on	   its	   own	  merits	   in	   order	   to	  weaken	  
competition	  in	  one	  of	  these	  markets	  and	  thereby	  strengthen	  its	  market	  position.1243	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1241	  A	  supermarket	  chain	  may	  for	  example	  convince	  suppliers	  not	  to	  deal	  with	  a	  competing	  retailer	  and	  give	  
each	  of	  these	  supplier	  assurances	  that	  their	  rivals	  would	  not	  cheat	  on	  that	  arrangement.	  This	  results	  in	  an	  
anticompetitive	  horizontal	  agreement	  between	  suppliers	  but	  initiated	  under	  the	  pressure	  of	  a	  powerful	  
retailer.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  suppliers	  can	  be	  used	  as	  intermediaries	  to	  discipline	  competing	  retailers	  and	  
implement	  a	  common	  policy	  at	  the	  retail	  level.	  On	  the	  different	  possible	  A-­‐B-­‐C	  agreements,	  see,	  above,	  
Chapter	  1,	  Section	  II,	  Point	  C.	  
1242	  C-­‐52/09,	  Konkurrensverket	  v	  TeliaSonera	  Sverige	  AB	  [2011]	  ECR,	  I-­‐0527,	  at	  85.	  See	  also:	  C-­‐333/94	  P,	  Tetra	  
Pak	  International	  SA	  v	  Commission	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐5951,	  at	  25.	  
1243	  C-­‐52/09,	  Konkurrensverket	  v	  TeliaSonera	  Sverige	  AB,	  op.cit.,	  	  at	  86.	  The	  Court	  held	  that	  “while	  the	  
application	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  presupposes	  a	  link	  between	  the	  dominant	  position	  and	  the	  alleged	  abusive	  
conduct,	  which	  is	  normally	  not	  present	  where	  conduct	  on	  a	  market	  distinct	  from	  the	  dominated	  market	  
produces	  effects	  on	  that	  distinct	  market,	  the	  fact	  remains	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  distinct,	  but	  associated,	  markets,	  
the	  application	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  to	  conduct	  found	  on	  the	  associated,	  non-­‐dominated,	  market	  and	  having	  
effects	  on	  that	  associated	  market	  can	  be	  justified	  by	  special	  circumstances”.	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In	  the	  grocery	  sector,	  different	  situations	   involving	  two	  markets,	  namely	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  
dominant	  market	  and	  the	  downstream	  seller	  non-­‐dominant	  market,	  may	  occur.1244	  In	  each	  of	  
these	  situations,	  it	  is	  thus	  assumed	  that	  the	  retail	  chain	  concerned	  is	  in	  a	  dominant	  position	  in	  
the	  procurement	  market	  under	  the	  criteria	  described	  above.	  
The	  first	  situation	  is	  where	  the	  abusive	  conduct	  takes	  place	  on	  the	  dominant	  upstream	  market	  
but	   lead	   to	   negative	   effects	   on	   the	   downstream	   retail	   market	   in	   which	   the	   retail	   chain	   in	  
question	  is	  not	  dominant.	  In	  most	  Member	  States,	  the	  largest	  supermarket	  chains	  are	  not	  in	  a	  
dominant	  position	   in	  the	  retail	  market	  under	  the	  criteria	  used	   in	  seller	  power	  cases.	  None	  of	  
them	  indeed	  holds	  a	  market	  share	  of	  more	  than	  30%	  while	  dominance	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  found	  
below	  40%.	  Among	  possible	  abuses	  committed	  in	  the	  upstream	  procurement	  market,	  we	  can	  
for	  example	  mention	  the	  delisting	  of	  branded	  products	  by	  a	  dominant	  buyer	  whose	  intention	  is	  
to	  strengthen	  the	  position	  of	   its	  own-­‐brands	   in	  the	  downstream	  retail	  market.	  Arrangements	  
restricting	  suppliers’	  freedom	  to	  deal	  with	  other	  buyers	  also	  aim	  at	  limiting	  competition	  in	  the	  
downstream	  retail	  market	  as	  the	  rival	  buyers	  concerned	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  compete	  effectively	  
in	  that	  latter	  market	  with	  regard	  to	  some	  product	  categories.	  	  
The	  second	  situation	  is	  where	  the	  abuse	  is	  committed	  on	  the	  non-­‐dominant	  retail	  market	  but	  
has	   the	  effect	  of	   strengthening	   the	   retailer’s	  position	   in	   the	  upstream	  dominant	  market.	   For	  
example,	   a	   retailer	   may	   decide	   to	   unfavourably	   place	   a	   particular	   branded	   product	   on	   the	  
shelves	  or	  to	  raise	  the	  price	  of	  that	  product	  in	  order	  to	  put	  it	  in	  a	  weaker	  position.	  This	  would	  
result	   in	   reinforcing	   the	   bargaining	   strength	   of	   the	   retailer	   in	   question	   in	   the	   upstream	  
procurement	   market.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   by	   weakening	   branded	   products,	   the	   retailer	   may	  
increase	   the	   demand	   for	   private	   labels	   and	   thereby	   create	   new	   alternatives	   in	   the	  
procurement	  market.	  Since	  the	  degree	  of	  buyer	  power	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  ability	  of	  buyers	  
to	  switch	  to	  alternative	  producers,	  this	  would	  hence	  strengthen	  the	  position	  of	  the	  dominant	  
retailer	   in	   that	  market.	  On	   the	  other	   hand,	   the	   sales	   of	   the	  branded	  product	   concerned	   are	  
likely	  to	  drop	  due	  to	  the	  competitive	  disadvantages	  faced	  by	  the	  producer	  in	  the	  retail	  market,	  
despite	   the	   latter’s	   possible	   efforts	   to	   meet	   consumer	   demand.	   Consequently,	   the	   retailer	  
would	  be	  in	  a	  stronger	  position	  to	  extract	  additional	  concessions	  from	  that	  producer,	  invoking	  
the	  poor	  sales	  results	  of	  its	  products.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1244	  The	  different	  situations	  where	  abusive	  conduct	  and	  dominance	  occur	  in	  different	  markets	  are	  described	  by	  
O’Donoghue	  and	  Padilla	  with	  reference	  to	  EU	  case	  law	  on	  that	  matter	  in	  seller	  power	  cases.	  We	  take	  
inspiration	  from	  the	  analysis	  made	  by	  the	  authors	  to	  provide	  examples	  of	  abuses	  in	  the	  grocery	  sector	  involving	  
different	  markets.	  See:	  R.O’Donoghue	  &	  A.J.Padilla,	  op.cit.,	  at	  211-­‐212.	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The	  third	  situation	  is	  where	  the	  abuse	  takes	  place	  in	  the	  downstream	  retail	  market	  and	  aims	  at	  
reinforcing	  the	  retailer’s	  position	  in	  that	  market.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  it	  would	  be	  essential	  to	  show	  
that	  the	  retailer’s	  dominant	  position	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market	  allows	  it	  to	  exploit	  the	  links	  
between	   that	   market	   and	   the	   downstream	   non-­‐dominant	   retail	   market	   so	   as	   to	   use	   its	  
dominance	  to	  commit	  an	  abuse	  in	  the	  latter	  market.	  To	  put	  it	  in	  other	  words,	  there	  would	  be	  
no	  basis	   for	   finding	  abusive	   conduct	   if	   dominance	  and	   the	  abuse	   take	  place	   in	  different	  and	  
unrelated	  markets.1245	  The	  Court	  of	  Justice	  held	  on	  that	  matter	  that:	  
“It	   is	   true	   that	   application	   of	   Article	   [102]	   presupposes	   a	   link	   between	   the	  
dominant	  position	  and	  the	  alleged	  abusive	  conduct,	  which	  is	  normally	  not	  present	  
where	  conduct	  on	  a	  market	  distinct	  from	  the	  dominated	  market	  produces	  effects	  
on	   that	   distinct	   market.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   distinct,	   but	   associated,	   markets,	   […]	  
application	  of	  Article	   [102]	   to	  conduct	   found	  on	   the	  associated,	  non-­‐dominated,	  
market	   and	   having	   effects	   on	   that	   associated	   market	   can	   only	   be	   justified	   by	  
special	  circumstances”.1246	  
The	  EU	  case	  law	  on	  that	  matter	  suggests	  that	  an	  abuse	  on	  a	  non-­‐dominant	  market	  will	  only	  be	  
found	   in	   very	   rare	   cases.1247	   In	   the	   grocery	   sector,	   one	  may	   considered	   that	   close	   links	   exist	  
between	   the	   upstream	   procurement	   market	   and	   the	   downstream	   retail	   market.	   We	   have	  
indeed	  pointed	  out	  that	  a	  strong	  position	  in	  the	  former	  market	  is	  likely	  to	  provide	  retail	  chains	  
with	  competitive	  advantages	  in	  the	  latter	  market	  so	  that	  a	  retailer	  could	  leverage	  its	  dominant	  
buyer	  position	  to	  gain	  unfair	  advantages	  at	  the	  retail	   level.	  Given	  the	  existence	  of	  substantial	  
interconnections	  between	  the	  two	  markets,	   it	   is	  hence	  not	  excluded	  that	   leveraging	  conduct	  
amounts	   to	  an	  abuse.	  However,	   in	  order	   to	   find	  an	  abuse	  prohibited	  under	   the	   competition	  
rules,	   competition	  authorities	  will	  have	   to	  establish	   that	  a	  grocery	   retailer	  uses	   its	  dominant	  
buyer	   position	   to	   commit	   an	   abuse	   and	   restrict	   competition	   in	   the	   related	   retail	   market.	   A	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1245	  R.O’Donoghue	  &	  A.J.Padilla,	  op.cit.,	  at	  212.	  
1246	  C-­‐333/94	  P,	  Tetra	  Pak	  International	  SA	  v	  Commission	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐5951,	  at	  27.	  
1247	  Such	  «	  links	  »	  between	  the	  dominant	  and	  non-­‐dominant	  markets	  have	  only	  been	  found	  in	  two	  cases,	  
namely	  in	  Tetra	  Pak	  II	  and	  in	  Microsoft.	  In	  the	  first	  case,	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  considered	  that	  there	  were	  
sufficient	  “associative	  links”	  between	  the	  dominant	  aseptic	  carton	  market	  and	  the	  non-­‐dominant	  non-­‐aseptic	  
carton	  market	  so	  as	  to	  treat	  predatory	  pricing	  on	  the	  latter	  market	  as	  an	  abuse.	  Different	  factors	  lead	  the	  Court	  
to	  that	  conclusion.	  See:	  C-­‐333/94	  P,	  Tetra	  Pak	  International	  SA	  v	  Commission	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐5951,	  at	  28-­‐31.	  In	  the	  
second	  case,	  the	  market	  of	  PC	  operating	  systems	  and	  the	  one	  of	  work	  group	  servers	  were	  considered	  to	  be	  
interrelated.	  Microsoft	  was	  sanctioned	  for	  leveraging	  its	  dominant	  market	  position	  from	  the	  PC	  operating	  
system	  market	  to	  the	  work	  group	  operating	  system	  market.	  See:	  Microsoft,	  Case	  COMP/C-­‐3/37.792,	  
Commission	  Decision	  of	  24	  March	  2004,	  upheld	  on	  appeal	  in	  case	  T-­‐201/04,	  Microsoft	  Corp.	  v	  Commission	  
[2007]	  ECR	  II-­‐3601.	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causal	   connection	   needs	   indeed	   to	   be	   shown	   between	   the	   dominance	   and	   the	   abusive	  
conduct.1248	  
v. Refusal	  to	  list,	  delisting	  and	  the	  essential	  facilities	  doctrine	  
The	   essential	   facilities	   doctrine	   specifies	   when	   the	   owner	   of	   an	   “essential”	   or	   bottleneck”	  
facility	  is	  obliged	  to	  give	  competitors	  access	  to	  that	  facility,	  against	  a	  reasonable	  fee,	  so	  as	  to	  
enable	   those	   competitors	   to	   do	   business.	   1249	   As	   stated	   by	   Advocate	   General	   Jacobs	   in	   the	  
Oscar	  Bronner	  case,	  	  
“according	   to	   that	   doctrine	   a	   company	   which	   has	   a	   dominant	   position	   in	   the	  
provision	   of	   facilities	   which	   are	   essential	   for	   the	   supply	   of	   goods	   or	   services	   in	  
another	   market	   abuses	   tis	   dominant	   position	   where,	   without	   objective	  
justification,	  it	  refuses	  access	  to	  those	  facilities.	  Thus,	  in	  certain	  cases,	  a	  dominant	  
undertaking	   must	   not	   merely	   refrain	   from	   anti-­‐competitive	   action	   but	   must	  
actively	   promote	   competition	   by	   allowing	   potential	   competitors	   access	   to	   the	  
facilities	  which	  it	  has	  developed”.1250	  
Essential	   facilities	  cases	   involve	  two	  related	  markets:	  an	  upstream	  market	  where	  a	  dominant	  
firm	  controls	  the	  supply	  of	  a	  particular	  asset	  and	  a	  downstream	  market	  where	  the	  production	  
of	  goods	  or	  services	  requires	  access	  to	  the	  asset	  in	  question.	  If	  a	  refusal	  by	  the	  dominant	  firm	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1248	  R.O’Donoghue	  &	  A.J.Padilla,	  op.cit.,	  at	  210.	  
1249	  OECD,	  The	  essential	  facilities	  concept,	  Policy	  Roundtables,	  1996,	  OECD/GD(96)113,	  available	  at:	  
http://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/1920021.pdf	  On	  that	  doctrine,	  see	  also:	  J.T.	  Lang,	  Defining	  legitimate	  
competition:	  Companies’	  duties	  to	  supply	  competitors	  and	  access	  to	  essential	  facilities,	  18	  Fordham	  
International	  Law	  Journal	  439	  (1994);	  J.T.Lang,	  The	  Principle	  of	  Essential	  Facilities	  in	  European	  Community	  
Competition	  Law	  –	  The	  Position	  since	  Bronner,	  1	  Journal	  of	  Network	  Industries	  375	  (2000);	  S.J.Evrard,	  Essential	  
facilities	  in	  the	  European	  Union:	  Bronner	  and	  Beyond,	  10	  Columbia	  Journal	  of	  European	  Law	  491	  (2003-­‐2004);	  
R.O’Donoghue	  &	  A.J.Padilla,	  op.cit.,	  at	  407-­‐476;	  V.Hatzopoulos,	  The	  EC	  essential	  facilities	  doctrine,	  in	  EC	  
Competition	  Law:	  A	  Critical	  Assessment,	  Guiliano	  Amato	  and	  Claus-­‐Dieter	  Ehlermann	  (ed.)	  (2007),	  at	  333-­‐375.	  
The	  duty	  of	  a	  dominant	  firm	  to	  grant	  access	  to	  essential	  facilities	  was	  developed	  in	  cases	  referring	  to	  essential	  
transport	  infrastructure	  for	  which	  there	  was	  no	  effective	  alternative,	  such	  as	  railroad,	  port	  or	  airport.	  Following	  
the	  liberalization	  of	  public	  utilities,	  the	  doctrine	  has	  become	  important	  because	  access	  to	  networks,	  such	  as	  
telecommunication,	  electricity,	  postal,	  rail	  or	  gas	  networks,	  is	  essential	  for	  competitors	  willing	  to	  provide	  
services	  in	  the	  downstream	  market.	  In	  many	  cases,	  access	  obligations	  have	  resulted	  in	  EU	  legislation	  confirming	  
duties	  to	  share	  facilities.	  See:	  Liberalization	  of	  network	  industries	  –	  Economic	  implications	  and	  main	  policy	  
issues,	  European	  Commission	  -­‐	  Directorate-­‐General	  for	  Economic	  and	  Financial	  Affairs,	  Reports	  and	  Studies	  No	  
4,	  1999,	  available	  at:	  http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication8093_en.pdf	  ;	  D.Geradin,	  
Remedies	  in	  network	  industries:	  EC	  competition	  law	  Vs.	  sector-­‐specific	  regulation	  (2004)	  
1250	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Jacobs,	  delivered	  on	  28th	  May	  1998,	  Case	  7/97,	  Oscar	  Bronner	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐7791,	  at	  34.	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to	  deal	  with	  third	  parties	  in	  the	  upstream	  market	  would	  eliminate	  competition	  in	  the	  relevant	  
downstream	  market,	  a	  duty	  to	  provide	  access	  to	  the	  essential	  asset	  may	  arise.1251	  
In	  the	  grocery	  retail	  sector,	  one	  may	  wonder	  whether	  shelf-­‐space	  of	  dominant	  retailers	  under	  
the	   criteria	   defined	   above	   could	   be	   considered	   as	   an	   essential	   infrastructure,	   the	   access	   of	  
which	  is	  needed	  for	  grocery	  manufacturers	  so	  as	  to	  provide	  their	  products	  to	  consumers	  in	  the	  
downstream	   retail	  market.	   	   To	   answer	   that	   question,	  we	  will	   look	   over	   the	   legal	   conditions	  
under	   which	   access	   to	   an	   essential	   facility	   should	   be	   ordered.	   As	   such,	   the	   facility	  must	   be	  
indispensable	  to	  compete	   in	  the	  downstream	  market	  (1);	  the	  refusal	  to	  deal	  would	  eliminate	  
competition	  in	  the	  downstream	  market	  (2)	  and;	  no	  objective	  considerations	  justify	  the	  refusal	  
to	  deal	  (3).1252	  	  	  
Before	  examining	  these	  conditions,	  it	  must	  be	  underlined	  that	  a	  private	  distribution	  network,	  
such	   as	   a	   grocery	   retail	   network,	  may	   constitute	   a	   facility.1253	   In	   the	   grocery	   retail	   sector,	   it	  
could	   therefore	   be	   considered	   that	   large	   retail	   chains	   control	   an	   essential	   facility	   and	   could	  
restrict	  competition	  in	  the	  downstream	  retail	  market	  by	  refusing	  access	  to	  their	  shelf-­‐space	  to	  
grocery	  manufacturers.	  As,	  in	  a	  way,	  supermarket	  chains	  compete	  with	  those	  manufacturers	  in	  
the	   downstream	   retail	  market	   through	   their	   private	   label	   lines,	   they	   could	   use	   their	   control	  
over	  shelf-­‐space	  to	  leverage	  their	  position	  in	  that	  downstream	  market.	  However,	  this	  may	  not	  
necessarily	  be	  sufficient	  to	  mandate	  large	  retailers	  to	  grant	  shelf-­‐space	  to	  food	  producers.	  The	  
freedom	  to	  choose	  ones’	  trading	  partner	  and	  dispose	  of	  one’s	  property	  is	   indeed	  the	  general	  
rule,	  even	  for	  dominant	  companies.	  The	  refusal	  to	  deal	  is	  therefore	  not	  in	  itself	  an	  abuse	  and	  
any	   incursion	   on	   that	   freedom	   requires	   careful	   justification	   and	   is	   subject	   to	   the	   following	  
conditions.1254	  	  
(1)	   The	   facility	   must	   be	   essential,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   is	   indispensable	   to	   compete	   in	   the	  
downstream	   market,	   there	   is	   no	   alternative	   and	   it	   cannot	   be	   duplicated	   or	   only	   at	   an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1251	  The	  concept	  of	  refusal	  to	  deal	  also	  covers	  situations	  where	  the	  dominant	  firm	  makes	  access	  to	  the	  essential	  
facility	  subject	  to	  objectively	  unreasonable	  terms	  or	  uses	  dilatory	  tactics	  tantamount	  to	  a	  refusal	  to	  deal.	  See,	  
for	  example:	  Deutsche	  Post	  AG	  –	  Interception	  of	  cross-­‐border	  mail,	  Case	  No	  COMP/C-­‐1/36.915,	  Commission	  
Decision	  of	  25	  July	  2001;	  Sea	  Containers	  v	  Stena	  Sealink	  –	  Interim	  measures,	  Case	  No	  IV/39.689,	  Commission	  
Decision	  of	  21	  December	  1993;	  Cleastream	  (Clearing	  and	  Settlement),	  Case	  No	  COMP/38.096,	  Commission	  
Decision	  of	  4	  June	  2004.	  
1252	  These	  conditions	  have	  been	  set	  out	  in	  different	  cases.	  See,	  for	  examples:	  T-­‐69/89,	  Radio	  Telefis	  Eireann	  
(RTE)	  v	  Commission	  [1991]	  ECR	  II-­‐485;	  C-­‐7/97,	  Oscar	  Bronner	  v	  Mediaprint	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐7791;	  Joined	  cases	  T-­‐
374/94,	  T-­‐375/94,	  T-­‐384/94	  and	  T-­‐388/94,	  European	  Night	  Services	  Ltd	  (ENS)	  &	  Co	  v	  Commission	  [1998]	  ECR	  II-­‐
3141;	  C-­‐418/01,	  IMS	  Health	  GmbH	  &	  Co.	  OHG	  v	  NDC	  Health	  GmbH	  &	  Co.	  KG	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐3401;	  T-­‐201/04,	  
Microsoft	  Corp.	  v	  Commission	  [2007]	  ECR	  II-­‐3601.	  
1253	  The	  Court	  of	  Justice	  indeed	  held	  in	  Oscar	  Bronner	  that	  a	  private	  distribution	  network	  for	  newspapers	  may	  
constitute	  a	  facility.	  	  
1254	  See:	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Jacobs	  in	  Bronner,	  op.cit.,	  at	  56.	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uneconomic	  cost.1255	  The	  Court	  of	  Justice	  in	  Bronner	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  test	  is	  objective	  and	  
not	   based	   on	   the	   capacities	   of	   a	   particular	   company	   seeking	   access	   to	   the	   facility.1256	   The	  
objective	  is	  indeed	  to	  protect	  competition,	  not	  competitors.	  The	  question	  is	  therefore	  whether	  
it	  would	  be	  economically	  viable	  to	  create	  another	  network	  with	  comparable	  size/economies	  of	  
scale.	  In	  this	  respect,	  AG	  Jacobs	  maintained	  that	  a	  facility	  might	  be	  deemed	  essential	  where	  
“duplication	  of	  the	  facility	  is	  impossible	  or	  extremely	  difficult	  owing	  to	  physical,	  
geographical	   or	   legal	   constraints	   or	   is	   highly	   undesirable	   for	   reasons	   of	   public	  
policy.	  It	  is	  not	  sufficient	  that	  the	  undertaking's	  control	  over	  a	  facility	  should	  give	  
it	  a	  competitive	  advantage.	  	  
[…]	   The	   cost	   of	   duplicating	   a	   facility	   might	   alone	   constitute	   an	   insuperable	  
barrier	  to	  entry.	  That	  might	  be	  so	  particularly	   in	  cases	   in	  which	  the	  creation	  of	  
the	   facility	   took	   place	   under	   non-­‐competitive	   conditions,	   for	   example,	   partly	  
through	   public	   funding.	   […]If	   the	   cost	   of	   duplicating	   the	   facility	   alone	   is	   the	  
barrier	   to	   entry,	   it	   must	   be	   such	   as	   to	   deter	   any	   prudent	   undertaking	   from	  
entering	  the	  market”.1257	  	  
Consequently,	   one	  may	   affirm	   that	   a	   private	   grocery	   retail	   network	   developed	   under	   competitive	  
conditions	   is	   unlikely	   to	   meet	   the	   test	   of	   indispensability.	   The	   presence	   of	   different	   supermarket	  
chains	   controlling	   their	   own	   distribution	   network	   and	   the	   emergence	   of	   new	   competing	   retailers,	  
such	   as	   hard-­‐discounters,	   show	   that	   a	   company	   operating	   on	   the	   same	   scale	   as	   a	   dominant	  
supermarket	  chain	  in	  the	  upstream	  market	  could	  develop	  another	  distribution	  network.	  	  
(2)	  The	  second	  condition	  for	   the	  finding	  of	  an	  abuse	   is	   that	   the	  refusal	   to	  deal	  substantially	  affects	  
competition	   in	   the	  downstream	  market.	   The	  elimination	  of	  one	  competitor	   is	  hence	  unlikely	   to	  be	  
sufficient	   to	   meet	   that	   condition,	   provided	   that	   the	   downstream	   market	   remains	   competitive	  
without	   it.1258	   In	   fact,	   the	   condition	   related	   to	   the	   risk	   of	   elimination	   of	   competition	   requires	   that	  
dominance	  in	  the	  upstream	  market	  is	  combined	  with	  or	  would	  lead	  to	  dominance	  in	  the	  downstream	  
market	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  refusal.	  	  
In	  the	  grocery	  sector,	  despite	  the	  growing	  presence	  of	  private	  label	  products,	  it	  cannot	  be	  considered	  
that	  a	  supermarket	  chain	  holds	  a	  dominant	  position	  in	  any	  product	  category.	  Competition	  is	  indeed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1255	  R.O’Donoghue	  &	  A.J.Padilla,	  op.cit.,	  at	  434.	  
1256	  C-­‐7/97,	  Oscar	  Bronner,	  op.cit.,	  at	  44-­‐46.	  
1257	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Jacobs	  in	  Bronner,	  op.cit.,	  at	  65-­‐66.	  
1258	  J.T.Lang,	  The	  Principle	  of	  Essential	  Facilities	  in	  European	  Community	  Competition	  Law	  –	  The	  Position	  since	  
Bronner,	  1	  Journal	  of	  Network	  Industries	  375,	  at	  383	  (2000)	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still	  effective	  between	  a	  retailer’s	  private	  label	  lines	  and	  branded	  products	  as	  well	  as	  brands	  owned	  
by	   competing	   retailers.	   The	   refusal	   to	   deal	   with	   a	   particular	   supplier	   is	   therefore	   unlikely	   to	  
substantially	  eliminate	  competition	  in	  the	  downstream	  retail	  market.	  
	  (3)	  The	  final	  condition	  for	  a	  duty	  to	  deal	  is	  that	  the	  refusal	  cannot	  be	  objectively	  justified.	  Among	  the	  
objective	  reasons	  that	  might	  be	   invoked	  to	   justify	  a	   refusal	   to	  deal,	  we	  can	   for	  example	  mention	  a	  
lack	  of	  creditworthiness	  of	  the	  company	  seeking	  access,	  a	  difficulty	  of	  providing	  access	  to	  the	  facility,	  
a	   reduction	   in	   efficiency	  or	   a	   possible	   quality	   or	   security	   degradation	   if	   access	  was	   granted	  or	   the	  
absence	  of	  available	  capacity.1259	  That	  last	  reason	  is	  of	  particular	  relevance	  in	  the	  grocery	  retail	  sector	  
where	   shelf-­‐space	   is	   already	   fully	   used	   in	   supermarket	   stores.	   Given	   that	   competition	   remains	  
effective	  between	  grocery	  products,	  large	  retail	  chains	  could	  argue	  that	  there	  would	  be	  little	  increase	  
in	  competition	  if	  it	  were	  required	  to	  reduce	  the	  presence	  of	  existing	  products	  on	  the	  shelves	  to	  let	  in	  
another	  competitor	  supplying	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  product.1260	  	  
One	   could	  argue	   that,	   if	   the	   firm	  which	   request	   access	  does	  not	   intent	   to	   limit	   itself	   essentially	   to	  
duplicating	   the	   goods	   already	   offered	   by	   the	   dominant	   retailer	   in	   the	   downstream	  market,	   but	   is	  
planning	  to	  offer	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  or	  an	  improved	  product,	  not	  comparable	  to	  any	  existing	  product	  on	  a	  
retailer’s	   shelves,	   a	   refusal	   to	   list	   that	   product	   is	   more	   likely	   to	   stifle	   competition	   and	   thereby	  
constitute	   an	   abuse,	   so	   that,	   despite	   limited	   capacity	   availability,	   a	   duty	   to	   give	   access	   should	   be	  
mandated.1261	  However,	  as	  the	  conditions	  for	  imposing	  a	  duty	  to	  deal	  are	  cumulative,	  the	  failure	  to	  
meet	  the	  test	  of	  indispensability	  would,	  anyway,	  tilt	  the	  balance	  of	  interests	  at	  stake	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  
retailers’	  freedom	  to	  choose	  their	  trading	  partners.	  	  
In	   addition,	   the	   fact	   that	   grocery	   retail	   networks	   have	   been	   developed	   by	   purely	   private	   means,	  
within	   a	   genuinely	   competitive	   environment,	   is	   of	   particular	   importance.	   Indeed,	   it	   should	   be	  
underlined	   that	   the	   essential	   facilities	   doctrine	   has	   mostly	   been	   used	   for	   the	   deregulation	   and	  
liberalization	   of	   state-­‐owned	   natural	   monopolies.	   In	   those	   sectors	   such	   as	   port,	   airport,	   railway,	  
electricity	   or	   telecommunication,	   the	   facility	   used	   to	   provide	   public	   services	   has	   been	   financed	   by	  
public	  funds	  and	  controlled	  by	  a	  monopolist.	  Ordering	  access	  to	  such	  a	  facility	  under	  the	  conditions	  
developed	   here	   above	   may	   therefore	   be	   thought	   most	   likely	   to	   confer	   the	   greatest	   benefit	   to	  
competition	  and	  the	  least	  harm	  to	  the	  facility	  owner.1262	  Similar	  arguments	  can	  be	  held	  when	  private	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1259	  R.O’Donoghue	  &	  A.J.Padilla,	  op.cit.,	  at	  450-­‐454.	  
1260	  J.T.	  Lang,	  Defining	  legitimate	  competition:	  Companies’	  duties	  to	  supply	  competitors	  and	  access	  to	  essential	  
facilities,	  18	  Fordham	  International	  Law	  Journal	  439,	  at	  493	  (1994)	  
1261	  See	  in	  this	  sense:	  Guidance	  on	  the	  Commission’s	  enforcement	  priorities	  in	  applying	  Article	  102	  of	  the	  EC	  
Treaty,	  op.cit.,	  at	  87.	  
1262	  R.O’Donoghue	  &	  A.J.Padilla,	  op.cit.,	  at	  463.	  See	  also:	  V.Hatzopoulos,	  The	  EC	  essential	  facilities	  doctrine,	  in	  
EC	  Competition	  Law:	  A	  Critical	  Assessment,	  Guiliano	  Amato	  and	  Claus-­‐Dieter	  Ehlermann	  (ed.)	  (2007),	  at	  368.	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companies	  enjoyed	  special	  or	  exclusive	   rights	  with	   regard	   to	  exploitation	  of	   facilities	  developed	  by	  
them.	   Conversely,	   in	   the	   grocery	   retail	   sector,	   no	   privilege	   has	   been	   granted	   to	   the	   existing	  
supermarket	  chains	  and	  nothing	  prevents	  competitors	  from	  entering	  the	  market.	  
vi. Effect-­‐based	  approach	  
In	  any	  case,	  the	  prohibition	  on	  abusive	  conduct	  in	  the	  grocery	  sector	  should	  be	  based	  on	  clear	  
evidence	  that	  a	  given	  practice	  restricts	  or	  is	  likely	  to	  restrict	  competition	  and	  thereby	  prevents	  
the	   competition	   rules	   from	   achieving	   their	   objectives.	   The	   competition	   assessment	  must	   be	  
based	  on	   the	   impact	  of	  dominant	   retailers’	  practices	  on	   the	   competitive	  process	  and	  on	   the	  
resulting	  harm	  that	  they	  may	  cause	  to	  consumers,	  not	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  price	  but	  also	  in	  terms	  
of	  quality	  and	  choice.	  The	  balancing	  test	  used	  in	  competition	  cases	  which	  aims	  at	  weighing	  the	  
positive	  and	  negative	  effects	  of	  business	  conduct	  is	  undoubtedly	  the	  best	  means	  not	  to	  inhibit	  
significantly	   retailers’	   freedom	   of	   negotiation	   through	   overly	   prescriptive	   rules	   and	   not	   to	  
deter	  practices	  whose	  positive	  effects	  on	  competition	  prevail	  over	  the	  negative	  ones.	  	  
4. Revised	  criteria	  applicable	  to	  vertical	  and	  collusive	  arrangements	  
If	  the	  new	  criteria	  suggested	  above	  were	  to	  be	  adopted	  to	  assess	  abuses	  of	  dominance	  in	  the	  grocery	  
retail	   sector,	  a	  similar	  approach	  should	  be	  adopted	  with	   regard	   to	  vertical	  agreements	   imposed	  by	  
large	   retailers	   on	   their	   suppliers,	   as	   well	   as	   those	   leading	   to	   an	   indirect	   exchange	   of	   information	  
between	   competitors	   within	   a	   hub-­‐and-­‐spoke	   system,	   so	   as	   to	   ensure	   consistency	   in	   the	  
enforcement	  of	  the	  competition	  rules.	  	  
a) Vertical	  agreements	  
Market	  share	  thresholds	  are	  not	  only	  used	  in	  the	  competition	  assessment	  of	  single-­‐firm	  conduct	  but	  
also	   in	   cases	   involving	   vertical	   agreements.	   We	   have	   indeed	   already	   mentioned	   that	   vertical	  
agreements	   are	   likely	   to	   fall	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   General	   Block	   Exemption	   Regulation	   if	   the	  
market	  share	  held	  by	  the	  supplier	  does	  not	  exceed	  30%	  of	  the	  relevant	  market	  on	  which	  it	  sells	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
According	  to	  M.Hatzopoulos,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  R&D	  for	  and	  construction	  of	  the	  facility	  have	  been	  financed	  by	  
public	  funds,	  policy	  considerations	  argue	  in	  favour	  of	  enlarged	  access	  rights.	  M.O’Donoghue	  &	  Padilla,	  
however,	  consider	  that	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  why	  the	  public	  source	  of	  the	  funding	  for	  the	  property	  should	  lead	  to	  a	  
stricter	  legal	  standard.	  “The	  public	  source	  of	  [the	  funding	  of	  the	  property	  rights]	  may	  explain	  why	  certain	  
refusal	  to	  deal	  cases	  are	  pursued,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  offer	  a	  useful	  legal	  test	  for	  determining	  the	  legal	  conditions	  
under	  which	  a	  duty	  to	  deal	  is	  appropriate.	  At	  most,	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  facility	  is	  a	  natural	  monopoly,	  the	  result	  of	  a	  
former	  statutory	  monopoly,	  or	  publicly-­‐owned	  helps	  explain	  the	  type	  of	  cases	  that,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  policy,	  are	  
thought	  most	  likely	  to	  confer	  the	  greatest	  benefit	  to	  competition	  in	  ordering	  access	  and	  the	  least	  harm	  to	  the	  
property	  owner.	  Limiting	  the	  use	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  forced	  sharing	  to	  these	  situations	  is	  therefore	  a	  convenient	  
policy	  argument	  to	  place	  general	  restrictions	  on	  the	  duty	  to	  share	  in	  order	  to	  limit	  its	  harmful	  effects	  rather	  
than	  a	  substantive	  principle.”	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contract	  goods	  or	  services	  and	  that	  the	  market	  share	  held	  by	  the	  buyer	  does	  not	  exceed	  30%	  of	  the	  
relevant	   market	   on	   which	   it	   purchases	   the	   contract	   goods	   or	   services.1263	   The	   same	   inadequacy	  
hence	   appears	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   criterion	   used	   to	   assess	   buyers’	  market	   power	   in	   the	   upstream	  
procurement	  market.	  The	  market	  share	  held	  in	  that	  market	  is	  indeed	  unlikely	  to	  reflect	  the	  degree	  of	  
market	  power	  of	  the	  buyer	  involved.	  	  
As	  a	  result,	  the	  criteria	  developed	  above	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  assessment	  of	  buyer	  power	  should	  also	  
be	  used	  in	  vertical	  agreement	  cases.	  This	  would	  be	  particularly	  relevant	  when	  such	  an	  agreement	  is	  
obviously	   initiated	   by	   a	   buyer,	   such	   as	   in	   case	   of	   restrictions	   concerning	   the	   supply	   of	   goods	   to	  
competing	  buyers.	  	  
b) The	  issue	  of	  hub	  &	  spoke	  conspiracy	  
Some	  arrangements	  cannot	  be	  classified	  either	  as	  vertical	  or	  horizontal	  because	  they	  involve	  vertical	  
relationships	   leading	   to	   horizontal	   collusion	   as	   illustrated	   above.1264	  We	   suggested	   in	   Point	   3	   that	  
Article	   102	   TFEU	   be	   applicable	   to	   a	   dominant	   retailer	   inducing	   suppliers	   to	   engage	   in	   a	   collective	  
boycott	   or	   to	   pass	   on	   information	   to	   competitors	   in	   order	   to	   help	   them	   implement	   a	   collusive	  
strategy	   at	   the	   retail	   level.	   However,	   an	   abuse	   under	   that	   provision	   could	   only	   be	   found	   if	   it	   is	  
established	  that	  the	  retailer’s	  conduct	  generate	  horizontal	  anticompetitive	  effects.	  
There	  are	  no	  EU	  cases	  dealing	  specifically	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  a	  concerted	  practice	  resulting	  from	  an	  A-­‐
B-­‐C	   information	   exchange.	   However,	   with	   regard	   to	   hub-­‐and-­‐spoke	   strategy	   leading	   to	   indirect	  
contact	   between	   competing	   retailers	   via	   a	   common	   supplier,	   different	   UK	   decisions,	   and,	   in	  
particular,	   the	  decision	   rendered	   in	   the	  cheese	  sector	  by	   the	  Competition	  Appeal	  Tribunal1265,	  may	  
shed	  some	  light	  on	  the	  conditions	  to	  be	  met	  to	  consider	  that	  the	  parties	  involved	  in	  such	  a	  strategy	  
are	  in	  fact	  part	  of	  a	  concerted	  practice	  restricting	  competition.	  
The	  concept	  of	   concerted	  practice	  was	  briefly	  developed	   in	  Part	   II.1266	   It	   is	  defined	  by	   the	  Court	  of	  
Justice	  as	  	  
“a	  form	  of	  coordination	  between	  undertakings	  which,	  without	  having	  reached	  the	  stage	  
where	   an	   agreement	   properly	   so-­‐called	   has	   been	   concluded,	   knowingly	   substitutes	  
practical	  cooperation	  between	  them	  for	  the	  risks	  of	  competition”.1267	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1263	  Commission	  Regulation	  on	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  101(3)	  of	  the	  Treaty	  to	  categories	  of	  vertical	  
agreements	  and	  concerted	  practices	  ,	  op.cit.,	  Article	  3(1).	  
1264	  See	  above,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  II,	  Point	  C.	  
1265	  Competition	  Appeal	  Tribunal,	  Tesco	  Stores	  Ltd	  Tesco	  Holdings	  Ltd	  Tesco	  Plc	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading,	  Cases	  
1188/1/1/11	  [2012]	  CAT	  31.	  On	  that	  decision,	  see	  above,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  II,	  Point	  C.	  
1266	  See	  :	  Part	  II,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  I,	  Point	  A,	  1,	  c).	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Economic	  operators	  must	  in	  fact	  determine	  independently	  their	  trade	  policy.	  Even	  though	  they	  
are	   free	   to	   adapt	   themselves	   intelligently	   to	   the	   existing	   and	   anticipated	   conduct	   of	  
competitors,	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  requirement	  of	  independence	  does	  
“preclude	  any	  direct	  or	   indirect	  contact	  between	  such	  operators,	   the	  object	  or	  
effect	  whereof	  Is	  either	  to	  influence	  the	  conduct	  on	  the	  market	  of	  an	  actual	  or	  
potential	  competitor	  or	  to	  disclose	  to	  such	  a	  competitor	  the	  course	  of	  conduct	  
which	  they	  themselves	  have	  decided	  to	  adopt	  or	  contemplate	  adopting	  on	  the	  
market”.1268	  
The	   UK	   Competition	   Appeal	   Tribunal	   pointed	   out	   that	   concerted	   practices	   can	   take	   many	  
different	   forms	   so	   that	   the	   assessment	   as	   to	   whether	   such	   a	   practice	   exists	   must	   be	   fact-­‐
specific.1269	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  indirect	  exchange	  of	  information,	  it	  may	  be	  considered	  
that	  a	  concerted	  practice	  arise	  in	  circumstances	  where	  (1)	  retailer	  A	  discloses	  to	  supplier	  B	  its	  
future	  pricing	  intentions	  and	  may	  be	  taken	  to	  intend	  that	  B	  will	  make	  use	  of	  that	  information	  
to	  influence	  market	  conditions	  by	  passing	  that	  information	  to	  other	  retailers	  (of	  whom	  C	  is	  or	  
may	  be	  one),	  (2)	  B	  does,	  in	  fact,	  pass	  that	  information	  to	  C	  where	  C	  may	  be	  taken	  to	  know	  the	  
circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  information	  was	  disclosed	  by	  A	  to	  B	  and	  (3)	  C	  does,	  in	  fact,	  use	  the	  
information	  in	  determining	  its	  own	  future	  pricing	  intentions.1270	  	  
The	  mental	   element	   in	  each	  of	   the	   ‘A	   to	  B’	   and	   the	   ‘B	   to	  C’	   communications	   is	  of	  particular	  
importance.	  Disclosures	  of	  information	  by	  a	  retailer	  to	  its	  supplier	  in	  relation	  to	  matters	  such	  
as	   retail	   prices	   or	   profit	   margins	   are	   indeed	   often	   part	   of	   normal	   commercial	   vertical	  
discussions.	   However,	  where	   such	   information	   is	   disclosed	   by	   the	   supplier	   to	   other	   retailer-­‐
customers	  and	  that	  these	  retailers	  involved	  act	  with	  the	  relevant	  state	  of	  mind,	  this	  triangular	  
exchange	  of	  information	  may	  amount	  to	  the	  knowing	  substitution	  of	  practical	  cooperation	  for	  
the	  risks	  of	  competition	  and	  hence	  constitute	  an	  anticompetitive	  practice.	  	  
With	   regard	   to	   the	   ‘A	   to	   B’	   communication	   (1),	   it	   is	   therefore	   incumbent	   on	   competition	  
authorities	  to	  establish	  that	  retailer	  A	  may	  be	  taken	  to	  have	  intended,	  or	  actually	  foresaw,	  that	  
its	   future	   intentions	   would	   be	   conveyed	   to	   its	   competitor,	   retailer	   C.1271Establishing	   such	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1267	  Joined	  cases	  48,	  49	  and	  51-­‐57/69,	  ICI	  v	  Commission	  [1979]	  ECR	  619,	  at	  64.	  	  
1268	  Joined	  cases	  40-­‐48,	  50,	  54-­‐56,	  111,	  113,	  114/73,	  Coöperatieve	  Vereniging	  «	  Suiker	  Unie	  »	  UA	  and	  others	  v	  
Commission	  [1975]	  ECR	  1669,	  at	  174.	  
1269	  Competition	  Appeal	  Tribunal,	  Tesco	  Stores	  Ltd	  Tesco	  Holdings	  Ltd	  Tesco	  Plc	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading,	  Cases	  
1188/1/1/11	  [2012]	  CAT	  31,	  at	  56.	  
1270	  Ibid.,	  at	  57.	  
1271	  Ibid.,	  at	  66.	  This	  requirement	  is	  meant	  to	  avoid	  A	  being	  held	  strictly	  liable	  for	  the	  conduct	  of	  B,	  over	  whom	  
it	  may	  have	  limited	  control.	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state	  of	  mind	  is	  a	  question	  of	  fact	  which	  may	  hence	  be	  inferred	  from	  the	  circumstances.	  	  For	  
example,	  the	  UK	  Competition	  Appeal	  Tribunal	  maintained	  that	  	  
“the	  absence	  of	  any	  legitimate	  commercial	  reason	  for	  a	  disclosure	  by	  retailer	  A	  of	  
its	  future	  pricing	   intentions	  to	  supplier	  B	  may	  be	  indicative	  of	  the	  requisite	  state	  
of	  mind,	  when	   viewed	   in	   light	   of	   all	   the	   circumstances	   known	   to	   the	   disclosing	  
party	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  communication.”1272	  
Similarly,	   concerning	   the	   ‘B	   to	   C’	   communication	   (2),	   competition	   authorities	   have	   to	   prove	  
that	  retailer	  C	  may	  be	  taken	  to	  have	  known	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  A	  disclosed	  its	  future	  
retail	  pricing	  intentions	  to	  B.	  On	  that	  matter,	  the	  UK	  Competition	  Appeal	  Tribunal	  considered	  
that	  
“if,	   for	   example,	   [retailer	   C]	   knows	   that	   his	   supplier,	   B,	   is	   in	   negotiations	   with	  
retailer	  A	  about	  cost	  and	  retail	  price	  increases,	  and	  B	  subsequently	  tells	  him	  that	  A	  
will	   be	   increasing	   its	   prices	   on	   a	   particular	   date,	   it	   will	   scarcely	   be	   credible	   for	  
[retailer	  C]	   to	  maintain	   that	   it	  never	  occurred	   to	  him	  that	   the	   information	  came	  
from	  A”.1273	  	  
The	  Competition	  Appeal	  Tribunal	  also	  noted	  that	  the	  proof	  of	  a	  concerted	  practice	  would	  be	  all	  
the	  stronger	   if	   there	   is	   reciprocity,	   that	   is,	   if,	   after	   receiving	   information	  on	  A’s	   intentions,	  C	  
discloses	  to	  supplier	  B	  its	  own	  pricing	  intentions,	  intending	  that	  B	  will	  convey	  that	  information	  
to	  A.1274	  
Requiring	  that	  the	  competing	  retailers	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  role	  being	  played	  by	  the	  supplier	  is	   in	  
fact	   in	   line	   with	   the	   definition	   of	   a	   concerted	   practice	   given	   above	   which	   refers	   to	   firms	  
knowingly	  substituting	  practical	  cooperation	  between	  them	  for	  the	  risks	  of	  competition.	  	  
When	   the	   requisite	   mental	   element	   accompanying	   the	   exchange	   of	   information	   has	   been	  
proved,	  it	  remains	  to	  examine	  whether	  retailer	  C	  used	  the	  information	  in	  determining	  its	  own	  
future	   pricing	   intentions	   (3).	   In	   fact,	   a	   causal	   link	   between	   the	   concerted	   practice	   and	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1272	  Ibid.,	  at	  72.	  On	  that	  matter,	  «	  it	  is	  important	  to	  distinguish	  between	  communications	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  a	  
retailer	  will	  reduce	  its	  prices,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  that	  a	  retailer	  will	  maintain	  or	  increase	  its	  prices,	  on	  the	  
other.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  a	  planned	  reduction	  in	  the	  retail	  price,	  the	  retailer	  might	  legitimately	  relay	  its	  intentions	  to	  
the	  supplier,	  for	  example,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  secure	  a	  lower	  cost	  price	  to	  help	  fund	  the	  anticipated	  loss	  of	  margin.	  
There	  may	  be	  fewer	  legitimate	  commercial	  reasons	  for	  the	  transmission	  of	  a	  retailer’s	  intentions	  to	  maintain	  or	  
increase	  its	  prices.”	  
1273	  Ibid.,	  at	  83.	  
1274	  Ibid.,	  at	  70.	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subsequent	  conduct	  of	  the	  firms	  involved	  must	  be	  established.1275	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  Court	  of	  
Justice	  held	  that:	  
“subject	   to	   proof	   to	   the	   contrary,	   which	   it	   is	   for	   the	   economic	   operators	  
concerned	   to	   adduce,	   there	   must	   be	   a	   presumption	   that	   the	   undertakings	  
participating	  in	  concerting	  arrangements	  and	  remaining	  active	  on	  the	  market	  take	  
account	  of	   the	   information	  exchanged	  with	   their	   competitors	  when	  determining	  
their	  conduct	  on	  that	  market”.1276	  
It	   is	   hence	   presumed	   that	   competing	   firms	   take	   into	   account	   their	   rivals’	   planned	  
strategy	   when	   determining	   their	   own	   conduct	   on	   the	   market.	   Although	   the	   Court	  
referred	  to	  that	  presumption	   in	  cases	  of	  direct	  contact	  between	  competitors,	  a	  similar	  
approach	   should	   be	   adopted	  when	   information	   is	   exchanged	   indirectly	   via	   a	   common	  
trading	  partner.1277	  To	  rebut	  that	  presumption,	  the	  participating	  firms	  will	  have	  to	  prove	  
that	  their	  concerted	  action	  did	  not	  alter	  whatsoever	  their	  behavior.	  
Provided	  that	  the	  aforementioned	  conditions	  are	  met,	  hub-­‐and-­‐spoke	  conspiracy	  would	  
amount	   to	   an	   anticompetitive	   concerted	   practice	   and	   be	   pursued	   accordingly	   by	  
competition	   authorities.	   The	   use	   of	   buyer	   power	   to	   induce	   suppliers	   to	   enter	   in	   a	  
triangular	   arrangement	   could	   therefore	   be	   severely	   sanctioned	   due	   to	   the	   resulting	  
adverse	  horizontal	  effects.	  All	  parties	  involved,	  retailers	  and	  suppliers,	  would	  in	  fact	  be	  
subject	   to	   the	   rules	   and	   sanctions	   applicable	   in	   cases	   of	   restrictive	   agreements.	  
However,	   we	   would	   suggest	   that,	   when	   a	   hub-­‐and-­‐spoke	   cartel	   is	   successfully	  
implemented	   only	   due	   to	   pressure	   exerted	   by	   one	   (or	   more)	   retailer(s)	   on	   its	   (their)	  
suppliers,	   emphasis	   be	   put	   on	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	   which	   is	   behind	   such	  
collusive	  conduct.	  
As	  already	  mentioned,	   it	  would	  be	  possible	   to	  highlight	   the	  conduct	  at	   the	  root	  of	   the	  A-­‐B-­‐C	  
arrangement	   by	   enforcing,	   concurrently	   to	   the	   rules	   on	   restrictive	   agreements,	   these	   on	  
abusive	   conduct	  under	   the	  new	  criteria	  defined	  here	  above	   so	  as	   to	   sanction	  more	   severely	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1275	  See:	  C-­‐49/92P,	  Commission	  v	  Anic	  Partecipazioni	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐4125.	  The	  Court	  of	  Justice	  maintained:	  “It	  
follows	  that,	  as	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  very	  terms	  of	  Article	  [101(1)]	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  a	  concerted	  practice	  implies,	  
besides	  undertakings’	  concerting	  together,	  conduct	  on	  the	  market	  pursuant	  to	  those	  collusive	  practices,	  and	  a	  
relationship	  of	  cause	  and	  effect	  between	  the	  two”.	  (at	  118)	  
1276	  C-­‐49/92P,	  Commission	  v	  Anic	  Partecipazioni,	  op.cit.,	  at	  121.	  See	  also:	  C-­‐8/08,	  T-­‐Mobile	  Netherlands	  BV	  and	  
others	  v	  Raad	  van	  bestuur	  van	  de	  Nederlandse	  Mededingingsautoriteit	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐4529,	  at	  61.	  
1277	  This	  is	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  UK	  Competition	  Appeal	  Tribunal	  which	  maintained	  that	  “although	  there	  is	  no	  EU	  
authority	  on	  the	  point,	  it	  was	  common	  ground	  that	  the	  Anic	  presumption	  applied	  to	  the	  indirect	  exchange	  
between	  competitors	  of	  confidential	  future	  pricing	  intentions”.	  (at	  53)	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misuse	   of	   buyer	   power.	   In	   addition,	   competition	   authorities	   could	   look	   into	   the	   interests	   of	  
each	  party	  in	  participating	  in	  the	  information	  exchange	  arrangement	  and	  be	  more	  lenient	  with	  
suppliers	  which	  are	  in	  fact	  also	  “victims”	  of	  such	  conduct.	  Accordingly,	  competition	  authorities	  
could	  decline	  to	  fine	  suppliers	  or	  reduce	  the	  penalty	  imposed	  on	  them	  where	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  
the	   latter	   acted	   under	   retailers’	   threats	   and	   were	   thereby	   forced	   to	   pass	   on	   information	  
between	  competitors.1278	  	  
One	   element	   to	   be	   considered	   when	   assessing	   the	   possible	   coercion	   exerted	   by	   powerful	  
retailers	  upon	  their	  suppliers	  is	  for	  example	  the	  benefit	  suppliers	  gained	  or	  were	  likely	  to	  gain	  
by	  engaging	  in	  the	  exchange	  of	  information.	  If	  it	  appears	  that	  they	  had	  no	  economic	  interest	  in	  
conveying	   information	   or	   that	   their	   interest	   was	   quite	   unlike	   the	   benefit	   obtained	   by	   their	  
customer	  retailers,	  it	  could	  be	  presumed	  that	  the	  arrangement	  was	  initiated	  by	  the	  latter.	  It	  is	  
worth	   noting	   that,	   in	   case	   of	   a	   hub-­‐and-­‐spoke	   cartel	  meant	   to	  maintain	   higher	   retail	   prices,	  
suppliers	  do	  not	  necessarily	  profit	  by	  those	  high	  prices	  when	  they	  face	  customers	  with	  buyer	  
power.	   Indeed,	  the	   increase	   in	  prices	  of	  branded	  products	  will	   lead	  to	  a	  reduced	  demand	  for	  
these	  products	  and	  benefit	  competing	  private	  labels.	  In	  addition,	  unlike	  in	  cases	  of	  monopoly	  
prices	  imposed	  by	  powerful	  sellers,	  suppliers	  are	  unlikely	  to	  raise	  their	  margins	  by	  participating	  
in	   a	   resale	   price	   realignment	   orchestrated	   by	   large	   retailers.	   Due	   to	   their	   significant	  market	  
power,	   the	   latter	  will	   indeed	   be	   able	   to	   extract	   the	  most	   part	   of	   profits	   engendered	   by	   the	  
collusion.	  Although	  retailers’	  objective	  could	  not	  be	  achieved	  without	  suppliers’	  participation	  
in	  the	  hub-­‐and-­‐spoke	  strategy,	  the	  latter’s	  position	  of	  weakness	  and,	   in	  particular,	  their	  state	  
of	  economic	  dependency,	  should	  hence	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration	  by	  competition	  authorities	  
when	  sanctioning	  such	  practices.	  
	  
	  
CONCLUSION	  PART	  III	  
	  
Where	  authorities	  are	   reluctant	   to	  act	  against	  buyer	  power	  because	   it	   is	   assumed	   that	   such	  buyer	  
power	  brings	  lower	  prices	  to	  consumers,	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  objectives	  of	  EU	  competition	  law	  shows	  
that	  the	  competition	  rules	  are	  not	  only	  meant	  to	  ensure	  lower	  prices	  for	  consumers	  .	  The	  concept	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1278	  We	  have	  indeed	  mentioned	  above	  that,	  even	  though	  suppliers	  were	  unwilling	  to	  engage	  in	  an	  
anticompetitive	  exchange	  of	  information,	  they	  could	  not	  escape	  from	  the	  application	  of	  the	  competition	  rules.	  
However,	  competition	  authorities	  can	  take	  those	  circumstances	  into	  consideration	  when	  deciding	  the	  sanction	  
to	  be	  imposed	  on	  each	  firm	  involved.	  See	  above,	  Point	  A,	  1,	  b)	  and	  the	  related	  case	  law.	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consumer	  welfare	   indeed	   includes	  other	  aspects	   such	  as	  quality	  and	  choice.	   In	  order	   to	  protect	  all	  
these	   values,	   EU	   competition	   authorities	   focus	   on	   protecting	   the	   competition	   process	   and	   do	   not	  
only	  base	  the	  competition	  assessment	  on	  price	  effects	  in	  the	  downstream	  seller	  market.	  
Under	  that	  perspective,	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  large	  retail	  chains’	  buyer	  power	  could	  affect	  the	  competition	  
law	  goals.	  The	  grocery	  retail	  sector	  presents	  specificities	  that	  amplify	  buyers’	  market	  power	  due,	   in	  
particular,	  to	  the	  growing	  presence	  of	  private	  labels,	  the	  gatekeeper	  effect	  and	  high	  consumer	  loyalty	  
to	  their	  supermarket.	  As	  a	  result,	  suppliers	  are	  dependent	  on	  large	  grocery	  chains.	  	  
We	  have	  pointed	  out	  that	  some	  practices	  may	  raise	  consumer	  prices,	  in	  particular	  when	  negotiations	  
focus	   on	   commercial	   payments	   or	   other	   concessions	   extracted	   from	   suppliers	   rather	   than	   lower	  
purchase	   prices	   or	   when	   retailers	   aim	   at	   favoring	   their	   own-­‐brands.	   Supermarket	   chains’	   conduct	  
may	  also	  affect	  product	  quality	  and	  consumer	  choice.	  
In	   fact,	   retailers	  are	  customers	  of	   suppliers	  but	  also	   their	   competitors	  and	  suppliers	  of	  commercial	  
services	  which	  give	  them	  many	  opportunities	  to	  (ab)use	  their	  market	  power.	  
Despite	  the	  likely	  anticompetitive	  impact	  of	  buyers’	  practices	  in	  the	  grocery	  sector,	  competition	  rules	  
fall	  short	  of	  addressing	  buyer	  power	  concerns,	  especially	  the	  rules	  on	  dominance.	  Under	  Article	  102	  
TFEU	   and	   in	   most	   Member	   States	   which	   follow	   the	   EU	   principles	   when	   enforcing	   their	   national	  
competition	   legislation,	   retail	   chains	   are	   not	   regarded	   as	   dominant	   so	   that	   they	   escape	   from	   the	  
prohibition	  on	  abusive	  conduct.	  
In	  order	   to	   remedy	   that	   situation,	  we	  suggest	  harmonizing	   the	  Member	  States’	  national	   legislation	  
through	   a	   Directive	   so	   as	   to	   introduce	   new	   criteria	   to	   assess	   retail	   chains’	   buyer	   conduct.	   Such	  
Directive	  would	   aim	   at	   preventing	   harmful	   effects	   of	   buyer	   power	   on	   competition	   and	   drawbacks	  
which	  result	  from	  discrepancies	  between	  national	  laws	  on	  this	  matter.	  The	  suggested	  common	  rules	  
would	   be	   defined	   under	   the	   competition	   law	   policy	   so	   as	   to	   increase	   deterrence	   and	   give	   an	  
independent	  authority	  the	  power	  to	  enforce	  the	  rules.	  
In	  addition,	  such	  action	  would	  be	  limited	  to	  the	  grocery	  sector	  where	  large	  buyer	  retailers’	  practices	  
have	   been	   raising	   high	   concerns.	   Competition	   authorities	   would	   have	   thus	   the	   responsibility	   to	  
oversee	  supermarkets’	  conduct	  and	  enforce	  the	  prohibition	  on	  abusive	  conduct	  when	  the	  latter	  are	  
in	  a	  dominant	  position.	  
Under	   the	   new	   criteria,	   it	   would	   be	   concluded	   to	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   dominant	   position	   in	   the	  
upstream	   procurement	   market	   when	   the	   lack	   of	   alternative	   buyers	   and	   the	   high	   share	   the	   retail	  
chain	   concerned	   represents	   in	   suppliers’	   turnover	   make	   the	   latter	   dependent	   and	   that	   no	   other	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competitive	   constraints	   are	   likely	   to	  dissuade	   the	   retail	   chain	   in	  question	   from	  exploiting	   its	  buyer	  
power.	   In	   such	   circumstances,	   a	   retailer	   could	   limit	   competition,	   in	   particular	   by	   favoring	   its	   own-­‐
brands	  or	  by	  extracting	  concessions	  from	  suppliers	  which	  do	  not	  benefit	  consumers.	  Similar	  criteria	  
should	  also	  be	  used	   to	  assess	  vertical	  agreements	  between	   large	   retail	   chains	  and	   their	   supplier	   in	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Buyer	  power	   is	   a	   complex	   issue	  and	   there	   is	  no	   straightforward	  answer	   to	   the	  question	  of	  how	   to	  
address	   that	   power.	   The	   analysis	   made	   in	   this	   thesis	   though	   shows	   that	   addressing	   buyer	   power	  
within	   the	   scope	   of	   EU	   competition	   law	   and	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   specific	   criteria	  would	   be	   justified	   on	  
various	  grounds.	  	  
Although	  seller	  power	  and	  buyer	  power	  are	  the	  two	  facets	  of	  a	  same	  concept,	  namely	  the	  concept	  of	  
market	   power,	   these	   two	   types	   of	   power	   need	   to	   be	   assessed	   differently.	   Seller	   power	   has	   been	  
extensively	   analyzed	   by	   competition	   authorities	   and	   the	   European	   Commission	   has	   set	   clear	  
guidelines	   to	  measure	   that	  power	   in	  competition	  cases.	  The	  primary	  criterion	   to	  be	  used	   to	  assess	  
sellers’	  market	  power	  is	  the	  market	  share	  of	  the	  firm(s)	  involved.	  Under	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  a	  position	  
of	  dominance	   is	  unlikely	   to	  be	   found	  where	   the	   firm’s	   share	  of	   the	   relevant	  market	   is	  below	  40%.	  	  
Under	  Article	  101	  TFEU,	  vertical	  agreements	  are	  generally	  exempted	  if	  the	  market	  shares	  of	  the	  firms	  
taking	  part	  in	  those	  agreements	  do	  not	  exceed	  30%.	  Those	  criteria	  defined	  in	  seller	  power	  cases	  are,	  
however,	  ill-­‐suited	  to	  measure	  the	  degree	  of	  buyer	  power.	  
The	  description	  of	  buyer	  power	  reveals	  indeed	  that	  a	  buyer’s	  market	  share	  in	  the	  relevant	  upstream	  
buyer	  market	  is	  not	  the	  main	  factor	  to	  be	  considered	  when	  assessing	  the	  ability	  of	  that	  firm	  to	  exert	  
buyer	   power.	   Such	   ability	   results	   instead	   from	   the	   state	   of	   economic	   dependency	   of	   its	   suppliers.	  
Accordingly,	  the	  degree	  of	  buyer	  power	   is	  mainly	   linked	  to	  the	  number	  of	  alternatives	  available	  for	  
suppliers	   and	   to	   the	   buyer’s	   share	   in	   these	   suppliers’	   turnover.	   A	   buyer	   customer	   is	   indeed	   in	   a	  
position	  to	  dictate	  the	  rules	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market	  if	  it	  can	  threat	  to	  switch	  to	  other	  suppliers	  
while	   the	   latter	   cannot	   find	   equivalent	   alternatives	   to	   sell	   their	   products	   and	   would	   see	   their	  
economic	  viability	  put	  at	   risk	  should	  they	   lose	  that	  customer.	  Measuring	  buyer	  power	  according	  to	  
the	   criteria	   and	   market	   share	   thresholds	   established	   in	   the	   assessment	   of	   sellers’	   market	   power	  
might	  hence	   lead	   competition	  authorities	   to	  underestimating	   the	  ability	  of	  buyers	   to	  exert	  market	  
power	  in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market	  and	  to	  affect	  competition.	  	  
Buyer	   power	   is	   rarely	   used	   in	   terms	   of	   monopsony	   power.	   It	   is	   rather	   envisaged	   either	   as	  
countervailing	  buyer	  power,	  that	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  curb	  sellers’	  market	  power,	  or	  as	  buyer	  power	  senso	  
stricto,	   referring	   to	   a	   buyer’s	   ability	   to	   decrease	   price	   or	   extract	   other	   concessions	   from	   suppliers	  
without	  reducing	  the	  quantity	  purchased.	  In	  the	  first	  case,	  it	  is	  commonly	  accepted	  that	  buyer	  power	  
constitutes	   a	   positive	   strength	   which	   prevents	   sellers	   from	   misusing	   their	   market	   power.	   In	   the	  
second	   case,	   however,	   there	   is	   no	   consensus	   about	   the	  effects	  of	   buyer	  power	  on	   the	  markets	   so	  
that	   controversies	   have	   arisen	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   need	   to	   constrain	   or	   not	   that	   power.	   Those	  
uncertainties	  concerning	  the	  potential	  harmful	  effect	  of	  buyer	  power	  have	  in	  fact	  led	  EU	  and	  national	  
authorities	  to	  follow	  a	  cautious	  approach	  on	  this	  matter.	  Where	  new	  initiatives	  have	  been	  taken	  in	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some	  Member	   States	   to	   address	   buyer	   power	   concerns,	   it	   turns	   out	   that	   these	   remain	   relatively	  
timid	  and	  that	  national	  authorities	  walk	  on	  thin	  ice	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  enforce	  them.	  
In	  EU	  law,	  no	  specific	  action	  has	  been	  adopted	  to	  address	  buyer	  practices	  so	  that	  one	  and	  the	  same	  
set	  of	  rules	  apply	  to	  both	  buyer	  and	  seller	  cases.	  The	  focus	  is	  hence	  put	  on	  the	  firm’s	  market	  share	  to	  
assess	  its	  degree	  of	  market	  power.	  The	  state	  of	  economic	  dependency	  of	  the	  firm’s	  trading	  partners	  
is	   not	   considered	   in	   itself	   as	   a	   source	   of	  market	   power	   but	   rather	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   firm’s	  
dominance	   in	   the	   relevant	   market.	   The	   Commission	   put	   greater	   emphasis	   on	   the	   bilateral	  
relationships	  between	  buyers	  and	  suppliers	  and	  on	  the	  relative	  dependence	  that	  may	  exist	  between	  
them	  only	  when	  buyer	  power	   is	  assessed	   in	   the	   sense	  of	   countervailing	  power.	  The	  specificities	  of	  
buyer	  power	  are	  though	  not	  taken	   into	  consideration	  when	  competition	  concerns	  arise	  from	  buyer	  
and	   not	   seller	   practices,	   except	   in	   a	   few	  merger	   cases	  where	   the	   Commission	   concluded	   that	   the	  
operation	  would	  create	  a	  dominant	  position	  in	  the	  relevant	  upstream	  buyer	  market	  due	  to	  the	  strong	  
dependency	  of	  suppliers	  on	  the	  merged	  entity.	  
The	  application	  of	   similar	  criteria	   in	   seller	  and	  buyer	  power	  cases	  would	  not	  generate	  discussion	   if	  
buyers	  with	  a	  market	  share	  below	  the	  thresholds	  commonly	  used	  in	  the	  former	  cases	  were	  not	  able	  
to	  distort	  competition.	  However,	   in	  view	  of	  the	  objectives	  of	  EU	  competition	   law,	  we	  have	  pointed	  
out	  that	  some	  buyers’	  practices	  fall	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  competition	  rules	  despite	  their	  potential	  
harmful	  effect	  on	  competition.	  The	  objective	  of	  EU	  competition	  law	  is	  indeed	  to	  enhance	  consumer	  
welfare	   through	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   competition	   process.	   Although	   the	   exercise	   of	   buyer	   power	  
may,	   at	   first	   sight,	   appear	   positive	   from	   a	   competition	   law	   perspective	   as	   it	   is	   likely	   to	   lower	  
consumer	  prices,	  we	  pointed	  out	  that,	  in	  some	  circumstances,	  buyer	  practices	  may	  have	  an	  adverse	  
impact	  on	  those	  prices.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  grocery	  retail	  sector,	  large	  retailers	  can	  take	  advantage	  of	  
their	   suppliers’	   weaker	   position	   through	   various	   practices	   which	   do	   not	   necessarily	   lower	   the	  
purchasing	   prices.	   	   They	  may	   even	   be	   incited	   to	   do	   so	   as	   higher	   prices	   for	   branded	   products	   are	  
beneficial	  for	  private	  labels.	  In	  addition,	  the	  concept	  of	  consumer	  welfare	  includes	  other	  values	  such	  
as	   product	   quality	   and	   choice	   which	   could	   also	   be	   affected	   by	   some	   buyers’	   conduct.	   Excessive	  
pressure	  exerted	  on	  producers	  may	   indeed	   force	   them	   to	   reduce	   investments	   in	  new	  or	   improved	  
products	   while	   the	   choice	   offered	   to	   consumers	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   tailored	   to	   retailers’	   own	   interests	  
which	  may	   not	   be	   in	   line	  with	   those	   of	   consumers.	   Even	   though	   some	   practices	  may	   bring	   about	  
lower	  prices	  at	  the	  retail	  level,	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  buyers’	  conduct	  on	  competition	  can	  
therefore	  not	  be	  limited	  to	  looking	  at	  the	  impact	  of	  such	  conduct	  in	  terms	  of	  price	  but	  must	  include	  a	  
longer-­‐term	  and	  dynamic	  vision	  of	  competition.	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Despite	   their	   ability	   to	   limit	   competition,	   none	   of	   the	   largest	   retail	   chains	   in	   the	   European	   Union	  
meet	   the	   criteria	   of	   dominance.	   The	   protection	   of	   effective	   competition	   hence	   requires	   new	  
initiatives	  in	  EU	  competition	  law	  to	  tackle	  anticompetitive	  buyer	  practices.	  Action	  at	  EU	  level	  would	  
be	  all	   the	  more	   justified	   in	  that	  no	  effective	  action	  has	  been	  taken	  by	  national	  authorities	  and	  that	  
discrepancies	  in	  national	  laws	  are	  likely	  to	  create	  competition	  distortion	  and	  barriers	  to	  trade	  in	  the	  
Union.	   The	   objective	   would	   be	   to	   give	   independent	   authorities,	   namely	   national	   competition	  
authorities,	  the	  responsibility	  to	  supervise	  buyers’	  conduct.	  The	  possible	  intervention	  of	  independent	  
authorities	   would	   in	   fact	   remedy,	   to	   some	   extent,	   the	   actual	   climate	   of	   fear	   which	   dissuades	  
suppliers	   from	   denouncing	   some	   buyer	   practices.	   Furthermore,	   the	   severe	   sanctions	   that	  may	   be	  
applied	  on	  the	  top	  of	  competition	  law	  investigations	  would	  create	  a	  strong	  deterrent	  effect.	  	  
The	  action	  suggested	  in	  this	  thesis	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  Directive	  whose	  scope	  would	  be	  limited	  to	  the	  
grocery	   retail	   sector.	   The	   limitation	  of	   intervention	   to	   that	   sector	   is	   justified	  by	   the	   fact	   that	   large	  
supermarket	  chains	  are	  able	  to	  exert	  significant	  buyer	  power	  due	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  different	  factors	  
that	  are	   rarely	  encountered	  all	   together	   in	  other	   sectors.	   In	  addition,	  grocery	   retailers	  are	   strongly	  
incited	   to	   exploit	   their	   power	   because,	   in	   particular,	   of	   their	   triple	   role	   of	   commercial	   services	  
provider,	   customer	  and	  competitor	  of	  brands	  producers.	   It	  was	  also	  noted	   that	   the	  high	  degree	  of	  
concentration	  in	  the	  grocery	  sector,	  both	  in	  the	  up-­‐	  and	  downstream	  markets,	  raises	  the	  risk	  of	  hub-­‐
and-­‐spoke	   collusion.	   It	   is	   indeed	   easier	   to	   orchestrate	   and	   to	   succeed	   in	   implementing	   horizontal	  
arrangements,	  such	  as	  price	  realignments,	  through	  the	  intervention	  of	  a	  common	  trading	  partner	  in	  
those	  circumstances.	  
The	  suggested	  Directive	  would	  in	  fact	  introduce	  specific	  criteria	  to	  be	  used	  in	  buyer	  power	  cases	  with	  
regard	   to	   the	  definition	  of	   the	   relevant	  upstream	  buyer	  market	   and	   the	  assessment	  of	  dominance	  
and	   abusive	   conduct	   in	   that	   market.	   These	   criteria	   are	   in	   line	   with	   the	   analysis	   made	   by	   the	  
Commission	   in	   three	   merger	   cases,	   namely	   in	   Kesko/Tuko,	   Rewe/Meinl	   and	   Carrefour/Promodes,	  
where	   the	   dominant	   position	   of	   the	   merged	   entity	   was	   mainly	   based	   on	   the	   suppliers’	   state	   of	  
economic	   dependency.	   Under	   this	   new	   definition	   of	   dominance,	   more	   than	   one	   grocery	   retailer	  
could	  be	  regarded	  as	  dominant	   in	  the	  upstream	  buyer	  market,	  each	  of	  whom	  would	  have	  a	  special	  
responsibility	   not	   to	   hinder	   effective	   competition	   and	   not	   to	   incite	   other	   market	   participants	   to	  
engage	  in	  restrictive	  conduct.	  This	  specific	  approach	  defined	  to	  address	  buyer	  power	  should	  also	  be	  
considered	  in	  case	  of	  vertical	  agreements	  so	  as	  to	  prevent	  the	  exemption	  of	  arrangements	  between	  
large	   retailers	   and	   their	   suppliers	   on	   the	   grounds	   that	   the	   parties’	  market	   shares	   are	   below	   30%.	  
Retail	   chains	   with	   a	   market	   share	   below	   that	   threshold	   are	   indeed	   able	   to	   coerce	   suppliers	   into	  
participating	  in	  anticompetitive	  practices.	  Such	  pressure	  exerted	  on	  suppliers	  may	  also	  lead	  to	  a	  so-­‐
called	  A-­‐B-­‐C	  arrangement	  which	  could	  be	  assimilated	  to	  and	  sanctioned	  as	  an	  unlawful	   information	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exchange	  between	  competitors	  if	  the	  latter	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  role	  played	  by	  their	  common	  trading	  
partner.	  
The	  objective	  is	  to	  protect	  no	  more	  than	  effective	  competition	  in	  the	  European	  Union.	  Intervention	  in	  
the	  grocery	   retail	   sector	  must	  hence	  be	   strictly	  defined	  and	  subject	   to	   clear	   rules	   so	  as	   to	  prevent	  
excessive	   intrusion	   into	   buyer-­‐supplier	   relationships.	   The	   suggested	   new	   approach	   to	   address	  
supermarkets’	  practices	  takes	  account	  of	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  grocery	  retail	  sector	  where	  market	  power	  
is	   now	   in	   the	  hands	  of	   retail	   buyers.	  Given	   the	   large	  debate	   about	   the	  potential	   harmful	   effect	   of	  
supermarket	  chains’	  buyer	  power	  and	  the	  disparate	  initiatives	  taken	  by	  national	  authorities,	  this	  new	  
approach	   tries	   in	   fact	   to	   introduce	   some	  coherence	  within	   the	  Union	  and	  address	   the	  competition	  
concerns	  raised	  in	  this	  respect.	  	  	  
The	   specific	   approach	   suggested	   in	   this	   thesis	   is	   not	  meant	   to	   close	   down	   the	   debate	   on	   how	   to	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  11	  June	  1993	  
-­‐	  Knorr/Bremse/Allied	  Signal,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.337,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  15	  October	  1993	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-­‐	  Vesuvius/Wülfrath,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.472,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  5	  September	  1994	  
-­‐	  AAB/Daimler-­‐Benz,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.580,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  18	  October	  1995	  
-­‐	  Kvaerner/Trafalgar,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.731,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  15	  April	  1996	  
-­‐	  Kesko/Tuko,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.784,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  20	  November	  1996	  
-­‐	  Irish	  Sugar	  Plc,	  Case	  No	  IV/34.624,	  Commission	  decision	  of	  14	  May	  1997	  
-­‐	  Mannesmann/Vallourec,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.906,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  3	  June	  1997	  
-­‐	  The	  Coca-­‐Cola	  Company/Carlsberg	  A/S,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.833,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  11	  September	  
1997	  
-­‐	  Guinness/Grand	  Metropolitan,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.938,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  15	  October	  1997	  	  
-­‐	  Promodes/Casino,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.991,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  30	  October	  1997	  
-­‐	  FAG-­‐Flughafen	  Frankfurt/Main	  AG,	  Case	  IV/34.801,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  14	  January	  1998	  
-­‐	  VW,	  Case	  IV/35.733,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  28	  January	  1998	  
-­‐	  GEC	  Alsthom/Cegelec,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1164,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  15	  May	  1998	  
-­‐	  Bloemenveilingen	  Aalsmeer,	  Case	  IV/31.379,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  26	  July	  1998	  
-­‐	  Valeo/ITT	  Industries,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1245,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  30	  July	  1998	  
-­‐	  Elf/Texaco/Antifreze	  JV,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1135,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  18	  August	  1998	  
-­‐	  Trans-­‐Atlantic	  Conference	  Agreement	  (TACA),	  Case	  No	  IV/35.134,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  16	  
September	  1998	  
-­‐	  Pirelli/Siemens,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1271,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  30	  September	  1998	  
-­‐	  Enso/Stora,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1225,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  25	  November	  1998	  
-­‐	  Dupont/Hoechst/Herberts,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1363,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  5	  February	  1999	  
-­‐	  Rewe/Meinl,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1221,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  3	  February	  1999	  
-­‐	  Danish	  Crown/Vestyjyske	  Slagerier,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1313,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  9	  March	  1999	  
-­‐	  Thomson-­‐CSF/Racal	  Electronics,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1413,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  15	  March	  1999	  
-­‐	  Kuoni/First	  Choice,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1502,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  6	  May	  1999	  
-­‐	  Kingfisher/Asda,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1541,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  15	  June	  1999	  
-­‐	  CVC/Danone/Gerresheimer,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1539,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  5	  July	  1999	  
-­‐	  Rhodia	  Chemie/Albright	  &	  Wilson,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1517,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  13	  July	  1999	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-­‐	  Virgin/British	  Airways,	  Case	  IV/D-­‐2/34.780,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  14	  July	  1999	  
-­‐	  1998	  Football	  World	  Cup,	  Case	  IV/36.888,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  20	  July	  1999	  
-­‐	  Fenin/SNS+Spain,	  Case	  No	  IV.F.1./36.834,	  Commission	  decision	  of	  26	  August	  1999	  
-­‐	  Airtours/First	  Choice,	  Case	  IV/M.1524,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  22	  September	  1999	  
-­‐	  AlliedSignal/Honeywell,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.1601,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  1	  December	  1999	  
-­‐	  Telia/Telenor,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1439,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  13	  October	  1999	  
-­‐	  Carrefour/Promodes,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.1684,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  25	  January	  2000	  
-­‐	  Granaria/Ültje/Intersnack/May	  Holding,	  Case	  No	  COMP/JV.32,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  28	  February	  
2000	  
-­‐	  Saab/Celsius,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1797,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  4	  February	  2000	  
-­‐	  Sky	  B/Kirch	  Pay	  TV,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.0037,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  21	  March	  2000	  
-­‐	  MMS/DASA/Astrium,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1636,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  21	  March	  2000	  
-­‐	  Vodafone	  Airtouch/Mannesmann,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1795,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  12	  April	  2000	  
-­‐	  EADS,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1745,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  11	  May	  2000	  
-­‐	  BP	  Amoco/Castrol,	  Case	  NO	  IV/M.1891,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  18	  May	  2000	  
-­‐	  Pirelli/BICC,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.1882,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  19	  July	  2000	  
-­‐	  Preussag/Thomson,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.2002,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  26	  July	  2000	  
-­‐	  Flextronics/Italdata,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.2116,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  25	  September	  2000	  
-­‐	  Phillip	  morris/Nabisco,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.2072,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  16	  October	  2000	  
-­‐	  Soda	  ash-­‐Solvay,	  Case	  No	  COMP/33.133-­‐C,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  13	  December	  2000	  
-­‐	  Shell/Halliburton/Well	  Dynamics	  JV,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1976,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  15	  March	  2001	  
-­‐	  Bombardier/ADtranz,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.2139,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  3	  April	  2001	  
-­‐	  DSD,	  Case	  No	  COMP/34493,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  20	  April	  2001	  
-­‐	  Michelin,	  Case	  No	  COMP/E-­‐2/36.041/PO,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  20	  June	  2001	  
-­‐	  General	  Electric/Honeywell,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.2220,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  3	  July	  2001	  
-­‐	  Deutsche	  Post	  AG	  –	  Interception	  of	  cross-­‐border	  mail,	  COMP/C-­‐1/36.915,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  25	  
July	  2001	  
-­‐	  C&N/Thomas	  Cook,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.2228,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  26	  July	  2001	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-­‐	  Friesland	  Coberco/Nutricia,	  Case	  No	  cOMP/M.2399,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  8	  August	  2001	  
-­‐	  Tyco/CR	  Bard,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.2505,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  4	  October	  2001	  
-­‐	  Philips/Marconi	  Medical	  Systems,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.2537,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  17	  October	  2001	  
-­‐	  INA/FAG,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.2608,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  18	  October	  2001	  
-­‐	  Usinor/Arbed/Aceralia,	  Case	  No	  COMP/ECSC.1351,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  21	  November	  2001	  
-­‐	  UPM-­‐Kymmene/Haindl,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.2498,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  21	  November	  2001	  
-­‐	  SCA	  Hygiene	  Prodcuts/Cartoinvest,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.2522,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  21	  March	  2002	  
-­‐	  K+S/Solvay/JV,	  Case	  No	  COMP/2176,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  10	  January	  2002	  
-­‐	  Solvay/Montedison-­‐Ausimont,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.2960,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  9	  April	  2002	  
-­‐	  HDW/Ferrostaal/Hellenic	  Shipyard,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.2772,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  25	  April	  2002	  
-­‐	  Carnival	  Corporation/P&O	  Princess,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.2706,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  24	  July	  2002	  
-­‐	  Magna/Donnelly,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.2901,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  16	  September	  2002	  
-­‐	  JCI/Bosch/VB	  Autobatterien	  JV,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.2939,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  18	  October	  2002	  
-­‐	  Alcon/Flexpack,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3049,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  24	  February	  2003	  
-­‐	  French	  beef,	  Case	  COMP/C.38.279/F3,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  2	  April	  2003	  
-­‐	  Arla	  Foods/Express	  Dairies,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3130,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  10	  June	  2003	  
-­‐	  Wanadoo	  Interactive,	  Case	  No	  COMP/38.233,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  16	  July	  2003	  
-­‐	  Procter	  &	  Gamble/Wella,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3149,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  30	  July	  2003	  
-­‐	  GE/Instrumentarium,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.3083,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  2	  September	  2003	  
-­‐	  SNPE/Saab/Patria/JV	  (Eurenco),	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.3205,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  2	  October	  2003	  
-­‐	  Paperlinx/Buhrmann	  paper	  merchanting	  division,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3227,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  10	  
October	  2003	  
-­‐	  GE/Amersham,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.3304,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  21	  January	  2004	  
-­‐	  Toshiba/Samsung/JV,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3349,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  2	  March	  2004	  
-­‐	  Microsoft,	  Case	  COMP/C-­‐3/37792,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  24	  March	  2004	  
-­‐	  Fox	  Paine/Advanta,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3506,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  20	  August	  2004	  
-­‐	  Magna/New	  Venture	  Gear,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.3486,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  24	  September	  2004	  
-­‐	  Arvin	  Meritor/Volvo	  (Assets),	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3351,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  1	  October	  2004	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-­‐	  Spanish	  Raw	  Tobacco,	  Case	  No	  COMP/C.38.328/B.2,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  20	  October	  2004	  
-­‐	  CVC/Ani	  Printing	  Inks,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3564,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  28	  October	  2004	  
-­‐	  Continental/Phoenix,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.3436,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  26	  October	  2004	  
-­‐	  Sovion/HMG,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3605,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  21	  December	  2004	  	  
-­‐	  Henkel/Sovereign,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3612,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  22	  December	  2004	  
-­‐	  Orkla/Chips,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3658,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  3	  March	  2005	  
-­‐	  Alcatel/Finmeccanica/Alcatel	  Alenia	  Space	  &	  Telespazio,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.3680,	  Commission	  
Decision	  of	  28	  April	  2005	  
-­‐	  	  Apax/Mölnlycke,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.3816,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  15	  June	  2005	  
-­‐	  Johnson	  Controls/Robert	  Bosch/Delphi	  SLI,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.3789,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  29	  June	  
2005	  
-­‐	  Procter	  &	  Gamble/Gillette,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3732,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  15	  July	  2005	  
-­‐	  Aster	  2/Flint	  Ink,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3886,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  25	  August	  2005	  
-­‐TRW	  Automotive/Dalphi	  Metal	  Espac,	  Case	  COMP/M.3972,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  12	  October	  
2005	  
-­‐	  Amer/Salomon,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3765,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  12	  October	  2005	  
-­‐	  Italian	  Raw	  Tobacco,	  Case	  No	  COMP/38.281/B.2,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  20	  October	  2005	  
-­‐	  Sovion/S	  Fleisch,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.3968,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  21	  December	  2005-­‐5	  
Seagate/Maxtor,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.1400,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  27	  April	  2006	  
-­‐	  Korsnäs/AssiDomän	  Cartonboard,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.4057,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  12	  May	  2006	  
-­‐	  Apollo/Akzo	  Nobel	  IAR,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.4071,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  29	  May	  2006.	  
-­‐	  Saab/EMW,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.4288,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  31	  August	  2006	  
-­‐	  PKN/Mazeikiu,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.4348,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  7	  November	  2006	  
-­‐	  Metso/Aker	  Kvaerner,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.4187,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  12	  December	  2006	  
-­‐	  KKR/Permira/Prosiebensat.1,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.4547,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  22	  February	  2007	  
	  -­‐	  Karstadtquelle/Mytravel,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.4601,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  4	  May	  2007	  
-­‐	  Nestlé/Gerber,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.4688,	  Commission	  decision	  of	  27	  July	  2007	  
-­‐	  SCA/P&G,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.4533,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  5	  September	  2007	  
-­‐	  Sony/BMG,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.3333,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  3	  October	  2007	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-­‐	  Norddeutsche	  Affinerie/Cumerio,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.4781,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  23	  January	  2008	  
-­‐	  Henkel/Adhesives	  &	  Electronic	  Business,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.4941,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  15	  
February	  2008	  	  	  
-­‐	  Rexe/Hagemeyer,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.4963,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  22	  February	  2008	  
-­‐	  EATON/Moeller,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5050,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  1	  April	  2008	  
-­‐	  Rewe/Adeg,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5047,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  23	  June	  2008	  
-­‐	  BAT/Skandinavisk	  Tobakskompagni,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5086,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  27	  June	  2008.	  
-­‐	  Rexel/Hagemeyer,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.4963,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  22	  February	  2008	  
-­‐	  Valeo/Labinal,	  Case	  No	  IV/M.2036,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  4	  August	  2008	  
-­‐	  Manitowoc/Enodis,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5280,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  19	  September	  2008	  
-­‐	  Friesland	  Foods/Campina,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5046,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  17	  December	  2008	  
-­‐	  Mauser	  Holding	  International/Reyde/JV,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5394,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  21	  
January	  2009	  
-­‐	  BASF/CIBA,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5355,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  12	  March	  2009	  
-­‐	  Intel,	  Case	  COMP/C-­‐3/37.990,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  13	  March	  2009	  
-­‐	  Toshiba/Fujitsu	  HDD	  Business,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5483,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  11	  May	  2009	  
-­‐	  SGL	  Carbon/Brembo/BCBS/JV,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5484,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  27	  May	  2009	  
-­‐	  SHV/ERIKS,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5563,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  31	  July	  2009	  
-­‐	  Kraft	  Foods/Cadbury,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5644,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  6	  January	  2010	  
-­‐	  Akzonobel/Rhom	  and	  Hass	  Powder	  Coating	  Business,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5745,	  Commission	  Decision	  
of	  22	  April	  2010.	  
-­‐	  Procter	  &	  Gamble/Sara	  Lee	  Air	  Care,	  Care	  No	  COMP/M.5828,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  17	  June	  2010	  
-­‐	  Foxconn/Sony	  LCB	  TV	  Manufacturing	  Company	  in	  Slovakia,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5870,	  Commission	  
Decision	  of	  25	  June	  2010	  
-­‐	  Schlumberger/Smith	  International,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5839,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  26	  July	  2010	  
-­‐	  Vion/Weyl,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5935,	  Commission	  Decision,	  of	  28	  August	  2010	  
-­‐	  Foxconn/Dell	  (Products)	  Poland,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5765,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  28	  September	  
2010	  
-­‐	  EADS	  DS/Atlas/JV,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5936,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  28	  October	  2010	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-­‐	  Ardagh/Impress,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.6025,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  29	  November	  2010	  
-­‐	  Renco	  group/Body	  Systems,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5785,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  2	  December	  2010	  
-­‐	  Sun	  capital/DSM	  Special	  Products,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.5785,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  2	  December	  
2010	  
-­‐	  Safran/SNPE	  Matériaux	  énergétiques/Regulus,	  Case	  No	  COMP/¨.6104,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  30	  
March	  2011	  
-­‐	  GKN/Gegrag	  Corporation/Getrag	  All	  Wheel	  Drive,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.6320,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  
28	  September	  2011	  
-­‐	  Sony/Mubadala	  Development/EMI	  Music	  Publishing,	  Case	  No	  OMP/M.6459,	  Commission	  Decision	  
of	  19	  April	  2012	  
-­‐	  Freudenberg	  &	  Co/Trelleborg/JV,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.6339,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  14	  May	  2012	  
-­‐	  Robert	  Bosch/SPX’	  Service	  Solutions	  Business,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.6538,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  26	  
June	  2012	  
-­‐	  SCA/Georgia-­‐Pacific	  Europe,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.6455,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  5	  July	  2012	  
-­‐	  Faurecia/Plastal,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.6537,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  23	  July	  2012	  
-­‐	  Arla	  Foods/Milk	  Link,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.6611,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  27	  September	  2012	  
-­‐	  Precision	  Castparts/Titanium	  Metals,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.6765,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  19	  December	  
2012	  
-­‐	  U-­‐Shin/Valeo	  Cam,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.6714,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  6	  February	  2013	  
-­‐	  Hig	  Capital/Petrochem	  Carless	  Holdings,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.6782,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  26	  March	  
2013	  
-­‐	  FrieslandCampina/Zijerveld	  &	  Veldhuyzen	  and	  Den	  Hollander,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.6772,	  Commission	  
Decision	  of	  12	  April	  2013	  
-­‐	  Liberty	  Global/Virgin	  Media,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.6880,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  15	  April	  2013	  
-­‐	  Sumitomo	  Electric	  Industries/Anvis	  Group,	  Case	  No	  COMP/M.6876,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  24	  May	  
2013	  
ADVOCATE	  GENERAL	  OPINIONS	  
-­‐	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Jacobs,	  delivered	  on	  28th	  May	  1998,	  Case	  7/97,	  Oscar	  Bronner	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐7791	  
-­‐	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Poiares	  Maduro	  delivered	  on	  10	  November	  2005,	  C-­‐205/03P,	  Fenin	  v	  Commission	  
[2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐6295	  
-­‐	  Opinion	  Advocate	  General	  Kokott,	  delivered	  on	  23	  February	  2006,	  C-­‐95/04P,	  British	  Airways	  plc	  v	  
Commission	  [2007]	  ECR	  I-­‐2331	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NATIONAL	  LAWS,	  CASE	  LAW,	  DECISIONS	  
UNITED	  KINGDOM	  -­‐	  IRELAND	  
Legislation	  
-­‐	  Competition	  Act	  1998	  (CA98)	  
-­‐	  Enterprise	  Act	  2002	  
-­‐	  Groceries	  Code	  Adjudicator	  Act	  2013	  
Case	  law	  –	  Decisions	  
-­‐	  Competition	  Appeal	  Tribunal,	  BetterCare	  Group	  limited	  v	  DGFT,	  Case	  No	  1006/2/1/01,	  1st	  August	  
2002	  
-­‐	  OFT	  Decision,	  The	  Association	  of	  British	  Agents	  and	  British	  Airways	  plc,	  Case	  No	  CA98/19/2002,	  11	  
December	  2002	  
-­‐	  Irish	  Competition	  Authority	  Decision,	  Reduction	  In	  Travel	  Agent	  Commissions	  By	  Aer	  Lingus	  plc.,	  
Case	  COM/15/02,	  10	  June	  2003	  
-­‐	  OFT	  Decision,	  BetterCare	  Group	  Ltd/North	  &	  West	  Belfast	  Health	  &	  Social	  Services	  Trust,	  Case	  No	  
CA98/09/2003,	  18	  December	  2003.	  
-­‐	  OFT	  Decision,	  Price-­‐Fixing	  of	  Replica	  Football	  Kit,	  Case	  No	  CP/0817/01,	  1	  August	  2003	  
-­‐	  OFT	  Decision,	  Agreements	  between	  Hasbro	  UK	  Ltd,	  Argos	  Ltd	  and	  Littlewood	  Ltd	  Fixing	  the	  Price	  of	  
Hasbro	  Toys	  and	  Games,	  Case	  No	  CP/0480/01,	  21	  November	  2003	  
-­‐	  Competition	  Appeal	  Tribunal,	  JJB	  Sports	  Plc	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading;	  Allsports	  Limited	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  
Trading,	  Case	  1021/1/1/03	  and	  1022/1/1/03	  [2004]	  CAT	  17	  	  
-­‐	  Competition	  Appeal	  Tribunal,	  Argos	  Limited	  &	  Littlewoods	  Limited	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading,	  Cases	  
1014/1/1/03	  and	  1015/1/1/03	  [2004]	  CAT	  24	  
-­‐	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	  Argos	  Limited	  and	  Limited	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  and	  FFB	  Sport	  Plc	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  
Trading,	  ,	  Case	  Nos	  2005/1071,	  1074	  and	  1623	  [2006]	  EWCA	  Civ	  1318	  
-­‐	  OFT	  Decision,	  Dairy	  retail	  price	  initiatives,	  Case	  No	  CA/98/03/2011,	  26	  July	  2011	  	  
-­‐	  Competition	  Appeal	  Tribunal,	  Tesco	  Stores	  Ltd	  Tesco	  Holdings	  Ltd	  Tesco	  Plc	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading,	  




-­‐	  Code	  de	  Commerce,	  livre	  IV.	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-­‐	  Loi	  de	  finances	  n°63-­‐628	  du	  2	  juillet	  1963	  
-­‐	  Loi	  n°	  73-­‐1193	  du	  27	  décembre	  1973	  d'orientation	  du	  commerce	  et	  de	  l'artisanat	  
-­‐	  Ordonnance	  n°86-­‐1243	  du	  1er	  décembre	  1986,	  Article	  8.	  
-­‐	  Loi	  n°96-­‐588,	  1er	  juillet	  1996,	  sur	  la	  loyauté	  et	  l’équilibre	  des	  relations	  commerciales,	  JORF	  3	  juillet,	  
p.9983	  (Loi	  Galland)	  
-­‐	  Loi	  n°	  96-­‐603	  du	  5	  juillet	  1996	  relative	  au	  développement	  et	  à	  la	  promotion	  du	  commerce	  et	  de	  
l'artisanat	  
-­‐	  Loi	  n°2005-­‐882,	  2	  août	  2005,	  en	  faveur	  des	  petites	  et	  moyennes	  entreprises,	  JO	  3	  août,	  p.12639	  (Loi	  
Dutreuil)	  
-­‐	  Loi	  n°2008-­‐3,	  3	  janvier	  2008,	  pour	  le	  développement	  de	  la	  concurrence	  au	  service	  des	  
consommateurs,	  JO	  4	  janvier	  
-­‐	  Loi	  n°2008-­‐776,	  4	  août	  2008,	  de	  modernisation	  de	  l’économie,	  JO	  5	  août,	  p.12471	  
-­‐	  Loi	  n°2010-­‐874	  du	  27	  juillet	  2010,	  de	  modernisation	  de	  l’agriculture	  et	  de	  la	  pêche	  
-­‐	  Décret	  n°2010-­‐1753	  du	  30	  décembre	  2010	  pris	  pour	  l’application	  de	  l’article	  L.631-­‐24	  du	  code	  rural	  
et	  de	  la	  pêche	  maritime	  dans	  le	  secteur	  laitier	  
-­‐	  	  Décret	  2012-­‐512	  du	  19	  avril	  2012	  relatif	  à	  l’organisation	  économique	  dans	  le	  secteur	  du	  lait	  de	  
vache	  
Case	  law	  –	  Decisions	  
-­‐	  Décision	  n°94-­‐D-­‐60	  du	  13	  décembre	  94	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  relevées	  dans	  le	  secteur	  des	  lessives	  
-­‐	  Décision	  n°99-­‐D-­‐01	  du	  5	  janvier	  1999	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  par	  la	  société	  Distri	  
club	  médical.	  	  
-­‐	  Décision	  n°01-­‐D-­‐49	  du	  31	  août	  2001	  relative	  à	  une	  saisine	  et	  à	  une	  demande	  de	  mesures	  
conservatoires	  présentées	  par	  la	  société	  Concurrence	  concernant	  la	  société	  Sony	  
-­‐	  Décision	  n°02-­‐D-­‐77	  du	  27	  décembre	  2002	  relative	  à	  une	  saisine	  de	  la	  Société	  anonyme	  Daniel	  
Grenin	  à	  l’encontre	  des	  sociétés	  Imphy	  Ugine	  Précision,	  Sprint-­‐Métal	  et	  Usinor	  Achats	  
-­‐	  Décision	  n°03-­‐D-­‐11	  du	  21	  février	  2003	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  par	  la	  centrale	  de	  
référencement	  Opéra.	  
-­‐	  Décision	  n°03-­‐D-­‐45	  du	  25	  septembre	  2003	  relative	  aux	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  dans	  le	  secteur	  
des	  calculatrices	  à	  usage	  scolaire	  	  
-­‐	  Décision	  n°04-­‐D-­‐36	  du	  23	  juillet	  2004	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  dans	  le	  secteur	  du	  
transport	  de	  petits	  colis	  
-­‐	  Décision	  n°04-­‐D-­‐44	  du	  15	  septembre	  2004	  relative	  à	  une	  saisine	  présentée	  par	  le	  Ciné-­‐Théâtre	  du	  
Lamentin	  dans	  le	  secteur	  de	  la	  distribution	  et	  de	  l’exploitation	  de	  films	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-­‐	  Décision	  n°05-­‐D-­‐44	  du	  21	  juillet	  2005	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  par	  le	  groupe	  La	  
Provence	  dans	  le	  secteur	  de	  la	  publicité	  dans	  la	  presse	  quotidienne	  régionale	  à	  Marseille	  	  
-­‐	  Décision	  n°05-­‐D-­‐45	  du	  19	  décembre	  2005	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  dans	  le	  secteur	  
des	  vidéocassettes	  préenregistrées	  	  
-­‐	  Décision	  n°06-­‐D-­‐03	  du	  9	  mars	  2006	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  dans	  le	  secteur	  des	  
appareils	  de	  chauffage,	  sanitaires,	  plomberie,	  climatisation	  
-­‐	  Décision	  n°06-­‐D-­‐10	  du	  12	  mai	  2006	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  par	  la	  société	  Bouygues	  
Télécom	  contre	  le	  grossiste	  Stock-­‐Com	  	  
-­‐	  Décision	  n°07-­‐D-­‐18	  du	  16	  mai	  2007	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  sur	  le	  secteur	  du	  cidre	  
et	  des	  pommes	  à	  cidre.	  
-­‐	  Décision	  n°07-­‐D-­‐44	  du	  11	  décembre	  2007	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  par	  le	  GIE	  Ciné	  
Alpes.	  
-­‐	  Décision	  n°07-­‐D-­‐50	  du	  20	  décembre	  2007	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  dans	  le	  secteur	  
de	  la	  distribution	  des	  jouets	  
-­‐	  Décision	  n°09-­‐D-­‐21	  du	  23	  juin	  2009	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  par	  la	  société	  RTE	  sur	  le	  
marché	  de	  travaux	  de	  lignes	  aérienne	  haute	  tension	  
-­‐	  Décision	  n°10-­‐D-­‐08	  du	  3	  mars	  2010	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  par	  Carrefour	  dans	  le	  
secteur	  du	  commerce	  d’alimentation	  générale	  de	  proximité	  	  
-­‐	  Décision	  n°11-­‐D-­‐04	  du	  23	  février	  2011	  relative	  à	  des	  pratiques	  mises	  en	  œuvre	  par	  Carrefour	  dans	  le	  




-­‐	  Sherman	  Act	  of	  1890,	  15	  U.S.C.	  §§	  1-­‐7	  
-­‐	  Clayton	  Act	  of	  1914,	  15	  U.S.C.	  §§	  12-­‐27	  
-­‐	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act	  of	  1936,	  15	  U.S.C.	  §	  13	  
-­‐	  Capper-­‐Volstead	  Act	  of	  1922,	  7	  U.S.C.	  §	  291	  
-­‐	  Packers	  and	  Stockyards	  Act	  of	  1921,	  7	  U.S.C.	  §§	  191-­‐229	  
Case	  law	  –	  Decisions	  
-­‐	  Swift	  &	  Co.	  v	  .United	  States,	  196	  U.S.	  375	  (1905)	  
-­‐	  United	  States	  v.	  Socony-­‐Vacuum	  Oil	  Co.,	  Inc.,	  310	  U.S.	  150	  (1940)	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-­‐	  Fashion	  Originators’	  Guild	  v.	  FTC,	  312	  U.S.	  457	  (1941)	  
-­‐	  United	  States	  v.	  Crescent	  Amusement	  Co.,	  323	  U.S.	  173	  (1944)	  
-­‐	  Samuel	  H.	  Moss,	  Inc.,	  v.	  FTC,	  148	  F.2d	  378	  (2d	  Cir.),	  cert.	  denied,	  326	  U.S.	  736	  (1945)	  
-­‐	  Unites	  States	  v.	  Aluminum	  Co.	  of	  America,	  148	  F.2d	  	  416	  (2nd	  Cir.	  1945)	  
-­‐	  American	  Tobacco	  Co.	  v	  United	  States,	  328	  U.S.	  781	  (1946).	  
-­‐	  United	  States	  v.	  Griffith,	  334	  U.S.	  100	  (1948)	  
-­‐	  FTC	  v.	  Morton	  Salt	  Co.,	  334	  U.S.	  37	  (1948)	  
-­‐	  FTC	  v.	  Cement	  Institute,	  333	  U.S.	  383	  (1948)	  
-­‐	  Mandeville	  Island	  Farms	  v.	  American	  Crystal	  Sugar	  Co.,	  334	  U.S.	  219	  (1948)	  
-­‐	  Automatic	  Canteen	  Co.	  of	  America	  v.	  FTC,	  346	  U.	  S.	  61	  (1953)	  
-­‐	  FTC	  v.	  Motion	  Picture	  Advertising	  Svc.	  Co.,	  Inc.,	  344	  U.S.	  392	  (1953)	  
-­‐	  U.S.	  v.	  E.I.	  du	  Pont	  de	  Nemours	  &	  Co.,	  351	  U.S.	  377	  (1956).	  
-­‐	  Nashville	  Milk	  Co.	  v.	  Carnation	  Company,	  355	  U.S.	  373	  (1958).	  
-­‐	  Northern	  Pacific	  Railway	  Co.	  v.	  Unites	  States,	  356	  U.S.	  1	  (1958)	  
-­‐	  Klor’s	  v.	  Broadway-­‐Hale	  Stores,	  359	  U.S.	  207	  (1959)	  
-­‐	  FTC	  v.	  Anheuser-­‐Busch,	  Inc.,	  363	  U.S.	  536	  (1960)	  
-­‐	  Plymouth	  dealers’	  Ass’	  n	  	  v.	  United	  States,	  279	  F.2d	  128	  (9th	  Cir.	  1960)	  
-­‐	  Giant	  Foods	  Inc.,	  v.	  FTC,	  907	  F.	  2d	  184	  (D.C.Cir.	  1962)	  
-­‐	  Grand	  Union	  Co.	  v.	  FTC,	  3000	  F.	  2d	  92	  (2d	  Cir.	  1962)	  
-­‐	  Brown	  Shoe	  Co.,	  Inc.	  v.	  United	  States,	  370	  U.S.	  294	  (1962)	  
-­‐	  United	  States	  v.	  Aluminum	  Co.	  of	  America,	  377	  U.S.	  271	  (1964)	  
-­‐	  National	  Macaroni	  Manufacturers	  Association	  v.	  F.T.C.,	  345	  F.2d	  421	  (1965)	  
-­‐	  FTC	  v.	  Brown	  Shoe	  Co.,	  348	  U.S.	  316	  (1966)	  
-­‐	  Utah	  Pie	  Co.	  v.	  Continental	  Baking	  Co.,	  386	  U.S.	  685	  (1967)	  
-­‐	  Kroger	  Co.	  v.	  FTC,	  438	  F.	  2d	  1372	  (6th	  cir.)	  404,	  U.S.	  871	  (1971).	  
-­‐	  Baking	  Corp.	  v.	  Old	  Homestead	  Bread	  Co.,	  476	  F.2d	  97	  (10th	  Cir.)	  (1973).	  
-­‐	  Pac.	  Trading	  Co.	  v.	  Wilson	  &	  Co.,	  547	  F.2d	  367	  (7th	  Cir.	  1976).	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-­‐	  Oreck	  Corporation	  v.	  Whirlpool	  Corporation,	  563	  F.	  69	  (1979).	  
-­‐	  Great	  Atlantic	  &	  Pacific	  Tea	  Co.,	  Inc.	  v	  FTC,	  440	  U.Sd	  54	  (2nd	  Circ.	  1977).	  	  
-­‐	  Broadcast	  Music,	  Inc.,	  v.	  Columbia	  Broadcasting	  System,	  Inc.,	  441	  U.S.	  1	  (1979)	  
-­‐	  DeJong	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  Co.	  v.	  United	  States	  Dep’t	  of	  Agric.,	  618	  F.2d	  1329	  (9th	  Cir.	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-­‐	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  City	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  V.	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  460	  U.S.	  428	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-­‐	  Reid	  Brothers	  Logging	  Company	  v.	  Ketchikan	  Pulp	  Company,	  699	  F.2d	  1292	  (9th	  Cir.	  1983)	  
-­‐	  Kartell	  v.	  Blue	  Shield	  of	  Massachusetts,	  Inc.,	  749	  F.2d	  922	  (5th	  Cir.	  1984)	  
-­‐	  NCAA	  v.	  Board	  of	  Regents,	  468	  U.S.	  85	  (1984)	  
-­‐	  Harold	  Vogel	  v.	  American	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  of	  Appraisers,	  744	  F.2d	  598	  (7th	  Cir.	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-­‐	  Gerace	  v.	  Utica	  Veal	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  Inc.,	  580	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  1465	  (N.D.N.Y.	  1984)	  
-­‐	  Motive	  Parts	  Warehouse	  v.	  Facet	  Enters,	  774	  F.2d	  380	  (10th	  Cir.	  1985).	  
-­‐	  Farrow	  v.	  United	  States	  Dep’t	  of	  Agric.,	  760	  F.2d	  211	  (8th	  Cir.	  1985)	  
-­‐	  Boise	  Cascade	  Corp.	  v.	  FTC,	  837	  F.2d	  1127	  (D.C.Cir.	  1988)	  
-­‐	  Business	  Electronics	  Corp.	  v.	  Sharp	  Electronics	  Corp.,	  458	  U.S.	  717	  (1988)	  
-­‐	  Balmoral	  Cinema,	  Inc.,	  v.	  Allied	  Artists	  Pictures	  Corp.,	  855	  F.2d	  3313	  (6th	  Cir.	  1989)	  
-­‐	  Westchester	  Radiological	  Associates	  P.C.	  v.	  Empire	  Blue	  Cross	  and	  Blue	  Shield,	  884	  F.2d	  707	  (2nd	  Cir.	  
1989)	  
-­‐	  Texaco	  Inc.	  v.	  Hasbrouck,	  496	  U.S.	  543	  (1990).	  
-­‐	  Reazin	  v.	  Blue	  Cross	  and	  Blue	  Shield	  of	  Kansas,	  Inc.,	  899	  F.2d	  951	  (10th	  Cir.	  1990)	  
-­‐	  Brooke	  Group	  Ltd.	  V.	  Brown	  &	  Williamson	  Tobacco	  Corp.,	  509	  U.S.	  209	  (1993).	  
-­‐	  Kamine/Besicorp	  Allegany	  v.	  Rochester	  Gas	  &	  Elec.,	  908	  F.Supp.	  1194	  (W.D.N.Y.	  1995)	  
-­‐	  Nynex	  Corp.	  v.	  Discon,	  Inc.,	  525	  U.S.	  128	  (1998)	  
-­‐	  Law	  v.	  NCAA,	  134	  F.3d	  1010	  (10th	  Cir.	  1998)	  
-­‐	  Philson	  v.	  Goldsboro	  Milling	  Co.,	  Nos.,	  164	  F.3d	  625	  (4th	  Cir.	  1998)	  
-­‐	  Addamax	  Corporation	  v.	  Open	  Software	  Foundation,	  Inc.,	  888	  F.Supp.	  274	  (D.Mass.	  1995)	  
-­‐	  JBP,	  Inc.	  v.	  Glickman,	  187	  F.3d	  974	  (8th	  Cir.	  1999)	  
-­‐	  Knevelbaard	  Dairies	  v.	  Kraft	  Foods,	  Inc.,	  232	  F.3d	  979	  (9th	  Circ.	  2000)	  
-­‐	  Intimate	  Bookshop	  Inc.	  v	  Barnes	  and	  Noble,	  Inc.,	  88	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  133	  (S.D.N.Y.	  2000).	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-­‐	  Toys	  “R”	  Us,	  Inc.	  v.	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission,	  221	  F.3d	  928,	  (7th	  Cir.2000)	  
-­‐	  Todd	  v.	  Exxon	  Corporation,	  275	  F.3d	  191	  (2nd	  Cir.	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  Communications,	  Inc.	  v.	  Southwestern	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  Tel.	  Co.,	  305	  F.3d	  1124	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  v.	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  Co.,	  290	  F.3d	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  F.Supp.2d	  1090	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